Day: January 9, 2026

On what had been a pleasant morning run, I saw a man with a machete emerge from the woods. He yelled at me, then started sprinting in my direction. I felt an instant of fear, for I know the damage a machete can do to the human body. Then cold clarity took over, as it always does in times of danger. I have faith in my speed and endurance, but my speed failed me that day: the man caught up to me with shocking speed.  I spun to face him, crazily hearing the line from One Piece that “scars on the back are a swordsman’s shame.” More rationally, I knew that death was almost certain if he was able to hack at my back.

A past misfortune in the park suddenly seemed fortunate. In 2023 my dog Remy was attacked by another dog and I, contrary to the advice of experts, intervened. Remy got a trip to the emergency vet; afterwards I took myself to the ER where I was treated for rabies and had my hand x-rayed to check for teeth fragments. After that, I always walk and run with (legal) weapons. As such, I was well armed when the man caught up to me. I, of course, deployed my best weapon: I spoke to him.

He stopped and lowered what I had seen as a machete. While he was armed, it was with just a hefty stick. To this day, I use this as an example of how our perceptions can be mistaken when we are afraid—I perceived the metal blade of a machete when it was just a stick. I was still concerned, but fighting a man armed with a stick is different than facing a foe with a machete.

After a few minutes of confusing conversation, he explained that someone had stolen his laptop from his apartment and fled towards the park. I assured him that I did not have his laptop. He then set off at a jog to find the perpetrator. I, of course, had to follow him. He immediately ran into another runner, and I helped convince him that the runner did not steal his laptop. He moved on, and I ran with him, to protect him and others he might encounter.  Eventually he calmed down and said he was going home; I said farewell and finished my run.

 I briefly thought about contacting the police, but I feared for his safety. Like anyone who follows the news, I knew that there would be a chance that if an officer saw him with a stick, they would be “afraid for their life” and shoot him.  They might, as I did, perceive him as armed with a machete or even a gun. I never saw him again, but I hope he is okay and that he has a new laptop.

Since that incident, I have thought about my philosophy of violence, working out my principles. Each new episode of violence in the news, such as when ICE agents kill people, sets me thinking about a philosophy of violence again. I have, obviously, decided to start writing up my philosophy of violence. But I will begin with my backstory to provide context and to help me better understand my biases.

I grew up in a small Maine town, far from wars and criminal violence. That said, my backstory includes familiarity with the ways of violence. When I was a kid, my parents worked at a summer camp. One perk was that my sister and I were able to participate in the activities as if we were paying campers. I like to joke that I was trained in medieval warfare: I was taught fencing by an Olympic medalist and trained in horseback riding and archery. While this was sports rather than violence, my experience in fencing taught me about facing another person in combat.

I started shooting BB guns early on, then real guns as soon as my dad allowed that. I was soon hunting and was thus made familiar with guns and killing animals. I have been shooting my whole life, so I am comfortable with guns and noise. I was also properly trained in the responsibilities one takes on when one is armed.

When I started playing Dungeons & Dragons, I had the unwise idea that me and my friends should make our own weapons and fight each other for real. I had a wooden shield, a flail and a wooden sword while my friend Mike favored a croquet mallet as a Warhammer. While there were injuries, this was not real battle (although there was blood and stitches)—but it did increase my familiarity with being in a fight.

While running is useful for escaping fights, it also had a calming effect on me, shaping my disposition and allowing me to endure pain and discomfort.

When I started graduate school in 1993, I decided to earn my black belt in Tae Kwon Do and did so just before I completed my doctorate. That made me even more familiar with fighting and I continue to train to this day.  The meditation and moral aspects of the training are also critical, enhancing the pain tolerance and calmness  arising from my running. I am, of course, a philosopher—so talking is a core skill for me.

Because of my background, I was well suited for that encounter. Although the attempt to run away failed, that turned out to be for the best. Because of my experience and training, my reason remained in control during the encounter—fear and anger did not become my masters. And these are terrible masters, for they can lead us to unnecessary violence. While I was not sure I could have won the fight, should it have come to that, my competence in violence gave me the confidence to choose not to use it. This might strike some as odd, but my experience has been that the stronger a person truly is, the less inclined they are to use violence. Needless violence seems to arise most often from the fear of those who think themselves strong but know they are weak, the anger of those who lack self-discipline and those ruled by vices such as cruelty. I do my best not to be that sort of person, for they can easily act like monsters.

I provide this backstory, as noted above, to set the stage for the discussions to follow in which I develop my philosophy of violence. I am writing from my own biased perspective and part of sorting out my philosophy of violence is trying to see how my backstory is shaping (or distorting) my view. In the following essays, I will develop my religious view of the ethics of violence and my moral view of violence.

The scene is a bakery in a small town in Indiana. Ralph and Sally, a married couple, run the Straight Bakery with the aid of the pretty young Ruth. Dr. Janet and her fiancé Andrea enter the shop, looking to buy a cake.

Sally greets them with a pleasant smile, which quickly fades when she finds out that Janet and Andrea are a lesbian couple. Pointing at the door, she says “baking you a wedding cake would violate my religious beliefs. Go find Satan’s baker! Leave now!” The couple leave the shop, planning to drive to the next town as their small town has but one bakery.

At the end of the day, Sally leaves the shop. Ralph says he will help Ruth close the shop. After Sally leaves, Ralph and Ruth indulge in some casual adultery. As God intended.

 

Back in 2015 Indiana got nation attention for its version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The bill was aimed at preventing state and local governments in Indiana from “substantially burdening” the exercise of religion unless it can be proven the state has a compelling interest and is using the least restrictive means for acting on that interest.

Proponents claimed it was to protect people, such as business owners, with strong religious beliefs from the intrusion of the state. Those who opposed it noted it would legalize discrimination and that it was aimed at gays and lesbians. Many other states have similar laws, but some have laws that protect people from discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Since such laws cannot (yet) specify individual religions for protection, they sometimes have interesting consequences, possibly involving Satanism, as happened in my adopted state of Florida. While the legal aspects of such laws are of great concern, as a philosopher my main concern is with the ethics of the matter.

On the face of it, religious freedom seems good as it falls under the broader liberty of thought and belief (which is ably supported by Mill in his work on liberty). As such, these sorts of religious freedom laws seem to be a morally reasonable defense of a well-established right.

But these laws, as opponents argue, allow people to discriminate, provided it can be justified on religious grounds. The law cannot, obviously, require that a religion be true, rational, consistent, sensible or even sane as all religions are equally protected. This, of course, could lead to some serious consequences.

Driving home, Sally’s car is struck by a delivery van, and she is badly injured. Luckily, Dr. Janet and Andrea (a trained nurse) pull over to see if they can help. As Dr. Janet and Andrea rush to help, they see it is Sally. Dr. Janet, a devout member of the Church of Relentless Tolerance, has sworn to God that she will not treat any straight bigots. Looking down at the dying Sally, Dr. Janet says “saving you would violate my sincerely held religious beliefs. Sorry. Perhaps you can find another doctor.” Sally dies.

The obvious counter to this sort of scenario is that religious freedom does not grant a person the liberty to deny a person an essential service, such as medical treatment. Using the standard principle of harm as a limit on liberty, the freedom of religion ends when it would cause unwarranted harm to another person. It could also be argued that the moral obligation to others would override the religious freedom of a person, compelling her to act even against her religious beliefs. If so, it would be wrong of Dr. Janet and Andrea to let Sally die. This, of course, rests on either the assumption that harm overrides liberty or the assumption that obligations override liberty. There are well-established and reasonable arguments against both assumptions. That said, it would certainly seem that the state would have a compelling interest in not allowing doctors, pharmacists, and others to allow people to die or suffer harm because of their religious beliefs. But, perhaps, religious freedom trumps all these considerations.

After having a good time with Ruth, Ralph showers away the evidence of his sins and then heads for home. Ruth helps herself to money from the register and adjusts the spreadsheet on the business PC to cover up her theft.

Ralph is horrified to learn that Sally has been killed. He takes her to the only funeral home in town, run by the Marsh family (who moved there from Innsmouth). Unfortunately for Ralph, the Marsh family members are devoted worshippers of Dagon and their religious beliefs forbid them from providing their services to Christians. After being ejected from the property, Ralph tries to drive Sally’s body to the next town, but his truck breaks down.

He finds that the nearest shop is Mohamed’s Motors, a Muslim owned business. Bob, the tow truck driver, says that while he is generally fine with Christians, he is unwilling to tow a Christian’s truck. He does recommend his friend Charlie, a Jewish tow truck driver who is willing to tow Christians, if it is not on the Sabbath and the Christian is not a bigot.  Ralph cries out to God at the injustices he has suffered, forgetting that he has reaped what he has sown.

In the case of these sorts of important, but not essential, services it could be argued that people would have the right to discriminate. After all, while the person would be inconvenienced (perhaps extremely so), the harm would not be enough to make the refusal morally wrong. That is, while it would be nice of Bob to tow Ralph’s truck, it would not be wrong for him to refuse, and he is under no obligation to do so. It might, of course, be a bad business decision. But that is another matter entirely.

If appeals to harm and obligations fail, then another option is to argue from the social contract. The idea is that people who have businesses or provide services do not exist in a social vacuum: they operate within society. In return for the various goods of society (police protection, protection of the laws, social rights and so on) they are required to render their services and provide their goods to all the members of civil society without discrimination. This does not require that they like their customers or approve of them. Rather, it requires that they honor the tacit social contract: in return for the goods of society that allow one to operate a business, one must provide goods and services to all members of the society. That is the deal one makes when one operates a business in a democratic society that professes liberty and justice for all.

Obviously, people do have the right to refuse goods and services under certain conditions. For example, if a customer went into Ralph & Ruth’s Bakery (Ralph moved on quickly) and insulted Ralph, urinated on the floor and demanded a free cake, Ruth would be justified in refusing to make him a cake. After all, his behavior would warrant such treatment. However, refusing a well-behaved customer because she is gay, black, Christian, or a woman would not be justified. This is because those qualities are not morally relevant to refusing services. Most importantly, freedom of religion is not freedom to discriminate. Despite what some judges think.

It might be countered that the government has no right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple. This is true, in that the person can elect to close his business rather than bake the cake. However, he does not have the moral right to operate a business within civil society if he is going to unjustly discriminate against members of that society. So, in that sense, the state does have the right to force a Christian to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple, just as it can force him to bake a cake for a mixed-race couple, a Jewish couple, or an atheist couple.