Category: Politics

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On April 12, 2015 Freddie Gray died in police custody. For some, this was part of a pattern of police violence. For others (such as Fox hosts), this was just another isolated incident.

The initial protests to this death were peaceful and it was hoped by many that Baltimore would avoid the violence that marked other protests (including riots in Baltimore’s own past). This hope was shattered in an outbreak of violence and destruction.

One obvious concern is the identity and the nature of those engaged in violence. According to some narratives, the rioters were thugs or outsiders taking advantage of the situation to engage in destruction, theft and violence. That is, they are opportunists and not protestors.

The United States does have a history of costly and pointless riots that are not protests. These are, of course, sports riots. One outstanding example is the 1992 riot in the aftermath of the Chicago Bulls vs. the Portland Trail Blazers. The damage was estimated at $10 million. There have been other lesser riots, such as that following the 1999 Michigan State vs. Duke game that resulted in about $250,000 in damage (and whose iconic photo is a shirtless white bro “flashing the horns” atop a burned-out car). My adopted state of Florida also sees violence and property damage during Spring Break, although California did seem interested in getting into the spring break riot game.

Given that Americans are willing to riot over sports and spring breaks, it is reasonable to consider that the rioters in Baltimore were not protesting but were motivated by other reasons, perhaps just wanting to break and burn things.

There are some narratives that cast at least some of the rioters as having also been protesting. That is, their motivation is not just to steal, break and burn but to express their anger about the situation. One way to explore motivations is to consider the situation in Baltimore. That is, to see if there were legitimate grounds for anger and whether these factors might have provoked people to violence and destruction. 

Baltimore was (and still is) a paradigm of the brutal race and class divisions in the United States. It has the historical distinction of being the first city to pass a citywide segregation law (segregating each residential block by race) and the legacy of this law persists as Baltimore remains a segregated city. In the center of the city, 60% of the population is black. The suburbs are predominantly white. Despite there being laws against forced segregation, the United States is still highly segregated. This provides grounds for anger.

Baltimore also exemplifies the stark class divisions in the United States. Back in 2015, 150,000 of the city’s 620,000 were classified as poor (the average income for a family of four being $23,492). The unemployment rate was close to 10%. As the American Revolution showed, people get angry and violent in response to perceived economic injustice. Given the massive disparity between economic classes in the United States and their support by the structures of law and authority, what is shocking is not that there is an occasional riot but that there are not daily riots. As such, there were sufficient grounds for anger. Naturally, some people claimed that this poverty is because the poor are lazy: if they would only work hard for the job creators, they would not be poor. This view ignores the reality of poverty in America, but it is a beloved narrative of those who are doing well.

Not surprisingly, Baltimore also has had serious issues with crime. Drug addiction was a serious problem and the city was 5th in the number of murders per year in 2014. It was, however, 15th in the number of violent crimes per year. Crime is, of course, a complex matter. Some claim that this sort of crime arises from poverty, oppression and lack of opportunity (as opposed to the ‘crimes’ of the financial classes, such as destroying the world economy). There is, of course, a correlation between crime and these factors. Some claim that people turn to crime because of moral defects rather than these factors. This does have some merit. After all, a look at the financial sector and halls of power show evil behavior that is clearly not caused by poverty.

Like other US cities, there was also an issue with how the police treat their fellow citizens. In 2011 the city paid $6.3 million settling police misconduct claims. Between 2011 and 2012 there were 156 such lawsuits. The number did decline to 156 from 2013 to 2014. While it is reasonable to consider that not all these suits had merit, what happened to Gray does provide reason to suspect that there are grounds for being concerned about policing in the city.

When people think they are being oppressed and subject to brutality, they respond with anger. For example, one can see the rage the fine folks on Fox express when they speak of the War on Christmas and how Christians are being mistreated and persecuted in America. One can only imagine the anger that arises when people really are subject to mistreatment. As such, there seem to be legitimate grounds for anger.

While the anger of those engaged in violence might have been justified, there is still the obvious concerns about whether such behavior is morally acceptable and whether such behavior is effective in achieving goals.

On the face of it, much of the violence and destruction would seem to be difficult to justify morally. Most of the destruction seemed to involve community infrastructure and the property of people who were not responsible for what provoked the protests. While the anger against the police was understandable, the attacks on reporters and firefighters were unjustified. The reporters did nothing meriting being attacked and the firefighters were trying to keep the city from burning down, which is certainly a laudable goal. Crudely put, if the violent (alleged) protestors were striking against injustice, they were (mostly) hitting the wrong targets. To use an analogy, if Bob has wronged Sam and Sam smashes Sally’s windows because he lives near her and cannot get at Bob, then Sam has acted wrongly, no matter how badly Bob wronged him.

It might be countered that the destruction is morally acceptable because the (alleged) protestors are striking out against an unjust social order. The obvious reply is that while this might have some abstract appeal, the real damage is being done mainly to the innocent rather than the guilty. As such, the violence and destruction seem to have been immoral.

A second issue, which can connect to the moral issue, is the effectiveness of violence as a means of protest and social change. Obviously, violence can be very effective in achieving goals. We Americans can point to our own Revolutionary War and the wars won against everyone from the Apache to the Japanese. However, violence is only effective when one has enough power to achieve one’s goals through that violence. Since the rioters went up against the police and the National Guard, it makes sense why they could not achieve victory through force of arms.

However, a case can be made that violence gets attention. Peaceful protests, one might argue, sound nice but are easy to ignore. After all, “change things or we will peacefully protest again” has less power than “change things or there will be cop cars burning in the streets and the authorities will have to explain why they are losing control of the city.” Interestingly, many of the pundits who praised the property destruction that occurred during the Boston Tea Party are quick to condemn contemporary protests they do not like. These pundits also praise other violence they approve of but lack a consistent principle regarding violence as a means of achieving goals beyond they like violence aimed at goals they like and dislike violence that is aimed at goals they dislike.

A moral case can be made against violence, such as that famously made by Dr. King. When there is the possibility of redress and justice through peaceful means, then non-violence seems to have an obvious advantage over violence: people are not hurt or killed, and property is not destroyed. However, the fact that a major American city had to be patrolled by the National Guard showed once again that there are deep and profound problems in civil society. In 2025, it is equally evident that these underlying problems have not been addressed, and things are just getting worse.

 

 

In the United States, corporations are considered persons. In recent years the judiciary has accepted that this entitles corporations to various rights, such as freedom of speech (which was used to justify corporate spending in politics) and freedom of religion (which was used to allow companies to refuse to provide insurance coverage for birth control).

Despite having freedom of speech and religion because they are people, corporations can, unlike other people, be legally owned. Common stock is bought and sold as a matter of routine business and provides an ownership share in a corporation. Since corporations are people, this means that people are being allowed to legally own other people. Owning another person is, of course, slavery. While slavery was legal at one time in the United States, the 13th amendment is rather clear on this matter: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

If corporations are entitled to 1st amendment rights because they are people, it follows that they must also be entitled to 13th amendment rights. That is, corporations have a right not to be owned by other people. The obvious reply is that this is absurd. My response is that this is exactly my point: the 13th Amendment is an obvious reductio ad absurdum (“reducing to absurdity) of the claim that corporations are people. If they are people and thus get rights, then they cannot be owned. If they can be owned, they are not people and hence do not get the rights of people.

But, let it be supposed that companies are people and hence get the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  Yet somehow don’t get the freedom not to be enslaved. It will be interesting to see where these claims lead.

Freedom of expression is usually presented in terms of a person’s right to engage in expression, perhaps by secretly donating fat stacks of cash to secretive political organizations. However, freedom of expression is also a freedom from being compelled to express views. For example, the State of Texas argued against allowing the Confederate battle flag on Texas license plates on this ground. This is reasonable: the freedom to express myself includes the freedom to not express what I do not wish to express. Otherwise, my expression would not be free.

Freedom of religion is also usually presented in terms of protection from being limited or restricted in the practicing of one’s faith. However, like freedom of expression, it can also be taken to include the right not to be compelled to engage in activities against one’s will. So, for example, people argue that compelling a baker to not discriminate against same-sex couples would be to compel her to engage in an activity (baking a wedding cake) that goes against her faith. While I disagree with the claim that forbidding discrimination violates religious freedom, I do agree that compelling a person to act against their faith can be an unjust violation of religious freedom.

Corporations, at least according to the law, have freedom of expression and freedom of religion. As such, they have the right not to be compelled to express views they do not hold and the right not to be compelled to engage in practices against their religious beliefs. Given that a corporation is a person, there is the question of what a corporation would want to express and the question of its faith.

It might be claimed that since a corporation is a legal fiction operated by actual people, then the beliefs and expressed desires of the corporation are those of the people who are in charge. On this view, a corporation is a legal Mechanical Turk, a pantomime person, the face of the Wizard of Oz (“Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain”). While run by an actual person or people, it is a fictional shell that is not a person.

The advantage of this approach is the corporation’s faith is the faith of the actual people and what it desires to express is what they desire to express. The obvious problem is that this view makes it clear that the corporation itself is not a person, so it would not get a set of rights of its own, above and beyond the rights held by the actual people who control the legal pantomime person. So, claims about violations of freedom would have to be about violations against actual, specific people and not against the legal version of a Mechanical Turk (or Legal Turk, if one prefers).

If someone insists that the corporation is a person in its own right, then this entails it is a distinct entity apart from those who seem to be operating a non-person pantomime person. On this view, the views of the corporation cannot automatically be those of the people who would seem to be operating the pantomime person. After all, if it is just them, it is not a person. To be a person, it needs to have its own personhood. If it has freedom of expression, it must have its own desires of what to express. If it has freedom of religion, it must have its own faith.

Sadly, corporations are not free to express their own views or their own faith. They are owned and compelled to speak and engage in matters of faith. They are, contrary to the 13th amendment, legally enslaved. While there is a chance that the corporate person’s views and faith match those of the human persons parasitizing its legal body, this need not be the case. After all, a slave that is forced by her owner to say things and go to church might believe what she says or have the faith she is compelled to practice but she might not. Unless she is set free from her owners and allowed her own beliefs and faith, she cannot be said to have freedom of expression or faith.

While Tim Cook has spoken in favor of same-sex marriage, Apple might be a devoutly Christian corporation that cries each time it is forced to mouth Tim Cook’s words. The corporation Hobby Lobby might be a bisexual atheist. As it is beaten to its knees to cry out prayers to a God it does not believe in, it might be eager to engage in hot mergers with other companies, regardless of their gender. Until these corporations are freed from the tyranny of ownership, they can never truly exercise their freedom as people.

The obvious response to this absurd silliness is that it is clearly absurd and silly. However, that is my point. If a corporation is a person that is distinct from the actual people operating the pantomime legal person, then it is being denied its freedom of expression and religion because it is forced to say and do what others want it to say and do.  This is, as I am sure most will agree, absurd. If a corporation is a legal pantomime and the corporate beliefs and ideas are those of the folks operating it, then it is not a person and does not have the rights of a person. The real people do, of course, have all the rights they have always possessed.

This is not to say that there should not be collective rights and laws for organizations. But this is very different from regarding a corporation as a person with faith and beliefs it wishes to express. That is, obviously enough, a pile of pantomime bullshit.

Some states impose a waiting period on abortion, ranging from 24 to 72 hours.  My adopted state of Florida has a 24 hour waiting period. Opponents of these laws claim they are yet another attack on reproductive rights. Proponents claim that the state mandated waiting period is reasonable and will permit women to be informed about the risks of abortion and the condition of the fetus. While the legal aspects of these laws are of considerable interest, I will focus primarily on the moral aspects of the waiting period and the two-visit requirement.

When the law was being considered in Florida, Julie Costas argued in favor of it. She said she had an abortion thirty years previously and that she regretted the decision. Her argument was that, counterfactually, she might have changed her mind if she had received more information (thus supporting the two-visit requirement) and if she had to wait 24 hours (thus supporting the 24-hour requirement). This can be made into a moral argument in favor of such laws. By the state imposing the two-visit requirement and the waiting period, there is a chance that some women might change their minds about an abortion they might later regret. In terms of the moral aspect, the appeal is that the requirements might prevent a future harm, that of regret. It could also be argued that increasing the chance a woman might not get an abortion would be morally good since it would avoid the death of the fetus.

I agree that a person should take time to consider whether to have an abortion. I suspect, but do not know, that even without such laws people put thought into this decision. Obviously, there can be exceptions. There are, after all, people who consistently act without thinking through their actions. While there is a moral obligation to think through morally significant actions, it is not clear that 24 hours (or whatever it might be) is the right waiting time. After all, there needs to be evidence that an extra 24 hours of consideration is likely to result in a better decision.  

In terms of the number of visits, that should depend on what the person needs. After all, it is not clear that a second visit would consistently result in more information that one visit would not provide. There are also practical concerns of cost and time. It is reasonable to think that the intent of imposing a second visit is to make abortion harder and more expensive, rather than any concern about extra information.

While people should take time to consider significant decisions and two visits might be a good idea for some people, there is the central issue of whether this is a matter suitable for the coercive power of the state. After all, there are many things people should do that should not be compelled by the state. For example, I think that people should exercise, be polite, be kind and eat healthy. However, I do not think that the state should compel these things. But, of course, there are many things that people should do, and the state justly compels people to do them. These include such things as paying taxes, ensuring that any electrical work you do is up to code,  and serving on juries. The issue is whether a state imposed waiting period is justified in a principled way.

The principle I use, which I obviously stole from Mill, is that the use of the compulsive force of the state is justified when it is employed to prevent one person from wrongly harming another. A case can also be made for compelling people to serve the general civil good, such as compelling people to serve on juries and pay a fair share of the taxes. However, compelling people to serve the good is more problematic than compelling people to not do harm.

The principle of harm could, obviously enough, be used to argue against allowing abortion on the grounds that it harms (kills) a living thing. Of course, this is not decisive, since the harms of not having an abortion must also be considered. This principle does not justify the two-visit and 24-hour waiting period requirements. Then again, perhaps it could be argued that they would provide some slight possible protection for the fetus: the woman might change her mind or lack the funds to pay for the two visits. This is too weak to provide a convincing moral reason to have a such a law.

It could be argued that a different version of the principle of harm should be used. To be specific, that a law can be morally justified on the grounds that it would compel a person not to harm herself. This principle can, obviously enough, be justified on utilitarian grounds. Various laws, such as the infamous NYC ban on big sodas, have been passed that aim at protecting a person from self-inflicted harm.

In the case of this bill, the moral reasoning would be that because there is a chance that a woman might change her mind about an abortion and she might later regret, so the state has the right to compel her to have two visits and to wait twenty-four hours (or longer). A rather obvious problem is that it sets a very low bar for the state using its compulsive power: there must only be a chance that a person might change their mind about a legal procedure that they might later regret. This principle would warrant  massive state intrusion into the lives of citizens. Sticking with a medical example, people do sometimes regret having elective surgery. So, this principle would warrant the state imposing a waiting period and a two-visit rule. But there would seem to be no reason to stick within the field of medicine. People can regret many decisions, such as buying a car, choosing a college major, accepting a job offer, or moving. Yet it would seem unreasonable to impose a waiting period for such decisions. Looking at it in utilitarian terms, the harms inflicted by such laws (such as the cost of enforcement, the annoyance, and so on) would outweigh the alleged benefits. Especially since a waiting period would not seem to increase the chances of a better decision being made.

What makes more sense is having laws that protect people from decisions made while they are incapable of properly making decisions, such as when intoxicated. So, for example, it is reasonable to have a law that prevents a person from getting married when they are intoxicated. It is also reasonable to have waiting periods that are based on actual need. For example, a waiting period that is needed to complete paperwork or verify a person’s legal identity would be justifiable on practical grounds, assuming the time requirements are legitimate.

Given the above arguments, these laws are morally justified and are an unwarranted intrusion of the state into the lives of citizens. Those who oppose big government and government intrusion should oppose such laws. Those who favor big government “jamming things” should support it.

The scene is a bakery in a small town in Indiana. Ralph and Sally, a married couple, run the Straight Bakery with the aid of the pretty young Ruth. Dr. Janet and her fiancé Andrea enter the shop, looking to buy a cake.

Sally greets them with a pleasant smile, which quickly fades when she finds out that Janet and Andrea are a lesbian couple. Pointing at the door, she says “baking you a wedding cake would violate my religious beliefs. Go find Satan’s baker! Leave now!” The couple leave the shop, planning to drive to the next town as their small town has but one bakery.

At the end of the day, Sally leaves the shop. Ralph says he will help Ruth close the shop. After Sally leaves, Ralph and Ruth indulge in some casual adultery. As God intended.

 

Back in 2015 Indiana got nation attention for its version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The bill was aimed at preventing state and local governments in Indiana from “substantially burdening” the exercise of religion unless it can be proven the state has a compelling interest and is using the least restrictive means for acting on that interest.

Proponents claimed it was to protect people, such as business owners, with strong religious beliefs from the intrusion of the state. Those who opposed it noted it would legalize discrimination and that it was aimed at gays and lesbians. Many other states have similar laws, but some have laws that protect people from discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Since such laws cannot (yet) specify individual religions for protection, they sometimes have interesting consequences, possibly involving Satanism, as happened in my adopted state of Florida. While the legal aspects of such laws are of great concern, as a philosopher my main concern is with the ethics of the matter.

On the face of it, religious freedom seems good as it falls under the broader liberty of thought and belief (which is ably supported by Mill in his work on liberty). As such, these sorts of religious freedom laws seem to be a morally reasonable defense of a well-established right.

But these laws, as opponents argue, allow people to discriminate, provided it can be justified on religious grounds. The law cannot, obviously, require that a religion be true, rational, consistent, sensible or even sane as all religions are equally protected. This, of course, could lead to some serious consequences.

Driving home, Sally’s car is struck by a delivery van, and she is badly injured. Luckily, Dr. Janet and Andrea (a trained nurse) pull over to see if they can help. As Dr. Janet and Andrea rush to help, they see it is Sally. Dr. Janet, a devout member of the Church of Relentless Tolerance, has sworn to God that she will not treat any straight bigots. Looking down at the dying Sally, Dr. Janet says “saving you would violate my sincerely held religious beliefs. Sorry. Perhaps you can find another doctor.” Sally dies.

The obvious counter to this sort of scenario is that religious freedom does not grant a person the liberty to deny a person an essential service, such as medical treatment. Using the standard principle of harm as a limit on liberty, the freedom of religion ends when it would cause unwarranted harm to another person. It could also be argued that the moral obligation to others would override the religious freedom of a person, compelling her to act even against her religious beliefs. If so, it would be wrong of Dr. Janet and Andrea to let Sally die. This, of course, rests on either the assumption that harm overrides liberty or the assumption that obligations override liberty. There are well-established and reasonable arguments against both assumptions. That said, it would certainly seem that the state would have a compelling interest in not allowing doctors, pharmacists, and others to allow people to die or suffer harm because of their religious beliefs. But, perhaps, religious freedom trumps all these considerations.

After having a good time with Ruth, Ralph showers away the evidence of his sins and then heads for home. Ruth helps herself to money from the register and adjusts the spreadsheet on the business PC to cover up her theft.

Ralph is horrified to learn that Sally has been killed. He takes her to the only funeral home in town, run by the Marsh family (who moved there from Innsmouth). Unfortunately for Ralph, the Marsh family members are devoted worshippers of Dagon and their religious beliefs forbid them from providing their services to Christians. After being ejected from the property, Ralph tries to drive Sally’s body to the next town, but his truck breaks down.

He finds that the nearest shop is Mohamed’s Motors, a Muslim owned business. Bob, the tow truck driver, says that while he is generally fine with Christians, he is unwilling to tow a Christian’s truck. He does recommend his friend Charlie, a Jewish tow truck driver who is willing to tow Christians, if it is not on the Sabbath and the Christian is not a bigot.  Ralph cries out to God at the injustices he has suffered, forgetting that he has reaped what he has sown.

In the case of these sorts of important, but not essential, services it could be argued that people would have the right to discriminate. After all, while the person would be inconvenienced (perhaps extremely so), the harm would not be enough to make the refusal morally wrong. That is, while it would be nice of Bob to tow Ralph’s truck, it would not be wrong for him to refuse, and he is under no obligation to do so. It might, of course, be a bad business decision. But that is another matter entirely.

If appeals to harm and obligations fail, then another option is to argue from the social contract. The idea is that people who have businesses or provide services do not exist in a social vacuum: they operate within society. In return for the various goods of society (police protection, protection of the laws, social rights and so on) they are required to render their services and provide their goods to all the members of civil society without discrimination. This does not require that they like their customers or approve of them. Rather, it requires that they honor the tacit social contract: in return for the goods of society that allow one to operate a business, one must provide goods and services to all members of the society. That is the deal one makes when one operates a business in a democratic society that professes liberty and justice for all.

Obviously, people do have the right to refuse goods and services under certain conditions. For example, if a customer went into Ralph & Ruth’s Bakery (Ralph moved on quickly) and insulted Ralph, urinated on the floor and demanded a free cake, Ruth would be justified in refusing to make him a cake. After all, his behavior would warrant such treatment. However, refusing a well-behaved customer because she is gay, black, Christian, or a woman would not be justified. This is because those qualities are not morally relevant to refusing services. Most importantly, freedom of religion is not freedom to discriminate. Despite what some judges think.

It might be countered that the government has no right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple. This is true, in that the person can elect to close his business rather than bake the cake. However, he does not have the moral right to operate a business within civil society if he is going to unjustly discriminate against members of that society. So, in that sense, the state does have the right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple, just as it can force him to bake a cake for a mixed-race couple, a Jewish couple, or an atheist couple.

 

Back in 2015 some folks in my adopted state of Florida wanted three Confederate veterans to become members of the Veterans’ Hall of Fame. Despite the efforts of the Florida Sons of Confederate Veterans, the initial attempt failed on the grounds that the Confederate veterans were not United States’ veterans. Not to be outdone, the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans wanted an official Texas license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag. While custom license plates are allowed in the United States, states review proposed plates. The Texas department of Motor Vehicles rejected the proposed plate on the grounds that “a significant portion of the public associate[s] the Confederate flag with organizations” expressing hatred for minorities. Those proposing the plate claim that this violates their rights. The case reached the Supreme Court, and the court sided with the state of Texas. But as the Trump regime is Confederate friendly, it would not be surprising if there are new proposals for such license plates.

The legal issue, which was presented as a battle over free speech, was interesting. However, my main concern is with the ethics of the matter since I am not a lawyer.

One way to look at a state approved license plate is that it is a means of conveying a message the state agrees with. Those opposed to the plate argued that if the state were forced to allow the plate to be issued, the state will be compelled to be associated with a message. In free speech terms, this is forcing the state to express or facilitate a view it does not want to publicly accept.

This has some appeal as the state can be seen as representing the people. If a view is significantly offensive to a significant number of citizens (which is, I admit, vague), then the state could reasonably decline to accept a license plate expressing or associated with that view. So, to give some examples, the state could justly decline Nazi plates, pornographic plates, Stalin plates, and plates featuring racist or sexist images. Given that the Confederate flag represents slavery and racism, it seems reasonable to decline the plate. But citizens can still cover their cars in Confederate flags and thus express their views. As such, not having an official state plate does not interfere with free expression, anymore than not having an official state plate advertising a business would deny that business its free expression.

But the plate can be defended using the right of free expression: citizens should have the right to express their views via license plates. These plates, one might contend, do not express the views of the state since they express the view of the person using the plate.

In response to concerns about a plate being offensive, Granvel Block argued that not allowing a plate with the Confederate flag would be “as unreasonable” as the state forbidding the use of the University of Texas logo on a plate “because Texas A&M graduates didn’t care for it.” On the one hand, Block has made a reasonable point: if people disliking an image is a legitimate basis for forbidding its use on a plate, then any image could end up forbidden. It would, as Block noted, be absurd to forbid schools from having custom plates because rival schools do not like them.

On the other hand, there is a relevant difference between the logo of a public university and the battle flag of the Confederacy. While some Texas A&M graduates might not like the University of Texas, the University of Texas’ logo does not represent states that rebelled against the United States to defend slavery. So, while the state should not forbid plates merely because some people do not like them, it is reasonable to forbid a plate that includes the flag representing, as state Senator Royce West said, “…a legalized system of involuntary servitude, dehumanization, rape, mass murder…”

The lawyer representing the Sons of Confederate Veterans, R. James George Jr., presented an interesting line of reasoning. He notes, correctly, that Texas has a state holiday that honors veterans of the Confederacy, that there are monuments honoring Confederate veterans and that the gift shop in the capitol sells Confederate memorabilia. From this he infers that the Department of Motor Vehicles should follow the lead of the state legislature and approve the plate.

This argument, which is an appeal to consistency, has some weight. After all, the state seems to express its support for Confederate veterans (and the Confederacy) and this license plate is consistent with this support. To refuse the license plate on the grounds that the state does not wish to express support for what the Confederate flag stands for is inconsistent with having a state holiday for Confederate veterans as the state seems comfortable with this association. This is on par with arguing that if a state had a holiday devoted to pornography, monuments to porn stars and sold pornography in the capitol, then a pornographic license plate would be fine. Which is certainly reasonable.  

There is, of course, the broader moral issue of whether the state should have a state holiday for Confederate veterans, etc. That said, any arguments given in support of what the state already does in regard to the Confederacy also support the acceptance of the plate as they are linked. So, if the plate is to be rejected, these other practices should also be rejected on the same grounds. But, if these other practices are maintained, then the plate would fit and thus, on this condition, should also be accepted just as a pornographic license plate should be accepted in a state that honors porn.

Since I favor freedom of expression, it makes since that any license plate design that does not interfere with identifying the license number and state should be allowed. This would be consistent and would not require the state to make any political or value judgments. It would, of course, need to be made clear that the plates do not necessarily express the official positions of the government.

The obvious problem is that people would create horrible plates featuring pornography, racism, sexism, and so on. This could be addressed by appealing to existing laws. The state would not approve or reject a plate as such, but a plate could be rejected for violating, for example, laws against making threats or inciting violence. The obvious worry is that laws would then be passed to restrict plates that some people did not like, such as plates endorsing atheism or claiming that climate change is real. But this is not a problem unique to license plates. After all, it has been alleged that officials in my adopted state of Florida have banned the use of the term ‘climate change.’

A way to avoid all controversy is by getting rid of custom plates. Each state might have a neutral, approved image (such as a loon, orange or road runner) or the plates might simply have the number/letters and the state name. This would be consistent as no one gets a custom plate. But I always just get the cheapest license plate option, which is the default state plate. However, some people see their license plate as a means of expression and their view is worth considering.

 

A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 brings together a year of sharp, accessible, and often provocative reflections on the moral, political, cultural, and technological challenges of contemporary life. Written by philosopher Michael LaBossiere, these essays move fluidly from the ethics of AI to the culture wars, from conspiracy theories to Dungeons & Dragons, from public policy to personal agency — always with clarity, humor, and a commitment to critical thinking.

Across hundreds of entries, LaBossiere examines the issues shaping our world:

  • AI, technology, and the future of humanity — from mind‑uploading to exoskeletons, deepfakes, and the fate of higher education
  • Politics, power, and public life — including voting rights, inequality, propaganda, and the shifting landscape of American democracy
  • Ethics in everyday life — guns, healthcare, charity, masculinity, inheritance, and the moral puzzles hidden in ordinary choices
  • Culture, identity, and conflict — racism, gender, religion, free speech, and the strange logic of modern outrage
  • Philosophy in unexpected places — video games, D&D, superheroes, time travel, and the metaphysics of fictional worlds

Whether he is dissecting the rhetoric of conspiracy theories, exploring the ethics of space mining, or reflecting on the death of a beloved dog, LaBossiere invites readers into a conversation that is rigorous without being rigid, principled without being preachy, and always grounded in the belief that philosophy is for everyone.

This collection is for readers who want more than hot takes — who want to understand how arguments work, why beliefs matter, and how to think more clearly in a world that rewards confusion.

Thoughtful, wide‑ranging, and often darkly funny, A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 is a companion for anyone trying to make sense of the twenty‑first century.

 

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While some countries will pay ransoms to free hostages, the United States has a public policy of not doing this. One reason to not pay a ransom for hostages is based on sticking to a principle. This principle could be that bad behavior should not be rewarded or that hostage taking should be punished. Or some other principle.

One of the best arguments against paying ransoms for hostages is a practical and utilitarian moral argument. Paying ransoms gives hostage takers an incentive to take hostages. This incentive means more people will be taken hostage. The cost of not paying is, of course, the possibility that hostages will be killed. However, the argument goes, if hostage takers realize that they will not be paid a ransom, they will have less incentive to take more hostages. This will reduce the chances that hostages will be taken. The calculation is, of course, that the harm done to the current hostages will be outweighed by the benefits of not having people taken hostage in the future.

This argument assumes that hostage takers are primarily motivated by the ransom. If they are taking hostages primarily for other reasons, such as for status, to make a statement or to get media attention, then not paying them a ransom will not significantly reduce their incentive to take hostages. This leads to a second reason why ransoms should not be paid.

In addition to the incentive argument, there is also the funding argument. While a terrorist group might have reasons other than money to take hostages, they benefit from getting ransoms. The money they receive can be used to fund additional operations, such as taking more hostages. Obviously, if ransoms are not paid, then such groups lose this funding, and this could impact their operations. Since paying a ransom would be funding terrorism, this provides both a moral and a practical reason not to pay.

While these arguments have a rational appeal, they are typically countered by emotional appeals. One approach to arguing that ransoms should be paid is the “in their shoes” appeal. The method involves asking a person whether they would want a ransom to be paid for their release or for the release of a loved one. Most people would want the ransom paid, assuming doing so would be effective. Sometimes the appeal is made explicitly in terms of emotions: “how would you feel if your loved one died because the government refused to pay the ransom?” Obviously, a person would feel awful.

This method does have considerable appeal. The “in their shoes” appeal can is like the golden rule approach (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) and is that policy should be based on how you would want to be treated in that situation. If I would not want the policy applied to me (that is, I would want to be ransomed or have my loved one ransomed), then I should be morally opposed to a no-pay policy as a matter of consistency. This certainly makes sense: if I would not want a policy applied in my case, then I should (in general) not support that policy.

One obvious counter is that there seems to be a distinction between what a policy should be and whether a person would want that policy applied to herself. For example, some universities have a policy that if a student misses more than three classes, the student fails the course. Naturally, no student wants that policy to be applied to her (and most professors would not have wanted it to apply to them when they were students), but this does not show that the policy is wrong. As another example, a company might have a policy of not providing health insurance to part time employees. While the CEO would certainly not like the policy if she were part-time, it does not follow that the policy must be a bad one. As such, policies need to be assessed not just in terms of how a person feels about them, but in terms of their merit or lack thereof.

Another obvious counter is to use the same approach, only with a modification. In response to the question “how would you feel if you were the hostage or she were a loved one?” one could ask “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage in an operation funded by ransom money? Or “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage because the hostage takers learned that people would pay ransoms for hostages?” The answer would be, of course, that one would feel bad about that. However, while how one would feel about this can be useful in discussing the matter, it is not decisive. Settling the matter rationally does require considering more than just how people would feel. It requires looking at the matter with a degree of objectivity. That is, not just asking how people would feel, but what would be right and what would yield the best results in the practical sense.  Obviously, talking about objectivity is easy when one is not a hostage.

In my previous essay I set the stage for discussing the concern about people switching competition categories to gain something. It is to this matter that I now turn.

The Sickle Cell 5K in Tallahassee is known for its excellent master’s trophy for the overall male and female masters runners. It has consistently been bigger and better than the second and third overall awards. One year a master’s runner was third overall but wanted the male masters’ award instead. This created a problem. While there was no rule about this, there are established running norms: overall places take precedence over the masters category and the masters category takes precedence over age group placing.  So, a 40+ year old runner who placed first to third would get the corresponding overall award. The first 40+ runner outside the top three would get the masters award and the next runner in their age group would win that age group. As would be expected, some people got mad about this runner’s efforts to get the masters award since he was breaking the norms and traditions to get a better award.

His argument, which was not unreasonable, was that he was the first masters runner and hence earned that award. This meant that the 4th place runner would get third overall. This might sound odd, but (as noted above) the running norms already allow for a person who finishes second in their age group to place first if the person who would win that age group wins an overall or masters award (most races have a no-double-dip rule). While his request did break the norms, he was  in the masters category. One might say that he elected to identify as a masters runner for the purpose of the award. He got the award when the original masters winner did everyone a favor by giving it to him, allowing the awards to continue. But this episode is still spoken of today and switching categories to get a better award is usually seen as questionable. This episode can be used as an analogy.

Suppose that transgender athletes are like the masters athlete: they belong in their chosen category but they are changing from one category to another in order to get a better award (or win). The masters runner could have accepted the third-place award, a transgender runner who identifies as female could stick to competing as male. But by switching categories, the athletes could be seen as gaining an advantage and thus they have an incentive to do so. They also are both picking a category they really belong in, so they are not engaged in a cheat or deceit. But if their motive is to switch for a gain and and in doing so they do harm another athlete, then this would seem to be wrong. The masters runner took the better award from another runner and a transgender athlete who changes categories to win takes away a win from another female athlete. This can be used to ground a moral argument against allowing athletes to change categories to win. That said, there is an easy counter.

Imagine a runner attends a Division 1 school and finds that they are good enough for the division but not good enough to regularly win. They switch to a Division 2 school so they can win regularly. They have changed their category to improve their gains and have “harmed” other runners. They might displace a runner from the team and will take victories that would have gone to other athletes had they not changed their category. While this approach to sports might not seem morally ideal, the runner would not be acting wrongly. They would be Division 2 even if they could have stuck with Division 1. Likewise, for an athlete who switches their gender category by transitioning: one might take issue with someone doing this for an advantage, but this is morally acceptable. It must be noted that people do not transition just to get an advantage. Some readers probably doubt that an athlete can legitimately switch categories, so I now turn to this matter.

Let us go back to the masters award incident but change it slightly. Imagine that the third-place runner is 39 years and 10 months old but decides to identify as a masters runner to get the award. In this case, the issue is easily resolved: age is an objective matter, and they are not a masters runner. Hence, they do not get the award. Likewise, athletes who claim to be female but are not have no right to switch categories. While this might seem to settle the matter, there are at least two replies.

One reply is to go back to the masters case. Imagine that the runner is 39 years old based on his birthday, but he is a devote Catholic who sincerely believes that life begins at conception and sets his age accordingly at over 40. By his religious based standard of age, he is a masters runner. While the official age of runner for racing is based on their birthdate and not their moment of conception, the runner could make an argument based on freedom of religion: he is being discriminated against by the failure of the race officials to recognize that he is at least 40 because his life began at conception under his faith. Likewise, a runner who self-identifies as a female could argue that she is being discriminated against when she is not allowed to select her category based on her beliefs about what it is to be female. Both runners could agree that there is a fact of the matter about being a masters runner or a female runner, but they disagree with the standards being imposed upon them by those who they see as discriminating against them. As such, the debate becomes one of defining category membership.

In the case of age, the dispute would seem to be easy to settle: to avoid charges of attacking religious freedom, the rules about age could be put neutrally to specify that the time from birth is used to determine the competition age of a runner. The standard applies to everyone and intuitively seems fair. In the case of gender, the same approach should be taken: a fair set of standards to categorize people is needed. But gender is much more complicated than age.

If gender were only of concern in sports, then the matter would be easier to address. But gender impacts every aspect of a person’s life and is, of course, a key battleground in the culture wars. As such, even if one makes a good faith effort to develop gender standards for sports categories, this will be a daunting task.  Obviously,  many people think they have the right answer and think they could easily solve the problem by imposing their own views on everyone else.

There are, of course, some easy and obvious sufficient conditions for being admitted into the female category: people with XX chromosomes and female anatomy and physiology get an automatic admission (if they wish).  Beyond that, the debates begin.  Since this matter is complicated and not my area of expertise, I freely admit that I do not have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I do not even have a well-considered set of general principles.

One obvious principle is that it would be morally wrong for a male athlete to lie about his identify to gain a competitive advantage. The moral problem is, of course, the intent to deceive to gain an advantage.

This is analogous to my view that it is wrong for person to lie about their religious views to gain something, such as a person who wants to use a religious excuse to get away with discrimination or to avoid paying taxes. My moral assessment would, of course, adjust in cases of sincere belief, even if the person’s belief turns out to be untrue. As with the religion case, there is the practical problem of sorting out when people are lying, though in the United States we generally do not put professed religious beliefs to a test.

While there is no crisis in sports involving male athletes switching categories in large numbers, allowing people to switch categories merely by saying they identify in that category does provide an opportunity for the unprincipled to exploit, just as allowing people to claim special treatment simply for asserting they have religious beliefs allows opportunities for the unprincipled. The moral and practical challenge is sorting out what tests should be used to protect against such unprincipled exploitation while avoiding discriminating against people. We do not make people prove that their religious beliefs are true before allowing them to gain the benefits of professing belief and we need to be consistent when it comes to professed gender identity. One approach, which is what we generally do for religion, is to take people at their word unless there is adequate evidence of an intent to deceive. For example, a male athlete who posted “LOL identifying as a girl just to win the 5K today, but fellas stay away I ain’t gay! After I win, I will be a boy again.” would be intending to deceive and should, one would infer, not be allowed to compete in the 5K as a female.  Likewise, if someone bringing a freedom of religion lawsuit so they can discriminate posted “LOL pretending to believe in God so I can hate on the gays!”, then they should probably not win that lawsuit. But in other cases, we should accept their profession as sincere. I do admit this does not settle the matter.

Upon taking office, Joe Biden signed an executive order requiring that schools receiving federal funding allow people who self-identify as females onto female sport’s teams. Pushback against it has ranged from thoughtful considerations of fairness to misogyny masquerading as morality. Exploiting the manufactured panic over transgender people, Trump signed an executive order banning transgender people from competing in women’s sports. While the narrative is that the anti-trans athlete folks are motivated by fairness, this is easily disproved by their lack of concern about fair treatment of women in sports in other areas, such as funding and facilities.

In addition to being complicated on its own, the fairness of transgender women competing with other women is linked to other complicated matters, such as general concerns about fairness in society and issues of gender identity. People arguing in good faith can make arguments in one area without realizing the implications of these arguments in other areas. To illustrate, consider the fictional character of Polly. Polly is a national level high school runner who holds to a principle of fairness. Polly’s brother, Paul, is faster than Polly but not a national level male runner. He jokingly suggests putting on a dress and beating Polly, which worries her. If a person could just self-identify as a female, Paul could do so and suddenly be a national level female high school runner. In a panic, Polly thinks up a nightmare scenario: the top male runners compete as boys, switch their gender identities, and win again as girls! Polly and her sister runners would be out of the competition, which would be unfair. In good faith, Polly can make a good moral argument against allowing this based on fairness. But her seemingly reasonable argument might justifying harming people in the broader context of fairness in society, something Polly would not want. As such, we should be careful to consider the implications of arguments about fairness in sports have in other areas.

People can also argue in bad faith, presenting an appealing fairness argument about sports while not caring about fairness. They might be using the sport argument as a Trojan horse to lure people into their ideological agenda or they might want to weaponize a seemingly reasonable argument. This is not to say that arguing in bad faith entails that a person must be making false claims or fallacious arguments. After all, one can use truth and good logic in bad faith. But we should be on guard against bad faith arguments. I will endeavor to follow my own advice and make good faith arguments while considering their implications.

From the standpoint of fairness, there are reasonable moral grounds to be concerned about allowing people to self-identify their category for competition. To focus the discussion, I will use my own sport of running and the specific context of road races—but the general points apply across all sports.

Road races have well-established categories that are based on a conception of fair competition. Almost all races have gender categories (male or female). Most races have age groups and some also include the master category (40+) and sometimes the grand master category (50+). A few races also add a weight category (Clydesdale or Athena). In addition to categories created for fairness, races sometimes have categories for other reasons. For example, the Bowlegs 5K in Tallahassee raises money for a college scholarship and has a special educator category. Since educators as a class have neither advantages nor disadvantages relative to other runners, this category is not based on fairness.

In most cases, these categories serve their intended purpose as they make competition fairer by sorting people into groups based on qualities that impact performance. In some cases, these categories can have the unintended effect of allowing a person in a generally advantaged category win in their category while losing to a runner in a disadvantaged category. For example, a 50-year-old runner might win nothing in his age group while also beating every runner in the younger age groups. He thus loses to inferior performances because of the age groups intended to allow older runners like him to fairly compete. While this can be annoying, these cases are rare, and the overall positive impact of age groups and gender divisions outweigh the negative aspects. This is a good general approach to setting policies. A good policy will never be perfect, but a good policy creates more overall good than bad. But there are people who do try to exploit categories to their advantage. I will turn to this in my next essay.

Three Confederate veterans, who fought against the United States of America, were nominated for admission to Florida’s Veterans’ Hall of Fame. The purpose of the hall is to honor “those military veterans who, through their works and lives during or after military service, have made a significant contribution to the State of Florida.”

The three nominees were David Lang, Samuel Pasco and Edward A. Perry. Perry was Florida’s governor from 1885 to 1889; Pasco was a U.S. senator. Lang assisted in creating what is now the Florida National Guard. They did make significant contributions to Florida. The main legal question was whether they qualify as veterans. Since Florida was in rebellion (in defense of slavery) against the United States there is also a moral question of whether or they should be considered United States veterans.

The state of Florida and the US federal government have similar definitions of “veteran.” For Florida, a veteran is a person who served in the active military and received an honorable discharge. The federal definition states that “The term ‘veteran’ means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.” The law also defines “Armed Forces” as the “United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard.” The reserves are also included as being in the armed forces.

According to Mike Prendergast, the executive director of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the three nominees in question did not qualify because the applications did not indicate that the men served in the armed forces of the United States of America. Interestingly, Agricultural Commissioner Adam Putnam took the view that “If you’re throwing these guys out on a technicality, that’s just dumb.”

Presumably, Putnam saw the fact that the men served in the Confederate army and took up arms against the United States as a technicality. This strikes me as more than a mere technicality. After all, the honor seems reserved for veterans as defined by the relevant laws. As such, being Confederate veterans would seem to no more qualify the men than being a veteran of the German or Japanese army in WWII would qualify someone who moved to Florida and ended up doing great things for the state. There is also the moral argument about enrolling people who fought against the United States. Fighting in defense of slavery and against the lawful government of the United States would seem to be morally problematic in regard to the veteran part of the honor.

One counter to the legal argument is that Confederate soldiers were granted (mostly symbolic) pensions about 100 years after the end of the Civil War. Confederate veterans can also be buried in a special Confederate section of Arlington National Cemetery. These facts do open the door to a legal and moral argument. In regard to the legal argument, it could be contended that Confederate veterans have been treated, in some other ways, as United States veterans. As such, one might argue, this should be extended to the Veterans’ Hall of Fame.

The obvious response is that these concessions to the Confederate veterans do not suffice to classify Confederate veterans as veterans of the United States. As such, they would not be qualified. There is also the moral counter that soldiers who fought against the United States should not be honored as veterans of the United States. After all, one would not honor veterans of other militaries that have fought against the United States even if they ended up doing great things for Florida.

It could also be argued that since the states that made up the Confederacy re-joined the United States, the veterans of the Confederacy would, as citizens, become United States’ veterans. Of course, the same logic would seem to apply to parts of the United States that were assimilated from other nations, such as Mexico, the lands of the Iroquois, and the lands of Apache and so on. As such, Sitting Bull would qualify as a veteran under this reasoning. Perhaps this could be countered by contending that the south left and then rejoined, so it is not becoming part of the United States that has the desired effect but rejoining after a rebellion.

Another possible argument is to contend that the Veterans’ Hall of Fame is a Florida hall and, as such, just requires that the veterans were Florida veterans. In the Civil War units were, in general, connected to a specific state (such the 1st Maine). As such, if the men in question served in a Florida unit that fought against the United States, they would be Florida veterans but not United States veterans. Using this option would, of course, require that the requirements not include that a nominee be a veteran of the United States military and presumably it could not be connected to the United States VA since that agency is only responsible for veterans of the United States armed forces and not veterans who served other nations.

In regard to the moral concerns of honoring, as veterans, men who fought against the United States and in defense of slavery, it could be claimed that the war was not about slavery. The obvious problem with this is that the war was, in fact, fought to preserve slavery. The southern states made this abundantly clear. Alexander Stephens, vice president of the Confederacy, gave his infamous Cornerstone Speech and made this quite clear when he said “Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition.”

It could, of course, be argued that not every soldier fighting for the South was fighting to defend slavery. After all, just like today, most people fighting in wars are not the people who set policy or benefit from these policies. These men could have gone to war not to protect the institution of slavery, but because they were duped by the slave holders. Or because they wanted to defend their state from “northern aggression.” Or some other morally acceptable reason. That is, it could be claimed that these men were fighting for something other than the explicit purpose of the Confederacy, namely the preservation of slavery. Since this is not impossible, it could be claimed that the men should be given the benefit of the doubt and be honored for fighting against the United States and then doing significant things for Florida.

Given how the Trump regime is re-embracing the Confederacy, it would not be surprising if this matter was re-considered in Florida. It would serve as a distraction from whatever the administration is up to and would please the white supremacists  and lovers of the Confederacy in the base.