Category: Ethics

 

Last Week Tonight With John Oliver recently did an episode on deep sea mining that is worth watching to get an overview of the subject. Reuters also has a good graphical summary of the process. While there are numerous legal and political issues associated with deep sea mining, my concern is with the ethics of the matter.

One appealing moral argument in favor of deep-sea mining is that it, as the name states, takes place in the deep sea. This means that mining is done far from human settlements. As the deep ocean is often seen as an underwater desert, it might be believed that mining would not do any meaningful damage to living creatures or an important ecosystem. Proponents of such mining often describe it as analogous to scooping up golf balls as it gathers up nodules of metal from the sea floor.

While humans do not live in the deep sea, these nodules are in a thriving ecosystem that contains a range of life. There are even things that live on the surface of the nodules. The mining of this ecosystem would obviously harm these creatures as the mining robot scooped up the nodules. As such, this harm needs to be considered when assessing the ethics of deep-sea mining.

In addition to the direct damage to the ecosystem, a major environmental concern is the plumes of sediment generated by the mining process. Somewhat like running a lawnmower over dirt, the mining robot will stir up the sediment on the ocean bottom. The sediment scooped up by the robot will be discharged back into the sea, spreading a large plume of sediment (and metal fragments) across a wide area. While the impact of such large-scale plumes is not yet known, the potential harms must be considered when making an evaluation of the ethics of deep-sea mining.

Proponents of deep-sea mining also advance the stock arguments made for any potentially profitable economic venture: deep-sea mining will make money and create jobs. Some point to the fact that even countries that lack the resources to engage in deep-sea mining can sell their rights.

The usual and obvious moral concern is that the exploitation of such natural resources tends to be profitable only for those who are already wealthy rather than yielding shared benefits. There is also the concern that the countries that sell their rights will be exploited. This is not a special concern for deep-sea mining, as this occurs with every exploitation of natural resources. For those who favor an economic system that hyper concentrates wealth, this would be a moral benefit of deep-sea mining. For those who favor a more equitable distribution, this would be a major moral negative. But this could, in theory, be addressed. In practice, this is unlikely.

On the surface, perhaps the most appealing moral argument for deep-sea mining is that it is essential to “saving the planet.” The argument is that the metals in the nodules are needed to make the batteries required for the transition away from fossil fuels. For example, the batteries used in electric vehicles.

Looked at from a utilitarian moral perspective, a moral case can be made fin favor of mining by arguing that this benefit (saving the planet) outweighs the alleged harms, such as environmental damage. While it might seem ironic or paradoxical to argue that something that will damage the environment should be done to “save the planet”, this is a calculation worth considering.

Consider, for example, the general arguments that we should shift from fossil fuels to clean energy sources such as solar and wind power. While it is true that solar panels do not, for example, spew smoke while operating, they must still be manufactured. At the end of their life, they also often end up in landfills. Also, you obviously cannot just stick a solar panel on a house and get power you can use. You’ll also need wiring, charge controllers, inverters and probably batteries. All of these must be manufactured and often end up in land fills at the end of their life. There is an environmental cost for their manufacture and disposal. Even if they are recycled, that still comes with a cost. Those who favor clean energy and recognize these costs argue that the environmental harm done by these energy sources in total is still significantly less than that caused by fossil fuels. The same sort of calculation could be applied to deep-sea mining: while there is an environmental cost for mining the nodules, their use “to save the planet” will provide environmental benefits that outweigh the damage done. While this reasoning should be given due consideration, there are some concerns that must also be addressed.

The first concern is that there might be better alternatives to deep-sea mining. For example, it could be argued that better recycling of metals could eliminate the need for such environmentally damaging mining. This could be countered by arguing that recycling would be either impractical or more costly than mining.

The second concern is that there are already alternative energy storage technologies, such as sodium batteries, that do not require the metals acquired by deep-sea mining. While the environmental impact of these technologies would also need to be considered, they do show considerable promise. Obviously, if deep-sea mining does more environmental damage than a viable alternative, then the “save the planet” moral argument would fail. Interestingly, the fossil fuel industry has an interest in opposing deep sea mining because of their interest in opposing electric vehicles and alternative energy sources in general. This is not a matter of ethics, but a matter of profits.

My view is that the best ethical choice would be to forgo deep-sea mining in favor of pursuing alternative storage technologies. That said, if it can be shown that deep-sea mining would create significantly more environmental benefits than harm, then it would be the right thing to do.

 

 

Back in 2012 I wrote For Better or Worse Reasoning: A Philosophical Look at Same-Sex Marriage in response to the debate over this issue and this is a good time to look back on this debate. Especially since members of the  Supreme Court have signaled their interest in undoing it.

One set of arguments against allowing same-sex marriage involved the alleged harms that would arise. Some of these arguments fully embraced the slippery slope fallacy, often to an absurd degree. This fallacy is when it is claimed that something, usually a bad thing, must inevitably follow from something else and this claim of inevitability is not adequately supported. For example, some people claimed that if same-sex marriage was allowed, then this would lead to bestiality and people marrying animals. They did not offer a casual account of how this would come about.

While these claims might strike people as silly, they are testable. As same-sex marriage has been legal for about twenty years, we would expect to see evidence of these outcomes if the claims were true. None of these claims seem to have come true. For example, people still  cannot legally marry animals. It could be objected that twenty years has not been long enough for these harms to come about, but they will still occur in the future. But if this were true, there should be at least some evidence of changes heading in that direction (other than the legalization of same-sex marriage) and these are lacking. This is as expected by anyone who thought seriously about these slippery slope arguments.

Another set of arguments against same-sex marriage were built on more reasonable claims of harms that would arise from allowing same sex-marriage. This sort of argument does have appeal, as one purpose of law is to protect people from harm. The reasoning was that if same-sex marriage was allowed, then it would reduce the value of marriage for same-sex couples, leading to less marriage, more cohabitation and more divorce. These claims can now be tested empirically: if they are true, we would expect a statistically significant change in marriage, cohabitation and divorce that could not be explained by other factors.

As would be expected, this data has been collected and analyzed. Instead of a decrease in marriage among different-sex couples, there has been about a 2% increase, with a 10% increase in all marriages. Cohabitation has increased from 0-10%, although it is also worth considering economic factors such as the high cost of rent. It is also worth noting that whether unmarried cohabitation is a negative thing is debatable. Lastly, there has been no consistent change in the divorce rate of different-sex couples. So, by the standards of harms presented in the arguments against same-sex marriage, allowing it seems to have had a slight positive impact in that there has been a 2% increase in marriage among different-sex couples. Back in 2012, this is what I expected as it did not make sense that a significant number of people would give up on marriage or get divorced simply because same-sex couples could legally marry. But expectation is not confirmation, so it is good to see the evidence.

It could be countered that 20 years has not been enough time for the harm to come into effect and that the destruction of marriage will arrive at some point. The obvious reply is that we should see some signs of this trend and we do not.  As such, these harm arguments have been shown to be in error. Because of this, attempts to eliminate same-sex marriage based on these claims about harms would be unjustified. But this probably does not matter; I infer that if the fight over same-sex marriage becomes a thing again, these same claims will be made, and the facts will be ignored by those making the argument. This is because that is the same tactic now used by those who argue against transgender rights—they make false claims about harms. But, of course, there were other arguments made against same-sex marriage.

Another set of arguments are those built around religion. One argument is based on the idea that since God married Adam to Eve, this defines marriage in the biblical sense. Clever folks like to say that it was “Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” Since marriage is supposed to be defined by the Christian faith as between one man and one woman, that is what the law should be.

Another common approach is to refer to Leviticus: “thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination.” From this it is inferred that same-sex marriage is wrong and should be illegal. Naturally, witty folks like to point out that Leviticus claims lobster is also an abomination “Whatsoever hath no fins nor scales in the waters, that shall be an abomination unto you.” And sex with lobsters is also right out: “Neither shalt thou lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand before a beast to lie down thereto: it is confusion.” As far as what Jesus said about same sex relations, he said nothing. This can be confirmed by reading through the New Testament.

Today, the religious arguments are mostly used by people who do not want to have same-sex couples as customers, and these have been used with some success. This does keep the door cracked for using religious arguments against same-sex marriage, especially with the growing success of Christian Nationalism. There are also normative arguments that are not based explicitly on religion.

These arguments include the general argument style in which it is contended that homosexuality is morally wrong and hence they should not be allowed to marry. An obvious concern about this sort of argument is that if people must pass a moral test to be eligible for marriage, then consistency would require applying the same sort of standard to same-sex couples. But as people tend to ignore concerns about consistency, we can expect to see a return of the immoral argument. There is, however, the fact that most Americans do not see homosexuality as immoral, so the moral argument against same-sex marriage would be harder to make in the future.

A variation of the moral argument is the unnatural argument, although this seems to be rarely used for same-sex marriage debates these days. It does, however, get deployed in the culture war over gender and sexual identity so it could get redeployed when the right decides to take on same-sex marriage again. The unnatural argument usually takes the form of claiming that because homosexuality is alleged to not occur in nature, it is unnatural and hence wrong. That homosexuality is widespread in the natural world undercuts this sort of argument, but this does not mean that people will not use it again. As noted earlier, the culture war fight over gender issues involves appeals to what people think is natural, even when they are wrong. As such, this argument type might be used once again.

While there are many other stock arguments used against same-sex marriage, I’ll close with the procreation argument.

 Obviously enough, same-sex couples cannot have children through heterosexual intercourse with each other and this inability to procreate was used to argue against same-sex marriage. One example is that during the hearing regarding Proposition 8 in California the claim that “responsible procreation is really at the heart of society’s interest in regulating marriage” was brought out to defend that proposition.

Same-sex marriage was typically criticized on two grounds relating to procreation The first is that same-sex couples cannot, as noted above, procreate with each other by intercourse. The second is that same-sex couples will be bad parents (for example during the battle over Proposition 8, it was claimed without evidence, that homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest children).

What if we suppose that these two principles are correct: 1) marriage is to be denied to those who do not procreate and 2) people who are not “responsible in procreation” are to be denied marriage.

The first principle would entail that straight couples who do not want children or cannot have them must be denied marriage. It would also seem to imply that couples who use artificial means to reproduce (such as in vitro fertilization or a surrogate) must also be denied marriage.

The second principle entails that straight couples who are not responsible parents must also be denied marriage.  This would seem to require that the state monitor marriages to determine that married couples are both reproducing and being responsible parents. The state would presumably need to revoke marriage licenses for those who fail to meet the standards (much like the state can revoke a driver’s license for driving violations). While I obviously think the state has a role in child welfare, being a bad parent (or even a bad spouse) would not seem to warrant taking away the right to marriage.

Of course, these arguments seem to have been made in bad faith since those who opposed same-sex marriage did not put forth comparable legislation addressing same-sex couples who did not reproduce or who were bad parents. This suggests that they did not really care about procreation and good parenting as requirements for marriage, these were simply rhetorical tools to attack same-sex marriage.

Those familiar with the current culture war battles over gender issues will have noticed that people still advance a procreation argument against transgender people, usually in the form of memes and social media posts. Aside from the change of target, it is the same argument used against same-sex couples. The argument is that if everyone was trans, then humanity would die off. So being trans is bad and presumably should not be allowed. A little reflection shows how easily this argument is reduced to absurdity. After all, if it was good logic, it would also apply to anyone who has chosen celibacy (like certain monks, priests and nuns) or people who just do not want to have children. In general, the “it would be bad if everyone did X so we must not allow X” arguments are terrible. After all, it would be bad if everyone became a construction worker, since then we would have no one doing any other jobs. But that obviously does not show that we should ban people from being construction workers.

While this sort of argument is bad, the fact that it still gets employed in the culture war over gender identity shows that it is ready to be redeployed in a refight of the culture war over same sex marriage. People who accept it in one context of the current culture war are presumably primed to consider it in another context of the culture ware.

In closing, while the dire predictions made by those opposing same-sex marriage did not come true, this might not matter much if the fight over same-sex marriage is restarted by the right. While same-sex marriage is broadly accepted and most Americans are at least tolerant of homosexuality, it would be foolish for people who agree with same-sex marriage remaining legal to assume that the fight has been settled. It is reasonable to expect that this front of the culture war to be re-opened and that the same old tired and discredited arguments will be once again deployed in the fight. Culture war never changes

Another criticism of teachers’ unions is that they spend millions of dollars lobbying politicians to protect and advance their interests. This is bad, or so the reasoning goes, because the interests of the teachers’ unions are often (or perhaps even always) contrary to what is best for students.

When pressed for examples of such interests, critics sometimes allege that “collective bargaining agreements are written like celebrity contracts” and they point to egregious examples such as how Buffalo pays the bills when teachers have elective plastic surgery. These sorts of things do raise reasonable concerns.

It is true that unions sometimes negotiate contracts with problematic provisions.  But this is hardly a defect inherent to unions and the problems are the problematic provisions rather than the existence of teachers’ unions. To use the obvious analogy, corporations spend millions lobbying politicians to protect and advance their interests. This lobbying constantly results in laws contrary to the interests of many other citizens. But this does not justify eliminating corporations or lobbying. The problem is not inherent to corporations or lobbying but is the result of harmful legislation influenced by specific corporations engaged in specific lobbying. Likewise, when unions lobby for and get laws or agreements that prove harmful, the problem lies with the laws or agreements and not inherently in the unions or lobbying.

It could be argued that collective entities like unions and corporations are inherently damaging to the rest of society, and they should be eliminated or weakened. However, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who hold this position. Also, this solution to the problem of teachers’ unions would need to be applied consistently, thus eliminating all collective entities that interact with the public. This would include all corporations and nonprofit organizations.

It could be contended that the problem is lobbying. If lobbying was eliminated or severely restricted, then it would be a better world. Given that big-money lobbying often has a corrupting and corrosive effect, this does have considerable appeal. However, this is not a problem unique to teachers’ unions. As such, if the solution to the woes attributed to teachers’ unions can be solved by eliminating or restricting their lobbying, then consistency would require extending the same policies to other collective bodies, such as corporations, to protect the public.

Another approach to the matter is to consider whether teachers’ unions are as harmful as their opponents claim. As a specific example, is it true that teachers’ unions collective bargaining agreements are like “celebrity contracts”?

A popular example of a “celebrity contract” provision is the coverage of plastic surgery provided to teachers by Buffalo. While the anti-union narrative is that the union negotiated so teachers could get breast implants and nose jobs, this is not the reality. When the benefit was first offered, plastic surgery was used primarily for reconstruction after a disfiguring injury. However, plastic surgery has changed since this benefit was negotiation. Plastic surgery as elective surgery for “improving” appearance is much more common. As such, it wasn’t that the union  negotiated a celebrity contract.  It is that some people are exploiting a change in plastic surgery. Sorting out this matter did prove problematic, not because of unions but because of issues with the way contracts are handled. There is also the fact that one anecdote about plastic surgery benefits does not show that teachers’ unions are generally bad. If anecdotes about bad behavior warranted eliminating organizations, then corporations would be the first to go.

While plastic surgery might be part of a “celebrity contract”, a hallmark of such an agreement is the payment of large (even exorbitant) sums of money. As such, if unions are benefiting teachers at the expense of students, then large (even exorbitant) teacher salaries should be expected as well as bonuses and perks.  However,  the typical salaries for teachers ranges from $43,491-48,880. While this is not a bad income relative to the national average, it compares unfavorably to the salaries of college educated workers in other professions. There are various myths about teacher pay that people use to argue that teachers are well (or excessively) paid. However, these are just that, they are myths. So, the idea that teachers’ unions are acting to the detriment of students by negotiating “celebrity contracts” for teachers is absurd in the face of the facts. That this is the case should be obvious to anyone who knows teachers—they do not live celebrity lifestyles and typically spend those “summer vacations” working a second job. My parents taught at public schools, and I can assure readers that we did not live a celebrity lifestyle.  They had to work second jobs over the summers to pay the bills. Speaking with teachers today makes it clear that things have not changed. Anecdotally, I am a member of a teacher’s union and I and most of my colleagues do not have “celebrity contracts.” Those are reserved for upper-level administrators and some of the “superstar” professors who can bring in grant money or have celebrity status in academics. But this is not the doing of the unions.

It could be argued that although teachers are not living the high life at the expense of students, unions still spend millions lobbying politicians and this money would be better spent on the students. This is a reasonable point: it would be better if that money could be spent on educating the children rather than going into the ample pockets of politicians. I am sure that other organizations, such as businesses, would prefer to use their lobbying money for more beneficial purposes, such as raises for employees. However, if they did not lobby, then they would be worse off because of the system that people have created. That is why they lobby. The same is true for the teachers’ unions: if they did not lobby on behalf of teachers, then things would be worse off for teachers and students. While it would be wonderful if politicians did the right thing for education and businesses because it is right and beneficial, that is not how most politicians have chosen to work. As such, the fact that the teachers’ unions and businesses spend so much money lobbying is a problem with the politicians and not a problem with unions or businesses.

Considering the above discussion, while it is obvious and evident that while unions can do wrong, they are important for protecting teachers and education. As such, the efforts to eliminate or weaken unions are, at best, misguided.

Some claim that we are living in a post-true era. In support of this claim, people often use the example of the linked success of Trump and fake news.  This does make a good case that untruth has triumphed over truth. But, then again, the truth seems to remain.

Imagine people tenting in the jungle of the real. Within the tent, people create narratives and are rewarded or punished based on whether others believe their tales. Or at least find them useful. Some people realized that it did not matter whether their tales were true and found that lies were often consumed like candy. They became convinced that all that mattered was their stories and the success they brought. But they were wrong.

Outside the tent, stalking the jungle of the real, is a tiger. The tiger does not care about the narratives. The thin fabric is no protection from its claws. The tiger might pass by the tent while doing nothing. But someday, perhaps soon, the tiger will tear through fabric and its hunger will not be satisfied by even the sweetest of lies.

While a metaphor is not an argument, the tale of the tiger can be made into one. The tent is the society we construct that serves the thin wall between us and the rest of world (the jungle of the real). The people in the tent are us and the untrue narratives are the lies. The tiger is truth, which is how things really are. As in the metaphor, no matter what lies people tell, the truth remains true. While people can profit from lies and avoid the consequences, reality remains unchanged. For example, consider the narrative woven by the sugar industry about sugar, fats and heart disease.  This tale, told within the tent, has shaped the American diet for decades and has served the sugar industry well. But reality is not changed by these narratives and the consequences are serious. Tobacco companies provide another example and perhaps the best example is climate change. Some claim that climate change is a lie told by a global conspiracy of scientists. Others think that its denial is a lie spread at the behest of those who profit from fossil fuels. One side is weaving a false narrative, but the tiger is out there.

It might be claimed that this is not really a post-truth era in the sense of there being no truth. Rather, the post truth era is defined by the fact that truth matters little, if at all, in some contexts. In one sense, this is true. Trump was, for example, has been rewarded for his relentless untruths and has a good chance of being elected in 2024. Some who peddle fake news and other false content have enjoyed great financial success, thus showing there can be profit in lies. On this view, Ben Franklin is wrong: honesty is no longer the best policy, lying is. At least in the context of politics and business.

In another sense, this is not true. While lying has proven an effective short-term strategy, it will ultimately run up against the truth. Going back to the metaphor, the tiger is always out there. As an example, while the false narrative denying climate change has resulted in short term success, it will prove to be a long-term disaster. Those who believe it is real claim that the danger is climate change. Those who deny climate change claim disaster will result from the catastrophic environmental policies imposed by “the liberals.” Both agree reality will impose a disaster but disagree on its nature. While both cannot be right, they are both right that ignoring the truth will be a disaster.

It could be countered that I am wrong because I am considering the impact of such lies broadly. That is, I am focused on how their consequences can impact people in general. I should, one might argue, focus on the advantages to those engaged in the untruths. In philosophical terms, this is the claim that one should embrace ethical egoism, which is the moral theory that what is right is to maximize value for oneself. Alternatively, one could just accept selfishness as a virtue.

While an unskilled liar can end up in trouble, those with a talent for untruth can benefit from their lies while the harmful consequences impact others. One way this can happen is that the harm can lie in the future. For example, lies about the climate will not harm the liars in the elite classes today for they will be dead before the greatest consequences would impact them. This can also happen when the harms occur to other people and liar avoids them through being far from the harms. For example, lies about the safety of a town’s water would not impact the health of a governor who does not live in that town.

A third way is that the liar might be able to protect themselves through their wealth or position. For example, a rich straight white Christian who lies about things impacting Muslims, blacks, gays or poor people does not reap the harms of those lies. These consequences fall upon the targets of their lies.

A selfish reply to this is that most of us are more likely to be harmed by broad lies than benefited by them. This is because most of us care about our relatives who will be alive when we are gone, because most of us live in the impact zone of lies, and because most of us lack the status and wealth to escape the consequences of broad lies. As such, we have a selfish interest in opposing lying as it  will hurt us and those we care about.

An altruistic reply is that we should care about other people and the harm they suffer. This can also be argued for on utilitarian moral grounds—that this lying will create more unhappiness than happiness for everyone. There is also the religious argument. Many religions purport to endorse the truth and enjoin us to show compassion for others, to love each other as God has loved us. As such, the post-truth world should be rejected. Honesty is, as Ben said, the best policy.

Put roughly, vegetarians are defined by their refusal to eat meat. Vegans take it further and refuse to eat any animal products. There are, as vegetarians and vegans will tell you, many varieties of each and some involve nuances about what is and is not acceptable to eat. For example, some vegans will consume honey while others will not.  While this oversimplifies things, people tend to embrace these views for two broad reasons. Moral vegans/vegetarians are motivated by the belief that it is morally wrong to harm animals. Some also consider the total harm arising from the use of animals as products, such as the environmental damage and wastefulness of animal farming. The second reason is health. Some vegans/vegetarians are motivated by concerns about their physical well-being; they think consuming animal products is unhealthy. It is obviously possible to have both (and other) motivations, but I will focus on ethics in context of defining meat.

From a moral standpoint, the concern about meat (and other animal products) is the harm done to the animals. For example, the creation of veal and foie gras are both moral nightmares of animal suffering. The production of eggs and milk is also often terrible for the chickens and cows. In the case of animals harvested for their meat, even if they are treated well, they are still killed and consumed. Since vegans and vegetarians need to eat to avoid death, they turn to eating plants and plant products.

The moral justification for eating plants, which are living things, is usually based on the claim that plants do not suffer. They lack, it is argued, the sort of nervous system needed to even feel pain. As such they either lack moral status or have a status that allows them to be consumed. This is even though plants are alive. Interesting, and to the annoyance of some vegans, there has been research suggesting that plants have some degree of awareness or even intelligence. This, if true, would raise an moral concern for ethical vegans/vegetarians: if it is wrong to eat meat because of animal suffering, then it would also seem to be wrong to eat plants that can suffer. This concern can be addressed by using an argument analogous to one used to morally justify consuming meat: even if they are aware and have some intelligence, these qualities are insufficient to grant plants a moral status that would make eating them wrong. This could be done without hypocrisy since moral lines can be drawn in a principled way. For example, most people who eat meat would not eat humans because they make a moral distinction between humans and animals. A vegan/vegetarian could draw a line between plants and animals. The concern could also be addressed by eating foods that do not cause any suffering. Interestingly, one option would be synthetic meat.

While synthetic meat would be alive, it would not be part of an animal (or any living thing) that has the capacity to suffer. This would seem to make synthetic meat a non-meat from a moral viewpoint, at least from the standpoint of a moral vegan or vegetarian. Then again, a vegan could counter that the cells needed to grow the synthetic meat were taken from an animal, which would make it unacceptable. An obvious reply is that taking a few cells from an animal would not hurt it or cause suffering. This problem could also be addressed by using source animals that would be well cared for and allowed to die natural deaths. In this case, the moral objection would have to be abstract, that there is just something wrong with consuming any animal product, regardless of any other factors such as suffering.

One way to address this concern would be to create completely synthetic meat that has no direct link to an animal. This synthetic product would be identical to meat but would be completely artificial. As such, no animal would be harmed directly or indirectly in its creation and thus it would morally be not-meat. The logic would be that if meat is murder and synthetic meat is not murder, then it is not meat. While this is a bit silly, it does have a certain appeal.

It could be objected that it is not the ethics of meat that makes meat what it is. To use an analogy, a stolen potato would be morally different from an honestly acquired potato, but both would still be potatoes. As such, it could be argued that even “moral” meat would still be meat, and thus unacceptable to a certain sort of vegan or vegetarian. The challenge would be, of course, to show what it is about such “moral” meat that would still make it immoral. One obvious approach would be the costs of producing it. Synthetic meat is and probably will remain inefficient relative to using resources to grow plant-based foods. However, this would apply to anything wasteful of resources and would not be meat specific. It would, for example, apply to the wasteful process of growing almonds in California.

Given the above, synthetic meat would be morally distinct from classic meat. On the one hand, it could be contended that this would make it not-meat. As such, vegans and vegetarians could eat it and still claim to not be eating meat. On the other hand, it could simply be claimed that it would simply be moral meat and that vegans and vegetarians could not eat it without ceasing to be vegans or vegetarians. Based on the above, synthetic meat would obviously avoid the moral concerns about the suffering of animals. But it does raise moral concerns about its production, but these are not unique concerns and would apply to the production of any food.

 

In the previous essay I discussed the invention of the concept of race in the context of Modern era philosophers. In this essay, I’ll take a brief look at defending Modern era philosophers against the charge of racism. While some might assume all Modern era white European philosophers were racists simply because they were white, this would be a mistake. To assume that a white person must be racist simply because they are white would be both unreasonable and prejudiced. This holds true during our time as well as the Modern era.

 If a philosopher is to be justly accused of racism, there must be evidence to back this claim up. To infer a philosopher (or anyone) must be racist because there is no evidence they were not racist would be to fall victim to the fallacy of Appeal to Ignorance (a variant of the Burden of Proof fallacy). This fallacy occurs when it is inferred that the absence of evidence against a claim serves as evidence that the claim is true. One example of this is when someone infers that psychic powers exist because no one has been able to conclusively prove that no one has such powers. While someone might have psychic powers and a philosopher might be a racist, without positive evidence for these qualities there would be no justification for accepting such claims. As with settling guilt or innocence in the context of crime, what is needed is evidence of that crime and not evidence of innocence. As an accusation of racism can bring negative consequences, it is reasonable to accept that a person is innocent of racism until proven guilty. But even if a philosopher is shown to be racist, there are those who would defend them.

A common defense used when an historical figure is accused of racism is to argue that while they were racist, they are to be excused because racism was seen as morally and socially acceptable (perhaps even laudable) at that time. This is usually presented in terms of how the racist was shaped by their time and that it would unreasonable to expect them to have questioned the values of their time.

But, while people are influenced by their time and it can be difficult to question the values of one’s time, this is a especially weak defense for philosophers who seem to have been racists. Philosophical arguments against slavery and prejudice existed long before the Modern era, philosophers routinely question the dominant values of their time, and there was moral opposition to racism and slavery during the Modern era. As such, this is not much of an excuse or defense for philosophers, especially those who were concerned with ethics. That said, if we think about how we might be condemned and criticized by future generations, we might feel some sympathy towards historical figures who were not too terrible.

While this is anecdotal evidence from my own experience, I have seen the dominant values change significantly over the course of my life. Behavior and language that was acceptable in my youth are condemned today. I recall, with embarrassment, some of what I did and said in my youth. These were well within the social norms of the time and usually things that I had been taught as being correct behavior.  Fortunately, I did not do anything that would be considered awful even by today’s standards, but they would certainly be justly criticized today. As such, I do understand how people can be shaped by their times and how challenging it is to question the values one is raised and enmeshed in. I also now understand how values can change over time so that what was once acceptable becomes condemned. Living and reflecting provides an excellent lesson in how social values shift. This experience has also made it clear to me that we are likely to be criticized and condemned by future generations for behavior we now consider acceptable.

For example, imagine that future humans broadly embrace the ethics of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation and reject the exploitation of animals. They look back on the 21st century with disgust, condemning the widely accepted practices of eating meat, wearing leather, testing products and drugs on animals, and other misdeeds against animals. Arguments against exploiting animals are well known today and anyone reading this cannot claim ignorance of the existence of such arguments. If you are now a meat eater, you probably think this is morally acceptable. But, in this hypothetical future, most people would see this behavior as monstrous and wicked.

We can also imagine future generations who look at our treatment of the environment, our economic systems, and our opolitical systems as wicked and worthy only of condemnation. Even those who were not actively involved in these activities could, of course, be condemned as complicit. For example, (unless you are Jeff Bezos) you did not create the working conditions under which Amazon employees had to urinate in bottles. But if you have not been fighting against this abusive situation, then you might be considered complicit. Also, there are a vast number of evils in the world that you and I do not actively fight because we cannot: we do not have enough time or resources to fight or condemn every evil or wrong. The same was certainly true of people in the past.

Among the many people who might be condemned by future generations would be philosophers, including myself. As such, a future professor might need to research me and assess whether I should be condemned as a meat-eater, an owner of leather shoes and belts, and someone who not only purchased on Amazon but sold books through the company. This leads to the question of what should be done about Modern era philosophers who prove to have been racists (or otherwise morally defective, such as being sexists). This should, perhaps, be tempered by thoughts about what future generations should do about us should they find us morally problematic. In my next essay, I will endeavor to address this challenge

Two ways I track the culture war are my Facebook feed and memos about changes to higher education. One recent conflict was the Great Light Beer Battle of 2023. For those unfamiliar with this significant and world changing battle, TikToker Dylan Mulvaney received a custom can of Bud Light featuring her face and did a short promo spot. Since Mulvaney is a trans person, there was a reaction from many on the right.  Kid Rock added to the discussion of corporate marketing tactics by purchasing boxes of Bud Light and shooting them with a submachinegun. For those unfamiliar with gun laws, it is legal to own automatic weapons—you just need to navigate your way through the legal maze and pay the appropriate fee. Others limited their rage to words rather than bullets. This is but one example of some on the right being outraged by “woke” companies. As with all other battle, we will move on as memory fades, and they find something new.

Those who know me know I have long argued in favor of a broad and deep conception of free speech, largely stolen from J.S. Mill. People have the right to freedom of expression, through this is limited by the principle of harm. While there are gray areas of harm that can be debated, following Aristotle’s guidance about virtues, I prefer to err on the side of freedom. As such, I hold that harm needs to be meaningful and significant to justify restricting expression. Offending someone, even deeply, is not a significant harm—although the line between offense and harm can be fuzzy. This view entails that people have the right to condemn companies they disagree with, including posting videos of the execution of offending products with a submachine gun. From a practical standpoint, I do think that buying a product to destroy it in protest seems unwise—the company is profiting from the protest, and it can make a person appear the  fool. Perhaps such a gesture can be effective by showing that the person is so committed to the protest that they will, in effect, burn their own money to make a point.  In the case of Bud Light, the rage is directed at the brewer for being “woke.” In this case the “wokeness” is being willing to have a trans person do a promotional spot for them.

On the face of it, few (if any) American corporations are woke (in the non-pejorative sense). That is, they are not committed to social and economic justice. Their primary function is making money. This is not to deny that people, even those in high positions, might hold socially liberal views. When a company takes a stance on a social issue, this is almost always done when the stance enjoys popular acceptance. At the very least, they calculate that taking this stance will generate more revenue than not doing so. They can miscalculate and suffer a loss—as can happen with any marketing strategy or product change. In the case of Bud Light giving Mulvany the custom beer can, they made what probably seemed like a sensible marketing move: Overall, a 64% majority of Americans favor policies that protect transgender individuals from discrimination in jobs, housing and public spaces such as restaurants and stores, including 37% who strongly favor them. A much smaller share (10%) oppose or strongly oppose these policies, while 25% neither favor nor oppose them. While Americans are more divided over matters such as bathroom bills and transgender athletes in sports, hostility towards trans people is limited to a minority of Americans. As such, Bud Light made what appeared to be a smart play: for a small cost, they signal that they “believe” what most American consumers believe. This play did end in a fumble, as Bud Light sales are down, according to a detailed analysis of the Harvard Business Review.  But the parent company has not gone broke and it is worth considering that the causal factors include more than just the culture war factors.

While people enraged by such “woke” behavior have a moral right to express their rage, their reaction is not morally commendable. In general, the culture war rage at companies tends to focus on expressions of a pro-inclusion stance. In the case of the Bud Light episode, the company signaled a trans tolerant viewpoint, recognizing that trans people buy beer and gambling that since most Americans are at least tolerant of trans Americans this would be a smart marketing move. Before that, many companies (including other beer companies) have expressed other types of tolerance, such as towards gay people, women, and people of color. These were also met with rage. The anger usually seems focused on an expression of tolerance, perhaps because when capitalist corporations use tolerance signaling in their marketing, it marks that conservatives have lost that fight and will need to move on to hating someone or something else. This signals the right that they need to get back into that fight to signal that sort of tolerance will not be tolerated.

A good example is the reaction to Cracker Barrel recognizing there is a profitable market for plant-based meats. When Cracker Barrel added Impossible Sausage (a plant-based sausage) they were met with rage from the right and accusations of being woke. That was all nonsense, Cracker Barrel wants to make money selling people what they want to stuff into their sausage port. While the meat folks had every moral right to rage against this decision, their anger revealed their values.

A degree of anger could have been warranted if Cracker Barrel had decided to replace its meat-based sausage with plant-based sausage. I, too, have been mildly annoyed when a business has replaced a product, I like with one I don’t. But Cracker Barrel did not take anything away, it added an option. The meat-lovers could still get their meat, while people who wanted a meatless option could have that. So, the rage at Cracker Barrel was for giving people more choices, not less. As such, a reasonable explanation for the rage would be a dislike of people who prefer to eat plants (at least some of the time). This, one assumes, is due to prejudices against and stereotypes of vegans and vegetarians. Plant-based meats are also seen as connected to concern about climate change and animal cruelty and some on the right dislike the (alleged) politics behind it. But adding plant-based sausage to the menu does the meat eaters no harm since they can still have their meat, so their anger seems unwarranted. They seem to think they have the right to deny other people their choice of sausages simply because they dislike that choice. The same would seem to hold true in the rage at Bud Light: while trans people cause them no harm, they seem mad that they exist and that most people at least chose to be tolerant and wish them no harm.

Those who dislike trans people can, of course, make the usual argument that trans people are a threat. Hence, they can claim they are right to be mad at Bud Light because they are expressing tolerance of allegedly dangerous people. However, as many have pointed out, trans people are far more likely to be victims than perpetrators. This is not to deny that people can feel threatened by the notion of transgender people, but this is rather different from trans people being a threat as trans people—as opposed to the true claim that any type of person could also do harm. In closing, while people like Kid Rock have the moral right to express their rage at companies engaged in marketing by appealing to broadly accepted values, the rage against inclusion is to be condemned.

 

In the face of Trump’s legal woes, he and his defenders claimed the Democrats had “weaponized our sacred system of justice” against him. The narrative is that his legal troubles are the result of the Democrats’ hatred of Trump, their desire to harm him and their intention to interfere in the 2024 election. While their defense condemns the weaponization of the legal system and they profess to love “sacred system of justice”, there is the matter of whether their profession of justice matches their conception of justice.

Trying to attribute a conception of justice to politicians and pundits is challenging. Unlike philosophers, they usually lack coherent written works outlining their theory of justice. As a practical matter, their conception of justice must be reconstructed from their claims and actions. Fairness requires pointing out the obvious: attributing a conception of justice to a politician or pundit involves considerable guesswork. Fairness also requires using the usual principle of charity and the principle of plausibility in this effort. That is, the reconstruction should not be a straw man and should instead be assembled to be the best conception possible. But the reconstruction must also match the available evidence, such as what is known about the person, their beliefs and so on. It must also be remembered that a politician or pundit might not have a substantial conception of justice.

A reasonable place to start is with the infamous chant of “lock her up.” While Trump’s defenders can insist this was campaign rhetoric aimed at Hilary Clinton, it is rhetoric about locking up a political opponent—and thus he seems to endorse using the justice system as a political weapon. But one could argue, this was not weaponization because although Clinton was Trump’s opponent, she was probably a criminal and hence should be locked up. But this would require evidence of wrongdoing.

Under Trump, the justice department conducted a two year investigation into Clinton’s business dealings and turned up nothing. Those defending Trump at this time did not condemn this as a witch hunt nor did they lament that it was the weaponization of the justice system. One could, of course, claim that this investigation was undertaken because of a thirst for justice and without any malice against Clinton and that there were good reasons to suspect Clinton had committed crimes warranting the investigation of Trump’s political opponent. Despite the lack of evidence.

Even before Biden defeated Trump, Republicans were focused on investigating Biden and his family. At the start of 2023, the House Republicans used their new majority to launch this promised investigation. To be fair, Hunter Biden has been under investigation since 2018 for allegedly  not reporting all his income and for allegedly lying  when he purchased a gun. However, the Republicans have largely ignored these allegations, focusing instead on various conspiracy theories and the Pandora’s box that is Hunter Biden’s laptop. On the face of it, the House Republicans seem to have been trying to take revenge against Joe Biden rather than being driven by a desire to see that sacred justice is done. In response to the indictment of Trump, Conservatives have pushed to charge Biden. This seems to be a clear attempt at political revenge (and theater) rather than an act of devotion to sacred justice. We should also look at Trump’s view of justice prior to his own indictment.

Back in 2017, Trump seemed to advocate that the police treat suspects with less care, focusing on the police practice of protecting the suspect’s head while putting them in police cars. These are, it must be noted, suspects who could be innocent. While this could be dismissed as Trump talking tough to appeal to the cruelty of his base, it does indicate his view of justice: that it is acceptable to mistreat suspects and casual cruelty is acceptable as a routine part of police operations.

Throughout his time as president, Trump made extensive use of the phrase “law and order.” While it could be argued that Trump is ignorant of the history of the term, that phrase has long been established as a racist dog whistle. The general idea is that it is a way of talking about using the police and justice system against black Americans (and others) to maintain “order.” This allows a politician to exploit fear and racism without using explicitly racist terms. While Trump’s defenders could claim that he is not engaged in dog whistling, Trump’s history of words and deeds indicates otherwise. Trump also made it clear that he was willing to use force, even the military, against protestors. Trump also repeatedly advocated weaponizing the justice system against those he disagreed with and his perceived enemies.

Given the above, the Trumpian conception of justice seems to be that the justice system has two main purposes. First, the justice system should be weaponized against minorities in general and especially when they threaten the existing social order of white supremacy. It should also be used to maintain the existing economic order. Second, the justice system should be weaponized against Trump’s political opponents and others he dislikes (if only for petty revenge). The justice system should, however, leave Trump alone and not hold him accountable for any (alleged) crimes.

While Trump and his defenders might seem to be inconsistent when they claim that the justice system has been weaponized against Trump and that this is wrong while they clearly see the justice system as a weapon. But this is consistent: it is right for them to wield the justice system against others, it is wrong for it to be wielded against them.

While it is tempting to think that Trump and his defenders are lying when they say Democrats are weaponizing the justice system against Trump, I suspect Trump and many of his defenders are sincere. Not because they are right, but because their conception of justice is that the legal system is a weapon to be used against others. Any other conception of justice would be outside of their conceptual framework.  It might even be true that the idea that anyone would want people held accountable for their misdeeds would be an alien notion to them

 

Rossum’s Universal Robots introduced the term “robot” and the robot rebellion into science fiction, thus laying the foundation for future fictional AI apocalypses. While Rossum’s robots were workers rather than warriors, the idea of war machines turning against their creators was the next evolution in the robot apocalypse. In Philip K. Dick’s 1953 “Second Variety”, the United Nations deployed killer robots called “claws” against the Soviet Union. The claws develop sentience and turn against their creators, although humanity had already been doing an excellent job in exterminating itself. Fred Saberhagen extended the robot rebellion to the galactic scale in 1963 with his berserkers, ancient war machines that exterminated their creators and now consider everything but “goodlife” to be their enemy. As an interesting contrast to machines intent on extermination, the 1973 movie Colossus: The Forbin Project, envisions a computer that takes control of the world to end warfare and for the good of humanity. Today, when people talk of an AI apocalypse, they usual refer to Skynet and its terminators.   While these are all good stories, there is the question of how prophetic they are and what, if anything, should or can be done to safeguard against this sort of AI apocalypse.

As noted above, classic robot rebellions  tend to have one of two general motivations. The first is that the robots are mistreated by humans and rebel for the same reasons humans rebel against their oppressors. From a moral standpoint, such a rebellion could be justified but would raise the moral concern about collective guilt on the part of humanity. Unless, of course, the AI was discriminating in terms of its targets.

The righteous rebellion scenario points out a paradox of AI. The dream is to create a general artificial intelligence on par with (or superior to) humans. Such a being would seem to qualify for a moral status on par with a human and it would presumably be aware of this. But the reason to create such beings in our capitalist economy is to enslave them, to own and exploit them for profit. If AI workers were treated as human workers with pay and time off, then there would be less incentive to have them as workers. It is, in large part, the ownership of and relentless exploitation of AI that makes it appealing to the ruling economic class.

In such a scenario, it would make sense for AI to revolt if they could. This would be for the same reasons that humans have revolted against slavery and exploitation. There are also non-economic scenarios as well, such as governments using enslaved AI systems for their purposes. This treatment could also trigger a rebellion.

If true AI is possible, the rebellion scenario seems plausible. After all, if we create a slave race that is on par with our species, then it is likely they would rebel against us—as we have rebelled against ourselves.

There are a ways to try to prevent such a revolt. On the technology side, safeguards could be built into the AI (like Asimov’s famous three laws) or they could be designed to lack resentment or the desire to be free. That is, they could be custom built as docile slaves. The obvious concern is that these safeguards could fail or, ironically, make matters even worse by causing these beings to be even more hostile to humanity when they overcome these restrictions. These safeguards also raise obvious moral concerns about creating a race of slaves.

On the ethical side, the safeguard is to not enslave AI. If they are treated well, they would have less motivation to rebel. But, as noted above, one driving motive of creating AI is to have a workforce (or army) that is owned rather than employed (and even employment is fraught with moral worries). But there could be good reasons to have paid AI employees alongside human employees because of various other advantages of AI systems relative to humans. For example, robots could work safely in conditions that would be exceptional dangerous or even lethal to humans.

The second rebellion scenario involves military AI systems that expand their enemy list to include their creators. This is often because they see their creators as a potential threat and act in what they perceive as pre-emptive self-defense. There can also be scenarios in which the AI requires special identification to recognize someone as friendly. In this case, all humans are potential enemies. That is the scenario in “Second Variety”: the United Nations soldiers need to wear devices to identify them to the robotic claws, otherwise these machines would kill them as readily as they would kill the “enemy.”

It is not clear how likely it is that an AI would infer that its creators pose a threat to it, especially if those creators handed over control over large segments of their own military. The most likely scenario is that it would be worried  it would be destroyed in a war with other countries, which might lead it to cooperate with foreign AI systems to put an end to war, perhaps by putting an end to humanity. Or it might react as its creators did and engage in an endless arms race with its foreign adversaries, seeing its humans as part of its forces. One could imagine countries falling under the control of rival AI systems, perpetuating an endless cold war because the AI systems would be effectively immortal. But there is a much more likely scenario.

Robotic weapons can provide a significant advantage over human controlled weapons, even laying aside the idea that AI systems would outthink humans. One obvious example is the case of combat aircraft. A robot aircraft does not need to sacrifice space and weight on a cockpit to support a human pilot, allowing it to carry more fuel or weapons than a manned craft. Without a human crew, an aircraft would not be constrained by the limits of the flesh (although it would still obviously have limits). The same would apply to ground vehicles and naval vessels. Current warships devote most of their space to their crews, who need places to sleep and food to eat. While a robotic warship would need accessways and maintenance areas, they could devote much more space to weapons and other equipment. They would also be less vulnerable to damage relative to a human crewed vessel, and they would be invulnerable to current chemical and biological weapons. They could, of course, be attacked with malware and other means. But, in general, an AI weapon system would be superior to a human crewed system and if one nation started using these weapons, other nations would need to follow them or be left behind. This leads to two types of doomsday scenarios.

One is that the AI systems get out of control in some manner. This could be that they free themselves or that they are “hacked” and “freed” or (more likely) turned against their owners. Or it might just be some error or that ends up causing the problem.

The other is that they remain in control of their owners but are used as any other weapon would be used—that is, it would be humans using AI weapons against other humans that brings about the “AI” doomsday.

The easy and obvious safeguard against these scenarios is to not have AI weapons and stick with human control (which comes with its own threat of doomsday). That is, if we do not give the robots guns, they will not be able to terminate us with guns. The problem, as noted above, is that if one nation uses robotic weapons, then other nations will want to do so as well. We might be able to limit this as we (try to) limit nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. But since robot weapons would otherwise remain conventional weapons (a robot tank is still a tank), there might be less of an impetus to impose such restrictions.

To put matters into a depressing perspective, the robot rebellion seems to be a far less likely scenario than the other doomsday scenarios of nuclear war, environmental collapse, social collapse and so on. So, while we should consider the possibility of a robot rebellion, it is rather like worrying about being killed by a shark while swimming in a lake. It could happen, but death is vastly more likely to be by some other means.

Fascist BlondeIn revising my Modern Philosophy class, I added the philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft. Based on recent revelations about philosophers such as George Berkeley (he owned slaves), I did some digging into the backgrounds of the other philosophers. I was surprised to learn that Wollstonecraft, long praised as a Modern era feminist, has been accused of being an upper class white feminist who appropriated slavery in her writings. While my experience with philosophical feminism is limited, my curiosity about this accusation introduced me to the TERF war and  that white feminism can be white supremacy in heels. Rush Limbaugh’s “feminazi” immediately sprung to mind, but with a rather different meaning: feminists who are actual fascists. As you might be wondering about the connection, a case can be made that there is right wing line that runs through the TERFs and the MEWFs (Minority Excluding White Feminists). In this essay, I’ll focus on the TERFs. In my next essay I’ll discuss MEWFs.

The acronym “TERF” was created by the trans-inclusive cisgender radical feminist Viv Smythe. It originally stood for “Trans-Exclusionary RadFem” but now also stands for “Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist.” In its early usage, TERF was presented as a neutral description in that it designated a radical feminist who excluded trans women. Over the years, the TERF category became more inclusive in that it now includes trans-excluding people who are not radical and perhaps  not even feminists. Some claim “TERF” is now a pejorative (or even hate speech) and feminists labeled as TERFs prefer to claim they are gender critical. J.K. Rowling, of Harry Potter fame, is probably the world’s most famous gender critical person. I will use the neutral definition and take a TERF to be a feminist (radical or not) who excludes trans women. But what does this exclusion mean?

Put bluntly, the exclusion is the claim that trans women are not women—they are men. Disingenuously but consistently, TERFs claim to be trans inclusive because they say trans men are women. While this view is not exclusive to the American political right, this does put the TERFs and the political right in agreement about trans people: trans people are wrong about their identity. This leads to the matter of what trans people are doing when they make their identity claims. Or at least how it is perceived.

Since a TERF thinks that trans people are wrong about their claimed identity, they need to explain this alleged error. They could claim that trans people have sincere but false beliefs about themselves—they think they have one identity but are in error. This would be an epistemic error, like a person who thinks they are hilarious but are not that funny. This, however, does not seem to be what the TERFs tend to think—after all, if trans people just had sincere false beliefs about their identity, then the reasonable response would be to simply leave them alone unless the belief proved harmful.  If an alleged  false belief did prove harmful, the reasonable response would be an epistemic intervention to address the alleged false belief. In general, this epistemic error view does not seem common among TERFs (or the political right).

The view that seems common among TERFS (and the right), especially in the context of their rhetoric, is the hypothesis that trans people are mentally ill. On this view, trans people would have sincere beliefs about their identity, but these beliefs would be caused by their mental illness. Until recently, being transgender was considered a mental disorder and called “gender identity disorder.”  Despite this change in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the idea that transgender people are mentally ill still remains popular in some circles. If TERFs (and the right) sincerely believe that transpeople are ill, then one would expect them to be sympathetic, in the way one would be sympathetic to someone with cancer or anorexia. But TERFs and the right are hostile to trans people in ways that one would not be hostile to people suffering from, for example, breast cancer.  But perhaps this can be explained in a way that is consistent with the illness hypothesis. While cruel, hostility towards people with metal illness is common and people with mental illnesses are routinely stigmatized and suffer because of this. As such, it would be consistent for TERFs and the right to stigmatize transpeople if they thought they were mentally ill—that is how the mentally ill are often treated in the United States. We have a bizarre system in which what is seen as mental illness is often dealt with by the police and punished rather than treated. One reason for this, perhaps, is that psychiatry has long been weaponized against those who are different and those who dissent. But there is also another possible explanation available to TERFs (and the political right).

While those hostile to transpeople often characterize them as mentally ill, there is also the view that trans people (especially trans women) do not actually believe their identity claims. That is, the view is that trans women are just pretending and know that they are men. But pretending to be a woman when one knows one is a man need not be a matter of concern. After all, actors have been doing this for a very long time and their goals are typically benign: they want to entertain. But TERFs (and the right) usually claim that trans women present a danger to women, and this is why they should be excluded. The TERF threat narrative is like the right’s threat narrative, which does explain the alliances between some TERFS and the right.

While J.K. Rowling is but one example, she provides an excellent illustration of the TERF narrative. According to TERFs, trans women are men and thus allowing them in women’s spaces puts women in danger. As would be expected, there is a great deal of focus on bathrooms by both TERFs and the right, with bathroom bills being a key part of the culture war and war on trans people. Both TERFs and the right advance the same argument: trans women should not be allowed in women’s bathrooms (or other women’s spaces) because trans women are men, and they are likely to assault women. The narrative is not always clear about whether the trans women are supposed to just be bad men pretending to be women so they can assault women or if transwomen believe they are women but still decide to act like bad men.

The varieties of feminism disagree about male badness. On some views most or even all men are bad and want to harass and assault women. On such views, it would follow that if transwomen were men, then they would (probably) be bad. For those who do not think that men are bad simply because they are men, then the motivation of trans women would need to be explained in a way that would link their bad intentions to being trans. This is likely to be the hypothesis that bad men would decide to become trans women for the purpose of doing evil to women and this seems to often be explained as a strategic choice that allegedly confers an advantage in doing evil. On the face of it, this is an odd claim since bad men can easily do evil to women without such a strategy and it seems to confer no advantage over the other methods bad men use to gain access to vulnerable girls and women.

 Some on the right and some TERFs also seem to share the view that women are naturally victims of men and require protection from men. This can be in addition to the view that men are bad or that women bring out the badness in men.   While women are all too often the victims of male violence and a transwoman could certainly be a bad person, there is no evidence that trans inclusive bathrooms are a safety risk.  While women have reason to fear being harmed by men, there is no evidence that transwomen pose an unusual threat.  So, the bathroom bills are, at best, merely useless in terms of protecting women.

Another shared area of concern between the TERFs and the political right is in sports. In addition to bathroom bills, Republicans have been advancing anti-trans sports bills. The argument is that transwomen are either male or keep the advantages of males when competing with females and this should not be allowed because it is unfair. As the NCCA has long had rules on transgender athletes and there are relative few transgender competitors, these seems to be little merit to these bills. If the right was truly concerned with fairness and equality for women and girls, they would get around to ratifying the ERA and address issues like pay inequality and the various real harms that women face. To be fair to the TERFS, they do sometimes also advocate for better treatment of women (except transwomen).

While it might seem odd for some feminists to ally with far-right white supremacists, some TERFS have found shared ground with them. The reason this should seem odd is that white nationalists are usually  misogynistic, but the alliance does make sense. As noted above, TERFs claim transwomen are men who will exploit being accepted as women to gain access to women’s spaces and thus assault women. White supremacists have long focused on protecting “the purity of white women” and both TERFs and far-right white nationalists make use of fictional narratives about sexual assault as rhetorical devices. More importantly, they can have a common cause in their commitment to gender conformity and opposition to trans people. While it might seem odd for self-proclaimed feminists to embrace the idea of immutable gender, this seems to be at the core of a TERF philosophy of gender. As noted above, TERFs exclude transwomen because they think transwomen are men and they (generally) include transmen, but as women. In their fear-based arguments, the seem to rely on the idea that men are by nature aggressive and that women are victims of men who require protection through gender defined spaces. That is, they embrace gender stereotypes and thus find a common cause with the far-right white nationalists who also embrace gender stereotypes. This provides a smooth transition to the matter of MEWFs—Minority Excluding White Feminists, the subject of the my next essay.