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In the previous essay, I addressed the matter of the state’s contribution to an individual’s success (and failure). Naturally, no discussion of success would be complete without a discussion of genetics.

While the role of genetics in human behavior is complicated, it seems reasonable to accept that genetics play at least some role in success (and failure). Interestingly, these genes might not all be human—there are some interesting findings about the roles of the bacteria that live in us.

Thanks to years spent in athletics, I have had access to an informal laboratory in which I could observe various factors at play when it comes to success. As might be imagined, genetics probably plays a  significant role in athletic success (and failure). Being a runner, I will limit myself to running, but the same points can be applied to other aspects of life as well.

One rather obvious role of genetics is body type. As people who run or at least watch competitive running know, top runners tend to have a specific body type. While much of this results from training, there are genetic factors and it helps to be born to run. After all, no amount of running will give a person longer legs. There are also the factors that one cannot see, such as the efficiency of the cells in handling the energy requirements of competitive running. While training can influence these factors, natural ability (which is probably largely based in genetics) does have a significant impact and this is supported by my own years of competitive running.

Having run in high school and college, I was able to observe runners who were in the same training programs, had similar backgrounds and lived in similar conditions. However, performance obviously varied quite even among people who followed the exact same training. In my own case, I was lucky—while I lacked the easy high school success of “natural athletes”, I found that training really paid off for me. In contrast, some other runners worked as hard (or harder) than me yet did not meet with the same level of success. Of course, there were also runners who trained as hard as I did (or less) who did much better. After graduation, I was no longer on a team but still trained with other runners. Obviously, some people I trained with and ran with step-for-step were better than me and some were worse. I also found out the obvious—no matter how hard or smart I trained; I would never be able to make the Olympics.  It makes sense to attribute some of this failure to genetics—my body simply cannot match what the Olympic marathoners can do, despite all that training. Of course, it also makes sense to attribute some of my success to genetics—while I do not have Olympian genes, I have brought home many trophies. Plus, as we old runners say, running is itself a victory.

Naturally, these results were impacted by many variables, but the fact that genes influence performance seems to be well established. The more interesting question is, then, “how much do genes influence success (and failure)?”

Not surprisingly, people often turn to the study of twins to attempt to sort out what is genetic and what is not. After all, twins are supposed to be genetically identical and hence any differences between them would be non-genetic in nature. Interestingly, it has turned out that twins are not actually identical, thus entailing that some differences might be genetic. There has also been some recent interesting work regarding the bacteria that inhabit the human body and their influence on such factors as health. Oddly enough, it might be the case that some of a person’s success is due to their bacteria.

While the physiological aspects of running and other activities at which one might fail or succeed seem to be strongly influenced by genetics, there is an open question as to how much genetics impacts the mental aspects of success and failure. Going back to running, training and competition have mental elements. For example, there is the matter of having the will to train as needed. As any runner will tell you, training is suffering. Of course, racing hurts more—a big part of being a competitive runner is having what Hobbes called the will to hurt. Only in this case is it is the will to hurt yourself rather than others.

As might be imagined, if the “mental” aspects are as influenced by genetics as the physical aspects, then much of a person’s success or failure rests in these genes. For example, if the ability to finish a race despite the pain of an injury is not a matter of the “will” of the athlete, but a matter of the structure of their brain that resulted from the genes that constructed it, then they did not succeed any more than a car would succeed by being able to keep running despite damage. Likewise, if a runner is “broken” in the final sprint by a tougher runner because of the genetics of their nervous systems, then he has not failed, anymore than a car has failed if it runs out of gas.

Shockingly enough, the essay ends as it began, with the question unanswered. After all, we do not know how much the genes influence our success (and failures). But I got to write about running and that is a success.

 

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In the previous essay I discussed the question “to what extent do people owe their success (and failures) to others?” In this essay I will focus on how much of a person’s success (or failure) is owed to the state. Obviously, the exact debt will vary, and this examination will be, of necessity, somewhat abstract.

One way to begin the discussion is to use the state of nature. This philosophical device was used by such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in their examination of rights and the justification of political power. I am, however, going to use the device to see what the state contributes to success (or failure).

While this oversimplifies things two lassic approaches to the state of nature are the Hobbesian state and the Lockean state. In general terms, the state of nature is a state in which there is no governmental authority. It is often presented as a hypothetical predecessor to the rise of political states. In any case, the state of nature is marked by the lack of any artificial authority.

 For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war “and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Because of the conditions of this state, none of the following are possible: “Industry, culture of the earth, navigation, use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, commodious building; instruments of moving and removing, such things as require much force, knowledge of the face of the earth, account of time, arts, letters, society.” As Hobbes sees it, the establishment of the sovereign (the state) is necessary for the establishment of order, and this allows the possibility of industry and the other things that are required for “commodious living.” Given Hobbes assumptions about the state of nature being a state of war of all against all, the idea that these things would not be possible makes sense. One has but to look at what happens in real cases where civil authority utterly collapses to see the plausibility of Hobbes’ view.

On the Hobbesian model, an individual who succeeded in industry or other endeavors would owe a great deal to the state (that is, the collective of everyone forming the great leviathan that is the state). After all, without the order provided by the state, success in these areas would not be possible. Naturally, this does not include any other contributions made by the state, such as providing infrastructure or support for research. These contributions would, obviously enough, add to the debt owed by the individual to the collective society.

The Lockean model is much nicer than the Hobbesian, most likely because Locke includes divinely based rights to life, liberty and property even in the state of nature. On Locke’s model, life in the state if nature is not a state of war (although war can occur) and there is the possibility of success within this state. For example, the right to property allows for the accumulation of goods and this could be seen as success.

While the Lockean state of nature is more appealing than Hobbes’ state of war, Locke does argue that it is not preferable to the state of civil society. While there are, according to Locke, rights in the state of nature, these rights are enforced only by vigilante justice in which individuals act (or not) to prevent and take revenge for misdeeds. As such, wrongs are not reliably prevented or corrected. If, for example, someone stole the goods a person had accumulated, it would be up to her (and any allies) to recover her goods and punish the malefactors.

To solve this and other problems, civil society is created and vigilante justice is (mostly) replaced with a legal system. Once the state is established, then the state has the responsibility of protecting the citizens and dealing with criminals. Assuming the state is doing its job, the state of civil society provides a stable system in which success is more possible and more secure.

If Locke’s view is correct, a successful individual owes less to the state (that is, the collective agreements and actions of the people) than she would if Hobbes were right. After all, the difference between Locke’s state of nature and civil society is not as extreme as the difference in Hobbes’ view. However, the successful individual would still owe much to the collective efforts of civil society, not the least of which would be a debt for the existence of laws enabling and protecting the fruits of her success. If additional contributions of civil society, such as infrastructure, public education and so on are included, then the successful individual would owe a great deal to the state.

Of course, not everyone sees the state in such a positive way. For example, the philosophical communists contend that while the state is necessary for capitalism and socialism, it will wither away as true communism is achieved. Before then it will be an instrument of oppression, either serving the capitalists or the socialists. Obviously, once communism is achieved, then people will not owe any of their success (or failure) to the state because there will be no state. Or so the communists claim. However, a debt would still be owed to the states—without them, humanity would not have been able to achieve communism.

As another example, the anarchists have a negative view of the state—although the degree of negativity varies. Some, like Thoreau, are willing to co-exist with benign states. Others, like Goldman, advocate the destruction of the state because of its role in oppression and how it prevents true human flourishing.

Thoreau claims “that government is best which governs least” and even goes so far as to say, “that government is best which governs not at all.” As Thoreau sees it, government interferes with success in two main ways. The first is that people use it to impose on each other for their advantage (see, for example, how businesses use regulations against their competition). While this aids the success of those who control the state, it impedes the success of those who are imposed upon. Second, he claims that the state gets in the way of success, noting that “trade and commerce continuously face obstacles placed by legislators.” As he sees it government has only one role in success, namely doing nothing and “government never furthered any enterprise except by getting out of its way.”

On Thoreau’s system of government non-involvement, an individual’s success (and failures) would depend more on them than it does in the United States and similar countries. After all, the state is routinely used by some to their considerable advantage over others (subsidies, favorable laws and so on) and it also imposes restrictions on what people can do. As such, the state does contribute to success (and failure) via these impositions and restrictions.

Thoreau advocates evolution rather than destruction of the state, but other anarchists (such as Goldman) advocate complete elimination of the state. This would take the discussion full circle by returning to the state of nature—a situation without political authority. Naturally, if there was no state, then there would be no state to contribute to or prevent an individual’s success. There is, however, the question of whether such a state would be desirable. There is also the question of whether success would even be possible without a state, unless success is merely a matter of staying alive.

 

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As an undergraduate I participated in a faculty-student debate about artificial intelligence. While the details of the debate have faded from my non-artificial mind, I vividly recall one exchange. The professor on the opposing side claimed I believed in free will because I wanted to take credit for my successes. Filled with the pride of youth, I replied with something to the effect of “of course, they are my successes.” I also recall showing some small wisdom by adding “my failures are also mine.” This was probably my first attempt at reflecting on the extent to which I was responsible for my successes and failures. This got me thinking about success and failure in general and not just the specifics of my own victories and defeats.

Not surprisingly, I have thought about this over the years, often in the context of teaching. For example, students who do well say things like “I earned an A” while students who do poorly typically say things like “the professor failed me.” At the start of each semester, at least one student will ask me if I fail students. My reply, which I make with a smile, is always “No. People fail themselves. I merely record their failure.” I follow that by saying that students have every chance to succeed and that I will do my best to ensure that they get the grade they earn. As might be imagined, being a teacher does tend to get a person thinking about who is responsible for the success and failures of students.

The matter of responsibility for success (and failure) extends far beyond the classroom. Way back in July 2012 a speech by President Obama set off a battle between Democrats and Republicans. The key part of Obama’s speech  is as follows:  “…Look, if you’ve been successful, you didn’t get there on your own.… If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business – you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.”

Some Republicans claimed Obama believed business owners owe all their success to others (especially the state) but the most plausible interpretation is that he claimed people who are successful in business owe some of their success to others, including the state.

Mitt Romney (he was famous once), criticized Obama at the time but had presented a similar view about success back in 2002: “You Olympians, however, know you didn’t get here solely on your own power. For most of you, loving parents, sisters or brothers encouraged your hopes. Coaches guided, communities built venues in order to organize competitions. All Olympians stand on the shoulders of those who lifted them. We’ve already cheered the Olympians, let’s also cheer the parents, coaches and communities.”

As with Obama, the most plausible interpretation of Romney’s remarks is that he claimed athletes who made it to the Olympics owe some of their success to others not that they owed all their success to others.

These claims made by Obama and Romney about success in business and sports are intuitively plausible. Obviously, people do not appear as grown, educated adults ex nihilo via the power of their own will. Less obviously, but still rather obviously, business owners do not create their business out of nothing. To use a silly example, a business owner obviously does not invent commerce. In the case of Olympic athletes, they obviously do not just appear  at the games with no support or assistance from others.

The interesting question  here is not “do people owe some of their success (and failures) to others?” but “to what extent do people owe their success (and failures) to others?” Making this discussion manageable does require making assumptions that can (and should) be challenged. I will be assuming that people can have meaningful agency and that the universe is not strictly deterministic or entirely random. As an illustration, consider a prize drawing after a 5K race. For those not familiar with such events, some races feature the usual earned awards (what the runners get for running well) and a random prize drawing. Interestingly, people often applaud as loudly when people win a random prize as they do for people who earn a trophy.

 In a deterministic universe it makes little sense to speak of meaningful success or failure. Such a universe can be seen as a rigged prize drawing.  If I “win” a prize because it is determined that I will win (that is, it is rigged) then I have not really succeeded and the others have not really failed—there is no victory, there is no defeat.

The same holds true for a completely random universe. If I “win” a prize because my number is pulled by chance, I have not succeeded and the others have not failed. Things have just happened by chance.

Success and failure, then, would thus seem to assume that the agent has a meaningful role in the outcome. Going back to the prize drawing, while I would not have succeeded by “winning” either a fixed or random drawing, I could succeed by winning a trophy in the 5K by my efforts. Naturally, the nature of this agency in even something as apparently straightforward as a 5K race is a mystery. However, for the sake of the discussion that will follow in additional essays, I must assume this mysterious agency. After all, I want to think I earned all those trophies, and I am obligated to accept the disgrace of my failures.

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While same-sex marriage is now legal, there seems to be an appetite to roll it back. As such, it is worth considering the previous fight in preparation for the future fight. Back when President Obama supported same-sex marriage he was criticized by some leaders in the black community.  For example, Reverend William Owens, the president of the Coalition of African-American Pastors said that “by embracing gay marriage, President Obama is leading the country down an immoral path.”

Owens based his position on his view that same-sex marriage is “simply wrong” and that it was a mistake to consider same-sex marriage as a civil right. He also claimed that the Black Church must oppose it because “the Black Church has always been the conscience of America.” Because of this view, he called upon black pastors and Christians to stop supporting Obama. Owens seemed to claim that the President’s view was just to get the support (and money) of the “Hollywood folks.” This raised some interesting issues back then that will no doubt arise again.

Not surprisingly, those who support same-sex marriage often draw an analogy between the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the movement to secure rights for LGBT+ Americans. Supporters of same-sex marriage also compared same-sex marriage and mixed-race marriages to argue in favor of same-sex marriage rights. In the United States, it was not until the case of Loving v. Virginia in 1967 that laws against inter-racial marriages were deemed unconstitutional. Even now, some oppose mixed race marriage because they see it as immoral and unnatural. I still get the occasional paper arguing against mixed marriage in my college Ethics class.

On the face of it, mixed-marriage and same-sex marriages seem morally analogous. After all, in both cases people are denied the right to marry based on who they want to marry being the “wrong” sort of person: either the wrong race or the wrong sex. Those who favor allowing mixed-race marriages contend that race should not be a relevant factor in determining who one should be allowed to marry. In the case of those who favor same-sex marriage, it was contended that a person’s sex should not be a relevant factor in determining who one should be allowed to marry.

Given the similarity, it is tempting to think that those who supported the civil rights movements of the past and support (or at least tolerate) mixed-race marriage should also, based on consistency, support same-sex marriage.

However, this is not always the case and some people (such as Owens) who support civil rights oppose same-sex marriage. There is a reasonable question as to whether this difference is morally justified.

Owens, as noted above, takes the strategy of claiming that same-sex marriage is immoral and hence should not be supported. Given his remarks about civil rights, he presumably believed that the civil rights movement was morally good. As such, grounds are needed for distinguishing between the goodness of the civil rights movement and the alleged evil of same-sex marriage.

One stock approach is to use the religious argument against same-sex marriage. Among Christian thinkers, the basis for the religious objection is typically and famously found in Leviticus. Naturally, there must also be a mixing of norms (see my Moral Methods book) from the religious claim that homosexuality is an abomination to the moral claim that homosexuality (and thus same-sex marriage) is morally wrong. Since I argue about this general point at length in my book For Better or Worse Reasoning, I will focus on three specific points here.

The first is that basing the opposition to same sex-marriage on religious grounds runs into the problem that the same text used to attack same-sex marriage also contains passages that seem to support slavery and inequality, things inimical to the views of those who support the equality of the civil rights movement.

The second, which is a related point, is that if same-sex marriage is opposed on religious grounds, then consistency requires that other religious rules be followed. This is an instance of a general problem of using religion as the basis for ethics: when people use religion to justify or condemn one practice, they often selectively ignore parts of the text that condemn or justify other practices.

For example, consider the commandment that requires keeping the Sabbath. This, unlike the short line in Leviticus, is one of the ten major rules. However, this commandment is routinely and regularly ignored by the same people who oppose same-sex marriage, as are many other rules (such as those regarding usury and the stoning of disobedient children). If it is argued that these other rules should be ignored because of changing times or on some other grounds, the same sorts of reasons can be given for ignoring Leviticus and thus this religious foundation of the argument against same-sex marriage can be undercut. Of course, it could be argued that this interpretation of this part of Leviticus should be honored while other rules can be ignored as desired. The challenge is doing this selective ignoring in a principled manner rather than merely on the basis of prejudice and convenience.

A third point is that religious arguments were used in support of slavery, against the civil rights movement and against mixed-race marriages. As such, those who would use religious arguments against same-sex marriage while wanting to hold to civil rights will need to be careful to show that their religious arguments against same-sex marriage are legitimate while the religious based opposition to civil rights was mistaken and, of course, that the religious based support of civil rights was in the right. This could be done but the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who want to support civil rights while also opposing same-sex marriage.

Considering the above, the religious based approach does not seem to be a particularly viable means of condemning same-sex marriage if one wants to support other civil rights.

A second common way to argue against same-sex marriage is an appeal to tradition. What is claimed to be traditional marriage is good and right because it is alleged to be traditional. One problem is that appealing to tradition is a fallacy. Another problem with this, at least for those who oppose same-sex marriage while favoring civil rights is that the civil rights movement was opposed on the grounds of tradition and it involved a break with the traditions of racism and unequal rights. As such, appealing to tradition not a very viable option for those who want to oppose same-sex marriage while also supporting civil rights. The same sort of problem arises with appealing to common practice and appealing to belief. There are also logical fallacies and both were employed to argue against civil rights. As such, these do not seem to be viable ways to argue against same-sex marriage while also supporting civil rights.

Naturally, these approaches are not the only avenues to arguing that same-sex marriage is morally wrong. However, these other arguments also certainly seem to fail, as I argue in my For Better or Worse Reasoning. Unlike some opponents of same-sex marriage, those who support civil rights face the added burden of reconciling their arguments against same-sex marriage with their support of civil rights. For example, if someone argues in favor of civil rights based on the principle of equality, they would need to argue why this principle applies to civil rights but does not apply to same-sex marriage. This might be doable but the burden of proof rests on those who wish to support civil rights but also wish to oppose same-sex marriage.

Another possible approach is to argue that there is a relevant difference between the past civil rights movement and same-sex marriage. One plausible way to do this is to note that civil rights should be seen as relating to race while same-sex marriage is (obviously) a matter of sexual orientation. One stock argument is that race is not a matter of choice and hence discrimination against people based on race is wrong. Since the traditional civil rights focus on race, supporting these civil rights would thus seem right. In contrast, it could be argued that sexual orientation is a matter of choice and hence a person could choose to be straight and thus be able to marry someone of the opposite sex. In contrast, a person cannot decide to not be black and hence it makes sense to have civil rights extended to people regardless of race. In contrast, there is no such obligation to people who “choose” to be gay. There is also the point that while people cannot, in general, easily hide their race in America, they can hide their sexual orientation. Hence, features that cannot be hidden should be protected, while those that can need not be protected.

One obvious objection to this approach is arguing that being gay is no more a matter of choice than is being black or being born a woman. As such, the choice argument would not hold. Another obvious objection is that the mere fact that a person can conceal something about themselves hardly seems to justify not extending rights to them. Just because, for example, some black people can “pass” for white does not entail that they are not entitled to equal civil rights. Likewise, the fact that a gay person can pass as straight does not mean that they do not need their rights protected.

Another approach is to argue that while being of a certain race or sex (male or female) is not immoral, being gay is. If true, this claim would provide the needed relevant difference to allow a person to support civil rights while still opposing same-sex marriage.

One obvious concern with this approach is that those who oppose civil rights for minorities or women would argue that minorities or women are inferior to, for example, white men and are not entitled to the same rights. In the case of same-sex marriage, the idea is that people who are gay are morally inferior to straight people and thus not entitled to the same rights, most especially marriage rights. As such, those who support minorities or women having civil rights while opposing the extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples need to show that there is a difference between homosexuals and other people that warrants the difference in treatment.

In the case of people who otherwise supported civil rights, such as Owens, the burden of proof would appear to be on them to show that while certain people should have full civil rights other people should be denied the right to marry.

There is, of course, also the issue of whether marriage rights should be denied to people who are immoral. Other civil rights do not seem to require being moral. As I have argued in Better or Worse Reasoning, there is not a general moral requirement for marriage, So, for example, a serial killer could always legally marry a murderer, if they are different sexes. As such, there seems to be no general grounds for denying marriage rights to same-sex couples, even if it is assumed that being gay in and of itself makes a person morally evil.

It could be argued that marriage rights are, in fact, denied to people who are immoral (or who want to engage in immoral activities). Pedophiles are rightfully denied the right to marry underage children (although what counts as underage varies by state) , people who are fond of animals are denied the right to marry animals, close relatives are denied the right to marry, necrophiliacs are denied the right to marry corpses and so on. However, this point can easily be countered, and I do so in my For Better or Worse Reasoning. After all, there are good moral arguments against marrying children, corpses and animals, mainly based on the obvious notion that they cannot provide consent. The same arguments do not, however, hold against same-sex couples.

On the face of it, it is difficult for a person to consistently support civil rights while at the same time opposing same-sex marriage rights. While clearly not impossible, the burden of proof rests on those who wish to defend civil rights for themselves while not extending those rights to others they regard as immoral or inferior. As this is being written, same-sex marriage is still legal in the United States, but no battle for rights is ever over.

 

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One clever political trick is to convince people you accept an appealing principle and then act in direct violation of that principle. That way, you gain the rhetorical benefit of espousing a principle while gaining the practical benefit of breaking it.

One of the holiest principles of American conservatives is the free market. It is advanced as a cure to economic ills and often described in ways that sound like it possesses magical powers. As might be imagined, thinkers have debated the merits of the free market of capitalism. Both Adam Smith and Marx praised it while others were rather critical of it, especially the forms that involve an essentially unregulated market.

Not surprisingly, one standard ritual for any Republican candidate is to praise the free market and promise to fight for the freedom of this market. But they seem too often engaged in an empty performance as the allegedly free market is not free. Rather than competitors competing on a level playing field without unfair advantages, the existing system consists of mechanisms of advantage that ensure competition is anything but free.

One of the great castles of advantage is occupied by fossil fuel industry. From this castle, propagandists for the industry rail against subsidies for the competing renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. To be fair and balanced, some conservative thinkers have argued for eliminating government support for all energy industries based on the free market principle. To also be fair and balanced, this is after the fossil fuel industry has enjoyed decades of subsidies and other state provided advantages. As an obvious example, the fossil fuel industry was built, in part, using oil extracted from public lands.

But one can consistently argue in favor of support for an industry while arguing against the support of another. If there were a relevant difference between the two industries that would require that the state support one industry to level the playing field, then the difference could be justified. To use an analogy, an athlete who is missing his legs should be allowed to use prosthetic legs so he can compete with other runners. However, giving mechanical enhancement (such as enhanced running shoes) to an able runner would be unfair. Likewise, an industry that needs governmental support to be able to fairly compete against other industries that were established and supported by state support could justly also receive state support. As such, if it could be shown that the oil and gas industry needed to retain its government support to compete against alternative energy, then that support could be justified.  Obviously, the same would also apply to the alternative energy industries—if they need the support to compete on a level playing field against the fossil fuel industry and its state support, then they should receive such support.

This, of course, assumes such support is acceptable. After all, another professed conservative principle is that the state should not take the hard-earned money of taxpayers and give it to those who have not earned it. While this principle is usually embraced when the state is providing support to the disadvantaged, it is usually ignored when it comes to state support to the advantaged, such as tax breaks for the wealthy.

While it might be claimed that the oil and gas industry needs the state welfare it enjoys, this is an odd claim. After all, the top five companies in the oil industry have made about $1.3 trillion in 2021-2025 with the big US fossil fuel companies making about $600-800 billion in the past 10 years. As such, they hardly seem to need state support.  

As noted above, some conservative thinkers have contended that the energy market should be made into a free market, although they usually just say that renewable energy sources should not receive subsidies while remaining silent about fossil fuel subsidies. However, doing this would not level the playing field. After all, the oil and gas industries have enjoyed state support since 1918. While the exact numbers can be disputed, it is estimated that the oil and gas industries received about $31 billion in state support each year. In contrast, the renewable energy industries received far less support, and this has been slashed and eliminated under the Trump regime. It is hilarious to hear conservatives attack solar and wind for not being viable without subsidies while they remain silent about how the fossil fuel industry was built on and is enriched by public support. But to be fair and balanced, some conservative pundits might be speaking in good faith ignorance about the history of state support for fossil fuel. But this is something they should look into if they are going to condemn state support for developing alternative energy.

Even if the state support of energy industries was eliminated, the playing field would not be level. After all, fossil fuel companies still have decades of state support and billions of dollars in advantages over the alternative energy companies.

To use an analogy, to call for a “level playing field” by condemning public support for alternative energy industries would be like calling for a “fair boat race” by forcing all competitors to row after some of them have been pulled for miles by powerboats and others are just a little bit out from the starting buoy. While everyone would now be rowing, it would hardly be a level playing field or a fair competition.

Obviously, the analogy does break down. In a boat race, the competitors could be returned to the start to begin the race anew. In the case of the energy industries, the oil companies cannot be “pushed” back to its starting point to give alternative energy companies a fair competition.

But it might be argued that while decades of state welfare for the energy industries was not a free-market system and gives them an unfair advantage, since nothing can be done about the past, the right thing to do is to restore the free market now and let the competition play out. This is analogous to how white supremacists like to argue against DEI efforts while ignoring centuries of established advantage.

Perhaps the alternative energy industries can still make a go of it, despite being at a tremendous disadvantage (like in the movies in which the underdog wins against all odds) and being denied the support that enabled the fossil fuel industries to become viable. Of course, this would be like making a competition “fair” by eliminating training for all athletes and then having the trained athletes compete against the untrained newcomers.

This analogy does suggest a potentially fair solution. To level the playing field, the alternative energy industry would need to receive support comparable to that enjoyed by the fossil fuel industries. This could be done by shifting the support from the fossil fuel industries to the alternative energy industries. Once the playing field has, in fact, been leveled in a few decades, then the support for the alternatives can be withdrawn and fair competition can finally begin. To go back to the boat analogy, the new competitors would be allowed to be pulled by a motorboat for the same amount of time and then they could row fairly against each other. In the case of the training analogy, the new athletes would receive comparable training to the old and then they could compete fairly on a level playing field. We would then have a free market, rather than a system that has given the fossil fuel industries an incredible advantage over the competition via past and current state welfare.

 

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Way back in July, 2012 the newsletter of the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) supported Meatless Monday. This was based on health concerns about meat consumption, the environmental impact of meat production, and its inefficiency (for example, it takes 7 kilograms of grain to make 1 kilogram of beef).

The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) took issue with this recommendation and J.D. Alexander, the president of the NCBA, responded: “This is truly an awakening statement by USDA, which strongly indicates that USDA does not understand the efforts being made in rural America to produce food and fiber for a growing global population in a very sustainable way. USDA was created to provide a platform to promote and sustain rural America in order to feed the world. This move by USDA should be condemned by anyone who believes agriculture is fundamental to sustaining life on this planet.” It was also claimed that the support of Meatless Monday was “a slap in the face of the people who every day are working to make sure we have food on the table to say, ‘Don’t eat their product once a week.’ ”

There were also tweets critical of the newsletter. For example, Iowa Representative Steve King responded with “USDA HQ meatless Mondays!! At the Dept. of Agriculture? Heresy! I’m not grazing there. I will have the double rib-eye Mondays instead.”After these reactions, a USDA spokesperson retracted its support Meatless Monday and that the link to the newsletter had been posted without “proper clearance.” 

While this was a minor political dust up, especially compared to the nightmare that is current political hellscape, the meat debate is still ongoing. One issue that persists is whether meat is a means of producing “food and fiber for a growing global population in a very sustainable way.”

While meat is food and has some fiber, it is not an effective way of providing food and fiber for a growing global population relative to the alternatives. After all, meat production is far less efficient than growing crops. While the exact ratios vary, producing a kilogram of meat requires much more than one kilogram of feed. As such, a more effective way to feed a growing global population would be to grow crops for human consumption rather than use them to make meat.

While the meat industry has tried to make meat production more sustainable, it is not as sustainable as the alternatives. Meat production is far more resource intensive than growing crops for human consumption and meat production does more environmental damage by adding the damage of meat production on top of the damage caused by feed production.  And given that producing a kilogram of meat requires creating multiple kilograms of feed, it is just math that meat production is not as sustainable as the alternatives. There is also concern about the waste products of the animals that often end up contaminating water and food. While non-meat agriculture generated contamination (mainly from pesticides and fertilizers), meat production produces far more because the animals require feed crops that produce contaminants and the animals also produce contaminants, for a double shot of contamination.  So, the idea that meat production is a sustainable means for feeding a growing global population seems mistaken. 

There is also the economic concern to consider. The meat industry employs people and can be a profitable business, especially with the government transferring wealth from taxpayers to farmers.  If people go meatless on Mondays (or other days) this could result in slightly lower sales of meat, thus costing the meat industry some profits. As such, a utilitarian argument could be made against Meatless Monday. If people eat less meat, then there will be less income for the meat industry.

There is an obvious reply to this concern. While Meatless Monday might lead to less meat consumption, it is not the same thing as “Meal less Monday” in which people eat nothing. As such, if someone is not eating a steak or pork chop on a given Monday, they will probably be eating something else, thus supporting some other food industry.

While I still like meat, I love truth more and hence I  believe that eating meat is not very healthy. While it has long been known that excessive meat consumption is unhealthy, even small amounts of red meat present a health risk.  While red meat is protein dense, eating red meat is a causal factor in heart disease and studies also link it to other health problems, such as colorectal cancer. Naturally, those in the meat industry dispute these findings. While the fact that the meat industry is biased does not prove that they are in error, this bias reduces their credibility.

Because I do like eating meat, I would like these studies to be wrong. However, what I would like is not the same thing as what is true. In my own case, I had to change my diet because of health concerns back in 2012. Despite running 50+ miles a week and working out regularly, my blood pressure and cholesterol were not great. After changing my diet, my blood pressure dropped and my good cholesterol increased. Since then, I’ve maintained a diet that is very light in meat and mostly plants. While my case is just an anecdote, my experience is consist with the best medical advice today.  

To head off the obvious straw man attacks, I am not advocating that people eliminate all meat from their diets (although that would be an excellent idea in terms of health and ethics). Rather, I think that reducing meat consumption would help improve individual health and would also help the non-meat producing aspects of American agriculture. It would also be better for the environment. It would, of course, not be ideal for folks in the meat industry—but they are not the only people who matter and a Meatless Monday is not Meatless Everyday or even Meal Less Monday.

 

 

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With each mass shooting the gun debate ignites again, in an endless circular dance. Some people see such horrific events as evidence in favor of new gun regulation. Others quickly head off attempts to act.

Some think it odd that I, an allegedly liberal philosophy professor, am pro-gun. The psychological casual explanation for this is easy: I was shaped by my pro-gun upbringing. I learned to shoot as soon as I could hold a gun, I hunted for years, and I am still a gun owner. I enjoy shooting and I feel comfortable with guns. I feel uncomfortable around people with guns who have no grasp of basic gun safety—an encounter that sometimes happens at the range. But how I feel about guns should not determine what I should believe about guns and gun control.

Gun control, the limiting of gun ownership, can be supported by a very reasonable utilitarian argument. By restricting gun ownership, the likelihood of people getting injured or killed by guns is reduced. While limiting gun rights can be seen as a harm, this is supposed to be offset by the greater reduction in harm to the potential victims of guns (or people with guns if you prefer).

Because of the utilitarian argument, I accept that some gun control laws can be morally justified. However, there is the question of the extent to which gun rights should be limited (if at all). There are varying degrees of gun control ranging from none to complete gun control in which gun ownership is forbidden.

In the United States, people often see gun rights as special rather than in terms of general principles about right. On the right, gun ownership is sometimes venerated and defended with zealous devotion. On the left, guns are sometimes seen as inherently terrifying. I, however, follow a general principle that can be used to sort out what should be allowed and what should be restricted.

As noted above, the main argument for restricting gun rights is to reduce harm. This is based on the more general principle that rights or liberties can be restricted under the justification of reducing harm. As such, it would seem useful to discuss gun rights in this general context.

Given that the goal of gun control is to reduce harm, it might be tempting to argue in favor of complete gun control or at least strict restrictions. The general principle is that a ban or strict restrictions would be justified by significant harm reduction. While this does have some appeal, it needs to be considered in a broader context.

If the goal is to reduce harm, then gun control would be low on the list of things that should be restricted. After all, far more people perish due to automobiles, tobacco, alcohol and obesity than die in incidents of gun violence.  As such, if guns should be restricted to reduce harm, then automobiles should also be restricted more because they do much more harm. Also, poor health choices create massive harm, so regulation of food and exercise would be justified by this general principle. While some do advocate this regulation, most see these as absurd. However, if banning Big Macs and cars seems absurd, then banning guns would also seem absurd.

But it can be argued there are relevant differences between gun control and such things as strict automobile and obesity control. In the case of obesity, it can be argued that a person who is obese is primarily hurting themself (although general obesity does harm everyone). If people have a right of self-harm while not having the liberty to harm others, then the distinction is easy to make. Except, obviously, for suicide by gun—if slow suicide by obesity should not be restricted, then quick suicide by gun would also be a liberty. Using a right to self-harm, one might argue that suicide deaths involving guns should be morally distinct from homicides involving guns.

In the case of automobiles, it is tempting to argue that automobile deaths are accidents while gun deaths are intentional. However, there are accidental deaths involving guns and intentional deaths involving automobiles A vehicle can be used as a very effective weapon, albeit one that is hard to conceal.

A more plausible option is a utilitarian approach: while severely restricting automobiles would lower death and injury tolls (not to mention reducing pollution and perhaps encouraging exercise), the utility of the automobile provides an adequate offset against the harms arising from automotive liberty.

Unlike cars, it could be argued that guns lack adequate utility to morally justify the harm they cause. After all, guns are mainly used for entertainment such as hunting and target shooting. While they are sometimes used for survival hunting or protection against animal or human threats, these benefits are offset by the harm of allowing gun rights or liberties.

Naturally, when making the calculation of harms and benefits, if the entertainment value of guns is to be discounted or dismissed, then the same must be done for automobiles and anything else. This would include pool ownership. While pools are mainly for amusement, they cause numerous drowning deaths every year. This would also apply to tobacco, which has no practical benefit and is used solely for pleasure, despite the fact that it harms the user and those exposed to the secondhand smoke. It could even apply to junk food, snacks and desserts—these are consumed for pleasure rather than any health benefit yet are major contributors to obesity. It could even be argued that these harmful products are inflicted on people (by advertising and subsidies that make them cheaper than healthy food) and thus they could be seen as a form of attack.

Interestingly, if the restriction of guns is based on arguing that they are primarily entertainment and lack suitable utility, then the same line of reasoning can be used to restrict automotive rights. After all, if the enjoyment of target shooting does not justify the liberty to use a gun for this purpose, then the enjoyment of driving would not justify the liberty to drive. So, if automotive liberty is warranted in the face of death and injury on utilitarian grounds then then it is reasonable to restrict automotive usage to utility, such as transporting heavy items over a long distance. Merely driving around for amusement or to go someplace to be amused, such as a movie, would not warrant putting oneself and others at risk of death and injury.

Of course, gun defenders will argue that guns are not primarily for amusement. Rather, they would point to their essential role in protection, perhaps against scary minorities or communists. There is also the argument that private ownership of guns provides a balance against the compulsive power of the state. An unarmed population is only free at the discretion of the armed, which is a rather uncertain sort of freedom. After all, we did see the pro-gun groups rush out to counter the flooding of cities with ICE and the National Guard just as they promised. At least we might have in some possible world in another timeline.

The stock counter is that people are safer without guns and that the state can generally be trusted not to oppress the people to a degree that would necessitate armed resistance. These are, of course, factual matters—but not uncontroversial ones.  After all, people will point to the few cases where someone defended themselves and others with their guns. And we do see the Trump regime flooding the streets of American cities with ICE to allegedly do crimes against people and inflict terror on the population.

It can be said that it would be a better world without any weapons. This might be true, but it would also be a much better world if no one was willing to hurt anyone else and these seem equally likely to come about.

 

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BAI (Before AI) “Big Data” was a bugbear and the term was used to describe the acquisition, storage and analysis of large quantities of data. The search giant Google was one of the pioneers in this area and it is developed into an industry worth billions of dollars. While Big Data is obviously still used, it is now usually presented as part of the AI debate. But whether considered on its own or as part of AI, it still raises ethical concerns.

One common use of Big Data is to analyze customer data to make predictions used to target advertising. An infamous old example of this is Target’s pregnancy targeting. This Big Data adventure was a model of inductive reasoning. First, an analysis was conducted of Target customers who had signed up for Target’s new baby registry. The purchasing history of these women was analyzed to find patterns of buying that corresponded to each stage of pregnancy. For example, pregnant women were found to often buy lots of unscented lotion at the start of the second trimester. Once the analysis revealed the buying patterns of pregnant women, Target then applied this information to the buying patterns of women customers. Oversimplifying things, they were essentially using an argument by analogy:  inferring that hat women not known to be pregnant who had X,Y, and Z patterns were probably pregnant because women known to be pregnant had X,Y, and Z buying patterns.  The women who were tagged as probably pregnant were then subject to targeted ads for baby products and this proved to be a winner for Target, other than some public relations issues.

One interesting aspect of this method is that it does not follow the usual model of predicting a person’s future buying behavior from their past buying behavior. An example of predicting future buying behavior based on past behavior would be predicting that I would buy Gatorade the next time I went grocery shopping because I have bought it consistently in the past. The analysis used by Target and other companies differs from this model by making inferences about the future behavior of customers based on their similarity to customers whose past buying behavior is known. For example, a store might see shifts in someone’s buying behavior that matches other data from people starting to get into fitness and thus predict the person was getting into fitness. The store might then send the person (and others like her) targeted ads featuring Gatorade coupons because their models show that such people buy more Gatorade.

This method also has an interesting Sherlock Holmes aspect to it. The fictional detective was able to use inductive logic (although it was described as deducing) to make impressive inferences from seemingly innocuousness bits of information. The use of Big Data allows for (sometimes) reliable inferences based on what appears to be irrelevant information. For example, likely voting behavior might be inferred from factors such as one’s preferred beverage. 

Naturally, Big Data can be used to sell products, including politicians and ideology. It also has non-commercial applications, such as law enforcement. As such, it is hardly surprising that companies gather and analyze data at a relentless and ever growing pace. This certainly is cause for concern.

One ethical concern is that the use of Big Data can impact the outcome of elections. For example, analyzing massive amounts of data allows ads to be crafted and targeted. Given that Big Data is expensive, the data advantage would tend to go to the side with the most money, thus increasing the influence of money on the outcome of elections. Naturally, the influence of money on elections is already a moral concern. While more spending does not ensure victory, there is a clear connection between spending and success.

In any case, Big Data (and now AI) adds yet another tool and expense to political campaigning, thus making it more costly for people to run for office. This, in turn, means that those running for office will need even more money than before, thus making money an even greater factor than in the past. This, obviously enough, increases the ability of those with more money to influence the candidates and the issues. But, as a counterpoint, one could argue that the current age of AI provides Big Data AI tools for a low price and thus makes things “fairer.” As a counter to the counterpoint, one can argue that the best tools and the people who can use them well are still very expensive. But one can argue that the role of Big Data and AI in politics should be addressed by laws.

On the face of it, it would seem unreasonable to require campaigns go without Big Data. After all, it could be argued that this would be tantamount to demanding that campaigns operate in ignorance. However, the concerns about big money buying Big Data to influence elections could be addressed by campaign finance reform, which would be another ethical issue.

One major ethical concern about Big Data is privacy. First, there is the ethical worry that much of the data used in Big Data is gathered without people knowing how the data will be used or that it is even being gathered. For example, if you walk past a neighbor’s smart camera or drive by a Flock camera, data about you is being stolen without your consent and perhaps without you being aware of it. As a side issue, there is the interesting moral question about whether such systems being used to steal data about you would morally warrant your disabling them or even grabbing, for example, the solar panel used to power one, as compensation for their theft. Legally, of course, the answer is obvious—the law is generally against the people rather than protecting them.

While people might know that some information is being collected about them, knowing this and knowing that the data will be analyzed for specific purposes are two different things. As such, it can be argued that private data is obviously being gathered without proper informed consent and this is morally wrong.

The obvious solution is for data collectors to make it clear about what the data will be used for, thus allowing people to make an informed choice regarding their private information. Of course, one problem that will remain is that it is difficult to know what sort of inferences can be made from data. As such, people might think that they are not providing any meaningful private data when they are, in fact, handing over valuable information that can be exploited.

If a business claims that they would be harmed because people would not hand over such information if they knew what it would be used for, the obvious reply is that this hardly gives them the right to deceive to get what they want. However, most businesses need not worry about people deciding not to provide data. While Facebook seems to be dying under the hand of Zuckerberg, it still scoops up data and Tik Tok and Instagram are excellent data collectors.

A second moral concern is that Big Data provides a means of making inferences about private matters, such as pregnancy. While this sort of reasoning is classic induction, Big Data changes the game because of the massive amount of data and processing power available to make these inferences. In short, the analysis of seemingly innocuous data can yield inferences about information that people believe to be private—or at the very least, information they would not think would be appropriate for a company to know. People running companies generally seem that it is right and good for them to know anything they can monetize in the endless extraction quest.

One obvious counter is to argue that privacy rights are not being violated. After all, if the data used does not violate the privacy of individuals, then inferences made from this data do not violate privacy, even if the inferences are about things people think of as private (such as pregnancy). To use an analogy, if I were to spy on someone and learn from this that she was an alcoholic, then I would be violating her privacy. However, if I inferred that she is an alcoholic from publicly available information (like the Vodka bottles spilling from her recycling bin), then I might know something private about her, but I have not violated her privacy.

This counter has some appeal. After all, there is a meaningful and relevant distinction between directly getting private information by violating privacy and inferring private information using public data. To use an analogy, if I get the secret ingredient in someone’s prize secret recipe by sneaking a look at the recipe, then I have acted wrongly. However, if I infer the secret ingredient by tasting the food when I am invited to dinner, then I have not acted wrongly.

A reasonable reply to this counter is that while there is a difference between making an inference that yields private data and getting the data directly, there is also the matter of intent. It is, for example, one thing to infer the secret ingredient simply by tasting it, but it is another to arrange to get invited to dinner specifically so I can get that secret ingredient by tasting the food.  To use another example, it is one thing to infer that someone is an alcoholic, but quite another to systematically gather public data to determine whether or not she is an alcoholic. In the case of Big Data, there is clearly intent to infer data that customers have not already voluntarily provided. After all, if the data had been provided, there would be no need to undertake an analysis to get the desired information. Thus, while the means do not involve a direct violation of privacy rights, they do involve an indirect violation—at least in cases in which the data is private (or at least intended to be private).

The solution, which would be difficult to implement, would involve setting restrictions on what sort of inferences can be made from data. And there is the reasonable objection that drawing inferences from data is not a violation of privacy as long as the data used was not itself a violation of privacy rights.

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Back in 2022 college swimmer Riley Gaines tied for 5th place in the 200-yard freestyle with Lia Thomas during the Women’s Swimming and Diving Championships. While 5th place is a remarkable achievement at this level of competition, it would not have made the news except for the fact that Thomas is a transgender woman and Gaines decided to take up the anti-trans banner. From a cynical standpoint, one might argue that Gaines is now cashing in on the manufactured anti-trans grift beloved by the right. To be fair and balanced, one might also assert that Gaines is acting on deeply held beliefs and confronting what she perceives as a moral threat and not just as an opportunity to gain fame and sell books.

On her website, Gaines presents two of the main concerns advanced by anti-trans activists in the context of sports. Gaines asserts that “I can attest to the tears that I witnessed from finishers who missed being named an All-American by one place.” This can be seen as pointing towards the fairness argument against trans athletes, at least those who transitioned from male to female. The gist of the argument is that even after transitioning, a transwoman will have an unfair advantage in competition and hence should be banned. It is worth pointing out that Gaine’s one example of her own experience is used to “prove” that a problem exists. However, even if one thinks that it is unfair for a transwoman to compete with other women, even when transwomen were allowed to compete, the number of transwomen athletes was tiny. Put bluntly, it seems crazy to have a political frenzy over one example where Gaines tied for 5th place.

As I have argued in other essays, one can have a good faith discussion about fairness and competition. For example, while Thomas did knock another woman out of being an All-American, all the woman who placed also knocked other women out of being All-American. It is reasonable to infer that the women who placed had advantages over the women who did not (or just had a better day). They might, for example, have had a genetic advantage in endurance, strength or other qualities. Or maybe they have wealthier parents who were able to pay for better lessons. Or they went to schools that provided better support for swimmers. And so on. But to be fair and balanced, we collectively have decided to address fairness is simple ways, such as size, age, and sex and perhaps one could make a moral case that while other advantages do not matter morally, the alleged advantages of being a transwoman do matter. As I am not an expert in sports performance science, my opinions about whether a transwoman has, on average, an advantage after transitioning have no weight—so I will leave this to experts operating in good faith. There is, of course, the obvious fact that men, on average, have an advantage over women and this is commonly appealed to in making the anti-trans case. But, back to Gaines.

After Riley Gaines spoke during the 2022 CPAC, Trump said, “Just to show you how ridiculous it is, look at me. I am much bigger and much stronger than her, there is no way she could beat me in swimming, do we all agree?” When I saw this on video, I felt a nanosecond of empathy for Gaines. I know female athletes who have endured men disparaging their athletic ability and have seen how much this hurts them. This empathy quickly passed, since she had chosen a road on which misogynistic views are displayed like billboards. But I would have loved to see Trump try to swim against her. If he did, Vance would probably be president now. I freely admit that Gaines could easily beat me in a swimming race, unless she has gotten way out of shape. I’m sure that at her peak she could have beaten me when I was at my running peak as a varsity college runner—because running speed does not translate well to swimming speed. As an experienced athlete, I have respect for female athletes and know how strong they can be—which is why I see the anti-trans tactic of belittling them as fundamentally insulting to my fellow athletes.

To be fair and balanced, one can say that Trump was just joking and not making the absurd claim that he could beat Gaines. But some men do think that an average man can beat even a top female athlete, as evidenced by the infamous 2019 survey in which 12% of British men thought they could win a point against Serena Williams (3% of women thought they could). There is also the obvious fact that the anti-trans argument must assume that even a transitioned transwoman will consistently be a superior athlete.

Underlying this view, obviously enough, is the misogynistic view that women are inferior and need to be protected (the fairness argument often includes the dramatic claim that transwoman athletes will cause excessive injuries). While Gaines professes to want to protect female athletes, this view of women is weaponized against cis-gender athletes in the form of false accusations, public harassment and demands that they prove their sex. The focus on this also distracts from other concerns, such as women’s sports being underfunded. Shockingly, misogynistic views end up hurting all women. As such, even if Gaines does have good intentions, the ideology she is supporting will hurt women like her. But at least she can sell some books at collect speaking fees. But perhaps she is sincere and thinks she is doing good while she sells books and collects speaking fees.

The second point made by Gaines on her website is that “I can attest to the extreme discomfort in the locker room from 18-year-old-girls exposed to male body parts and having to undress with a male watching in the same room.” To her credit, she does not seem to accuse Thomas of planning to assault her and the “girls”, which is another standard attack on transwomen. To be fair and balanced, there can be a good faith discussion about the safety of women and who should be allowed in what spaces. However, transwoman as predator rhetoric is a bad faith argument, as it is not backed up with evidence. It also embraces sexist views of men as predators and women as helpless victims.

Speaking of predators, it did look like Trump tried to kiss Gaines at CPAC and that she turned away in disgust. To be fair and balanced, Gaines denies this and claims Trump was merely speaking to her and that she turned her head to listen. Even if Gaine’s is telling the truth, Trump has been accused by over 25 women of various forms of sexual misconduct. Most famously, Trump was found liable for sexual abuse and defamation in the E. Jean Caroll case. Ironically, it has been alleged that Trump walked into dressing rooms while contestants (including some as young as 15 or 16) were changing or naked. Given Gaine’s statement about how she felt about Thomas being in the locker room, it might seem odd that she would support Trump.

While Trump is just one example, the allegations against him show the obvious: transwomen are not the threat that other women should worry about, it is the cisgender sexual predators that present a real danger. This also illustrates the bad faith of many of the anti-trans activists: they profess to want to protect women, but support Trump.

 

 

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We Americans generally do health and nutrition badly. One reason for this is that we are often systematically misled by the state at the behest of commercial interests. Ask a nutritionist you trust about the federal food pyramid. Another reason consists of all the usual critical thinking problems humans have combined with the influence of ignorant influencers and grifters singing siren songs in the sea of social media.

One thing we sort of get right is that we need protein, yet we tend to get the protein thing wrong. As a runner, one of the mistakes I made in the past was thinking that stuff made for athletes, like protein bars, would be healthy choices. But the sports beverages turned out to be mostly sugar water and the protein bars are expensive candy—albeit with some protein. Since I wanted to eat less badly and not spend as much, I started making my own protein bars last year. They didn’t kill me or give me explosive diarrhea, so that has been great.

I’d like to say that this recipe was found in the text of the Odyssey and fueled Odysseus through his various deceits and crimes. But the truth is that Odysseus was fueled by Dunkin Donuts. I will avoid the usual recipe nightmare of providing an irrelevant narrative about how the recipe interacts in some unexplained manner with my life and daily activities. I just eat one of these bars after a run.

You’ll need a food processor or a strong mixing hand to make them, and cooking is only required for the quinoa. Or you could just eat it raw and risk stomach pain and gas. Do what you do and you get what you get.

 

Ingredients

  • 1 cup raw quinoa
  • 2 cups water (to cook the quinoa)
  • 3 cups oats
  • 3 cups chocolate chips (dark chocolate recommended)
  • 3 cups peanut butter (crunchy, smooth if you are a heretic)
  • 18 pitted Medjool dates (unpitted if you are a psychopath)
  • 1 cup chopped walnuts (or any other nut)
  • Salt (optional)
  • Honey (optional)

 

Recipe

Step 1: Cook the Quinoa. Follow the directions on the container; which usually say to boil 1 cup of quinoa in 2 cups of water and then simmer for 15-20 minutes. I put a little salt in the water.

 

Step 2: Process. Combine the following into your food processor and process using the slicing shredding blade; I usually use the pulse function to let the motor cool a bit. I divide the processing into three to avoiding killing the processor’s motor. A Vitamix might also work or might cause a kitchen fire. Process until everything is well mixed.

 

  • 1 cup cooked quinoa
  • 1 cup oats
  • 1 cup chocolate chips (dark chocolate recommended)
  • 1 cup peanut butter (crunchy, smooth if you are a heretic)
  • 6 pitted Medjool dates (unpitted if you are a psychopath)
  • 1/3 cup chopped walnuts (or any other nut)
  • 1 tsp Salt (optional)
  • ¼ cup Honey (optional)

Step 3: Pan Time: Line a pan with parchment paper and dump the processed stuff into it. Push it together and down, ideally filling 1/3 of the pan.

 

Step 4: Repeat. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all the stuff has been processed. You can use a rolling pin to flatten the top.

 

Step 5: Cool, cut and store. Chill the bars-to-be in the fridge for at least 30 minutes. Cut them into bars, squares, stars or whatever you want. Put bars into an airtight container and store them in the fridge.  Eat after running or whenever. You’re an adult; life choices are up to you.