Category: Ethics

Peaceful protest is a basic right and in a democratic state the police should not interfere with that right. However, protests do escalate and violence can occur. In the United States it is all too common for peaceful protests to be marred by violence—such as damage to businesses and looting. The police are sometimes the instigators of violence, attacking peaceful protestors and then blaming the victims.

When considering reports of damage and looting during protests it is reasonable to consider whether this is being done by protestors or opportunists using the protest as cover or excuse. It is also worth considering that the reports are not true, especially now under the Trump regime.

An actual protestor is someone whose primary motivation is moral —they are there to express a moral condemnation of something perceived as wrong. Not all people who go to protests are actual protestors—some are there for other reasons. Some people believe a protest can provide an excellent opportunity for them to engage in criminal activity—to commit violence, to damage property and to loot. Protests do attract such people and often these are often not from the area.

Of course, actual protestors can engage in violence and damage property. Perhaps they can even engage in looting (though that almost certainly crosses a moral line). Anger and rage are powerful things, especially righteous anger. A protestor who is motivated by her moral condemnation of a perceived wrong can give in to her anger and do damage to others or their property. When people damage the businesses in their own community, this sort of behavior seems irrational. After all, setting a local gas station on fire generally won’t be morally justified by the alleged injustice. However, anger tends to impede rationality. I, and I assume most people, have seen people angry enough to break their own property. One example of this is when MAGA folks buy merchandise just to destroy it as an act of protest, usually against a company pretending to care about some issue.

While I am not a psychologist, I suspect that people sometimes engage in such violence because they cannot reach the target of their anger. Alternatively, they might be damaging property to vent their rage in place of harming people. I have seen people do just that. For example, I once saw someone hit a metal door frame (and break his hand) rather than hit the person he was mad at. Anger does summon up a need to express itself and this can easily take the form of property damage.

When a protest becomes destructive (or those using it for cover start destroying things), the police can often be justified in intervening. While protests are intended to draw attention and try to do so by creating a disruption of the normal course of events, a state of protest does not grant protestors a carte blanche right to interfere with the rights of others. As such, the police have a legitimate right to prevent protestors from violating the rights of others and this can sometimes involve the use of force. That said, sometimes the police are the ones engaged in the violation of rights, such as the infamous cases involving ICE under the Trump regime.

That said, the role of rage needs to be considered. When property is destroyed during protests, some condemn the destruction and wonder why people are destroying their own neighborhoods. In some cases, as noted above, the people doing the damage might not be from the neighborhood and might be there to destroy neighborhood property rather than to protest. If such people can be identified, they should be dealt with as criminals. What is morally problematic is when people are driven to such destruction by moral rage, that is, they have been pushed to a point at which they believe they must use violence and destruction to express their moral condemnation.

When looked at from a cool and calm perspective of distance, such behavior can seem irrational and unwarranted.  However, it is well worth it to think of something that has caused the fire of righteous anger to ignite your soul. Think of that and consider how you might respond if you believed that you have been systematically denied justice. Over. And over. Again. 

 

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The Republican narrative that gun violence is caused by mental illness is sometimes true, much as a broken analog clock is right two times a day. On November 20, 2014, Myron May shot three people on the FSU campus in Tallahassee, Florida. He was shot to death after firing at the police. I did not know May, but I know people who did. That is the sort of place Tallahassee is: if you don’t know someone, you know someone who does.

May can be seen as a fourth victim.  May had been a cross-country runner who graduated from FSU and went to law school. During most of his life, May seemed to be the last person who would hurt anyone else—he was well regarded and interested in doing good for the community. But he showed signs of mental illness that culminated in his death on the campus he loved.  As would be expected, while the Republican narrative blames mental illness, the party is not inclined to do anything to address the mental health crisis in America. While the Democrats do talk about gun control and helping Americans with health issues, they have largely proven ineffective. But this essay isn’t about criticizing our two awful political parties, but to discuss mental illness and gun violence.

As I learned many shootings ago, a person can usually only be involuntarily detained for mental health issues when they present an imminent danger. Because of this high threshold, authorities often cannot act until it is too late.

It can be argued that the threshold should be lower so a person can be helped before they engage in violence. The practical challenge is determining the extent to which a person presents a danger to himself or others. The moral challenge is justifying lowering the threshold.

Oen approach is using a utilitarian argument: helping someone before they engage in violence will help prevent such violence. That said, there is a moral concern with allowing authorities to act because someone  might do something. It must be noted that mentally ill people are more likely to be victims than perpetrators of violence.

It could be countered that certain mental issues are adequate evidence that a person is reasonably likely to engage in harmful behavior, even though they have done nothing to reach the imminent danger threshold.

This has some appeal. By analogy to physical health, if certain factors indicate a high risk of an illness, then it is sensible to treat that condition before it manifests. Likewise, if certain factors indicate a high risk of a person with mental issues engaging in violence, then it makes sense to treat for that condition before it manifests.

An obvious objection is that people can refuse medical treatment for physical conditions and hence they should be able to do the same for mental issues. A reply is that if a person refuses treatment for a physical ailment, they are usually only endangering themselves. But if someone refuses treatment for a condition that can result in her engaging in violence against others, then she is putting others in danger without their consent and she does not have the liberty or right to do this.

To use another analogy, some forms of mental illness can be seen as analogous to infectious diseases. The analogy is not that mental illness can be caught, but that an infected person presents a serious risk to others and, likewise, a person with a certain sort of mental illness can also present a serious risk to others. Provided that there is adequate evidence of the danger, then the state could be warranted in acting against the individual’s will. The practical challenge is determining what conditions warrant acting. The infectious disease analogy does make this even more political, given the ideological battles over COVID-19.

One practical concern is that mental health science is far behind physical health sciences and the physical health sciences are still relatively primitive. Because of this, predictions about mental health can be unreliable. Using the coercive power of the state on such a tenuous foundation would be morally problematic. After all, a person can only be justly denied liberty on adequate grounds, and such a prediction is not strong enough to warrant such action. Also, as noted above, people with mental illnesses are more likely to be victims than perpetrators. As such, focusing on preventing mass shootings by policing mental health does not seem like a good approach. But addressing the health issues in the United States would be good.

A counter to this is to argue that preventing a mass shooting is worth the price of denying people their freedom. An obvious worry is that without clear guidelines and limitations, this principle could be extended to anyone who might commit a crime—thus justifying locking up people for being potential criminals. This would  be wrong.

It might be countered that there is no danger of the principle being extended and that such worries are worries based on a slippery slope. After all, one might say, the principle only applies to those deemed to have a certain sort of mental issue. Normal people, one might say in a calm voice, have nothing to worry about.

However, it seems that normal people would have reason to worry. After all, it is “normal” for people to have mental issues (such as depression) because our society is a stressful nightmare.  There is also the concern that the application of the fuzzy science of mental health might result in people being subject to coercion without real justification. 

Considering these considerations, it might be worth reconsidering the threshold for applying the coercive power of the state to people with mental issues. However, this reconsideration needs to involve carefully considered guidelines and should be focused on helping people rather than merely locking them away in the hope of protecting others. Or yet another example of ineffective political theater. Obviously, some would argue that the best way to address gun violence is to focus on guns.

The situation at FSU also illustrated another point of moral concern. If we take the claim that some mass shooters are mentally ill seriously, then using lethal force against them would be morally problematic. While police have some less-than-lethal options like Tasers and nightsticks, these are not very effective against someone armed with a gun. There have been some efforts to produce less-than-lethal options that are as or nearly effective as guns, but these options have not proven successful, and police have generally not adopted them.

From a moral perspective, it would be preferable if officers had better less-than-lethal options. In the case of May’s situation, if he had been rendered unable to act rather than shot to death, he might have been able to benefit from medical help and return to a normal life. In the case of criminals who are not suffering from mental illness, it would still seem morally preferable to subdue them without shooting them. As such, there is a good moral reason to develop an effective less-than-lethal weapon.

It is also important to note that such a weapon would need to be effective enough to morally justify its use in place of a gun. Such a weapon could be less effective than a gun and still be acceptable, but there is an important question about how effective the weapon would need to be. In practical terms, of course, there is the question of whether such a weapon is possible. After all, while something like the stun setting on a Star Trek phaser would be ideal, it is likely to always be science fiction.

In closing, some might argue that this essay is misguided. Debating about mental illness and discussing less-than-lethal options is a distraction from the real problem, which is the horrible society that is inflicted upon us. The real solution, one might argue, is fixing the nightmare in which the rest of us are ruled over by the cruel, the ignorant and the wicked.

 

 

 

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Bionics have long been part of science fiction (most famously the Six Million Dollar Man), the reality of prosthetics has mostly been disappointing. But, thanks to America’s endless wars and advances in technology, bionic prosthetics are real. There are, for example, replacement legs that replicate the functionality of the original organic versions quite well. There have also been advances in prosthetic arms and hands as well as progress in artificial sight.  As with all technology, these devices raise ethical issues.

The easiest moral issue to address involves restorative bionics. These are devices that restore a degree of the original functionality possessed by the lost limb or organ. For example, a soldier who lost the lower part of her leg to an IED might receive a bionic device that restores much of the functionality of the lost leg. As another example, a person who lost an arm in an industrial accident might be fitted with a replacement that does some of what he could do with the original.

On the face of it, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who would claim that the use of restorative bionics is immoral—after all, they merely restore functionality. However, there is still a moral concern about the obligation to provide restorative bionics. One version of this is the matter of whether the state is morally obligated to provide such devices to soldiers injured in the course of their duties. Another is whether insurance should cover such devices for the general population.

The usual argument against both obligations is financial—such devices are expensive. Turned into a utilitarian moral argument, the argument would be that the cost outweighs the benefits; therefore, the state and insurance companies should not pay for such devices. One reply, at least in the case of the state, is that the state owes the soldiers restoration. After all, if a soldier lost the use of a body part (or parts) in the course of her duty, then the state is obligated to replace that part if possible. Roughly put, if Sally gave her leg for her country and her country can provide her with a bionic leg, then it should do so.

In the case of insurance, the matter is somewhat more complicated. In the United States, medical insurance a private, for-profit business. As such, a financially focused person could argue that the obligations of the insurance company are limited to the contract with the customer. So, if Sam has coverage that pays for his leg replacement, then the insurance company is obligated to honor that. If Bill does not have such coverage, then the company is not obligated to provide the replacement.

Switching to a utilitarian counter within the realm of practical concerns, it can be argued that bionic replacements would save money in the long term. Inferior prosthetics can cause pain, muscle and bone issues and other problems that generate ongoing costs. In contrast, a superior prosthetic can avoid many of those problems and allow the person to better return to the workforce or active duty. As such, there seem to be excellent practical reasons in support of the state and insurance companies providing such restorative bionics. I now turn to the ethics of bionics in sports.

Thanks to the infamous “Blade Runner” Oscar Pistorious, many people are familiar with unpowered, relatively simple prosthetic legs that allow people to engage in sports. Since these devices seem inferior to the original organics, there is little moral worry here iabout fairness. After all, a device that merely allows a person to compete as he would with his original parts does not seem to be morally problematic. This is because it confers no unfair advantage and merely allows the person to compete normally. There is, however, the concern about devices that are inferior to the original as these would put an athlete at a disadvantage and could warrant special categories in sports to allow for fair competition. Some of these categories already exist and more should be expected in the future.

Of greater concern are bionic devices that are superior to the original organics in relevant ways. That is, devices that could make a person faster, better or stronger. For example, bionic legs could allow a person to run at higher speeds and avoid the fatigue that limits organic legs. As another example, a bionic arm coupled with a bionic eye could allow a person incredible accuracy and speed in pitching. While such augmentations could make for interesting sporting events, they would seem to be clearly unethical when used in competition against unaugmented athletes. To use the obvious analogy, just as it would be unfair for a person to use a motorcycle in a 5K foot race, it would be unfair for a person to use bionic legs that are better than organic legs. There could, of course, be augmented sports competitions—these might even be very popular in the future.

Even if the devices did not allow for superior performance, it is worth considering that they might be banned from competition for other reasons. For example, even if someone’s powered legs only allowed them a slow jog in a 5K, this would be analogous to using a mobility scooter in such a race—though it would be slow, the competitor is not moving under her own power. Naturally, there should be obvious exceptions for events that are merely a matter of participation, such as charity walks.

Another area of moral concern is the weaponization of bionic devices. When I was in graduate school, I made some of my Ramen noodle money writing for R. Talsorian Games’ Cyberpunk. This science fiction game features implanted weapons and weapon grade cybernetic replacement parts. Fortunately, these weapons do not add a new moral problem since they fall under the existing ethics regarding weaponry, concealed or otherwise. After all, a gun in the hand is still a gun, whether it is held in an organic hand or literally inside a mechanical hand.

One final area of concern is that people will elect to replace healthy organic parts with bionic components either to augment their abilities or out of a psychological desire or need to do so. Science fiction, such as the above-mentioned Cyberpunk, has explored these problems and even come up with a name for the mental illness caused by a person becoming more machine than human: cyberpsyhcosis.

In general, augmenting for improvement seems morally acceptable, if there are no serious side effects (like cyberpsychosis) or other harms. However, it is easy enough to imagine various potential dangers: augmented criminals, the poor being unable to compete with the augmented rich, people being compelled to upgrade to remain competitive, and so on—all fodder for science fiction stories.

As far as people replacing healthy organic parts, that would also seem acceptable as a form of life style choice. This, of course, assumes that the procedures and devices are safe and do not cause health risks. Just as people should be allowed to have tattoos, piercings and such, they should be allowed to biodecorate.

 

 

 

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For those not familiar with the term, to catcall is to whistle, shout or make a comment of a sexual nature to a person passing by. In general, the term is used when the person being harassed is a woman, but men can also be subject to such harassment.

Back in 2014, a video documenting a woman’s 10 hours of being catcalled as she walked New York City, garnered considerable attention. In between 2014 and today there was the #MeToo movement and some pushback against the patriarchy. With the triumph of Trump, the patriarchy of idiots pushed back hard, and I almost expect a presidential medal of misogyny to be awarded at some point. But there is the question of why some men catcall.

 Some men seem to think they have a right to catcall. As one man put it back in 2014, “if you have a beautiful body, why can’t I say something?” This view has two parts. The first (“you have a beautiful body”) seems to suggest that the woman is responsible for the response because of her beautiful body. It is reasonable to accept that beauty, be it in a person or painting, can evoke a response from a viewer. The problem is that a catcall is not a proper response to beauty and certainly not a proper response to a person. Also, while a woman’s appearance might cause a reaction, the verbal response chosen by the man (or boy) is his responsibility.

The second part (“why can’t I say something?”) suggests a presumptive right to catcall. This seems to assume the burden of proving that men should not catcall rests on women and it should be assumed that a man has such a right. While the moral right to free speech does entail than men have a right to express their views, there is also the matter of whether it is right to engage in such catcalling. I would argue that it does not on the grounds that the harm done to women by catcalling outweighs the harm that would be done to men if they did not catcall. While I am wary of laws that infringe on free expression, men should not (in the moral sense) behave this way.

This question also shows a sense of entitlement—that the man seeing the woman as beautiful entitles him to harass her. This seems similar to believing that seeing someone as unattractive warrants saying derogatory things about them. Again, while people do have freedom of expression, there are things that are unethical to express.

Some men also claim that the way a woman dresses warrants their behavior. As one young man said back in 2014, “If a girl comes out in tight leggings, and you can see something back there… I’m saying something.” This is just an expression of the horrible view that a woman invites or deserves the actions of men by her choice of clothing. This is best known as a “defense” for rape—the idea that the woman was “asking for it” because she was dressed in provocative clothing. However, a woman’s mode of dress does not justify her being catcalled or attacked. After all, if a man was wearing an expensive Rolex watch and was robbed, it would not be said that he was provocative or was “asking for it” by displaying such an expensive timepiece. Or if a corporation has beautiful databases of information, few would argue that it was asking to be hacked. Naturally, it might be a bad idea to dress a certain way or wear an expensive watch when going certain places, but this does not justify catcalling or robbery.

There has been some speculation that catcalling, like everything else, is the result of natural selection. One might say that if the theory of evolution is correct and human behavior is determined (rather than free), then this could be be true. This is because all human behavior would be the result of such selection and determining factors. In this case, one cannot really say that the behavior would be wrong, at least if something being immoral requires that the person engaging in the behavior could do otherwise. If a person cannot do otherwise, placing blame or praise on the person would be pointless—like praising or blaming water for boiling at a certain temperature and pressure. Looking at it another way, it might be useful to consider the alleged evolutionary forces that might lead to the behavior.

One possible “just so” story is that males would call out to passing females as a form of mating display (like how birds display for each other). Some of the females would respond positively and thus the catcalling genes would be passed on to future generations of men who would in turn catcall women to attract a mate.

One reason to accept this view is that some forms of what could be seen as catcalling do seem to work. Having been on college campuses for decades, I have seen a vast amount of catcalling in various forms. Some women respond by ignoring it, some respond with hostility, and some respond positively. While the positive response rate seems low, it is a low effort “fishing trip” and hence the cost to the male is rather small. Like fishing, a person might cast hundreds of times to catch a single fish.

One reason to reject this view is that many of the guys who use it will obviously never get a positive response. However, they might think they will—they are casting away like mad, not realizing it will never work. After all, they might have seen it work for other guys and think they have a chance.

Moving away from evolution, one stock explanation for catcalling is that men do it as an expression of power over women. A man might be an unfit, ugly, overweight, graceless, unemployed slob but he can make a fit, beautiful, intelligent and successful woman feel afraid and awful by screeching at her about her body. Of course, catcalling is not limited to such men, though the power motive would still seem to hold. This is morally reprehensible because of the harm it does to women. Even if the woman is not afraid of the man, having to hear such things is unpleasant. While I am a man, I do understand what it is like to have stupid and hateful remarks yelled at me. When I was young and running was not as accepted as it is now, it was rare for me to go for a run without someone saying something stupid or hateful to me. Or throwing things. Being a reasonably large male, I did not feel afraid (most of those yelling did so from the safety of passing automobiles). However, such remarks did bother me—much in the way that being bitten by mosquitoes bothers me. The harassment made running less pleasant. As such, I have sympathy for women who are catcalled, especially since the harassment would be far worse for them since they need to worry that the catcaller might attack them.

In my youth, I was even “catcalled” by women—but I am sure it was not the same sort of experience that women face when catcalled by men. After all, the women who have catcalled me are probably just kidding (perhaps even being ironic) and, even if they are not, they almost certainly harbored no hostile intentions and presented no real threat. As an example, when a young woman yelled “nice ass” from her SUV as I ran through the FSU campus was a weird sort of compliment rather than a threat. Though it was still weird.  In contrast, when men engage in such behavior it seems overtly predatory and threatening. So, we men should refrain from catcalling women. I have mixed feeling about women praising my butt while I run, but honesty compels me to admit that part of my aging brain (and butt) would welcome it. Which is probably wrong.

 

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Like most people, I have eaten bugs. Also, like most Americans, this has been unintentional and often done in ignorance. I’ve accidentally inhaled a few bugs while running but mostly I’ve consumed bug bits in foods—the FDA allows a certain percentage of “debris” and some of that is composed of bugs.

While Americans typically do not willingly and knowingly eat insects, about 2 billion people do and there are about 2,000 species that are known to be edible. As might be guessed, many who eat insects live in developing countries. As countries develop, people tend to switch away from eating insects. This is hardly surprising—eating meat is seen as a sign of status while eating insects typically is not. However, there are excellent reasons to use insects as a food source for humans and animals. Some of these reasons are practical while others are ethical. Unfortunately, using insects as food is now a battle in the culture war, with a conspiracy theory that the global elites want to make us eat (more) bugs. After all, we already get bugs in our food.

One practical reason to use insects as a food source is efficiency. 10 pounds of feed will yield 4.8 pounds of cricket protein, 4.5 pounds of salmon, 2.2 pounds of chicken, 1.1 pounds of pork, and .4 pounds of beef.  With a growing human population and the degradation of the environment, increased efficiency will be vital to providing people with enough food.

A second practical reason is they require less land to produce protein. For example, it takes 269 square feet to produce a pound of pork protein while it requires only 88 square feet to generate one pound of mealworm protein.  Given an expanding population and a decrease in available land, this is a good reason to use insect farming as a food source. It is also morally relevant, at least for those who are concerned about the environmental impact of food production. If we can produce more food on less land we could, in theory, allow some currently used land to return to the wild.

A third reason, which would be rejected by those who deny climate change, is that producing insect protein generates less greenhouse gas. A pound of pork generates 38 pounds of CO2 while a pound of mealworms produces only 14. For those who believe that CO2 production is a problem, this is both a moral and practical reason in favor of using insects for food. For those who think that CO2 has no impact or does not matter, this would be no advantage.

A fourth practical reason is that while many food animals are fed using food that humans could also eat (like grain and corn based feed), many insects  consume organic waste unfit for human consumption. As such, insects can transform low-value feed material (such as garbage) into higher value feed or food. This would also provide a moral reason, at least for those who favor reducing waste that ends up in landfills. This could provide some interesting business opportunities and combinations—imagine a waste processing business that “processes” organic waste with insects and then converts the insects to feed, food or for use in other products (such as medicine, lipstick and alcoholic beverages).

A potentially powerful moral argument in favor of choosing insect protein over protein from animals such as chicken, pigs and cows is based on the assumption that insects have a lower moral status than such animals (or at least would suffer less).

In terms of the lower status approach, the argument would be a variation on one commonly used to support vegetarianism over eating meat: plants have a lower moral status than animals; therefore, it is preferable to eat plants rather than animals. If insects have a lower moral status than chickens, pigs, cows, etc., then using insects for food would be morally preferable. This, of course, also rests on the assumption that it is preferable to do wrong (in this case kill and eat) to beings with a lesser moral status than to those with a higher status.

In terms of the suffering argument, this would be a standard utilitarian argument. The usual calculation involves weighing the harm (in this case, the suffering) against the benefits. Insects are, on the face of it, less able to suffer (and less able to understand their own suffering) than animals like pigs and cows. Also, insects would seem to suffer less under the conditions in which they would be raised. While chickens might be factory farmed with their beaks clipped and confined to tiny cages, mealworms would be pretty much doing what they would do in the “wild” when being raised as food. While the insect would still be killed, the overall suffering generated by using insects as food would be far less than that created by using animals like pigs and cows as food. This would seem to be a morally compelling argument.

The most obvious problem with using insects as food is the “yuck factor.” Bugs are generally seen as dirty and gross. They are things that you usually do not want to find in your food. Some of the “yuck” is visual, such as seeing the insect as you eat it. One obvious solution is to process insects into forms that look like “normal” foods, such as powders, pastes, and the classic “mystery meat patty.”  People can also learn to overcome the distaste, much as some people must overcome their initial rejection of foods like lobster and crab. Also, to be a bit crude, most people eat flesh cut from the corpses of dead animals so we should be able to tolerate the alleged grossness of eating bugs.

Another concern is that insects might bear the stigma of being a food suitable for “primitive” cultures and not suitable for “civilized” people. Insect based food products might be seen as lacking in status, especially in contrast with traditional meats. These are, of course, all matters of social perception. Just as they are created, they can be altered. As such, these problems could be overcome.

Since I grew up eating lobsters and crabs (I’m from Maine), I am already fine with eating “bug-like” creatures. So, I would not have any problem with eating actual bugs, if they are safe to eat. I will admit that I probably will not be serving up plates of fried beetles to my friends, but I would have no problem serving up food containing properly processed insects. And not just because it would be, at least initially, funny.

 

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Back in 2014 Kaci Hickox, a nurse from my home state of Maine, returned to the United States after serving as a health care worker in an Ebola outbreak. Rather than being greeted as a hero, she was confined to an unheated tent with a box for a toilet and no shower. She did not have any symptoms and tested negative for Ebola. After threatening a lawsuit, she was released and allowed to return to Maine. After arriving home, she refused to be quarantined again. She did, however, state that she would be following the CDC protocols. Her situation put a face on a general moral concern, namely the ethics of balancing rights with safety. As Ebola has once again made it into the American news cycle, it is worth revisiting this situation.

While past outbreaks of Ebola in Africa were met largely with indifference from the West (aside from those who went to help), the 2014 outbreak infected the United States with a severe case of fear. Some in the media fed the fear, presumably in the hopes of increasing views. Politicians also contributed to the fear. Some tried to make Ebola into a political game piece to bash their opponents and score points by appeasing fears they helped create. Because of this fear, most Americans supported a travel ban for Ebola infected countries and some states imposed mandatory quarantines. While politicians will exploit the fears of the public, the ethics of the matter should be considered rationally. My view has not changed much from 2014 but is worth reconsidering.

While Ebola and other deadly diseases are scary, I address them with the same approach I use for all situations in which rights (or liberties) conflict with safety.  The first step is sorting out the level of risk. This includes determining the probability that the harm will occur as well as the severity of the harm (in quantity and quality). In the case of Ebola, the probability that someone will be infected in the United States is low. As experts have pointed out, infection requires direct contact with bodily fluids while a person is infectious. Even then, the infection rate has seemed relatively low, at least for past cases in the United States. In terms of the harm, Ebola can be fatal. However, timely treatment in a well-equipped facility can be effective. In terms of the things that are likely to harm or kill someone in the United States, Ebola is near the bottom of the list. As such, a rational assessment of the threat is that it is usually a small one in the United States. Naturally, if the chances of infection increased, then a reassessment of the threat would be in order. While overreacting from fear is bad, not responding to a disease can be worse.

The second step is determining key facts about safety proposals. One obvious concern is the effectiveness of the proposed method. As an example, the 21-day mandatory quarantine would be effective at containing Ebola. If someone shows no symptoms during that time, then she is almost certainly Ebola free and can be released. If a person shows symptoms, then she can be treated immediately.  An alternative, namely tracking and monitoring people rather than locking them up would also be effective—at least it has worked in the past. However, this method could fail—bureaucratic failures might happen or people might refuse to cooperate. A second concern is the cost of the method. In the case of the 21-day quarantine, there are the obvious economic and psychological costs to the person being quarantined. After all, some people will not be able to work from quarantine, and the person will be isolated from others. There is also the cost of the quarantine itself. In terms of other consequences, it was argued that imposing this quarantine would discourage volunteers from going to help and this will be worse for the United States. This is because it is best for the rest of the world if Ebola is stopped before it spreads and this will require volunteers from around the world. In the case of the tracking and monitoring approach, there would be a cost—but less than a mandatory quarantine.

From a practical standpoint, assessing a proposal is a utilitarian calculation: does the risk warrant the cost? To use some non-Ebola examples, every aircraft could be made as safe as Air-Force One, every car could be made as safe as a NASCAR vehicle, and all guns could be taken away to prevent gun accidents and homicides. However, we have decided that the cost of such safety is too high and hence we are willing to allow people to die. In the case of Ebola, the calculation is a question of considering the risk against the effectiveness and cost of the proposed method. Since I am not a medical expert, I  will defer to the medical experts who claimed that the quarantine approach was not warranted for people who lack symptoms and test negative.

The third concern is the moral concern. Sorting out the moral aspect involves weighing the practical concerns (risk, effectiveness and cost) against the right (or liberty) in question. Some also include the legal aspects of the matter here as well, although law and morality are distinct (except for those who are legalists and see the law as determining morality). Since I am not a lawyer, I will leave the legal aspects to others and focus on the ethics.

When working through the moral aspect, the challenge is determining whether the practical concerns morally justify restricting or even eliminating rights (or liberties) in the name of safety. This should be based on consistent principles in when balancing safety and rights. Unfortunately, people tend to be wildly inconsistent. In the case of Ebola, some people expressed the “better safe than sorry” view and imposed or supported mandatory quarantines at the expense of the rights and liberties of those  quarantined. In the case of gun rights, these are often taken as trumping concerns about safety. The same holds true of the “right” or liberty to operate automobiles: tens of thousands of people die each year on the roads, yet any proposal to deny people this right would be rejected.  In general, people assess based on feelings, prejudices, biases, ideology and other non-rational factors, which helps explain the lack of consistency. So, people are willing to impose on basic rights for little or no gain to safety, while also being content to refuse even modest infringements in matters that result in great harm (as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated). However, there are also legitimate grounds for differences: people can, after due consideration, assess the weight of rights against safety differently.

Turning back to Ebola, the main moral question is whether the safety gained by imposing a quarantine (or travel ban) would justify denying people their rights. In the case of someone who is infectious, the answer would seem to be “yes.” After all, the harm done to the person (being quarantined) is greatly exceeded by the harm that would be inflicted on others by his putting them at risk of infection. In the case of people who are showing no symptoms, who test negative and who are relatively low risk (no known specific exposure to infection), then a mandatory quarantine would not be justified. Naturally, some would argue that “it is better to be safe than sorry” and hence the mandatory quarantine should be imposed. However, if it was justified in the case of Ebola, it would also be justified in other cases in which imposing on rights has even a slight chance of preventing harm. This would seem to justify taking away private vehicles and guns: these kill more people in the United States than Ebola. It might also justify imposing mandatory diets and exercise on people to protect them from harm.  After all, poor health habits are major causes of health issues and premature deaths. To be consistent, if imposing a mandatory quarantine is warranted on the grounds that rights can be set aside even when the risk is incredibly slight, then this same principle must be applied across the board. This seems rather unreasonable and hence the mandatory quarantine of people who are not infectious would also be unreasonable and not morally acceptable. 

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Having written on the ethics of asteroid mining, I thought I would return to this subject and address an additional moral concern, namely the potential dangers of asteroid (and comet) mining. My concern here is not with the dangers to the miners but with dangers to our home world and the rest of us.

While mining of asteroids and comets is currently science fiction, it is possible and might prove to be economically viable. One relevant factor is the high cost of getting material into space. Given this cost, space construction using material mined in space might be cost effective. Satellites might be built in space from material harvested from asteroids. It is also worth considering that the cost of mining materials in space and shipping them to earth might also be low enough that space mining would be viable. If such material is more expensive to mine or has limited availability on earth, then space mining could be viable or even necessary.

If material mined in space is to be used on earth, an obvious problem is how to get the material to the surface safely and as cheaply as possible. One approach is to move an asteroid close to the earth to facilitate mining and transportation—it might be more efficient to move the asteroid rather than send mining vessels back and forth. One obvious moral concern about moving an asteroid close to earth is that something could go wrong and the asteroid could strike the earth, perhaps in a populated area. Another obvious concern is that the asteroid could be intentionally used as a weapon—perhaps by a state or by non-state actors. An asteroid could do incredible damage and would provide a “clean kill” without radioactive fallout or chemical or biological residue.  An asteroid might even “accidentally on purpose” be dropped on a target, thus allowing the attacker to claim that it was an accident (something harder to do when using actual weapons).

Given the dangers posed by moving asteroids into earth orbit, this is something that should be carefully regulated. That said, accidents and intentional misuse are guaranteed.

Another concern is the transport of material from space to earth. The obvious approach is to ship material to the surface using a vehicle, perhaps constructed in orbit from materials mined in space. Such a vehicle could be simple as it would not need a crew and would just have to ensure that the cargo landed in roughly the right area. Another approach would be to drop material from orbit—perhaps by surrounding valuable materials with materials intended to ablate during the landing and with a parachute system for some braking.

An obvious concern is the danger posed by such transport methods. While vehicles or rock-drops would not do the sort of damage that an asteroid would, if one crashed into a densely populated area (intentionally or accidentally) it could do significant harm. While such crashes will almost certainly occur, there is a moral obligation to try to minimize the chances they will happen. The obvious problem is that increasing safety usually increases cost and decreases convenience. For example, having the landing zones in unpopulated areas would reduce the risk of a crash into an urban area, but would  require transporting materials to places where it can be processed (unless the processing plants are built in the drop zone).  As another example, payload sizes might be limited to reduce the damage done by crashes. As a final example, the vessels or drop-rocks might be required to have safety systems, such as backup parachutes. Given that people will cut costs and corners and suffer lapses of attention, accidents are inevitable. We can also expect the Republican party to work hard to ensure that space mining is not well regulated and that it is used to hurt people.  Also of concern is the fact that the vessels and drop-rocks could be used as weapons (as a rule, any technology that can be used to kill people will be used to kill people). As such, there will need for safeguards. It would, for example, be bad if terrorists were able to get control of a system and start dropping vessels or rocks onto a city.

Despite the risks, if there is profit to be made in mining space and new chances to make people suffer, it will almost certainly be done. Given that the resources on earth are limited, access to the bounty of the solar system could be good for (almost) everyone. It could also be another step for humanity towards the stars. Or it could play out in a corporate dystopia.

 

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In science fiction automated medical services are common. One example is the autodoc—an autonomous robotic pod that treats the patient within its confines. Medbots, as distinct from the autodoc, are robots that do not enclose the patient, but do their work in a way like a traditional doctor or medic.  There are also non-robotic options using remote-controlled machines—this would be an advanced form of telemedicine in which the patient can be treated remotely. Naturally, robots can be built that can be switched from robotic (autonomous) to remote controlled mode. For example, a medbot might gather data about the patient and then a human doctor might take control to diagnose and treat the patient.

One of the main and morally commendable reasons to create medical robots and telemedicine capabilities is to treat people in areas without enough human medical professionals. For example, a medical specialist who lives in New York City could diagnose and treat patients in such desolate areas as New Jersey or Ohio. With such machines, a patient could (in theory) have access to any also radically change health care—after all, a medical robot would never get tired and such robots could, in theory, be sent all over the world, even Florida, to provide medical care. There is, of course, the usual concern about the impact of technology on jobs—if robots can replace medical personnel and increase profits for corporations, that will certainly happen. While robots would excel at programmable surgery and similar tasks, it will probably be some time before robots are advanced enough to replace human medical professionals on a large scale

Another excellent reason to create medical robots and telemedicine capabilities has been made clear by the latest Ebola outbreak: medical personnel are at risk for infection. While protective gear and protocols do exist, the gear is cumbersome, flawed and hot and people often fail to follow protocols.  While many people are moral heroes and put themselves at risk to treat the ill and bury the dead, there are no doubt people who are deterred by the very real possibility of a horrible death. Medical robots and telemedicine seem ideal for handling such cases and the more utopian use of robots is to save lives (rather than just take jobs).

First, human diseases cannot infect machines: a robot cannot get Ebola. So, a doctor using telemedicine to treat Ebola patients would be at not risk. This would presumably increase the number of people willing to treat such diseases and lower the impact of such diseases on medical professionals. That is, far fewer would get sick or die trying to treat people.

 Second, while a machine can be contaminated, decontaminating a medical robot or telemedicine machine would be easier than disinfecting a human. After all, a sealed machine could be completely hosed down by another machine without concerns about it being poisoned by disinfectants, etc. While patients might be exposed to a contaminated machine, machines do not go home—so a contaminated machine would not spread a disease like an infected or contaminated human would.

Third, medical machines could be sent, even air-dropped, into remote and isolated areas that lack doctors yet are often the starting points of diseases. This would allow a rapid response that would help the people there and help stop a disease before it makes its way into heavily populated areas. While some doctors and medical professionals are willing to be dropped into isolated areas, there are no doubt many more who would be willing to remotely operate a medical machine that has been dropped into a remote area suffering from a deadly disease.

There are, of course, some concerns about the medical machines, be they medbots, autodocs or telemedicine devices.

One is that these medical machines might be so expensive that it would be cost prohibitive to use them in situations in which they would be ideal (namely in isolated or impoverished areas). While politicians and pundits often blather about human life being priceless, actual practice shows they do not act on this. So, the challenge would be to develop medical machines that are effective yet inexpensive enough that they would be deployed where they would be needed.

Another concern is the possibility of a psychological impact on the patient. When patients who have been treated by medical personal in hazard suits speak about their experiences, they often remark on the lack of human contact. If a machine is treating the patient, even one remotely operated by a human, there will be a lack of human contact. But the psychological harm done to the patient would be outweighed by the vastly lowered risk of a disease spreading. Also, machines could be designed to provide more in the way of human interaction—for example, a telemedicine machine could have a screen that allows the patient to see the doctor’s face and talk to her.

A third concern is that such machines could malfunction or be intentionally interfered with. For example, someone might “hack” into a telemedicine device as an act of terrorism. While it might be wondered why someone would do this, it seems to be a general rule that if someone can do something evil, then someone will do something evil. As such, these devices would need to be safeguarded. While no device will be perfect, it would certainly be wise to consider possible problems ahead of time—although the usual process is to have something horrible occur and then fix it. Or at least talk about fixing it.

In sum, the latest Ebola outbreak has (once again) shown the importance of developing effective medical machines that can enable treatment while taking medical and other personnel out of harm’s way.

 

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The right to vote is part of the foundation of democracy and this includes the right to have one’s vote count. One part of protecting this right is preventing voter fraud. Fraud can rob legitimate voters of their right to decide the election. Another part is preventing voter suppression because it can rob people of their votes.

Republicans profess to be very worried about voter and election fraud (by Democrats) and have enacted laws aimed they claim will reducing such fraud. In response, Democrats claim these laws are aimed at voter suppression. Each side accuses the other of having wicked political motives. Many Democrats see Republicans as trying to disenfranchise voters who tend to vote for Democrats. The Republicans counter, without evidence, that Democrats support fraud because it is in their favor. While these beliefs might be sincere, sincerity is irrelevant to truth. What matters are the reasons and evidence that support the belief. As such, I will look at the available evidence and endeavor to sort out the matter.

One point of contention is the extent of voter fraud. One longstanding Republican talking point is that voter fraud is widespread.  For example, on April 7, 2014 Dick Morris claimed that over 1 million people voted twice in 2012. If this was true, then it would be a very serious matter: widespread voter fraud could change the results of elections and rob voters of their right to decide. Democrats admit fraud does occur but at such a miniscule level that it has no effect on election outcomes and does not warrant the measures favored by the Republicans.

Settling this matter requires looking at the available facts.  Dick Morris’ claim (which made the rounds as a conservative talking point), is false. But the fact that Morris was astoundingly wrong does not prove that voter fraud is not widespread. However, the facts do. Despite years of searching for fraud, the Republicans have not found any evidence (other their own efforts to overturn the 2020 election).

Republicans argue for voter ID laws by claiming they will prevent fraud. However, past investigations of voter fraud has shown only 31 credible cases out of one billion ballots. As such, this sort of fraud does occur—but only at an incredibly low rate.

In general, significant (let alone widespread) voter fraud does not occur although the myth is widespread. Republican claims about voter fraud are based on a myth and shows the lack of foundation for their claims and proposals regarding the matter. And yet they persist in their fairy tales of fraud.

It might be argued that while voter fraud is insignificant, it still must be countered by laws and policy changes, such as requiring voter IDs and eliminating early voting.  This has some appeal. To use an analogy, even if only a fraction of 1% of students cheated, then professors should still take some effort to prevent that cheating for the sake of academic integrity. Unless, of course, the measures used to counter that cheating did more harm than the cheating. The same would seem to apply to measures to counter voter fraud.

A key moral issue here is whether it is more important to prevent fraud or to prevent disenfranchisement. This is analogous to the moral concern about guilt in the legal system. In the United States, there is (supposed to be) a presumption of innocence on the moral grounds that it is better that a guilty person goes free than an innocent person be unjustly punished. In the case of voting, should it be accepted that it is better that a legitimate voter be denied her vote rather than an illegitimate voter be allowed to get away with fraud? Or is it better that an illegitimate voter gets away with fraud then to deny a legitimate voter her right to vote?

My moral conviction is that it is more important to prevent disenfranchisement and this should be given greater weight than fraud prevention. To avoid a straw man attack, I must say I am against fraud and favor rational safeguards against it. However, given the minuscule rates of fraud if attempts to reduce it result in disenfranchisement, then I would oppose such attempts on moral grounds. Naturally, others take a different view and believe it is worth disenfranchising voters in an (alleged) attempt to reduce the minuscule rates of fraud to even more miniscule levels.

Returning to the matter of facts, one  important concern is whether the laws and policies in question result in voter suppression. If they do not, even if they do nothing to counter voter fraud, then they might be tolerable (assuming they do not come with other costs).

But the evidence shows the laws allegedly aimed at preventing voter fraud serve as voter suppression measures, mostly aimed at minority voters. Keith Bentele and Erin E. O’Brien published a study entitled “Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies.” Based on their analysis of the data, they concluded “the Republican Party has engaged in strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting electoral fortunes, and an internal rightward ideological drift among the party faithful.” The full study, from the journal Perspectives on Politics, is available here. Since this is a factual matter, those who disagree with these findings can counter this by providing an analysis of equal or greater credibility based on supported facts. Since the 2013 study, Republicans have increased their efforts to fight “fraud” and Trump has made it clear he wants Republicans to do anything they can to ensure Republican victories through such means as redistricting and various strategies that are obviously aimed at voter suppression.

It is a talking point among Republicans that most professors are tools of the Democrats and academic experts should not be trusted. While this has been an effective ad homimen, what is needed is evidence and arguments countering the claims.  If professors are tools of the Democrats and academic experts are not to be trusted, then it should be easy to provide credible, objective evidence and analysis showing that they are in error.

One of the best-known methods proposed to counter voter fraud is the voter ID law. While, as shown above, the sort of fraud that would be prevented by these laws almost never occurs, it serves to disenfranchise voters. As would be suspected, Hispanic and African-American voters are more likely than white Americans to lack the ID required by these laws.

Another approach is to make it harder for citizens to register. One example is restrictions on voter registration drives—Hispanics and African-Americans register to vote at twice the rate of whites via drives. It is not clear how these methods would reduce fraud. The restrictions mostly do not seem to be aimed at making it harder for people to register fraudulently—just to make it more inconvenient to register at all.

A third tactic is to reduce the available early voting times and eliminate weekend and evening voting. This would seem to have no effect on fraud but seems aimed at minority voting patterns. In 2008 70% of African-American voters in North Carolina cast their ballots early.  Minority voters are more likely than white voters to vote on weekends and in the evening. For example, 56% of the 2008 weekend voters in Cuyahoga County in Ohio were black.

A fourth tactic is to make it harder for people with past convictions to regain their voting rights. This impacts African Americans the most. This tactic does not prevent fraud—it merely denies people the right to vote.

The laws and policies allegedly aimed at voter fraud would not reduce the existing fraud (which is already miniscule) and the only effect would be to suppress voting. As such, these laws and proposals fail to protect the rights of voters and instead are a violation of that basic right. In short, they are either a misguided and failed effort to prevent fraud or a wicked and potentially successful effort to suppress voters in favor of Republican victories. Either way, these laws and policies are a violation of a fundamental right of American democracy.

 

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As I have written in other essays, the Dungeons & Dragons alignment system is surprisingly useful for categorizing people in the real world. This time I will look at chaotic evil.

In fantasy games, players often encounter chaotic evil foes—these include classic enemies ranging from the lowly goblin to the terrifyingly powerful demon lord. Chaotic evil foes are usually good choices for those who write adventures—no matter what alignment the party happens to be, almost no one has a problem with killing chaotic evil creatures. Especially other chaotic evil creatures. Fortunately, chaotic evil is not as common in the actual world as it is in game world. In the game system, chaotic evil is defined as follows:

 

A chaotic evil character is driven entirely by her own anger and needs. She is thoughtless in her actions and acts on whims, regardless of the suffering it causes others.

In many ways, a chaotic evil character is pinned down by her inherent nature to be unpredictable. She is like a spreading fire, a coming storm, an untested sword blade. An extreme chaotic evil character tends to find similarly minded individuals to be with—not out of any need for company, but because there is a familiarity in this chaos, and she relishes the opportunity to be true to her nature with others who share that delight.

 

The chaotic evil person differs from the lawful evil person in their view of law. While they are both evil, the lawful evil person is committed to order, tradition and hierarchy. As such, lawful evil types can create, lead and live in organized states (and all real-world states have lawful evil aspects). They can get along with others. In contrast, chaotic evil types have no commitment to order, tradition or hierarchy. But they can be compelled. For example, if the threat of punishment is sufficient, a chaotic evil type will obey those with greater power. Chaotic evil types do like order, tradition and hierarchy in the same way that arsonists like things that burn—without these things, the chaotic evil type would have much less to destroy.

Lawful evil types do often find chaotic evil types useful for specific tasks, although those wise about evil are aware of the dangers of using such tools. For example, a well-organized terrorist group or corporation might have lawful evil leadership. However, they will find many uses for the chaotic evil types. A lawful evil type is generally not likely to strap on an explosive vest and run into a crowd, but a chaotic evil person might. Lawful evil types also sometimes need people to create chaos so that they can then impose more order—the chaotic evil are the right people for this job. But, as noted, chaotic evil people can get out of hand—they are not constrained by order or even rational selfishness. This is why the smart lawful evil types do their best to see to it that the chaotic evil types do not outlive their usefulness.

The chaotic evil person differs from the neutral evil person in terms of their view of chaos. While the chaotic evil and neutral evil are both selfish and care nothing for others, the neutral evil person tends to be more rational and calculating in her selfishness. A neutral evil person can have excellent self-control and conceal her true nature to achieve her selfish and evil ends. Chaotic evil types lack that self-control and find it hard to conceal their true nature—that takes a discipline that the chaotic, by their nature, lack. President Trump provides an excellent real-world example of a chaotic evil person, although his followers might envision him as awful good.

The neutral evil see society as having instrumental value for them—but their selfishness means that they will take actions that can destroy society. The chaotic evil person sees no value in society other than as presenting a target rich environment for their evil. In our world, chaotic evil types tend to be those who commit horrific crimes, endeavor to corrupt and destroy nations, or engage in acts of brutal terror.

While chaotic evil types are chaotic and evil, they can take up the mantle of a cause and purport to be acting for some greater good. However, their actions disprove their claims about their alleged commitment to anything good. They might take up a religious or political cause to assuage whatever shreds of conscience they might still retain—or do so as part of their chaotic game.

In an orderly society that does not need the chaotic evil people to do evil tasks, smarter chaotic evil types try to hide from the authorities—though their nature drives them to commit evil. Those that are less clever commit their misdeeds and are quickly caught. The cleverer might never be caught and become legends. Fortunately for the chaotic evil (and unfortunately for everyone else), they have plenty of opportunities to act on their alignment. There are always organizations that are happy to have them and there are always places where they can act in accord with their true natures—often with the support and blessings of the authority. In the end, though many are willing to make use of their morality, no rational person wants the chaotic evil around.

 

 

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