Category: Politics

In the previous essay, I addressed the matter of the state’s contribution to an individual’s success (and failure). Naturally, no discussion of success would be complete without a discussion of genetics.

While the role of genetics in human behavior is complicated, it seems reasonable to accept that genetics play at least some role in success (and failure). Interestingly, these genes might not all be human—there are some interesting findings about the roles of the bacteria that live in us.

Thanks to years spent in athletics, I have had access to an informal laboratory in which I could observe various factors at play when it comes to success. As might be imagined, genetics probably plays a  significant role in athletic success (and failure). Being a runner, I will limit myself to running, but the same points can be applied to other aspects of life as well.

One rather obvious role of genetics is body type. As people who run or at least watch competitive running know, top runners tend to have a specific body type. While much of this results from training, there are genetic factors and it helps to be born to run. After all, no amount of running will give a person longer legs. There are also the factors that one cannot see, such as the efficiency of the cells in handling the energy requirements of competitive running. While training can influence these factors, natural ability (which is probably largely based in genetics) does have a significant impact and this is supported by my own years of competitive running.

Having run in high school and college, I was able to observe runners who were in the same training programs, had similar backgrounds and lived in similar conditions. However, performance obviously varied quite even among people who followed the exact same training. In my own case, I was lucky—while I lacked the easy high school success of “natural athletes”, I found that training really paid off for me. In contrast, some other runners worked as hard (or harder) than me yet did not meet with the same level of success. Of course, there were also runners who trained as hard as I did (or less) who did much better. After graduation, I was no longer on a team but still trained with other runners. Obviously, some people I trained with and ran with step-for-step were better than me and some were worse. I also found out the obvious—no matter how hard or smart I trained; I would never be able to make the Olympics.  It makes sense to attribute some of this failure to genetics—my body simply cannot match what the Olympic marathoners can do, despite all that training. Of course, it also makes sense to attribute some of my success to genetics—while I do not have Olympian genes, I have brought home many trophies. Plus, as we old runners say, running is itself a victory.

Naturally, these results were impacted by many variables, but the fact that genes influence performance seems to be well established. The more interesting question is, then, “how much do genes influence success (and failure)?”

Not surprisingly, people often turn to the study of twins to attempt to sort out what is genetic and what is not. After all, twins are supposed to be genetically identical and hence any differences between them would be non-genetic in nature. Interestingly, it has turned out that twins are not actually identical, thus entailing that some differences might be genetic. There has also been some recent interesting work regarding the bacteria that inhabit the human body and their influence on such factors as health. Oddly enough, it might be the case that some of a person’s success is due to their bacteria.

While the physiological aspects of running and other activities at which one might fail or succeed seem to be strongly influenced by genetics, there is an open question as to how much genetics impacts the mental aspects of success and failure. Going back to running, training and competition have mental elements. For example, there is the matter of having the will to train as needed. As any runner will tell you, training is suffering. Of course, racing hurts more—a big part of being a competitive runner is having what Hobbes called the will to hurt. Only in this case is it is the will to hurt yourself rather than others.

As might be imagined, if the “mental” aspects are as influenced by genetics as the physical aspects, then much of a person’s success or failure rests in these genes. For example, if the ability to finish a race despite the pain of an injury is not a matter of the “will” of the athlete, but a matter of the structure of their brain that resulted from the genes that constructed it, then they did not succeed any more than a car would succeed by being able to keep running despite damage. Likewise, if a runner is “broken” in the final sprint by a tougher runner because of the genetics of their nervous systems, then he has not failed, anymore than a car has failed if it runs out of gas.

Shockingly enough, the essay ends as it began, with the question unanswered. After all, we do not know how much the genes influence our success (and failures). But I got to write about running and that is a success.

 

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In the previous essay I discussed the question “to what extent do people owe their success (and failures) to others?” In this essay I will focus on how much of a person’s success (or failure) is owed to the state. Obviously, the exact debt will vary, and this examination will be, of necessity, somewhat abstract.

One way to begin the discussion is to use the state of nature. This philosophical device was used by such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in their examination of rights and the justification of political power. I am, however, going to use the device to see what the state contributes to success (or failure).

While this oversimplifies things two lassic approaches to the state of nature are the Hobbesian state and the Lockean state. In general terms, the state of nature is a state in which there is no governmental authority. It is often presented as a hypothetical predecessor to the rise of political states. In any case, the state of nature is marked by the lack of any artificial authority.

 For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war “and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Because of the conditions of this state, none of the following are possible: “Industry, culture of the earth, navigation, use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, commodious building; instruments of moving and removing, such things as require much force, knowledge of the face of the earth, account of time, arts, letters, society.” As Hobbes sees it, the establishment of the sovereign (the state) is necessary for the establishment of order, and this allows the possibility of industry and the other things that are required for “commodious living.” Given Hobbes assumptions about the state of nature being a state of war of all against all, the idea that these things would not be possible makes sense. One has but to look at what happens in real cases where civil authority utterly collapses to see the plausibility of Hobbes’ view.

On the Hobbesian model, an individual who succeeded in industry or other endeavors would owe a great deal to the state (that is, the collective of everyone forming the great leviathan that is the state). After all, without the order provided by the state, success in these areas would not be possible. Naturally, this does not include any other contributions made by the state, such as providing infrastructure or support for research. These contributions would, obviously enough, add to the debt owed by the individual to the collective society.

The Lockean model is much nicer than the Hobbesian, most likely because Locke includes divinely based rights to life, liberty and property even in the state of nature. On Locke’s model, life in the state if nature is not a state of war (although war can occur) and there is the possibility of success within this state. For example, the right to property allows for the accumulation of goods and this could be seen as success.

While the Lockean state of nature is more appealing than Hobbes’ state of war, Locke does argue that it is not preferable to the state of civil society. While there are, according to Locke, rights in the state of nature, these rights are enforced only by vigilante justice in which individuals act (or not) to prevent and take revenge for misdeeds. As such, wrongs are not reliably prevented or corrected. If, for example, someone stole the goods a person had accumulated, it would be up to her (and any allies) to recover her goods and punish the malefactors.

To solve this and other problems, civil society is created and vigilante justice is (mostly) replaced with a legal system. Once the state is established, then the state has the responsibility of protecting the citizens and dealing with criminals. Assuming the state is doing its job, the state of civil society provides a stable system in which success is more possible and more secure.

If Locke’s view is correct, a successful individual owes less to the state (that is, the collective agreements and actions of the people) than she would if Hobbes were right. After all, the difference between Locke’s state of nature and civil society is not as extreme as the difference in Hobbes’ view. However, the successful individual would still owe much to the collective efforts of civil society, not the least of which would be a debt for the existence of laws enabling and protecting the fruits of her success. If additional contributions of civil society, such as infrastructure, public education and so on are included, then the successful individual would owe a great deal to the state.

Of course, not everyone sees the state in such a positive way. For example, the philosophical communists contend that while the state is necessary for capitalism and socialism, it will wither away as true communism is achieved. Before then it will be an instrument of oppression, either serving the capitalists or the socialists. Obviously, once communism is achieved, then people will not owe any of their success (or failure) to the state because there will be no state. Or so the communists claim. However, a debt would still be owed to the states—without them, humanity would not have been able to achieve communism.

As another example, the anarchists have a negative view of the state—although the degree of negativity varies. Some, like Thoreau, are willing to co-exist with benign states. Others, like Goldman, advocate the destruction of the state because of its role in oppression and how it prevents true human flourishing.

Thoreau claims “that government is best which governs least” and even goes so far as to say, “that government is best which governs not at all.” As Thoreau sees it, government interferes with success in two main ways. The first is that people use it to impose on each other for their advantage (see, for example, how businesses use regulations against their competition). While this aids the success of those who control the state, it impedes the success of those who are imposed upon. Second, he claims that the state gets in the way of success, noting that “trade and commerce continuously face obstacles placed by legislators.” As he sees it government has only one role in success, namely doing nothing and “government never furthered any enterprise except by getting out of its way.”

On Thoreau’s system of government non-involvement, an individual’s success (and failures) would depend more on them than it does in the United States and similar countries. After all, the state is routinely used by some to their considerable advantage over others (subsidies, favorable laws and so on) and it also imposes restrictions on what people can do. As such, the state does contribute to success (and failure) via these impositions and restrictions.

Thoreau advocates evolution rather than destruction of the state, but other anarchists (such as Goldman) advocate complete elimination of the state. This would take the discussion full circle by returning to the state of nature—a situation without political authority. Naturally, if there was no state, then there would be no state to contribute to or prevent an individual’s success. There is, however, the question of whether such a state would be desirable. There is also the question of whether success would even be possible without a state, unless success is merely a matter of staying alive.

 

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As an undergraduate I participated in a faculty-student debate about artificial intelligence. While the details of the debate have faded from my non-artificial mind, I vividly recall one exchange. The professor on the opposing side claimed I believed in free will because I wanted to take credit for my successes. Filled with the pride of youth, I replied with something to the effect of “of course, they are my successes.” I also recall showing some small wisdom by adding “my failures are also mine.” This was probably my first attempt at reflecting on the extent to which I was responsible for my successes and failures. This got me thinking about success and failure in general and not just the specifics of my own victories and defeats.

Not surprisingly, I have thought about this over the years, often in the context of teaching. For example, students who do well say things like “I earned an A” while students who do poorly typically say things like “the professor failed me.” At the start of each semester, at least one student will ask me if I fail students. My reply, which I make with a smile, is always “No. People fail themselves. I merely record their failure.” I follow that by saying that students have every chance to succeed and that I will do my best to ensure that they get the grade they earn. As might be imagined, being a teacher does tend to get a person thinking about who is responsible for the success and failures of students.

The matter of responsibility for success (and failure) extends far beyond the classroom. Way back in July 2012 a speech by President Obama set off a battle between Democrats and Republicans. The key part of Obama’s speech  is as follows:  “…Look, if you’ve been successful, you didn’t get there on your own.… If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business – you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.”

Some Republicans claimed Obama believed business owners owe all their success to others (especially the state) but the most plausible interpretation is that he claimed people who are successful in business owe some of their success to others, including the state.

Mitt Romney (he was famous once), criticized Obama at the time but had presented a similar view about success back in 2002: “You Olympians, however, know you didn’t get here solely on your own power. For most of you, loving parents, sisters or brothers encouraged your hopes. Coaches guided, communities built venues in order to organize competitions. All Olympians stand on the shoulders of those who lifted them. We’ve already cheered the Olympians, let’s also cheer the parents, coaches and communities.”

As with Obama, the most plausible interpretation of Romney’s remarks is that he claimed athletes who made it to the Olympics owe some of their success to others not that they owed all their success to others.

These claims made by Obama and Romney about success in business and sports are intuitively plausible. Obviously, people do not appear as grown, educated adults ex nihilo via the power of their own will. Less obviously, but still rather obviously, business owners do not create their business out of nothing. To use a silly example, a business owner obviously does not invent commerce. In the case of Olympic athletes, they obviously do not just appear  at the games with no support or assistance from others.

The interesting question  here is not “do people owe some of their success (and failures) to others?” but “to what extent do people owe their success (and failures) to others?” Making this discussion manageable does require making assumptions that can (and should) be challenged. I will be assuming that people can have meaningful agency and that the universe is not strictly deterministic or entirely random. As an illustration, consider a prize drawing after a 5K race. For those not familiar with such events, some races feature the usual earned awards (what the runners get for running well) and a random prize drawing. Interestingly, people often applaud as loudly when people win a random prize as they do for people who earn a trophy.

 In a deterministic universe it makes little sense to speak of meaningful success or failure. Such a universe can be seen as a rigged prize drawing.  If I “win” a prize because it is determined that I will win (that is, it is rigged) then I have not really succeeded and the others have not really failed—there is no victory, there is no defeat.

The same holds true for a completely random universe. If I “win” a prize because my number is pulled by chance, I have not succeeded and the others have not failed. Things have just happened by chance.

Success and failure, then, would thus seem to assume that the agent has a meaningful role in the outcome. Going back to the prize drawing, while I would not have succeeded by “winning” either a fixed or random drawing, I could succeed by winning a trophy in the 5K by my efforts. Naturally, the nature of this agency in even something as apparently straightforward as a 5K race is a mystery. However, for the sake of the discussion that will follow in additional essays, I must assume this mysterious agency. After all, I want to think I earned all those trophies, and I am obligated to accept the disgrace of my failures.

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With each mass shooting the gun debate ignites again, in an endless circular dance. Some people see such horrific events as evidence in favor of new gun regulation. Others quickly head off attempts to act.

Some think it odd that I, an allegedly liberal philosophy professor, am pro-gun. The psychological casual explanation for this is easy: I was shaped by my pro-gun upbringing. I learned to shoot as soon as I could hold a gun, I hunted for years, and I am still a gun owner. I enjoy shooting and I feel comfortable with guns. I feel uncomfortable around people with guns who have no grasp of basic gun safety—an encounter that sometimes happens at the range. But how I feel about guns should not determine what I should believe about guns and gun control.

Gun control, the limiting of gun ownership, can be supported by a very reasonable utilitarian argument. By restricting gun ownership, the likelihood of people getting injured or killed by guns is reduced. While limiting gun rights can be seen as a harm, this is supposed to be offset by the greater reduction in harm to the potential victims of guns (or people with guns if you prefer).

Because of the utilitarian argument, I accept that some gun control laws can be morally justified. However, there is the question of the extent to which gun rights should be limited (if at all). There are varying degrees of gun control ranging from none to complete gun control in which gun ownership is forbidden.

In the United States, people often see gun rights as special rather than in terms of general principles about right. On the right, gun ownership is sometimes venerated and defended with zealous devotion. On the left, guns are sometimes seen as inherently terrifying. I, however, follow a general principle that can be used to sort out what should be allowed and what should be restricted.

As noted above, the main argument for restricting gun rights is to reduce harm. This is based on the more general principle that rights or liberties can be restricted under the justification of reducing harm. As such, it would seem useful to discuss gun rights in this general context.

Given that the goal of gun control is to reduce harm, it might be tempting to argue in favor of complete gun control or at least strict restrictions. The general principle is that a ban or strict restrictions would be justified by significant harm reduction. While this does have some appeal, it needs to be considered in a broader context.

If the goal is to reduce harm, then gun control would be low on the list of things that should be restricted. After all, far more people perish due to automobiles, tobacco, alcohol and obesity than die in incidents of gun violence.  As such, if guns should be restricted to reduce harm, then automobiles should also be restricted more because they do much more harm. Also, poor health choices create massive harm, so regulation of food and exercise would be justified by this general principle. While some do advocate this regulation, most see these as absurd. However, if banning Big Macs and cars seems absurd, then banning guns would also seem absurd.

But it can be argued there are relevant differences between gun control and such things as strict automobile and obesity control. In the case of obesity, it can be argued that a person who is obese is primarily hurting themself (although general obesity does harm everyone). If people have a right of self-harm while not having the liberty to harm others, then the distinction is easy to make. Except, obviously, for suicide by gun—if slow suicide by obesity should not be restricted, then quick suicide by gun would also be a liberty. Using a right to self-harm, one might argue that suicide deaths involving guns should be morally distinct from homicides involving guns.

In the case of automobiles, it is tempting to argue that automobile deaths are accidents while gun deaths are intentional. However, there are accidental deaths involving guns and intentional deaths involving automobiles A vehicle can be used as a very effective weapon, albeit one that is hard to conceal.

A more plausible option is a utilitarian approach: while severely restricting automobiles would lower death and injury tolls (not to mention reducing pollution and perhaps encouraging exercise), the utility of the automobile provides an adequate offset against the harms arising from automotive liberty.

Unlike cars, it could be argued that guns lack adequate utility to morally justify the harm they cause. After all, guns are mainly used for entertainment such as hunting and target shooting. While they are sometimes used for survival hunting or protection against animal or human threats, these benefits are offset by the harm of allowing gun rights or liberties.

Naturally, when making the calculation of harms and benefits, if the entertainment value of guns is to be discounted or dismissed, then the same must be done for automobiles and anything else. This would include pool ownership. While pools are mainly for amusement, they cause numerous drowning deaths every year. This would also apply to tobacco, which has no practical benefit and is used solely for pleasure, despite the fact that it harms the user and those exposed to the secondhand smoke. It could even apply to junk food, snacks and desserts—these are consumed for pleasure rather than any health benefit yet are major contributors to obesity. It could even be argued that these harmful products are inflicted on people (by advertising and subsidies that make them cheaper than healthy food) and thus they could be seen as a form of attack.

Interestingly, if the restriction of guns is based on arguing that they are primarily entertainment and lack suitable utility, then the same line of reasoning can be used to restrict automotive rights. After all, if the enjoyment of target shooting does not justify the liberty to use a gun for this purpose, then the enjoyment of driving would not justify the liberty to drive. So, if automotive liberty is warranted in the face of death and injury on utilitarian grounds then then it is reasonable to restrict automotive usage to utility, such as transporting heavy items over a long distance. Merely driving around for amusement or to go someplace to be amused, such as a movie, would not warrant putting oneself and others at risk of death and injury.

Of course, gun defenders will argue that guns are not primarily for amusement. Rather, they would point to their essential role in protection, perhaps against scary minorities or communists. There is also the argument that private ownership of guns provides a balance against the compulsive power of the state. An unarmed population is only free at the discretion of the armed, which is a rather uncertain sort of freedom. After all, we did see the pro-gun groups rush out to counter the flooding of cities with ICE and the National Guard just as they promised. At least we might have in some possible world in another timeline.

The stock counter is that people are safer without guns and that the state can generally be trusted not to oppress the people to a degree that would necessitate armed resistance. These are, of course, factual matters—but not uncontroversial ones.  After all, people will point to the few cases where someone defended themselves and others with their guns. And we do see the Trump regime flooding the streets of American cities with ICE to allegedly do crimes against people and inflict terror on the population.

It can be said that it would be a better world without any weapons. This might be true, but it would also be a much better world if no one was willing to hurt anyone else and these seem equally likely to come about.

 

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Back in 2022 college swimmer Riley Gaines tied for 5th place in the 200-yard freestyle with Lia Thomas during the Women’s Swimming and Diving Championships. While 5th place is a remarkable achievement at this level of competition, it would not have made the news except for the fact that Thomas is a transgender woman and Gaines decided to take up the anti-trans banner. From a cynical standpoint, one might argue that Gaines is now cashing in on the manufactured anti-trans grift beloved by the right. To be fair and balanced, one might also assert that Gaines is acting on deeply held beliefs and confronting what she perceives as a moral threat and not just as an opportunity to gain fame and sell books.

On her website, Gaines presents two of the main concerns advanced by anti-trans activists in the context of sports. Gaines asserts that “I can attest to the tears that I witnessed from finishers who missed being named an All-American by one place.” This can be seen as pointing towards the fairness argument against trans athletes, at least those who transitioned from male to female. The gist of the argument is that even after transitioning, a transwoman will have an unfair advantage in competition and hence should be banned. It is worth pointing out that Gaine’s one example of her own experience is used to “prove” that a problem exists. However, even if one thinks that it is unfair for a transwoman to compete with other women, even when transwomen were allowed to compete, the number of transwomen athletes was tiny. Put bluntly, it seems crazy to have a political frenzy over one example where Gaines tied for 5th place.

As I have argued in other essays, one can have a good faith discussion about fairness and competition. For example, while Thomas did knock another woman out of being an All-American, all the woman who placed also knocked other women out of being All-American. It is reasonable to infer that the women who placed had advantages over the women who did not (or just had a better day). They might, for example, have had a genetic advantage in endurance, strength or other qualities. Or maybe they have wealthier parents who were able to pay for better lessons. Or they went to schools that provided better support for swimmers. And so on. But to be fair and balanced, we collectively have decided to address fairness is simple ways, such as size, age, and sex and perhaps one could make a moral case that while other advantages do not matter morally, the alleged advantages of being a transwoman do matter. As I am not an expert in sports performance science, my opinions about whether a transwoman has, on average, an advantage after transitioning have no weight—so I will leave this to experts operating in good faith. There is, of course, the obvious fact that men, on average, have an advantage over women and this is commonly appealed to in making the anti-trans case. But, back to Gaines.

After Riley Gaines spoke during the 2022 CPAC, Trump said, “Just to show you how ridiculous it is, look at me. I am much bigger and much stronger than her, there is no way she could beat me in swimming, do we all agree?” When I saw this on video, I felt a nanosecond of empathy for Gaines. I know female athletes who have endured men disparaging their athletic ability and have seen how much this hurts them. This empathy quickly passed, since she had chosen a road on which misogynistic views are displayed like billboards. But I would have loved to see Trump try to swim against her. If he did, Vance would probably be president now. I freely admit that Gaines could easily beat me in a swimming race, unless she has gotten way out of shape. I’m sure that at her peak she could have beaten me when I was at my running peak as a varsity college runner—because running speed does not translate well to swimming speed. As an experienced athlete, I have respect for female athletes and know how strong they can be—which is why I see the anti-trans tactic of belittling them as fundamentally insulting to my fellow athletes.

To be fair and balanced, one can say that Trump was just joking and not making the absurd claim that he could beat Gaines. But some men do think that an average man can beat even a top female athlete, as evidenced by the infamous 2019 survey in which 12% of British men thought they could win a point against Serena Williams (3% of women thought they could). There is also the obvious fact that the anti-trans argument must assume that even a transitioned transwoman will consistently be a superior athlete.

Underlying this view, obviously enough, is the misogynistic view that women are inferior and need to be protected (the fairness argument often includes the dramatic claim that transwoman athletes will cause excessive injuries). While Gaines professes to want to protect female athletes, this view of women is weaponized against cis-gender athletes in the form of false accusations, public harassment and demands that they prove their sex. The focus on this also distracts from other concerns, such as women’s sports being underfunded. Shockingly, misogynistic views end up hurting all women. As such, even if Gaines does have good intentions, the ideology she is supporting will hurt women like her. But at least she can sell some books at collect speaking fees. But perhaps she is sincere and thinks she is doing good while she sells books and collects speaking fees.

The second point made by Gaines on her website is that “I can attest to the extreme discomfort in the locker room from 18-year-old-girls exposed to male body parts and having to undress with a male watching in the same room.” To her credit, she does not seem to accuse Thomas of planning to assault her and the “girls”, which is another standard attack on transwomen. To be fair and balanced, there can be a good faith discussion about the safety of women and who should be allowed in what spaces. However, transwoman as predator rhetoric is a bad faith argument, as it is not backed up with evidence. It also embraces sexist views of men as predators and women as helpless victims.

Speaking of predators, it did look like Trump tried to kiss Gaines at CPAC and that she turned away in disgust. To be fair and balanced, Gaines denies this and claims Trump was merely speaking to her and that she turned her head to listen. Even if Gaine’s is telling the truth, Trump has been accused by over 25 women of various forms of sexual misconduct. Most famously, Trump was found liable for sexual abuse and defamation in the E. Jean Caroll case. Ironically, it has been alleged that Trump walked into dressing rooms while contestants (including some as young as 15 or 16) were changing or naked. Given Gaine’s statement about how she felt about Thomas being in the locker room, it might seem odd that she would support Trump.

While Trump is just one example, the allegations against him show the obvious: transwomen are not the threat that other women should worry about, it is the cisgender sexual predators that present a real danger. This also illustrates the bad faith of many of the anti-trans activists: they profess to want to protect women, but support Trump.

 

 

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Smithsonian National Museum of American History Director Anthea Hartig was brought before congress in July 2026. During the questioning, Nancy Mace asked the director “what is a woman?” For those not familiar with this rhetorical tool, the question might have seemed irrelevant and even bizarre. However, it is a well-established rhetorical tool used by the right that was popularized by Matt Walsh and Justin Folk in the propamentary What is a Woman?

The use of rhetorical tools is a rational approach. For those who accept the cognitive miser theory, using a rhetorical tool saves cognitive resources. Even without a theory, it makes sense not to waste time re-inventing the wheel.  It also allows one to borrow skills by “running” a rhetorical “program.”

 My fellow gamers will understand the analogy of using an optimized character build and rotation in a game like Diablo IV or World of Warcraft: this allows a person to play above their own skill level by using the work of someone else. There is also the analogy to how people in tech support and customer service use scripts. One can even look at expert systems and AI that use stolen processes to emulate skills.

I have no general issue with people borrowing skills and using templates as I do this myself when I, for example, use an argument by analogy or use a plumbing technique I learned from a book or YouTube video. I also have no issue with using rhetoric—as I tell my students, rhetoric is like flavoring for food. Rhetoric is logically neutral but there is no need to avoid making your arguments “taste good” by using some rhetoric. But I do have an issue with substituting rhetoric for logic and using it in bad faith.

While “what is a woman?” can be a good faith philosophical question, when someone like Mace asks it, they are asking in bad faith. They are not inviting someone along on a journey of discovery or a thoughtful inquiry. Instead, it is a bad faith set up for a trap, for they already have the answer they want, and their intent is to score rhetorical points as part of an ideological performance.

If the target of the question is not prepared, they will probably flounder and struggle with their answer. The questioner can allow them to flounder a while and then shut them down with their prepared answer: “A woman is an adult human female.” For many audiences, it will seem that the questioner won: they confidently offer a decisive, simple answer while their target floundered. But this is obviously just a rhetorical victory: they have proved nothing and have merely persuaded the audience. This is why people on the right prefer to engage with unprepared people, such as college freshmen and other non-experts.

When engaging with a prepared or expert target, folks on the right prefer to ask the question when the target has a limited time to answer, the context favors them or when they can edit the response. In the case of Mace questioning Hartig, Hartig had only a short time to respond and was speaking before congress and cameras as a director trying to do the best she could for the Smithsonian and not, for example, as an expert on gender in a risk free environment. Folks on the right try to avoid engaging experts in contexts in which the experts have the time to provide a detailed response without a metaphorical sword dangling over their head.  But this question can still be rhetorically effective against even an expert.

While the right professes to believe their simplistic, grade-school answer to the question “what is a woman?”, this answer does actually have many rhetorical advantages over the sort of complex answer an expert would give.

One is that people generally find complexity boring when it is outside their areas of interest. Obviously. As a philosopher, I notice this—which makes sense. Most people are not, for example, interested in the finer points of trope theory. But I also notice it in my role as the DIY guy who fixes things. I learned decades ago that most people just want the thing fixed and, at best, a simple explanation. They do not want to hear me talk about IRQ conflicts or the idiosyncrasies of 2-stroke engines. An expert explaining what a woman is will most likely bore people, especially since the time spent learning expertise cuts into the time one might spend learning showmanship and rhetorical skills.

The second is that people often find complex explanations about what they thought were simple things unsettling or even frightening, even if they do not have an ideological commitment to the simple conception. While this might seem odd, dealing with the complexities of reality is a matter not just of intellect but also a matter of virtue. Virtue is, as our good dead friend Aristotle said, hard.

Engaging with the complexities of reality requires moderating your pride because you will need to admit when you do not know and when you are wrong. In American culture, admitting ignorance or error is usually a blow to one’s pride and status. It is often equated with weakness, although it obviously requires more strength of character to admit ignorance or error than it does to lie. Admitting ignorance or error also requires courage because, as just noted, doing so puts your status and pride at risk. My students often seem disconcerted and worried when I tell them, somewhat jokingly, that I am wrong about everything.

Concern about status crosses the political divide in the United States but folks on the right seem somewhat more concerned about hierarchy and status than the left. So, if someone offers a complex account of what it is to be a woman that goes beyond what we are taught in grade school, this might cause discomfort and fear in the audience. As such, a simple answer that fits what we were taught in grade school will feel right.

Given that Socrates famously claimed that wisdom is knowing you know nothing, it is hardly surprising that philosophers are often willing to admit ignorance and error. At least within certain limits that, ironically, help preserve their status as philosophers. In my own case, studying philosophy did help me accept that my ignorance is infinite and that I am wrong about everything. But my DIY training also led me to this view.

I had the good fortune of being raised by a dad who taught me many useful skills of the sort that would be stereotypically considered manly. I learned to use tools ranging from saws to rifles. I also took shop in school, something that has apparently been abandoned. I was good at shop, as evidenced by the fact that I have all my fingers. During COVID I enhanced my DIY skills by learning much more about electrical repair, plumbing and automobile repair. I’m also good at electrical work, as evidenced by the fact that I have not been electrocuted or burned down my house.

Refusing to acknowledge ignorance or error is an obstacle in fixing or building things, so part of learning to be good at these skills is learning how to moderate pride and develop courage. While one can get away with lying in business and politics, lying is not going to get your ice maker working again or solve the problem with your PC crashing when you try to play Darktide. Sure, you can lie to someone about fixing their icemaker or PC but that is a business skill. Lying about fixing, for example affordability, is a political skill. As is lying about what it is to be a woman.

The simple answer, that a woman is an adult human female, is obviously appealing to people who accept that ideology. Obviously, any conflicting answer will be looked upon negatively, especially if it is complex. Ironically, while the right seems smugly content with what they think is a simple answer that “proves” their gender ideology correct, they do not seem to understand that it invites more questions. Obviously enough, someone with any curiosity would realize that the concepts of adult, human and female raise questions that demand complex answers.

For example, while the concept of adult might seem simple and obvious, in the United States even the legal concept is complicated. For voting, contracts, jury duty, military service and consensual sex, a person is an adult at 18. For drinking, 21. If we get into the biology of adulthood, then we get different answers that vary between individuals. If we consider adulthood from a normative standpoint, such as in terms of moral accountability, then we also get different answers that vary with time and culture.

Sorting out what it is to be human is also a complex matter. There is the biological question in which we might wonder, for example, if neanderthals were human. There is also the normative question. For example, Kirk claimed that Spock was the most human, despite being only half biologically human. Outside of sci-fi, we make the moral claims that someone is human or inhuman, although they are obviously homo sapiens. There is also the metaphysical question of what it is to be human. For example, was Plato right when he claimed there was a form of Man? Probably not.

And although the right thinks (or pretends) they perfectly understand what it is to be female, this is also complicated even if we just stick to genetics and biology. For example, we are told in grade school that females are XX and males are XY. But 1 in 1,000 females are XXX. Human genital physiology is also complicated. But how can one respond to the “what is a woman?” question effectively and honestly?

From a rhetorical standpoint, the ideal would be to have a concise, snappy answer that is true. So, when the Nancy Maces of the world ask, “what is a woman?” one could just say (insert concise snappy truth). Unfortunately, the truth is complicated.

 As others have noted, there is no lower limit to simplicity if you lie, while reality imposes a simplicity floor on truth. This is one of the many reasons politicians and advertisers lie in varying degrees; they know that they need to keep it simple while also understanding simplifying leads to untruth. As such, beyond saying “it is complicated” there is no short, simple true answer to the question, which gives the right a huge rhetorical advantage. As would be suspected, they use the advantage of untrue simplicity broadly and this is augmented by decades of the right training Americans to distrust expertise. They also use the rhetorical technique of repetition as the question “what is a woman?” and the response “an adult human female” are talking points used across the world by the right.

To be honest, there is probably no way to counter this rhetorical question in a way that would change the minds of people already committed to the “an adult human female” gender ideology. Fortunately, most people are not committed to this ideology and their minds can change. After all, people have changed their minds about many things in America, with a recent change being the public view of same sex couples. It was not long ago that people just said “it’s Adame and Eve and not Adam and Steve” to “refute” same sex marriage. So, “a woman is an adult human female” might become another rhetorical relic of the right and they will need to find a new vulnerable group to demonize. Or rely on the classics, as misogyny, racism and antisemitism have served the right well.

 

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In my previous essay I discussed the company side of corporate advocacy. As noted in the essay, in the before time the group One Million Moms called for a boycott of Kraft in response to the rainbow Oreo. However, what motived my decision to write about consumer advocacy was the quandary faced by a friend of mine about Chick-Fil-A. On one hand, my friend really likes the food at Chick-Fil-A and has been a loyal customer for years. On the other hand, my friend supports same sex marriage and was dismayed to learn that Chick-Fil-A donated about $2 million to anti-gay groups in 2009. As might be imagined, my friend was worried that their purchases contributed (however insignificantly) to anti-gay groups. This friend isn’t me; I’ve only eaten Chick-Fil-A when it’s been given to me.  I was told by my parents that people are starving in China, and my wasting food would, I had to infer, make them starve more. I assume people now tell their kids that people are going hungry in America unless they are the ones going hungry. In that case, they obviously know they are going hungry. But to get back to the tangent, I’ll eat Chick-Fil-A rather than throw it away because I’m conditioned to not waste food. But to get back to the point, let’s look at the ethics of consumer advocacy.

On the face of it, a person is free to decide whether to buy goods or services from a company as a matter of advocacy (or any other reason). So, for example, if someone was pleased by the rainbow Oreo and decided to buy Oreos, she has every right to do so. Likewise, if someone was displeased with the rainbow and decides to switch to another cookie, then he has every right to do so. This is a matter of personal choice and on par with buying (or not) based on any factor—be it the actor shilling for the company or a taste preference.

It might be objected that buying based on advocacy would be unfair—after all, a person should buy based on the quality of the product or service and other such relevant factors rather than by the (alleged) irrelevant factor of company advocacy. The easy and obvious reply is that by using (probably performative) advocacy, the company makes this a legitimate factor in purchasing decisions. If the company does not wish to be judged or impacted by its advocacy choices, then the only course of action (other than secrecy) is to not engage in that advocacy.

A more interesting moral problem is the issue of whether a person should buy from a company that engages in advocacy that they morally disagree with. For example, a person who finds same-sex marriage morally unacceptable faced the question of whether to buy Kraft products in the light of the rainbow Oreo. As another example, a person who supports gay rights faces the issue of whether to patronize Chick-Fil-A.

This problem is like the issue of taxes addressed by Thoreau in his essay on civil disobedience. He argued that people should not pay taxes to a state whose actions they found morally reprehensible. In Thoreau’s case, his concern was with the wickedness of slavery and an unjust war with Mexico. As he saw it, a person has an obligation to at least not be a party to what they see as evil. After all, a person who contributes to the doing of misdeeds bears some of the blame. At the very least, the person’s involvement shows that they accept or at least tolerate those misdeeds.

In the case of the state, the consequences of not paying taxes tend to be serious for some citizens. It is also difficult for the average citizen to get beyond the reach of the state. As such, citizens should probably be given slack when it comes to paying taxes to states that do wicked things. After all, all states do wicked things and living on a decommissioned offshore oil rig or on an ice sheet are not viable options for most folks.

Fortunately, it is much easier when it comes to companies. After all, there are sometimes other companies that offer similar goods and services. As such, it can be easy for a person to avoid contributing to cause that they find morally unacceptable. For example, a cookie lover who is opposed to same-sex marriage could have abandoned Oreos for another cookie. As another example, a person who favors gay rights can consume chicken from a company that does not contribute to anti-gay groups.

It might be countered that people should not have to make such choices. After all, it could be argued that by buying from those companies the consumer is expressing a preference for the product or service and not an approval of a specific moral or political agenda that the company might endorse.

The obvious reply to this counter is that while a person can patronize the company without supporting its advocacy, the customer is contributing to that advocacy. For example, the money Kraft made from selling products paid for the creation of the rainbow Oreo. As another example, $2 million of the money Chick-Fil-A made from selling food was given to anti-gay groups. So people who bought from them contributed to those groups, albeit indirectly.

It could be objected that very little of the money a company receives ever ends up in advocacy and each customer only spends a small amount. If one were to calculate what, for example, the average Kraft or Chick-Fil-A customer spends per year with those companies and what percentage a company spends on advocacy, then each customer would make a miniscule contribution. As such, saying that a customer contributes to advocacy would seem absurd.

But even a miniscule contribution is still a contribution, and the individual is thus responsible to that miniscule degree for advocacy conducted by that company. As such, if someone opposed to same sex marriage bought Kraft food, they made some microscopic contribution to the rainbow Oreo. Likewise, if a person who is for gay rights ate at Chick-Fil-A, then they helped fund anti-gay organizations. Naturally, a person’s responsibility can be mitigated by legitimate ignorance. For example, most customers have no idea what companies contribute to and many never see the performative advocacy advertisements.  

Because being a customer of a company that engages in advocacy helps fund that advocacy, it would seem to follow that a person who sees the advocacy position taken by a company as immoral should not patronize that company. Otherwise, they would be contributing to something they regard as wrong and that would be wrong.

That said, there is obviously the question of whether the person is right in their moral assessment. For example, if homosexuals are morally entitled to equal rights, then Chick-Fil-A would be acting wrongly in supporting groups that seem intent on denying gay rights. Kraft would, in contrast, be acting rightly in showing its support. In this scenario, boycotting Chick-Fil-A would seem right, but boycotting Kraft because of its support of gay rights would have been wrong.

In closing, one obvious problem is that all major corporations are morally awful—so supporting any of them would be wrong. But they excel at ensuring there are few if any alternatives and so we are trapped in supporting evil.

 

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In the before time, one Gay Pride Day Kraft posted an image of a rainbow Oreo cookie (sadly not yet a real product). Almost immediately, the group One Million Moms condemned Kraft and urged a boycott of Kraft foods for jamming their views down the throats of America. On an interesting side note, conservative groups seem oddly obsessed with the metaphor of things being jammed down their throats, but that is a matter for a psychologist rather than a philosopher.

One Million Moms was consistent in its condemnation of companies that indicate an acceptance of homosexuality. They condemned both DC and Marvel for having gay characters in their comic books. They also advocated boycotting J.C. Penney because the company hired Ellen DeGeneres as a spokesperson. They even went after the company for including a lesbian couple in its advertisement for Mother’s Day and for including a gay male couple in a Father’s Day advertisement. Naturally, One Million Moms was not alone in this—other anti-gay groups and individuals have protested companies that expressed acceptance of homosexual customers. More recently, transpeople have been the focus of the culture war.

Not surprisingly, there were people who condemned companies for being against homosexuality. For example, Chick-Fil-A donated about $2 million to anti-gay groups in 2009 and this concerned some customers. I know people who eat at Chick-Fil-A because of its anti-gay stance and people who refuse to do so for the same reason.

As might be imagined, corporate involvement in culture war issues raises interesting philosophical issues. One issue is whether companies should be involved in political causes, such as same sex marriage, trans rights or gun rights. Another is whether people should boycott companies that (seem to) support views they oppose.

If I made decisions for a company, I would avoid engaging in performative advocacy. This is based on the approach I take to being a professor: I am not there to preach an ideological agenda or make converts to my causes. I am there to provide an educational opportunity. By analogy, if I was running a company that made computers, my goal would be to make good computers and not engage in performative advocacy. That would not be the function of my company—it is not an ideology company but a computer company.

Naturally, in my personal capacity I do engage in advocacy and I should do so. However, I make it clear that my views are my own. I do not have the moral right to speak for my colleagues. Likewise, if I owned a company, it would be unreasonable and unethical of me to claim to speak for my employees in the context of ideology. But there are at least two obvious counters to the view that companies should avoid (performative) advocacy.

One counter is that a company that remains silent can be seen as tacitly accepting certain views. For example, a company that went along with segregation in the United States would be acting immorally by going along with that evil.

It might be objected that companies should go with whatever the law or practice of the day is, thus not being advocates one way or the other. While this is tempting, there do not seem to be any reasonable grounds for exempting the people running companies from ethics. Hence, the excuse of “I was just following the law and doing business” rings as hollow as “I was just following orders.” As such, companies do need to be concerned about the stances they take on issues that concern the business of the company. This does, of course, give them a reasonable out on issues that do not concern their business.

In the case of homosexuality or transgender issues, it could be argued that most companies do not need to take a stance on the issues, such as the ethics of same-sex marriage or trans athletes competing in sports. As such, they cannot be condemned for not taking a stance or engaging in advocacy one way or the other. However, it can be argued that even if they do not need to take a stance, they can and this leads to the second counter.

A second obvious counter is that companies have the moral right to engage in advocacy based on the right of free expression that the decision makers of the company possess. As far as the concern that company advocacy is questionable because the few decision makers for the company are claiming to speak for the entire company, there are two replies.

One is that while a company need not reflect the views of its employees as the employees are not obligated to endorse the advocacy views adopted by the decision makers of the company. That is, working for a company does not morally obligate the worker to accept the positions advocated by the company. So, someone could work for Kraft without being a supporter of same-sex marriage and their employment at Kraft should not be taken as an endorsement of what the rainbow Oreo stood for. Employees who find this too objectionable can, of course, quit—if they can find another job.

Second is that the company decision makers already make decisions about what the company does and deciding to take an advocacy position is just another decision. For example, Apple does not consult with the people who assemble iPads to see what they think about what the next version of iOS should be or what the EULA should contain. As such, they are not exceeding their authority over the company as an entity.

That said, the people who decide the advocacy roles and positions of the company are morally accountable for those roles and positions. As such, if they adopt an unethical position, they would be acting wrongly. There is also practical concern about the impact of such advocacy on the company’s bottom line. After all, (performative) advocacy is done with the intent of attracting or keeping customers and there is the question of which stance will result in the greatest profits. This is, of course, a practical rather than ethical question. Deciding to take a position based on the profit potential is, however, a matter of ethical concern. The company side is but one side of the cookie, there is also the consumer side. This will be discussed in the next essay.

 

 

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In times of tight budgets, state governments usually cut spending.  Whether the tight budget was self-inflicted or not. One common “cost savings” approach is to fire state workers and eliminate positions; another is privatization of such things as prisons and school busing.

The reasons given for privatizing are usually intended to seem reasonable. Privatizing is supposed to save money, proved higher quality service and reduced red tape. If privatizing did these things, then it would be a good idea. After all, getting better service for less cost and less red tape would be great. In fact, even if privatizing only improved one area (cost, quality, or bureaucracy) then it would be a good thing (assuming it did not make things worse otherwise). However, there is the question of whether privatizing can deliver these alleged goods.

While it is often claimed that privatizing saves money, this does not seem true. While more studies are always needed, the evidence indicates that privatization has tended to increase costs. While supporters of privatization sometimes argue that this claim has not been well studied, this does not prove that privatization saves money.

Intuitively, it is unlikely that privatizing would save money. After all, there is no private sector magic that enables it to do things that just cannot be done by the state. As such, the state could save money by doing whatever would be done by contractors to save money. This would, of course, save the state even more money than privatizing. After all, private contractors need to make a profit on top of what it costs them to provide the service, something the state does not need to do. For privatization to save the state money, the costs incurred by the contractor plus the profit must be less than what it would cost the state to do it. It is not clear how this would be possible without the assumption that the state, as a matter of necessity, must always pay higher costs than the private contractor.

It could, of course, be countered that the state simply must do things inefficiently and in a costly manner. That is, the private sector is just better than the public sector because it is private sector and hence privatizing can save money.

This reply just begs the question by assuming the private sector will be more cost effective than the state and be able to save the state money while making a profit. What is needed is evidence that this can be done. Ideology is, of course, not evidence. As noted above, the existing (albeit limited) evidence is that privatizing is not a money saver.

This is a factual matter. I have no objection to privatization in principle—my objection is based on the evidence that it does not save money. If it can be shown that the only way to save is to go private while also maintaining quality, then I would be for that privatization. If, however, the state can save more money by adopting effective cost savings measures, then that would be the better option. After all, if the goal is to save money, then the greater savings win. That said, it is also important to consider the quality of the services.

As far as quality goes, a stock argument is that privatization is a good idea because it will improve quality.  It is often argued that the state is bad at doing things and hence provides low quality services. In contrast, the private sector is supposed to provide higher quality services (at a lower cost).  While higher quality (at a lower cost) is appealing, there is the obvious question of whether this is true or merely ideological faith. As with the matter of saving money, this is a factual matter.

While people do point to problems with the quality of state services, it is also easy to point to quality problems with privatized services. These can be horrible, as shown by the way the privatized half way houses in New Jersey were run. Paul Krugman provides an interesting analysis of this problem that is still worth reading. And I am sure most readers are thinking “enshitifictaion” and have countless examples of how the private sector industries are making everything worse. As such, the idea that the private sector will simply be better because it is private is not true.

As I argued with savings, unless it is assumed the state is incapable of providing quality service, there is nothing that a private contractor could do in terms of quality that the state could not do. After all, there does not seem to be a private sector magic that enhances quality. In fact, the opposite now seems true.

There is also the obvious point that the private contractor must make a profit, and this usually leads to cutting corners. After all, lowering costs can be an effective way of increasing profits. However, cost cutting usually involves cutting quality and this practice is common fodder for all those news stories about the horrors of quality cutting to save money.  Again, we are in the age of enshitification.

It might be replied that the private sector must have better quality because the contractor must keep the customer happy. However, the people they must keep happy are the same people who would be “customers” of the state. So, if a need to keep people happy leads to good quality, then the state should be subject to this as well. After all, just as unhappy people would change companies (if they could), they would also presumably vote to change the people running the state. Somewhat ironically, it might be easier to change the government than change the companies one must deal with. While the state has a monopoly on power, we (for now) get to vote people in and out of office. In the case of the megacorporations like Amazon, Google, Meta and Apple, we have no role in deciding who runs them or what they do.

I am in favor of what would provide the highest quality services for a reasonable cost. If privatization did this better than the state, then that would be the sensible thing to do. However, this must be based on evidence rather than an ideological view that simply favors the private (or public) sector. 

In terms of  reducing red tape, privatization clearly does not do that. In fact, it adds more bureaucracy.  Instead of two levels (state and state employees) there are now three levels (state, contractor, and employees). 

It might be countered that there will be less bureaucracy at the state level because most of it will be privatized. While this would be true, it does not actually reduce the bureaucracy, it just moves it.

It might then be countered that the private sector is just less bureaucratic than the state and hence it will be able to do the same with less bureaucracy.

One obvious reply is that the private sector has its own bureaucracy. For example, try cancelling your internet service if you have Xfinity or dealing with some other customer support issue. Another is that if the contractor can do the job as well with less bureaucracy, then the state could simply take the same approach—unless, of course, there is a contractor magic that must of necessity be denied to the state.

As with cost and quality, the bureaucracy reduction is a factual matter. If privatization did reduce the overall bureaucracy (rather than shift it) while still being able to provide the same (or better) management, then this would be a gain. However, this is something that must be shown rather than being assumed based on ideology.

Overall, if privatization could save money, reduce bureaucracy and increase quality, then it would be a good idea. However, this is not something that should be accepted (or rejected) because of ideological faith. As it stands, the evidence is that privatization is no magic bullet and makes things worse. In terms of why it is done, it does excel at one thing: funneling public money into private hands.  

 

 

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In the United States, the number of homeless shelters increased in the 1980s due to a variety of factors (mostly Reagan). One factor was a recession which resulted in more people being unable to afford housing. A second factor was a shift away from single room housing. Though limited in size, this was cheaper than the alternatives. Back in the early 1990s, some of my fellow graduate students lived in singles, but these seemed to be (like most graduate student housing) relics from another time. A third factor was the infamous closing of mental institutions and reduction in care for the mentally ill. While proponents of the approach lauded the cost savings, some critics saw it as simply dumping people onto the streets.

In the face of this surge in homelessness religious groups, charitable organizations and local governments increased the number of homeless shelters. The intent was to provide people with a place to stay until they could sort things out and secure a permanent home. This approach does make some sense and did work in some cases. After all, it seems reasonable to infer that people become homeless because of problems (financial, mental and so on) and that once these problems are fixed, then a person will be ready to have a home. Unfortunately, this approach did not prove successful and there are now about 771,480 people without homes.

Fortunately, an alternative approach had a more positive impact. This approach reverses the old approach: rather than “fixing” people so that they are ready for permanent homes, this approach involves getting the homeless into more home-like shelters or permanent housing. Those who need treatment are given treatment and the results seem to have been positive.

While this approach seems to have merit, there is the stock concern that the state funded programs are wasting the taxpayers’ money by supporting free riders. Somewhat ironically, the troubled economic times that increase homelessness also decrease the funding available for such programs and gives some support to claims that scarce financial resources should be better used, perhaps by allowing more tax breaks for the job creators or bailing out corporations whose bad decision making wrecked them. As such, there seem to be two main arguments against funding such programs with state money.

The first is a utilitarian argument. As there is less state money available than what was normal before it is even more important that the money be spent effectively. Putting money into shelters, programs and permanent housing for the homeless would yield fewer positive results than using the money elsewhere (such as deficit reduction, tax breaks for the rich or maintaining infrastructure). As such, the money should be spent in these other areas rather than in addressing the problem of homelessness.

This argument can, of course, be countered by showing that the money spent on addressing homelessness would be less than the cost of not addressing the problem. If this is the case, then the cost argument favors spending the money rather than incurring the costs that can be avoided or mitigated by spending.

While homelessness is clearly bad for the people who are homeless, it is also costly to society. One area of cost is the medical costs of homelessness. On average, homeless people average hospital stays longer than comparable non-homeless people. Also, since homeless people tend to not have insurance, the cost is born either by the state (that is, us) or by those with insurance (in the form of increased premiums).

Not surprisingly, people do become homeless because of medical problems and medical problems are caused or worsened by being homeless. Those who are homeless are more likely to become ill than those who have homes and are more likely to suffer from problems of greater severity. As such, homelessness adds a burden to the health care system, especially the emergency rooms. Addressing the problem of homelessness would help reduce these costs. That said, no doubt some people profit off this problem and they would argue that this is a good thing.

Another area is crime and prisons. People who are homeless tend to spend more time in prison than the non-homeless, especially since the United States tends to address many social problems by criminalizing them. In some cases, they are arrested for “general” criminal activity, but they are often arrested for breaking laws that are aimed specifically at the homeless, such as laws against loitering and begging. That is, they are arrested because they are homeless. While this laws are often pitched as a means to coerce the homeless to go elsewhere and be someone else’s’ problem, they also help feed “customers” into the for-profit prison system.

While prisons can be quite profitable for the private companies that run them, it is expensive to imprison people. The prices vary greatly. For example, a prison stay in California costs $127,788 a year. While those who profit from prisons will not see it this way, reducing homelessness would be a good thing because it would mean fewer people in prison and lower the cost to the taxpayers. Those who profit from prisons will, of course, wish to ensure that people keep suffering from homelessness as long as this increases the chances they are imprisoned. After all, every prisoner means more profit.

A third factor is the cost of emergency shelters, which are the traditional homeless shelter.s These shelters are more expensive than the cost of a permanent residence. As such, permanent housing would provide savings over temporary shelters.

Naturally, it is reasonable to wonder what impact the permanent home programs might have on the cost to society of homelessness. Studies have shown that these do save money, although they do obviously cost money to implement.

Of course, these savings assumes that the temporary shelters would be funded. For those willing to allow homeless people to live on the streets or who want to drive them away to become someone else’s problem, this sort of program would not yield the highest savings. After all, the cost of housing the homeless on the street is nothing. Of course, this would not reduce the other costs associated with homelessness and would almost certainly increase them. After all, people living on the street are more likely to get ill or injured and more likely to be arrested. But, as noted above, these could be profitable features for some or a chance to inflict harm (cruelty is, after all, often the point).

Of course, changing the law so that people can be refused even emergency medical care if they cannot pay and ending all state-funded treatment programs for addiction and mental illness could reduce the medical costs. That is, we could entirely abandon the homeless, other than imprisoning them when they are arrested. Of course, there would remain the question as to whether this would result in a cost saving. After all, the abandonment approach might result in a large enough increase in number of homeless people being imprisoned to offset the savings from abandonment. Naturally, this does not consider the moral cost of abandonment, just the financial cost.

Overall, the evidence does seem to be that providing permanent housing for the homeless would be a cost saver, though perhaps not as big a cost saver as the complete abandonment of a sort worthy of fiends. The second argument is a moral argument or, rather, various moral arguments. One stock argument is based on the idea that we have no moral obligations to others and hence not obligation to help the homeless. On this view, we could provide such support, but we are not obligated to do so.

A second stock argument is that providing such support is immoral because it creates a culture of dependency. That is, by providing the homeless with permanent homes and treatment for any health problems they might possess they are learning to depend on others and will be unable to carry their own weight. While not supporting them might seem harsh, the argument is that this sort of “tough love” will enable then to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Those who make this argument are often the wealthy who are bailed out by the government when their bad decisions cause their businesses to fail or who are lavishly gifted state subsidies.

While this line of reasoning has some appeal, one obvious reply is that this approach is like responding to a broken leg by refusing to treat it because putting a cast on a broken leg will just make the person dependent on the cast.  As with a broken leg, a person whose life is broken needs support until they can stand on her own again.

One reply to this is that while this might hold for those who will be able to stand on their own, it does not address the problem of those who will remain dependent forever. These people, it can be argued, are just parasites and should not be supported.

I do, of course, agree that someone who is just free riding the system should not be supported. However, the number of people who will intentionally become homeless and unemployed just so they can free ride seems to be rather low (but probably more than zero). After all, most people want to be self-supporting rather than dependent on others. To deny people who need the support to rebuild just because some small percentage of poor people would free ride seems as unreasonable as getting rid of handicapped parking because some people will get a decal for those spaces that they are not really entitled to.  It can also be countered that supporting a free rider in such a program would be cheaper and less damaging than having them free riding on the alternative system.

Another moral argument against providing support for other people is that those being supported are stealing from the taxpayers by having their housing and treatments paid by others. As such, the homeless are morally wrong and we should not enable their theft by allowing such programs. Alternatively, the homeless people could be cast as being pawns used by the politicians who are stealing money from taxpayers and giving it to the homeless. Or, for extra immorality, the homeless and those who enable such support can be seen as being in wicked (or at least misguided) cahoots.

One obvious reply is that by this sort of reasoning we all spend years as thieves. After all, as children we live off our parents (or whoever is keeping is alive), we steal education from the state (or whoever is paying for it), and until we pay enough in taxes to pay for all the public goods and services we use we are stealing every time we walk down a public sidewalk, drive on a public street or go to free a public park. We also steal from all those who have come before us and who enabled us to live in a modern society with technology, medicine and such. That is, we are all beneficiaries of the labor, money and ideas of others. As such, it would be hypocritical to regard the homeless as thieves because others assist them. It would be especially hypocritical of the wealthy who benefit from tax cuts, subsidies, bailouts and government contracts.

The obvious reply is that the non-homeless who do pay taxes (and presumably pay off their financial debt to their families) eventually pay back what they stole (or borrowed) from society when they were young thieves. Of course, the same could be said of the homeless, if they are able to return to society and work, they can repay what they owe to others.

This does not, however, address the problem presented by those who will either never be able to return to contributing to society or who will not be able to repay what they cost society, perhaps because of mental illness. The obvious reply is that it would seem unreasonable to see such people as thieves. It could, of course, be argued that we should be rid of those who cannot support themselves—but this would be a different moral argument than the one based on thievery. And would take us into a monstrous place.

What, then, about people who could return to society but elect to be free riders? That is, their situation is entirely a matter of choice and tomorrow they could pay their own way. In this case, it would be reasonable to regard these people as thieves. After all, they are taking what they could earn by honest labor and there would be (by the scenario presented) no justification for them receiving support. These do seem to be limited cases, unless we consider the wealthy people supported by the public. As argued above, the fact that very few people might exploit something intended to help people in need does not give an adequate reason to treat everyone in such a program as being an exploiter.

Considering the above arguments, providing permanent housing for the homeless seems to be both a cost saver and morally acceptable.

 

 

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