Category: Race

When attacking DEI efforts, folks on the right usually make vague remarks about merit. While the right seems to have abandoned philosophy, let us imagine a good faith argument against DEI efforts based on an appeal to merit.

While the right is unclear what they mean by “merit”, the common usage is that a person receives something, such as a position, based on earning it through being worthy. For example, when people talk about meritocracy, they usually speak of people earning positions, jobs, scholarships or promotions based on their skills, abilities and effort. In contrast, receiving such things because of factors such as wealth, social class, or family connections would not be the result of merit. There are obvious philosophical questions about what factors should count as merit in terms of determining what people earn and what they merely receive. For example, a person who gets into college because of their academic ability might seem to have earned it by merit. But what if they have that ability because of the genetic lottery and years of expensive tutoring and schooling paid for by wealth inherited by their parents? They did not earn their genes, tutoring, and schooling and this would, it seems to diminish claims of merit. But let us return to constructing a merit argument against DEI efforts. I will then use that merit argument against inheritance.

To build a merit argument against DEI efforts, one must begin with the assumption that DEI is either not needed or unfair. For it not to be needed, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI do not face significant discrimination or unfair obstacles and have equal opportunity to succeed on their merits. For it to be unfair, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI gain an unfair, unmerited advantage over others.

While those who oppose DEI often seem to do so from racism, sexism and similar bigotry, one could take the view that women and minorities are just as capable as white men (and have equal opportunities) but that DEI efforts provide its beneficiaries unfair advantages over equally qualified white men. If it is also assumed that things such as jobs and scholarships should be earned by merit, then it would follow that DEI is bad. Obviously, I do not think that most folks on the right are advancing good faith arguments against DEI but let us take the merit argument seriously and hold them to their professed view that laws should be crafted to ensure that success is merit based and that unfair advantages are eliminated. This entails that the inheritance laws should be changed to eliminate the unfair, unearned advantages conferred by inherited wealth. If one is exceptionally devoted to merit, one could even push for laws aimed at creating equality of opportunity for everyone—but I will just focus on inheritance.

Inherited wealth, by definition, is unearned and thus anything it is used to acquire would be unmerited to the degree the wealth purchased it. Such wealth can confer significant advantages in terms of such things as influence, opportunities and resources. As a minor example, a family with sufficient inherited wealth can own property in the best school district, provide tutoring and other support for their children, enroll them in special programs and so on. If one is a stickler about merit, children obviously do not earn or merit such advantages even if their parents did not inherit their wealth and to the degree the children gain from them, they would not be earning whatever they receive from them. Ironically, the anti-DEI President Trump received millions from his father, and this provided him with a massive, unearned advantage over everyone who choose their parents less wisely. Family members can also inherit businesses and gain unearned ownership and positions in those businesses. And so on, for all that can be inherited and can yield unfair advantages. None of these are earned or merit based. So, those who reject DEI based on the merit argument must also oppose inheritance on the same basis. If laws should be passed to forbid DEI to ensure that success is based on merit, then laws should also be passed to eliminate or severely restrict inheritance to ensure that success is based on merit.

It might be objected that inherited wealth is not like DEI efforts, but the challenge is to show how they different in relevant ways. One could argue that there is an obvious difference: DEI is linked to such factors as gender, ethnicity and veteran status, whereas inheritance is usually just a matter of birth. But objections of this sort would be based on the idea that merit should apply to DEI factors but not otherwise, which would not be a merit-based argument. If merit is what matters and the law must ensure this, then merit is what matters and the law must ensure this.

While few, if any, on the right would accept the above reasoning and consistency arguments obviously have no effect on the right (or most people), we should always remember that their merit arguments against DEI are made in bad faith unless they also argue against inheritance. When they speak of merit, they should be asked about inheritance and other unfair advantages they favor.

As a follow up to the war on CRT (Critical Race Theory) and wokeness, the right has waged a largely successful war on DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusivity). While I take a favorable view of DEI, I recognize that DEI efforts sometimes suffered from corruption and inefficiency. I also acknowledge (and criticize) that some of it was purely performative. This is to say that the efforts of DEI were just like other human efforts, which gives us no special reason to criticize it in particular for these failings. But these are flaws that should be addressed, whether they be in DEI programs or the operations of the Pentagon. Despite these flaws, there are  good reasons in favor of DEI. And, of course, arguments against DEI.

One justification for DEI efforts is that they are supposed to offset past unfairness, discrimination, and injustice. That is, they are warranted on the moral grounds that they address past wrongs. A standard concern about this justification is that it can be seen as addressing past discrimination by engaging in present discrimination. As an illustrating anecdote, when I was applying for a job during my last year of grad school, I and my fellow white male philosophers were worried that our chances of getting a job would be lower because schools appeared to be addressing past discrimination in hiring by what seemed might be present discrimination in hiring. That is, that we white males of the (then) present would be sacrificed to atone for the sins of the white males of the past. While it is tempting to dismiss such concerns, there is a reasonable moral concern about fairness. I recall that there were serious suggestions that the old white guys should step down to open more jobs for women and minorities. After all, to the degree they “earned” their jobs because of past discrimination and exclusion, would it not be fair that they be the ones to pay the price demanded by justice? This approach and its consequences do raise moral concerns about individual justice and justice for groups. Being philosophers, we did consider that even if we, as individuals, were treated unfairly during the hiring process, this might still be morally justified. Those of us inclined to difficult self-reflection also considered that we might have been under the influence of racism and sexism when thinking that we might be treated unfairly simply in virtue of being white men. Because of my own experience, I can understand how people might feel about DEI. My considered view is that while there can be cases where white men are treated unfairly, concerns about addressing past wrongdoing are morally relevant on utilitarian grounds. Also, virtue theory supports this: it is better to err on the side of addressing a greater injustice rather than refusing to do so out of an exaggerated fear of the possibility of a lesser injustice.

A second reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can address existing unfairness and discrimination. For example, funding programs for minority owned businesses can be seen as helping to offset the discrimination against minorities in the realm of finance. As another example, a scholarship for female students in the sciences can be seen as offsetting the bias against women in the sciences.

Such efforts can, of course, be interpreted as unfair. For example, a white business owner might argue that funding only available to minorities is unfair to her. As another example, a male student could contend that it is unfair that he cannot get the scholarship that a woman can. While such arguments can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith by people who know that, for example, white business owners are more likely to get loans than minority business owners (even when they are financially equal)—so white business owners already have an unfair advantage. Good faith reasoning requires that we consider the full context and not just take each alleged unfairness in ahistorical isolation. For example, in isolation it might seem unfair if funding or a scholarship were not available to everyone. But if one group already enjoys an unfair advantage, attempting to offset that helps restore fairness. Unfortunately, many unfair advantages are hidden and exposing them often requires good faith analysis and interpretation. To illustrate, banks obviously do not advertise special white-only rates for home loans, but these exist in practice. As such, explicit efforts to provide fair loans to minority home buyers can appear unfair, since they explicitly exclude while the exclusions in practice are usually concealed.

A third reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can aim at allowing fair consideration of and opportunities for people who would otherwise be excluded. Going back to my example of academic hiring, academic philosophy was (and is) a mostly white male field and it took intentional effort for highly qualified women and minorities to even be considered for professorships. In the case of competitions for such things as jobs or scholarships, this approach increases fairness by preventing people from being excluded simply because of their race, gender, age, etc.

The usual criticism of this is that DEI efforts are not really aimed at providing equal consideration and fairness, but are intended to provide an unearned advantage to some people based on their identity. While such criticisms can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith based on racism and sexism. I will discuss this in my next essay in this series as I look at how the American right works to erase and whitewash history as part of its attack on DEI efforts.

The murder of nine people in the Emanuel AME Church in South Carolina in 2015 ignited an intense discussion of race and violence. While there was near-universal condemnation of the murders, some argue it was part of a broader problem of racism in America. This claim is supported by reference to the well-known history of systematic violence against blacks in America as well as consideration of contemporary data. Interestingly, some people respond to this approach by asserting that more blacks are killed by blacks than by whites. Some even seem obligated to claim that more whites are killed by blacks than blacks are killed by whites.

While these points are often “thrown out there” without being forged into a coherent argument, presumably the intent of such claims is to disprove or at least diminish the significance of claims about violence against blacks by whites. To be fair, there might be other reasons for bringing up such claims. Perhaps someone wants to broaden the discussion to all violence out of a genuine concern for the well-being of all people.

In cases in which the claims about the number of blacks killed by blacks are brought forth in response to incidents such as the church shooting, this tactic appears to be a specific form of a red herring. This occurs when an irrelevant topic is presented to divert attention from the original issue. The idea is to “win” an argument by leading attention to another topic.

This sort of “reasoning” has the following form:

 

  1. Topic A is under discussion.
  2. Topic B is introduced under the guise of being relevant to topic A (when it is not).
  3. Topic A is abandoned.

 

In the case of the church shooting, the pattern would be as follows:

 

  1. The topic of racist violence against blacks is being discussed, specifically the church shooting.
  2. The topic of blacks killing other blacks is brought up.
  3. The topic of racist violence against blacks is abandoned in favor of focusing on blacks killing other blacks.

 

This sort of “reasoning” is flawed because changing the topic of discussion is not an argument against a claim. In the specific case at hand, switching the topic to black-on-black violence does nothing to address the topic of racist violence against blacks.

While the red herring label would certainly suffice for these cases, it is certainly appealing to craft a more specific version for cases in which something bad is “countered” by bringing up another bad. The obvious name for this fallacy is the “two bads fallacy.” This is a fallacy in which a second bad thing is presented in response to a bad thing with the intent of distracting attention from the first bad thing (or with the intent of diminishing the badness of the first bad thing).

This reasoning has the following pattern:

 

  1. Bad thing A is under discussion.
  2. Bad thing B is introduced under the guise of being relevant to A (when it is not).
  3. Bad thing A is ignored, or the badness of A is claimed to be diminished or refuted.

 

In the case of the church shooting, the pattern would be as follows:

 

  1. The murder of nine people in the AME church, which is bad, is being discussed.
  2. The claim that blacks killing other blacks, which is bad, is brought up.
  3. The badness of the murder of the nine people is ignored, or its badness is claimed to be diminished or refuted.

 

This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because the fact that something else is bad does not entail that another bad thing has its badness lessened or refuted. After all, even if there are worse things than something, this does not entail that it is not bad. In cases in which there is not an emotional or ideological factor, the poorness of this reasoning is usually evident:

 

Sam: “I broke my arm, which is bad.”

Bill: “Well, some people have two broken arms and two broken legs.”

Joe: “Yeah, so much for your broken arm being bad. You are just fine. Get back to work.”

 

What seems to lend this sort of “reasoning” some legitimacy is that comparing two things that are bad is relevant to determining relative badness. If a person is arguing about how bad something is, it is certainly reasonable to consider it in the context of other bad things. For example, the following would not be fallacious reasoning:

 

Sam: “I broke my arm, which is bad.”

Bill: “Some people have two broken arms and two broken legs.”

Joe: “That is worse than one broken arm.”

Sam: “Indeed it is.”

Joe: “But having a broken arm must still suck.”

Sam: “Indeed it does.”

 

Because of this, it is important to distinguish between cases of the fallacy (X is bad, but Y is also bad, so X is not bad) and cases in which a legitimate comparison is being made (X is bad, but Y is worse, so X is less bad than Y, but still bad).

Way back in 2015 the internet exploded over Rachel Dolezal, the former leader of Spokane’s NAACP chapter. Ms. Dolezal had claimed to be African-American, Native American and white. She also claimed that her father is black. Reporters at KXLY-TV, however, looked up her birth certificate and determined that her legal parents are both white. Her parents asserted that she is white.

While the specifics of her case were certainly interesting to many, my concern is with more general issues about race and identity. While this situation was the best-known case of a white person trying to pass as black, passing as another “race” has long been a common practice in the United States, although this has usually been people trying to pass as white. Since being accepted as white enables a person to avoid many disadvantages, it is clear why people would attempt to pass as white. Since being accepted as black generally does not confer advantages in the United States, it is not surprising that Dolezal drew so much attention. These matters raise some interesting questions and issues about race.

Borrowing language from metaphysics, one approach to race could be called race realism. This is not being realistic about race in the common use of the term “realistic.” Rather, it is accepting that race is a real feature of reality. That is, the metaphysics of the world includes categories of race. As such, a person could be objectively black or white (or a mix). Naturally, even if there are real categories of race, people could be wrong about them.

One alternative is race nominalism. This is the idea that racial categories are social constructs and do not line up with an underlying metaphysical and physical reality. This is because there is no underlying metaphysical and physical reality that objectively grounds racial categories. In this case, a person might engage in self-identification in regard to race and this might or might not be accepted by others. A person might also have others place them into a race category, which they might or might not accept.

Throughout history, some people have struggled to find an objective basis for categories of race. Before genetics, people had to use appearance and ancestry. The ancestry was, obviously, needed because people did not always look like the race category that some people wanted them to be in. One example of this is the “one drop” rule once popular in some parts of the United States: one drop of black blood made a person black, regardless of their appearance.

The discovery of genes provided some people with a new foundation for race categories as they believed that there would be a genetic basis for their racism. The idea was that just as a human can be distinguished from a cat by genes, humans could be divided into races by their genetic make-up. While humans show genetic variations that are often linked to the geographical migration and origin of their many ancestors, race genes were not found. That is, humans (not surprisingly) are all humans with some minor genetic variations. The variations are not sufficient to objectively ground race categories.

In general, the people who quested for objective foundations for race categories were (or are) racists. These searches typically involved trying to find evidence of the alleged superiority of one’s race and the inferiority of other races. That said, a person could look for foundations for race without being a racist. They could be engaged in a scientific or philosophical inquiry rather than seeking to justify social practices and behaviors.

Given the failure to find a real foundation for race categories, it makes sense to embrace race nominalism. On this view, the categories of race exist only in the mind, they designate  how people think about the world rather than how reality is carved up. Even if it is accepted that race is a social construct, there is still the matter of the rules of construction: how the categories are created and how people are placed in them

One approach, which is similar to that sometimes taken for gender, is that people can self-identify. That is, a person can declare their race and this is sufficient to be in that category. If race categories are essentially made up, this does have a certain appeal. If race is a fiction, then anyone can be the author of her own fiction.

While there are some who do accept this view, the outrage over Ms. Dolezal showed that most people reject the idea of self-identification at least when a white person endeavors to self-identify as black. Interestingly, some of those who condemned her did defend the historical passing as white by some black people. The defense is appealing since blacks endeavoring to pass as white were doing so to escape oppression and this can be justified as a form of self-defense. In the case of Ms. Dolezal, the presumption seemed to be that the self-identification was both insincere and aimed at personal gain. Regardless of her true motivation, insincere self-identification aimed at personal gain seems to be wrong on the grounds that it is a malign deception. Some might, of course, regard all attempts at passing to gain an advantage as being immoral.

Another approach is that of the social consensus. The idea is that a person’s membership in a race category depends on the acceptance of others. This could be a matter of majority acceptance (one is, for example, black if most people accept one as black) or acceptance by a specific group or social authority. The obvious problem is working out what group or authority has the right to decide membership in race categories. On the one hand, this very notion seems linked to racism: one probably thinks of white supremacists and Nazis setting race categories. On the other hand, groups also seem to want to serve as the authority for their race category. Consistency might indicate that this would also be racist.

The group or authority that decides membership in race categories might make use of a race credential system to provide a basis for their decisions. That is, they might make use of appearance and ancestry. So, Ms. Dolezal would not be black because she looks white and has white parents. The concern with this sort of approach is that it was also used by racists, such as the KKK and Nazis, to divide people by race. A more philosophical concern is the basis for using appearance and ancestry as the foundation for race categories, for what justifies their use?

This discussion does show an obvious concern with policing race categories as it seems like doing so uses the tools of racism and would thus seem to be at least a bit racist. However, arguments could be advanced as to why the policing of race categories is morally acceptable and not racist.

One interesting narrative about the riots in Baltimore involved the concept of the rule of law. Put roughly, the rule of law is the idea that the law should govern rather than the arbitrary decisions of those in power. The notion is sometimes applied to the citizens as well, that citizens should follow the rule of law to resolve conflicts—as opposed to engaging in activities such as riots or vigilantism.

Thinkers such as John Locke have argued that the rule of law is preferable to that of the state of nature. These arguments are generally persuasive, especially since Locke emphasizes the moral responsibilities of the state in regard to the good of the people. That is, he does not simply advocate obedience to whatever the laws happen to be but requires that the laws and the leaders prove worthy of obedience. Laws or leaders that are tyrannical are not to be obeyed but are to be defied and justly so.

Since I find Locke’s arguments appealing, it is hardly surprising that I favor rule of law when the laws are good and the leaders are acting for the good of the people. When the government has moral legitimacy, the laws and the leaders have the right to expect people to follow the laws and listen to the leaders. However, when the laws or leaders violate the basic agreement, then their legitimacy evaporates.

Some conservatives spoke of the tyranny of Obama and how the Democrats wished to create a tyrannical state. They are right to be worried about tyranny. However, their timeline is in error: tyranny was already present in 2015 and has strengthened since.  

John Locke provides the following definition of “tyranny”: “Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.  And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage.”

The United States meets this definition. In 2014, researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted a study to determine the extent to which laws reflect the views of the majority versus the interests of those in power. This study, titled “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” , used data gathered from 1981 to 2002.

The researchers examined about 1,800 polices from that time and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups. The results were hardly surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”

While following these laws would be to conform to the rule of law, it would also be to embrace tyrannical laws crafted for the advantage of those holding power and not the good of the people.

While the people who riot are probably unfamiliar with this research, they know the obvious: they live within a political and economic system that serves the “private, separate advantage” of the elite class and has little to offer them. As such, it should be no shock that some people do not embrace the rule of such law. If they are striking out against these laws and their riots are a revolt, they are revolting against a tyrannical system, one that serves the interests of the powerful few and not the good of the people. Or to be fair to those who were critical of the riots, perhaps they are just breaking things.

Continuing with tyranny, Locke notes that “Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another.”

Sadly, this is an accurate description of the excessive use of force against citizens by some police officers. Baltimore, as has been widely reported, has paid out millions of dollars in settlements due to the wrongful use of force by police against citizens. As folks on the right love to say, not all police officers are bad and there are excellent officers. However, even a cursory examination of the problems with policing in American cities shows that Locke’s definition of tyranny is routinely met. As such, it is evident that the rule of law was already broken well before the riots. And is being shattered in 2025.

While Locke did not use this phrase, the rule of law is a two-way street and those who are charged with enforcing the law must also obey that law, otherwise it would be unreasonable to expect obedience from the citizens. As such, the most obvious step to restoring rule of law is to ensure that those charged with enforcing the laws are also following the laws. This was true in 2015 and is still true today.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Veggies

On April 12, 2015 Freddie Gray died in police custody. For some, this was part of a pattern of police violence. For others (such as Fox hosts), this was just another isolated incident.

The initial protests to this death were peaceful and it was hoped by many that Baltimore would avoid the violence that marked other protests (including riots in Baltimore’s own past). This hope was shattered in an outbreak of violence and destruction.

One obvious concern is the identity and the nature of those engaged in violence. According to some narratives, the rioters were thugs or outsiders taking advantage of the situation to engage in destruction, theft and violence. That is, they are opportunists and not protestors.

The United States does have a history of costly and pointless riots that are not protests. These are, of course, sports riots. One outstanding example is the 1992 riot in the aftermath of the Chicago Bulls vs. the Portland Trail Blazers. The damage was estimated at $10 million. There have been other lesser riots, such as that following the 1999 Michigan State vs. Duke game that resulted in about $250,000 in damage (and whose iconic photo is a shirtless white bro “flashing the horns” atop a burned-out car). My adopted state of Florida also sees violence and property damage during Spring Break, although California did seem interested in getting into the spring break riot game.

Given that Americans are willing to riot over sports and spring breaks, it is reasonable to consider that the rioters in Baltimore were not protesting but were motivated by other reasons, perhaps just wanting to break and burn things.

There are some narratives that cast at least some of the rioters as having also been protesting. That is, their motivation is not just to steal, break and burn but to express their anger about the situation. One way to explore motivations is to consider the situation in Baltimore. That is, to see if there were legitimate grounds for anger and whether these factors might have provoked people to violence and destruction. 

Baltimore was (and still is) a paradigm of the brutal race and class divisions in the United States. It has the historical distinction of being the first city to pass a citywide segregation law (segregating each residential block by race) and the legacy of this law persists as Baltimore remains a segregated city. In the center of the city, 60% of the population is black. The suburbs are predominantly white. Despite there being laws against forced segregation, the United States is still highly segregated. This provides grounds for anger.

Baltimore also exemplifies the stark class divisions in the United States. Back in 2015, 150,000 of the city’s 620,000 were classified as poor (the average income for a family of four being $23,492). The unemployment rate was close to 10%. As the American Revolution showed, people get angry and violent in response to perceived economic injustice. Given the massive disparity between economic classes in the United States and their support by the structures of law and authority, what is shocking is not that there is an occasional riot but that there are not daily riots. As such, there were sufficient grounds for anger. Naturally, some people claimed that this poverty is because the poor are lazy: if they would only work hard for the job creators, they would not be poor. This view ignores the reality of poverty in America, but it is a beloved narrative of those who are doing well.

Not surprisingly, Baltimore also has had serious issues with crime. Drug addiction was a serious problem and the city was 5th in the number of murders per year in 2014. It was, however, 15th in the number of violent crimes per year. Crime is, of course, a complex matter. Some claim that this sort of crime arises from poverty, oppression and lack of opportunity (as opposed to the ‘crimes’ of the financial classes, such as destroying the world economy). There is, of course, a correlation between crime and these factors. Some claim that people turn to crime because of moral defects rather than these factors. This does have some merit. After all, a look at the financial sector and halls of power show evil behavior that is clearly not caused by poverty.

Like other US cities, there was also an issue with how the police treat their fellow citizens. In 2011 the city paid $6.3 million settling police misconduct claims. Between 2011 and 2012 there were 156 such lawsuits. The number did decline to 156 from 2013 to 2014. While it is reasonable to consider that not all these suits had merit, what happened to Gray does provide reason to suspect that there are grounds for being concerned about policing in the city.

When people think they are being oppressed and subject to brutality, they respond with anger. For example, one can see the rage the fine folks on Fox express when they speak of the War on Christmas and how Christians are being mistreated and persecuted in America. One can only imagine the anger that arises when people really are subject to mistreatment. As such, there seem to be legitimate grounds for anger.

While the anger of those engaged in violence might have been justified, there is still the obvious concerns about whether such behavior is morally acceptable and whether such behavior is effective in achieving goals.

On the face of it, much of the violence and destruction would seem to be difficult to justify morally. Most of the destruction seemed to involve community infrastructure and the property of people who were not responsible for what provoked the protests. While the anger against the police was understandable, the attacks on reporters and firefighters were unjustified. The reporters did nothing meriting being attacked and the firefighters were trying to keep the city from burning down, which is certainly a laudable goal. Crudely put, if the violent (alleged) protestors were striking against injustice, they were (mostly) hitting the wrong targets. To use an analogy, if Bob has wronged Sam and Sam smashes Sally’s windows because he lives near her and cannot get at Bob, then Sam has acted wrongly, no matter how badly Bob wronged him.

It might be countered that the destruction is morally acceptable because the (alleged) protestors are striking out against an unjust social order. The obvious reply is that while this might have some abstract appeal, the real damage is being done mainly to the innocent rather than the guilty. As such, the violence and destruction seem to have been immoral.

A second issue, which can connect to the moral issue, is the effectiveness of violence as a means of protest and social change. Obviously, violence can be very effective in achieving goals. We Americans can point to our own Revolutionary War and the wars won against everyone from the Apache to the Japanese. However, violence is only effective when one has enough power to achieve one’s goals through that violence. Since the rioters went up against the police and the National Guard, it makes sense why they could not achieve victory through force of arms.

However, a case can be made that violence gets attention. Peaceful protests, one might argue, sound nice but are easy to ignore. After all, “change things or we will peacefully protest again” has less power than “change things or there will be cop cars burning in the streets and the authorities will have to explain why they are losing control of the city.” Interestingly, many of the pundits who praised the property destruction that occurred during the Boston Tea Party are quick to condemn contemporary protests they do not like. These pundits also praise other violence they approve of but lack a consistent principle regarding violence as a means of achieving goals beyond they like violence aimed at goals they like and dislike violence that is aimed at goals they dislike.

A moral case can be made against violence, such as that famously made by Dr. King. When there is the possibility of redress and justice through peaceful means, then non-violence seems to have an obvious advantage over violence: people are not hurt or killed, and property is not destroyed. However, the fact that a major American city had to be patrolled by the National Guard showed once again that there are deep and profound problems in civil society. In 2025, it is equally evident that these underlying problems have not been addressed, and things are just getting worse.

 

A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 brings together a year of sharp, accessible, and often provocative reflections on the moral, political, cultural, and technological challenges of contemporary life. Written by philosopher Michael LaBossiere, these essays move fluidly from the ethics of AI to the culture wars, from conspiracy theories to Dungeons & Dragons, from public policy to personal agency — always with clarity, humor, and a commitment to critical thinking.

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Whether he is dissecting the rhetoric of conspiracy theories, exploring the ethics of space mining, or reflecting on the death of a beloved dog, LaBossiere invites readers into a conversation that is rigorous without being rigid, principled without being preachy, and always grounded in the belief that philosophy is for everyone.

This collection is for readers who want more than hot takes — who want to understand how arguments work, why beliefs matter, and how to think more clearly in a world that rewards confusion.

Thoughtful, wide‑ranging, and often darkly funny, A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 is a companion for anyone trying to make sense of the twenty‑first century.

 

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It has been argued that everyone is a little bit racist. Various studies have shown that black America are treated differently than white Americans. Examples of this include black students being more likely to be suspended, blacks being arrested at a higher rate than whites, and job applications with “black sounding” names being less likely to get callbacks than those with “white sounding” names. Interestingly, studies have shown that the alleged racism is not confined to white Americans and black Americans also seem to share this racism.

One study involved a simulator in which a participant takes on the role of a police officer and must decide to shoot or holster their weapon when confronted by simulated person. The study indicated that participants, regardless of race, shoot more quickly at blacks than whites and are more likely to shoot an unarmed black person than an unarmed white person. There are, of course, many other studies and examples that support the claim that everyone is a little bit racist.

Given the evidence, it would seem reasonable to accept that everyone is a little bit racist. However, there seems to be something problematic with claiming that everyone is racist, even if it is the claim that the racism is of the small sort.

One point of logical concern is that inferring that all people are at least a little racist based on such studies would be problematic. Rather, what should be claimed is that the studies indicate the presence of racism and that these findings can be generalized to the entire population. But this can be dismissed as a quibble about inductive logic.

Some might take issue with this claim because being accused of racism is offensive. Some, as also might be suspected, would take issue with this claim because they claim that racism has ended in America, hence people are not racist. Not even a little bit. Others might complain that the accusation is a political weapon that is wielded unjustly. I will not argue about these matters, but will instead focus on another concern, that of the concept of racism.

In informal terms, racism is prejudice, antagonism or discrimination based on race. Since studies show that people have prejudices linked to race and engage in discrimination along racial lines, it seems reasonable to accept that everyone is at least a bit racist.

To use an analogy, consider the matter of lying. A liar, put informally, is someone who makes a claim that she does not believe with the intention of getting others to accept it as true. Since people engage in this behavior, everyone is a little bit of a liar. That is, everyone has told a lie.

Another analogy would be to being an abuser. Presumably each person has been at least a bit mean or cruel to another person. This entails that everyone is at least a little bit abusive. The analogies could continue almost indefinitely, but it will suffice to stop with the result that we are all racist, abusive liars.

On the one hand, the claim is true. I have been prejudiced. I have lied. I have been mean to people I love. The same is likely to be true of even the very best of us. Since we have lied, we are liars. Since we have abused, we are abusers. Since we have prejudice and have discriminated based on race, we are racists.

On the other hand, the claim is problematic. After all, to judge someone to be a racist, an abuser, or a liar is to make a strong moral judgment of the person. For example, imagine the following conversation:

 

Sam: “Your friend Sally seems cool. You know her well, what is she like?”

Kelly: “She is a liar and a racist.”

Sam: “But…she seems so nice.”

Kelly: “She is. In fact, she’s one of the best people I know.”

Sam: “But you said she is a liar and a racist.”

Kelly: “Oh, she is. But just a little bit.”

Sam: “What?”

Kelly: “When she was in college, she lied to a creepy guy to avoid going on a date. She also said that when she was five, she briefly thought white people were racists and would not be friends with them. So, she is a liar and a racist.”

Sam: “I don’t think you know what those words mean.”

 

The point is, of course, that terms like “racist”, “abuser” and “liar” have a proper moral usage. Because these are such strong terms, they should be applied in cases to which they fit. For example, while anyone who lies is technically a liar, the designation of being a liar should only apply to someone who routinely engages in that behavior. That is, a person who has a moral defect in regard to honesty. Likewise, anyone who has a prejudice based on race or who has discriminated based on race is technically a racist. However, the designation of racist should be reserved for those who have the relevant moral defect. That is, racism is their way of being, as opposed to having some bias. As such, using the term “racist” (or “liar”) in claiming that “everyone is a little bit racist” (or “everyone is little bit of a liar”) either waters down the moral term or imposes too harsh a judgment on the person.

So, if the expression “we are all a little bit racist” should not be used, what should replace it? My suggestion is to speak instead of people being subject to biases. While saying “we all have biases” is less attention grabbing than “we are all a little bit racist”, it is a more honest description.

While there are some varieties of white nationalism, it is an ideology committed to the creation and preservation of a nation comprised entirely of whites (or at least white dominance of the nation). While some white nationalists honestly embrace their racism, others prefer to present white nationalism in a more pleasant guise. Some advance arguments contending it is both good and desirable.

While it is not limited to using Black Lives Matter, I will dub one of the justifying arguments “the BLM argument” and use BLM as my main example when discussing it. The argument typically begins by pointing out the existence of “race-based” identity groups such as Black Lives Matters, Hispanic groups, black student unions and so on. The next step is to note that these groups are accepted, even lauded, by many (especially on the left). From this it is concluded that, by analogy, white identity groups should also be accepted, if not lauded.

If analogies are not one’s cup of tea, white identity groups can be defended on the grounds of consistency: if the existence of non-white identity groups is accepted, then consistency requires accepting white identity groups.

From a logical standpoint, both arguments are appealing because they involve effective methods of argumentation. However, consistency and analogical arguments can be challenged and this challenge can often be made on the same basis, that of the principle of relevant difference.

The principle of relevant difference is the principle that similar things must be treated in similar ways, but that relevantly different things can be justly treated differently. For example, if someone claimed that it was fine to pay a woman less than a man simply because she is a woman, then that would violate the principle of relevant difference. If it was claimed that a male worker deserves more pay because he differs from a female co-worker in that he works more hours, then this would fit the principle. In the case of the analogical argument, a strong enough relevant difference would break the analogy and show that the conclusion is not adequately supported. In the case of the consistency argument, showing a strong enough relevant difference would justify treating two things differently because sufficiently different things can justly be treated differently.

A white nationalist deploying the BLM argument would contend that although there are obviously differences between BLM and a white nationalist group, these differences are not sufficient to allow condemnation of white nationalism while accepting BLM. Put bluntly, it could be said that if black groups are morally okay, then so are white groups. On the face of it, this general reasoning is solid enough. It would be unprincipled to regard non-white groups as acceptable while condemning white groups merely because they are white groups.

One way to respond to this would be to argue that all such groups are unacceptable; perhaps because they would be fundamentally racist in character. This would be a consistent approach and has some appeal; accepting these sorts of identity groups is to accept race identification as valid; which seems problematic.

Another approach is to make relevant difference arguments that establish strong enough differences between white nationalist groups and groups like BLM and Hispanic student unions. There are many options, and I will consider a few.

One option is to argue that such an identity group is justified when the members of that group are identified by others and targeted on this basis for mistreatment or oppression. In this case, group identity would be imposed and acknowledged as a matter of organizing a defense against the mistreatment or oppression.  BLM members can make the argument that black people are identified as blacks and mistreated on this basis by some police. As such, BLM is justified as a defensive measure against this mistreatment. Roughly put, blacks can justly form black groups because they are targeted as blacks. The same reasoning would apply to other groups aimed at protection from mistreatment aimed at specific identity groups.

Consistency would require extending this same principle to whites. As such, if whites are being targeted for mistreatment or oppression because they are white, then the formation of defensive white identity groups would be warranted. Not surprisingly, this is exactly the argument that white groups often advance: they allege they are victims and are acting to protect themselves.

While white groups have a vast and varied list of the crimes they believe are being committed against them as whites, they are fundamentally mistaken. While crimes are committed against white people and there are white folks who are suffering from things like unemployment and opioid addiction, these are not occurring because they are white. They are occurring for other reasons. While it is true that the special status of whites is being challenged, and has eroded over the years, the loss of such unfair and unwarranted advantages in favor of greater fairness is not a moral crime. The belief in white victimhood is the result of willful delusion and intentional deceit and is not grounded in facts.

This line of argument does, however, remain open to empirical research. If it can be shown with objective evidence that whites are subject to general mistreatment and oppression because they are whites, then defensive white groups would be justified on these grounds. While I am aware that people can find various videos on YouTube purporting to establish the abuse of whites as whites, one must distinguish between anecdotal evidence and adequate statistical support. For example, if fatal DWW (Driving While White) incidents started occurring at a statistically significant level, then it would be worth considering the creation of WLM (White Lives Matter).

A second option is to consider the actions and goals of the group in question. If a group has a morally acceptable goal and acts in ethical ways, then the group would be morally fine. However, a group that had morally problematic goals or acted in immoral ways would be relevantly different from groups with better goals and methods.

While BLM does have its detractors, its avowed goal is “is working for a world where Black lives are no longer systematically and intentionally targeted for demise.” This is a morally commendable goal. While BLM was often condemned by the likes of Fox News for their protests, the organization certainly seems to be operating in accord with a non-violent approach to protesting. As such, its general methodology is at least morally acceptable. This is, of course, subject to debate and empirical investigation. If, for example, it was found that BLM were organizing the murder of police officers, then that would make the group morally wrong.

White groups could, of course, have morally acceptable goals and methods. For example, if a white group was created in response to the surge in white people dying from opioids and they focused on supporting treatment of white addicts, then such a group would seem to be morally fine.

However, there are obviously white groups that have evil goals and use immoral methods. White supremacy groups, such as the KKK, are the usual examples of such groups. The white nationals also seem to be an immoral group. The goal of white dominance and the goal of establishing a white nation are both to be condemned, albeit not always for the same reasons. While the newly “mainstreamed” white nationalists are (usually)not explicitly engaged in violence, they do make use of a systematic campaign of untruths and encourage hatred. The connections of some to Nazi ideology is also extremely problematic.

In closing, while it is certainly possible to have white identity groups that are morally acceptable, the white nationalists are not among them. It is also worth noting that all identity groups might be morally problematic in some manner.

While many supporters of Trump insist he is not a racist, white nationalists have once again rejoiced in his victory. Regardless of what Trump believes, his rhetoric has created a safe space for the alt-right. While this term is broad and, perhaps, misused, it bundles groups that are perceived as racist and even neo-Nazi in character. I will not endeavor to break down the fine distinctions between these various groups but will focus on white nationalists. As the name indicates, they have an ideological commitment to creating a nation consisting solely of whites.

Since Nazis and other hate groups have advocated the same goal, it seems reasonable to consider that white nationalists are racists and a hate group. Not surprisingly, they often claim they are not racists and are not a hate group. They even advance some arguments in support of these claims. In this essay, I will consider the family argument.

While the family argument is presented in various ways, the gist is that it is natural for people to prefer the company of their family members and that it is right to give precedence to one’s family. In their family analogy, they take whites to be a family. This, as they see it, warrants having a white nation or, failing that, giving precedence to whites. Some white nationalists extend the family argument to other races, arguing that each race should act in the same way and each race should have its own nation. This helps explain the apparently inconsistent claims about Jews by some white nationalists: they want the Jews to leave America, but they support Israel becoming a pure Jewish state.

The family analogy gains much of its appeal from human psychology: as a matter of fact, humans do generally prefer and give precedence to their own family members over others. This approach is also commonly used in solving ethical problems, such as who to save and how to distribute resources. For example, if a mother is given the choice between saving a stranger or her daughter from drowning, the intuitively right choice is her daughter. While the family approach has considerable appeal, there are some obvious concerns. One is whether whites constitute a family. Another is the extent to which being family morally warrants preference and precedence.

In the biological sense, a human family is made up of humans who are closely genetically related to each other. This is something that can be objectively tested, such as with a paternity test. In this regard, family identity is a matter of the genetic similarity (and origin) of the members. There is also the matter of distinguishing the family members from outsiders. This is done by focusing on the differences between the family members and others.

To argue that whites are a biological family requires establishing that whites are genetically related to each other. This is easy enough to do; all humans are genetically related because they are humans. But the white nationalist wants whites to be an exclusive family. One obvious problem with this, especially in the United States, is that most whites are closely related to non-whites. To use one well-known example, Thomas Jefferson has many descendants, and they thus constitute a family. However, many of them are descended from him and Sally Hemings and thus would presumably not be regarded as white by white nationalists. While one might quibble about whether Heming and Jefferson had children, it is well-established that the genetic background of most “white” Americans will not be “pure white.” There is also the fact that the genetic background of many “non-white” Americans will include white ancestors. This will mean that the “white family” will include people who the white nationalists would regard as non-white. For example, Dick Cheney and Barack Obama are related and are thus family. As such, the biological family analogy breaks down immediately in terms of the white nationalists’ approach.

A possible counter to this is to focus on specific “white” genes and argue that these are what define being white. One obvious point of focus is skin color; white skin is apparently the result of a single letter DNA mutation in the 3.1 billion letters in the human genome. As such, white nationalists could rally around this one letter and use that to define what it is to be white. This would certainly seem like an absurd foundation for preference and precedence; but perhaps the absurd would suffice for the white nationalists.

While families are often defined biologically, there are also family members that are adopted and, of course, people marry into families they are (hopefully not) closely related to. As such, a family need not be genetically defined. This provides an alternative way to try to make whites into a family.

White nationalists could argue that the white family is not defined by white genes, but by a set of values or interests that constitute being white. That is, being white is a social construct analogous to a political party, religion, or club. While there is the obvious challenge of working out what would be the values and interests one must have to be part of the white club, this could in theory be worked out. After all, the white nationalists have set up their own little white club and they presumably have ways of deciding who gets to join. The obvious problem with this approach is that it does not seem to capture what the white nationalists want in terms of being white. After all, anyone could have those values and interests and thus be white by that definition. Also, there are many people who have white skin who do not share the interests or values of the white nationalists and would thus not be white on this approach. I, for one, do not want to be in their little club.

The white nationalists could always go with the traditional approach of regarding as white anyone who looks white. Potential whites would presumably need to provide some proof that they do not have any non-whiteness in their background. There is, after all, a long history of people passing as whites in the United States. Since white nationalists tend to regard Jews as non-white, they would also need to sort that out in some way; after all, Jews can have very white skin. Presumably they can look to the Nazis for how to work this all out. There is also concern about using technology to allow people to appear white, such as genetic modification. One could even imagine a sci-fi scenario in which people could switch genes as they wished, thus creating a bit of a problem for racists who base their racism in genetics. Presumably white nationalists would really need to worry about such things. After all, they would not want non-whites in their white paradise.

One obvious problem with this approach is that it is like accepting as family anyone who looks like you in some specified way. For example, embracing someone as a relative because they have a similar nose. This seems an odd way to set a foundation for preference and precedence, but white nationalists presumably think in odd ways.

Given the above discussion, there seems to be no foundation for regarding whites as a family. As such, the white nationalist family analogy fails.