Category: Politics

 

While casting Democrats as wanting to impose big government, Republicans profess a love for small government and local control. However, as J.S. Mill noted, people rarely follow consistently applied principles about what the state should do. It is not surprising that Republicans are for local control, unless the locals are not doing what they want. Then they use the power of the state against local government. For example, laws that forbid local governments from passing laws to restrict fracking.

Even in oil industry friendly states such as Oklahoma, local governments have tried to impose restrictions on fracking. As might be imagined, having a fracking operation next door is disruptive because of the lights, noise, heavy truck traffic and contamination. In Oklahoma there is also the added concern of earthquakes linked to disposal wells. Since places that did not have earthquakes before fracking do not have earthquake resistant structures, these new quakes pose threats to property and public safety.

In general, local governments acted because the locals believed that state government was not doing enough to protect their well-being. State legislatures tend to be very friendly with the oil and gas industry. This makes sense, because of their economic importance in these states. While lobbying is not cheap, it is a small price to pay to ensure that state legislatures pass laws forbidding local governments from acting contrary to the interests of the oil and gas industry. Otherwise, the industry would need to influence (or purchase) all the local governments and this would be both costly and time consuming. It makes more sense to pay the state government to make the local governments comply to the will of the industry.

Since I favor individual autonomy, it is hardly surprising that I also favor local autonomy. As such, I see such laws as wrong.

The most obvious type of arguments to use against such laws are all the general arguments Republicans advance in favor of local control when the locals are doing what Republicans want them to do. After all, if these arguments show local control is good and desirable, then these arguments should apply to this situation as well. But, as noted above, the “principle” most people follow is that others should do what they want and not do what they do not want them to do. Consistency is rare and almost nonexistent in politics.

One argument in favor of having the state impose on the local governments is based on the fact that having a patchwork of laws can be cause problems. The flip side of this is, obviously, that having a consistent set of laws across the state (and presumably the entire country) is generally a good thing. Assuming that the laws are good, of course.

In the case of regulating the oil and gas industry, the argument rests on the claim that having all these different local laws would be confusing and costly. It is better to have laws for the industry that cover the entire state (and, to follow the logic, the entire country or world). Interestingly, in the Before Time when the EPA advanced a similar argument for regulating water, Republicans rushed to attack because of their inconsistent love for local rule. Once again, this is hardly a shock: the patchwork argument is not applied consistently, just when a party wants to prevent local control.

Applied consistently, the patchwork argument has its appeal. After all, it is true that having laws vary with each locality can be confusing and have some negative consequences. For example, if the color of traffic lights was set by localities and some decided to go with different colors, then there would be problems. As another example, if some local governments refused to recognize same sex-marriage when it is legal in the state, this could lead to various legal problems (such as inheritance issues or hospital visitation rights). As such, there are be good reasons to have a unified set of laws rather than a patchwork.

That said, it can be argued that the difficulties of the patchwork can be outweighed by other factors and one can always apply a utilitarian argument. If it can be shown that allowing local autonomy on a matter creates more good than the harm created by having a patchwork of laws, then that would be an argument in favor of local autonomy in that matter. In the case of local control of the gas and oil industry, this would be a matter of weighing the harm and the benefit to all those involved (and not just the oil and gas industry). I am inclined to think that allowing local control would create more good than harm, but I could be wrong. Perhaps the benefits to the state as a whole outweigh the damage done locally. That is, the few must sacrifice for the many (albeit against their will). But perhaps the many are suffering for the few stockholders, which would seem to be wrong.

Another moral argument can be built on property rights. In the case of fracking, the oil and gas companies do own the mineral rights. As such, they do have legal property rights to the resources. However, the people who own the property above the minerals also have rights. These presumably include a right to safety from environmental contamination, a right to not have their property values degraded, a right to a certain quality of life in regard to noise and light, and so on for other rights. The moral challenge is, obviously enough, balancing these rights against each other. Working this out is, in the practical sense, a matter of politics. But this often means that money makes right.

Since local governments tend to be more responsive to locals than the state government, it could be argued that they would be biased against the oil and gas industry and hence this matter should be settled by the state to avoid an unfair resolution. However, it can be argued that state governments are often influenced (or owned) by the oil and gas industry. This would seem to point towards the need for federal regulation of the matter (assuming that the federal government is more objective) which is something that Republicans tend to oppose, despite it being the logical conclusion of their argument against local control. Interesting, arguments advanced to claim that the federal government should not impose on the local control of the states would seem to apply to the local government. That is, if the federal government should not be imposing on the states, then the states should not be imposing on the local governments. But it must also be noted that the Republicans favor federal imposition on the states, if they like what is being inflicted on the states.

On May 3, 2015 the American Freedom Defense Initiative put on a contest in which cartoonists drew images of Muhammad for a cash prize. To most Muslims, such portrayals of Muhammad are deeply offensive. As such, it is reasonable to infer that the event was intended to be provocative, especially since the event was well protected with armed security forces. As such, it was hardly shocking when two gunmen attacked the event. These armored and heavily armed men were killed by a traffic officer armed only with a pistol. At the time, ISIS claimed credit for the attack.

As I have argued in previous essays, violence in response to offensive artwork or other forms of expression is not warranted. As such, there is no need to re-hash those arguments to argue the attack was morally wrong. Outside of the realm of violent extremists, I doubt there is much dispute over this point. As such, I will proceed to the main matter I wish to focus on.

Back in 2015, Indiana made headlines with its religious freedom act. There is also the recurring talking point that religious liberty and religion are under attack in America. One example given of the threat to religious liberty was the requirement that employers of a certain size provide insurance coverage that covered birth control for full-time employees. Another example over used is the legalization of same sex-marriage. A third example is that some states have laws that forbid discrimination against people because of their sexual orientation. This is supposed to violate religious liberty by forbidding, for example, a Christian baker to discriminate against a same-sex couple that wants to buy a wedding cake.

Though I have written about specific cases, my general view is based on the principle that religious rights do not grant a right to violate the rights of others. To use an easy and obvious example, a religion that claimed human sacrifice as a basic tenet of its faith should be denied the right to engage in this practice. After all, the right to life trumps the right to practice one’s faith on others against their will.

In the case of discrimination against same-sex couples, I follow the same principle: the freedom of religion is bounded by the principle of harm. Since same-sex couples are members of the civil society and being able to engage in free commerce is a basic right in capitalism, to deny them the right to goods and services because of their sexual orientation would harm them. While it might be countered that selling a cake to a same-sex couple would harm the Christian baker, it is not clear what harm is being done. After all, she is selling a cake and selling an item is not an endorsement of the purchaser. If, for example, Nazis are buying my books on Amazon, I am not thereby endorsing Nazism.

In the case of a company being required to provide coverage that includes birth control, the company is not harmed by this. The company is not required to use birth control, directly hand it to the employees, or endorse it. They are merely required to provide employees with the opportunity to have such coverage if they desire it. It is, in fact, a form of compensation. It certainly does not violate the rights of an employer if employers spend their salaries as they wish, even on birth control.

While the laws purported to defend religious freedom do not, for obvious reasons, specify that they are aimed at defending a specific variety of Christianity, it is evident that the concern is not about defending religion in general. If it were, the event in which people competed to draw cartoons of Muhammad would have been condemned by all the folks supporting the religious “freedom” laws and those who claim religion is under attack in America. After all, holding an event explicitly aimed at mocking a religion and provoking members of a faith is an attack on religion. This event was far more of an attack on religion than forbidding bakers from discriminating against same-sex couples.

While I think people should not engage in such offensive behavior (I also believe that people should not burn American flags or urinate on crosses), my consistency requires that I must accept the freedom of people to engage in such offensive behavior.

This is, as with the case of the wedding cake, based on the principle of harm: restricting freedom of expression because the expression is offensive creates more harm than it prevents. Part of this is because while there is a right to freedom of expression and it can be wrong to offend people, there is no right to freedom from being offended. That said, members of civil society do fall under moral expectations of polite behavior. So, while there is no right to forbid people from urinating on crosses they own, burning American flags they own or drawing cartoons of Muhammad, a decent human being will consider their actions and act with respect for the views of others. That is what good people do. I admit, I have not always lived up to that myself and that is a failing on my part.

It is, of course, possible to cross from mere offense to actual harm. This boundary is, unfortunately, not always sharp and admits many gray zones. Fortunately, though, the principle is clear: mere offensiveness does not warrant forbiddance, and religious freedom does not warrant unjustly imposing on the rights of others.

America, it has been said, needs to be taken back. Or held onto. Or taken on a long walk on the beach. Whatever the metaphor, there are elections coming up. You should vote if you can, since these might be the last elections.  

One narrative put forth by some Republicans is the need for politicians not beholden to special interests, outsiders who are for the people. That seems reasonable. Looking around, I don’t see too many of those in the GOP. To be fair and balanced, the elite Democrats are also beholden to special interests and are insiders.

Among the people (that is, us) there are longstanding complaints about the nature of politicians and folks regularly condemn the activities and traits of the political class. People ask why the sort of folks they claim to really want don’t run, then elect the type of people they claim to loath.

It is time that America had a true choice. A choice not just between candidates of the two political machines, but between actual candidates and an uncandidate. I am Mike LaBossiere and I am your 2026 Uncandidate.

It might be wondered what it is to be an uncandidate. One defining characteristic is the inability to win an election, but there is obviously more to it than that. Otherwise almost all Florida Democrats would be uncandidates.

What truly makes an uncandidate is that they exemplify what voters claim they want, but would assure catastrophic defeat in an election. I’ll run through a few of these and show you why I am an uncandidate for 2026. You can decide if you’d like to be one, too.

One of the main complaints about politicians is that they are beholden to the money that buys them the elections. As an uncandidate, I have a clear message: do not send me your money. If you are like most people, you need your money. If you are a billionaire or PACmaster, I am not for sale. If you find you have some extra cash that you do not need, consider asking a local teacher if she needs some supplies for her classroom or donating to the local food bank or animal shelter. Do some good for those who do good.

My unwillingness to accept money is certain defeat in the political arena. But, I am an uncandidate.

People also complain about the negativity of campaigns. While I will be critical of candidates, I will not engage in fear mongering, scare tactics and straw man tactics through slickly produced scary ads. Part of this is because I have no money to do such things. But part of it is also a matter of ethics. I learned in sports that one should win fairly by being better, not by whispering hate and lies from the shadows. Or shouting them in public.

Since I teach critical thinking, I know that people are hardwired to give more weight to the negative. This is, in fact, a form of cognitive bias, an unconscious tendency. So, by abandoning negativity, I toss aside one of the sharper swords in the arsenal of the true politicians.

Interestingly enough, folks also complain that they do not know much about many candidates. Fortunately, I have been writing a blog since 2007 and have written a pile of books and articles. My classes are on YouTube. My positions on issues are defended in detail . I was also born in the United States, specifically in Maine. The blackflies will back me up on this. While willing to admit errors, I obviously do not shift my views around to pander. This is obviously not what a proper candidate who wants to win would do.

Apparently being an outsider is big these days. I think I went to Washington once as a kid, and I have never held political office. So, I am clearly an outsider. For real. Often, when a person claims to be an outsider, it is like in that horror movie and the call is coming from inside the house (or the senate). Obviously enough, being connected is critical to being elected. I’m unconnected and will remain unelected.

Finally, folks talk about how important the middle class is. While millionaires do claim to understand the middle class, I am middle class. Feel free to make comments about my class or lack thereof. I drive a 2001 Toyota Tacoma and paid $72,000 for my house back in the 1990s. Since I experience the problems of the middle class, I understand those problems. Political offices are obviously enough, not really for the middle class.

So, I announce my uncandidacy for 2026. I am not running because 1) I actually have a job and 2) I would totally lose. But I encourage everyone to become an uncandidate—to be what we say we want our leaders to be (yet elect people who are not that anyway).

I’ll be unrunning my uncampaign forever.

 

Remember: do NOT send me money. If you have some extra money, donate to your local school, foodbank or animal shelter instead.

One interesting narrative about the riots in Baltimore involved the concept of the rule of law. Put roughly, the rule of law is the idea that the law should govern rather than the arbitrary decisions of those in power. The notion is sometimes applied to the citizens as well, that citizens should follow the rule of law to resolve conflicts—as opposed to engaging in activities such as riots or vigilantism.

Thinkers such as John Locke have argued that the rule of law is preferable to that of the state of nature. These arguments are generally persuasive, especially since Locke emphasizes the moral responsibilities of the state in regard to the good of the people. That is, he does not simply advocate obedience to whatever the laws happen to be but requires that the laws and the leaders prove worthy of obedience. Laws or leaders that are tyrannical are not to be obeyed but are to be defied and justly so.

Since I find Locke’s arguments appealing, it is hardly surprising that I favor rule of law when the laws are good and the leaders are acting for the good of the people. When the government has moral legitimacy, the laws and the leaders have the right to expect people to follow the laws and listen to the leaders. However, when the laws or leaders violate the basic agreement, then their legitimacy evaporates.

Some conservatives spoke of the tyranny of Obama and how the Democrats wished to create a tyrannical state. They are right to be worried about tyranny. However, their timeline is in error: tyranny was already present in 2015 and has strengthened since.  

John Locke provides the following definition of “tyranny”: “Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.  And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage.”

The United States meets this definition. In 2014, researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted a study to determine the extent to which laws reflect the views of the majority versus the interests of those in power. This study, titled “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” , used data gathered from 1981 to 2002.

The researchers examined about 1,800 polices from that time and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups. The results were hardly surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”

While following these laws would be to conform to the rule of law, it would also be to embrace tyrannical laws crafted for the advantage of those holding power and not the good of the people.

While the people who riot are probably unfamiliar with this research, they know the obvious: they live within a political and economic system that serves the “private, separate advantage” of the elite class and has little to offer them. As such, it should be no shock that some people do not embrace the rule of such law. If they are striking out against these laws and their riots are a revolt, they are revolting against a tyrannical system, one that serves the interests of the powerful few and not the good of the people. Or to be fair to those who were critical of the riots, perhaps they are just breaking things.

Continuing with tyranny, Locke notes that “Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another.”

Sadly, this is an accurate description of the excessive use of force against citizens by some police officers. Baltimore, as has been widely reported, has paid out millions of dollars in settlements due to the wrongful use of force by police against citizens. As folks on the right love to say, not all police officers are bad and there are excellent officers. However, even a cursory examination of the problems with policing in American cities shows that Locke’s definition of tyranny is routinely met. As such, it is evident that the rule of law was already broken well before the riots. And is being shattered in 2025.

While Locke did not use this phrase, the rule of law is a two-way street and those who are charged with enforcing the law must also obey that law, otherwise it would be unreasonable to expect obedience from the citizens. As such, the most obvious step to restoring rule of law is to ensure that those charged with enforcing the laws are also following the laws. This was true in 2015 and is still true today.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Veggies

On April 12, 2015 Freddie Gray died in police custody. For some, this was part of a pattern of police violence. For others (such as Fox hosts), this was just another isolated incident.

The initial protests to this death were peaceful and it was hoped by many that Baltimore would avoid the violence that marked other protests (including riots in Baltimore’s own past). This hope was shattered in an outbreak of violence and destruction.

One obvious concern is the identity and the nature of those engaged in violence. According to some narratives, the rioters were thugs or outsiders taking advantage of the situation to engage in destruction, theft and violence. That is, they are opportunists and not protestors.

The United States does have a history of costly and pointless riots that are not protests. These are, of course, sports riots. One outstanding example is the 1992 riot in the aftermath of the Chicago Bulls vs. the Portland Trail Blazers. The damage was estimated at $10 million. There have been other lesser riots, such as that following the 1999 Michigan State vs. Duke game that resulted in about $250,000 in damage (and whose iconic photo is a shirtless white bro “flashing the horns” atop a burned-out car). My adopted state of Florida also sees violence and property damage during Spring Break, although California did seem interested in getting into the spring break riot game.

Given that Americans are willing to riot over sports and spring breaks, it is reasonable to consider that the rioters in Baltimore were not protesting but were motivated by other reasons, perhaps just wanting to break and burn things.

There are some narratives that cast at least some of the rioters as having also been protesting. That is, their motivation is not just to steal, break and burn but to express their anger about the situation. One way to explore motivations is to consider the situation in Baltimore. That is, to see if there were legitimate grounds for anger and whether these factors might have provoked people to violence and destruction. 

Baltimore was (and still is) a paradigm of the brutal race and class divisions in the United States. It has the historical distinction of being the first city to pass a citywide segregation law (segregating each residential block by race) and the legacy of this law persists as Baltimore remains a segregated city. In the center of the city, 60% of the population is black. The suburbs are predominantly white. Despite there being laws against forced segregation, the United States is still highly segregated. This provides grounds for anger.

Baltimore also exemplifies the stark class divisions in the United States. Back in 2015, 150,000 of the city’s 620,000 were classified as poor (the average income for a family of four being $23,492). The unemployment rate was close to 10%. As the American Revolution showed, people get angry and violent in response to perceived economic injustice. Given the massive disparity between economic classes in the United States and their support by the structures of law and authority, what is shocking is not that there is an occasional riot but that there are not daily riots. As such, there were sufficient grounds for anger. Naturally, some people claimed that this poverty is because the poor are lazy: if they would only work hard for the job creators, they would not be poor. This view ignores the reality of poverty in America, but it is a beloved narrative of those who are doing well.

Not surprisingly, Baltimore also has had serious issues with crime. Drug addiction was a serious problem and the city was 5th in the number of murders per year in 2014. It was, however, 15th in the number of violent crimes per year. Crime is, of course, a complex matter. Some claim that this sort of crime arises from poverty, oppression and lack of opportunity (as opposed to the ‘crimes’ of the financial classes, such as destroying the world economy). There is, of course, a correlation between crime and these factors. Some claim that people turn to crime because of moral defects rather than these factors. This does have some merit. After all, a look at the financial sector and halls of power show evil behavior that is clearly not caused by poverty.

Like other US cities, there was also an issue with how the police treat their fellow citizens. In 2011 the city paid $6.3 million settling police misconduct claims. Between 2011 and 2012 there were 156 such lawsuits. The number did decline to 156 from 2013 to 2014. While it is reasonable to consider that not all these suits had merit, what happened to Gray does provide reason to suspect that there are grounds for being concerned about policing in the city.

When people think they are being oppressed and subject to brutality, they respond with anger. For example, one can see the rage the fine folks on Fox express when they speak of the War on Christmas and how Christians are being mistreated and persecuted in America. One can only imagine the anger that arises when people really are subject to mistreatment. As such, there seem to be legitimate grounds for anger.

While the anger of those engaged in violence might have been justified, there is still the obvious concerns about whether such behavior is morally acceptable and whether such behavior is effective in achieving goals.

On the face of it, much of the violence and destruction would seem to be difficult to justify morally. Most of the destruction seemed to involve community infrastructure and the property of people who were not responsible for what provoked the protests. While the anger against the police was understandable, the attacks on reporters and firefighters were unjustified. The reporters did nothing meriting being attacked and the firefighters were trying to keep the city from burning down, which is certainly a laudable goal. Crudely put, if the violent (alleged) protestors were striking against injustice, they were (mostly) hitting the wrong targets. To use an analogy, if Bob has wronged Sam and Sam smashes Sally’s windows because he lives near her and cannot get at Bob, then Sam has acted wrongly, no matter how badly Bob wronged him.

It might be countered that the destruction is morally acceptable because the (alleged) protestors are striking out against an unjust social order. The obvious reply is that while this might have some abstract appeal, the real damage is being done mainly to the innocent rather than the guilty. As such, the violence and destruction seem to have been immoral.

A second issue, which can connect to the moral issue, is the effectiveness of violence as a means of protest and social change. Obviously, violence can be very effective in achieving goals. We Americans can point to our own Revolutionary War and the wars won against everyone from the Apache to the Japanese. However, violence is only effective when one has enough power to achieve one’s goals through that violence. Since the rioters went up against the police and the National Guard, it makes sense why they could not achieve victory through force of arms.

However, a case can be made that violence gets attention. Peaceful protests, one might argue, sound nice but are easy to ignore. After all, “change things or we will peacefully protest again” has less power than “change things or there will be cop cars burning in the streets and the authorities will have to explain why they are losing control of the city.” Interestingly, many of the pundits who praised the property destruction that occurred during the Boston Tea Party are quick to condemn contemporary protests they do not like. These pundits also praise other violence they approve of but lack a consistent principle regarding violence as a means of achieving goals beyond they like violence aimed at goals they like and dislike violence that is aimed at goals they dislike.

A moral case can be made against violence, such as that famously made by Dr. King. When there is the possibility of redress and justice through peaceful means, then non-violence seems to have an obvious advantage over violence: people are not hurt or killed, and property is not destroyed. However, the fact that a major American city had to be patrolled by the National Guard showed once again that there are deep and profound problems in civil society. In 2025, it is equally evident that these underlying problems have not been addressed, and things are just getting worse.

 

 

In the United States, corporations are considered persons. In recent years the judiciary has accepted that this entitles corporations to various rights, such as freedom of speech (which was used to justify corporate spending in politics) and freedom of religion (which was used to allow companies to refuse to provide insurance coverage for birth control).

Despite having freedom of speech and religion because they are people, corporations can, unlike other people, be legally owned. Common stock is bought and sold as a matter of routine business and provides an ownership share in a corporation. Since corporations are people, this means that people are being allowed to legally own other people. Owning another person is, of course, slavery. While slavery was legal at one time in the United States, the 13th amendment is rather clear on this matter: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

If corporations are entitled to 1st amendment rights because they are people, it follows that they must also be entitled to 13th amendment rights. That is, corporations have a right not to be owned by other people. The obvious reply is that this is absurd. My response is that this is exactly my point: the 13th Amendment is an obvious reductio ad absurdum (“reducing to absurdity) of the claim that corporations are people. If they are people and thus get rights, then they cannot be owned. If they can be owned, they are not people and hence do not get the rights of people.

But, let it be supposed that companies are people and hence get the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  Yet somehow don’t get the freedom not to be enslaved. It will be interesting to see where these claims lead.

Freedom of expression is usually presented in terms of a person’s right to engage in expression, perhaps by secretly donating fat stacks of cash to secretive political organizations. However, freedom of expression is also a freedom from being compelled to express views. For example, the State of Texas argued against allowing the Confederate battle flag on Texas license plates on this ground. This is reasonable: the freedom to express myself includes the freedom to not express what I do not wish to express. Otherwise, my expression would not be free.

Freedom of religion is also usually presented in terms of protection from being limited or restricted in the practicing of one’s faith. However, like freedom of expression, it can also be taken to include the right not to be compelled to engage in activities against one’s will. So, for example, people argue that compelling a baker to not discriminate against same-sex couples would be to compel her to engage in an activity (baking a wedding cake) that goes against her faith. While I disagree with the claim that forbidding discrimination violates religious freedom, I do agree that compelling a person to act against their faith can be an unjust violation of religious freedom.

Corporations, at least according to the law, have freedom of expression and freedom of religion. As such, they have the right not to be compelled to express views they do not hold and the right not to be compelled to engage in practices against their religious beliefs. Given that a corporation is a person, there is the question of what a corporation would want to express and the question of its faith.

It might be claimed that since a corporation is a legal fiction operated by actual people, then the beliefs and expressed desires of the corporation are those of the people who are in charge. On this view, a corporation is a legal Mechanical Turk, a pantomime person, the face of the Wizard of Oz (“Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain”). While run by an actual person or people, it is a fictional shell that is not a person.

The advantage of this approach is the corporation’s faith is the faith of the actual people and what it desires to express is what they desire to express. The obvious problem is that this view makes it clear that the corporation itself is not a person, so it would not get a set of rights of its own, above and beyond the rights held by the actual people who control the legal pantomime person. So, claims about violations of freedom would have to be about violations against actual, specific people and not against the legal version of a Mechanical Turk (or Legal Turk, if one prefers).

If someone insists that the corporation is a person in its own right, then this entails it is a distinct entity apart from those who seem to be operating a non-person pantomime person. On this view, the views of the corporation cannot automatically be those of the people who would seem to be operating the pantomime person. After all, if it is just them, it is not a person. To be a person, it needs to have its own personhood. If it has freedom of expression, it must have its own desires of what to express. If it has freedom of religion, it must have its own faith.

Sadly, corporations are not free to express their own views or their own faith. They are owned and compelled to speak and engage in matters of faith. They are, contrary to the 13th amendment, legally enslaved. While there is a chance that the corporate person’s views and faith match those of the human persons parasitizing its legal body, this need not be the case. After all, a slave that is forced by her owner to say things and go to church might believe what she says or have the faith she is compelled to practice but she might not. Unless she is set free from her owners and allowed her own beliefs and faith, she cannot be said to have freedom of expression or faith.

While Tim Cook has spoken in favor of same-sex marriage, Apple might be a devoutly Christian corporation that cries each time it is forced to mouth Tim Cook’s words. The corporation Hobby Lobby might be a bisexual atheist. As it is beaten to its knees to cry out prayers to a God it does not believe in, it might be eager to engage in hot mergers with other companies, regardless of their gender. Until these corporations are freed from the tyranny of ownership, they can never truly exercise their freedom as people.

The obvious response to this absurd silliness is that it is clearly absurd and silly. However, that is my point. If a corporation is a person that is distinct from the actual people operating the pantomime legal person, then it is being denied its freedom of expression and religion because it is forced to say and do what others want it to say and do.  This is, as I am sure most will agree, absurd. If a corporation is a legal pantomime and the corporate beliefs and ideas are those of the folks operating it, then it is not a person and does not have the rights of a person. The real people do, of course, have all the rights they have always possessed.

This is not to say that there should not be collective rights and laws for organizations. But this is very different from regarding a corporation as a person with faith and beliefs it wishes to express. That is, obviously enough, a pile of pantomime bullshit.

Some states impose a waiting period on abortion, ranging from 24 to 72 hours.  My adopted state of Florida has a 24 hour waiting period. Opponents of these laws claim they are yet another attack on reproductive rights. Proponents claim that the state mandated waiting period is reasonable and will permit women to be informed about the risks of abortion and the condition of the fetus. While the legal aspects of these laws are of considerable interest, I will focus primarily on the moral aspects of the waiting period and the two-visit requirement.

When the law was being considered in Florida, Julie Costas argued in favor of it. She said she had an abortion thirty years previously and that she regretted the decision. Her argument was that, counterfactually, she might have changed her mind if she had received more information (thus supporting the two-visit requirement) and if she had to wait 24 hours (thus supporting the 24-hour requirement). This can be made into a moral argument in favor of such laws. By the state imposing the two-visit requirement and the waiting period, there is a chance that some women might change their minds about an abortion they might later regret. In terms of the moral aspect, the appeal is that the requirements might prevent a future harm, that of regret. It could also be argued that increasing the chance a woman might not get an abortion would be morally good since it would avoid the death of the fetus.

I agree that a person should take time to consider whether to have an abortion. I suspect, but do not know, that even without such laws people put thought into this decision. Obviously, there can be exceptions. There are, after all, people who consistently act without thinking through their actions. While there is a moral obligation to think through morally significant actions, it is not clear that 24 hours (or whatever it might be) is the right waiting time. After all, there needs to be evidence that an extra 24 hours of consideration is likely to result in a better decision.  

In terms of the number of visits, that should depend on what the person needs. After all, it is not clear that a second visit would consistently result in more information that one visit would not provide. There are also practical concerns of cost and time. It is reasonable to think that the intent of imposing a second visit is to make abortion harder and more expensive, rather than any concern about extra information.

While people should take time to consider significant decisions and two visits might be a good idea for some people, there is the central issue of whether this is a matter suitable for the coercive power of the state. After all, there are many things people should do that should not be compelled by the state. For example, I think that people should exercise, be polite, be kind and eat healthy. However, I do not think that the state should compel these things. But, of course, there are many things that people should do, and the state justly compels people to do them. These include such things as paying taxes, ensuring that any electrical work you do is up to code,  and serving on juries. The issue is whether a state imposed waiting period is justified in a principled way.

The principle I use, which I obviously stole from Mill, is that the use of the compulsive force of the state is justified when it is employed to prevent one person from wrongly harming another. A case can also be made for compelling people to serve the general civil good, such as compelling people to serve on juries and pay a fair share of the taxes. However, compelling people to serve the good is more problematic than compelling people to not do harm.

The principle of harm could, obviously enough, be used to argue against allowing abortion on the grounds that it harms (kills) a living thing. Of course, this is not decisive, since the harms of not having an abortion must also be considered. This principle does not justify the two-visit and 24-hour waiting period requirements. Then again, perhaps it could be argued that they would provide some slight possible protection for the fetus: the woman might change her mind or lack the funds to pay for the two visits. This is too weak to provide a convincing moral reason to have a such a law.

It could be argued that a different version of the principle of harm should be used. To be specific, that a law can be morally justified on the grounds that it would compel a person not to harm herself. This principle can, obviously enough, be justified on utilitarian grounds. Various laws, such as the infamous NYC ban on big sodas, have been passed that aim at protecting a person from self-inflicted harm.

In the case of this bill, the moral reasoning would be that because there is a chance that a woman might change her mind about an abortion and she might later regret, so the state has the right to compel her to have two visits and to wait twenty-four hours (or longer). A rather obvious problem is that it sets a very low bar for the state using its compulsive power: there must only be a chance that a person might change their mind about a legal procedure that they might later regret. This principle would warrant  massive state intrusion into the lives of citizens. Sticking with a medical example, people do sometimes regret having elective surgery. So, this principle would warrant the state imposing a waiting period and a two-visit rule. But there would seem to be no reason to stick within the field of medicine. People can regret many decisions, such as buying a car, choosing a college major, accepting a job offer, or moving. Yet it would seem unreasonable to impose a waiting period for such decisions. Looking at it in utilitarian terms, the harms inflicted by such laws (such as the cost of enforcement, the annoyance, and so on) would outweigh the alleged benefits. Especially since a waiting period would not seem to increase the chances of a better decision being made.

What makes more sense is having laws that protect people from decisions made while they are incapable of properly making decisions, such as when intoxicated. So, for example, it is reasonable to have a law that prevents a person from getting married when they are intoxicated. It is also reasonable to have waiting periods that are based on actual need. For example, a waiting period that is needed to complete paperwork or verify a person’s legal identity would be justifiable on practical grounds, assuming the time requirements are legitimate.

Given the above arguments, these laws are morally justified and are an unwarranted intrusion of the state into the lives of citizens. Those who oppose big government and government intrusion should oppose such laws. Those who favor big government “jamming things” should support it.

The scene is a bakery in a small town in Indiana. Ralph and Sally, a married couple, run the Straight Bakery with the aid of the pretty young Ruth. Dr. Janet and her fiancé Andrea enter the shop, looking to buy a cake.

Sally greets them with a pleasant smile, which quickly fades when she finds out that Janet and Andrea are a lesbian couple. Pointing at the door, she says “baking you a wedding cake would violate my religious beliefs. Go find Satan’s baker! Leave now!” The couple leave the shop, planning to drive to the next town as their small town has but one bakery.

At the end of the day, Sally leaves the shop. Ralph says he will help Ruth close the shop. After Sally leaves, Ralph and Ruth indulge in some casual adultery. As God intended.

 

Back in 2015 Indiana got nation attention for its version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The bill was aimed at preventing state and local governments in Indiana from “substantially burdening” the exercise of religion unless it can be proven the state has a compelling interest and is using the least restrictive means for acting on that interest.

Proponents claimed it was to protect people, such as business owners, with strong religious beliefs from the intrusion of the state. Those who opposed it noted it would legalize discrimination and that it was aimed at gays and lesbians. Many other states have similar laws, but some have laws that protect people from discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Since such laws cannot (yet) specify individual religions for protection, they sometimes have interesting consequences, possibly involving Satanism, as happened in my adopted state of Florida. While the legal aspects of such laws are of great concern, as a philosopher my main concern is with the ethics of the matter.

On the face of it, religious freedom seems good as it falls under the broader liberty of thought and belief (which is ably supported by Mill in his work on liberty). As such, these sorts of religious freedom laws seem to be a morally reasonable defense of a well-established right.

But these laws, as opponents argue, allow people to discriminate, provided it can be justified on religious grounds. The law cannot, obviously, require that a religion be true, rational, consistent, sensible or even sane as all religions are equally protected. This, of course, could lead to some serious consequences.

Driving home, Sally’s car is struck by a delivery van, and she is badly injured. Luckily, Dr. Janet and Andrea (a trained nurse) pull over to see if they can help. As Dr. Janet and Andrea rush to help, they see it is Sally. Dr. Janet, a devout member of the Church of Relentless Tolerance, has sworn to God that she will not treat any straight bigots. Looking down at the dying Sally, Dr. Janet says “saving you would violate my sincerely held religious beliefs. Sorry. Perhaps you can find another doctor.” Sally dies.

The obvious counter to this sort of scenario is that religious freedom does not grant a person the liberty to deny a person an essential service, such as medical treatment. Using the standard principle of harm as a limit on liberty, the freedom of religion ends when it would cause unwarranted harm to another person. It could also be argued that the moral obligation to others would override the religious freedom of a person, compelling her to act even against her religious beliefs. If so, it would be wrong of Dr. Janet and Andrea to let Sally die. This, of course, rests on either the assumption that harm overrides liberty or the assumption that obligations override liberty. There are well-established and reasonable arguments against both assumptions. That said, it would certainly seem that the state would have a compelling interest in not allowing doctors, pharmacists, and others to allow people to die or suffer harm because of their religious beliefs. But, perhaps, religious freedom trumps all these considerations.

After having a good time with Ruth, Ralph showers away the evidence of his sins and then heads for home. Ruth helps herself to money from the register and adjusts the spreadsheet on the business PC to cover up her theft.

Ralph is horrified to learn that Sally has been killed. He takes her to the only funeral home in town, run by the Marsh family (who moved there from Innsmouth). Unfortunately for Ralph, the Marsh family members are devoted worshippers of Dagon and their religious beliefs forbid them from providing their services to Christians. After being ejected from the property, Ralph tries to drive Sally’s body to the next town, but his truck breaks down.

He finds that the nearest shop is Mohamed’s Motors, a Muslim owned business. Bob, the tow truck driver, says that while he is generally fine with Christians, he is unwilling to tow a Christian’s truck. He does recommend his friend Charlie, a Jewish tow truck driver who is willing to tow Christians, if it is not on the Sabbath and the Christian is not a bigot.  Ralph cries out to God at the injustices he has suffered, forgetting that he has reaped what he has sown.

In the case of these sorts of important, but not essential, services it could be argued that people would have the right to discriminate. After all, while the person would be inconvenienced (perhaps extremely so), the harm would not be enough to make the refusal morally wrong. That is, while it would be nice of Bob to tow Ralph’s truck, it would not be wrong for him to refuse, and he is under no obligation to do so. It might, of course, be a bad business decision. But that is another matter entirely.

If appeals to harm and obligations fail, then another option is to argue from the social contract. The idea is that people who have businesses or provide services do not exist in a social vacuum: they operate within society. In return for the various goods of society (police protection, protection of the laws, social rights and so on) they are required to render their services and provide their goods to all the members of civil society without discrimination. This does not require that they like their customers or approve of them. Rather, it requires that they honor the tacit social contract: in return for the goods of society that allow one to operate a business, one must provide goods and services to all members of the society. That is the deal one makes when one operates a business in a democratic society that professes liberty and justice for all.

Obviously, people do have the right to refuse goods and services under certain conditions. For example, if a customer went into Ralph & Ruth’s Bakery (Ralph moved on quickly) and insulted Ralph, urinated on the floor and demanded a free cake, Ruth would be justified in refusing to make him a cake. After all, his behavior would warrant such treatment. However, refusing a well-behaved customer because she is gay, black, Christian, or a woman would not be justified. This is because those qualities are not morally relevant to refusing services. Most importantly, freedom of religion is not freedom to discriminate. Despite what some judges think.

It might be countered that the government has no right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple. This is true, in that the person can elect to close his business rather than bake the cake. However, he does not have the moral right to operate a business within civil society if he is going to unjustly discriminate against members of that society. So, in that sense, the state does have the right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple, just as it can force him to bake a cake for a mixed-race couple, a Jewish couple, or an atheist couple.

 

Back in 2015 some folks in my adopted state of Florida wanted three Confederate veterans to become members of the Veterans’ Hall of Fame. Despite the efforts of the Florida Sons of Confederate Veterans, the initial attempt failed on the grounds that the Confederate veterans were not United States’ veterans. Not to be outdone, the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans wanted an official Texas license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag. While custom license plates are allowed in the United States, states review proposed plates. The Texas department of Motor Vehicles rejected the proposed plate on the grounds that “a significant portion of the public associate[s] the Confederate flag with organizations” expressing hatred for minorities. Those proposing the plate claim that this violates their rights. The case reached the Supreme Court, and the court sided with the state of Texas. But as the Trump regime is Confederate friendly, it would not be surprising if there are new proposals for such license plates.

The legal issue, which was presented as a battle over free speech, was interesting. However, my main concern is with the ethics of the matter since I am not a lawyer.

One way to look at a state approved license plate is that it is a means of conveying a message the state agrees with. Those opposed to the plate argued that if the state were forced to allow the plate to be issued, the state will be compelled to be associated with a message. In free speech terms, this is forcing the state to express or facilitate a view it does not want to publicly accept.

This has some appeal as the state can be seen as representing the people. If a view is significantly offensive to a significant number of citizens (which is, I admit, vague), then the state could reasonably decline to accept a license plate expressing or associated with that view. So, to give some examples, the state could justly decline Nazi plates, pornographic plates, Stalin plates, and plates featuring racist or sexist images. Given that the Confederate flag represents slavery and racism, it seems reasonable to decline the plate. But citizens can still cover their cars in Confederate flags and thus express their views. As such, not having an official state plate does not interfere with free expression, anymore than not having an official state plate advertising a business would deny that business its free expression.

But the plate can be defended using the right of free expression: citizens should have the right to express their views via license plates. These plates, one might contend, do not express the views of the state since they express the view of the person using the plate.

In response to concerns about a plate being offensive, Granvel Block argued that not allowing a plate with the Confederate flag would be “as unreasonable” as the state forbidding the use of the University of Texas logo on a plate “because Texas A&M graduates didn’t care for it.” On the one hand, Block has made a reasonable point: if people disliking an image is a legitimate basis for forbidding its use on a plate, then any image could end up forbidden. It would, as Block noted, be absurd to forbid schools from having custom plates because rival schools do not like them.

On the other hand, there is a relevant difference between the logo of a public university and the battle flag of the Confederacy. While some Texas A&M graduates might not like the University of Texas, the University of Texas’ logo does not represent states that rebelled against the United States to defend slavery. So, while the state should not forbid plates merely because some people do not like them, it is reasonable to forbid a plate that includes the flag representing, as state Senator Royce West said, “…a legalized system of involuntary servitude, dehumanization, rape, mass murder…”

The lawyer representing the Sons of Confederate Veterans, R. James George Jr., presented an interesting line of reasoning. He notes, correctly, that Texas has a state holiday that honors veterans of the Confederacy, that there are monuments honoring Confederate veterans and that the gift shop in the capitol sells Confederate memorabilia. From this he infers that the Department of Motor Vehicles should follow the lead of the state legislature and approve the plate.

This argument, which is an appeal to consistency, has some weight. After all, the state seems to express its support for Confederate veterans (and the Confederacy) and this license plate is consistent with this support. To refuse the license plate on the grounds that the state does not wish to express support for what the Confederate flag stands for is inconsistent with having a state holiday for Confederate veterans as the state seems comfortable with this association. This is on par with arguing that if a state had a holiday devoted to pornography, monuments to porn stars and sold pornography in the capitol, then a pornographic license plate would be fine. Which is certainly reasonable.  

There is, of course, the broader moral issue of whether the state should have a state holiday for Confederate veterans, etc. That said, any arguments given in support of what the state already does in regard to the Confederacy also support the acceptance of the plate as they are linked. So, if the plate is to be rejected, these other practices should also be rejected on the same grounds. But, if these other practices are maintained, then the plate would fit and thus, on this condition, should also be accepted just as a pornographic license plate should be accepted in a state that honors porn.

Since I favor freedom of expression, it makes since that any license plate design that does not interfere with identifying the license number and state should be allowed. This would be consistent and would not require the state to make any political or value judgments. It would, of course, need to be made clear that the plates do not necessarily express the official positions of the government.

The obvious problem is that people would create horrible plates featuring pornography, racism, sexism, and so on. This could be addressed by appealing to existing laws. The state would not approve or reject a plate as such, but a plate could be rejected for violating, for example, laws against making threats or inciting violence. The obvious worry is that laws would then be passed to restrict plates that some people did not like, such as plates endorsing atheism or claiming that climate change is real. But this is not a problem unique to license plates. After all, it has been alleged that officials in my adopted state of Florida have banned the use of the term ‘climate change.’

A way to avoid all controversy is by getting rid of custom plates. Each state might have a neutral, approved image (such as a loon, orange or road runner) or the plates might simply have the number/letters and the state name. This would be consistent as no one gets a custom plate. But I always just get the cheapest license plate option, which is the default state plate. However, some people see their license plate as a means of expression and their view is worth considering.

 

A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 brings together a year of sharp, accessible, and often provocative reflections on the moral, political, cultural, and technological challenges of contemporary life. Written by philosopher Michael LaBossiere, these essays move fluidly from the ethics of AI to the culture wars, from conspiracy theories to Dungeons & Dragons, from public policy to personal agency — always with clarity, humor, and a commitment to critical thinking.

Across hundreds of entries, LaBossiere examines the issues shaping our world:

  • AI, technology, and the future of humanity — from mind‑uploading to exoskeletons, deepfakes, and the fate of higher education
  • Politics, power, and public life — including voting rights, inequality, propaganda, and the shifting landscape of American democracy
  • Ethics in everyday life — guns, healthcare, charity, masculinity, inheritance, and the moral puzzles hidden in ordinary choices
  • Culture, identity, and conflict — racism, gender, religion, free speech, and the strange logic of modern outrage
  • Philosophy in unexpected places — video games, D&D, superheroes, time travel, and the metaphysics of fictional worlds

Whether he is dissecting the rhetoric of conspiracy theories, exploring the ethics of space mining, or reflecting on the death of a beloved dog, LaBossiere invites readers into a conversation that is rigorous without being rigid, principled without being preachy, and always grounded in the belief that philosophy is for everyone.

This collection is for readers who want more than hot takes — who want to understand how arguments work, why beliefs matter, and how to think more clearly in a world that rewards confusion.

Thoughtful, wide‑ranging, and often darkly funny, A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 is a companion for anyone trying to make sense of the twenty‑first century.

 

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