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After the Verdict: American Racism

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Former police officer Chauvin was found guilty of murder and manslaughter in the death of George Floyd. What once seemed impossible, the conviction of a white officer for the murder of a black American, has become a reality. While this marks an important historic change, it has only happened once. And it only happened in the face of overwhelming evidence and against the background of ongoing protest against police violence against citizens.

After the murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020 there have been 966 reported killings by police. Of these, 181 were black people—thus making them 18.7% of those killed.  Among these is Daunte Wright, who was shot by police not far from where Chauvin was on trial.

37% of the deaths were those of white Americans. The fact that most people killed by the police are white is often presented by the right as evidence against racism, but they either neglect to mention or downplay the fact that black Americans are about 13% of the total population while whites are 76.3%. 11.7% of those killed were identified as Hispanic, 1% as Native American and 1% as Asian or Pacific Islander. In 359 cases the race of the victim has not been identified. Identification of the race of these people would, of course, impact the above numbers.

There is, of course, the argument built around the claim that since blacks commit more crimes, they are more likely to be killed by the police. Even if that is assumed, black Americans are three times more likely to be killed by the police despite being 1.3 times more likely to be unarmed. In some cities, the disproportion is far greater than the average. For example, in Chicago black Americans are killed at 22 times the rate at which white Americans killed.  Looking at the numbers, even assuming that black Americans “commit more crimes”, a black American is still more likely to be killed in an encounter with the police than a white American and more likely to be unarmed when killed. If one looks at the recordings of police using force, the disparity between how white and black Americans are generally treated is clear. For example, consider how Lt. Nazario was treated by the police after being pulled over for “not” having a tag. As such, while the Chauvin trial is an important event, one should be cautious when assessing what it shows—as recent events in congress show.

During the Chauvin trial, Republican representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Paul Gosar were working on creating the America First Caucus. This caucus was to be dedicated to calling for “”common respect for uniquely Anglo-Saxon political traditions.” While the phrase “America First” is a classic bit of racism, it can “explained away” as being about putting America first. That is, it is a well-established dog-whistle for the racists. But the America First Caucus proposal set aside the dog whistle and simply screamed at the dogs, laying out what has been called a “racism in a jar.” The full platform can be viewed here.

While the Republican party has shown considerable comfort with racism, the leadership of the party pushed back against the America First Caucus. In response to the broad backlash, Greene and Gosar attempted to distance themselves from the document, saying it came from an outside group and seeming to throw their staff under the bus. But the values expressed in the document are clearly consistent with those expressed by Greene and Gosar.

While there are certainly Republicans who sincerely condemn racism, it is important to note two things: racism comes in degree and racists tend to lie. In terms of racism coming in degrees, a racist can sincerely condemn other racists for going too far (from their perspective) in their racism. For example, a casual and pragmatic racist might be fine with using low-intensity racism to their advantage in various ways, such as by dog-whistling to their base to get elected. This racist might be honestly horrified by full-on white supremacy and sincerely disagree with much of what the America First Caucus proposed. But, of course, the casual and pragmatic racist still feeds and waters the monster of racism, albeit just giving it the occasional snack rather than serving it full meals.

In terms of lying, it has been a conscious strategy of racists to conceal their racism behind code phrases. This allows them a degree of plausible deniability, provides them with cover, and is a useful tool for recruiting people deeper into racism. An obvious problem with the America First Caucus platform is that, as noted above, it set aside the dog whistle and yelled at the dogs: the language was so obviously racist and white supremacist that only those utterly ignorant of the history of American racism would fail to immediately understand the message. As such, it seems to have been a stupid strategic error based on mistaken assumptions about what can pass as a dog whistle and how people would react. Roughly put, the caucus platform was simply too openly racist at this time.

While, as noted above, it was condemned and Greene and Gosar had to back away from it, it would be a mistake to think that this is somehow the end of their racism. They, at most, learned the lesson that they still need to use language that is not obviously racist when organizing their racist caucus. And we see what is obvious: despite the results of the Chauvin trial, racism is still a powerful force. But perhaps it is slightly less powerful than it was before.

 

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The UK/British Variant

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As the virus behind COVID remains active in large populations, it mutates and produces new strains. This is one reason why continuing to follow safe practices until herd immunity is reached is so important. If the “freedom” to serve as mutant incubators persist widely and long enough, the current vaccines will be reduced in effectiveness and another pandemic could occur. But my concern here is not with that issue, but with referring to COVID variants by their regions of origin.

One example is what is called the “UK” or “British” variant. The correct designation is B .1.1.7. Other examples include what are being called the “South African variant” and the “Brazilian variant.” These should also be referred to by their correct, non-geographic designations and here is why.

Trump and his fellow racists made the conscious decision to call the virus the “China virus.” I have argued why this usage is racist in other essays, so I will not repeat my arguments here. While responsible media outlets did not use “China virus”, the use of the geographic names of the variants is quite common. They should not be doing this, for the same reasons I advanced against using the term “China virus.” Moral consistency requires applying moral principles the same way in similar contexts and if it is wrong to use “China virus” then it is wrong to use “UK variant.”

One concern with the widespread used of the regional name of variants is that doing so allows people to argue that “China virus” is acceptable to use and is not racist. After all, if the mainstream media and scientists can talk about the “UK variant” without being racists, then surely Trump and his fellows can use “China virus” without being racist. While this argument is generally made in bad faith; the reasoning is solid: if “UK variant” is not racist, then “China virus” would (probably) also not be racist. The easy and obvious reply is that using the term “UK variant” is wrong, so using “China virus” is also wrong. The same applies to naming any other variant based on its apparent region of origin.

To anticipate a straw man attack, I am not claiming that the origin points of a virus or a variant should be ignored or stricken from the scientific data. Knowing where a virus or variant originated is critical to determining the origin of the virus and is also essential to planning a response to that virus. As such, it is morally acceptable to note that B.1.1.7 seems to have originated in the UK, just as it is correct to note that the original virus originated in China. However, saying “the UK variant of the China virus” would be morally wrong—again, I have made these arguments at length in earlier essays.

In the case of the “UK variant” example it is interesting and enlightening to look at how racism in naming diseases works. After Trump and his fellows started calling it the “China virus”, violence against Asians and Asian Americans increased significantly in the United States. To be fair to Trump, some of this increase would have certainly occurred even if he had scrupulously called it by its correct name—after all, xenophobia and racism centered on disease is firmly established in the United States. All Trump did was throw a few more logs and some gasoline on an established fire.

While using “UK variant” is still wrong, it is interesting to note that there has been no uptick in hate crimes against people of UK origin or ancestry. Brits in the states are not hiding their accents to avoid being attacked by angry anti-Brit people who are blaming them for the new strain. The UK is not being described as dirty or diseased (well, other than the way everyone is now diseased) and there is not xenophobic rhetoric on the right against the UK. As an American with publicly acknowledged documented ties to 17th century England, I would be among the targets for any anti-WASP racism erupting over the “UK variant.” But no one has shouted “Dr. Flu!” at me or attempted to assail me. In fact, it would be absurd for me to express any concern that I or any other white person would be subject to racism because of the use of “UK variant.” While some might take this as some sort of proof that “UK variant” is not wrong to use and thus “China virus” is not wrong to use (and so not racist to use), this would be either a bad faith argument or utterly miss the point. The reason the use of the “UK variant” has had no meaningful consequences for white people (and yes, I know that the UK is not entirely white, but it is thought of as being a “white nation”) is not that its use is morally correct. Rather it is because of the nature of American racism.

In closing, responsible media outlets and scientists should act morally and stop using the regional name for variants. While the consequences vary based on the region, consistency demands that the correct names for viruses be used rather than their area of origin. One should not feed the racists.

 

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Hidden Extremists

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Emboldened by the support offered by President Trump, “the right” decided to try to unite in the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The right was right that this would be a watershed moment, but wrong about who would be shedding the water (to maul a metaphor). The blatant displays of racism and bigotry did not endear these groups to most Americans and the murder of Heather Heyer proved to be the downfall of the event.

The right retreated to the relative safety of the internet and engaged in lower profile activities until the assault on the capital by Trump supporters in 2021. Trump and his deluded and deceived allies failed in their inept efforts to overthrow democracy, despite being aided and abetted by certain Republican members of congress and other officials. The attack on the capital was, to say the least, bad optics for the right and the right attempted to flee back to the safety of the internet. But they found that the social media companies and other tech giants had finally decided it was time to act against the extremists of the right. Which, one might note, seems a bit ungrateful: these extremists and their fellows had helped enrich the coffers of these tech giants. But the right preserved and found new habitats online and new means of encrypted communication.

In April of 2021 the far right attempted to organize White Lives matter rallies across the country. These proved utter failures. In one case, a single person showed up to rally for white lives and was outnumbered by counter protesters. In other cases, no one showed up at the rally sites. It is worth noting that some of these events might have been created to troll or trap white supremacists; tech savvy anti-fascist and anti-racist activists delight in such activities.

Given these repeated failures and Trump’s defeat, it might be tempting to think that extremists have been broken once again (as happened after the Oklahoma City bombing) but this would be a fatal error. To use an obvious analogy, the smart extremists and clever folks who want to exploit the extremists follow the guidance of Atwater and avoid being openly extreme. Open extremism, as Atwater notes, does not play well with the mainstream—but coded extremism is quite delicious to many Americans.

Smart extremists and clever exploiters of extremism are also careful to not attend big, loud, and stupid public events where things inevitably go wrong. Trump, though generally incompetent, had enough sense to walk away and watch his mob on television rather than assault the capital with them. Tucker Carlson is careful to use coded language and never shows up at extremist events, though his mask is tattered and pierced with holes. They want to avoid being outed to the public because of the negative consequences of being openly extremist. Even the less clever extremists have largely learned the lesson of January 6: extremism is still not a majority view, and the exploiters of extremism will abandon them to their fate without a second thought. So, they are also being quiet, at least for now. But they keep the hope alive that their time will come.

The big, loud, stupid events seem to be test runs for extremism, to see how the public reacts. So far, the public has not approved. Then again, I might be giving too much credit here: perhaps the less clever extremists keep jumping the gun against the wishes of their true and proper masters. But these loud failures should not deceive us. Extremism is alive and well. One can point to the obvious examples of extremist groups and hate groups such as the Proud Boys. One can also point to Trump and his followers.

While Joe Biden got 6 million more votes than Trump, this still means that Trump got 74 million votes. While people voted for Trump for a variety of reasons, Trump’s racism, his affinity for extremist groups, and his anti-democratic authoritarianism are all well known. While some who voted for him might sincerely believe that Trump is none of those things, it would be reasonable to infer that most of his supporters understand what Trump is and what he stands for. That is, they voted in favor of racism and authoritarianism. While most of these people are probably “moderate” racists and authoritarians or perhaps just comfortable with racism and authoritarianism, these sorts of people are ideal recruits for extremism. And, of course, even “moderate” racism and authoritarianism are serious threats to American democracy. In fact, they might be more serious threats than the extremists since they can be far more influential than extremists in shaping policy and law. The Republican Party has also largely embraced an anti-democratic position, rushing to pass laws aimed at restricting voting rights. Even Lindsey Graham acknowledges that the Georgia law forbidding giving food and water to people waiting in line to vote does not make a whole lot of sense. But he and his fellow Republicans support these laws in general and have been rushing to chastise and punish businesses that have acted in response to them. They still, of course, want corporations to keep donating money to their campaigns.

As such, it would be foolish to think that extremism has been defeated simply because attendance was low or nonexistent at some stupid extremist rallies. The real action is in the shadows. And in state legislatures. The huge public rallies for extremism, if history is a guide, do not become a thing until the extremists are on the way to victory. And then it will be far too late.

 

 

 

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Packing the Court?

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In April, President Biden created a commission to study expanding the Supreme Court. Expanding the court would allow Biden to appoint new judges, presumably to offset the conservative judges with liberal judges. This tactic is commonly known as “court packing” and the best known attempt to do this was by FDR.

On the face of it, expanding the court does seem constitutional. Congress does set the size of the court and it did vary from six to ten members until 1869. There are those who argue that it is not constitutional, as one would expect. Also, as one would expect, people tend to shift their position on this issue based on their political allegiances and who holds the White House and Congress. But, as always, my approach is to present a consistent and principled position that does not depend on my political interest now. Politically, I would certainly favor Biden packing the courts. But my principles are not simply a matter of what I favor at the moment. For the sake of the argument to follow, let it be assumed that court packing is constitutional. If it is not, then what follows would be irrelevant. Interestingly, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would need to rule on the constitutionality of expanding the Supreme Court—so if one party holds the majority, they could always block expansion in this manner. But now to the discussion.

The most obvious argument against packing the court is based on the need to preserve the norm of not using this tactic. Politics, like any game, depends heavily on the participants agreeing to and abiding by the rules of the game (be they formal or informal). While some players stick to the norms out of respect, others follow them for pragmatic reasons: if they break the norms, then the other players will respond by punishing them or by breaking the norms themselves. Since court packing seems constitutional, what serves to keep people in check are the consequences of breaking the norm of not using this tactic.

The obvious defect with court packing is that once one party uses the tactic to gain a majority, they have set the precedent for the other party using the same tactic when they take power. So, if Biden packs the court in his term, the next time the Republicans can do so, they would be fools to not pack the court in their favor. And then when the Democrats take power again, they would be fools to not pack the court again. One could thus easily imagine an ever-expanding Supreme Court. It would be better, one might argue, to stick with the existing system and follow the established norm of a nine-person court. Each should be content to wait for the deaths or retirements that would allow them to take control of the court. There is, however, an obvious counter to this: Mitch McConnell.

While there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids a Supreme Court vacancy being filled even if an election is close and the general norm was that a President could do just that, Mitch McConnell and his fellows blocked President Obama’s effort to fill the vacancy on the court in 2016. In 2020 McConnell and his fellows took the opposite position and rushed through a nominee to the Supreme Court.  If we take McConnell’s principle to be that he will do anything to gain and hold power for himself and his party, then he acted consistently. But if we listen to the reasons and arguments he advanced to justify his actions, then he acted inconsistently: either he was wrong in 2016 and that position should have gone to an Obama nominee or he was wrong in 2020 and that position should have gone to a Biden nominee. He cannot be right in both cases and thus the Democrats can rightfully claim they were unjustly robbed of one seat on the court. As such, McConnell has changed the norms of the game: he has set the precedent that when it comes to the Supreme Court, then one side can do what it needs to do to ensure it has a majority.

Since McConnell has shown that he cannot be trusted to abide by the norms and that his principle is clearly that a party should do whatever it takes to secure a majority on the court, he and his fellows have no grounds on which to criticize court packing. If the Democrats add one seat and fill it, then they would be addressing McConnell’s breaking of the norms and it would be reasonable to see this as a justified political move. If they go beyond this, it would also be justified under McConnell’s own principles (or lack thereof). Just as he did, they would be using political means in violation of the norms to secure a majority on the court. Those who were fine with McConnell’s maneuvers will certainly hate that the Democrats are playing politics to pack the court, but they have no grounds for complaint: they have already agreed that what matters is controlling the court and any protests about Constitutionality or fairness must be seen as empty rhetoric.

It can be argued that the Democrats should not pack the courts for the reason I gave above: it will set of a cycle of packing and be but a short-term gain. But McConnell has shown that politics as it is played is about these gains and he shows no signs of repentance or willingness to hold his desire for power in check the next time he has an opportunity to use it. This, then, is the core of the problem: if the Democrats stick with the norms and the Republicans persist in violating them, the Democrats will continue to lose these battles. If the Democrats start breaking the norms to counter the Republicans, then the damage to the norms will accelerate. The solution is, obviously, for both parties to restore the norms. But the Republicans have proven that they cannot be trusted.

So, packing the court will harm the United States, but to not pack the court will also be harmful. It is a losing option either way, but not packing the court is probably worse on the assumption that the Republicans are beyond redemption.

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The Problem of (Other) Racist Minds

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In epistemology, the problem of other minds is the challenge of proving that I know other beings have thoughts and feelings analogous to my own. One practical variation on this problem is knowing when someone is being honest: how do I know that their words match what they really believe? But the version I am concerned with here is the problem of racist minds. That is, how do I know when someone is a racist? Racism, like dishonesty, comes in degrees. Just as everyone is a bit dishonest, everyone is a bit racist. But a person should not be labeled a liar unless they are dishonest to a significant and meaningful degree. Likewise, for being a racist.  A person should not be labeled as a racist unless their racism is significant and meaningful. There is, of course, no exact boundary line that precisely defines when a person should be considered a liar or a racist. Fortunately, we can get by with imprecise standards and accept that there will be grey areas. To demand a precise line would, of course, fall into the classic line drawing fallacy.

It is important to be able to distinguish racists from people who merely seem racist. One reason is that an accusation of racism can have serious consequences and such claims should not be made lightly. Another reason is that racists should be exposed for what they are—a masquerading racist can be an effective recruiter and agent for racism. I am, of course, assuming that racism is bad. As such, what is needed are reliable tests for sorting out racists from non-racists.

The same need for a test arises in the classic problem of other minds. Descartes proposed a language-based test for other minds. Roughly put, if something uses true language, then it has a mind and thinks. Turing created his own variation on this test, one that is more famous than Descartes’ original test. In the case of testing for racism, it is assumed that people have minds—so that problem is bypassed (or ignored) for practical reasons.

It might be wondered why tests are needed. After all, many people assume that the only true racists are those who are blatantly racist: they burn crosses, have Swastika tattoos, and openly use language that is clearly racist. So, one might think, they are easy to spot. While these racists are easy to spot, there are racists who are far more subtle. In fact, coded racism has been a conscious strategy in the United States for decades. Lee Atwater presented this strategy in a famous interview:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

This clearly presents the challenge of determining whether a person is racist or not: there are coded words and phrases used by racists that are not openly racist in their normal meaning. These code words have many uses. First, they allow a racist plausible deniability: they can claim to be using the word or phrase with its surface meaning. Second, it allows racists to recruit non-racists. People who are, for example, sincerely concerned about welfare fraud can be drawn into racism through that gateway. Third, it allows racists to signal each other while making the “normies” think the critics are crazy. As an illustration, when I have tried to explain various code phrases used by racists to “normies” they often think I am either making it all up or I am embracing a wacky conspiracy theory. So how does one pierce the veil and solve the problem of racist minds? While a complete guide would be project suitable for a book, here are two useful guides.

As noted above, there are numerous code words and phrases used by racists that have normal surface meanings. A recent example is the use of “China virus” by Trump and his fellows. On the face of it, this seems non-racist: they are just referencing where the virus comes from. As I have argued in earlier essays, this use of “China virus” by Trump is racist. It makes use of the well-worn racist trope of foreigners bringing disease and his followers certainly got the message: anti-Asian violence increased dramatically. But one might say, surely there are many people who use such words and phrases without racist intent. That is true and is exactly what helps give the racists cover. So how does one know when a person is using such words and phrases in a racist manner and when they are not? One easy test is to see how they react to being informed of the racist connotation of the word or phrase. For example, if someone is using “China virus” and it seems it might be racist, then one can inform them that it has racist implications and is used by racists against Asians. If the person persists in using the phrase or word despite being aware of its implications, then it is reasonable to consider that they are being racist. It might be objected that a non-racist might want to persist in using the term to “own the libs” or because they refuse to be “politically correct.” While this is a possible reply, it does reveal a lot about the person who makes that response.

To use an analogy, imagine someone who likes setting off fireworks in their backyard. They then learn that their neighbor has PTSD because they lost an arm, an eye, and friends to IEDs in Iraq and that the fireworks really bother her. If they persist in setting of the fireworks despite this knowledge, it would be reasonable to believe they are an ass. After all, a decent person would not do that—even if they believed they had the right to set off fireworks. Likewise, a person who persists in using words and phrases that are racist code in contexts where the code is racist would provide evidence they are a racist. Or an ass.

As the Atwater quote also notes, racism is often coded into policies and their justifications.  Migration provides a good example of this sort of coding. Only the most blatant racists would openly say that they want to keep non-whites out of the United States because they are white supremacists. As such, racists have adopted the approach of arguing for restrictions that focus on non-whites using reasons that are not openly racist. The stock reasons given are that migrants are coming here to commit crimes, that migrants are coming here to steal jobs, that migrants are coming here to steal social services and that migrants are bringing diseases. On the face of it, these are not racist reasons: the person making the argument for restricting immigration is advancing economic and safety concerns. It just happens that these restrictions target non-white migrants. So how does one distinguish between racists and non-racists who advance such arguments? After all, racists have worked hard to recruit non-racists into using their arguments and they can have considerable appeal. A sensible person would, after all, be concerned if migrants were committing crimes and stealing jobs.

In most cases where the racists advance coded arguments, they are also making untrue or misleading claims. These cases allow for an effective test. Using the migration example, the claims that migrants are stealing jobs, committing crimes and so on are either false or presented in a misleading manner. If a person is a non-racist and supports, for example, restrictions on migration because they believe these claims, then proving that these claims are false would change their mind. So, if Sally supports restrictions on migration because of her concerns that migrants are doing all those terrible things she is told they do but she learns that these claims are not true or greatly exaggerated, then her position should change. If Sally is a racist, then these are not her real reasons—so she will not change her mind and will persist in lying and exaggerating. As such, a good general test is to find cases where a person claims to believe something that is also coded racism and is also not supported by the truth. If the person is not a racist, they would be amendable to changing their views when the reasons they profess for accepting their views are disproven.

One counter is to point out that people can become very invested in beliefs and double-down in the face of disproof. Might there not be cases in which a non-racist simply refuses to accept disprove about, for example, claims about migrants? This is certainly possible, but one must wonder why they would be so committed to holding to a disproven view—it makes sense for a racist to do this since their belief is based on racism. But a non-racist would be irrational to do this—something that is, I admit, possible. As such, the test would not be able to reliably distinguish between racists and people with an irrational commitment to such views.

But, going back to the fireworks analogy, this would seem to be like a person who insists they are not an ass, they just refuse to believe that their neighbor is bothered by the fireworks—despite all the overwhelming evidence. This is logically possible, but the better explanation would be that they are, in fact, an ass.

 

 

 

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The Ethics of Vaccine Passports

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In general terms a vaccine passport is proof that a person has been immunized that allows a person access or entry that would otherwise be restricted. The use and requirements of these passports varies greatly from place to place. New York has tested an app version of a passport to allow access to professional sports games. The governors of Florida and Texas have, as one would imagine, signed executive orders banning the government from issuing them and using the coercive power of the state to forbid business from requiring them. As such, the situation is effectively chaos.

While Fox News and others on the right have used hyperbole and falsehoods to make vaccine passports into a firestorm political issue, there are rational ethical concerns about such passports. While one might wonder why the right does not rationally advance such moral concerns, the easy and obvious reasons are that these generally do not match up with the espoused values of the right and most this sort of moral reasoning extremely dull when compared to the engaging and enraging power of hyperbole and outright lies. Now, to the moral issues.

As noted above, New York has been testing an app version of a vaccine passport. This raises a clear moral concern about access to such passports. A person would need to have a phone capable of running such an app. While many will assume that everyone has easy access to such phones, this is not the case. There are people who prefer to use basic phones that do not run such apps and there are even people who lack phones. If the scope of concern extends beyond the United States, the matter becomes even more serious. Fortunately, there is an easy way to address this issue—physical proof of vaccination can be issued. This does lead to other problems, such as the practical matter of integrating all the various methods of proof in an effective way. But this is on par with identifying documentation from diverse sources and could be managed. But to even have a legitimate vaccine passport, a person must be vaccinated.

While there is a worldwide roll-out of the vaccine, the process is still underway. While the vaccines vary, a person getting the two-shot vaccine can need to wait over a month after their first shot before they are considered fully vaccinated. Since access to vaccines has been extremely limited in many areas, imposing vaccine passports now would lock many people out of access for a while. If the scope of concern is extended beyond the United States, the disparity becomes even greater in terms of ready access to the vaccine. As such, requiring vaccine passports would impose greater restrictions on people who have yet to be fully vaccinated. This concern can be countered by a utilitarian argument: while the disparity of access will cause some harm, this is offset by the harms prevented by requiring vaccine passports. And this disparity will be addressed as more people are vaccinated. But this leads to the concern about people who do not want to get vaccinated.

People are refusing the vaccine for various reasons. Some have rational reasons based on concerns about the rapidity of the development of the vaccines and the lack of information about possible long-term harms. Others are driven by irrational fears about vaccination in general or by repeatedly debunked conspiracy theories. There will presumably also be a few people who cannot get the vaccine because of real health issues. These people will, of course, not be able to get a vaccine passport and will thus be denied access to certain things.

One reasonable reply is to make the usual utilitarian argument: while these people will suffer some harm by being denied access, this is offset by the harm it will prevent. In this case, the inconvenience of not having a passport is weighed against people risking getting and spreading COVID because they are not vaccinated. The ethics of requiring people to have vaccinations to access certain goods and services is well-established, so the main question is what access should be limited to those with proof of vaccination. To illustrate, travelling abroad often requires proof of vaccination. Adding COVID vaccination to the list would not seem to impose an undue burden on travelers. As another example, proof of vaccination is required to attend schools in the United States—this is because the potential harm an unvaccinated student can suffer or inflict morally outweighs concerns about the right or freedom to not get vaccinated. If one considers getting vaccination to be a negative, then it is easily cast as the price that one must pay to receive the benefits of being in a society—such as public education. Giving up some freedoms to allow society to function safely is well established in moral philosophy; one can turn to philosophers such as John Locke and even Thomas Hobbes for these arguments. If one wants to live in a state of irresponsible and dangerous freedom, then they do have that option: they can abandon civil society and live in the wilds of the state of nature far from others who prefer having civilization. A sensible reply to this is to note that my argument is based on very limited requirements for vaccination.

I agree with this sensible reply: the existing and clearly warranted vaccination requirements are limited to cases where close contact with others (or exposure) is likely, such as in schools. As such, arguments would be needed for broader requirements and these would probably need to be made for each general sort of requirement, such as requiring them for access to sporting events or stores.

One morally reasonable approach would be use vaccination passports to allow people access to venues that should remain closed without the vaccinations. These would, of course, be non-essential goods and services. For example, crowded sporting or entertainment events are not essential like grocery stores and they are risky. As such, granting “early” access to people who have been vaccinated would allow these venues to reopen safely. This could also incentivize people to get vaccinated. Once herd immunity is established, then the vaccine passports could be discontinued—they would no longer be needed. The practical problem is, of course, that the right has already made vaccine passports into a battleground in their endless war against social responsibility. One could, perhaps, criticize others for not doing a good job selling the idea of vaccine passports as a tool to speed getting back to normal; but the weight of the blame must fall on Fox News and their fellows who made the pandemic a political battle rather than a national health crisis. While the opposition to vaccine passports often focuses on choice and freedom, there is also the question of the choice and freedom of others.

When it comes to any freedom, a core debate is over the extent to which one person’s freedom can impose on another person’s freedom (and rights). In some cases, the answer is obvious: my freedom to drive my truck does not extend to running over you or driving around inside where you live. In the case of vaccinations of any kind, a person does have the freedom to refuse the vaccination. But this freedom can be offset and limited by the right of other people to not be exposed to disease. To use an analogy, while I do have the freedom to urinate as I wish, I do not have the freedom to urinate on you or your stuff: my right to do as I please with my body has clear limits when this right can cause harm to others.

As a counter, one can point out that there are many diseases circulating that we are not required to get vaccinated against to go about our daily lives. For example, there are vaccines for Hepatitis A and B, but we were (in the before time) able to go about our business without getting them (in general). As another example, the flu vaccine is generally not required (there are exceptions for certain workplaces).  The easy and obvious counter is that these diseases are rarer than COVID, or less infectious than COVID, or far less severe. As a rule, imposing on people is less justified in cases where the possibility of harm is less—this is a principle that applies broadly.

In the case of businesses, there is the moral concern that denial of services to people who refuse to get vaccinated might harm those people. On the one hand, it can be argued that they made their choice: if I insist on going to a business naked and urinating on people there, then it would be reasonable for the business to ban me. It would be my fault, for example, that I cannot get Krispy Kreme donuts because I was naked and urinated all over the store. Likewise, if someone does not want to get vaccinated, they can be justly banned for being a danger to others. On the other hand, one could argue that businesses do not have the right to deny service to people, even when it is a matter of preventing harm (or a matter of belief). As an aside, it would be interesting to see a business owner bring a religious liberty lawsuit to allow them to refuse people who are not vaccinated on religious grounds. After all, a religion can be just about anything and have almost any belief.

I think that vaccine passports are morally acceptable, but my practical view is a bit complicated. As noted above, requiring COVID vaccination proof in cases which already require proof of other vaccinations (such as school, certain workplaces, and certain travel) is morally uncontroversial. Since the right has turned vaccine passports into yet another stupid battle in their deranged war on social responsibility and ethic, then using them to provide incentives for vaccination and to increase public safety in the short term will be difficult if not impossible. For example, Florida has already killed the idea of these passports. That said, some other states might be able to use them correctly and effectively, thus fueling the rage of Fox and friends.

 

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