Category: Gender

For those not familiar with the term, to catcall is to whistle, shout or make a comment of a sexual nature to a person passing by. In general, the term is used when the person being harassed is a woman, but men can also be subject to such harassment.

Back in 2014, a video documenting a woman’s 10 hours of being catcalled as she walked New York City, garnered considerable attention. In between 2014 and today there was the #MeToo movement and some pushback against the patriarchy. With the triumph of Trump, the patriarchy of idiots pushed back hard, and I almost expect a presidential medal of misogyny to be awarded at some point. But there is the question of why some men catcall.

 Some men seem to think they have a right to catcall. As one man put it back in 2014, “if you have a beautiful body, why can’t I say something?” This view has two parts. The first (“you have a beautiful body”) seems to suggest that the woman is responsible for the response because of her beautiful body. It is reasonable to accept that beauty, be it in a person or painting, can evoke a response from a viewer. The problem is that a catcall is not a proper response to beauty and certainly not a proper response to a person. Also, while a woman’s appearance might cause a reaction, the verbal response chosen by the man (or boy) is his responsibility.

The second part (“why can’t I say something?”) suggests a presumptive right to catcall. This seems to assume the burden of proving that men should not catcall rests on women and it should be assumed that a man has such a right. While the moral right to free speech does entail than men have a right to express their views, there is also the matter of whether it is right to engage in such catcalling. I would argue that it does not on the grounds that the harm done to women by catcalling outweighs the harm that would be done to men if they did not catcall. While I am wary of laws that infringe on free expression, men should not (in the moral sense) behave this way.

This question also shows a sense of entitlement—that the man seeing the woman as beautiful entitles him to harass her. This seems similar to believing that seeing someone as unattractive warrants saying derogatory things about them. Again, while people do have freedom of expression, there are things that are unethical to express.

Some men also claim that the way a woman dresses warrants their behavior. As one young man said back in 2014, “If a girl comes out in tight leggings, and you can see something back there… I’m saying something.” This is just an expression of the horrible view that a woman invites or deserves the actions of men by her choice of clothing. This is best known as a “defense” for rape—the idea that the woman was “asking for it” because she was dressed in provocative clothing. However, a woman’s mode of dress does not justify her being catcalled or attacked. After all, if a man was wearing an expensive Rolex watch and was robbed, it would not be said that he was provocative or was “asking for it” by displaying such an expensive timepiece. Or if a corporation has beautiful databases of information, few would argue that it was asking to be hacked. Naturally, it might be a bad idea to dress a certain way or wear an expensive watch when going certain places, but this does not justify catcalling or robbery.

There has been some speculation that catcalling, like everything else, is the result of natural selection. One might say that if the theory of evolution is correct and human behavior is determined (rather than free), then this could be be true. This is because all human behavior would be the result of such selection and determining factors. In this case, one cannot really say that the behavior would be wrong, at least if something being immoral requires that the person engaging in the behavior could do otherwise. If a person cannot do otherwise, placing blame or praise on the person would be pointless—like praising or blaming water for boiling at a certain temperature and pressure. Looking at it another way, it might be useful to consider the alleged evolutionary forces that might lead to the behavior.

One possible “just so” story is that males would call out to passing females as a form of mating display (like how birds display for each other). Some of the females would respond positively and thus the catcalling genes would be passed on to future generations of men who would in turn catcall women to attract a mate.

One reason to accept this view is that some forms of what could be seen as catcalling do seem to work. Having been on college campuses for decades, I have seen a vast amount of catcalling in various forms. Some women respond by ignoring it, some respond with hostility, and some respond positively. While the positive response rate seems low, it is a low effort “fishing trip” and hence the cost to the male is rather small. Like fishing, a person might cast hundreds of times to catch a single fish.

One reason to reject this view is that many of the guys who use it will obviously never get a positive response. However, they might think they will—they are casting away like mad, not realizing it will never work. After all, they might have seen it work for other guys and think they have a chance.

Moving away from evolution, one stock explanation for catcalling is that men do it as an expression of power over women. A man might be an unfit, ugly, overweight, graceless, unemployed slob but he can make a fit, beautiful, intelligent and successful woman feel afraid and awful by screeching at her about her body. Of course, catcalling is not limited to such men, though the power motive would still seem to hold. This is morally reprehensible because of the harm it does to women. Even if the woman is not afraid of the man, having to hear such things is unpleasant. While I am a man, I do understand what it is like to have stupid and hateful remarks yelled at me. When I was young and running was not as accepted as it is now, it was rare for me to go for a run without someone saying something stupid or hateful to me. Or throwing things. Being a reasonably large male, I did not feel afraid (most of those yelling did so from the safety of passing automobiles). However, such remarks did bother me—much in the way that being bitten by mosquitoes bothers me. The harassment made running less pleasant. As such, I have sympathy for women who are catcalled, especially since the harassment would be far worse for them since they need to worry that the catcaller might attack them.

In my youth, I was even “catcalled” by women—but I am sure it was not the same sort of experience that women face when catcalled by men. After all, the women who have catcalled me are probably just kidding (perhaps even being ironic) and, even if they are not, they almost certainly harbored no hostile intentions and presented no real threat. As an example, when a young woman yelled “nice ass” from her SUV as I ran through the FSU campus was a weird sort of compliment rather than a threat. Though it was still weird.  In contrast, when men engage in such behavior it seems overtly predatory and threatening. So, we men should refrain from catcalling women. I have mixed feeling about women praising my butt while I run, but honesty compels me to admit that part of my aging brain (and butt) would welcome it. Which is probably wrong.

 

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A basic lesson of philosophy is that terms need to be properly defined. Oversimplifying a bit, a good definition needs to avoid being too narrow and too broad. A definition that is too narrow leaves out things that the term should include. One that is too broad allows in too much. A handy analogy for this is the firewall that your computer should have: if it is doing its job properly, it lets in what should be allowed while keeping attacks out. An example of a definition that is too narrow would be to define “art” as “any product of the visual arts, such as painting and sculpture.” This is too narrow because it leaves out literature. As an example of a definition that is too broad, defining “art” as “that which creates an emotional effect” is defective since such things as being punch in the face or winning the lottery would be art. A perfect definition would be like perfect security: all that belongs is allowed in and all that does not is excluded.

While people have a general understanding of the meaning of “rape”, the usual view covers what my colleague Jean Kazez calls “classic” rape—an attack that involves force, threat or coercion. As she notes, another sort of rape is “date” rape—a form of assault that, on college campuses, often involves intoxication rather than overt violence.

 In many cases survivors of sexual assault do not classify the assault as rape. According to Cathy Young, “three quarters of the female students who were classified as victims of sexual assault by incapacitation did not believe they had been raped; even when only incidents involving penetration were counted, nearly two-thirds did not call it rape. Two-thirds did not report the incident to the authorities because they didn’t think it was serious enough.”

In some cases, a person changes their assessment and re-classify the incident as rape. For example, a woman who eventually reported being raped twice by a friend explained her delay on the grounds that it took her a while to “to identify what happened as an assault.”

The fact that a person changed her mind does not, obviously, invalidate their claim. However, there is the question of what is a good definition of an extremely vile thing. After all, when people claim there is an epidemic of campus rapes, they point to statistics claiming that 1 in 5 women will be sexually assaulted in college. This statistic is horrifying, but it is still reasonable to consider what it means.

One problem with inquiring into the statistics and examining the definition of “rape” is that this can be an ideological issue for some people. For some, “rape” is broadly construed and to raise even rational concerns about the broadness of the definition is to invite accusations of ignorant insensitivity (at best) and charges of misogyny. For some on the right, “rape” is very narrowly defined (including the infamous notion of “legitimate” rape) and to consider expanding the definition is to invite accusations of being woke or a radical feminist man hater.

As the ideological territory is staked out and fortified, the potential for rational discussion is proportionally decreased. In fact, to even suggest that there is a matter to be rationally discussed (with the potential for dispute and disagreement) might be greeted with hostility. After all, when a view becomes part of a person’s ideological identity, the person tends to believe that there is nothing left to discuss and any attempt at criticism is both automatically in error and a personal attack.

However, the very fact that there are such distinct ideological fortresses indicates a clear need for rational discussion of this matter and I will endeavor to do so in the essays that follows. While this is a subject I wrote on back in 2014, the rise of the manosphere and the misogynistic right has pushed me to re-visit this topic.

 

 

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Way back on 4/9/2014 NPR did a report on why there are fewer women than men in business. While the gap has narrowed as of 2026, it persists (especially at the senior level). The difference begins in business school and continues forward. The report presented an interesting hypothesis: men and women differ in their ethics.

While people usually claim lying is immoral, men and woman are more likely to lie to a woman when negotiating. The report also mentioned a test with an ethical issue: the seller of a house does not want it sold to someone who will turn it into a condo, but a potential buyer wants to do just that. Men were more likely than women to lie to sell the house.

It was also found that men tend towards egocentric ethical reasoning in that if the man will be harmed by something, then it is regarded as unethical. If the man benefits, he is more likely to see it as morally grey. So, in the case of the house scenario, a man representing the buyer would tend to see lying to the seller as acceptable because he would make a sale. However, a man representing the seller would be more likely to see being lied to as unethical.

In another test of ethics, people were asked about their willingness to include an inferior ingredient in a product that would hurt people but would generate more profit. Men were more willing than the women to see this as acceptable. In fact, women tended to see this as outrageous.

These results provide two reasons why women would be less likely to be in business than men. The first is that men are less troubled by unethical, but more profitable, decisions.  The idea that having “moral flexibility” provides an advantage,  as Glaucon  argued in Plato’s Republic. If a morally flexible person needs to lie to gain an advantage, he can lie. If a bribe would serve his purpose, he can bribe. If a bribe would not suffice and someone needs to have a tragic “accident”, then he can arrange an accident. A morally flexible person is like a craftsperson that has a broader range of tools, so they are more likely to have the right tool for every occasion. Just as the better equipped craftsperson has an advantage, the morally flexible person has an advantage over those more constrained by ethics. If women are, in general, more constrained by ethics, then they would probably be less likely to remain in business because they would be at a competitive disadvantage. The ethical difference might also explain why women are less likely to go into business—it is a common stereotype that unethical activity is part of doing business. If women are more ethical than men, then they would be more inclined to avoid business.

It could be countered that Glaucon is wrong and that being unethical (while getting away with it) does not provide advantages. Obviously, getting caught and punished for unethical behavior is not advantageous—but it is not the unethical behavior that causes the problem. Rather, it is getting caught and punished. Glaucon is clear that being unjust is only advantageous when one can get away with it. Socrates argues that being ethical is superior to being unethical, but he does not do so by arguing that the ethical person will have greater material success. That is conceded to Glaucon.

It must be noted that a person could be ethical and have material success while a morally flexible person could be a complete failure. The claim is that ethical flexibility provides a distinct advantage in material success in the context of capitalism.

One could, and should, point out that there are unethical women and ethical men. The obvious reply is that this claim is true—it has not been asserted that all men are unethical or that all women are ethical. Rather, women seem to be generally more ethical than men.

It might be countered that the ethical view assumed in this essay is flawed. For example, it could be countered that what matters is profit and the means to this end are thus justified. As such, using inferior ingredients to make a profit would not be unethical, but laudable. After all, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. As such, women might be avoiding business because they are unethical on this view of ethics.

The second reason is that women are more likely to be lied to in negotiations. If true, this would put women at a disadvantage relative to men. This, of course, assumes that such deceit would be advantageous in negotiations. While there surely are cases in which deceit would be disadvantageous, at deceit can be a very useful technique. While President Trump is but one example, his regime does provide an excellent example of the power of moral flexibility in material success.

If it is believed that having more women in business is desirable (which would not be accepted by everyone), then there seem to be two main options. The first is for women to become more unethical so they can compete with men. The second would be to endeavor to make business more ethical. This would also help address the matter of lying to women.

 

 

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While same sex couples currently have the right to marry, it would be unwise to think that this right is permanent. As such, I find it wise to continue to discuss the various arguments used against it. Fortunately, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to recycle old arguments rather than advance something new. As a philosopher, I’ll focus on the moral arguments against same-sex marriage.

If something is morally wrong, then it should be possible to present non-fallacious and reasonable arguments to show it is wrong.  There should also be true claims in any arguments. I do not claim that the arguments must be decisive, that is a rare occurrence in ethics. While people continue to argue against same sex marriage, the arguments are often the old mix of fallacies and poor reasoning. There is also the usual employment of untrue “facts.”

Appeal to tradition and appeal to common practice are two fallacies that are often used to argue against same-sex marriage.  This might be done by arguing that defining marriage as being between a man and a woman is correct because it is “age-old and still predominant.” Appeal to tradition is the fallacy that something is good or true just because it has been believed or practiced for a long time. While people do refer to a test of time, the mere fact that something has endured as a tradition is not evidence it is true or good. If it is, in fact, true or good, then reasons beyond an appeal to tradition should exist. Common practice is the fallacy that a practice is good just because it is common. But just because many people do something does not entail it is good. Also, if something is good, then there should be other reasons as to why it is good beyond the claim that it is commonly done. As same-sex marriage has now been around for a while, the appeal to tradition and common practice arguments can be countered on their own fallacious terms by pointing out that same-sex marriage is now both a tradition and a common practice.

Another standard argument against same-sex marriage is the procreation gambit, sometimes with an added bit about the state’s interest. One example is the argument made by the state of Utah during the last fight over the issue:  “Same-sex couples, who cannot procreate, do not promote the state’s interests in responsible procreation (regardless of whether they harm it).” There is also the boilerplate argument about “responsible procreation” and “optimal mode of child rearing.” Expect to see these arguments more if the push back against same-sex marriage gets more momentum.

In these arguments, same-sex marriage is criticized on two grounds in the context of “responsible procreation.” The first is the claim that same-sex couples cannot procreate naturally. The second is that same-sex couples fail to provide an “optimal mode of child rearing.” To argue same-sex couples the right to marry because of these criticisms would require accepting two general principles: 1) marriage is to be denied to those who do cannot or do not procreate and 2) people who are not capable of the “optimal mode of child rearing” should not be allowed to marry.

The first principle entails that different sex couples who do not want or cannot have children must also be denied marriage. After all, if an inability (or unwillingness) to have kids warrants denying same-sex couples the right to marry, the same would also apply to different-sex couples.

This principle would also seem to imply that couples who use artificial means to reproduce (such as in vitro fertilization or a surrogate) must also be denied marriage. After all, same-sex couples can use these methods to procreate. Alternatively, if different-sex couples can use these methods and be allowed to marry, then same-sex couples who procreate would thus also seem to be entitled to marriage.

The principle would also seem to entail that all married couples would be required to have at least one child, presumably within a specific time frame to ensure that the couple is not just faking their desire (or ability) to have children to get married. This would certainly seem to be a violation of the rights of the parents and an egregious intrusion by the state.

The second principle entails that straight couples who are not optimal parents must be denied marriage.  This would seem to require that the state monitor all marriages to determine that the parents are providing an optimal mode of child rearing and that it be empowered to revoke marriage licenses (as the state can revoke a driver’s license for driving violations) for non-optimal parents. Different-sex parents can obviously provide non-optimal modes. After all, child abuse and neglect are committed by different-sex couples.

While I agree irresponsible people should not have children and the state has an obligation to protect children, it is absurd to deny such people the right to marry. After all, not allowing them to marry (or dissolving the marriage when they proved irresponsible) would not make them more responsible or benefit the children. Now to the state’s interest.

For the sake of the argument, I will grant that the state (that is, the people making up a political entity we call the state) has an interest in having people reproduce. After all, the state is just a collection of people, so if there are no new people, the state will cease to exist. Of course, this also gives the state an interest in immigration—it would also replace lost people.

This interest in procreation does not, however, entail that the state thus has an interest in preventing same sex-marriage. Allowing same-sex marriage does not reduce the number of different-sex marriages—that is, there is not a limited supply of marriages that same-sex couples could “use up.” Also, even if there were a limited number of allowed marriages, same-sex couples would only be a small percentage of the marriages and, obviously enough, marriage is not a necessary condition for procreation nor responsible procreation. That is, people can impregnate or be impregnated without being married. People can also be good parents without being married. And they can be terrible parents when married.

Considering these arguments, the procreation argument against same-sex marriage remains absurd. If those opposing same-sex marriage had better arguments, they would surely use them. But they simply repeat the old, failed arguments and fallacies. But, to be fair and balanced, this is not a fight that is won or lost by logic but by politics and that battle might be refought soon.

Over a decade ago Susan Patton, better known as the “Princeton Mom”, made the rounds promoting her book, Marry Smart: Advice for Finding THE ONE.  This book presented the 18th century view that a woman should focus primarily on quickly finding a husband as fertility diminishes with time.

Patton attracted more attention with her March 11, 2014 interview with the Daily Princetonian. In a letter to the editor written about a year before the interview, she wrote, “Please spare me your ‘blaming the victim’ outrage” and claimed that a woman who is drunk and provocatively dressed “must bear accountability for what may happen.” When asked why the woman is responsible in the case of rape or sexual assault, she had the following to say:

 

 The reason is, she is the one most likely to be harmed, so she is the one that needs to take control of the situation. She is that one that needs to take responsibility for herself and for her own safety, and simply not allow herself to come to a point where she is no longer capable of protecting her physical self. The analogy that I would give you is: If you cross the street without looking both ways and a car jumps the light or isn’t paying attention, and you get hit by a car — as a woman or as anybody — and you say, ‘Well I had a green light,’ well yes you did have a green light but that wasn’t enough. So in the same way, a woman who is going to say, ‘Well the man should have recognized that I was drunk and not pushed me beyond the level at which I was happy to engage with him,’ well, you didn’t look both ways. I mean yes, you’re right, a man should act better, men should be more respectful of women, but in the absence of that, and regardless of whether they are or are not, women must take care of themselves.

 

As might be imagined, this view generated some backlash from faculty at Princeton and other people. While this is all old news, the triumph of MAGA, the rise of misogynistic authoritarianism and the tradwife movement make reconsidering these claims relevant to today.

Patton’s first claim is that since the woman is most likely to be harmed, she needs to be responsible for her safety. There are at least two ways to view this claim. One is the reasonable claim a person has an obligation to herself to make sure she is not needlessly in danger. This view that self-preservation is rational and obligatory is ably defended by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Another way to view the claim, which was taken by her critics, is that the burden falls completely on the woman. While this can be seen as a prudent view, it runs afoul of the notion that the wrongdoer should bear most of the responsibility for the harm inflicted (if not all of it).

Patton’s second claim is that a woman has an obligation to not allow herself to be incapable of self-defense. This might mean that a woman has an obligation to not become so drunk that she cannot defend herself from assault or rape. In defense of this claim, Patton offers her analogy: a woman who gets assaulted or raped when she is too drunk to defend herself is like someone who gets hit by a car because they did not look both ways before crossing the street—even though she had the right to cross.

The analogy has some merit—while drivers are obligated to take care not to hit people, a person should take care to avoid being hit and to do otherwise is foolish. As an experienced runner, I understand the value of defensive crossing and respond with horror when I see people starring at their phones as they blindly step into the crosswalk.

However, there is a distinction between what is prudent and what is morally obligatory. While a woman should not impair herself when she believes she will be at risk of assault or rape, this is different from her having a moral obligation to herself to avoid being vulnerable. There is also a third matter, namely who is responsible when a drunk woman is raped or assaulted.

About the second matter, this is a question of whether there is a moral obligation for self-defense. It is generally accepted that people have a moral right to self-defense and for the sake of the discussion that will be assumed (see John Locke for an argument). This right gives a person the liberty to protect herself. If it is only a liberty, then the person has the right to not act in self-defense and thus increase their risk of being a victim. However, if there is an obligation for self-defense, then failing to act on this would be a moral failing. challenge is to show that there is such an obligation.

On the face of it, it would seem self-defense is a liberty rather than an obligation. However, some consideration suggests this is not as obvious as it might seem.  In the Leviathan, Hobbes presents what the Law of Nature (lex naturalis): “a precept or general rule, found by reason, that forbids a man to do what is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving it and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.” Hobbes goes on to note that “right consists in liberty to do or to forbear” and “law determines and binds.” If Hobbes is correct, then people would have both a right to and an obligation for self-defense.

John Locke and Thomas Aquinas also contend that life is to be preserved and if they are right, then this would impose an obligation of self-defense. Of course, this notion could be countered by contending that all it requires is for a person to seek protection from possible threats and doing so could involve relying on the protection or restraint of others rather than oneself. However, there are arguments against this.

I will start with a practical argument. While the modern Western state projects its coercive force and spying eyes into society, the state’s agents cannot (yet) observe all that occurs nor can they always be close at hand in times of danger. This assumes, of course, that agents of the state want to protect citizens from harm.

As such, relying solely on the state would put a person at risk—after all, they would often be helpless in the face of danger. If a person relies on other individuals, then unless she is always guarded, then she also faces the risk of being a helpless victim. Relying on the state or others would, at the very least, seem imprudent.

This argument can be used as the basis for a moral argument. If a person is morally obligated to preserve life (including their own) and others cannot be reliably depended on, then they would have an obligation of self-defense and this would include not intentionally making themselves vulnerable to known threats. These threats would include those presented by bad men. As such, a woman would have a moral obligation to avoid being vulnerable. This seems reasonable.

The third matter is the question of moral responsibility when a drunk woman is assaulted or raped by a man who takes advantage of her vulnerability.  In the abstract, it could be argued that the woman does bear some responsibility—if a woman has an obligation to defend herself, she would have failed in her obligation by becoming vulnerable. As with the road analogy, someone who crosses the road without looking and gets hit has failed in a duty to herself. However, even if this point is granted, there is still the matter of who bears most of the moral responsibility.

On the face of it, it seems evident that the man who assaulted or raped the woman bears the overwhelming moral responsibility. After all, even if the woman should have avoided being vulnerable, the man has a far greater moral obligation to not harm her. There is also the matter of reasonable expectations. To be specific, while a person is obligated to protect herself, this does not obligate her to be hyper-vigilant against all possible dangers. If a woman does not buy body armor to wear on campus (after all, there are campus shooting) and she is shot by a gunman, it would be absurd to blame her for her injury or death. The blame rests on the shooter—his obligation to not shoot her outweighs the extent of her obligation to be prepared.

In the case of rape and sexual assault, while a woman should be prudent for the sake of self-protection, the overwhelming moral responsibility is on the man. That the woman makes herself vulnerable to rape or assault no more lessens the rapist’s responsibility than the fact that the woman was not wearing body armor lessens the responsibility of the shooter. The principle here is that vulnerability does not mitigate moral responsibility. This is intuitively plausible: just because a victimizer has an easier time with his victim, it hardly makes his misdeeds less bad.

Patton did acknowledge that men should act better, but she insisted that a woman must take care of herself. This could be seen as sensible advice: a woman should not count on the goodwill of others but be on guard against reasonably foreseeable harm. This advice is, of course, consistent with the view that the rapist is the one truly responsible for the rape.

Because of my work on metaphysical free will, it is hardly a shock that I am interested in whether sexual orientation is a choice. One problem with this issue is it seems impossible to prove (or disprove) the existence of free will in this, or any, context. As Kant argued, free will seems to lie beyond the reach of our knowledge. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that a person’s sexual orientation is a matter of choice. But this is nothing special: the same can be said about the person’s political party, religion, hobbies and so on.

Laying aside metaphysical speculation, it can be assumed (or pretended) that people do have a choice in some matters. Given this assumption, the question would seem to be whether sexual orientation is in the category of things that can be reasonably assumed to be matters of choice.

On the face of it, sexual orientation is within the domain of what a person finds sexually appealing and attractive. This falls within a larger set of what a person finds appealing and attractive in general.

Thanks to science, it seems reasonable to believe that some of what people find appealing and attractive has a foundation in our neural hardwiring rather than in choice. For example, humans find symmetrical faces more attractive than non-symmetrical faces and this does not seem to be a preference we choose. Folks who like the theory of evolution often claim that this preference exists because those with symmetrical faces are often healthier and hence better “choices” for reproductive activities.  

Food preferences also involve some hard wiring: humans like salty, fatty and sweet foods and the usual explanation also ties into evolution. For example, sweet foods are high calorie foods but are rare in nature, hence our ancestors who really liked sweets did better at surviving than those who did not really like sweets. Or some such story of survival of the sweetest.

Assuming such hardwired preferences, it makes sense that sexual preferences also involve at least some hardwiring. So, for example, a person might be hardwired to prefer light hair over dark hair.  Then again, the preference might be based on experience—the person might have had positive experiences with those with light hair and thus was conditioned to have that preference. The challenge is, of course, to sort out the causal role of hard wiring from the causal role of experience (including socialization). What is left over might be what could be described as choice.

In the case of sexual orientation, it seems reasonable to have some doubts about experience being the primary factor. After all, homosexual behavior has often been condemned, discouraged and punished. As such, it seems less likely that people would be socialized into being homosexual—especially in places where being homosexual is punishable by death. However, this is not impossible—perhaps people could be somehow socialized into being gay by all the social efforts to make them be straight.

Hardwiring for sexual orientation does seem plausible. This is mainly because there seems to be a lack of evidence that homosexuality is chosen. Assuming that the options are choice, nature or nurture, then eliminating choice and nurture would leave nature. But, of course, this could be a false trilemma as there might be other options.

It can be objected that people do choose homosexual behavior and thus being homosexual is a choice. While this does have some appeal, it is important to distinguish between a person’s orientation and what the person chooses to do. A person might be heterosexual and choose to engage in homosexual activity for practical reasons or curiosity. A homosexual might act like a heterosexual to avoid being killed. However, these choices would not change their orientation. As such, my view is that while behavior can be chosen, orientation is probably not.

When attacking DEI efforts, folks on the right usually make vague remarks about merit. While the right seems to have abandoned philosophy, let us imagine a good faith argument against DEI efforts based on an appeal to merit.

While the right is unclear what they mean by “merit”, the common usage is that a person receives something, such as a position, based on earning it through being worthy. For example, when people talk about meritocracy, they usually speak of people earning positions, jobs, scholarships or promotions based on their skills, abilities and effort. In contrast, receiving such things because of factors such as wealth, social class, or family connections would not be the result of merit. There are obvious philosophical questions about what factors should count as merit in terms of determining what people earn and what they merely receive. For example, a person who gets into college because of their academic ability might seem to have earned it by merit. But what if they have that ability because of the genetic lottery and years of expensive tutoring and schooling paid for by wealth inherited by their parents? They did not earn their genes, tutoring, and schooling and this would, it seems to diminish claims of merit. But let us return to constructing a merit argument against DEI efforts. I will then use that merit argument against inheritance.

To build a merit argument against DEI efforts, one must begin with the assumption that DEI is either not needed or unfair. For it not to be needed, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI do not face significant discrimination or unfair obstacles and have equal opportunity to succeed on their merits. For it to be unfair, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI gain an unfair, unmerited advantage over others.

While those who oppose DEI often seem to do so from racism, sexism and similar bigotry, one could take the view that women and minorities are just as capable as white men (and have equal opportunities) but that DEI efforts provide its beneficiaries unfair advantages over equally qualified white men. If it is also assumed that things such as jobs and scholarships should be earned by merit, then it would follow that DEI is bad. Obviously, I do not think that most folks on the right are advancing good faith arguments against DEI but let us take the merit argument seriously and hold them to their professed view that laws should be crafted to ensure that success is merit based and that unfair advantages are eliminated. This entails that the inheritance laws should be changed to eliminate the unfair, unearned advantages conferred by inherited wealth. If one is exceptionally devoted to merit, one could even push for laws aimed at creating equality of opportunity for everyone—but I will just focus on inheritance.

Inherited wealth, by definition, is unearned and thus anything it is used to acquire would be unmerited to the degree the wealth purchased it. Such wealth can confer significant advantages in terms of such things as influence, opportunities and resources. As a minor example, a family with sufficient inherited wealth can own property in the best school district, provide tutoring and other support for their children, enroll them in special programs and so on. If one is a stickler about merit, children obviously do not earn or merit such advantages even if their parents did not inherit their wealth and to the degree the children gain from them, they would not be earning whatever they receive from them. Ironically, the anti-DEI President Trump received millions from his father, and this provided him with a massive, unearned advantage over everyone who choose their parents less wisely. Family members can also inherit businesses and gain unearned ownership and positions in those businesses. And so on, for all that can be inherited and can yield unfair advantages. None of these are earned or merit based. So, those who reject DEI based on the merit argument must also oppose inheritance on the same basis. If laws should be passed to forbid DEI to ensure that success is based on merit, then laws should also be passed to eliminate or severely restrict inheritance to ensure that success is based on merit.

It might be objected that inherited wealth is not like DEI efforts, but the challenge is to show how they different in relevant ways. One could argue that there is an obvious difference: DEI is linked to such factors as gender, ethnicity and veteran status, whereas inheritance is usually just a matter of birth. But objections of this sort would be based on the idea that merit should apply to DEI factors but not otherwise, which would not be a merit-based argument. If merit is what matters and the law must ensure this, then merit is what matters and the law must ensure this.

While few, if any, on the right would accept the above reasoning and consistency arguments obviously have no effect on the right (or most people), we should always remember that their merit arguments against DEI are made in bad faith unless they also argue against inheritance. When they speak of merit, they should be asked about inheritance and other unfair advantages they favor.

As a follow up to the war on CRT (Critical Race Theory) and wokeness, the right has waged a largely successful war on DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusivity). While I take a favorable view of DEI, I recognize that DEI efforts sometimes suffered from corruption and inefficiency. I also acknowledge (and criticize) that some of it was purely performative. This is to say that the efforts of DEI were just like other human efforts, which gives us no special reason to criticize it in particular for these failings. But these are flaws that should be addressed, whether they be in DEI programs or the operations of the Pentagon. Despite these flaws, there are  good reasons in favor of DEI. And, of course, arguments against DEI.

One justification for DEI efforts is that they are supposed to offset past unfairness, discrimination, and injustice. That is, they are warranted on the moral grounds that they address past wrongs. A standard concern about this justification is that it can be seen as addressing past discrimination by engaging in present discrimination. As an illustrating anecdote, when I was applying for a job during my last year of grad school, I and my fellow white male philosophers were worried that our chances of getting a job would be lower because schools appeared to be addressing past discrimination in hiring by what seemed might be present discrimination in hiring. That is, that we white males of the (then) present would be sacrificed to atone for the sins of the white males of the past. While it is tempting to dismiss such concerns, there is a reasonable moral concern about fairness. I recall that there were serious suggestions that the old white guys should step down to open more jobs for women and minorities. After all, to the degree they “earned” their jobs because of past discrimination and exclusion, would it not be fair that they be the ones to pay the price demanded by justice? This approach and its consequences do raise moral concerns about individual justice and justice for groups. Being philosophers, we did consider that even if we, as individuals, were treated unfairly during the hiring process, this might still be morally justified. Those of us inclined to difficult self-reflection also considered that we might have been under the influence of racism and sexism when thinking that we might be treated unfairly simply in virtue of being white men. Because of my own experience, I can understand how people might feel about DEI. My considered view is that while there can be cases where white men are treated unfairly, concerns about addressing past wrongdoing are morally relevant on utilitarian grounds. Also, virtue theory supports this: it is better to err on the side of addressing a greater injustice rather than refusing to do so out of an exaggerated fear of the possibility of a lesser injustice.

A second reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can address existing unfairness and discrimination. For example, funding programs for minority owned businesses can be seen as helping to offset the discrimination against minorities in the realm of finance. As another example, a scholarship for female students in the sciences can be seen as offsetting the bias against women in the sciences.

Such efforts can, of course, be interpreted as unfair. For example, a white business owner might argue that funding only available to minorities is unfair to her. As another example, a male student could contend that it is unfair that he cannot get the scholarship that a woman can. While such arguments can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith by people who know that, for example, white business owners are more likely to get loans than minority business owners (even when they are financially equal)—so white business owners already have an unfair advantage. Good faith reasoning requires that we consider the full context and not just take each alleged unfairness in ahistorical isolation. For example, in isolation it might seem unfair if funding or a scholarship were not available to everyone. But if one group already enjoys an unfair advantage, attempting to offset that helps restore fairness. Unfortunately, many unfair advantages are hidden and exposing them often requires good faith analysis and interpretation. To illustrate, banks obviously do not advertise special white-only rates for home loans, but these exist in practice. As such, explicit efforts to provide fair loans to minority home buyers can appear unfair, since they explicitly exclude while the exclusions in practice are usually concealed.

A third reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can aim at allowing fair consideration of and opportunities for people who would otherwise be excluded. Going back to my example of academic hiring, academic philosophy was (and is) a mostly white male field and it took intentional effort for highly qualified women and minorities to even be considered for professorships. In the case of competitions for such things as jobs or scholarships, this approach increases fairness by preventing people from being excluded simply because of their race, gender, age, etc.

The usual criticism of this is that DEI efforts are not really aimed at providing equal consideration and fairness, but are intended to provide an unearned advantage to some people based on their identity. While such criticisms can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith based on racism and sexism. I will discuss this in my next essay in this series as I look at how the American right works to erase and whitewash history as part of its attack on DEI efforts.

Back in 2015 Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, was the focus of national media because of her refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. In 2025 she appeared in the national news again because of her petition to revisit the same-sex ruling. The Supreme Court denied her petition. I wrote about Davis in 2015 and it seems reasonable to revisit the timeless issue of ad hominem attacks.

As should be expected, opponents of same-sex marriage focused on the claim that Davis’ religious liberty was being violated. As should also be expected, her critics sought and found evidence of what seemed to be her hypocrisy: Davis has been divorced three times and is on her fourth marriage. Some bloggers, eager to attack her, claimed that she was guilty of adultery. Such attacks can be relevant to certain issues, but they are also irrelevant for other issues. It is worth sorting between the relevant and the irrelevant.

If the issue at hand is whether Davis was consistent in her professed religious values, then her actions would be relevant. After all, if a person claims to have a set of values and acts in ways that violate those values, then this provides grounds for accusations of hypocrisy or even a lack of belief in the professed values. That said, there can be many reasons why a person acts in violation of her professed values. One obvious reason is moral weakness—most people, me included, fail to live up to their principles due to our flaws and frailties. As none of us is without sin, we should not be hasty in judging the failings of others.  However, it is reasonable to consider a person’s actions when assessing whether she is acting in a manner consistent with her professed values.

If Davis was, in fact, operating on the principle that marriage licenses should not be issued to people who have violated the rules of God (presumably as presented in the bible), then she would seem to have been required to accept that she should not have been issued a marriage license (after all, there is a wealth of scriptural condemnation of adultery and divorce). If she accepted that she should have been issued her license despite her violations of religious rules, then consistency would seem to require that the same treatment be afforded to everyone—including same-sex couples. After all, adultery makes God’s top ten list while homosexuality seems to be only mentioned in a single line (and one that also marks shellfish as an abomination). So, if adulterers can get licenses, it would be difficult to justify denying same-sex couples marriage licenses on the grounds of a Christian faith.

If the issue at hand is whether Davis was right in her professed view and her past refusal to grant licenses to same-sex couples, then references to her divorce and alleged adultery are logically irrelevant. If a person claimed that Davis was wrong in her view or acted wrongly in denying licenses because she has been divorced or has (allegedly) committed adultery, then this would be a personal attack ad hominem. A personal attack is committed when a person substitutes abusive remarks for evidence when attacking another person’s claim or claims. This line of “reasoning” is fallacious because the attack is directed at the person making the claim and not the claim itself. The truth value of a claim is independent of the person making the claim. After all, no matter how repugnant an individual might be, they can still make true claims.

If a critic of Davis asserts that her claim about same-sex marriage was in error because of her own alleged hypocrisy, then the critic would commit an ad hominem tu quoque.  This fallacy is committed when it is concluded that a person’s claim is false because 1) it is inconsistent with something else a person has said or 2) what a person says is inconsistent with her actions. The fact that a person makes inconsistent claims does not make any particular claim she makes false (although of any pair of inconsistent claims only one can be true—but both can be false). Also, the fact that a person’s claims are not consistent with her actions might indicate that the person is a hypocrite, but this does not prove her claims are false. As such, Davis’ behavior had no bearing on the truth of her claims or the rightness of her decision to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

Dan Savage and others  made the claim that Davis was motivated by her desire to profit from the fame she garnered from her actions. Savage asserts that “But no one is stating the obvious: this isn’t about Kim Davis standing up for her supposed principles—proof of that in a moment—it’s about Kim Davis cashing in.” Given, as Savage notes, the monetary windfall received by the pizza parlor owners who refused to cater a same-sex wedding, this has some plausibility.

If the issue at hand is Davis’ sincerity and the morality of her motivations, then whether or not she is motivated by hopes of profit or sincere belief does matter. If she is opposing same-sex marriage based on her informed conscience or, at the least, on a sincerely held principle, then that is a different matter than being motivated by a desire for fame and profit. A person motivated by principle to take a moral stand is at least attempting to act rightly—whether her principle is actually good or not. Claiming to be acting from principle while being motivated by fame and fortune would be to engage in deceit.

However, if the issue were whether Davis was right about her claim regarding same-sex marriage, then her motivations would not be relevant. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to yet another ad hominem, the circumstantial ad hominem. This is a fallacy in which one attempts to attack a claim by asserting that the person making the claim is making it simply out of self-interest. In some cases, this fallacy involves substituting an attack on a person’s circumstances (such as the person’s religion, political affiliation, ethnic background, etc.). This ad hominem is a fallacy because a person’s interests and circumstances have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim being made. While a person’s interests will provide them with motives to support certain claims, the claims stand or fall on their own. It is also the case that a person’s circumstances (religion, political affiliation, etc.) do not affect the truth or falsity of the claim. This is made clear by the following example: “Bill claims that 1+1 =2. But he is a Christian, so his claim is false.” Or, if someone claimed that Dan Savage was wrong simply because of his beliefs.

Thus, Davis’ behavior, beliefs, and motivations were relevant to certain issues. However, they are not relevant to the truth (or falsity) of her claims regarding same-sex marriage.

In the previous essay I discussed gender nominalism, the idea that gender is not a feature of reality, but a social (or individual) construct. As such, a person falling within a gender class is a matter of naming rather than a matter of having objective features. In this essay I will not argue for (or against) gender nominalism. Rather, I will be discussing gender nominalism within the context of competition.

Being a runner, I will start with competitive sports. As anyone who has run competitively knows, males and females usually compete within their own sexes. So, for example, a typical road race will often have awards for the top males and for the top females. While individual males and females vary greatly in their abilities, males have a general physical advantage over females when it comes to running: the best male runner is better than the best female runner and average male runners are also better than average female runners.  But good female runners are better than average male runners and the best female runners are better than good male runners.

Given that males generally have an advantage over females in running (and many other physical sports), it could be advantageous for a male runner if the division was based on gender and people could simply declare their genders. That is, a male could declare himself a woman and thus be more likely to do better relative to the competition. While there are those who do accept that people have the right to declare their gender and that others are obliged to accept this, it seems clear that this would not be morally acceptable in competitive sports.

The ethics based purpose of dividing athletes by sex is to allow for a fairer completion. This same principle, that of fairer competition, is also used to justify age groups. As older runner knows, few things slow you down like dragging years.  Because of this, a runner could, in general, gain an advantage by making a declaration of age identity (typically older). Perhaps the person could claim that he has always been old on the inside and that to refuse to accept his age identification would be oppression. However, this would be absurd: declaring an age does not change the person’s ability to compete and would thus grant an unfair advantage. Likewise, allowing a male to compete as a woman (or girl) in virtue of merely declared gender identification would be unfair. A declaration by itself would not, obviously, change the person’s anatomy and physiology.

There are, however, cases that are more complicated. These include cases in which a person has undergone a change in anatomy. While these cases are important, they go beyond the intended scope of this essay, which is gender nominalism.

Some competitions do not divide the competitors by sex. These are typically those where the statistical physical differences between males and females do not impact the outcome. Some examples include debate, chess, spelling bees and NASCAR. In these cases, males and females compete equally and hence the principle of fairness allows for the lack of sex divisions. Some of these competitions do have other divisions. For example, spelling bees do not normally pit elementary school students against high school students. In such competitions, gender identification would be irrelevant. As such, competitors should be free to gender identify as they wish within the context of such competitions.

Interestingly, there are competitions where there appear to be no sex-based advantages (in terms of physical abilities), yet there are gender divisions. There are competitions in literature, music, and acting that are divided by gender (and some are open only to one gender). There are also scholarships, fellowships and other academic awards that are open only to one gender.

Since being a biological male would seem to yield no advantage in such cases, the principle of fairness would not seem to apply. For example, the fact that males are generally larger and stronger would yield no advantage when it came to writing a novel, acting in a play, or playing a guitar. As such, if people should be able to set their own gender identity, they should be able to do so for such competitions, thus enabling them to compete where they wish.

It could be argued that the principle of fairness would still apply, that people born as males would still have an advantage even if they elected to identify as women for the competition. This advantage, it might be claimed, would be based in the socially constructed advantages that males possess. Naturally, it would need to be shown that a male that gender identifies as a woman for such competitions, such as getting a woman’s only scholarship, would still retain the alleged male advantage.

It could also be argued that these divisions are not based on a principle of fairness about advantages or disadvantages. Rather, the divisions are to give more people a chance of winning. This could be justified on the same grounds that justify having many categories. For example, there are awards for being the best actor in a supporting role, which exists to create another chance for an actor to win something. If a person could just gender declare and be eligible, then that would create an “imbalance”, much as allowing non-supporting actors to declare themselves supporting actors to get a shot at that award would be unfair.

Of course, this seems to assume that there is a justified distinction between the genders that would ground the claims of unfairness. That is, it would be as wrong for a male to win best actress as it would be for a female screenwriter who never acted to win best actress for her screenplay.  Or that it would be as bad for a male to get a scholarship intended for a woman as it would be for a football player who cannot do math to get a math scholarship. This approach, which would involve rejecting one form of gender nominalism (the version in which the individual gets to declare gender) is an option. This would not, however, require accepting that gender is not a social construct. One could still be a gender nominalist of the sort that believes that gender classification is both a matter of individual declaration and acceptance by the “relevant community.” As such, the relevant communities could police their competitions. For example, those who dole out scholarships for woman can define what it is to be a woman for the purpose of their scholarships, to prevent non-woman from getting them. This would, of course, seem to justify similar gender policing by society, which leads to some interesting problems about who gets to define gender identity. The usual answer people give is, of course, themselves.