Day: January 14, 2026

 

Shortly after Renee Good was killed, officials of the Trump administration and their allies began a propaganda campaign to cast her death as the justified elimination of a dangerous domestic terrorist. From the start, their narrative included deliberate factual errors and made extensive use of rhetorical techniques. In this essay, I’ll discuss this campaign from the standpoint of critical thinking.

As others have noted, officials of the Trump administration presented their interpretation of the event almost immediately, without waiting for an investigation. This was likely to pre-emptively capture the narrative, as the side that defines the narrative first usually enjoys a rhetorical advantage. Logically, of course, this is irrelevant to the truth of the narrative, and a rushed narrative is likely to be less accurate than one based on an investigation.

Given that the video evidence obviously contradicts some of the administration’s claims, it might be wondered why they would make such false claims. They are probably not trying to convince people that their obviously false claims are true, but flooding the zone with falsehoods can be an effective tactic for bogging down critics. For example, the administration claimed that Good menaced agents while they were trying to free their vehicle from the snow. As the video shows, this is entirely untrue. Rather concede this, it makes more rhetorical sense to continue to lie and fight about that point, thus wearing down the opposition on an issue that is less important than the main issue of whether the killing was justified.

As is standard practice, the Trump administration and the right-wing media have tried to demonize the victim and angelize the officer who killed her. By calling her a terrorist, the event is also cast as a matter of national security rather than a possible case of ICE misconduct.

Jesse Watters provides an excellent example of this. He (and others) focused on her use of pronouns and her being a lesbian, thus distracting people from the actual issue and signaling to the “in-group” that Good is not one of them to make it seem that her death is at least not tragic or perhaps even justified on this basis. In contrast, the right-wing narrative about the ICE agent is that he is a Christian, a husband and a parent. Ironically, these claims make his actions even worse. As a Christian, he should have considered the use of violence more carefully and should have shown the compassion of Christ to Good. As a spouse and a parent, he should have considered that she was also a spouse and a parent before killing her. Or, if he did not know this, considered she might be a spouse and a parent as well.  But getting back to the untruths.

As noted above, officials in the Trump administration made claims that are objectively not true and persisted in these claims. While it is reasonable to attribute errors to these officials based on incompetence, ignorance and laziness, there are other “good” reasons for them to advance untruths.

One reason is that these untruths provide a clear loyalty test. When the Trump administration makes an obviously untrue claim, they can then observe who loyally embraces the untruth and who chooses truth. Given that most Trump officials and supporters profess to be Christians, this is an interesting test of their faith: is their ultimately loyalty to God (who condemns lying and is the God of truth) or Trump? By choosing the lie over the truth, a professed Christian is making a profound statement of loyalty, for they are explicitly abandoning Christ for Trump. Roughly put, they are saying they will accept the risk of Hell to express their loyalty to Trump. Assuming, of course, that they are not lying when they profess to be Christians. Laying aside religion, the person who sincerely embraces such a lie is signaling that they trust Trump and his officials more than their own eyes.

To be fair, people can also be psychologically pressured into sticking with an untruth because it would cost them to reject a claim they publicly accepted or defended. So, while they now know it is not true, they are unwilling to risk the embarrassment of admitting error. They then double down on the untruth and can double down so hard that they convince themselves the untruth they are doubling down for is therefore true.

In addition to a loyalty test, the obvious lie is also useful as a corrosive tool of corruption. If a person reluctantly goes along with a lie as a show of loyalty (or as an opportunist), this can have a corrupting effect on their character. This means they are more likely to embrace lies in the future and this can progress to the point where they have little ethics remaining.

Finally, people can embrace untruths because of their values: if success is more important than truth, then lying is a means justified by this end. An extreme version of this is how people who know the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are a fabrication, yet they see them as expressing a deeper truth. On this view, a supporter of Trump and ICE might “reason” that although the administration is lying in this case, the goals of the administration justify lying about killing innocent people. They might also think even if Good was innocent of any wrongdoing in this incident, she deserved to die because of who she was and her opposition to Trump. That is, her execution was warranted not as a case of self-defense against a dangerous driver but because she opposed the will of Trump.

In closing, the way the Trump administration and the right address incidents like these is the reason I am not overly worried about AI fakes in the context of “deeper truths.” For AI fakes to influence people, people would need to be influenced primarily by evidence rather than other factors. As this incident and others, such as the infamous claims about migrants eating cats and dogs, people see what they believe more than they believe what they see—that is, the evidence or lack of evidence is largely irrelevant and people, especially on the right, stick with their “deeper truth” or wish to show loyalty.

What I think AI fakes will be most “useful” for is giving people images and videos that match what they already believe. For example, people who think Good was a terrorist who hit the agent with her car would presumably believe AI generated fakes “showing” that. But they obviously believe that she hit him with her vehicle even when the video evidence does not support this. This is not to say that AI fakes will not be a problem, but I think they will be a problem for claims that people are willing to accept or reject based on evidence rather than on their ideology. Fortunately, the people most likely to be swayed by evidence also tend to be those with better critical thinking skills. Crudely put, people who believe (or profess their belief) based on their ideology are unlikely to have their views changed by AI fakes. People who are critical thinkers and believe based on careful consideration of evidence are also unlikely to have their views changed by AI fakes.

While the ethical status of animals has been debated since at least the time of Pythagoras, the serious debate over whether animals are people has heated up in recent years. While it is easy to dismiss the claim that animals are people, it is a matter worth considering.

There are at least three types of personhood: legal personhood, metaphysical personhood and moral personhood. Legal personhood is the easiest of the three. While it would seem reasonable to expect some sort of rational foundation for claims of legal personhood, it is just a matter of how the laws define “personhood.” For example, in the United States corporations are people while animals and fetuses are not. There have been attempts by opponents of abortion to give fetuses the status of legal people (and some have succeeded). There have even been some attempts to make animals into legal people.

Since corporations are legally people, it is not absurd to make animals into legal people. After all, higher animals are closer to human people than corporate people. These animals can think, feel and suffer and these are things that actual people do but corporate people cannot. So, if it is not absurd for Hobby Lobby to be a legal person, it is not absurd for your dog to be a legal person. Or perhaps dogs should just  be incorporated and thus become people.

It could be countered that although animals do have qualities that make them worthy of legal protection, there is no need to make them into legal people. After all, this would create numerous problems. For example, if animals were legal people, they could no longer be owned, bought or sold. Because, with the inconsistent exception of corporate people, people cannot be legally bought, sold or owned (with exceptions).

Since I am a philosopher rather than a lawyer, my own view is that legal personhood should rest on moral or metaphysical personhood. I will leave the legal bickering to the lawyers, since that is what they are paid to do.

Metaphysical personhood is real personhood in the sense that it is what it is, objectively, to be a person. I use the term “metaphysical” here in the academic sense: the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of reality. I do not mean “metaphysical” in the pop sense of the term, which usually is taken to be supernatural or beyond the physical realm.

When it comes to metaphysical personhood, the basic question is “what is it to be a person?” Ideally, the answer is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions such that if a being has them, it is a person and if it does not, it is not. This matter is also tied closely to the question of personal identity. This involves two main concerns (other than what it is to be a person): what makes a person the person she is and what makes the person distinct from all other things (including other people).

Over the centuries, philosophers have endeavored to answer this question and have come up with a vast array of answers. While this oversimplifies things greatly, most definitions of personhood focus on the mental aspects of being a person. Put even more crudely, it often seems to come down to this: things that think and talk are people. Things that do not think and talk are not people.

John Locke presents a paradigm example of this sort of definition of “person.” According to Locke, a person “is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.”

Given Locke’s definition, animals that are close to humans in capabilities, such as the great apes and whales, might qualify as persons. Locke does not, unlike Descartes, require that people be capable of using true language. Interestingly, given his definition, fetuses and brain-dead bodies would not be people. Unless, of course, the mental activities are going on without any evidence of their occurrence.

Other people take a different approach and do not focus on mental qualities that could, in principle, be subject to empirical testing. Instead, they rest personhood on possessing a specific sort of metaphysical substance or property. Most commonly, this is the soul: things with souls are people, things without souls are not people. Those who accept this view often (but not always) claim that fetuses are people because they have souls and animals are not because they lack souls. The obvious problem is trying to establish the existence of the soul.

There are, obviously enough, hundreds or even thousands of metaphysical definitions of “person.” While I do not have my own developed definition, I do tend to follow Locke’s approach and take metaphysical personhood to be a matter of having certain qualities that can, at least in principle, be tested for. As a practical matter, I go with the talking test: things that talk (by this I mean true use of language, not just making noises that sound like words) are most likely people. However, this does not seem to be a necessary condition for personhood, and it might not be sufficient. As such, I am willing to consider that creatures such as apes and whales might be metaphysical people like me and erring in favor of personhood is a rational approach to those who want to avoid harming people.

Obviously enough, if a being is a metaphysical person, then it would seem to automatically have moral personhood. That is, it would have the moral status of a person. While people do horrible things to other people, having the moral status of a person is generally a good thing because non-evil people are generally reluctant to harm other people. So, for example, a non-evil person might hunt squirrels for food but would not hunt humans for food. If that non-evil person knew that squirrels were people, then he would not hunt them for food.

Interestingly enough, beings that are not metaphysical people might have the status of moral personhood. This is because the moral status of personhood might correctly or reasonably apply to non-persons.

One example is that a brain-dead human might no longer be a person, yet because of their former status as a person still be justly treated as a person in terms of its moral status. As another example, a fetus might not be an actual person, but its potential to be a person might reasonably grant it the moral status of a person.

Of course, it could be countered that such non-people should not have the moral status of full people, though they should (perhaps) have some moral status. To use the obvious example, even those who regard the fetus as not being a person often see it as having some moral status. If, to use a horrific example, a pregnant woman was attacked and beaten so that she lost her fetus, that would not just be a wrong against the woman but also a wrong against the fetus itself. That said, there are those who do not grant a fetus any moral status at all and the death of the fetus would be seen

In the case of animals, it might be argued that although they do not meet the requirements to be people for real, some of them are close enough to warrant being treated as having the moral status of people. The obvious counter to this is that animals can be given moral statuses appropriate to them rather than treating them as people.

Immanuel Kant took an interesting approach to the status of animals. In his ethical theory Kant makes it quite clear that animals are means rather than ends. People (rational beings), in contrast, are ends. For Kant, this distinction rests on the fact that rational beings can (as he sees it) choose to follow the moral law. Animals, lacking reason, cannot do this. Since animals are means and not ends, Kant claims that we have no direct duties to animals. They are classified in with the other “objects of our inclinations” that derive value from the value we give them.

But Kant argues that we should treat animals well. However, he does so while also trying to avoid giving animals any moral status of their own. Here is how he does it (or tries to do so).

While Kant is not willing to accept that we have any direct duties to animals, he “smuggles” in duties to them indirectly. As he puts it, our duties towards animals are indirect duties towards people. To make his case for this, he employs an argument from analogy: if a person doing X would obligate us to that human, then an animal doing X would also create an analogous moral obligation. For example, a human who has long and faithfully served another person should not simply be abandoned or put to death when he has grown old. Likewise, a dog who has served faithfully and well should not be cast aside in his old age.

Given this approach, Kant could be seen as regarding animals as virtual or ersatz people. Or at least those that would be close enough to people to engage in activities that would create obligations if done by people.

Considering this discussion, there are three answers to the question raised by the title of this essay. Are animals legally people? The answer is a matter of law: what does the law say? Are animals really people? The answer depends on which metaphysical theory is correct. Do animals have the moral status of people? The answer depends on which, if any, moral theory is correct.