Category: Ethics

Before the Trump regime, the United States miliary expressed interest in developing robots capable of moral reasoning and provided grant money to support such research. Other nations are no doubt also interested.  

The notion of instilling robots with ethics is a common theme in science fiction, the most famous being Asimov’s Three Laws. The classic Forbidden Planet provides an early movie example of robotic ethics: Robby the robot has an electro-mechanical seizure if he is ordered to cause harm to a human being (or an id-monster created by the mind of his creator. Dr. Morbius). In contrast, killer machines (like Saberhagan’s Berserkers) of science fiction tend to be free of moral constraints.

While there are various reasons to imbue robots with ethics (or at least pretend to do so), one is public relations. Thanks to science fiction dating at least back to Frankenstein, people worry about our creations getting out of control. As such, a promise that our killbots will be governed by ethics might reassure the public. Another reason is to make the public relations gimmick a reality—to place behavioral restraints on killbots so they will conform to the rules of war (and human morality). Presumably the military will also address the science fiction theme of the ethical killbot who refuses to kill on moral grounds. But considering the ethics of war endorsed by the Trump regime, they are probably not interested in ethical war machines.

While science fiction features ethical robots, the authors (like philosophers) are vague about how robot ethics works. In the case of intelligent robots, their ethics might work the way ours does—which is a mystery debated by philosophers and scientists to this day. While AI has improved thanks to massive processing power, it does not have human-like ethical capacity, so the current practical challenge is to develop ethics for the autonomous or semi-autonomous robots we can build now.

While creating ethics for robots might seem daunting, the limitations of current robot technology means robot ethics is a matter of programming these machines to operate in specific ways defined by whatever ethical system is used. One way to look at programing such robots with ethics is that they are being programmed with safety features. To use a simple example, suppose that I see shooting unarmed people as immoral. To make my killbot operate according to that ethical view, it would be programmed to recognize armed humans and have some code saying, in effect “if unarmedhuman = true, then firetokill= false” or, in normal English, if the human is unarmed, do not shoot them. Sorting out recognizing weapons would be a programming feat, likely with people dying in the process.

While a suitably programmed robot would act in a way that seemed ethical, the robot would not be engaged in ethical behavior. After all, it is merely a more complex version of an automatic door. A supermarket door, though it opens for you, is not polite. The shredder that catches your tie and chokes you is not evil.  Likewise, the killbot that does not shoot you because its cameras show you are unarmed is not ethical. The killbot that chops you into chunks is not unethical. Following Kant, since the killbot’s programming is imposed and the killbot lacks the freedom to choose, it is not engaged in ethical (or unethical behavior), though the complexity of its behavior might make it seem so.

To be fair to killbots, perhaps humans are not ethical or unethical under these requirements—we could just be meat-bots operating under the illusion of ethics. Also, it is sensible to focus on the practical aspect of the matter: if you are targeted by a killbot, your concern is not whether it is an autonomous moral agent or merely a machine—your main worry is whether it will kill you. As such, the general practical problem is getting our killbots to behave in accord with our ethical values. Or, in the case of the Trump regime, a lack of ethics.

Achieving this goal involves three steps. The first is determining which ethical values we wish to impose on our killbots. Since this is a practical matter and not an exercise in philosophical inquiry, this will involve using the accepted ethics (and laws) governing warfare rather than trying to determine what is truly good (if anything). The second step is translating ethics into behavioral terms. For example, the moral principle that makes killing civilians wrong would be translated into behavioral sets of allowed and forbidden behavior relative to civilians. This would require creating a definition of civilian  that would allow recognition using the sensors of the robot. As another example, the moral principle that surrender should be accepted would require defining surrender behavior in a way the robot could recognize.  The third step would be coding that behavior in whatever programming  is used for the robot in question. For example, the robot would need to be programmed to engage in surrender-accepting behavior. Naturally, the programmers or those typing the prompts into an AI program would need to worry about clever combatants trying to “deceive” the killbot to take advantage of its programming (like pretending to surrender to get close enough to destroy the killbot).

Since these robots would be following programmed rules, they would seem to be controlled by deontological ethics—that is, ethics based on following rules. Thus, they would be (with due apologies to Asimov), the Robots of Deon.

A  practical question is whether the “ethical” programming would allow for overrides or reprogramming. Since the robot’s “ethics” would just be behavior governing code, it could be changed and it is easy to imagine ethics preferences in which a commander could selectively (or not so selectively) turn off behavioral limitations. And, of course, killbots could be simply programmed without such ethics (or programmed to be “evil”).

One impact for this research will be that some people will get to live the science-fiction dream of teaching robots to be good. That way the robots might feel a little bad when they kill us all.

 

 

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When a new technology emerges, it is often claimed that it is outpacing ethics and law. Because of the nature of law in the United States, it is easy for technology to outpace it, especially given the average age of members of Congress. However, it is difficult for technology to outpace ethics.

One reason is that any minimally adequate ethical theory will have the quality of expandability. That is, the theory can be applied to what is new, be that technology, circumstances or something else. An ethical theory that lacks the capacity of expandability would become useless immediately and would not be much of a theory.

It is, however, worth considering that a new technology could “break” an ethical theory in that the theory could not expand to cover the technology. However, this would seem to show that the theory was inadequate rather than showing the technology outpaced ethics.

Another reason technology would have a hard time outpacing ethics is that an ethical argument by analogy can (probably) be applied to new technology. That is, if the technology is like something that exists and has been discussed in ethics, this ethical discussion can be applied to the new technology. This is analogous to using ethical analogies to apply ethics to different specific situations, such as an act of cheating in a relationship.

Naturally, if a new technology is absolutely unlike anything else in human experience (even fiction), then the method of analogy would fail absolutely. However, it seems unlikely that such a technology could emerge. But I like science fiction (and fantasy) and am willing to entertain the possibility of an absolutely new technology. While it would seem that existing ethics could handle, but perhaps something absolutely new would break all existing ethical theories, showing they are all inadequate.

While a single example does not provide much in the way of proof, it can be used to illustrate. As such, I will use the matter of personal drones to illustrate how ethics is not outpaced by technology.

While remote controlled and automated devices have been around a long time, the expansion of technology created something new for ethics: drones, driverless cars,  AI, Facebook, and so on. However, drone ethics is easy. By this I do not mean that ethics is easy, it is just that applying ethics to new technology (such as drones) is not as hard as some might claim. Naturally, doing ethics is hard—but this applies to very old problems (the ethics of war) and very “new” problems (the ethics of killer robots in war).

Getting back to the example, a personal drone is one that tends to be much smaller, lower priced and easier to use relative to government operated drones. In many ways, these drones are slightly advanced versions of the remote-control planes that are regarded as expensive toys. Drones of this sort that most concern people are those that have cameras and can hover—perhaps outside a bedroom window.

Two areas of concern are safety and privacy. In terms of safety, the worry is that drones can collide with people (or vehicles, such as manned aircraft) and injure them. Ethically, this falls under doing harm to people, be it with a knife, gun or drone. While a flying drone flies about, the ethics that have been used to handle flying model aircraft, cars, etc. can be applied here. So, this aspect of drones did not outpace ethics.

Privacy can also be handled. Simplifying things for the sake of a brief discussion, a drone allows a person to (potentially) violate privacy in the usual two “visual” modes. One is to intrude into private property to violate a person’s privacy. In the case of the “old” way, a person can put a ladder against a person’s house and climb up to peek through a window. In the “new” way, a person can fly a drone up to the window and peek in using a camera. While the person is not physically present in the case of the drone, their “agent” is present and is trespassing. Whether a person is using a ladder or a drone to gain access to the window does not change the ethics of the situation.

A second way is to peek into private space from public space. In the case of the old way a person could, for example,  stand on the public sidewalk and look into other peoples’ windows or yards. In the “new” way, a person can deploy his agent (the drone) in public space to do the same sort of thing.

One potential difference between the two situations is that a drone can fly and thus can get viewing angles that a person on the ground (or even with a ladder) could. For example, a drone might be in the airspace far above a person’s backyard, sending images of someone sunbathing in the nude behind her very tall fence on her very large estate. However, this is not a new situation—paparazzi have used helicopters to get shots of celebrities, and the ethics are the same. As such, ethics has not been outpaced by the drones in this regard.  This is not to say that the matter is solved people are still debating the ethics of this sort of “spying”, but to say that it is not a case where technology has outpaced ethics.

What is mainly different about the drones is that they are now affordable and easy to use—so whereas only certain people could afford to hire a helicopter to get photos of celebrities, now camera-equipped drones are easily in reach of the hobbyist. So, it is not that the low priced drone provides new capabilities, it is that it puts these capabilities in the hands of the many.

 

 

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Despite being seen as an academic liberal (with all associated sins), I have long had a mixed view of affirmative action in education and employment. As an individualist who believes in the value of merit, I hold that college admission and hiring should be based entirely on the merit of the individual.  That is, the best qualified person should be admitted or hired. This is based on the principle that admission and hiring should be based on earning the opportunity and this is fairly and justly based on whether an individual merits the admission or job.

To use a sports analogy, the person who gets the first-place award for a 5K race should be the person who runs the race the fastest. This person has merited the award by winning. To deny the best runner the award and give it to someone else in the name of diversity would be absurd and unfair—even if there is a lack of diversity among the winners.

However, I know about the foundational institutionalized inequality in America and that addressing it can, on utilitarian grounds, allow treating some people unfairly for the greater good. There is also the matter of the fairness of the competition, which allows me to believe both in merit and affirmative action.

In my 5K analogy, I assume the competition is fair and victory is a matter of ability. Everyone one runs the same course, and no one possesses an unfair advantage, such as having a head start or using a bike. In such a fair competition, the winner earns the victory. Unfortunately, the world beyond the 5K is rigged and unjust.

Discrimination, segregation and unjust inequality remain the order of the day in the United States. So, when people are competing for admission to schools and for jobs, some people have unfair advantages while others face unfair disadvantages. For example, African-Americans are more likely to attend underfunded and lower quality public schools and they face the specter of racism that still possessed the body of America. So, when people apply for college or for jobs they are not meeting on the starting line of a fair race which will grant victory to the best competitor. Rather, people are scattered about (some far behind the starting line, some far ahead) and some enjoy unfair advantages while others carry unfair burdens.

Many of these advantages and burdens involve employment and education. For example, a family that has a legacy at a school will have an advantage over a family whose members have never attended college. As such, affirmative action can shift things in the direction of fairness by, to use my 5K analogy, moving people to bring everyone closer to the starting line for a fairer competition.

To use a problematic analogy, 5K races usually divide awards by age and gender (and some have wheelchair divisions as well). As such, an old runner like me can win an age group award, even though the young fellows have the advantage of youth in competing for the overall awards. The analogy works in that the 5K, like affirmative action done properly, recognizes factors that influence the competition that can be justly addressed so that people can achieve success. The analogy, obviously enough, does start to break apart when pushed (as all analogies do). For example, affirmative action with awards will never make me as fast as the youth, whereas affirmative action in college admission can allow a disadvantaged student to gain an education to match those who have enjoyed advantages.   It also faces the obvious risk of suggesting that the competitors are inferior and cannot compete in the open competition. However, it does show that affirmative action can be squared with fair competition.

In closing, I do believe that a person of good conscience can be concerned about the ethics of affirmative action. After all, it does seem to run contrary to the principles of fairness and equality by seeming to grant an advantage to some people based on race, gender and such. I also hold that a person of good conscience can be for affirmative action—after all, it is supposed to aim at rectifying disadvantages and creating a society in which fair competition based on merit can properly take place. Unfortunately, the most vehement foes of affirmative action are white supremacists and misogynists who do not argue in good faith. Ironically, the anti-DEI folks in positions of power, such as certain Trump regime officials, seem to have been gifted with these positions despite their utter lack of merit. That is, they exemplify the claimed horrors of affirmative action gone wild.

 

 

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Some years ago, my running friend Nancy arranged a trash pickup after the Palace Saloon 5K. This involved spending about an hour and a half picking up trash in the hot Florida sun.  We runners created a pile of overstuffed trash bags full of a diversity of discarded debris.

On my training runs, I routinely pick up litter in San Luis Park. This ranges from the expected (discarded cans) to the unusual (a stereo system). These adventures in litter caused me to think about issues related to litter and especially the cost of litter.

One obvious cost of litter is the aesthetic damage. Litter is ugly and makes an area look, well, trashy. One of the many reasons I pick up litter is that I prefer not to run through trashy places.

Another obvious cost of litter is the environmental damage. Some of this is obvious, such as oil or paint leaking from discarded cans. Other damage is less obvious, such as erosion and flooding that can be caused by litter clogging storm drains.  There is also the harm done to animals directly, such as sea life killed when their stomachs fill with plastic debris. As with the aesthetic damage, the cost of the litter is largely paid by those who did not litter—such as the turtles and seabirds harmed by discarded items.

A less obvious cost is that paid by people who pick up the litter. For example, I take a few minutes out of almost every run to dispose of trash discarded by others. There are also walkers in my neighborhood who pick up trash during their entire walk—I will see them carrying full bags of cans, bottles and other debris that have been thrown onto the streets, sidewalks and lawns. Unlike my home state of Maine, Florida does not have a deposit on bottle and cans so there is no financial incentive to pick them up.

Those of us who clean up after the litterbugs pay with our time and effort. This is doubly annoying because the effort we need to expend to pick up the debris and dispose of it properly is more than the litterbug would spend to dispose of it. Litter is often scattered about, in pieces or tossed into the woods—thus making it a chore to pick up and carry. Also, carrying trash while running is more inconvenient than transporting it in a vehicle—and much of the trash beside the road is hurled from vehicles.

Some states, such as my home state of Maine, do shift some of the cost of litter to the litterer. To be specific, these states have a deposit on bottles and cans. When someone discards a can or bottle, they are throwing away the deposit—thus incurring a small cost for littering. When someone picks up the bottle or can, they can redeem it for the deposit—thus offsetting the cost of their effort. While this approach does not cover all forms of litter, it impacts the litter problem by providing people with an incentive to not litter or to pick up the litter thrown away by others.

This model of imposing a cost on littering and providing a reward for cleaning up litter is ethical. In terms of fairness, it seems right that the person littering should pay a price for the damage done and the cost imposed on others. It is also right that people who make the effort to clean up messes caused by others should receive compensation. The obvious challenge is making the model work on a broader scale beyond bottles and cans. I do, of course, think this should extend beyond mere personal littering, which is trivial when compared to the massive, organized littering of businesses.

 

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While there are various ways to define what it is for a pet to be exotic, I will focus on non-domesticated animals. Naturally, some of these pets do not involve much moral controversy. For example, keeping a tank of small fish seems morally acceptable—provided the fish are properly cared for. I am, for this short essay, mainly concerned with animals such as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, kangaroos, pythons, chimpanzees and other such animals. That is, animals that are wild and can present a danger to human beings. Also of concern are exotic pets that might pose no meaningful direct danger to humans but could be a danger to small animals or the local environment.

One obvious moral argument against allowing people to own dangerous exotic pets is that they are dangerous. Bears and tigers can easily kill humans. There is also the harm caused to ecosystems by escaped pets, such as the constrictors infesting my adopted state of Florida. This can be cast as utilitarian argument in terms of the harms outweighing the alleged benefits of having such exotic pets.

The obvious response to this argument is that non-exotic pets, such as dogs and horses, injure and even kill people. As such, the harm argument would also hold against having any pet that is a potential danger to a human. This response could be taken to entail at least two things. One is that all pet ownership of potentially dangerous animals should not be allowed. This would not appeal to most people, given the popularity of dogs. The other is that people should be allowed to have potentially dangerous pets, be the pet a dog or a bear. While this view has some appeal, the easy and obvious counter is that there are clear relevant differences between pets like dogs and pets like lions, tigers and bears.

While a domesticated animal like a dog or horse can seriously injure or kill a human, they are generally less dangerous and far less likely to attack than a wild species like a bear or tiger. After all, domestic animals have been (mostly) selected to not be aggressive towards humans and for other appropriate (from our perspective) behavior. So, while my dogs were good at biting, they were not as dangerous as a bear and never attacked a human, even when provoked. This is not to say that it is impossible for a well-behaved dog to turn violent. This is just to say that a well-trained dog is radically different from a well-trained bear or tiger.

While injuries caused by dogs are common, this is because there are so many dogs kept as pets. As such, even a tiny percentage of aggressive dogs will cause a relatively high number of incidents. There is also a reasonable concern about dogs that have been bred and trained to be aggressive. Such dogs present a threat to people and arguments can be made about restricting ownership of dog breeds that are alleged to be prone to violence.

Another obvious moral argument is based on the harms done to the exotic animals. While domesticated animals can do well living with humans (for example, my dogs have been happy living in my house—provided they got their runs and outdoor adventures), wild animals often do not do very well. Many who own exotic pets cannot provide the environment a wild species needs to be happy and healthy. There are also the concerns about medical care, proper exercise, diet and so on. As such, allowing people to own such exotic pets would often have negative consequences for the animals. Once again, the moral case against owning such pets can be made on utilitarian grounds.

An obvious reply is that domestic animals also have needs. As such, it could be contended that if the keeping of domestic animals is acceptable if they are properly cared for, then the same should hold for the exotic animals. This reply does have considerable appeal. After all, if an animal is properly cared for and is healthy and happy, then there would seem to be no moral grounds for forbidding a person from having such a pet.

The practical problem is that caring properly for such exotic animals is more challenging and more expensive than care for a domesticated animal. As I mentioned, my dogs have been happy living in my house and going on runs and expeditions with me. While medical care and food was not cheap, taking care of them was something I could easily afford. Exotic pets often present more serious challenges in terms of cost. For example, a tiger is very expensive to feed and one should not take a tiger out for an adventure to local dog park. However, with proper resources these challenges could be addressed.

As a final moral argument, there is the concern that it is simply wrong to keep an exotic animal as a pet. To steal from Aristotle, it is not the function (or nature) of wild animals to exist as pets for humans. While people and animals might form bonds, the wild animals are such that being made into a pet is a distortion or even violation of what they are, which would be wrong. This, of course, would seem to suggest that we have distorted animals and perhaps wronged them by domesticating them—which might be true.

This line of reasoning can be countered in various ways, ranging from arguing against there being such natures to religious appeals to the claim that humans were given dominion over the animals and thus we can do what we wish with them.

My own view is somewhat mixed. Since I have shared my home with many dogs and cats, it should be no surprise that I am morally fine with having a pet (provided they are well cared for). However, I think keeping exotic animals as pets is morally problematic. That said, some people do truly love their exotic pets and take excellent care of them. In the case of endangered species, there is also the added moral argument about the preservation of such species as pets—which does have some appeal when the alternative is extinction. This does, however, raise the moral issue of whether existing as pets (or domesticated animals) is morally better than being extinct.

In closing, I would certainly not have a lion, tiger or bear as a pet. A dire husky…well, sure.

Way back on 4/9/2014 NPR did a report on why there are fewer women than men in business. While the gap has narrowed as of 2026, it persists (especially at the senior level). The difference begins in business school and continues forward. The report presented an interesting hypothesis: men and women differ in their ethics.

While people usually claim lying is immoral, men and woman are more likely to lie to a woman when negotiating. The report also mentioned a test with an ethical issue: the seller of a house does not want it sold to someone who will turn it into a condo, but a potential buyer wants to do just that. Men were more likely than women to lie to sell the house.

It was also found that men tend towards egocentric ethical reasoning in that if the man will be harmed by something, then it is regarded as unethical. If the man benefits, he is more likely to see it as morally grey. So, in the case of the house scenario, a man representing the buyer would tend to see lying to the seller as acceptable because he would make a sale. However, a man representing the seller would be more likely to see being lied to as unethical.

In another test of ethics, people were asked about their willingness to include an inferior ingredient in a product that would hurt people but would generate more profit. Men were more willing than the women to see this as acceptable. In fact, women tended to see this as outrageous.

These results provide two reasons why women would be less likely to be in business than men. The first is that men are less troubled by unethical, but more profitable, decisions.  The idea that having “moral flexibility” provides an advantage,  as Glaucon  argued in Plato’s Republic. If a morally flexible person needs to lie to gain an advantage, he can lie. If a bribe would serve his purpose, he can bribe. If a bribe would not suffice and someone needs to have a tragic “accident”, then he can arrange an accident. A morally flexible person is like a craftsperson that has a broader range of tools, so they are more likely to have the right tool for every occasion. Just as the better equipped craftsperson has an advantage, the morally flexible person has an advantage over those more constrained by ethics. If women are, in general, more constrained by ethics, then they would probably be less likely to remain in business because they would be at a competitive disadvantage. The ethical difference might also explain why women are less likely to go into business—it is a common stereotype that unethical activity is part of doing business. If women are more ethical than men, then they would be more inclined to avoid business.

It could be countered that Glaucon is wrong and that being unethical (while getting away with it) does not provide advantages. Obviously, getting caught and punished for unethical behavior is not advantageous—but it is not the unethical behavior that causes the problem. Rather, it is getting caught and punished. Glaucon is clear that being unjust is only advantageous when one can get away with it. Socrates argues that being ethical is superior to being unethical, but he does not do so by arguing that the ethical person will have greater material success. That is conceded to Glaucon.

It must be noted that a person could be ethical and have material success while a morally flexible person could be a complete failure. The claim is that ethical flexibility provides a distinct advantage in material success in the context of capitalism.

One could, and should, point out that there are unethical women and ethical men. The obvious reply is that this claim is true—it has not been asserted that all men are unethical or that all women are ethical. Rather, women seem to be generally more ethical than men.

It might be countered that the ethical view assumed in this essay is flawed. For example, it could be countered that what matters is profit and the means to this end are thus justified. As such, using inferior ingredients to make a profit would not be unethical, but laudable. After all, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. As such, women might be avoiding business because they are unethical on this view of ethics.

The second reason is that women are more likely to be lied to in negotiations. If true, this would put women at a disadvantage relative to men. This, of course, assumes that such deceit would be advantageous in negotiations. While there surely are cases in which deceit would be disadvantageous, at deceit can be a very useful technique. While President Trump is but one example, his regime does provide an excellent example of the power of moral flexibility in material success.

If it is believed that having more women in business is desirable (which would not be accepted by everyone), then there seem to be two main options. The first is for women to become more unethical so they can compete with men. The second would be to endeavor to make business more ethical. This would also help address the matter of lying to women.

 

 

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While same sex couples currently have the right to marry, it would be unwise to think that this right is permanent. As such, I find it wise to continue to discuss the various arguments used against it. Fortunately, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to recycle old arguments rather than advance something new. As a philosopher, I’ll focus on the moral arguments against same-sex marriage.

If something is morally wrong, then it should be possible to present non-fallacious and reasonable arguments to show it is wrong.  There should also be true claims in any arguments. I do not claim that the arguments must be decisive, that is a rare occurrence in ethics. While people continue to argue against same sex marriage, the arguments are often the old mix of fallacies and poor reasoning. There is also the usual employment of untrue “facts.”

Appeal to tradition and appeal to common practice are two fallacies that are often used to argue against same-sex marriage.  This might be done by arguing that defining marriage as being between a man and a woman is correct because it is “age-old and still predominant.” Appeal to tradition is the fallacy that something is good or true just because it has been believed or practiced for a long time. While people do refer to a test of time, the mere fact that something has endured as a tradition is not evidence it is true or good. If it is, in fact, true or good, then reasons beyond an appeal to tradition should exist. Common practice is the fallacy that a practice is good just because it is common. But just because many people do something does not entail it is good. Also, if something is good, then there should be other reasons as to why it is good beyond the claim that it is commonly done. As same-sex marriage has now been around for a while, the appeal to tradition and common practice arguments can be countered on their own fallacious terms by pointing out that same-sex marriage is now both a tradition and a common practice.

Another standard argument against same-sex marriage is the procreation gambit, sometimes with an added bit about the state’s interest. One example is the argument made by the state of Utah during the last fight over the issue:  “Same-sex couples, who cannot procreate, do not promote the state’s interests in responsible procreation (regardless of whether they harm it).” There is also the boilerplate argument about “responsible procreation” and “optimal mode of child rearing.” Expect to see these arguments more if the push back against same-sex marriage gets more momentum.

In these arguments, same-sex marriage is criticized on two grounds in the context of “responsible procreation.” The first is the claim that same-sex couples cannot procreate naturally. The second is that same-sex couples fail to provide an “optimal mode of child rearing.” To argue same-sex couples the right to marry because of these criticisms would require accepting two general principles: 1) marriage is to be denied to those who do cannot or do not procreate and 2) people who are not capable of the “optimal mode of child rearing” should not be allowed to marry.

The first principle entails that different sex couples who do not want or cannot have children must also be denied marriage. After all, if an inability (or unwillingness) to have kids warrants denying same-sex couples the right to marry, the same would also apply to different-sex couples.

This principle would also seem to imply that couples who use artificial means to reproduce (such as in vitro fertilization or a surrogate) must also be denied marriage. After all, same-sex couples can use these methods to procreate. Alternatively, if different-sex couples can use these methods and be allowed to marry, then same-sex couples who procreate would thus also seem to be entitled to marriage.

The principle would also seem to entail that all married couples would be required to have at least one child, presumably within a specific time frame to ensure that the couple is not just faking their desire (or ability) to have children to get married. This would certainly seem to be a violation of the rights of the parents and an egregious intrusion by the state.

The second principle entails that straight couples who are not optimal parents must be denied marriage.  This would seem to require that the state monitor all marriages to determine that the parents are providing an optimal mode of child rearing and that it be empowered to revoke marriage licenses (as the state can revoke a driver’s license for driving violations) for non-optimal parents. Different-sex parents can obviously provide non-optimal modes. After all, child abuse and neglect are committed by different-sex couples.

While I agree irresponsible people should not have children and the state has an obligation to protect children, it is absurd to deny such people the right to marry. After all, not allowing them to marry (or dissolving the marriage when they proved irresponsible) would not make them more responsible or benefit the children. Now to the state’s interest.

For the sake of the argument, I will grant that the state (that is, the people making up a political entity we call the state) has an interest in having people reproduce. After all, the state is just a collection of people, so if there are no new people, the state will cease to exist. Of course, this also gives the state an interest in immigration—it would also replace lost people.

This interest in procreation does not, however, entail that the state thus has an interest in preventing same sex-marriage. Allowing same-sex marriage does not reduce the number of different-sex marriages—that is, there is not a limited supply of marriages that same-sex couples could “use up.” Also, even if there were a limited number of allowed marriages, same-sex couples would only be a small percentage of the marriages and, obviously enough, marriage is not a necessary condition for procreation nor responsible procreation. That is, people can impregnate or be impregnated without being married. People can also be good parents without being married. And they can be terrible parents when married.

Considering these arguments, the procreation argument against same-sex marriage remains absurd. If those opposing same-sex marriage had better arguments, they would surely use them. But they simply repeat the old, failed arguments and fallacies. But, to be fair and balanced, this is not a fight that is won or lost by logic but by politics and that battle might be refought soon.

As a young political science and philosophy major I learned about types of governments. Among these is the plutocracy—rule by the wealthy. I recall thinking, in my young anarchist days, that all governments were, are and will be plutocracies. After all, the rich always have influence proportional to their wealth and society tends to head in the direction desired by the wealthy. I was aware, of course, that there can be momentary disruptions of the plutocracy. For example, a rebellion or revolution might result in the old rich being killed, exiled or stripped of their wealth. However, history shows that a new rich always emerges (or the old rich return). Even in the allegedly communist states, a wealthy class has always appeared. “Communist” China, after all, has billionaires. The plutocratic system seems eternal.

As might be imagined, my cynical view was countered by some of my friends—they insisted that America was a democracy and not a plutocracy. After all, they argued, the rich do not always get their way in everything and money did not always decide elections. In fact, they pointed out that there were strict restrictions on political spending. A plutocracy would not have such limits.  As such, some might conclude that my younger anarchist self was mistaken. But I think, here in 2026, that my young self has been tragically proven right.

Years ago, the infamous Supreme Court ruling allowed unlimited campaign spending by corporations on the grounds that corporations are people, spending is speech and people have a right to free speech. The idea that corporations are people can be easily disproven by a simple reduction ad absurdum: If corporations have the right to free speech because they are people, then they cannot be owned. After all, the Constitution expressly forbids slavery (that is, the ownership of people). To contend that corporations can be owned yet are people who have freedom of speech is to either accept slavery or to fail to grasp the logical notion of consistency. So, a corporation can have freedom of speech, provided it is set free from being owned. Since it is obvious that corporations are things that can be justly owned, it should be obvious that they are not people. As such, they do not get freedom of speech. Naturally, the actual people associated with corporations have their right to freedom of speech. What remains is, of course, the matter of whether spending is speech or not.

On 4/2/2014 the Supreme Court struck down the aggregate campaign contribution limits. This was based, not surprisingly, on the Citizens United ruling in 2010.  That ruling included the absurd claim that the influence and access offered unlimited spending is not a concern in regard to corruption. The years since then have proven the obvious: unlimited spending invites corruption.

The case was brought by Shaun McCutcheon—a very wealthy Republican donor. The impact of his victory is that a single donor, such as McCutcheon, can contribute millions to parties, candidates and PACs. The ruling did leave some limits in place: an individual can give:  $2,600 per candidate, per election; $32,400 to political party committees per year; and $5,000 per PAC, per year. The main change was there is no longer an overall cap to the total donations. Previously, a donor could not give more than $123,200 to all political committees, with limits of $48,600 to candidates and $74,600 to political parties and PACs.

McCutcheon claimed, in error or falsely, that this was a grassroots victory against the status quo:  “With the ruling, we continue to chip away at the long entrenched status quo from the grassroots—a status quo that has kept challengers, better ideas, and new entrants to the political arena mostly locked out. Ensuring that citizens are able to contribute to multiple candidates or causes who share their views only provides further support to a system in which ‘We the People’ hold the ultimate reins of power.”

This was an odd claim in 2014, given that it benefits most those wealthy enough to make such donations as opposed to the average citizen who lacks the funds to take advantage of this ruling. As I predicted in 2014, this ruling weakened what little grasp the people still have on the reins of power and strengthened the grip of the wealth. As I predicted, this ruling was a boon for the Republican party and billionaires as was evident by the billionaires attemnding Trump’s last inauguration. While it is true that the Democrats also have their wealthy supporters, the Democrats rely more heavily on large numbers of small donations.

Back in 2014 I was concerned the ruling would lead to increased corruption and increased influence on politics by the wealthy. On the face of it, these seem to be the obvious consequences of lifting such restrictions and allowing the money to flow more freely into politics. After all, the original purpose of the restrictions was to address problems with corruption and influence buying. It was an easy prediction to get right.

While those who supported it insisted that corruption and influence buying would not increase, they also appealed to the principle of freedom. As Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner said at the time, “What I think this means is freedom of speech is being upheld. Donors ought to have the freedom to give what they want to give.”

The basic issue, then, was and still is whether such spending is speech.  That spending is free speech, seemed a dubious claim then and appears even more dubious now But let us reason through this. Suppose that spending money for political purposes should be considered speech. Now, it is acceptable to try to persuade a politician by speaking to them. If spending is speech, then I should be able to try to persuade politicians by speaking to them with money. However, this is bribery. But, if spending is a form of free speech, bribery should be acceptable as a form of free speech. This seems absurd, to say the least.

It might be countered that such contributions cannot be direct bribes in that there can be no direct giving of money in return for specific actions or promises to act. However, it would be foolish to believe campaign financing is not intended to influence behavior by providing money and support. After all, it would be ludicrous to imagine that millionaires and billionaires would donate millions of dollars and expect nothing in return. While this is not logically impossible, it is exceptionally unlikely. What has happened since 2014 has confirmed this repeatedly and the Trump regime has abandoned all pretense of not being a plutocracy. Although, to be fair and balanced, Trump’s approach is best seen as a griftocracy.

However, suppose  spending is a form of speech and tprotected by the right of free expression. It does not, of course, follow that such speech should be free of limits. After all, limits are justly placed on speech. The example everyone uses is yelling of “fire” in a crowded theater in which there is no fire. In the case of allowing this sort of spending, it would do serious harm to the political process by increasing the influence of an individual based on his wealth and thus proportionally decreasing the influence of those who are less wealthy. To use an analogy, it is on par with having a public discussion in which the wealthy are allowed to blast their speech from concert grade loudspeakers up on a stage while the rest of us are expected to try to shout out our views from the crowd.

To counter arguments like this, Roberts made an analogy to newspaper endorsements. As he said, there is no limit to the number of candidates a newspaper can endorse. As such, by analogy, it should follow that there should be no limit on the number of candidates a person can donate money to. There are two easy and obvious replies I made back in 2014. The first is to go back to the original argument that spending is not speech. While a newspaper endorsement is speech (it is the expression of ideas and views) handing people money does not seem to qualify as an expression of ideas and views. When I buy a pair of running shoes or pay my entry to a road race, I am not engaged in expression—I am trading money for goods and services. Likewise, when a person donates to a political cause, they are trading money for goods and services. But, even if it is accepted that spending is speech, there is still a significant difference. A newspaper endorsement works by persuasion—one is either swayed by it or not. In contrast, large sums of money have far more impact: money allows people to become viable candidates, and it allows them to run campaigns. As such, the influence of money is much more significant than the influence of a newspaper endorsement and this increases the likelihood of corruption.

This returns to the corruption issue. My contention, back in 2014, was that such a flow of money would lead to corruption and grant the wealthy even more influence, while reducing the political influence of the less wealthy. The competing claim is that allowing this sort of spending will not have any negative impact. Given the usual effect of large sums of money, I would claim that increased corruption seems to be the likely outcome. Looking back twelve years after that 2014 decision, my predictions were proven correct; although that was one of the easiest predictions I ever made.

Over a decade ago Susan Patton, better known as the “Princeton Mom”, made the rounds promoting her book, Marry Smart: Advice for Finding THE ONE.  This book presented the 18th century view that a woman should focus primarily on quickly finding a husband as fertility diminishes with time.

Patton attracted more attention with her March 11, 2014 interview with the Daily Princetonian. In a letter to the editor written about a year before the interview, she wrote, “Please spare me your ‘blaming the victim’ outrage” and claimed that a woman who is drunk and provocatively dressed “must bear accountability for what may happen.” When asked why the woman is responsible in the case of rape or sexual assault, she had the following to say:

 

 The reason is, she is the one most likely to be harmed, so she is the one that needs to take control of the situation. She is that one that needs to take responsibility for herself and for her own safety, and simply not allow herself to come to a point where she is no longer capable of protecting her physical self. The analogy that I would give you is: If you cross the street without looking both ways and a car jumps the light or isn’t paying attention, and you get hit by a car — as a woman or as anybody — and you say, ‘Well I had a green light,’ well yes you did have a green light but that wasn’t enough. So in the same way, a woman who is going to say, ‘Well the man should have recognized that I was drunk and not pushed me beyond the level at which I was happy to engage with him,’ well, you didn’t look both ways. I mean yes, you’re right, a man should act better, men should be more respectful of women, but in the absence of that, and regardless of whether they are or are not, women must take care of themselves.

 

As might be imagined, this view generated some backlash from faculty at Princeton and other people. While this is all old news, the triumph of MAGA, the rise of misogynistic authoritarianism and the tradwife movement make reconsidering these claims relevant to today.

Patton’s first claim is that since the woman is most likely to be harmed, she needs to be responsible for her safety. There are at least two ways to view this claim. One is the reasonable claim a person has an obligation to herself to make sure she is not needlessly in danger. This view that self-preservation is rational and obligatory is ably defended by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Another way to view the claim, which was taken by her critics, is that the burden falls completely on the woman. While this can be seen as a prudent view, it runs afoul of the notion that the wrongdoer should bear most of the responsibility for the harm inflicted (if not all of it).

Patton’s second claim is that a woman has an obligation to not allow herself to be incapable of self-defense. This might mean that a woman has an obligation to not become so drunk that she cannot defend herself from assault or rape. In defense of this claim, Patton offers her analogy: a woman who gets assaulted or raped when she is too drunk to defend herself is like someone who gets hit by a car because they did not look both ways before crossing the street—even though she had the right to cross.

The analogy has some merit—while drivers are obligated to take care not to hit people, a person should take care to avoid being hit and to do otherwise is foolish. As an experienced runner, I understand the value of defensive crossing and respond with horror when I see people starring at their phones as they blindly step into the crosswalk.

However, there is a distinction between what is prudent and what is morally obligatory. While a woman should not impair herself when she believes she will be at risk of assault or rape, this is different from her having a moral obligation to herself to avoid being vulnerable. There is also a third matter, namely who is responsible when a drunk woman is raped or assaulted.

About the second matter, this is a question of whether there is a moral obligation for self-defense. It is generally accepted that people have a moral right to self-defense and for the sake of the discussion that will be assumed (see John Locke for an argument). This right gives a person the liberty to protect herself. If it is only a liberty, then the person has the right to not act in self-defense and thus increase their risk of being a victim. However, if there is an obligation for self-defense, then failing to act on this would be a moral failing. challenge is to show that there is such an obligation.

On the face of it, it would seem self-defense is a liberty rather than an obligation. However, some consideration suggests this is not as obvious as it might seem.  In the Leviathan, Hobbes presents what the Law of Nature (lex naturalis): “a precept or general rule, found by reason, that forbids a man to do what is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving it and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.” Hobbes goes on to note that “right consists in liberty to do or to forbear” and “law determines and binds.” If Hobbes is correct, then people would have both a right to and an obligation for self-defense.

John Locke and Thomas Aquinas also contend that life is to be preserved and if they are right, then this would impose an obligation of self-defense. Of course, this notion could be countered by contending that all it requires is for a person to seek protection from possible threats and doing so could involve relying on the protection or restraint of others rather than oneself. However, there are arguments against this.

I will start with a practical argument. While the modern Western state projects its coercive force and spying eyes into society, the state’s agents cannot (yet) observe all that occurs nor can they always be close at hand in times of danger. This assumes, of course, that agents of the state want to protect citizens from harm.

As such, relying solely on the state would put a person at risk—after all, they would often be helpless in the face of danger. If a person relies on other individuals, then unless she is always guarded, then she also faces the risk of being a helpless victim. Relying on the state or others would, at the very least, seem imprudent.

This argument can be used as the basis for a moral argument. If a person is morally obligated to preserve life (including their own) and others cannot be reliably depended on, then they would have an obligation of self-defense and this would include not intentionally making themselves vulnerable to known threats. These threats would include those presented by bad men. As such, a woman would have a moral obligation to avoid being vulnerable. This seems reasonable.

The third matter is the question of moral responsibility when a drunk woman is assaulted or raped by a man who takes advantage of her vulnerability.  In the abstract, it could be argued that the woman does bear some responsibility—if a woman has an obligation to defend herself, she would have failed in her obligation by becoming vulnerable. As with the road analogy, someone who crosses the road without looking and gets hit has failed in a duty to herself. However, even if this point is granted, there is still the matter of who bears most of the moral responsibility.

On the face of it, it seems evident that the man who assaulted or raped the woman bears the overwhelming moral responsibility. After all, even if the woman should have avoided being vulnerable, the man has a far greater moral obligation to not harm her. There is also the matter of reasonable expectations. To be specific, while a person is obligated to protect herself, this does not obligate her to be hyper-vigilant against all possible dangers. If a woman does not buy body armor to wear on campus (after all, there are campus shooting) and she is shot by a gunman, it would be absurd to blame her for her injury or death. The blame rests on the shooter—his obligation to not shoot her outweighs the extent of her obligation to be prepared.

In the case of rape and sexual assault, while a woman should be prudent for the sake of self-protection, the overwhelming moral responsibility is on the man. That the woman makes herself vulnerable to rape or assault no more lessens the rapist’s responsibility than the fact that the woman was not wearing body armor lessens the responsibility of the shooter. The principle here is that vulnerability does not mitigate moral responsibility. This is intuitively plausible: just because a victimizer has an easier time with his victim, it hardly makes his misdeeds less bad.

Patton did acknowledge that men should act better, but she insisted that a woman must take care of herself. This could be seen as sensible advice: a woman should not count on the goodwill of others but be on guard against reasonably foreseeable harm. This advice is, of course, consistent with the view that the rapist is the one truly responsible for the rape.

In my first political science class, I learned every large human society has had a pyramid shaped distribution of wealth. Inevitably, the small population of the top controls a disproportionally large amount of wealth while the large population at the bottom owns a disproportionally small amount. This pattern holds whether the society is a monarchy, a dictatorship, a “communist” state or a democracy.

From a moral standpoint, one question is whether an unequal distribution is just. While some might be tempted to see any disproportional distribution as unjust, this would be an error. After all, the justness of a distribution is not only matter of numbers. For example, consider the unequal distribution of running trophies. First, most people who have them are or were runners. Most people will not have even a single running trophy. Second, even among runners there is a disproportionate distribution: there is a small percentage of runners who have a large percentage of the trophies. As such, there is a concentration of running trophies. However, this does not seem unjust: the competition for such trophies is usually open and fair and a trophy is generally earned by running well. The better runners will have more trophies and will be a small percentage of the runner population. Because of the nature of the competition, I have no issue with this. There is, of course, my bias in that I have won a lot of running trophies.

Those who defend the unequal distribution of wealth often claim competition for it is analogous to that of running trophies: the competition is open, the competition is fair, and the reward is justly earned by competing well. While this is a reasonable approach to justifying the massive inequality, the obvious problem is that these claims are simply not true.

Those who start out in a wealthy family might not make their money by inheritance, but they enjoy a significant starting advantage over those born into less affluent families. While it is true that a few people rise from humble origins to great financial success, those stories are so impressive because of the difficulty of doing so and the small number of people who achieve such great success. If people could consistently become wealthy through hard work and talent, these stories would be unremarkable, and the inequality of wealth would be much lower.

There is also the fact that the wealthy use their influence to ensure the political and social system favors them. While their efforts might not be explicitly aimed at keeping other people down, the effect is that the wealthy are favored and defended against attempts to “intrude” into the top of the pyramid. Naturally, people will point to those who succeeded fantastically despite this system. But, once again, these stories are impressive because of the incredible challenges that had to be overcome and because they are incredibly rare.

There is also the doubt about whether those who possess the greatest wealth earned the wealth in a way that justifies it. In the case of running, a person must earn her gold medal in the Olympic marathon by being the best runner and there is (usually) little doubt that the achievement has been properly earned. However, the situation of great wealth is not as clear. If a person arose from humble origins and by hard work, virtue, and talent managed to earn a fortune, then it seems fair to accept the justice of that wealth. However, if someone merely inherits an unearned fortune or engages in misdeeds (like corruption or crime) to acquire the wealth, then that is unjust wealth.

So, to the degree that the competition for wealth is open and fair and to the degree that the earning of wealth is proportional to merit, then the unbalanced distribution could be regarded as just. However, this is obviously not the case.  For example, a quick review of the laws, tax codes, and so on in the United States will show how the system is intended to work.

Suppose for the sake of argument, that the distribution of wealth in the United States is warranted on grounds like the distribution of running trophies. That is, suppose that the competition is open, fair and the rewards are merit based. This still provides grounds for criticism of the radical concentration of wealth.

One obvious point is that the distribution of running trophies has no significant impact. After all, a person can have a good life without any trophies. As such, letting them be divided up by competition is morally acceptable—even if most trophies go to a few people. However, wealth is fundamentally different as it is a necessity for survival. Beyond mere survival, it also determines the material quality of life in terms of health, clothing, housing, education, entertainment, and so on. Roughly put, wealth (loosely taken) is a necessity. To have such a competition when the well-being (and perhaps the survival) of people is at stake seems morally repugnant.

One obvious counter is a version of the survival of the fittest arguments of the past. The idea is that, just like all living things, people must compete to survive. As in nature, some people will not compete as well and will have less and perhaps not survive. Others will do better and a very few will do best of all.

The obvious reply is that this competition makes some sense when resources are so scarce that all cannot survive. To use a fictional example, if people are struggling to survive in a post-apocalyptic wasteland, then the competition for basic survival might be warranted by the reality of the situation. However, when resources are plentiful it is morally repugnant for the few to hyper-concentrate wealth while the many are left with little or nothing. To use the obvious analogy, seeing a glutton stuffing herself with a vast tableful of delicacies while her guards keep starving people away and her minions sell the scraps would strike all but the most callous as horrible. However, replace the glutton with one of the 1% and some are willing to insist that the situation is fair and just.

As a final point, the 1% also need to worry about the inequality of distribution. The social order which keeps the 99% from simply slaughtering the 1% requires that enough of the 99% believe that the situation is working for them. This can be done, to a degree, by coercion (police and military force) and delusion (this is where Fox News comes in). However, coercion and delusion have their limits and society, like all things, has a breaking point. While the rich can often escape a collapse in one country by packing up and heading to another (as dictators occasionally do), until space travel is a viable option the 1% are still stuck on earth with everyone else. Which is one reason why the richest of the rich have been so interested in space ships.