Category: Ethics

My long-term, long-distance relationship came to an amicable end in May of 2024, thus briefly tossing me back into the world of dating before I gave up. This is the sequel to a similar ending with a different person back in 2016, allowing me to revisit what I wrote back then.

Since starting and maintaining a relationship is a lot of work (if not, you are either lucky or doing it wrong), I think it is important to consider whether relationships are worth it. One obvious consideration is the fact that most romantic relationships end well before death.  Even marriage, which is supposed to be the most solid of relationships, tends to end in divorce. I am divorced; my smart and ambitious wife took an excellent academic job in California and then divorced me in 2004 when she could no longer do the long-distance thing. I definitely have a type.

While there are many ways to look at the ending of a relationship, there are two main approaches. One is to consider the relationship a failure. This can be seen as trying to write a book and not finish: all that work poured into it, yet it remains incomplete. Another obvious analogy is with running a marathon and not finishing. While great effort was expended, it ended in failure.

Another approach is to consider the ending more positively: the relationship ended but was completed. Going back to the analogies, it is like completing that book you are writing or finishing that marathon. True, it has ended, but it is supposed to end.

When my previous relationship ended in 2016, I initially looked at it as a failure: all that effort invested and it ended because, despite two years of trying, we could not get academic jobs in the same geographical area. However, I tried to look at it in a more positive light: although I would have preferred that it did not end, it was a very positive relationship, rich with wonderful experiences and helped me to become better as a human being. There still, of course, remains the question of whether it is worth being in another relationship. As a spoiler, I did meet another wonderful person, a smart ambitious woman who moved away and decided that the long-distance relationship was too much. I guess that is a double spoiler.

One way to address this is in the context of biology and evolution. Humans are animals that need food, water and air to survive. As such, there is no real question about whether food, water and air are worth it, one is simply driven to possess them. Likewise, humans are driven by their biology to reproduce, and natural selection seems to have selected genes that mold brains to engage in relationships. As such, there is no real question of whether they are worth it, humans have relationships. This answer is, of course, rather unsatisfying since a person can, it would seem, make the choice to be in a relationship or not. There is also the question of whether relationships are worth it. This is a question of value and science is not the realm where such answers lie. Value questions belong to such areas as moral philosophy and aesthetics. So, on to value.

The question of whether relationships are worth it or not is like asking whether technology is worth it: the question is too broad. While some might endeavor to give sweeping answers to these broad questions, such an approach would be problematic and unsatisfying. Just as it makes sense to be more specific about technology (such as asking if ChatGPT is worth the cost), it makes more sense to consider whether a specific relationship is worth it. That is, there seems to be no general answer to the question of whether relationships are worth it or not, it is a question of whether a specific relationship would be worth it.

It could be countered that there is, in fact, a legitimate general question. A person might see any likely relationship to not be worth it. For example, I know many professionals who have devoted their lives to their careers and have no interest in relationships. They say they do not consider romantic involvement to have much, if any value. A person might also regard a relationship as a necessary part of their well-being. While this might be due to social conditioning or biology, there are certainly people who consider almost any relationship worth it.

These counters are reasonable, but it can be argued that the general question is best answered by considering specific relationships. If no specific possible (or likely) relationship for a person would be worth it, then relationships in general would not be worth it. So, if a person honestly considered all the relationships she might have and rejected all of them because their value is not sufficient, then relationships would not be worth it to her. As noted above, some people take this view.

If at least some possible (or likely) relationships would be worth it to a person, then relationships would thus be worth it. This leads to an obvious point: the worth of a relationship depends on that specific relationship, so it comes down to weighing the negative and positive aspects. If there is a sufficient surplus of positive over the negative, then the relationship would be worth it.

As should be expected, there are many serious epistemic problems here. How does a person know what would be positive or negative? How does a person know that a relationship with a specific person would be more positive or more negative? How does a person know what they should do to make the relationship more positive than negative? How does a person know how much the positive needs to outweigh the negative to make the relationship worth it? And, of course, many more concerns. Given the challenge of answering these questions, it is no wonder that so many relationships fail. There is also the fact that each person has a different answer to many of these questions, so getting answers from others will tend to be of little real value and could lead to problems. Back in 2016, I had given up on relationships until I was inspired to try again. As I write this, I am once again in a state of doubt.

Back in the last pandemic, lawsuits were filed by some religious groups because of  restrictions imposed in response to COVID-19. If the government imposes similar restrictions during a future pandemic, this will happen again. One  concern about such lawsuits is that churches were super spreaders of COVID-19. An interesting consideration is that while politicians have made a religious freedom issue out of the COVID restrictions, most Americans (including religious Americans) did not see these restrictions as a threat to religious freedom.  The issue is whether these sorts of pandemic restrictions violate religious freedom. I will focus on the moral issue and leave the legal issue to the lawyers.

As a starting point, religious freedom is not absolute and can be justly restricted in at least some cases. As a general argument, unrestricted freedom would restrict (or destroy) itself. To use a silly example, if religious freedom was absolute, then the religious freedom of a religion that wanted to restrict all other religions on religious grounds must also be respected. This is a reductio on the idea of absolute freedom (and one I stole from Thomas Hobbes). As such, religious freedom requires some restrictions on religious freedom. If so, then what we need to settle is the limit (or the extent) of religious freedom and see where pandemic restrictions fall.

Intuitively, we all probably agree that religious freedom should not allow people to engage in such things as murder, theft, rape, and genocide. So, if the Church of Murder, Rape and Robbery insisted they had the moral right to rob, rape and murder you on the grounds of religious liberty you would, I assume, disagree. And rightfully so. Sticking within a rights theory of ethics, your right to life and property would override their right to religious liberty. This rests on the notion that there is a hierarchy of rights, with some rights having more moral weight than others (among other factors). One could also use a utilitarian approach of the sort developed by Mill: if restricting religious liberty would create more positive value than negative value, then doing so would be morally right. While the members of the Church of Murder, Rape and Robbery would be unhappy about not being able to practice their faith on other people, the harm this would inflict outweighs their unhappiness.

I am not claiming that wanting a religious freedom exemption from pandemic restrictions is analogous to wanting the freedom to murder, rape and rob. My point is to establish that limiting religious freedom to protect other rights and to prevent harm can be morally acceptable. But this does not settle the specific issue of whether pandemic restrictions would violate religious freedom. Obviously, this will depend on the specific restrictions and the context.

One relevant factor is the intent of restrictions. If restrictions were created and applied intending to infringe on religious liberty, then that would be wrong. But even if the restrictions were created and applied with only benign intent, they could still violate religious liberty. To use an analogy, one might impose restrictions on high calorie drinks from a benign intent (to reduce obesity) and yet still be wrongly limiting freedom.  But there is no evidence that the past restrictions were created to harm religious liberty. As far as future restrictions go, they would need to be assessed.

Another relevant factor is consistency in restrictions. To illustrate, if religious gatherings were restricted because of the risk of people gathering, then fairness requires that standard be applied consistently. For example, if bars, restaurants, and movie theaters were allowed to operate normally while churches were limited, then there would a moral case that churches were being treated unfairly. The conclusion of such moral reasoning might, however, be that the bars, restaurants, and movie theaters should also be restricted rather than that the churches should not be restricted.

One can also make the essential service argument for churches. Grocery stores, car rental businesses and many government offices remained open because they were considered essential. The justification here is on utilitarian grounds: there would be more harm in closing them than keeping them open. To use the most obvious illustration, closing grocery stores and food delivery would result in starvation, so keeping these operating is morally acceptable. One cannot Zoom salad or download pizza.  But are large, in-person gatherings at churches essential during a pandemic?

Religious is obviously important, even essential to some people. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether large, in person gatherings are essential to religion. That is, can people practice their religion without being able to gather closely in large numbers. To use an analogy, running is essential to me, but large road races were restricted during the pandemic. Could I practice my running without the large gatherings of races?

On the face of it, the answer is yes. Religious people could gather online, they could gather outside and space themselves, they could gather inside in small groups wearing masks, and so on. In the case of running, I can still run by myself, I can run with others by maintaining distance, and I can do virtual races. These do involve costs and inconveniences, but they all allow people to continue to practice the group aspects of religion (and running). The fact that most religious people did these things provides evidence that religion (and running) can be practiced while restrictions are in effect. This can, of course, be disputed on theological grounds—something I will leave to the theologians. But on the face of it these restrictions did not interfere with religious liberty in a way that is unfair, inconsistent, or unwarranted relative to other freedoms, like the freedom of running.  

If restrictions are applied consistently based on relevant factors such as gathering size, risk, being essential, and proximity, then the issue would become whether there should be a special religious freedom exemption from restrictions. The issue is thus whether religious freedom would allow a special exemption because religious people want to gather in ways that violate pandemic restrictions. If so, this means that there should be religious exemption in the case of public health. After all, they would not just be putting themselves at risk, they be putting everyone they contact at risk as well.

Imagine, if you will, that a person infected with Ebola insists on their religious freedom and demands they be allowed to go to church without restriction. This would be wrong: such a deadly disease could kill the others and then spread out into the community. While COVID-19 was not as lethal as Ebola, it is meaningfully dangerous. Other pandemics will come in varying degrees of lethality as well. If the next pandemic is more like COVID-19 than Ebola, perhaps it could be argued that churches should be allowed an exemption to operate normally.  Churches have the right to stay open in flu season, although this does put people at risk. But we would probably all agree that people infected with Ebola should not be allowed to freely go to church because they have religious freedom. So, it is a matter of how much risk is acceptable.

To use an analogy, we all probably agree that military grade flamethrowers should not be allowed for in-church use even if a church considers fire an important part of their services. This is because flame throwers would present a danger to the people in the church and could create a fire that would spread. But imagine a church that wants something less than flamethrowers: they just want their church to be exempt from the fire safety laws and regulations that other people must follow. They argue that their religion values fire, so being forced to have things like smoke alarms, working fire extinguishers and fire exits would violate their religious freedom to practice their faith. They also want to be able to use lots of fire in their services and want to a stock of flammable material on hand, stored in loose piles around the church, as their faith demands. They would argue that there is some risk, but it is relatively low compared to flame throwers. But, of course, they could easily set their church on fire and have it spread to all the nearby structures and burn them down (and hurt the people in them). While they could be argued to have a right to burn themselves and their church, their religious freedom would not seem to give them a right to put the nearby buildings (including other churches) and the people in them at such needless risk. They can, of course, have the fire needed for their faith, but it must be kept in a way that does not needlessly risk hurting other people. The same would seem to apply to pandemic restrictions and churches: they have the right to practice their faith, but they do not have the right to put others at risk while doing so.  

The question of whether some philosophical ideas are too harmful to even be proposed was raised in a philosophy teaching group on Facebook. The essay that follows is a quick ramble rather than a complete theory of harmful ideas.

When addressing this question, a good starting place is determining who would be harmed and the nature of the harm. From the perspective of those who perceive themselves as harmed, the answer is likely to be “yes.” But this leads to the matter of whether a perceived harm warrants not proposing an idea.

An easy and obvious way to approach this moral issue is utilitarianism: if proposing a philosophical idea would generate more harm (negative value) than benefit (positive value) for the morally relevant beings, then it would be too harmful to propose. Ideas would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis using a plausible account of value, a plausible system of weighing these values, and a plausible account of who is morally relevant. As would be expected, people can come up with different assessments in good faith. The obvious counters to this utilitarian approach would be arguments in favor of other moral systems, such as a deontological theory of ethics.

 The discussion of harmful ideas would also require setting some guidelines about the sort of ideas and harms that should be given serious consideration. For example, it is easy to make up a horror story of a philosophical idea such that understanding the idea would lead to madness, catatonia or even death. Fortunately, these fictional cases are easy to address: these ideas would  be too harmful to propose. The moral justification would be analogous to arguments one might use to show that handing out poisoned food to people would be wrong. While such ideas might be possible, this seems to be a purely theoretical concern: fun for horror stories but as worrisome as the possibility of being mauled by werewolves. That said,  there is the science-fiction case of Roko’s basilisk that some might use as an example of an idea too harmful to propose. But there seems to be no evidence for any meaningful harm caused by this idea. As such, it is best to focus on ideas that could cause actual harm.

Real philosophical ideas do cause harm. Obvious examples range from ideas that create mild discomfort in students to philosophical ideas that have been used to justify brutally oppressive governments. These ideas are already out in the wild but can be used as the starting point for discussions about general categories of new ideas. We should, of course, not make public an example of an idea we suspect might be too harmful to propose.

One general category of ideas would be those that would cause psychological distress in people, perhaps because these ideas are about those people. To use a real example, a philosophical idea that gender is set by Platonic universals and is thus an objective feature of reality could cause some dismay and distress, especially people for those whom a choice of gender is important. To use another real example, the philosophical ideas used to argue for atheism (such as the problem of evil) can be distressing to people of faith. These sorts of situations fall under existing concerns about ideas that cause similar distress, especially in the classroom. That is, these new ideas could be assessed in the context of how we already handle existing ideas.

Another general category of ideas is those that could cause social, economic, or political harm if proposed and acted upon. As a real example, the philosophical underpinnings of fascism and racism (such as they are) have a role in the harms done by these views. As another real example, those who possess great wealth and power would contend they could be harmed by the philosophical ideas underlying socialism, social justice, anarchism, and other views inimical to concentrated wealth and power.

These ideas should be assessed in a way like how one should assess new technology: what harm could it generate directly and what are likely scenarios in which it can be misused? While people often overestimate and underestimate harms and benefits, engaging in an assessment is still preferable to letting it loose in the wild and hoping for the best. We would also need to keep in mind the obvious: what is harmful to some can be beneficial to others. To illustrate with a sci-fi example, if a philosopher has an idea that would effectively undermine capitalism and create a Star Trek style world, then this would be perceived as extremely harmful to the ruling classes yet would be objectively beneficial to humanity. The rulers would, one assumes, would see this idea as too harmful to propose.

In closing, there can be ideas too harmful to propose but we lack a well-developed account of such ideas. At least for now.

Back when Black Lives Mattered, there was talk about defunding the police. While nothing significant seems to have come of this, it did create controversy at the time.  Some took issue with the choice of the word “defund” since  it allowed the right to easily create a straw person to attack. A straw person is a fallacy in which a distorted or exaggerated version is put in place of the actual claim, argument, or position. The straw version is attacked, thus “refuting” the real version. The most common straw person was that “defunding the police” meant the complete abolition of law enforcement. This was not true. While there was disagreement, the general view is that the police should have their funding reduced to fund chronically underfunded community services, such as mental health care. Some people did (and do) think that the current system of policing should be abolished in favor of a better system.

The straw person often guided the right into a slippery slope fallacy. This is a fallacy in which it is claimed that something (usually terrible) will inevitably follow from something else. The fallacy occurs when the connection between the two is not adequately supported. Slippery slope fallacies often involve hyperbole in the form of an extravagant exaggeration of the alleged consequences. In the case of defunding the police, the straw person slippery slope used by some on the right is that defunding the police would lead to utter chaos.

This also involved the use of scare tactics, a fallacy in which the “support” offered for the claim is something intended to frighten the target. As would also be expected, there are often racist dog-whistles (or open racism) employed to craft these nightmare scenarios.

It can be argued that that there are radical anarchists who want to get rid of the state and there are people who want a world free of police so they can commit violence, assault and theft. But taking these people to define what it means to defund the police is like using the Westboro Baptist Church to define all Christians. Using the most extreme members of the group to define the entire group, be they on the left or the right, is the fallacy of nut picking.  While there are many excellent moral arguments for defunding the police, I will focus on a very practical moral argument involving effective use of community resources. As “defunding the police” seems forever tainted, I prefer the phrase “rethinking the police.”

For a variety of reasons, the United States saw a marked militarization of the police. Police training has also shifted, with a very lucrative industry arising that trains police to be warriors. This would make sense if there had been a significant rise in violent crime and criminals were regularly using military weapons. However, violent crime has been consistently decreasing over time. While criminals do use assault rifles and some have used body armor, most crimes are not committed with guns and the most common guns used in crimes are handguns. While there is value in having superior firepower, the militarization of the police vastly exceeds the threat to a degree that is almost ludicrous. Also, SWAT teams exist for a reason, which is to handle the rare cases in which they are needed. But it doesn’t make sense to have most police armed to SWAT levels.

One problem with the combination of militarization and warrior training is a bias towards the use of force. One aspect of rethinking the police involves demilitarizing to make them less threatening to the public and, some hope, reducing the bias towards violence. There is also an image problem: militarized police marching the streets of America, violently attacking protestors makes us look like a repressive authoritarian state. To be fair, and balanced, this might soon be an accurate image.  Another problem with a militarized warrior police is that they are equipped and trained for violence but dealing with violent crime is a small fraction of their job.

While cities vary in the time officers spend on activities, addressing violent crime takes up about 4% of a typical shift. Over 30% of an officer’s time is spent responding to non-criminal calls. The rest of the time is spent on traffic, other crimes, property crimes and proactive activity. Between 6 and 9% are medical calls. Even it is incorrectly assumed that violent crimes always call for a militarized warrior response, that means that only 4% of police activity is responsible for the cost of militarizing the police and maintaining a warrior force. As numerous incidents involving people with mental health issues, autism, and other medical issues have shown, warrior police are  poorly equipped and trained to address these situations, even if they have the best intentions.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the right thing to do is to use the community resources to produce the best results. From a practical standpoint, the right thing to do is to use  community resources in a way that matches the needs of the community and to use the most effective methods, equipment, and training to meet these needs. Since violent crime makes up such a tiny fraction of police work, it makes moral and practical sense to shift funding and change the way policing works in the United States to make it both more ethical and more rational in terms of resource use.

While this might seem like a crazy notion or a utopian dream, some American communities have implemented these changes. An excellent example is the CAHOOTS program in Eugene, Oregon.  The gist of this program is that medics and mental health counselors are sent to respond to appropriate 911 calls. Because the United States has an ever-growing problem with homelessness, drug addiction and mental illness there is a corresponding need for professional response. Starting with Reagan, the United States decided to dump many social and health issues onto the police, and this has worked out as expected. Programs like CAHOOTS aim at reversing this. This program has proven successful and other cities are adopting similar programs. Rethinking the police has been going on for 30 years in Oregon and was spreading. This was a good thing.

While having medical professionals respond to relevant calls would be a major improvement, this does not address the underlying problems. In many ways, it is rather like policing: controlling the symptoms of social ills while leaving the causes in place. Ethically and effectively rethinking the police would require using resources to fix the social ills that require policing in all its forms. It would also, obviously, require meaningful political and economic changes to address poverty, homelessness, and such ills as the opioid epidemic inflicted by the pharmaceutical companies.  Rethinking the police in an ethical and rational manner would make for a better America for most people and is the right thing to do.

Back in my high school and college track and cross-country days I was accustomed to unflattering comparisons between runners and football players. Runners were mocked as weak and unmanly, while football is a sport for manly men. When Trump’s followers praise his strength, this reminds me of those days and leads me consider the concept of strength.

My conception of strength was influenced by one of my fellow college runners. After he was jokingly mocked by football players, he replied that anyone could hurt somebody else, but it took a real athlete to hurt themselves. To be fair to football players, they do endure being hurt by others and when doing serious training they hurt themselves. But this remark provides a good starting point for a discussion of strength in the context of Trump.

As a runner, I think of strength in terms of the ability to overcome pain, fear and vices to achieve excellence. As an example, getting up at 5:00 am to do a 12-mile training run in the freezing rain is an example of strength. Completing a marathon despite the pain and exhaustion is also an example of strength. While running provides a serious test of strength, there are far greater tests. A good example is the case of someone Trump loathed, Senator John McCain.

While I disagreed with McCain on many political issues, I respect the moral courage and strength he showed during the Viet Nam war. As is well known, McCain was shot down and captured. Severely injured, he endured torture and survived as a prisoner of war. When his captors offered to release him as a sign of preferential treatment, he refused in accord with the military Code of Conduct.  McCain showed incredible strength, endured pain and fear and resisted efforts to corrupt him. One can find other accounts of the strength of American soldiers who endured fear, pain and danger. Strength, obviously, is not limited to the military. The parent who endures the burden of working multiple jobs to provide for their children while also caring for their own parents shows great strength. Those who face adversity, pain and fear with courage show their strength, even if they are broken or killed in their acts of strength. Even the strongest have limits, and there is merit and honor even in defeat.

Trump has a different view of such people. I selected McCain as an example because Trump’s view of McCain is well known. Trump said of John McCain that “He’s not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.” I also used the example of American soldiers because Trump has allegedly called Americans who have died in war “losers” and “suckers.” Trump’s followers see him as strong, but given his utter contempt for McCain and America’s war dead, one must wonder about their conception of strength.

While McCain endured great adversity, Trump has not. He was given millions and has enjoyed a life in which others do his work for him (such as writing “his” book) and clean up his messes. Aside from his repeated bankruptcies and failures, he has been able to escape the consequences of his actions.  But Trump does face some challenges, and these allow us to see his alleged strength.

A good place to look for Trump’s alleged strength is how he handles even mild criticism and challenges presented by people in the media. One can also look at the harsher criticisms advanced by journalists and authors such as Bob Woodward.

Trump’s response is to throw tantrums and lie when faced with even mild criticism. He , accoridng to Tom Nichols, “…is a vain, cowardly, lying, vulgar, jabbering blowhard.” He is also a blamer who refuses to accept responsibility and turns against his people, throwing them under the bus rather than showing strength of characters and accepting responsibility and exhibiting loyalty. He is weakness personified, unable to endure even the mildest criticism without cracking. So where is his strength?

Going back to the remarks by my running friend, Trump’s “strength” seems to lie in his willingness to hurt others; he is “strong” enough to act in ways counter to empathy, compassion and moral decency. This is the sort of strength praised by Himmler in his Posen speeches: “Most of you here know what it means when 100 corpses lie next to each other, when there are 500 or when there are 1,000. To have endured this and at the same time to have remained a decent person — with exceptions due to human weaknesses — has made us tough, and is a glorious chapter that has not and will not be spoken of.” Himmler also expressed his view of strength when he said ,“Thus I have basically given the order to also kill the wives and children of these partisans, and commissars. I would be a weakling and a criminal to our descendants if I allowed the hate-filled sons of the sub-humans we have liquidated in this struggle of humanity against subhumanity to grow up.”

While people often roll their eyes at Nazi comparisons, this view that strength is a matter of overcoming kindness and moral principles in order to do “what must be done” is one explicitly endorsed by modern  thinkers of the right. Ben Shapiro, for example, has come out against empathy. Elon Musk has also come out against empathy, seeing it as a threat to Western civilization. It must be noted that there are critics of empathy who are not on the right; but these criticisms are not that empathy must be overcome by strength so that we might do the “hard things that must be done.” Rather, these tend to be criticisms of tribal empathy, which is only feeling empathy for your side. There have also been criticisms of how empathy can lead to bad policy, not because caring precludes good policy. The concern is that identifying with a very specific person in very specific circumstances can result in badly crafted laws. Those critical of this aspect of empathy do not advocate being uncaring, but advocate compassion over empathy. The right advocates cruelty.

It could be objected that strength is required to overcome empathy, compassion, and moral qualms to do the things that must be done. Going back to my example of McCain and the dead soldiers, they were in combat and usually willing to harm others in battle. Their strength was that they could do the hard things that must be done in war. While this sort of objection does have some appeal, there is an important moral distinction between the strength required to be a combatant and the strength required to be murderous and cruel. Himmler claims that those who engaged in the murders he described retained their decency and were acting from strength; but that is not true. They were engaged in genocide and thus they lost all claim to being decent people.

In the case of Trump, his “strength” is not the sort of strength that enables a person to do something difficult that must be done and can be morally justified, like fighting in a just war. Rather, his cruelty is mistaken for strength. That he readily does cruel and terrible things without any expression of regret, remorse or compassion shows the weakness of his character.  He cannot even be given some credit for contending against those as strong or stronger than him for he is the President and even before then he made a point of going after those with far less power. As such, his followers are making the classic error of confusing cruel emptiness with strength.

Some years ago The Atlantic published a piece claiming that Trump described Americans killed in war as ‘losers’ and ‘suckers.’ Trump has denied these claims and his supporters  rushed to defend him. As would be expected, people tend to believe or reject the claims based on their ideology rather than on considerations of the evidence. I will endeavor to assess the claims philosophically.

In support of the claims is the fact that the Atlantic is a credible source that engages in careful fact checking.  The story has also been corroborated by other news outlets. Trump and his supporters denied the claims. From a critical thinking standpoint, this dispute comes down to an assessment of relative credibility of the Atlantic and Trump. Looked at objectively, Trump lies regularly and the Atlantic carefully fact checks its claims. As such, this is a major plus in favor of the Atlantic. Trump’s supporters assert, without evidence, that the Atlantic is fake news but the burden of proof was  on them to respond to the evidence in favor of the Atlantic’s credibility. If the Atlantic is fake news, they should be able to present evidence establishing this. An obvious problem is that Trump’s supporters tend to reject any claims unfavorable to Trump as false while those who loath Trump tend to accept such claims because of their dislike of Trump. For those between these extremes, the Atlantic would presumably win the credibility battle.

Counting against the Atlantic is the fact that it has a known center-left bias. As such, the Atlantic does have a motivation to be critical of Trump and this lowers its credibility. Trump and his supporters are, obviously, biased in Trump’s favor which lowers their credibility. As such, it comes down to assessing the relative bias and its impact on the credibility of each source. Once again, Trump’s supporters will tend to see the Atlantic as utterly biased against Trump and those who loath Trump will take him as utterly biased. Those in the middle would seem likely to favor the Atlantic here.

Also counting against the Atlantic is the fact that the sources are anonymous. As such, we must rely on a double argument from authority: the claims are supported by the claimed expertise of the author in assessing the anonymous sources and the expertise (broadly speaking) of the anonymous sources. Since we do not know the identity of the sources, we cannot assess their credibility ourselves and must rely on the credibility of the author. While some might be tempted to reject anonymous sources out of hand, this would be an error since anonymous sources have a legitimate role in reporting in cases in which the sources could be harmed if they were identified. Trump would have taken action against anyone who revealed these negative facts. While the use of anonymous sources does not count against the credibility of the claims, their identification and confirmation would greatly increase credibility. And, of course, their identification and disconfirmation would reduce the credibility of the claims. Having a recording of what Trump said would also have a large impact on the credibility of the claims, although one should consider the possibility of technological trickery.

Counting in favor of the claims is Trump’s confirmed negative statements about veterans and, most especially prisoners of war. Trump famously attacked  former POW John McCain, asserting that he likes people that were not captured. Trump also has an established history of disrespecting veterans, soldiers and the military. Trump’s seemingly complete focus on defining all interactions as transactional  is consistent with the claims attributed to him, as is his well known cruelty and lack of empathy. The claims attributed to Trump are completely consistent with Trump’s character and his past claims, which increases the credibility of these claims about him. As such, it is reasonable to believe that the article is accurate.

While Trump and his supporters are very pro-military, Trump has made it clear that he is anti-veteran. The Musk-Trump regime’s cuts have caused significant and ongoing harm to veterans, and Trump expressed no concern for this harm. As such, his current actions lend credence to this past claim.

Back in 2020, Kyle Rittenhouse became famous for shooting three people in Kenosha, Wisconsin. This took place during protests of the killing of Jacob Blake by police. While he was charged, he was found not guilty and even got to meet with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 2021.

My adopted city of Tallahassee also saw an armed response to protestors. Fortunately, the incident ended quickly without injury or death. The episode seems to have begun with a confrontation between the protestors and the armed person which escalated into shoving. The armed person then drew his weapon to deter the protestors and quickly surrendered to the police.  He was seen as acting in legitimate self-defense: he felt threatened and drew his weapon to deter possible attackers. He might even be credited with showing restraint as Florida has a controversial stand your ground law that might have allowed him to legally shoot the protestors.

These two examples raise the issue of whether it is ethical to go armed to confront protestors. Since my expertise is not law, I will leave it to the lawyers, legislators, and judges to sort out the legal aspects and will focus on the moral issue.

To pre-empt likely straw person attacks, I will begin with the obvious: if protestors unjustly attack someone, they have the right to self-defense. For example, if Sally is standing in front of her store and protestors start throwing bricks at her, she has the right of self-defense. She has done nothing to warrant their attack, and they are acting wrongly to harm her.

As another example, if Bill engages protestors in a debate and the protestors start punching him, then he would have the moral right of self-defense. He has the moral right to be in public spaces and to express his views. As such, he would have done nothing that would warrant the attack and can rightfully defend himself.

At the other extreme there are cases in which it would be absurd to claim the right of self-defense. For example, if a person watches too much Fox News and is terrified of protestors and opens fire on a group of peaceful protestors walking past his property, he cannot claim the moral right of self-defense. Merely being afraid does not suffice to warrant self-defense; there must be a level of threat that a reasonable person would recognize. As another example, if a protestor was spray-painting protest slogans on the wall of a business, this would not morally warrant the owner shooting them as the offense does not merit the punishment of death. As with most moral issues, it is the land between the extremes where the meaningful debate usually takes place.

While many would see the Rittenhouse case as open and shut, it does raise a general point worth considering. Rather than focus on the specific case, this incident raises the moral question of whether a person has the moral right to intentionally travel to a place to defend the property or lives of others knowing that confrontation is likely. This is, of course, a case of an intentional, traveling vigilante. Since I have written vigilantism before, I will take my usual approach of using John Locke’s theory of self-defense.

Locke argues that when we are in the state of civil society, we still retain the right of self-defense and the right to protect others. But it must be “activated” before it can justly be used. What must occur is that a person must be temporarily removed from the state of civil society by an action that wrongly threatens life, liberty, or property. For this to occur, there must be no viable civil authority able or willing to intervene on the person’s behalf. If there is a viable and willing civil authority that can act effectively, the person remains in the state of civil society and does not have the right to use violence. To use an obvious example, if I am in a confrontation and someone punches me and a police officer immediately pins them to the ground, I do not have the right to attack them because the civil authority was present and acted effectively. But if the officer is fifty feet away while the person is trying to hit me, I have the moral right to engage them. But if the officer subdues them, I do not have the right to keep hitting them as civil society has been restored.

On the face of it, a travelling vigilante would be hard-pressed to invoke the right of self-defense: they must travel to a place to intentionally put themselves in danger when they could just stay home and remain safe. This is like running across a room to get in front of a punch aimed at someone else just so one can claim self-defense. That would be absurd. So, a travelling vigilante cannot justly claim self-defense: they could have defended themselves by staying away from the danger. 

But Locke also allows, in the state of nature, people to rightfully defend others. So, if civil society has failed in a location, then people would have a moral right to go to that place to defend lives and property that are being wrongfully threatened. Specific cases would require sorting out whether the alleged threats were real and morally wrong. But if civil society has not failed in that location, then such an action would not be warranted: protecting life, liberty and property is the obligation of the state and vigilantes would not be warranted in using violence. As such, a travelling vigilante could be justified in cases in which civil authority has failed.

The other general sort of case involves a person going to a protest while armed, knowing that their planned actions or presence is likely to provoke a response. There are two main types of situations here. One is that the person is aware that their presence and actions might provoke a response, but they do not intend to instigate violence. If the person has a morally acceptable reason to go, even if it is just to exercise their right to be in a public space, then their going would seem to be acceptable. That said, a person should still consider the consequences of their actions: while they do have the right to be there, if they go knowing they will trigger a conflict, then they bear some responsibility if something happens. After all, they could avoid the conflict by not going. To use an analogy, if Sam’s ex is going to be at a party and Sam knows there will be an incident if he goes, while he still has the right to attend the party, he does have some responsibility for deciding to attend. But, of course, if he does not want an incident and his ex is the instigator, then the ex bears most of the responsibility.

The second is that the person intends to provoke a response so that they can engage in violence while claiming they are acting in self-defense. This is morally complicated. On the one hand, claiming self-defense after intentionally provoking the response would be morally problematic. To use an ex analogy, if Sam knows that his ex will create an incident and ruin the party if he shows up and provokes her and shows up intending to provoke her and ruin the party, then he bears some of the blame.

On the other hand, it can be argued that even if the person intends to provoke an incident, they can still claim self-defense if those provoked act wrongly. Using the ex-example, if Sam knows what his ex will do and goes with the intent of provoking her, if his provocation does not morally justify her response, he can still rightfully claim that she bears most of the responsibility. He can, rightfully, claim that she has no right to respond in that manner even though he knows what will happen when he goes and provokes her. So, if Joe attends a protest of Trump and Musk supporters and shouts “black lives matter” and “go home Elon” intending to provoke a violent response, then he would bear some responsibility if violence ensued. After all, but for his presence and actions, it would not have occurred.  But he can also claim self-defense: the violent response was not warranted by his provocation. This does, of course, raise complicated moral questions about what sort of provocation warrants a violent response.

https://www.dukeupress.edu/fugitive-modernities

Jessica Krug, a former history professor at George Washington University, admitted to misrepresenting her race and ethnicity. In her confession, she accepted responsibility for her deception while making note of her mental health issues.  This incident was a gift to the right: when it occurred, I learned about it from a Facebook post contending this was proof that there is no such thing as white privilege. While the post asserted this claim without any argument, it did raise an interesting issue.

One could argue that if there is an advantage to a white person masquerading as black, then white privilege must not be real. After all, if a rational person were seeking an advantage by masquerading as another ethnicity, they would take on the most advantageous role. Since the white Krug masqueraded as black and she is clearly intelligent, then it follows that being white is not more advantageous than being black. Therefore, one might conclude that white privilege is not real.

While Krug does refer to mental health issues, she does not claim she took on the black identity because of mental illness. So, it would be a mistake to try to counter the above argument by contending she was crazy and thus gave up her real white privilege. In fact, while her choice was morally wrong, it can be seen as a clever choice in her situation and a case can be made that her masquerade was advantageous while also arguing that this is consistent with white privilege.

The statistical evidence for white privilege is overwhelming. The idea of white privilege is not that white people have it easy or get everything for nothing. In the United States, life for everyone who is not in the upper classes is difficult and often precarious. But being white makes it a bit less bad.  An average white person will enjoy statistically significant advantages over a black person because they are white. Or, rather, other people give white people an advantage in many circumstances. But this does not entail that there are no circumstances in which appearing black can yield an advantage.

As an analogy, matching the current conception of physical beauty yields many advantages and beautiful people are perceived as being better in many non-beauty related ways. But there can be specific and limited circumstances in which not being seen as conventionally beautiful can be advantageous. For example, a company might be looking for models who do not match that conception of beauty for a an ad campaign. As another example, there are some professional contexts in which matching that conception of beauty could be a disadvantage. But these limited cases do not prove that there is no general beauty advantage.

While the academy still favors white people (and more so every day now), there can be specific jobs, awards, fellowships, scholarships, and other opportunities in which being (or appearing) black can be an advantage (or a necessity). For example, when I was at Ohio State a fellow grad student applied for an African-American scholarship. He had dual American and African citizenship and thus seemed to qualify. But he did not because he was a white African-American and not black. There are also certain academic fields where having a specific identity provides more perceived credibility. A humorous example of this is the Black Jeopardy skit on Saturday Night Live featuring Lewis C.K. as a professor of African American Studies at Brigham Young University. It was funny, obviously, because Lewis C.K. is white. In such cases, appearing black can provide a specific advantage that can outweigh the general advantages of being white. While Krug would probably have been successful if she had been honest, this was a very narrow and  unusual case in which appearing black was probably more advantageous. As such, her case does not disprove white privilege; at best it shows that there are very limited and rare circumstances in which appearing black can provide a very specific advantage.

Some on the right might be pleased I have agreed that there can be cases in which a black person can  gain an advantage because they are black. But they should not be that pleased: all I have argued for is that there are very limited cases in which being (or appearing) black can yield a limited and specific contextual advantage. This does not show that whites are at a general disadvantage in the academy. And it certainly does not disprove white privilege. Going back to the beauty analogy, it would be like claiming that one model who succeeded because she was not seen as beautiful proves that there is no advantage to being seen as beautiful.

Back when Black Lives Mattered, (HBO) Max briefly pulled ‘Gone with the Wind’ from its video library as an indirect response to protests about racism. The movie was later returned with a disclaimer to provide context. This struck a reasonable balance between the aesthetic importance of the work and the moral importance of presenting slavery honestly. The disclaimer also provided context for the film, such as how racism impacted the black actors. Perhaps because of the success of this approach, Max also added a disclaimer to the classic comedy ‘Blazing Saddles’.

This classic comedy-western engages with racism and prominently features racist characters using racist language. But, as the disclaimer noted, it is anti-racist. The racists are the villains. Racism is savagely mocked. As such, it might be wondered why the film required a disclaimer. This seems like putting a disclaimer before ‘All Quiet on the Western Front’ to make it clear that the famously anti-war film is not pro-war.

One concern about putting a disclaimer on a film like ‘Blazing Saddles’ is it could provide ammunition to those saying the “politically correct cancel culture of the left” is out of control. It could be used as “proof” that “the left” is wrong about criticisms of racism in aesthetic works. In reply, the right can create outrage ex nihilo and thus a disclaimer will have no meaningful impact aside from providing a focus of the outrage. That said, the disclaimer might have some impact on those critical enough to check to see if the target of the outrage exists, yet not critical enough to be thorough critics of the outrage.

This might seem a silly concern, but things like a movie disclaimer can  strike “normies” as ridiculous and this can be exploited as part of the radicalization process. The strategy is that an “absurd” response from “the left” can help build a gradual ramp leading into the pit of, for example, racism.

Another concern is the disclaimer might be seen as insulting. It seems to suggest viewers are too stupid to understand the obvious point of the movie, that racism is bad. As a counter, people do misread comedy. A good example of this is the character of Stephen Colbert once played by Stephen Colbert on the Colbert Report. While Colbert is a liberal who mocks conservatives (and liberals) some conservative viewers believed that he was serious about being a conservative. They understood he was doing comedy (the show was on Comedy Central) but did not get his point. While it is anecdotal evidence, I know conservatives who thought this. Since we all enjoyed the show, I was careful not to spoil their fun with the truth.  As such, it is possible that the movie might be seen by some people as endorsing racism

As another example, the 1975 “Germans” episode of “Fawlty Towers” includes the use of the N-word by the character of the major. In the episode, the major corrects someone for using a racist slur by suggesting they use another racist slur. In 2013 the BBC edited the episode to take out the word, which created a negative reaction in some quarters. A few years ago the BBC pulled the episode from streaming.

John Cleese, who played the main character on the show said that the racism of the major was presented in a negative light and that the point of the line was to criticize (with comedy) rather than commit racism. According to Cleese, “You see, what people don’t understand, there’s two ways of criticizing people. One is a direct criticism. And the other is to present their views as they would present them, but to make sure that everyone realizes that the person presenting those rules is a fool. And literal-minded people, who are the curse of the planet, can’t understand that. They think if you say something, you must mean it literally.” The decision makers seem to have come to agree with Cleese.  The episode was eventually restored, but some streaming services included a disclaimer or warning.

While these are only two examples, they do show how people can be mistaken about the intent of comedy. As the “Fawlty Towers” example shows, people can be confused about the intent of the use of racism in comedy. As such, the use of disclaimers even for comedies critical of racism would seem justified. The explanation provided can help people understand the intention of the work and realize that the racism in the comedy is not intended to be racist but is critical of racism. As such, the use of disclaimers could be a reasonable means of preventing such confusion. This benefit must be balanced against the possible harm, though. It can be argued that a reaction from “the left” about a work they mistake as racist would provide even better fodder for the right-wing outrage engines than the disclaimer. If the argument is a good one, then this would serve to justify the use of disclaimers.

As a final point, it is certainly sensible to inform potential viewers about content that they might find problematic, but it might suffice to add a text warning at the start (“contains comedy critical of racism that references racism”) rather than a disclaimer.

I have two main goals in addressing the question of why the right lies so often. The first is to satisfy my curiosity as a philosopher who teaches ethics, epistemology, and critical thinking. While there is little point in trying to get the liars to stop lying, my second goal is to encourage honest people on the right to look at their claims critically.

What I am asking of the honest folks of the right is to act in accord with Ben Shapiro’s famous saying: “facts don’t care about your feelings.” If you are an honest person on the right and you believe this, then you should engage with the claims made by yourself and your fellows in accord with this professed view: hold your feelings in check and consider what the evidence supports. There is also the popular YouTube pastime of destroying the liberals with facts and logic. Consistency requires that honest folks on the right subject the claims of the conservatives to the same treatment. Or, rather, to the treatment promised in the memes: to check the claims rigorously in accord with the principles of critical thinking and to make use of non-fallacious logic. The truth can withstand scrutiny, and good reasoning can hold up when assessed. As such, if an honest person on the right is sure that a claim made by their fellows is true, then they should not fear subjecting it to rigorous and objective evaluation. Likewise, if an argument made by a fellow conservative is strong (or valid), then you should not hesitate to put it to the test.

Before getting to the substantial content, I need to pre-empt some likely fallacious attacks. One likely attack is to respond by saying “what about the left?” or “What about Stalin? He lied all the time!” This is the rhetorical strategy and fallacy known as “whataboutism.”A second likely response is to say that everyone lies, that the practice is a common one. This is, obviously enough, just the fallacy of common practice. A third likely response is to assert that the left also lies and so they are just as bad as the right. This is a false equivalence. To avoid straw man attacks, I must make it clear that I am not claiming that the American right always lies or that the American left never lies. My claim is that lying is common on the right and my inquiry is into why this is the case. Feel free to destroy the lying left with facts and logic in your own blog or video.

The first step is providing a definition of “lying.” While one could discuss the fine nuances of the concept at length, my discussion only requires an intuitively plausible definition: lying is intentionally asserting that a claim is true when one believes it is false. This is not a perfect definition of the concept, but my discussion does not hinge on any nuanced or fine distinctions. I would, of course, be happy to get into a deep discussion of the complexities of defining the concept at another time.

The second step is providing evidence that the right, under the common usage of the term, lies often. A good place to start is at the top with President Trump. To be fair to the right, a good case can be made that Trump is not committed to conservative ideology, he has shifted his political affiliations often and one can easily imagine a parallel  world in which Trump was elected as Democrat. But Trump has conquered the American right and is their undisputed king. Trump is an epic level liar and his lies are thoroughly documented.

The folks at Fox News lie regularly, as the Daily Show showed back in 2015 with their “50 Fox News lies in 6 seconds.” The dishonesty of Fox News is well documented.  This is important because Fox News is the defining news of the right, although it now has some competition.

Another realm to consider is the brain of the right, the self-proclaimed intellectuals and thinkers of the right. The best known are Ben Shapiro and Jordan Peterson. The YouTube intellectuals of the right are interesting in that they do what politicians and pundits generally do not: they lay out their views at length, they endeavor to argue, and they purport to offer evidence for their claims. While these folks generally do not hold political offices or positions of power, they present and defend the views of the right. As such, they are the ones that can be engaged in some form  intellectual combat.

There is an entire YouTube industry of left-wing tubers who meticulously go through the claims and arguments of the right. The usual approach is the same used by professional scholars: checking the sources and assessing the reasoning. One common occurrence is that the sources used in the right-wing video are often either problematic (biased) or clearly misused (the right-winger is wrong about what the source shows). One example of this is Shaun’s look at Lauren Southern’s claims about the great replacement conspiracy theory. As another example, the sarcastic Some More News goes through Ben Shapiro’s claims about systemic racism and notes the lies. While one might be tempted to use an ad hominem and dismiss the lefty critics on the grounds that they are lefties, the competent critics follow the good practices of citing sources, referencing the original in context, and assessing arguments in accord with the standards of good logic. As such, one can engage these works and check their claims and reasoning. In general, the right-wing thinkers seem to routinely make many false claims. These videos are all available on YouTube and you can go through each one yourself, checking the claims and assessing the logic. Destroying is an option, if you are into that.

The third step is to answer the question of why the right lies so often.  One easy and obvious answer is that it works: conservatives seem to be more susceptible to certain lies than liberals. There are also answers to be found in the realm of psychology as to why, for example, Trump lies. But my concern here is with the rational reasons why the right engages in lying as a strategy.

The first reason is that facts and reality often conflict with interests and ideology of the right. It also conflicts with their claims of success. To be more specific, the claims used to argue for the policies and views of the right are often not true and they know it. The claims used to defend the effectiveness of these policies are also often untrue and they know it. As Stephen Colbert said, reality has a well-known liberal bias.

Two classic examples of this are the right’s notion that tax cuts pay for themselves and climate change denial. We have had decades of empirical testing of the claim that tax cuts pay for themselves: you can examine the results yourself and find out that they do not. The truth of climate change has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. If the right were honest about tax cuts or climate change, they would have a difficult time making their case for their policies or “showing” that their policies are effective. Imagine if Republicans were honest about tax cuts or climate change; they would be unable to make much of a case in favor of their tax cut and climate policies.

As another example, consider the right’s claims about voter fraud. While the right asserts that voter fraud is a problem, the evidence does not support their claim. The means they propose to combat this almost non-existent fraud are instead aimed at voter suppression. If the right were honest about the extent of voter fraud, their argument would be utterly undercut. If voter fraud is almost non-existent, there would be little reason to accept their proposals to address it.

As a final example, consider Trump’s disastrous response to COVID-19. Trump’s main response was to lie. Bizarrely, Trump has made it clear that he would like less testing so that the United States would, falsely, look better. Trump is somewhat unusual in his tendency to sometimes be honest about his dishonesty. The COVID-19 response thus serves as a paradigm example of why the right lies so often: their policies and values often conflict with reality and the only way they can claim success is by lying.

A second reason that many on the right lie is that being honest about their values, beliefs and goals would either not win support or would even repulse most people. To illustrate, being honest about the effectiveness of tax cuts and who they benefit would generally not win much support from citizens. To use a more extreme example, consider the 1981 interview with Lee Atwater in which he lays out the southern strategy. Atwater makes it clear how lying about their racism is a strategy of the right:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

Lest you think that this strategy of deceit is a thing of the past, consider Trump’s tweet about the Suburban Lifestyle: “I am happy to inform all of the people living their Suburban Lifestyle Dream that you will no longer be bothered or financially hurt by having low income housing built in your neighborhood……Your housing prices will go up based on the market, and crime will go down. I have rescinded the Obama-Biden AFFH Rule. Enjoy!” Classic Atwater.  As a final example, saying to voters that they want to suppress voters to gain an undemocratic advantage to hold onto power would not win widespread support from the public.

Thus, the right has excellent reasons to lie. The first is that their claims often clash with the facts and if they did not lie, they would have to admit they are wrong. The second is that being honest would often cause them to lose support.

For those who dislike the Democrats, the mainstream of that party generally does not rely on strategic lying. Rather, they make use of strategic silence: they simply say nothing. We can see how well that has been working for them.