Month: December 2025

The bookshelves of the world abound with self-help tomes. Many profess to help with emotional woes, such as sadness, and make vague promises about happiness.  Philosophers have long been in the business of offering advice on how to be happy. Or at least how not  to be too sad.

Each spring semester I teach Modern Philosophy and cover our good dead friend Spinoza. In addition to an exciting career as a lens grinder, he also managed to avoid being killed by an assassin. However, breathing in all that glass dust contributed to his untimely death. But enough about his life and death, it is time to get to the point of this essay.

As Spinoza saw it, people are slaves to their emotions and chained to what they love, such as fame, fortune and other people. This inevitably leads to sadness: the people we love betray us or die. That fancy Tesla that once brought joy might become associated with a fascist. That million-dollar beach house can be swept away by the rising tide. A great job can be lost as a company seeks to boost its stock prices by downsizing the job fillers. And so on, through all the ways things can go badly.

While Spinoza was a pantheist and believed that everything is God and God is everything, his view of human beings is like that of the philosophical mechanist: humans are not magically exempt from the laws of nature. He was also a strict determinist: each event occurs from necessity and cannot be otherwise. There is no chance or choice. So, for example, Trump could not have lost the 2024 election As another example, I could not have written this essay in any other manner, so I had to make that remark about Trump winning in 2024 rather than mentioning his 2020 defeat.   

Buying into determinism, Spinoza took the view that human behavior and motivations can be examined as one might examine “lines, planes or bodies.” More precisely, he took the view that emotions follow the same necessity as all other things, thus making the effects of the emotions predictable provided one has enough knowledge.  Spinoza then used this idea as the basis for his “self-help” advice.

According to Spinoza all emotions are responses to the past, present or future. For example, a person might feel regret because she believes she could have made her last relationship work if she had only put more effort into it. As another example, a person might worry because he thinks that he might lose his job in the next round of downsizing at his company. These negative feelings rest, as Spinoza sees it, on the false belief that the past could have been otherwise and that the future is undetermined. Once a person realizes nothing could have been any different and the future cannot be anything other than what it will be, then that person will suffer less from emotions. Thus, for Spinoza, freedom from the enslaving chains is the recognition and acceptance that what was could not have been otherwise and what will be cannot be otherwise.

This view does have a certain appeal, and it does make sense that it can have some value. In regard to the past, people do often beat themselves up emotionally over past mistakes and wonder about how things might have been different.  These regrets can bind a person and thus trap them in the past as they spend hours wondering “what if?” This is not to say that feeling regret or guilt is wrong. Far from it. But lamenting about the past to the detriment of the now is a problem.  It is also a problem to believe that things could have been different when they, in fact, could not have been different.

This is also not to say that a person should not reflect on the past. After all, a person who does not learn from her mistakes is doomed to repeat them. People can, of course, also be trapped by the past because of what they see as good things. They are chained to what they (think) they once had or once were (such as being the big woman on campus back in college).

In regard to the future, it is easy to be trapped by anxiety, fear and even hope. It can be reassuring to embrace the view that what will be will be and to not worry and be happy. This is not to say that one should be foolish about the future, of course.

There is, unfortunately, one fatal and obvious problem with Spinoza’s advice. If everything is necessary and determined, his advice makes no sense: what is, must be and cannot be otherwise. To use an analogy, it would be like shouting advice at someone watching a cut scene in a video game. This is pointless, since the person cannot do anything to change what is occurring. What occurs must occur and cannot be otherwise. For Spinoza, while we might think life is like a game, it is like a cut scene: we are spectators and not players controlling the game.

The obvious counter is to say “but I feel free! I feel like I am making choices!” Spinoza was aware of this objection. In response, he claims that if a stone were conscious and hurled through the air, it would think it was free to choose to move and land where it does. People think they are free because they are “conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined.” In other words, we think we are free because we do not know better. Going back to the video game analogy, we think we are in control as we push the buttons, but this is because we do not know how the game works. We are just along for the ride and not in control.

Since everything is determined, whether a person heeds Spinoza’s advice is also determined. If you do, then you do and you could not do otherwise. If you do not, you could not do otherwise. As such, his advice seems beyond useless. This is a stock paradox faced by determinists who give advice: their theory says that people cannot choose to follow their advice as they will just do what they are determined to do. That said, it is possible to salvage some useful advice from Spinoza.

The first step is to reject his view that I lack free will.  I have a stock argument for this that goes as follows. Obviously, I have free will or I do not. It is equally obvious that there is no way to tell whether I do or not. From an empirical standpoint, a universe with free will looks and feels just like a universe without free will: you just observe people doing stuff and apparently making decisions while thinking and feeling that you are doing the same.  Suppose someone rejects free will and they are wrong. In this case they are not only mistaken but also consciously rejecting real freedom. 

Suppose someone rejects free will and they are correct. In that case, they are right. But not in the sense that they made the correct choice. They are determined to have that view and it would just so happen that it matches reality.

If I can choose, then I should obviously choose free will. If I cannot choose, then I will think I chose whatever it is I am determined to believe. If I can choose and choose to think I cannot, I am in error. Since I cannot know which option is correct, it seems best to accept free will. If I am free, I am right. If I am not free, then I am mistaken but have no choice.

Given the above argument, I accept that I have agency. This makes it possible for me to meaningfully give and accept (or reject) advice. Turning back to Spinoza, I obviously cannot accept his advice that I am enslaved by determinism. However, I can accept some of his claims, namely that I am acted upon by my attachments and emotions. As he sees it, the emotions are things that act upon us. On my view, they would  be things that impinge upon our agency. As I love to do, I will use an analogy to running.

I thought about this  essay on a run and also focused on the fact that feelings of pain and tiredness were impacting me like the way cold or rain might. In the case of pain and tiredness, the attack is from inside. In the case of the cold or rain, the attack is from the outside. Whether the attack is from inside or out, the attack is trying to make the choice for me, to rob me of my agency as a runner and make me give up. If the pain, cold or rain makes me stop, then I am not acting. I am being acted upon. If I choose to stop, then I am acting. If I choose to go on, I am also acting. And acting rightly.  As a runner I know the difference between choosing to stop and being forced to stop.

Being aware of this is useful for running. Thanks to decades of experience I understand, in a way Spinoza might approve, the workings of pain, fatigue and so on. To use a specific example, I know that I am acted upon by pain and I understand how it works. As such, the pain is not in control, I am. If I wish, I can run myself to ruin (and I have done just this). Or I can be wiser and avoid damaging myself.

Turning back to emotions, feelings impinge upon me in ways analogous to pain and fatigue. I do not have full control over how I feel as the emotions simply occur, perhaps in response to events or perhaps simply as the result of an electrochemical imbalance. To use a specific example, like most people I will sometimes feel depressed and know I have no reason to feel this. It is like the cold or fatigue in that it is just impinging on me. As Spinoza argued, my knowledge of how this works is critical to dealing with it. While I cannot fully control the feeling, I understand why I feel that way. It is like the cold I felt running in the Maine winters. It is a natural phenomenon that is, from my perspective, trying to destroy me. In the case of the cold, I can wear warmer clothing and stay moving. Knowing how it works enables me to choose how to combat it. Likewise, knowing how negative feelings work enables me to choose how to combat them. If I am depressed for no reason, I know it is just my brain trying to kill me. It is not pleasant, but it does not get to make the decisions for me. Fortunately, our good dead friend Aristotle has some excellent advice for training oneself to handle emotions.

That said, the analogy to cold is particularly apt. The ice of the winter can kill even those who understand it and know how to resist it. Sometimes the cold is just too much. Likewise, the emotions can be like the howling icy wind and be too much for the mind. We are, after all, only human and have our limits. Knowing this is a part of wisdom. Sometimes you just need to come in from the cold or it will kill you. Have some hot chocolate. With marshmallows.

While some countries will pay ransoms to free hostages, the United States has a public policy of not doing this. One reason to not pay a ransom for hostages is based on sticking to a principle. This principle could be that bad behavior should not be rewarded or that hostage taking should be punished. Or some other principle.

One of the best arguments against paying ransoms for hostages is a practical and utilitarian moral argument. Paying ransoms gives hostage takers an incentive to take hostages. This incentive means more people will be taken hostage. The cost of not paying is, of course, the possibility that hostages will be killed. However, the argument goes, if hostage takers realize that they will not be paid a ransom, they will have less incentive to take more hostages. This will reduce the chances that hostages will be taken. The calculation is, of course, that the harm done to the current hostages will be outweighed by the benefits of not having people taken hostage in the future.

This argument assumes that hostage takers are primarily motivated by the ransom. If they are taking hostages primarily for other reasons, such as for status, to make a statement or to get media attention, then not paying them a ransom will not significantly reduce their incentive to take hostages. This leads to a second reason why ransoms should not be paid.

In addition to the incentive argument, there is also the funding argument. While a terrorist group might have reasons other than money to take hostages, they benefit from getting ransoms. The money they receive can be used to fund additional operations, such as taking more hostages. Obviously, if ransoms are not paid, then such groups lose this funding, and this could impact their operations. Since paying a ransom would be funding terrorism, this provides both a moral and a practical reason not to pay.

While these arguments have a rational appeal, they are typically countered by emotional appeals. One approach to arguing that ransoms should be paid is the “in their shoes” appeal. The method involves asking a person whether they would want a ransom to be paid for their release or for the release of a loved one. Most people would want the ransom paid, assuming doing so would be effective. Sometimes the appeal is made explicitly in terms of emotions: “how would you feel if your loved one died because the government refused to pay the ransom?” Obviously, a person would feel awful.

This method does have considerable appeal. The “in their shoes” appeal can is like the golden rule approach (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) and is that policy should be based on how you would want to be treated in that situation. If I would not want the policy applied to me (that is, I would want to be ransomed or have my loved one ransomed), then I should be morally opposed to a no-pay policy as a matter of consistency. This certainly makes sense: if I would not want a policy applied in my case, then I should (in general) not support that policy.

One obvious counter is that there seems to be a distinction between what a policy should be and whether a person would want that policy applied to herself. For example, some universities have a policy that if a student misses more than three classes, the student fails the course. Naturally, no student wants that policy to be applied to her (and most professors would not have wanted it to apply to them when they were students), but this does not show that the policy is wrong. As another example, a company might have a policy of not providing health insurance to part time employees. While the CEO would certainly not like the policy if she were part-time, it does not follow that the policy must be a bad one. As such, policies need to be assessed not just in terms of how a person feels about them, but in terms of their merit or lack thereof.

Another obvious counter is to use the same approach, only with a modification. In response to the question “how would you feel if you were the hostage or she were a loved one?” one could ask “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage in an operation funded by ransom money? Or “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage because the hostage takers learned that people would pay ransoms for hostages?” The answer would be, of course, that one would feel bad about that. However, while how one would feel about this can be useful in discussing the matter, it is not decisive. Settling the matter rationally does require considering more than just how people would feel. It requires looking at the matter with a degree of objectivity. That is, not just asking how people would feel, but what would be right and what would yield the best results in the practical sense.  Obviously, talking about objectivity is easy when one is not a hostage.

While there is an established history of superhero characters having their ethnicity or gender changed, each change often creates a small uproar (and not just among the fans). For example, while the original Nick Fury is white, the character is black in some worlds. And Samuel Jackson played the character in the MCU movies and shows). As another example, a woman took on the role of Thor. I will be using “ethnicity” here rather than “race” because in most comic book worlds humans are one race, just as Kryptonians and Kree are races.

Some complaints about these changes are based in racism and sexism. While interesting from the standpoint of psychological analysis and ethical evaluation, these complaints are not worthy of serious aesthetics consideration. Instead, I will focus on legitimate concerns about such change.

A good place to begin is to address reasonable concerns about continuity and adherence to the original source material. Just as, for example, having Batman with Superman’s powers would break continuity, making him an Hispanic woman would also seem to break it. Just as Batman normally has no superpowers, he is also a white guy.

One obvious reply is that characters change over time. To use an obvious example, when Superman first appeared he was faster than a speeding bullet and able to leap tall buildings. However, he did not fly and did not have heat vision. Over the years writers added abilities and increased his powers until he became the Superman of today. Character background and origin stories are also frequently modified. If these sorts of changes are acceptable, then this opens the door to changes to the character’s ethnicity or gender.

One easy way to justify any change is to use alternative realities. When D.C. was faced with the problem of “explaining” the first versions of Flash (who wore a Mercury style helmet), Batman, Green Lantern (whose power was magic and whose vulnerability was wood) and Superman they came up with the idea of having Earth 1 and Earth 2. This soon became a standard device for creating more comics to sell, although it did have the effect of creating a bit of a mess for fans trying to keep track of things. An infinite number of earths is a lot to keep track of, which led to a crisis.  Marvel also has its famous “What If” series which allow for changes with an in-world (or across world) justification.

While the use of parallel and possible worlds provides an easy out, there is still the matter of changing the gender or ethnicity of the “real” character (as opposed to just having an alternative version). One option is to not have any “real” character as every version (whether on TV, in the movies or in comics) is just as “real” and “official” as any other. While this solves the problem by fiat, there still seems to be a legitimate question about whether all these variations should be considered the same character. That is, whether a Hispanic female Flash would really be the Flash.

In some cases, the matter is easy to handle. Some superheroes occupy roles, hold “super jobs” or have gear or an item that makes them super. For example, anyone can be a Green Lantern (provided the person qualifies for the ring). While the original Green Lantern was a white guy, a Hispanic woman could join the corps and thus be a Green Lantern. Just as almost, anyone can be a police officer or soldier.

As another example, being Iron Man could be seen as just a matter of wearing the armor. So, an Asian woman could wear Iron Man armor and be Iron Woman. As a final example, being Robin seems to be a role. As different white boys have occupied that role, there seems to be no real issue with having a female Robin (which has been done) or a Robin who is not white.

In many cases a gender change would be pointless because female versions of the character already exist. For example, a female Superman would just be another Supergirl or Power Girl. As another example, a female Batman would just be Batwoman or Batgirl, superheroes who already exist. So, what remains are cases that are not so easy to handle.

While every character has an “original” gender and ethnicity (for example, Captain America started as a white male), it is not always the case that the original’s gender and ethnicity are essential to the character. That is, the character would still make sense, and it would still be reasonable to regard the character as the same (only with a different ethnicity or gender).  This, of course, raises metaphysical concerns about essential qualities and identity. Put very simply, an essential quality is one that if an entity loses that quality, it ceases to be what it is. For example, having three sides is an essential quality for a triangle: if it ceases to be three sided, it ceases to be a triangle. Color and size are not the essential qualities of triangles. A red triangle that is painted blue does not cease to be a triangle.

In the case of superheroes, the key question here is one about which qualities are essential to being that hero and which ones can be changed while maintaining the identity of the character. One way to approach this is in terms of personal identity and to use models that philosophers use for real people. Another approach is to go with an approach that is more about aesthetics than metaphysics. That is, to base the essential qualities on aesthetic essentials, qualities relevant to being the right sort of fictional character.

One plausible approach here is to consider whether a character’s ethnicity and gender are essential to the character. That is, for example, whether Captain America would still be Captain America if he were black or a woman. Or a Colonel.

One key aspect of it would be how these qualities would fit the origin story in terms of plausibility. Going with the Captain America example, Steve Rogers could have been black. Black Americans served in WWII and it would be plausible that the super soldier experiment would be done on African-Americans (because they did experiments in the real world). Making Captain America into a woman would be implausible in a WWII world like our own. The sexism of the time would have ensured that a woman would not have been used in such an experiment and American women were not allowed to enlist in the combat infantry. But, of course, the creation could be an accident. As another example, the Flash could easily be cast as a woman or as having any ethnicity. Tere is nothing about the Flash’s origin that requires that the Flash be a white guy.

Some characters, however, have origin stories that would make it implausible for the character to have a different ethnicity or gender. For example, Wonder Woman would not work as a man, given the nature of the Amazons. She could, however, be cast as any ethnicity (since she is, in the original story, created from a statue).

Another key aspect would be the role of the character in terms of what he or she represents or stands for. For example, Black Panther’s origin story would seem to preclude him from being any ethnicity other than black. His role would also seem to preclude that, as well as a white Black Panther would, it would seem, simply not fit the role. Black Panther could, perhaps, be a woman especially since being the Black Panther is a role. So, to answer the title question, Black Panther could not be white. Or, more accurately, should not be white. 

As a closing point, it could be argued that all that really matters is whether the story is a good one or not. So, if a good story can be told casting Spider-Man as a black woman then that is all the justification needed for the change.

In my previous essay I set the stage for discussing the concern about people switching competition categories to gain something. It is to this matter that I now turn.

The Sickle Cell 5K in Tallahassee is known for its excellent master’s trophy for the overall male and female masters runners. It has consistently been bigger and better than the second and third overall awards. One year a master’s runner was third overall but wanted the male masters’ award instead. This created a problem. While there was no rule about this, there are established running norms: overall places take precedence over the masters category and the masters category takes precedence over age group placing.  So, a 40+ year old runner who placed first to third would get the corresponding overall award. The first 40+ runner outside the top three would get the masters award and the next runner in their age group would win that age group. As would be expected, some people got mad about this runner’s efforts to get the masters award since he was breaking the norms and traditions to get a better award.

His argument, which was not unreasonable, was that he was the first masters runner and hence earned that award. This meant that the 4th place runner would get third overall. This might sound odd, but (as noted above) the running norms already allow for a person who finishes second in their age group to place first if the person who would win that age group wins an overall or masters award (most races have a no-double-dip rule). While his request did break the norms, he was  in the masters category. One might say that he elected to identify as a masters runner for the purpose of the award. He got the award when the original masters winner did everyone a favor by giving it to him, allowing the awards to continue. But this episode is still spoken of today and switching categories to get a better award is usually seen as questionable. This episode can be used as an analogy.

Suppose that transgender athletes are like the masters athlete: they belong in their chosen category but they are changing from one category to another in order to get a better award (or win). The masters runner could have accepted the third-place award, a transgender runner who identifies as female could stick to competing as male. But by switching categories, the athletes could be seen as gaining an advantage and thus they have an incentive to do so. They also are both picking a category they really belong in, so they are not engaged in a cheat or deceit. But if their motive is to switch for a gain and and in doing so they do harm another athlete, then this would seem to be wrong. The masters runner took the better award from another runner and a transgender athlete who changes categories to win takes away a win from another female athlete. This can be used to ground a moral argument against allowing athletes to change categories to win. That said, there is an easy counter.

Imagine a runner attends a Division 1 school and finds that they are good enough for the division but not good enough to regularly win. They switch to a Division 2 school so they can win regularly. They have changed their category to improve their gains and have “harmed” other runners. They might displace a runner from the team and will take victories that would have gone to other athletes had they not changed their category. While this approach to sports might not seem morally ideal, the runner would not be acting wrongly. They would be Division 2 even if they could have stuck with Division 1. Likewise, for an athlete who switches their gender category by transitioning: one might take issue with someone doing this for an advantage, but this is morally acceptable. It must be noted that people do not transition just to get an advantage. Some readers probably doubt that an athlete can legitimately switch categories, so I now turn to this matter.

Let us go back to the masters award incident but change it slightly. Imagine that the third-place runner is 39 years and 10 months old but decides to identify as a masters runner to get the award. In this case, the issue is easily resolved: age is an objective matter, and they are not a masters runner. Hence, they do not get the award. Likewise, athletes who claim to be female but are not have no right to switch categories. While this might seem to settle the matter, there are at least two replies.

One reply is to go back to the masters case. Imagine that the runner is 39 years old based on his birthday, but he is a devote Catholic who sincerely believes that life begins at conception and sets his age accordingly at over 40. By his religious based standard of age, he is a masters runner. While the official age of runner for racing is based on their birthdate and not their moment of conception, the runner could make an argument based on freedom of religion: he is being discriminated against by the failure of the race officials to recognize that he is at least 40 because his life began at conception under his faith. Likewise, a runner who self-identifies as a female could argue that she is being discriminated against when she is not allowed to select her category based on her beliefs about what it is to be female. Both runners could agree that there is a fact of the matter about being a masters runner or a female runner, but they disagree with the standards being imposed upon them by those who they see as discriminating against them. As such, the debate becomes one of defining category membership.

In the case of age, the dispute would seem to be easy to settle: to avoid charges of attacking religious freedom, the rules about age could be put neutrally to specify that the time from birth is used to determine the competition age of a runner. The standard applies to everyone and intuitively seems fair. In the case of gender, the same approach should be taken: a fair set of standards to categorize people is needed. But gender is much more complicated than age.

If gender were only of concern in sports, then the matter would be easier to address. But gender impacts every aspect of a person’s life and is, of course, a key battleground in the culture wars. As such, even if one makes a good faith effort to develop gender standards for sports categories, this will be a daunting task.  Obviously,  many people think they have the right answer and think they could easily solve the problem by imposing their own views on everyone else.

There are, of course, some easy and obvious sufficient conditions for being admitted into the female category: people with XX chromosomes and female anatomy and physiology get an automatic admission (if they wish).  Beyond that, the debates begin.  Since this matter is complicated and not my area of expertise, I freely admit that I do not have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I do not even have a well-considered set of general principles.

One obvious principle is that it would be morally wrong for a male athlete to lie about his identify to gain a competitive advantage. The moral problem is, of course, the intent to deceive to gain an advantage.

This is analogous to my view that it is wrong for person to lie about their religious views to gain something, such as a person who wants to use a religious excuse to get away with discrimination or to avoid paying taxes. My moral assessment would, of course, adjust in cases of sincere belief, even if the person’s belief turns out to be untrue. As with the religion case, there is the practical problem of sorting out when people are lying, though in the United States we generally do not put professed religious beliefs to a test.

While there is no crisis in sports involving male athletes switching categories in large numbers, allowing people to switch categories merely by saying they identify in that category does provide an opportunity for the unprincipled to exploit, just as allowing people to claim special treatment simply for asserting they have religious beliefs allows opportunities for the unprincipled. The moral and practical challenge is sorting out what tests should be used to protect against such unprincipled exploitation while avoiding discriminating against people. We do not make people prove that their religious beliefs are true before allowing them to gain the benefits of professing belief and we need to be consistent when it comes to professed gender identity. One approach, which is what we generally do for religion, is to take people at their word unless there is adequate evidence of an intent to deceive. For example, a male athlete who posted “LOL identifying as a girl just to win the 5K today, but fellas stay away I ain’t gay! After I win, I will be a boy again.” would be intending to deceive and should, one would infer, not be allowed to compete in the 5K as a female.  Likewise, if someone bringing a freedom of religion lawsuit so they can discriminate posted “LOL pretending to believe in God so I can hate on the gays!”, then they should probably not win that lawsuit. But in other cases, we should accept their profession as sincere. I do admit this does not settle the matter.

Upon taking office, Joe Biden signed an executive order requiring that schools receiving federal funding allow people who self-identify as females onto female sport’s teams. Pushback against it has ranged from thoughtful considerations of fairness to misogyny masquerading as morality. Exploiting the manufactured panic over transgender people, Trump signed an executive order banning transgender people from competing in women’s sports. While the narrative is that the anti-trans athlete folks are motivated by fairness, this is easily disproved by their lack of concern about fair treatment of women in sports in other areas, such as funding and facilities.

In addition to being complicated on its own, the fairness of transgender women competing with other women is linked to other complicated matters, such as general concerns about fairness in society and issues of gender identity. People arguing in good faith can make arguments in one area without realizing the implications of these arguments in other areas. To illustrate, consider the fictional character of Polly. Polly is a national level high school runner who holds to a principle of fairness. Polly’s brother, Paul, is faster than Polly but not a national level male runner. He jokingly suggests putting on a dress and beating Polly, which worries her. If a person could just self-identify as a female, Paul could do so and suddenly be a national level female high school runner. In a panic, Polly thinks up a nightmare scenario: the top male runners compete as boys, switch their gender identities, and win again as girls! Polly and her sister runners would be out of the competition, which would be unfair. In good faith, Polly can make a good moral argument against allowing this based on fairness. But her seemingly reasonable argument might justifying harming people in the broader context of fairness in society, something Polly would not want. As such, we should be careful to consider the implications of arguments about fairness in sports have in other areas.

People can also argue in bad faith, presenting an appealing fairness argument about sports while not caring about fairness. They might be using the sport argument as a Trojan horse to lure people into their ideological agenda or they might want to weaponize a seemingly reasonable argument. This is not to say that arguing in bad faith entails that a person must be making false claims or fallacious arguments. After all, one can use truth and good logic in bad faith. But we should be on guard against bad faith arguments. I will endeavor to follow my own advice and make good faith arguments while considering their implications.

From the standpoint of fairness, there are reasonable moral grounds to be concerned about allowing people to self-identify their category for competition. To focus the discussion, I will use my own sport of running and the specific context of road races—but the general points apply across all sports.

Road races have well-established categories that are based on a conception of fair competition. Almost all races have gender categories (male or female). Most races have age groups and some also include the master category (40+) and sometimes the grand master category (50+). A few races also add a weight category (Clydesdale or Athena). In addition to categories created for fairness, races sometimes have categories for other reasons. For example, the Bowlegs 5K in Tallahassee raises money for a college scholarship and has a special educator category. Since educators as a class have neither advantages nor disadvantages relative to other runners, this category is not based on fairness.

In most cases, these categories serve their intended purpose as they make competition fairer by sorting people into groups based on qualities that impact performance. In some cases, these categories can have the unintended effect of allowing a person in a generally advantaged category win in their category while losing to a runner in a disadvantaged category. For example, a 50-year-old runner might win nothing in his age group while also beating every runner in the younger age groups. He thus loses to inferior performances because of the age groups intended to allow older runners like him to fairly compete. While this can be annoying, these cases are rare, and the overall positive impact of age groups and gender divisions outweigh the negative aspects. This is a good general approach to setting policies. A good policy will never be perfect, but a good policy creates more overall good than bad. But there are people who do try to exploit categories to their advantage. I will turn to this in my next essay.

Three Confederate veterans, who fought against the United States of America, were nominated for admission to Florida’s Veterans’ Hall of Fame. The purpose of the hall is to honor “those military veterans who, through their works and lives during or after military service, have made a significant contribution to the State of Florida.”

The three nominees were David Lang, Samuel Pasco and Edward A. Perry. Perry was Florida’s governor from 1885 to 1889; Pasco was a U.S. senator. Lang assisted in creating what is now the Florida National Guard. They did make significant contributions to Florida. The main legal question was whether they qualify as veterans. Since Florida was in rebellion (in defense of slavery) against the United States there is also a moral question of whether or they should be considered United States veterans.

The state of Florida and the US federal government have similar definitions of “veteran.” For Florida, a veteran is a person who served in the active military and received an honorable discharge. The federal definition states that “The term ‘veteran’ means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.” The law also defines “Armed Forces” as the “United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard.” The reserves are also included as being in the armed forces.

According to Mike Prendergast, the executive director of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the three nominees in question did not qualify because the applications did not indicate that the men served in the armed forces of the United States of America. Interestingly, Agricultural Commissioner Adam Putnam took the view that “If you’re throwing these guys out on a technicality, that’s just dumb.”

Presumably, Putnam saw the fact that the men served in the Confederate army and took up arms against the United States as a technicality. This strikes me as more than a mere technicality. After all, the honor seems reserved for veterans as defined by the relevant laws. As such, being Confederate veterans would seem to no more qualify the men than being a veteran of the German or Japanese army in WWII would qualify someone who moved to Florida and ended up doing great things for the state. There is also the moral argument about enrolling people who fought against the United States. Fighting in defense of slavery and against the lawful government of the United States would seem to be morally problematic in regard to the veteran part of the honor.

One counter to the legal argument is that Confederate soldiers were granted (mostly symbolic) pensions about 100 years after the end of the Civil War. Confederate veterans can also be buried in a special Confederate section of Arlington National Cemetery. These facts do open the door to a legal and moral argument. In regard to the legal argument, it could be contended that Confederate veterans have been treated, in some other ways, as United States veterans. As such, one might argue, this should be extended to the Veterans’ Hall of Fame.

The obvious response is that these concessions to the Confederate veterans do not suffice to classify Confederate veterans as veterans of the United States. As such, they would not be qualified. There is also the moral counter that soldiers who fought against the United States should not be honored as veterans of the United States. After all, one would not honor veterans of other militaries that have fought against the United States even if they ended up doing great things for Florida.

It could also be argued that since the states that made up the Confederacy re-joined the United States, the veterans of the Confederacy would, as citizens, become United States’ veterans. Of course, the same logic would seem to apply to parts of the United States that were assimilated from other nations, such as Mexico, the lands of the Iroquois, and the lands of Apache and so on. As such, Sitting Bull would qualify as a veteran under this reasoning. Perhaps this could be countered by contending that the south left and then rejoined, so it is not becoming part of the United States that has the desired effect but rejoining after a rebellion.

Another possible argument is to contend that the Veterans’ Hall of Fame is a Florida hall and, as such, just requires that the veterans were Florida veterans. In the Civil War units were, in general, connected to a specific state (such the 1st Maine). As such, if the men in question served in a Florida unit that fought against the United States, they would be Florida veterans but not United States veterans. Using this option would, of course, require that the requirements not include that a nominee be a veteran of the United States military and presumably it could not be connected to the United States VA since that agency is only responsible for veterans of the United States armed forces and not veterans who served other nations.

In regard to the moral concerns of honoring, as veterans, men who fought against the United States and in defense of slavery, it could be claimed that the war was not about slavery. The obvious problem with this is that the war was, in fact, fought to preserve slavery. The southern states made this abundantly clear. Alexander Stephens, vice president of the Confederacy, gave his infamous Cornerstone Speech and made this quite clear when he said “Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition.”

It could, of course, be argued that not every soldier fighting for the South was fighting to defend slavery. After all, just like today, most people fighting in wars are not the people who set policy or benefit from these policies. These men could have gone to war not to protect the institution of slavery, but because they were duped by the slave holders. Or because they wanted to defend their state from “northern aggression.” Or some other morally acceptable reason. That is, it could be claimed that these men were fighting for something other than the explicit purpose of the Confederacy, namely the preservation of slavery. Since this is not impossible, it could be claimed that the men should be given the benefit of the doubt and be honored for fighting against the United States and then doing significant things for Florida.

Given how the Trump regime is re-embracing the Confederacy, it would not be surprising if this matter was re-considered in Florida. It would serve as a distraction from whatever the administration is up to and would please the white supremacists  and lovers of the Confederacy in the base.

It is estimated that almost 30% of humans are overweight or obese and this is likely to increase. Given this large number of large people, it is not surprising that moral and legal issues have arisen regarding their accommodation. It is also not surprising that people arguing in favor of accommodation contend that obesity is a disability. The legal issues are, of course, are matter of law and are settled by lawsuits. Since I am not a lawyer, I will focus on ethics and will address two main issues. The first is whether obesity is a disability. The second is whether obesity is a disability that morally justifies making accommodations.

On the face of it, obesity is disabling. That is, a person who is obese will have reduced capabilities relative to a person who is not obese. An obese person will tend to have lower endurance than a non-obese person, less speed, less mobility, less flexibility and so on. An obese person will also tend to suffer from more health issues and be at greater risk for some illnesses. Because of this, an obese person might find it difficult or impossible to perform certain job tasks, such as those involving strenuous physical activity or walking relatively long distances.

 The larger size and weight of obese individuals also presents challenges when they deal with chairs, doors, equipment, clothing and vehicles. For example, an obese person might be unable to operate a forklift with the standard seating and safety belt. As another example, an obese person might not be able to fit in one airline seat and instead require two (or more).  As a third example, an obese student might not be able to fit into a standard classroom desk. As such, obesity could make it difficult or impossible for a person to work or make use of certain goods and services.   

Obviously enough, obese people are not the only ones who have disabilities. There are people with short term disabilities due to illness or injury. I experienced this myself when I had a complete quadriceps tendon tear. My left leg was locked in an immobilizer for weeks, then all but useless for months. With this injury, I was much slower, had difficulty with stairs, could not carry heavy loads, and could not drive. This experience opened my eyes to the challenges of navigating a world not designed to accommodate people.

There are also people who have long term or permanent disabilities, such as people who are paralyzed, blind, or are missing limbs due to accidents or war. These people can face great challenges in performing tasks at work and in life. For example, a person who is permanently confined to a wheelchair due to a spinal injury will find navigating stairs or working in the woods rather challenging.

In general, it seems morally right to require employees, businesses, schools and so on to make reasonable accommodations for people who have disabilities. The principle that justifies that is equal treatment: people should be afforded equal access, even when doing so requires some additional accommodation. As such, while having ramps in addition to stairs costs more, it is a reasonable requirement given that some people cannot fully use their legs.  Given that the obese are disabled, it is reasonable to conclude they should be accommodated just as the blind and paralyzed are accommodated.

Naturally, it could be argued that there is no moral obligation to provide accommodation for anyone. If this is the case, then there would be no obligation to accommodate the obese. However, it would seem to be rather difficult to prove, for example, that veterans with disabilities returning to school should just have to fight their way up the steps in their wheelchairs. For the sake of the discussion to follow I will assume that there is a moral obligation to accommodate the disabled. However, there is still the question of whether this should apply to the obese.

One obvious way to argue against accommodations for the obese is to argue that there is a morally relevant difference between those disabled by obesity and those disabled by injury, birth defects, etc. One difference that people often point out is that obesity is claimed to be a choice and other disabilities are not. That is, a person’s decisions result in their being fat and hence they are responsible in a way a person who is disabled by an accident or war is not.

It could be pointed out that some people who are disabled by injury were disabled as the result of their decisions. For example, a person might have driven while drunk and ended up paralyzed. But, of course, the person would not be denied access to handicapped parking or the use of automatic doors because their disability was self-inflicted. The same reasoning could be used for the obese: even if their disability self-inflicted, it is still a disability and thus should be accommodated.

A reply to this is that there is still a relevant difference. While a person who loses the ability to use their legs in a self-inflicted drunken crash caused their own disability, there is little they can do about that disability. They can change their diet and exercise, but this will not restore functionality to their legs. That is, they are permanently stuck with the results of that decision. In contrast, an obese person must maintain their obesity. While some people are genetically predisposed to being obese, how much a person eats and exercises is a matter of choice. Since they could reduce their weight, the rest of us are under no obligation to provide special accommodation for them. This is because they could take reasonable steps to remove the need for such accommodation. To use analogy, imagine someone who insisted that they be provided with a Seeing Eye dog because she wants to wear opaque glasses all the time. These glasses would result in their being disabled since they would be effectively blind. However, since they can just remove the glasses, there is no obligation to provide them with the dog. In contrast, a person who is blind cannot just get new eyes and hence it is reasonable for society to accommodate them. 

It can be argued that obesity is not a matter of choice. One approach would be to argue for metaphysical determinism: the obese are obese by necessity and could not be otherwise. The easy reply here would be to say that we are, sadly enough, metaphysically determined not to provide accommodation.

A more sensible approach would be to argue that obesity is, in some cases, a medical condition that is beyond the ability of a person to control. The most likely avenue of support for this claim would come from neuroscience. If it can be shown that people are incapable of controlling their weight, then obesity would be a true disability, on par with having one’s arm blasted off by an IED or being born with a degenerative neural disorder.

It could also be argued that a person does have some choice, but that acting on the choice would be so difficult that it is more reasonable for society to accommodate the individual than it is for the individual to struggle not to be obese. To use an analogy, a person with a disability might be able to regain enough functionality to operate in a “mostly normal” way, but doing so might require agonizing effort beyond what could be expected of a person. In such a case, one would surely not begrudge the person the accommodations. So, it could be argued that since it is easier for society to accommodate the obese than it is for the obese to not be obese, society should do so.

There is, however, a legitimate concern here. If the principle is adopted so that society must accommodate the obese because they have a disability and they cannot help their obesity, then others could appeal to that same sort of principle and perhaps over-extend the realm of disabilities that must be accommodated. For example, people who are addicted to drugs could make a similar argument: they are disabled, yet their addiction is not a matter of choice. As another example, people who are irresponsible can claim they are disabled as well and should be accommodated on the grounds that they cannot be other than they are. But  it is likely that boundaries  can be drawn in a principled way so that the obese have a disability, but the irresponsible do not.

Human flesh is weak, and metal is strong. So, it is no surprise that military science fiction includes cyborg soldiers. An example of a minor cybernetic is an implanted radio. The most extreme example would be a full body conversion: the brain is removed from the original body and placed in a mechanical body. This body might look like a human (known as a Gemini full conversion in Cyberpunk) or be a vehicle such as a tank, as in Keith Laumer’s A Plague of Demons.

An obvious moral concern with cybernetics is the involuntary “upgrading” of soldiers, such as the sort practiced by the Cybermen of Doctor Who. While important, the issue of involuntary augmentation is not unique to cybernetics and was addressed in the second essay in this series. For the sake of this essay, it will be assumed that the soldiers volunteer for their cybernetics and are not coerced or deceived. This then shifts moral concern to the ethics of the cybernetics themselves.

While the ethics of cybernetics is complicated, one way to handle matters is to split cybernetics into two broad categories. The first category consists of restorative cybernetics. The second consists of enhancement cybernetics.

Restorative cybernetics are devices used to restore normal functions to a wounded soldier. Examples would include cyberoptics (replacement eyes), cyberlimbs (replacements legs and arms), and cyberorgans (such as an artificial heart). Soldiers are already being fitted with such devices, although by the standards of science fiction they are very primitive. Given that these devices merely restore functionality and the ethics of prosthetics and similar replacements are well established, there is no moral concern about using such technology in a medical role. In fact, it could be argued that nations have a moral obligation to use such technology to restore their wounded soldiers.

While enhancement cybernetics might be used to restore functionality to a wounded soldier, enhancement cybernetics goes beyond mere restoration. By definition, they are intended to improve on the original. These enhancements break down into two main classes. The first class consists of replacement cybernetics. These devices require the removal of the original part (be it an eye, limb or organ) and serve as replacements that improve on the original in some manner. For example, cyberoptics could provide a soldier with night vision, telescopic visions and immunity to being blinded by flares and flashes. As another example, cybernetic limbs could provide greater speed, strength and endurance. And, of course, a full conversion could provide a soldier with a vast array of superhuman abilities.

The obvious moral concern with these devices is that they require the removal of the original organic parts, something that certainly seems problematic, even if they do offer enhanced abilities. This could, of course, be offset if the original parts were preserved and restored when the soldier left the service. There is also the concern raised in science fiction about the mental effects of such removals and replacements. The Cyberpunk role playing game developed the notion of cyberpsychosis, a form of insanity caused by having your body replaced by machines. Obviously, it is not yet known what negative effects (if any) such enhancements will have. As in any case of weighing harms and benefits, the likely approach would be utilitarian: are the advantages of the technology worth the cost to the soldier?

A second type of enhancement is an add-on which does not replace existing organic parts. Instead, as the name implies, an add-on involves the addition of a device to the body of the soldier. Add-on cybernetics differ from wearables and standard gear in that they are implanted in or attached to the soldier’s body. As such, removal is more complicated than just taking off a suit of armor.

A minor example would be something like an implanted radio. A rather extreme example would be the comic book villain Doctor Octopus: his mechanical limbs are add-ons.  Other examples of add-ons include such things as implanted sensors, implanted armor, implanted weapons (such as in the comic book hero Wolverine), and other such augmentations.

Since these devices do not involve removal of healthy parts, they do avoid that moral concern. However, there are still legitimate concerns about the physical and mental harm that might be caused by such devices. It is easy enough to imagine implanted devices having serious side effects on soldiers. As noted above, these matters would probably be best addressed by utilitarian ethics, weighing the harms against the benefits.

Both types of enhancements also raise a moral concern about returning the soldier to the civilian population after their term of service. In the case of restorative grade devices, there is not as much concern. These ex-soldiers would, ideally, function as they did before their injuries. However, the enhancements do present a potential problem since they, by definition, give the soldier capabilities that exceed that of normal humans. In some cases, re-integration would probably not be a problem. For example, a soldier with enhanced cyberoptics would presumably present no special problems. However, certain augmentations would present serious problems, such as implanted weapons or full conversions. Ideally, augmented soldiers could be restored to normal after their service has ended, but there could obviously be cases in which this was not done, either because of the cost or because the augmentation could not be reversed. This has been explored in science fiction, soldiers that can never stop being soldiers because they are machines of war. While this could be justified on utilitarian grounds (after all, war itself is often justified on such grounds), it is certainly a matter of concern, or will be.

 

Humans have limitations that make us less than ideal weapons of war. For example, we get tired and need sleep. As such, it is no surprise militaries have sought various ways to augment humans to counter these weaknesses. For example, militaries use caffeine and amphetamines to keep their soldiers awake and alert. There have also been experiments in other forms of improvement.

In science fiction, militaries go far beyond these drugs and develop potent pharmaceuticals. These chemicals tend to split into two broad categories. The first consists of short-term enhancements (what gamers refer to as “buffs”) that address a human weakness or provide augmented abilities.  In the real world, caffeine and amphetamines are short-term enhancement drugs.

In fiction, the classic sci-fi role-playing game Traveller featured the aptly (though generically) named combat drug. This drug would boost the user’s strength and endurance for about ten minutes. Other fictional drugs have more dramatic effects, such as the Venom drug used by the super villain Bane. Given that militaries already use short-term enhancers, it is reasonable to think they are interested in more advanced enhancers of the sort considered in science fiction.

The second category is long-term enhancers. These are chemicals that enable or provide long-lasting effects. An obvious real-world example is steroids: these allow the user to develop greater muscle mass and increased strength. In fiction, the most famous example is probably the super-soldier serum that was used to transform Steve Rogers into Captain America.

Since the advantages of improved soldiers are obvious, it seems reasonable to think that militaries would also be interested in the development of effective long-term enhancers. While it is unlikely there will be a super-soldier serum soon, chemicals aimed at improving attention span, alertness, memory, intelligence, endurance, pain tolerance and such would be useful to militaries. And people in general.

As might be suspected, chemical enhancers raise moral concerns worth considering. While some might see discussing enhancers that do not yet (as far as we know) exist as a waste of time, there is an advantage in considering ethical issues in advance. It is wiser to plan for a problem before it happens rather than waiting for it to occur and then dealing with it.

One obvious point of concern, especially given the record of unethical experimentation, is that enhancers will be used on soldiers without their informed consent. Since this is a general issue, I addressed it in its own essay and reached the obvious conclusion: informed consent is morally required. As such, the following discussion assumes that the soldiers using the enhancers have been informed of the nature of the enhancers and have given their consent.

When discussing the ethics of enhancers, it might be useful to consider real world cases in which enhancers are used. One obvious example is that of professional sports. While Major League Baseball has seen many cases of athletes using such enhancers, they are used worldwide and in many sports, from running to gymnastics. In the case of sports, one of the main reasons certain enhancers, such as steroids, are considered unethical is that they provide the athlete with an unfair advantage.

While this is a legitimate concern in sports, it does not apply to war. After all, there is no moral requirement for fair competition in battle. Rather, the goal is to gain every advantage over the enemy to win. As such, the fact that enhancers would provide an “unfair” advantage in war does not make them immoral. One can, of course, discuss the relative morality of the sides involved in the war, but this is another matter.

A second reason why the use of enhancers is wrong in sports is that they often have harmful side effects. Steroids, for example, do awful things to the body. Given that even aspirin has potentially harmful side effects, it seems likely that military-grade enhancers will have serious harmful side effects. These might include addiction, psychological issues, organ damage, death, and perhaps even new side effects yet to be observed in medicine. Given the potential for harm, an obvious way to approach the ethics of this matter is utilitarianism. That is, the benefits of the enhancers would need to be weighed against the harm caused by their use.

This assessment could be done with a narrow limit: the harm of the enhancer could be weighed against the benefits provided to the soldier. For example, an enhancer that boosted a combat pilot’s alertness and significantly increased her reaction speed while having the potential to cause short-term insomnia and diarrhea would seem to be morally (and pragmatically) fine given the relatively low harms for significant gains. As another example, a drug that greatly boosted a soldier’s long-term endurance while creating a high risk of a stroke or heart attack would seem to be morally and pragmatically problematic.

The assessment could also be done more broadly by considering ever-wider factors. For example, the harms of an enhancer could be weighed against the importance of a specific mission and the contribution the enhancer would make to the success of the mission. So, if a powerful drug with terrible side-effects was critical to an important mission, its use could be morally justified in the same way that taking any risk for such an objective can be justified. As another example, the harm of an enhancer could be weighed against the contribution its general use would make to the war. So, a drug that increased the effectiveness of soldiers, yet cut their life expectancy, could be justified by its ability to shorten a war. As a final example, there is also the broader moral concern about the ethics of the conflict itself. So, the use of a dangerous enhancer by soldiers fighting for a morally good cause could be justified by that cause (using the notion that the consequences justify the means).

There are, of course, those who reject using utilitarian calculations as the basis for moral assessment. For example, there are those who believe (often on religious grounds) that the use of pharmaceuticals is always wrong (be they used for enhancement, recreation or treatment). Obviously enough, if the use of pharmaceuticals is wrong in general, then their specific application in the military context would also be wrong. The challenge is, of course, to show that the use of pharmaceuticals is simply wrong, regardless of the consequences.

In general, the military use of enhancers should be assessed morally on utilitarian grounds, weighing the benefits of the enhancers against the harm done to the soldiers.

Science fiction abounds with stories of enhanced soldiers such as Captain America and the Space Marines of Warhammer 40K. The real-world augmentation of soldiers raises a moral concern about informed consent. While fiction abounds with tales of involuntary augmentation, real soldiers and citizens of the United States have also been coerced or deceived into participating in experiments. As such, are legitimate grounds for being concerned that soldiers and citizens could be involuntarily augmented as part of experiments or actual weapon deployment.

Assuming the context of a democratic state, it is reasonable to hold that augmenting a soldier without informed consent would be immoral. After all, the individual has rights against the democratic state, and these include the right not to be unjustly coerced or deceived. Socrates, in the Crito, also advanced reasonable arguments that the obedience of a citizen required that the state not coerce or deceive the citizen in the social contract and this would apply to soldiers in a democratic state. Or any morally legitimate state.

It is tempting to rush to accept that informed consent would make the augmentation of soldiers morally acceptable. After all, the soldier would know what they were getting into and would be volunteering. In popular fiction, one example is Steve Rogers volunteering for the super soldier conversion. Given his consent, such an augmentation would seem morally acceptable.

There are, of course, some cases where informed consent makes a critical difference in ethics. One obvious example is the moral difference between sex and rape; the difference is a matter of informed and competent consent. If Sam agrees to have sex with Sally, then Sally is not raping Sam. But if Sally drugs Sam and has her way with him, then that would be rape.  Another obvious example is the difference between theft and receiving a gift. This is also a matter of informed consent. If Sally gives Sam a diamond ring, then that is not theft. If Sam takes the ring by force or coercion, then that is theft and presumably wrong.

Even when informed consent is important, there are still cases in which consent does not make the action morally acceptable. For example, Sam might consent to give Sally an heirloom ring that has been in the family for untold generations, but it might still be the wrong thing to do, especially when Sally pawns the ring to buy ketamine and Tesla stock.

There are also cases in which informed consent is not relevant because of the morality of the action itself. For example, Sam might have consented to join Sally’s plot to murder Ashley but this would not be relevant to the ethics of the murder. At best it could be said that Sally did not add to her misdeed by coercing or tricking her accomplices, but this would not make the murder itself less bad.

Turning back to the main subject of augmentation, even if the soldiers gave their informed consent, the above consideration shows that there would still be the question of whether the augmentation itself is moral. For example, there are reasonable moral arguments against genetically modifying human beings. If these arguments hold up, then even if a soldier consented to genetic modification, the modification itself would be immoral.  I will be addressing the ethics of pharmaceutical and cybernetic augmentation in later essays.

While informed consent does seem to be a moral necessity, this position can be countered. One way to do this is to make use of a utilitarian argument: if the benefits gained from augmenting soldiers without their informed consent outweighed the harm, then the augmentation would be morally acceptable. For example, imagine that a war against a wicked enemy is going badly and that an augmentation method has been developed that could turn the war around. The augmentation is dangerous and has awful long-term side-effects that would deter most soldiers from volunteering. However, losing to the wicked enemy would be worse, so it could be argued that the soldiers should be deceived so that the war can be won. As another example, a wicked enemy is not needed, it could simply be argued that the use of augmented soldiers would end the war faster, thus saving lives, albeit at the cost of those terrible side-effects.

Another stock approach is to appeal to the arguments used by democracies to justify conscription in time of war. If the state (or, rather, those who expect people to do what they say) can coerce citizens into killing and dying in war, then the state can surely coerce and citizens to undergo augmentation. It is easy to imagine a legislature passing something called “the conscription and augmentation act” that legalizes coercing citizens into being augmented to serve in the military. Of course, there are those who are suspicious of democratic states so blatantly violating the rights of life and liberty. However, not all states are democratic. The United States, for example, seems to have given up the pretense of democracy.

While democratic states face some moral limits when it comes to involuntary augmentation, non-democratic states appear to have more options. For example, under fascism the individual exists to serve the state (that is, the bad people who think everyone else should do what they say). If this political system is morally correct, then the state would have every right to coerce or deceive the citizens for the good of the state. In fiction, these states tend to be the ones to crank out involuntary augmented soldiers that still manage to lose to the good guys.

Naturally, even if the state has the right to coerce or deceive soldiers into becoming augmented, it does not automatically follow that the augmentation itself is morally acceptable, this would depend on the specific augmentations. These matters will be addressed in upcoming essays.