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While same-sex marriage is now legal, there seems to be an appetite to roll it back. As such, it is worth considering the previous fight in preparation for the future fight. Back when President Obama supported same-sex marriage he was criticized by some leaders in the black community.  For example, Reverend William Owens, the president of the Coalition of African-American Pastors said that “by embracing gay marriage, President Obama is leading the country down an immoral path.”

Owens based his position on his view that same-sex marriage is “simply wrong” and that it was a mistake to consider same-sex marriage as a civil right. He also claimed that the Black Church must oppose it because “the Black Church has always been the conscience of America.” Because of this view, he called upon black pastors and Christians to stop supporting Obama. Owens seemed to claim that the President’s view was just to get the support (and money) of the “Hollywood folks.” This raised some interesting issues back then that will no doubt arise again.

Not surprisingly, those who support same-sex marriage often draw an analogy between the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the movement to secure rights for LGBT+ Americans. Supporters of same-sex marriage also compared same-sex marriage and mixed-race marriages to argue in favor of same-sex marriage rights. In the United States, it was not until the case of Loving v. Virginia in 1967 that laws against inter-racial marriages were deemed unconstitutional. Even now, some oppose mixed race marriage because they see it as immoral and unnatural. I still get the occasional paper arguing against mixed marriage in my college Ethics class.

On the face of it, mixed-marriage and same-sex marriages seem morally analogous. After all, in both cases people are denied the right to marry based on who they want to marry being the “wrong” sort of person: either the wrong race or the wrong sex. Those who favor allowing mixed-race marriages contend that race should not be a relevant factor in determining who one should be allowed to marry. In the case of those who favor same-sex marriage, it was contended that a person’s sex should not be a relevant factor in determining who one should be allowed to marry.

Given the similarity, it is tempting to think that those who supported the civil rights movements of the past and support (or at least tolerate) mixed-race marriage should also, based on consistency, support same-sex marriage.

However, this is not always the case and some people (such as Owens) who support civil rights oppose same-sex marriage. There is a reasonable question as to whether this difference is morally justified.

Owens, as noted above, takes the strategy of claiming that same-sex marriage is immoral and hence should not be supported. Given his remarks about civil rights, he presumably believed that the civil rights movement was morally good. As such, grounds are needed for distinguishing between the goodness of the civil rights movement and the alleged evil of same-sex marriage.

One stock approach is to use the religious argument against same-sex marriage. Among Christian thinkers, the basis for the religious objection is typically and famously found in Leviticus. Naturally, there must also be a mixing of norms (see my Moral Methods book) from the religious claim that homosexuality is an abomination to the moral claim that homosexuality (and thus same-sex marriage) is morally wrong. Since I argue about this general point at length in my book For Better or Worse Reasoning, I will focus on three specific points here.

The first is that basing the opposition to same sex-marriage on religious grounds runs into the problem that the same text used to attack same-sex marriage also contains passages that seem to support slavery and inequality, things inimical to the views of those who support the equality of the civil rights movement.

The second, which is a related point, is that if same-sex marriage is opposed on religious grounds, then consistency requires that other religious rules be followed. This is an instance of a general problem of using religion as the basis for ethics: when people use religion to justify or condemn one practice, they often selectively ignore parts of the text that condemn or justify other practices.

For example, consider the commandment that requires keeping the Sabbath. This, unlike the short line in Leviticus, is one of the ten major rules. However, this commandment is routinely and regularly ignored by the same people who oppose same-sex marriage, as are many other rules (such as those regarding usury and the stoning of disobedient children). If it is argued that these other rules should be ignored because of changing times or on some other grounds, the same sorts of reasons can be given for ignoring Leviticus and thus this religious foundation of the argument against same-sex marriage can be undercut. Of course, it could be argued that this interpretation of this part of Leviticus should be honored while other rules can be ignored as desired. The challenge is doing this selective ignoring in a principled manner rather than merely on the basis of prejudice and convenience.

A third point is that religious arguments were used in support of slavery, against the civil rights movement and against mixed-race marriages. As such, those who would use religious arguments against same-sex marriage while wanting to hold to civil rights will need to be careful to show that their religious arguments against same-sex marriage are legitimate while the religious based opposition to civil rights was mistaken and, of course, that the religious based support of civil rights was in the right. This could be done but the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who want to support civil rights while also opposing same-sex marriage.

Considering the above, the religious based approach does not seem to be a particularly viable means of condemning same-sex marriage if one wants to support other civil rights.

A second common way to argue against same-sex marriage is an appeal to tradition. What is claimed to be traditional marriage is good and right because it is alleged to be traditional. One problem is that appealing to tradition is a fallacy. Another problem with this, at least for those who oppose same-sex marriage while favoring civil rights is that the civil rights movement was opposed on the grounds of tradition and it involved a break with the traditions of racism and unequal rights. As such, appealing to tradition not a very viable option for those who want to oppose same-sex marriage while also supporting civil rights. The same sort of problem arises with appealing to common practice and appealing to belief. There are also logical fallacies and both were employed to argue against civil rights. As such, these do not seem to be viable ways to argue against same-sex marriage while also supporting civil rights.

Naturally, these approaches are not the only avenues to arguing that same-sex marriage is morally wrong. However, these other arguments also certainly seem to fail, as I argue in my For Better or Worse Reasoning. Unlike some opponents of same-sex marriage, those who support civil rights face the added burden of reconciling their arguments against same-sex marriage with their support of civil rights. For example, if someone argues in favor of civil rights based on the principle of equality, they would need to argue why this principle applies to civil rights but does not apply to same-sex marriage. This might be doable but the burden of proof rests on those who wish to support civil rights but also wish to oppose same-sex marriage.

Another possible approach is to argue that there is a relevant difference between the past civil rights movement and same-sex marriage. One plausible way to do this is to note that civil rights should be seen as relating to race while same-sex marriage is (obviously) a matter of sexual orientation. One stock argument is that race is not a matter of choice and hence discrimination against people based on race is wrong. Since the traditional civil rights focus on race, supporting these civil rights would thus seem right. In contrast, it could be argued that sexual orientation is a matter of choice and hence a person could choose to be straight and thus be able to marry someone of the opposite sex. In contrast, a person cannot decide to not be black and hence it makes sense to have civil rights extended to people regardless of race. In contrast, there is no such obligation to people who “choose” to be gay. There is also the point that while people cannot, in general, easily hide their race in America, they can hide their sexual orientation. Hence, features that cannot be hidden should be protected, while those that can need not be protected.

One obvious objection to this approach is arguing that being gay is no more a matter of choice than is being black or being born a woman. As such, the choice argument would not hold. Another obvious objection is that the mere fact that a person can conceal something about themselves hardly seems to justify not extending rights to them. Just because, for example, some black people can “pass” for white does not entail that they are not entitled to equal civil rights. Likewise, the fact that a gay person can pass as straight does not mean that they do not need their rights protected.

Another approach is to argue that while being of a certain race or sex (male or female) is not immoral, being gay is. If true, this claim would provide the needed relevant difference to allow a person to support civil rights while still opposing same-sex marriage.

One obvious concern with this approach is that those who oppose civil rights for minorities or women would argue that minorities or women are inferior to, for example, white men and are not entitled to the same rights. In the case of same-sex marriage, the idea is that people who are gay are morally inferior to straight people and thus not entitled to the same rights, most especially marriage rights. As such, those who support minorities or women having civil rights while opposing the extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples need to show that there is a difference between homosexuals and other people that warrants the difference in treatment.

In the case of people who otherwise supported civil rights, such as Owens, the burden of proof would appear to be on them to show that while certain people should have full civil rights other people should be denied the right to marry.

There is, of course, also the issue of whether marriage rights should be denied to people who are immoral. Other civil rights do not seem to require being moral. As I have argued in Better or Worse Reasoning, there is not a general moral requirement for marriage, So, for example, a serial killer could always legally marry a murderer, if they are different sexes. As such, there seems to be no general grounds for denying marriage rights to same-sex couples, even if it is assumed that being gay in and of itself makes a person morally evil.

It could be argued that marriage rights are, in fact, denied to people who are immoral (or who want to engage in immoral activities). Pedophiles are rightfully denied the right to marry underage children (although what counts as underage varies by state) , people who are fond of animals are denied the right to marry animals, close relatives are denied the right to marry, necrophiliacs are denied the right to marry corpses and so on. However, this point can easily be countered, and I do so in my For Better or Worse Reasoning. After all, there are good moral arguments against marrying children, corpses and animals, mainly based on the obvious notion that they cannot provide consent. The same arguments do not, however, hold against same-sex couples.

On the face of it, it is difficult for a person to consistently support civil rights while at the same time opposing same-sex marriage rights. While clearly not impossible, the burden of proof rests on those who wish to defend civil rights for themselves while not extending those rights to others they regard as immoral or inferior. As this is being written, same-sex marriage is still legal in the United States, but no battle for rights is ever over.

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We Americans generally do health and nutrition badly. One reason for this is that we are often systematically misled by the state at the behest of commercial interests. Ask a nutritionist you trust about the federal food pyramid. Another reason consists of all the usual critical thinking problems humans have combined with the influence of ignorant influencers and grifters singing siren songs in the sea of social media.

One thing we sort of get right is that we need protein, yet we tend to get the protein thing wrong. As a runner, one of the mistakes I made in the past was thinking that stuff made for athletes, like protein bars, would be healthy choices. But the sports beverages turned out to be mostly sugar water and the protein bars are expensive candy—albeit with some protein. Since I wanted to eat less badly and not spend as much, I started making my own protein bars last year. They didn’t kill me or give me explosive diarrhea, so that has been great.

I’d like to say that this recipe was found in the text of the Odyssey and fueled Odysseus through his various deceits and crimes. But the truth is that Odysseus was fueled by Dunkin Donuts. I will avoid the usual recipe nightmare of providing an irrelevant narrative about how the recipe interacts in some unexplained manner with my life and daily activities. I just eat one of these bars after a run.

You’ll need a food processor or a strong mixing hand to make them, and cooking is only required for the quinoa. Or you could just eat it raw and risk stomach pain and gas. Do what you do and you get what you get.

Ingredients

• 1 cup raw quinoa
• 2 cups water (to cook the quinoa)
• 3 cups oats
• 3 cups chocolate chips (dark chocolate recommended)
• 3 cups peanut butter (crunchy, smooth if you are a heretic)
• 18 pitted Medjool dates (unpitted if you are a psychopath)
• 1 cup chopped walnuts (or any other nut)
• Salt (optional)
• Honey (optional)

Recipe

Step 1: Cook the Quinoa. Follow the directions on the container; which usually say to boil 1 cup of quinoa in 2 cups of water and then simmer for 15-20 minutes. I put a little salt in the water.

Step 2: Process. Combine the following into your food processor and process using the slicing shredding blade; I usually use the pulse function to let the motor cool a bit. I divide the processing into three to avoiding killing the processor’s motor. A Vitamix might also work or might cause a kitchen fire. Process until everything is well mixed.

• 1 cup cooked quinoa
• 1 cup oats
• 1 cup chocolate chips (dark chocolate recommended)
• 1 cup peanut butter (crunchy, smooth if you are a heretic)
• 6 pitted Medjool dates (unpitted if you are a psychopath)
• 1/3 cup chopped walnuts (or any other nut)
• 1 tsp Salt (optional)
• ¼ cup Honey (optional)

Step 3: Pan Time: Line a pan with parchment paper and dump the processed stuff into it. Push it together and down, ideally filling 1/3 of the pan.

Step 4: Repeat. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all the stuff has been processed. You can use a rolling pin to flatten the top.

Step 5: Cool, cut and store. Chill the bars-to-be in the fridge for at least 30 minutes. Cut them into bars, squares, stars or whatever you want. Put bars into an airtight container and store them in the fridge.  Eat after running or whenever. You’re an adult; life choices are up to you.

As a fan of science fiction and fantasy, I know the female breast is a frequent guest in many works of the genre. Honesty compels me to admit that, as a straight male, I am not fundamentally opposed to such nudity. However, there are some reasonable grounds for objecting to nudity in works of fantasy and science fiction, at least in certain contexts. The first is ethical and the second is aesthetical.

A stock moral objection to nudity is that it is inherently wrong, perhaps because it is seen as dirty or filthy. This view is often based on a religious view that sees nudity as shameful. Some base this view on the story of Adam and Eve in which they learn to be ashamed of their nudity and this seemed to set the stage for a persistent puritanical view. There is also a feminist tendency to cast female nudity as being especially bad—there is an abundance of feminist literature addressing this point and hence I will not expand on this here.

Some people take a different view, claiming that it is men that are the problem and the moral weakness of men entails that women must always be covered. However, the result is ironically similar in that female nudity is seen as a moral threat.

While this sort of view is popular, it is not one I subscribe to. As far as the religious foundation is concerned, there are two obvious replies. The first is that the burden of proof rests on those who make this argument—they need to prove that God exists and He thinks the human form is “dirty” and his creations should be covered in shame. The second is that the human form does not seem to be dirty and although some people might stand some more time working out, there does seem to be a beauty to the human body—as the ancient Greeks and others believed. Thus, while the shame argument is not without merit, I do not find it convincing, and it is not the foundation of my dismay at gratuitous nudity.

A second stock moral objection to nudity is based on Plato’s criticism of art, namely that the portrayal of lustful behavior can corrupt the viewer. On this view, it is not that nudity itself is bad; rather it would be the lustful behavior that is typically associated with nudity. As such, the concern about nudity would be secondary, although the display of nudity would presumably augment the alleged corrupting power of art.

This argument does have some appeal. After all, what people experience (even fictional experiences) does help shape how people think and behave. Hence, exposure to nudity and lustful behavior in art could shape people in negative ways. This is like a common argument against pornography based on it alleged ability to corrupt. Of course, the nudity in science fiction and fantasy is supposed to be secondary whereas pornography is supposed to be focused primarily on nudity and sex.

While this argument does seem reasonable, the corrupting power of the occasional breast or other nudity in science fiction or fantasy seems limited. To use an analogy to radiation, the amount of exposure does generally not seem enough to provide a dangerous dose of nudity (and this assumes there is a dangerous dose). As such, the corruption argument does not really motivate my criticism of gratuitous nudity.

A third moral argument is a specific variation on the corruption argument and is one that is sometimes presented by feminist thinkers. The idea is that female nudity of this type demeans women by presenting them as mere sexual objects. This is harmful to both females (who are demeaned and objectified) and males (who learn to demean and objectify) and hence wrong.

This argument has some appeal. After all, looking at the  stereotypical demographic targets for science fiction and fantasy that includes nudity it seems likely that nudity is there to attract and titillate male viewers. Women are being exploited as objects for the amusement of men. This does work—I recall, as a young guy, people talking about seeing certain movies specifically for the nude scenes.

Even then, this struck me as a bit odd—I recall asking a friend why he didn’t just get a Penthouse or Playboy if he wanted to see nudity (this was long before the internet). The internet now serves up nudity and porn 24/7 and this seems to make gratuitous nudity make even less sense. My suspicion is that this is like how people used to say that they got Playboy for the articles and perhaps people do the same thing with science-fiction and fantasy works that feature nudity—they can say they are watching it for the story and that the nudity just happens to be there. Maybe this works in a way like the psychology that allows a person to feel that they are dieting when they have a diet soda with their super-sized meal.

Getting back to the main subject, this line of argumentation does have merit—most cases of nudity in such works seems to be there to appeal to the target demographic and clearly seems to be objectifying and demeaning women. This does not, of course, even consider women being cast as sexual victims (prostitutes, rape victims and so on) in such works.

That said, there is a reasonable concern that this sort of argument can bring one into the moral territory of the other two moral arguments. After all, if it is claimed that nudity demeans a woman and presents her as a mere object, then this might seem to entail that there is something wrong about the female body, which seems problematic from many feminist perspectives. The easy reply is, of course, that it is not the woman’s body that is wrong, but rather the way the woman is being treated and the specific context. This seems a reasonable reply.

In my own case, I do admit that this is part of the reason that I often feel dismay at such nudity. It is not so much the nudity itself, but the way it is used and the context, which is often demeaning. However, the moral aspects of the matter do not exhaust the issue and there remains the aesthetic aspect.

When it comes to aesthetics, I am something of a traditionalist. To be specific, I draw much of my aesthetic theory from thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. While I have already mentioned Plato’s argument, I will now borrow a bit from Aristotle.

When I teach my students how to write the paper for my classes, I discuss the matter of deciding what should and should not be in the paper. I base this discussion on Aristotle’s view that a work should be a complete whole as defined by the purpose of the work. I tell my students that there is a simple test to decide whether something should be left in or left out, which is to leave it out and see whether this improves, worsens or leaves the work the same. Obviously, if leaving it out makes the work worse relative to its purpose, then it should be retained. Otherwise, it should be removed. This same sort of principle can be applied to nudity in works of science fiction and fantasy.

While a discussion of the purposes of science fiction and fantasy would go beyond the limited scope of this essay, it does seem reasonable to accept that their primary purpose is not to serve as a platform for displaying nudity to men. That is, of course, one purpose of pornography. As works of fiction, their main purpose is to present a story (at least as Aristotle would argue) and that should be the focus. Sticking with Aristotle, the display of nudity would typically seem to be part of the spectacle rather than part of the story. The nudity does not (in almost all cases) advance the plot in a way that is probably or necessary in order to achieve the purpose of the work.

Science-fiction and fantasy have a long tradition of gratuitous nudity that has no connection at all to the plot. For example, in the movie Moontrap there is a completely gratuitous stripper scene that has nothing to do with what little plot the movie has. I use this example because the image of Chekov (Walter Koenig) in a strip joint has stuck in my mind since 1989. Obviously, gratuitous nudity by its nature lacks aesthetic justification.

Interestingly, some movies and shows have attempted to merge plot and sex, creating what Myles McNutt called “sexposition”, which is when characters present exposition while having sex.

Not surprisingly, merging sex and exposition seems to be an aesthetic failure. First, it seems odd to have people engaged in lengthy exposition during sex. While I am not an expert on what most people do during sex, it seems that is not something that people would do. As such, this makes the scenes less in accord with what is probable. Second, the nudity still seems to add nothing to the plot—the exposition is doing all that and hence the nudity is gratuitous and would seem to have no aesthetic justification. But one could argue that it is keeping the audience’s attention during the exposition dump. But that assumes the audience is, obviously, listening to the exposition. Also, if a sex scene is needed to keep the audience’s attention, then that is a flaw in the work—some other way should be used to inform the audience, perhaps by showing rather than telling.

In addition to not adding anything to the story, the use of gratuitous nudity has two other flaws. The first is that it can be seen as an insult to the audience—that they will only retain interest in the work if they see nudity. Of course, this might be true in some cases. Second, it would seem to show a flaw in the work.  After all, if the story cannot sustain interest through aesthetic means and they need to throw in nudity to keep people interested or to fill the visual space while characters are engaged in lengthy exposition, then they would seem to be lacking in their craft. Of course, it is fair to keep in mind that a show or film is subject to many influences and creators and that the nudity stuck in a work might not be the idea of the writer or director. For example, some of the famous nudity and sexposition in the Game of Thrones might not be what Martin envisioned.

These arguments do not exclude all nudity from  works. After all, there can be cases in which it is warranted on aesthetic grounds. For example, the nudity in a scene might be required for realism and the scene might be an important part of the plot. That is, removing the scene or the nudity would result in an inferior aesthetic result. I am sure that there are such cases, but none comes to mind.

As another example, nudity might be an important part of the experience the work is supposed to create. For example, the horror movie From Dusk Till Dawn could be seen as intentionally embracing the stereotypes of a genre that must, of necessity, include gratuitous nudity. As such, nudity could serve a legitimate aesthetic purpose in that work and other similar works. One could draw an obvious analogy to violence as being a necessary ingredient in certain subgenres and styles.

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 While most Americans do not vote, there is still in question of how a voter should vote. While I have opinions about the candidates and issues in the upcoming election in my adopted state of Florida, this essay is not aimed at convincing you to vote as I will. Rather, my goal is to discuss how you should vote in general.

The answer to the question of how you should vote is easy: if you are rational, then you should vote in your rational self-interest. In the case of a candidate, you should vote for the candidate you believe will act in your self-interest. In the case of such things as ballot measures, you should vote for or against based on how you believe it will impact your self-interest. So, roughly put, you should vote for what you think is best for you.

While this is obvious advice, it does bring up two often overlooked concerns. The first is the determining what is actually in your self-interest. The second is determining whether your decision is in your self-interest. In the case of a candidate, the concern is whether the candidate will act in your self-interest. In the case of things like ballot measures, the question is whether the measure will be advantageous to your interests or not.

It might be thought that a person knows what is in her self-interest. Unfortunately, people can be wrong about this. In most cases people assume that if they want or like something, then it is in their self-interest. But what a person likes or wants might not be what is best for them. For example, a person might like the idea of cutting school funding without considering how it will impact her family and community. In contrast, what people do not want, or dislike is often assumed to be against their self-interest. But what a person dislikes or does not want might not be bad for her. For example, a person might dislike the idea of an increased minimum wage and vote against it without considering whether it would be in their self-interest or not. The take-away is that a person needs to look beyond what they like or dislike, want or do not want to determine their actual self-interest.

It is natural to think that of what is in a person’s self interest in selfish terms. That is, in terms of what seems to benefit only the person without considering its effect on others. While this is one way to look at self-interest, it is worth considering what might seem to be in a person’s selfish interest could be against her self-interest. For example, a business owner might see paying taxes to fund public education as being against her self-interest because it seems to have no direct, selfish benefit to her. However, having educated fellow citizens would seem to be in her self-interest and even in her selfish interest. Having the state pay for the education of her workers is advantageous to her—even if she has to contribute a little through her taxes. As another example, a person might see paying taxes for public health programs and medical aid to foreign countries as against her self-interest because she has her own medical coverage and does not travel to those countries. However, as has been shown with Ebola, public and world health is in her interest—unless she lives in total isolation. As such, even the selfish should consider whether their selfishness in a matter is actually in their self-interest.

It is also worth considering a view of self-interest that is more altruistic. That is, that a person’s interest is not just in her individual advantages but also in the general good. For this sort of person, providing for the common defense and securing the general welfare would be in her self-interest because her self-interest goes beyond just herself.

So, a person should sort out her self-interest and consider that it might not just be a matter of what she likes, wants or sees as in her selfish advantage. The next step is to determine which candidate is most likely to act in her self-interest and which vote on a ballot measure is most likely to serve her self-interest.

Political candidates, obviously enough, try to convince their target voters that they will act in their interest. Those backing ballot measures also do their best to convince voters that voting a certain way is in their self-interest. However, the evidence shows that most politicians do not act in the interest of the majority of those who voted for them. Researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted a study, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, to determine whether politicians acted based on the preferences of the majority. The researchers examined about 1,800 policies and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50^th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90^th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups.

The results are hardly surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.” This suggests that voters are bad at selecting candidates who will act in their interest. Or, to be fair and balanced, perhaps there are few  candidates who will do so.

It can be countered that the study just shows that politicians generally act contrary to the preferences of the majority but not that they act contrary to their self-interest. After all, I made the point that what people want (prefer) might not be what is in their self-interest. But, on the face of it, unless what is in the interest of the majority is that the affluent get their way, then it seems that the politicians voters choose generally do not act in the best interest of the voters. This would suggest that voters should pick different candidates and that better people should run for office.

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I was asked to share a link to a post by another philosopher:

Written by Tracy Llanera, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut.

Everything doesn’t happen for a reason

https://iai.tv/articles/everything-doesnt-happen-for-a-reason-auid-3073?_auid=2020

“Everything happens for a reason,” “it’s meant to be,” “it is what it is.” These cliches express an increasingly popular form of Stoic fatalism. The underlying idea is that “Reality” just is a certain way, determined by God or physics. This superficially tough realism comforts us by absolving us of responsibility: whatever happens was bound to happen. But this makes it dangerous, argues Tracy Llanera. It leads to resigned inaction in the face of geopolitical strife, injustice, and our personal lives. Instead, we must recognize that there is no higher being responsible for us: we must take responsibility for each other and the world we live in.