Category: Ethics

Because the United Kingdom was suffering from a shortage of sperm donors it was been proposed that men be allowed to donate their sperm after they are dead. As with other post-death donations, the donated material would be extracted and used. This does raise some ethical issues.

It must be noted that the donation process is voluntary, and the sperm is not simply harvested without consent. As such, the main moral issue is whether such a donation is morally acceptable. The specific act of donating sperm post death falls under two broader moral areas. The first is the ethics of donating anything after death. If such donations were morally unacceptable, then it would follow that sperm donation after death would also be unacceptable. While the general ethics of post-death donations is beyond the scope of this work, the ethics of donating organs after death is well-established: it is not only acceptable, but laudable. But this does not establish that post-death sperm donation is acceptable.

The second is the ethics of sperm donation in general. If this is morally wrong, then post-death sperm donation would also be morally wrong. While some might take issue with sperm donation in generally, it does not seem morally problematic, but this is also matter is beyond the scope of this work

The distinction between post-death sperm donation and general post-death donation is that what is being donated is sperm, but the ethics of this falls under the more general ethical topic of sperm donation. Thus, the moral concern specific to post-death sperm donation is that it occurs post-death. As such, this is the one factor that would distinguish post-death sperm donation from normal sperm donation. So, the question is what, if any, moral difference is made by the donor being dead before their donation.

While there might be a bit of an “icky” factor to the post-death aspect, the “argument from icky” does not have much moral weight unless the “ick” can be spelled out in terms relevant to the moral status of the action. There are certainly numerous other considerations that are morally relevant, and I will focus on these.

One moral concern is the treatment of the dead. While the dead person is presumably beyond caring, there is a possible impact on family and friends when they learn of the procedure. There is also the concern about treating the dead with respect and one might argue that extracting sperm would be disrespectful. It could be argued that the procedure is no more (or less) disrespectful than those used to harvest donated organs. There is also the fact that the person consented to the procedure; if they were not deceived or misled about the procedure, the consent of an adult overrides the concerns of their family and addresses the issue of respect. If those doing the extraction are acting in accord with the donor’s consent and do not do anything beyond that consent, they would be acting in a respectful manner.

There is also a pragmatic concern: a donor might have died from a genetic condition. This can be addressed by providing prospective recipients with this information so they can make an informed choice. And any donated sperm would come with an unknown risk of possible genetic problems.

One objection is that children from donated sperm will have lost a parent before they are even conceived. They will never be able to meet their biological father. While this might seem an odd situation, this is like cases in which a father dies before their child is born. While this is not common, it does happen. Wars, for example, claim fathers before their children are born. In the case of the typical donor, there is likely to be far less emotional impact, since the donor would have no connection to the mother. There is also the fact that a living sperm donor could die before his children decide to seek him out and there is the possibility that neither children nor donor will ever want to meet. As such, there seems to be no special moral problem with post-death donation that makes it different from other cases in which a child never meets the man who donated the sperm that created them.

Another concern is that while a donated organ might grant life, donated sperm creates a new person. One worry is that the spouse or partner of the dead man might be harmed by this. While this is a matter of concern, the same problem arises with living sperm donors. Also, if the spouse or partner is worried about this, they need to address this with the man while he is still alive. But this is obviously not unique to post-death sperm donation; the man chooses to donate his sperm in both types of donations. So, the ethics of a married man deciding to donate sperm remains the same whether the donation occurs when he is alive or dead.

Based on the above, if the man consented, there is no specific moral problem with post-death sperm donation. So, if sperm donation and post-death body component donation are acceptable, post-death sperm donation is as well.

Ever since Trump won his first term in office, I have wondered why people support him. I am not going make a straw man his supporters and say they are all stupid, racist, or opportunists. Rather, I want to consider reasons why people back Trump.

To start with the most obvious, some agree with his actions and policies, and it is rational that they support him. There is no mystery here other than why they agree with him.

There are some who are dismayed about what he says and wish he would show more restraint. While they dislike some of his word choices, they largely agree with his policies and actions. This is certainly rational. If their only concern about him is that he sometimes gets salty or a bit rough, it makes sense they support him.

There are even some supporters who worry about some of his policies and actions but go along with him anyway. In many cases, their motivations seem pragmatic: they get something from Trump or would pay a high price for not supporting him. For example, a Republican politician might get taken out in a primary if they earned Trump’s ire. As another example, a wealthy person might loath Trump yet like the tax breaks and de-regulation that increase their wealth. This involves setting aside certain values for others, but this can be rational. We all must make judgments in which values are in conflict, so a Trump supporter backing him despite their dislike makes sense. Trump supporters also try to convince others to support Trump.

When people criticize of Trump, his supporters often defend him by making economic arguments. For example, Trump supporters have told me that because of him the stock market does well, and this is good for my retirement income. So, I should stop criticizing Trump. When the stock market does badly, they place the blame elsewhere and say that Trump will fix it soon.  As another example, his supporters also respond to criticism about Trump’s racism with by arguing minorities ought to support Trump (or at least shut up) because under his leadership they will be better off . These arguments are based on the principle most eloquently put by  James Carville’s “the economy, stupid.” While Carville originally presented this to Clinton campaigners, it is now used broadly to claim that what matters the most is the economy.

From a factual standpoint, this claim has merit: people often say that they vote based on economic concerns. In the 2024 election, Trump supporters posted about inflation, egg prices and the cost of gas as reasons to support Trump. But is the argument that people should support Trump for economic reasons a good one?

From a factual standpoint, there are obvious problems with the premise of this argument. First, Trump (as predicted) failed to deliver on his promises about the cost of eggs and inflation. The stock market has also been a bit erratic.

 Second, the economy has been good for the wealthy and not so good for everyone else. While this gives billionaires an excellent reason to support Trump, it does not give the rest of us an economic reason to do so. Third, the influence of the president on the economy is often exaggerated. In good times, supporters of the president give him the credit, in bad time his opponents assign him the blame.  Trump failed to deliver on egg prices and inflation, but much of this is beyond Trump’s control. While his gets him off the hook to a degree, it also undercuts the argument that people should support Trump because of the economy.

Trump most devoted supporters will dispute these claims and assert that the economy is either great or will soon be great. Let these claims be granted for the sake of argument. The Trump supporter version of the argument would be:

 

Premise 1: The economy is great.

Premise 2: This is because of Trump.

Conclusion: You should support Trump (or at least stop criticizing him).

 

This argument is used to convince people who oppose to support or at least stop criticizing him. I oppose many of Trump’s policies and actions. These include his racist immigration policies, his approach to Ukraine, DOGE, his tax cuts, his putting incompetent grifters into positions of power and so on. While Trump’s supporters would dispute my views, their economic argument is that I should set aside my moral concerns because of his (alleged) success with the economy This argument is an old one and connects to America’s original sin.

Some of the slave-owning founders recognized that slavery was morally wrong or at least expressed this view in their more philosophical writings. Yet, they allowed it to continue for pragmatic reasons: profit and political support. Those who supported them but who also had moral concerns about slavery were swayed by similar reasons: slavery was crucial to the economy. People looked away, morally speaking, because they wanted to get paid. This approach has persisted: people who have moral qualms often set them aside for economic reasons and are often persuaded to do so.

I am not saying that supporting Trump is the moral equivalent of supporting slavery. Rather, my point is that an original sin of America is putting economics over ethics. What Trump supporters are now asking me to do is analogous, albeit not as bad: they want me to set aside my moral concerns about Trump because of his alleged economic success. That is, I should look away because I am getting paid. They are not amused when I ask if this means that they will turn against Trump when the economy goes bad.

One could try to make a utilitarian case by arguing that the harm he causes is outweighed by the good of the economic benefits of his presidency. But even if it is (wrongly) assumed that Trump is significantly responsible for the positive aspects of the economy it is not plausible to claim that most of his morally problematic actions and policies have anything to do with the economy. For example, his racist immigration policies will hurt the economy if fully acted upon. If Trump did have to do morally problematic things to make the economy better, then one could make the utilitarian argument to justify these actions. But the economy cannot justify evil actions and policies that do not impact the economy. Using an analogy, one could imagine a spouse who does questionable things to make money for their family. These could be, perhaps, justified on utilitarian grounds. But this would not justify wrongdoing on their part that had nothing to do with making money. So, if dad must do some shady business to pay for Timmy’s cancer treatment, then that could be justified. But the fact that he makes money would not, for example, justify dad committing adultery, beating Timmy, or vandalizing the local mosque and synagogue. Likewise, for Trump, whatever he might do to (allegedly) improve the economy might be justified on utilitarian grounds. But this does not warrant his other misdeeds. Those who believe he is a bad person doing bad things should not be swayed by an appeal to money; they should not look away just because they want to get paid.

As a political tool, members of congress threaten or engage in a government shutdown. When the government is shut down, federal workers can be furloughed and sent home without pay and forbidden from working. Others, like TSA agents, can be compelled to work without pay. As the government shutdown does not shut down bills and expenses, the unpaid workers will be harmed by their lack of income. While some federal workers are well paid, many live from paycheck to paycheck and have few financial reserves. Because of this, some federal workers have turned to food banks during past shutdowns. In addition to the impact on workers, there are indirect impacts on those providing goods and services. After all, people who are not getting paid will be spending less.

In addition to the financial impacts, there are other harms. One example is the national parks. There is also the harm suffered by those who need the federal services. There are also the long-term harms of the shutdown. While one could write almost endlessly of the harms of a shutdown, it suffices to say they are harmful and something that should be avoided.

Debating about who is to blame for any shutdown is often a fruitless endeavor because of the partisan divide. Minds will generally not be changed by evidence or reasons. That said, a shutdown requires both parties: if one party gives in to the other, then the shutdown will end. From a moral standpoint, both sides bear some blame. However, the blame need not be equal.

After all, refusing to give in to a threat to harm others can be morally acceptable. And it is usually the Republicans who make such threats.  From a utilitarian standpoint, giving in would be wrong if it created more harm than refusing to do so. This utilitarian calculation can consider more than just the immediate factors. For example, it should also include that yielding to such tactics encourages their future use.

The ethics of the shutdown comes down to two moral concerns. The first is whether it is morally acceptable to hurt innocent people to get what you want. The second is whether it is morally acceptable to refuse to give someone what they want when they threaten to harm the innocent.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the matter is settled by weighing the harm against benefit. The benefits can include preventing harm. So, a shutdown would be morally acceptable if doing so prevented greater harm, since shutdowns are always harmful. What must also be considered is whether there is an alternative to the shutdown. To use an analogy, if someone proposed a risky surgery, failing to consider alternatives would be morally irresponsible. In the case of the shutdown, there are alternatives. One is to use a less harmful process of negotiation and for each side to agree they will not use the shutdown as a political tool.

One practical problem is that the shutdown is perceived as a useful, albeit risky, political tool. The side pushing a shutdown will think that it will probably work; the other side thinks they can keep it from working. Both sides think they can score political points. Using a shutdown as a tool requires ignoring or even not caring about the harm being inflicted on the American people. After all, while politicians can lose political points or not get what they want, they are not harmed by their shutdown. This willingness to use people as pawns is morally problematic, assuming you agree with Locke that the purpose of the state is the good of the people.

That said, political, economic and military calculations always involve harming pawns—so the shutdown could be seen as just another move in the political game. This can be countered by arguing that there are better alternatives, and so causing harm is not necessary. As such, the shutdown would seem to be an unethical political tool. Unfortunately, just as it takes two to shut down the government, it also takes two to avoid it: both parties must agree to not shut it down. But as long as it is seen as a viable tool and if politicians are willing to hurt Americans to achieve their political goals, then we must expect future shutdowns.

During Trump’s first term the United States assassinated Iran’s Qassem Soleimani which raised moral questions about targeted killings. As it seems likely Trump will order more assassinations, this is a topic worth revisiting.

While the definition of “assassination” can be debated, it is a targeted killing aimed to achieve a political, economic or ideological end. While one could quibble over the fine points of definitions, my concern is with the issue of whether assassination can be morally warranted.

It can be argued that I am misguided to even consider this issue. Some might point out that assassination is killing and killing is wrong, thus there is no need for a distinct discussion about assassination. But I will assume, perhaps incorrectly, that at least some killings are morally acceptable. If I am in error, then the issue would be settled: assassination would be wrong because all killing is wrong,

Others might take the stance that morality is irrelevant and embrace the pragmatic approach that a country should kill when doing so is advantageous. On this view, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. This is a viable approach but entails that if the United States is justified in killing on pragmatic grounds, then everyone else is also justified. The only unjustified killings would be those that were not advantageous, as defined by the killers. This seems problematic.

In discussing this matter “in the wild”, I have found that people can be confused about what counts as ethics. For example, during a Facebook discussion of assassination someone rejected the notion of applying ethics.  They did so for what they claimed were two non-moral reasons. The first was that the United States is justified in assassinating people based on self-defense. The second is that the United States is justified when it kills in retribution.  But self-defense and retribution justifications are moral justifications and are subject to evaluation.

During the discussion, the “anger justification” was also advanced, which is often used to try to justify violence. For example, people will often try to “defend” the death penalty by asking people how they would feel if someone they loved were the victim of a terrible crime. They are supposed to feel angry, and this is supposed to somehow justify the death penalty based on this anger.

 The gist of the argument about assassination was that I would be mad if someone I knew had been killed by a foreigner and I would want to kill them and this entail that killing them would be somehow justified. The gist of the “logic” seems to be

 

Premise 1: If B did X to you, then you would be angry enough to do Y to B.

Conclusion: Doing Y to B is morally justified. 

 

While there might be a macho appeal to this “reasoning”, whether I would be angry enough to kill someone is irrelevant to whether killing them is right. If this was good logic, it would entail that sufficient anger would justify any killing, which is absurd.  For example, it would justify someone killing you if they were enraged because they thought you cut them off in traffic.

This sort of reasoning seems to be fueled by the tendency people have to think that if they are angry, then they are justified in being angry.  But this does not follow; being angry just means you are angry. The anger you feel is irrelevant to truth and justification. Naturally, a person can be both justified and angry, so anger does not invalidate justification.

Getting back to the ethics of assassination, if the principle was adopted that anger justified killing, it would mean that people who killed Americans would also be justified if they were angry and that someone who was angry at you would be justified in killing you. This all seems absurd, so this “principle” is absurd. But perhaps a case can be made for ethical assassination.

A good historical example is Operation Vengeance. In WWII, American P-38 fighters intercepted and killed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. This had a significant impact in terms of morale and the elimination of an important leader.

The moral justification for this is clear: when one is engaged in war, then leaders are legitimate targets. In the broader moral perspective, the overall ethics of a killing would depend on whether the war was just or unjust.  In fact, one could argue that targeting leaders in a just war is morally superior to the killing of soldiers. In general, the soldiers are not involved in the decisions that started the war and would not be fighting without being sent by their leaders. In contrast, the leaders are making the decisions and are morally responsible for the wars they start. As such, if a soldier in a war is a morally legitimate target for violence, then the leaders who sent them to war are also morally legitimate targets. Or even more legitimate, since it is their war.

In the example of Soleimani, the United States and Iran were not at war, hence the ethics of war do not apply. However, one could appeal to the ethics of conflict between nations. In general, killing the citizens of other nations outside of war is wrong. But there can be exceptions if the person did things that morally warranted their death. But accepting this as a justification requires accepting the corresponding moral principle and we would need to accept that Americans could be justly killed by other nations if their evil deeds warranted their deaths. For example, there are those who would argue that the deaths caused by American politicians could warrant their assassination on moral grounds.  There is also the option of just insisting that it is acceptable for the United States to engage in assassination because it is “my country”, but the same sort of argument can be made by citizens of other countries. For example, Iranians can make an equally bad case that it is acceptable for Iran to engage in assassination because it is their country.

Since most Americans find overt racism unpalatable, racist politicians and pragmatic exploiters of racism need to avoid it. However, they want to recruit and advance their agenda, so they need to express their racism while maintaining plausible deniability.  The example I will focus on involves racism and migration.

If a politician said, “I will build a wall to protect the purity of the white race from becoming mongrelized by the brown rapists swarming across our border” they would normally not last very long in office. If a recruiter for the alt right said to “normies” that “the inferior non-white races are defiling our women and robbing us our blood and soil…let me also warn you of the covetous Jew…” they would not be very effective at turning normal folks into racists. But racists need a way to get the message out in public while also denying they are racists. This is where dog whistles, coded language and chocolate chipping (see my essay on this) come in. The basic idea is presenting racism in a way that does not seem racist.

When it comes to migration, open racism is not always effective in the public arena. Fortunately for the racist, centuries of American racism against migrants provide tools to lure in non-racists and allow plausible deniability. These tools are effective because they involve presenting concerns that can also be rational and non-racist.

One approach is presenting migrants as criminals who are coming here to commit crimes. It is rational to be concerned about crime and being worried about crime does not make a person a racist. As such, casting migrants as criminals allows a racist to appeal to non-racists and if pressed, they can say they are not racists. They are just worried about crime.

Another tactic is to associate migrants with disease, the claim is they are bringing diseases that will infect us. As with crime, it is rational to be concerned about disease and this does not make a person a racist. This also allows racists to appeal to non-racists and gives them cover in the form of a professed concern about health.

A third tactic is to assert that migrants are causing economic harm by stealing American jobs and exploiting social services like schools, food stamps and welfare. It is sensible to be worried about economic harms and such worries do not make one a racist. Once again, this tactic provides a cloak for the racist, they can deny their racism and assert they are just looking out for American jobs and protecting the taxpayer.

Since it is rational to be concerned about crime, disease and economic harms, how can one discern a non-racist from a racist? While this method is not foolproof, the logical way is to use the facts.

While migrants do commit crimes, they commit crimes at a rate lower than native born Americans. While having more migrants does entail more crime, so does having more babies since more people results in more crime. As such, reducing migration to reduce crime makes as much sense as lowering birth rates to fight crime. That is, not much sense. If one has doubts about migrants and crime, one can examine the police data to see the truth.

While migrants do get sick, they do not present a significant health risk when one considers that Americans are already infecting each other. It is, of course, rational to be concerned that war-torn countries and failing countries might be suffering from a decline in vaccination. But Americans are also falling behind in their vaccination rates, so this is not a threat unique to migrants. As this is being written, Americans are far more at risk to get Measles from Texans and Floridians than migrants.  In any case, worries about vaccinations and disease are better addressed by health care solutions rather than broad migration policies. Examination of health data will show that migrants are not a special health threat. That said, pandemics and epidemics can create special situations that justify restricting travel.

While it is true that illegal migrants can lower wages because businesses engage in illegal hiring practices and can exploit undocumented workers, illegal migrants are not stealing jobs. Rather, they are given jobs illegally. Migrants that are here legally are also not stealing jobs; they are being hired.

The main reasons Americans lose jobs is not because migrants take them. Rather the causes tend to be technological change (such as automation), economic factors (such as natural gas being cheaper than coal), and decisions by business leaders (such as sending jobs overseas). As far as checking on whether migrants have stolen jobs, think about this: how many legally run American businesses have fired American workers and replaced them with migrants here in America? Is there, for example, a big GM plant being operated entirely by Mexicans? There are, of course, American owned plants in Mexico and other countries, but that is because of decisions made by the companies and not due to migrants dragging plants across the border.

If someone endorses harsh migration policies and professes it is because of their concerns about crime, disease and economic harms, the method to test them is to present the facts of the matter. If the person is not a racist, they will be willing to reconsider their position. After all, if they favor harsh migration polices because they believe that they would meaningfully reduce crime and they learn that they will not, they should change their position. If the facts have no impact on their position, then that serves as evidence that just rejects facts or are a racist.

It might be objected that someone could argue migrants are disease carrying criminals who come here to steal jobs and exploit the social system without being racists. While this is possible, they would need to prove their claims and thus overturn all evidence to the contrary. It is also worth noting that the notion that migrants are disease carrying criminals is a an old one. If your family is not pure WASP, it is likely the same was said about your family. So, which is more likely: that past and present migrants were or are disease carrying criminals coming here to steal jobs or that these assertions are just tired racism hidden under a badly worn and threadbare cloak of deceit?

 

I will begin with the obvious: charity is good and those who help others from the goodness of their hearts are good people. But behind the light of charity lies a terrible darkness. This darkness remains unseen, for attention is focused on the light.

The media pushes stories of charity and it is right to praise the charitable. While presented as feel-good stories, there is often a horror behind them that can be revealed with a little reflection. For example, considerthe popular stories of school employees donating their sick days to a colleague being treated for cancer. These co-workers should be lauded for their sacrificing. This is the light of the story. But a little thought reveals the darkness behind the light: the sick person needs charity because they do not have enough sick days to cover their serious illness. They, it could be argued, should not need charity because they should have adequate sick days to cover their illness. It could be objected that such serious illnesses are unusual and that everything worked out because other people gave up their sick days.

While it is true that serious illnesses are uncommon, they do occur, and a good sick leave system would take that into account. As for others donating sick days, this is a problem because they are putting themselves at risk should they need those days. Also, a sick leave system should not depend on a person’s luck or ability to get sympathy. As such, while these stories tell us about good people doing good, they also show that there is something wrong with sick leave. If these were rare cases involving “slackers”, then that would be one thing. But these involve people who are working hard.

Continuing with another medical example, GoFundMe is regularly used to pay medical expenses. This practice is now so common that the site has its own guide to the process. Giving to such fundraisers is kind and stories about success make for feel good stories. I have given to several of them, sometimes for friends who have exhausted their insurance and savings and sometimes for strangers whose stories came to my attention. For example, I’ve seen signs posted at businesses asking people to help a sick employee.

While stories of successful fundraisers focus on the light, they usually fail to mention the darkness. One obvious problem is that even people who have insurance, who have worked hard and who have done everything right (such as a person I went to school with) can end up with crushing medical debt. That they need to turn to public fundraising is a harsh condemnation of the system. A second problem is that while news stories focus on successes, not all fundraisers succeed. That the ability to pay for medical expenses can depend on social media savvy and the appeal of one’s story is arbitrary and unfair.

It could be objected that only “slackers” and bad planners need to turn to GoFundMe, that they are exploiting the gullible compassionate. Some people are running scams, and some people get into medical debt because of poor life choices. However, people who have worked hard, who got insurance, and who made good decisions can end up needing to ask strangers for assistance, because people created and are maintaining a brutal, predatory system. What is needed is something that both Democrats and Republicans have called for, a better healthcare system.

Moving away from medical charity, one might think that post-disaster charity has no dark side. After all, people who have suffered due to a fire, a hurricane or flooding are not the victims of a human-designed system. While they are the victims of natural disasters, some of these have been made worse by climate change and humans are responsible for that. There is also the fact that, as with medical expenses, people lack the resources to address natural disasters even if they have insurance, have worked hard and have done everything right. One reason for this is that wealth is concentrated, and most people lack the resources to deal with disasters. The state (people acting collectively) does help, but it also has limited resources to address disasters, and the push is to cut these resources. This is due to spending choices and decisions about revenue. As such, people are ever more dependent on the aid of others to deal with disasters. Once again, those best at social media appeals do best, while others fare less well. Better solutions would include addressing the causes of disasters and having more public resources available to deal with them. But the Trump administration is pushing to the opposite.

For there to be charity, there must be those who suffer and lack the resources to assuage their own suffering. Why people lack these resources is worrisome. The dark side of charity is the dark side of our civilization: a system designed to concentrate wealth means most lack resources to address medical and natural disasters. There are also people who are so lacking in resources that every day is a disaster. Hence, they must rely on appealing to others.

It could and has been argued that this system is good that having a hyper-concentration of wealth and resources is somehow better for everyone. This is obviously untrue as it is not better for those who must rely on charity even when they have done everything they were supposed to do.

While some might be tempted to make a straw man my view and insist that I want to take all the money from the rich and distribute it among the poor, this is not true. Rather, what I advocate is modest, that there should be real effort to adjust the system so more can have adequate resources and that dealing with such things as medical problems does not require begging for money or pleading for donated sick days.

When billionaires are criticized for their excess wealth, their defenders often point out that they are philanthropists. Bill Gates is famous for his foundation, Jeff Bezos has given millions to his charities, and the Koch brothers have spent lavishly on higher education and medical research.

One counter to this defense is that this philanthropy yields advantages ranging from tax breaks to buying influence. To use an Aristotelian criticism, if the billionaires are engaging in philanthropy to advance their own interests rather than being generous for generosity’s sake, then they are not acting from virtue and should not be praised. To use a non-billionaire example, if I volunteer with an environmental group because I want to impress the liberals, then I am not being virtuous. If I volunteer because I want to do good, then I would be virtuous. But not everyone embraces virtue ethics.

A utilitarian would not be concerned with the motives and character of billionaires and would focus on the consequences of their actions. So, if Bezos donates money to get a tax break or offset his negative image, that does not matter to the utilitarian. What matters is the effect of the donation in terms of generating happiness and unhappiness. As such, even if a billionaire should not be praised for their motives or character, they should be lauded if their donation does more good than the alternatives. While the motives and character of billionaires and the utilitarian value of philanthropy can be debated at length, I turn now to the claim that the rich give the most to charity.

When people say the rich give more to charity than the non-rich, this seems to be an obviously true claim. After all, the rich have more resources and can give more in total and as a percentage of their wealth than the poor without making a significant sacrifice. To use an analogy, suppose Sally Bigbucks, you, and I are at lunch. Poor Pete asks us for $10 so he can buy food for his family. I have $10, you have $20 in your pocket, and Sally has $10,000. If lunch is $10, I’d have to forgo lunch to help Pete, which would be a real sacrifice. You could give 50% of what you have and still buy lunch, which would also be a meaningful sacrifice. Sally could generously give Pete $100, but this would only be 1% of what she has on hand and would not be a sacrifice. If she only gave him $10, that would be 0.1% of what she has on hand. The same sort of calculation should be made when the rich give what seem like large amounts of money to charity. To put these donations in perspective, you should determine what percentage the donation would be in terms of their yearly income or total wealth. So, while a wealthy person might publicly and loudly donate thousands of dollars to a charity, it might be comparable to you or I donating tens of dollars. This is not to attack the rich for donating to charity; it is better that they do this than, for example, buying a $900,000 watch. But we should keep the extent of their generosity in perspective: they can give more because they have far more than the rest of us.

Another point is that the rich can only be charitable because other people are in need. On the one hand, this can be dismissed as a an obvious “duh”: charity is only needed because there are poor people in need. If everyone was well off, there would be no need for charity.  On the other hand, this is an important and we need to understand why the rich are so rich and others are so poor they need charity. With the vast wealth of the United States, why do so many people need the largess of the wealthy and the support of taxpayers just to survive?

The American right tends to explain this by claiming the rich earn their wealth and those in need of charity are defective or have been the victim of a disaster.  For example, the poor are lazy or less intelligent. Racism often factors in here as well. As such, the rich are generously giving what they have rightfully earned to the unworthy or incapable. Using a Thanksgiving analogy, Grandma Sally bought a turkey feast that she graciously shares with others, despite the fact they contributed little or nothing. Perhaps because they were victims of a disaster or perhaps because they are too lazy or stupid to afford their own feast.

The left often claims the rich get their wealth by using unfair advantages and exploiting others. On this view, there are many people who need charity because the rich have taken most of the wealth. As such, when the rich engage in charity they give back to the poor some of what they took away. To use a Thanksgiving analogy, Grandma Sally has a great feast in which everyone works hard to make the feast, but Grandma doles out a few tiny bits of food to the folks at the little table.

While the left and right will endlessly debate this, charity is needed because there are people who cannot meet their needs by their own efforts, usually because of low wages and high costs. This is the system that exists, and it creates both those in need of charity and those who have so much that they can engage in philanthropy and remain extremely wealthy. As such, while philanthropy is better than nothing, it is the result of an evil system, one so imbalanced that some people require charity despite working hard.

Naturally one could advance the usual counter that those who get charity are somehow defective, such as lazy and unwilling to find good jobs. But this goes against the facts: people need charity because we have created and tolerate a system that takes so much from so many that some depend on the wealthy giving a tiny back from what they have taken. This is not worthy of praise.

 

For years, Republicans have warned voters Democrats will take their guns. The Democrats have never done this. But back in 2019 Beto O’Rourke spoke the words long prophesized by Republicans: “Hell, yes, we’re going to take your AR-15, your AK-47.” This, obviously enough, never came to pass. But as gun violence is an ongoing problem, the issue of taking away guns remains. While there is the legal question, that is best left to the lawyers. My focus will be on the ethics of the matter. While “assault weapon” and “assault rifle” are not well defined, I’ll rely on the imprecise intuitive understanding of these terms. Fine distinctions of definition can matter but should not impact the broader moral issue.

As this is a matter of ethics on a national scale, it is reasonable to take a utilitarian approach: would taking away assault weapons create more good than bad? On the positive side, proponents of taking away guns note they are the favored weapon for mass shootings. Their high-capacity magazines make them ideal for rapidly killing people, which is what they were designed to do. As such, if assault weapons were taken away, mass shootings would probably have fewer casualties as potential killers would need to rely on other firearms. While one could work out rate-of-fire calculations for all weapons to determine the likely impact of an absence of assault weapons, it makes sense that the body count would be lower. This is the strongest moral argument in favor of taking guns: it would reduce the number of people killed. But not as much as people might think. While assault weapons get special attention, handguns are used the most in killings. So, while an assault weapon ban could reduce the number of deaths, it would not impact the leading types of gun deaths.

While it might seem cold, it must be said that we (collectively) tolerate deaths that could be prevented by banning dangerous things. One obvious example is banning private vehicles in favor of public transportation.  That would save thousands of lives. Banning swimming pools would also save lives, mostly those of children. But we do not ban these things because when we weigh the deaths against other factors, the other factors win. We thus tolerate thousands of deaths for economic reasons, convenience and enjoyment. As such, the same consideration should be given to assault weapons.

On the positive side, assault weapons do have economic value since they are manufactured and sold. People enjoy owning, modifying and using them. They do have some use as hunting and defense weapons. On the face of it, saying these positive aspects outweigh human lives seems heartless. But as noted above, this same reasoning is applied to many other dangerous things. If, for example, you drive a car, then you find the risk of killing or injuring people acceptable.

So, moral consistency requires people who support taking away guns to apply the same principle to all dangerous things, which would morally require us to ban cars and many other things. Some people will see this as reasonable as there are those who would prefer a world free of automobiles.

The negatives of taking away guns must also be considered. There are people in the “cold dead fingers” camp who say they will fight to the death for their guns. As such, efforts to take guns would result in some deaths and these must be included in the moral calculation. On the pragmatic side, there is also the cost to take weapons. Even if the state steals them without financial compensation, it will still be expensive to take guns. If the state compensates the owners, there could be a significant financial cost, and this would also need to be factored into the calculation.

One the face of it, it is reasonable to think a mass shooter must have “something wrong” with them. Well-adjusted, moral people do not engage in mass murder. But are mass shooters mentally ill? The nature of mental illness is a medical matter, not a matter for common sense pop psychology or philosophers to resolve. But critical thinking can be applied to the claim that mass shootings are caused by mental illness.

Using the strict medical definition, mentally ill people do not make up the majority of mass shooters and about 3% of violent criminals are mentally ill. Research consistently shows that the mentally ill are more likely to be victims of violence rather than perpetrators. Violence on the part of the mentally ill tends to be self-directed rather than directed at others.

Self-injury is a matter of concern, but mass shootings and gun violence are not primarily a mental health issue. While the mentally ill commit some gun violence, focusing on mental illness as the primary means to reduce gun violence would be an error, except to address cases of self-harm.

It could be objected that the definition of mental illness used above is too narrow and that engaging in a mass shooting is evidence of mental illness because a sane person would not do such a thing. While this has some appeal, expanding the scope of mental illness to automatically include those who engage in mass shootings would be problematic.

One obvious concern is that soldiers and police could thus be classified as mentally ill simply by being involved in shootings on par with a mass shooting. It could be countered that soldiers and the police (usually) use violence legally and rationally while mass shooters and people engaging in other gun violence do not. While it is true that mass shootings and gun violence are illegal, mass shooters do often act from grievances and ideology, just as soldiers and police are sent to kill over grievances and in accord with an ideology. As such, killing people for these reasons does not make someone mentally ill, unless we want to classify combat veterans and some police officers as automatically mentally ill. As far as the legal aspect is concerned, breaking the law hardly seems to show someone is mentally ill, otherwise all criminals would be insane and thus would always succeed in the insanity defense.

A second concern is that assuming mass shooters are mentally ill would eliminate the role of evil. If people do mass shooting things because of mental illness, then they are not evil in a morally meaningful sense. While this could be true, such an approach to evil would need to be applied consistently and not just to mass shootings. So, for example, when terrorists crash planes into buildings or blow up a wedding, they are suffering from mental illness and are not evil. One could attempt to work out accounts of ethics and mental illness that put the blame for gun violence on mental illness while putting the blame for terrorism on evil, but this would be challenging. After all, if a white supremacist kills people because he is mentally ill, then the same would apply to a member of ISIS. Interesting enough, while Republicans and the NRA rush to blame mass shootings on mental illness, they do not do the same for terrorism or other crime and it is interesting to compare the rhetoric used by the same pundit or politicians to describe these situations. This is not to say that a case cannot be made for eliminating the concept of evil in favor of the concept of mental illness, but this must be done in a principled manner and applied consistently.

Considering the above discussion, the mental illness explanation for mass shootings (and gun violence) is not adequate. While seriously addressing mental illness would be laudable, it would not eliminate mass shootings and would have an insignificant impact on most violence (other than self-inflicted violence). This is not to say that mental illness should not be addressed, it absolutely should. But claiming mental illness explains gun violence is an error and a distraction from addressing the causes of gun violence.

In the previous essay I drew an analogy between the ethics of abortion and the ethics of migration. In this essay, I will develop the analogy more and do so with a focus on the logic of the analogy. Because everyone loves logic.

Strictly presented, an analogical argument will have three premises and a conclusion. The first two premises (attempt to) establish the analogy by showing that the things in question are similar in certain respects.  The third premise establishes the additional fact known about one thing and the conclusion asserts that because the two things are alike in other respects, they are alike in this additional respect. Here is the form of the argument:

 

Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.

Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.

Premise 3: X has property Z as well.

Conclusion: Y has property Z

 

X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as rats and humans or Hitler and that politician you hate. P, Q, R, and Z are also variables, but they stand for properties or qualities, such as having a heart. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of the illustration as the things being compared might have more properties in common.

It is easy to make a moral argument using an argument from analogy. To argue that Y is morally wrong, find an X that is already accepted as being wrong and show how Y is like X. To argue that Y is morally good, find an X that is already accepted as morally good and show how Y is like X. To be a bit more formal, here is how the argument would look:

 

Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.

                    Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.

                    Premise 3: X is morally good (or morally wrong).

                    Conclusion: Y is morally good (or morally wrong).

 

The strength of an analogical argument depends on three factors. To the degree that an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument. If it fails to meet these standards, then it is weak. If it is weak enough, then it would be fallacious. There is no exact point at which an analogical argument becomes fallacious, however the standards do provide an objective basis for making this assessment.

First, the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. This standard is based on the commonsense notion that the more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. It should be noted that even if the two things are very much alike in many respects, there is still the possibility that they are not alike regarding Z.

Second, the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present.

Third, it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

In the case of drawing a moral analogy between the ethics of abortion and migration, the challenges are to determine the properties that make them alike and to establish the relevant moral status of abortion.

Since my goal is to show that those who already think abortion is morally wrong should also think expelling migrant children is wrong, I can assume (for the sake of the argument) that abortion is wrong. The next step is showing that abortion and expelling migrant children are alike enough to create a strong analogy.

Opponents of abortion tend to argue that human life has intrinsic worth and often speak in terms of a life being precious and a sacred gift from God. Since they tend to believe that a child exists at or soon after conception, it follows that the wrongness of abortion stems from the harm done to that precious life and sacred gift. While some opponents of abortion do allow exceptions for incest and rape, some do not and  reject abortion even if the pregnancy occurs against the mother’s will. Obviously enough, all opponents of abortion agree that in most cases the mother should be compelled to bear the child, even if they do not want to and even when doing so would cause them some harm. One way to see this is that the child has a right to remain where it is, even when it got there without the consent of the owner of the womb (the mother) and when she does not want it to remain.  What, then, are the similarities between abortion and expelling child migrants?

While this makes for a very problematic analogy, one could note that a child who is brought into the United States illegally would be like a child implanted in a woman (or girl) by rape. That is, their presence is the result of an illegal act and is against the will of the host. While expelling a fetus would certainly (given current technology) result in death, expelling a migrant child generally results in harm and can result, indirectly, in death. As such, if abortion is wrong for the above reasons, then expelling migrant children would be wrong, even if they were brought into the United States illegally.

There are a few obvious ways to counter this reasoning. One is to focus on the distinction between expelling a fetus and expelling a migrant child. As noted above, the fetus will certainly die during an abortion, but expelling a migrant child back into danger does cause certain death. This requires taking the moral position that only certain death matters. Interestingly, if artificial wombs became available, then abortion opponents who take the only death matters view would have to accept that a woman would have every right to expel a fetus into an artificial  womb, if death was not certain. That is, if the odds of the fetus would be comparable to the odds of a child being expelled back into a dangerous region.

A second difference is that migrant children are already born, so they are not unborn children. Those who are anti-abortion are often unconcerned about what happens to born children and mothers (anti-abortion states tend to have the highest infant mortality rates), so it would be “consistent” for them to not be concerned about the fate of migrant children. This requires accepting the moral view that what matters is preventing abortion and that once birth occurs, moral concern ends. While not an impossible view, it does seem rather difficult to defend in a consistent manner. As such, those who oppose abortion in all cases would need to accept that expelling migrant children into danger would be morally wrong and they should oppose this with the same vehemence with which they oppose abortion. But what about anti-abortion folks who allow abortion in the case of rape and incest?

Those who oppose abortion but make exceptions for cases of rape and incest would seem to be able to consistently advocate expelling migrant children, even when doing so would put them in danger. This is because they hold to what seems to be a consistent principle: if a child is present against the will of the property owner and as the result of a crime, then the child can be expelled even if this results in death whether this is an abortion or expelling a child who is an illegal migrant. But if the child is present due to consensual activity, then it would be wrong to expel the child.

While sexual consent can be a thorny issue, migration consent is even more problematic. After all, there is the question about what counts as consensual migration. On the face of it, one could simply go with the legal view: those who cross the border illegally are here without consent and can be expelled. But there is the fact that American business and others actively invite migrants to cross the border and want them here, thus seeming to grant a form of consent. Also, people can (or could) legally cross the border to seek asylum, thus there is legal consent for such people, which includes migrant children. So, the matter is less clear cut. But even if we stick with strict legality, then asylum seekers are still here with consent and hence expelling their children is morally like abortion: children are being harmed by being expelled. As such, those who hold an anti-abortion position are obligated to also oppose expelling migrant children if they arrived seeking asylum.

It is worth noting that if the analogy holds, it will also seem to hold in reverse. That is, a person who is opposed to expelling migrant children because of the harm it would do to them would seem to also need to oppose abortion. Pro-choice pro-migrant folks do have a way to get out of this. They can argue that while migrant children are clearly people and hence have that moral status, a developing fetus does not have that moral status and hence the choice of the woman trumps the rights (if any) of the fetus. This is a consistent position since the pro-choice pro-migrant person holds that people have rights, but that the fetus is not a person. In contrast, the anti-abortion anti-migrant person is in something of a bind; they need to argue that unborn fetuses have a greater moral status than already born migrant children.  But they are usually comfortable with claiming that an unborn fetus has the same or more rights than the mother, so this is probably not a problem for them.