Back in 2015 some folks in my adopted state of Florida wanted three Confederate veterans to become members of the Veterans’ Hall of Fame. Despite the efforts of the Florida Sons of Confederate Veterans, the initial attempt failed on the grounds that the Confederate veterans were not United States’ veterans. Not to be outdone, the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans wanted an official Texas license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag. While custom license plates are allowed in the United States, states review proposed plates. The Texas department of Motor Vehicles rejected the proposed plate on the grounds that “a significant portion of the public associate[s] the Confederate flag with organizations” expressing hatred for minorities. Those proposing the plate claim that this violates their rights. The case reached the Supreme Court, and the court sided with the state of Texas. But as the Trump regime is Confederate friendly, it would not be surprising if there are new proposals for such license plates.

The legal issue, which was presented as a battle over free speech, was interesting. However, my main concern is with the ethics of the matter since I am not a lawyer.

One way to look at a state approved license plate is that it is a means of conveying a message the state agrees with. Those opposed to the plate argued that if the state were forced to allow the plate to be issued, the state will be compelled to be associated with a message. In free speech terms, this is forcing the state to express or facilitate a view it does not want to publicly accept.

This has some appeal as the state can be seen as representing the people. If a view is significantly offensive to a significant number of citizens (which is, I admit, vague), then the state could reasonably decline to accept a license plate expressing or associated with that view. So, to give some examples, the state could justly decline Nazi plates, pornographic plates, Stalin plates, and plates featuring racist or sexist images. Given that the Confederate flag represents slavery and racism, it seems reasonable to decline the plate. But citizens can still cover their cars in Confederate flags and thus express their views. As such, not having an official state plate does not interfere with free expression, anymore than not having an official state plate advertising a business would deny that business its free expression.

But the plate can be defended using the right of free expression: citizens should have the right to express their views via license plates. These plates, one might contend, do not express the views of the state since they express the view of the person using the plate.

In response to concerns about a plate being offensive, Granvel Block argued that not allowing a plate with the Confederate flag would be “as unreasonable” as the state forbidding the use of the University of Texas logo on a plate “because Texas A&M graduates didn’t care for it.” On the one hand, Block has made a reasonable point: if people disliking an image is a legitimate basis for forbidding its use on a plate, then any image could end up forbidden. It would, as Block noted, be absurd to forbid schools from having custom plates because rival schools do not like them.

On the other hand, there is a relevant difference between the logo of a public university and the battle flag of the Confederacy. While some Texas A&M graduates might not like the University of Texas, the University of Texas’ logo does not represent states that rebelled against the United States to defend slavery. So, while the state should not forbid plates merely because some people do not like them, it is reasonable to forbid a plate that includes the flag representing, as state Senator Royce West said, “…a legalized system of involuntary servitude, dehumanization, rape, mass murder…”

The lawyer representing the Sons of Confederate Veterans, R. James George Jr., presented an interesting line of reasoning. He notes, correctly, that Texas has a state holiday that honors veterans of the Confederacy, that there are monuments honoring Confederate veterans and that the gift shop in the capitol sells Confederate memorabilia. From this he infers that the Department of Motor Vehicles should follow the lead of the state legislature and approve the plate.

This argument, which is an appeal to consistency, has some weight. After all, the state seems to express its support for Confederate veterans (and the Confederacy) and this license plate is consistent with this support. To refuse the license plate on the grounds that the state does not wish to express support for what the Confederate flag stands for is inconsistent with having a state holiday for Confederate veterans as the state seems comfortable with this association. This is on par with arguing that if a state had a holiday devoted to pornography, monuments to porn stars and sold pornography in the capitol, then a pornographic license plate would be fine. Which is certainly reasonable.  

There is, of course, the broader moral issue of whether the state should have a state holiday for Confederate veterans, etc. That said, any arguments given in support of what the state already does in regard to the Confederacy also support the acceptance of the plate as they are linked. So, if the plate is to be rejected, these other practices should also be rejected on the same grounds. But, if these other practices are maintained, then the plate would fit and thus, on this condition, should also be accepted just as a pornographic license plate should be accepted in a state that honors porn.

Since I favor freedom of expression, it makes since that any license plate design that does not interfere with identifying the license number and state should be allowed. This would be consistent and would not require the state to make any political or value judgments. It would, of course, need to be made clear that the plates do not necessarily express the official positions of the government.

The obvious problem is that people would create horrible plates featuring pornography, racism, sexism, and so on. This could be addressed by appealing to existing laws. The state would not approve or reject a plate as such, but a plate could be rejected for violating, for example, laws against making threats or inciting violence. The obvious worry is that laws would then be passed to restrict plates that some people did not like, such as plates endorsing atheism or claiming that climate change is real. But this is not a problem unique to license plates. After all, it has been alleged that officials in my adopted state of Florida have banned the use of the term ‘climate change.’

A way to avoid all controversy is by getting rid of custom plates. Each state might have a neutral, approved image (such as a loon, orange or road runner) or the plates might simply have the number/letters and the state name. This would be consistent as no one gets a custom plate. But I always just get the cheapest license plate option, which is the default state plate. However, some people see their license plate as a means of expression and their view is worth considering.

 

A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 brings together a year of sharp, accessible, and often provocative reflections on the moral, political, cultural, and technological challenges of contemporary life. Written by philosopher Michael LaBossiere, these essays move fluidly from the ethics of AI to the culture wars, from conspiracy theories to Dungeons & Dragons, from public policy to personal agency — always with clarity, humor, and a commitment to critical thinking.

Across hundreds of entries, LaBossiere examines the issues shaping our world:

  • AI, technology, and the future of humanity — from mind‑uploading to exoskeletons, deepfakes, and the fate of higher education
  • Politics, power, and public life — including voting rights, inequality, propaganda, and the shifting landscape of American democracy
  • Ethics in everyday life — guns, healthcare, charity, masculinity, inheritance, and the moral puzzles hidden in ordinary choices
  • Culture, identity, and conflict — racism, gender, religion, free speech, and the strange logic of modern outrage
  • Philosophy in unexpected places — video games, D&D, superheroes, time travel, and the metaphysics of fictional worlds

Whether he is dissecting the rhetoric of conspiracy theories, exploring the ethics of space mining, or reflecting on the death of a beloved dog, LaBossiere invites readers into a conversation that is rigorous without being rigid, principled without being preachy, and always grounded in the belief that philosophy is for everyone.

This collection is for readers who want more than hot takes — who want to understand how arguments work, why beliefs matter, and how to think more clearly in a world that rewards confusion.

Thoughtful, wide‑ranging, and often darkly funny, A Philosopher’s Blog 2025 is a companion for anyone trying to make sense of the twenty‑first century.

 

Available for $2.99 on Amazon

 

 

 

While some countries will pay ransoms to free hostages, the United States has a public policy of not doing this. One reason to not pay a ransom for hostages is based on sticking to a principle. This principle could be that bad behavior should not be rewarded or that hostage taking should be punished. Or some other principle.

One of the best arguments against paying ransoms for hostages is a practical and utilitarian moral argument. Paying ransoms gives hostage takers an incentive to take hostages. This incentive means more people will be taken hostage. The cost of not paying is, of course, the possibility that hostages will be killed. However, the argument goes, if hostage takers realize that they will not be paid a ransom, they will have less incentive to take more hostages. This will reduce the chances that hostages will be taken. The calculation is, of course, that the harm done to the current hostages will be outweighed by the benefits of not having people taken hostage in the future.

This argument assumes that hostage takers are primarily motivated by the ransom. If they are taking hostages primarily for other reasons, such as for status, to make a statement or to get media attention, then not paying them a ransom will not significantly reduce their incentive to take hostages. This leads to a second reason why ransoms should not be paid.

In addition to the incentive argument, there is also the funding argument. While a terrorist group might have reasons other than money to take hostages, they benefit from getting ransoms. The money they receive can be used to fund additional operations, such as taking more hostages. Obviously, if ransoms are not paid, then such groups lose this funding, and this could impact their operations. Since paying a ransom would be funding terrorism, this provides both a moral and a practical reason not to pay.

While these arguments have a rational appeal, they are typically countered by emotional appeals. One approach to arguing that ransoms should be paid is the “in their shoes” appeal. The method involves asking a person whether they would want a ransom to be paid for their release or for the release of a loved one. Most people would want the ransom paid, assuming doing so would be effective. Sometimes the appeal is made explicitly in terms of emotions: “how would you feel if your loved one died because the government refused to pay the ransom?” Obviously, a person would feel awful.

This method does have considerable appeal. The “in their shoes” appeal can is like the golden rule approach (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) and is that policy should be based on how you would want to be treated in that situation. If I would not want the policy applied to me (that is, I would want to be ransomed or have my loved one ransomed), then I should be morally opposed to a no-pay policy as a matter of consistency. This certainly makes sense: if I would not want a policy applied in my case, then I should (in general) not support that policy.

One obvious counter is that there seems to be a distinction between what a policy should be and whether a person would want that policy applied to herself. For example, some universities have a policy that if a student misses more than three classes, the student fails the course. Naturally, no student wants that policy to be applied to her (and most professors would not have wanted it to apply to them when they were students), but this does not show that the policy is wrong. As another example, a company might have a policy of not providing health insurance to part time employees. While the CEO would certainly not like the policy if she were part-time, it does not follow that the policy must be a bad one. As such, policies need to be assessed not just in terms of how a person feels about them, but in terms of their merit or lack thereof.

Another obvious counter is to use the same approach, only with a modification. In response to the question “how would you feel if you were the hostage or she were a loved one?” one could ask “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage in an operation funded by ransom money? Or “how would you feel if you or a loved one were taken hostage because the hostage takers learned that people would pay ransoms for hostages?” The answer would be, of course, that one would feel bad about that. However, while how one would feel about this can be useful in discussing the matter, it is not decisive. Settling the matter rationally does require considering more than just how people would feel. It requires looking at the matter with a degree of objectivity. That is, not just asking how people would feel, but what would be right and what would yield the best results in the practical sense.  Obviously, talking about objectivity is easy when one is not a hostage.

In my previous essay I set the stage for discussing the concern about people switching competition categories to gain something. It is to this matter that I now turn.

The Sickle Cell 5K in Tallahassee is known for its excellent master’s trophy for the overall male and female masters runners. It has consistently been bigger and better than the second and third overall awards. One year a master’s runner was third overall but wanted the male masters’ award instead. This created a problem. While there was no rule about this, there are established running norms: overall places take precedence over the masters category and the masters category takes precedence over age group placing.  So, a 40+ year old runner who placed first to third would get the corresponding overall award. The first 40+ runner outside the top three would get the masters award and the next runner in their age group would win that age group. As would be expected, some people got mad about this runner’s efforts to get the masters award since he was breaking the norms and traditions to get a better award.

His argument, which was not unreasonable, was that he was the first masters runner and hence earned that award. This meant that the 4th place runner would get third overall. This might sound odd, but (as noted above) the running norms already allow for a person who finishes second in their age group to place first if the person who would win that age group wins an overall or masters award (most races have a no-double-dip rule). While his request did break the norms, he was  in the masters category. One might say that he elected to identify as a masters runner for the purpose of the award. He got the award when the original masters winner did everyone a favor by giving it to him, allowing the awards to continue. But this episode is still spoken of today and switching categories to get a better award is usually seen as questionable. This episode can be used as an analogy.

Suppose that transgender athletes are like the masters athlete: they belong in their chosen category but they are changing from one category to another in order to get a better award (or win). The masters runner could have accepted the third-place award, a transgender runner who identifies as female could stick to competing as male. But by switching categories, the athletes could be seen as gaining an advantage and thus they have an incentive to do so. They also are both picking a category they really belong in, so they are not engaged in a cheat or deceit. But if their motive is to switch for a gain and and in doing so they do harm another athlete, then this would seem to be wrong. The masters runner took the better award from another runner and a transgender athlete who changes categories to win takes away a win from another female athlete. This can be used to ground a moral argument against allowing athletes to change categories to win. That said, there is an easy counter.

Imagine a runner attends a Division 1 school and finds that they are good enough for the division but not good enough to regularly win. They switch to a Division 2 school so they can win regularly. They have changed their category to improve their gains and have “harmed” other runners. They might displace a runner from the team and will take victories that would have gone to other athletes had they not changed their category. While this approach to sports might not seem morally ideal, the runner would not be acting wrongly. They would be Division 2 even if they could have stuck with Division 1. Likewise, for an athlete who switches their gender category by transitioning: one might take issue with someone doing this for an advantage, but this is morally acceptable. It must be noted that people do not transition just to get an advantage. Some readers probably doubt that an athlete can legitimately switch categories, so I now turn to this matter.

Let us go back to the masters award incident but change it slightly. Imagine that the third-place runner is 39 years and 10 months old but decides to identify as a masters runner to get the award. In this case, the issue is easily resolved: age is an objective matter, and they are not a masters runner. Hence, they do not get the award. Likewise, athletes who claim to be female but are not have no right to switch categories. While this might seem to settle the matter, there are at least two replies.

One reply is to go back to the masters case. Imagine that the runner is 39 years old based on his birthday, but he is a devote Catholic who sincerely believes that life begins at conception and sets his age accordingly at over 40. By his religious based standard of age, he is a masters runner. While the official age of runner for racing is based on their birthdate and not their moment of conception, the runner could make an argument based on freedom of religion: he is being discriminated against by the failure of the race officials to recognize that he is at least 40 because his life began at conception under his faith. Likewise, a runner who self-identifies as a female could argue that she is being discriminated against when she is not allowed to select her category based on her beliefs about what it is to be female. Both runners could agree that there is a fact of the matter about being a masters runner or a female runner, but they disagree with the standards being imposed upon them by those who they see as discriminating against them. As such, the debate becomes one of defining category membership.

In the case of age, the dispute would seem to be easy to settle: to avoid charges of attacking religious freedom, the rules about age could be put neutrally to specify that the time from birth is used to determine the competition age of a runner. The standard applies to everyone and intuitively seems fair. In the case of gender, the same approach should be taken: a fair set of standards to categorize people is needed. But gender is much more complicated than age.

If gender were only of concern in sports, then the matter would be easier to address. But gender impacts every aspect of a person’s life and is, of course, a key battleground in the culture wars. As such, even if one makes a good faith effort to develop gender standards for sports categories, this will be a daunting task.  Obviously,  many people think they have the right answer and think they could easily solve the problem by imposing their own views on everyone else.

There are, of course, some easy and obvious sufficient conditions for being admitted into the female category: people with XX chromosomes and female anatomy and physiology get an automatic admission (if they wish).  Beyond that, the debates begin.  Since this matter is complicated and not my area of expertise, I freely admit that I do not have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I do not even have a well-considered set of general principles.

One obvious principle is that it would be morally wrong for a male athlete to lie about his identify to gain a competitive advantage. The moral problem is, of course, the intent to deceive to gain an advantage.

This is analogous to my view that it is wrong for person to lie about their religious views to gain something, such as a person who wants to use a religious excuse to get away with discrimination or to avoid paying taxes. My moral assessment would, of course, adjust in cases of sincere belief, even if the person’s belief turns out to be untrue. As with the religion case, there is the practical problem of sorting out when people are lying, though in the United States we generally do not put professed religious beliefs to a test.

While there is no crisis in sports involving male athletes switching categories in large numbers, allowing people to switch categories merely by saying they identify in that category does provide an opportunity for the unprincipled to exploit, just as allowing people to claim special treatment simply for asserting they have religious beliefs allows opportunities for the unprincipled. The moral and practical challenge is sorting out what tests should be used to protect against such unprincipled exploitation while avoiding discriminating against people. We do not make people prove that their religious beliefs are true before allowing them to gain the benefits of professing belief and we need to be consistent when it comes to professed gender identity. One approach, which is what we generally do for religion, is to take people at their word unless there is adequate evidence of an intent to deceive. For example, a male athlete who posted “LOL identifying as a girl just to win the 5K today, but fellas stay away I ain’t gay! After I win, I will be a boy again.” would be intending to deceive and should, one would infer, not be allowed to compete in the 5K as a female.  Likewise, if someone bringing a freedom of religion lawsuit so they can discriminate posted “LOL pretending to believe in God so I can hate on the gays!”, then they should probably not win that lawsuit. But in other cases, we should accept their profession as sincere. I do admit this does not settle the matter.

Upon taking office, Joe Biden signed an executive order requiring that schools receiving federal funding allow people who self-identify as females onto female sport’s teams. Pushback against it has ranged from thoughtful considerations of fairness to misogyny masquerading as morality. Exploiting the manufactured panic over transgender people, Trump signed an executive order banning transgender people from competing in women’s sports. While the narrative is that the anti-trans athlete folks are motivated by fairness, this is easily disproved by their lack of concern about fair treatment of women in sports in other areas, such as funding and facilities.

In addition to being complicated on its own, the fairness of transgender women competing with other women is linked to other complicated matters, such as general concerns about fairness in society and issues of gender identity. People arguing in good faith can make arguments in one area without realizing the implications of these arguments in other areas. To illustrate, consider the fictional character of Polly. Polly is a national level high school runner who holds to a principle of fairness. Polly’s brother, Paul, is faster than Polly but not a national level male runner. He jokingly suggests putting on a dress and beating Polly, which worries her. If a person could just self-identify as a female, Paul could do so and suddenly be a national level female high school runner. In a panic, Polly thinks up a nightmare scenario: the top male runners compete as boys, switch their gender identities, and win again as girls! Polly and her sister runners would be out of the competition, which would be unfair. In good faith, Polly can make a good moral argument against allowing this based on fairness. But her seemingly reasonable argument might justifying harming people in the broader context of fairness in society, something Polly would not want. As such, we should be careful to consider the implications of arguments about fairness in sports have in other areas.

People can also argue in bad faith, presenting an appealing fairness argument about sports while not caring about fairness. They might be using the sport argument as a Trojan horse to lure people into their ideological agenda or they might want to weaponize a seemingly reasonable argument. This is not to say that arguing in bad faith entails that a person must be making false claims or fallacious arguments. After all, one can use truth and good logic in bad faith. But we should be on guard against bad faith arguments. I will endeavor to follow my own advice and make good faith arguments while considering their implications.

From the standpoint of fairness, there are reasonable moral grounds to be concerned about allowing people to self-identify their category for competition. To focus the discussion, I will use my own sport of running and the specific context of road races—but the general points apply across all sports.

Road races have well-established categories that are based on a conception of fair competition. Almost all races have gender categories (male or female). Most races have age groups and some also include the master category (40+) and sometimes the grand master category (50+). A few races also add a weight category (Clydesdale or Athena). In addition to categories created for fairness, races sometimes have categories for other reasons. For example, the Bowlegs 5K in Tallahassee raises money for a college scholarship and has a special educator category. Since educators as a class have neither advantages nor disadvantages relative to other runners, this category is not based on fairness.

In most cases, these categories serve their intended purpose as they make competition fairer by sorting people into groups based on qualities that impact performance. In some cases, these categories can have the unintended effect of allowing a person in a generally advantaged category win in their category while losing to a runner in a disadvantaged category. For example, a 50-year-old runner might win nothing in his age group while also beating every runner in the younger age groups. He thus loses to inferior performances because of the age groups intended to allow older runners like him to fairly compete. While this can be annoying, these cases are rare, and the overall positive impact of age groups and gender divisions outweigh the negative aspects. This is a good general approach to setting policies. A good policy will never be perfect, but a good policy creates more overall good than bad. But there are people who do try to exploit categories to their advantage. I will turn to this in my next essay.

Three Confederate veterans, who fought against the United States of America, were nominated for admission to Florida’s Veterans’ Hall of Fame. The purpose of the hall is to honor “those military veterans who, through their works and lives during or after military service, have made a significant contribution to the State of Florida.”

The three nominees were David Lang, Samuel Pasco and Edward A. Perry. Perry was Florida’s governor from 1885 to 1889; Pasco was a U.S. senator. Lang assisted in creating what is now the Florida National Guard. They did make significant contributions to Florida. The main legal question was whether they qualify as veterans. Since Florida was in rebellion (in defense of slavery) against the United States there is also a moral question of whether or they should be considered United States veterans.

The state of Florida and the US federal government have similar definitions of “veteran.” For Florida, a veteran is a person who served in the active military and received an honorable discharge. The federal definition states that “The term ‘veteran’ means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.” The law also defines “Armed Forces” as the “United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard.” The reserves are also included as being in the armed forces.

According to Mike Prendergast, the executive director of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the three nominees in question did not qualify because the applications did not indicate that the men served in the armed forces of the United States of America. Interestingly, Agricultural Commissioner Adam Putnam took the view that “If you’re throwing these guys out on a technicality, that’s just dumb.”

Presumably, Putnam saw the fact that the men served in the Confederate army and took up arms against the United States as a technicality. This strikes me as more than a mere technicality. After all, the honor seems reserved for veterans as defined by the relevant laws. As such, being Confederate veterans would seem to no more qualify the men than being a veteran of the German or Japanese army in WWII would qualify someone who moved to Florida and ended up doing great things for the state. There is also the moral argument about enrolling people who fought against the United States. Fighting in defense of slavery and against the lawful government of the United States would seem to be morally problematic in regard to the veteran part of the honor.

One counter to the legal argument is that Confederate soldiers were granted (mostly symbolic) pensions about 100 years after the end of the Civil War. Confederate veterans can also be buried in a special Confederate section of Arlington National Cemetery. These facts do open the door to a legal and moral argument. In regard to the legal argument, it could be contended that Confederate veterans have been treated, in some other ways, as United States veterans. As such, one might argue, this should be extended to the Veterans’ Hall of Fame.

The obvious response is that these concessions to the Confederate veterans do not suffice to classify Confederate veterans as veterans of the United States. As such, they would not be qualified. There is also the moral counter that soldiers who fought against the United States should not be honored as veterans of the United States. After all, one would not honor veterans of other militaries that have fought against the United States even if they ended up doing great things for Florida.

It could also be argued that since the states that made up the Confederacy re-joined the United States, the veterans of the Confederacy would, as citizens, become United States’ veterans. Of course, the same logic would seem to apply to parts of the United States that were assimilated from other nations, such as Mexico, the lands of the Iroquois, and the lands of Apache and so on. As such, Sitting Bull would qualify as a veteran under this reasoning. Perhaps this could be countered by contending that the south left and then rejoined, so it is not becoming part of the United States that has the desired effect but rejoining after a rebellion.

Another possible argument is to contend that the Veterans’ Hall of Fame is a Florida hall and, as such, just requires that the veterans were Florida veterans. In the Civil War units were, in general, connected to a specific state (such the 1st Maine). As such, if the men in question served in a Florida unit that fought against the United States, they would be Florida veterans but not United States veterans. Using this option would, of course, require that the requirements not include that a nominee be a veteran of the United States military and presumably it could not be connected to the United States VA since that agency is only responsible for veterans of the United States armed forces and not veterans who served other nations.

In regard to the moral concerns of honoring, as veterans, men who fought against the United States and in defense of slavery, it could be claimed that the war was not about slavery. The obvious problem with this is that the war was, in fact, fought to preserve slavery. The southern states made this abundantly clear. Alexander Stephens, vice president of the Confederacy, gave his infamous Cornerstone Speech and made this quite clear when he said “Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition.”

It could, of course, be argued that not every soldier fighting for the South was fighting to defend slavery. After all, just like today, most people fighting in wars are not the people who set policy or benefit from these policies. These men could have gone to war not to protect the institution of slavery, but because they were duped by the slave holders. Or because they wanted to defend their state from “northern aggression.” Or some other morally acceptable reason. That is, it could be claimed that these men were fighting for something other than the explicit purpose of the Confederacy, namely the preservation of slavery. Since this is not impossible, it could be claimed that the men should be given the benefit of the doubt and be honored for fighting against the United States and then doing significant things for Florida.

Given how the Trump regime is re-embracing the Confederacy, it would not be surprising if this matter was re-considered in Florida. It would serve as a distraction from whatever the administration is up to and would please the white supremacists  and lovers of the Confederacy in the base.

Plato, through the character of Socrates, advances a classic argument against democracy. When something requires knowledge and skill, such as a medical issue, it would be foolish to decide by having the ignorant vote. The wise turn to those who have the knowledge and skill needed to make a good decision.

Political matters, such as deciding what policies to adopt for immigration, require knowledge and skill. As such, it would be foolish to make decisions by having the ignorant and unskilled vote on such matters. Picking a competent leader also requires knowledge and skill and thus it would be foolish to leave it to those lacking these attributes.

In the abstract, this argument is compelling: as with all tasks that require competence, it would be best to have the competent make decisions. There are, however, various counters to this argument.

One appealing argument assumes people have a moral right to a role in decisions that impact them, even if they are not likely to make the best (or even good) choices.  Consider, for example, something as simple as choosing a meal. Most people will not select the most nutritious or even the most delicious option, thus making a bad choice. However, compelling people against their will to eat a meal, even if it is the best for them, is morally problematic. At least when it comes to adults. Naturally, an argument can be made that people who routinely make poor health choices would be better off being compelled to eat healthy foods, which is the heart of this dispute between democracy and being ruled by those with the knowledge and skills to make better decisions.

Another approach is to use the context of the state of nature. This is a philosophical device developed by thinkers like Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau in which one is asked to imagine a world without a political system in place which is a world in which everyone is equal in social status. In this world, there are no kings, presidents, lawyers, police or other such socially constructed positions of hierarchy. It is also assumed there is nothing supernatural conferring a right to rule (such as the make-believe divine right of kings). In such a context, the obvious question is that of what would give a person the right to rule over others.

As a practical matter, the strongest would probably coerce others into submission, but the question is one of the right to rule and not a question of what people would do. Given these assumptions, it would seem that no one has the right to be the boss over anyone else, since everyone is equal in status. What would be required, and what has often been argued for, is that the consent of the governed would be needed to provide the ruler with the right to rule. This is, of course, the professed justification for political legitimacy in the United States and other democratic countries.

If it is accepted that political legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed, the usual method of determining this consent is by voting. For a country to continue as one country it must also be accepted that the numerical minority will go along with the vote of the numerical majority. Otherwise, as Locke noted, the country would be torn asunder. This is, as has been shown in the United States, consistent with having certain things (such as rights) that are protected from the tyranny of the majority.

If voting is accepted in this role, then maintaining political legitimacy would seem to require two things. The first is that there must be reliable means of assuring that fraud does not occur in elections. The United States has done an excellent job at this. While there are some issues with the accuracy of voter lists (people who move or die often remain on lists for years), voter fraud is almost non-existent, despite unsupported assertions to the contrary by Republicans.

The second is that every citizen who wishes to vote must have equal and easy access to the voting process. To the degree that citizens are denied this equal and easy access, political legitimacy is decreased. This is because those who are deterred or prevented from voting are denied the opportunity to provide their consent. This excludes them from falling under the legitimate authority of the government. It also reduces the legitimacy of the government in general. Since accepting a democratic system means accepting majority rule, excluding voters impacts this. After all, one does not know how the excluded voters would have voted, thus calling into question whether the majority is ruling or not.

Because of this, the usual attempts to deter voter participation are a direct attack on political legitimacy in the United States. These include such things as voter ID laws, restrictions on early voting, gerrymandering, unreasonable limits on polling hours, cutting back on polling places and so on.

In contrast, efforts to make voting easier and more accessible (consistent with maintaining the integrity of the vote) increase political legitimacy. These include such things as early voting, expanded voting hours, providing free transportation to polling stations, mail in voting, online voter registration and so on. One particularly interesting idea is automatic voter registration.

It could be argued that citizens have an obligation to overcome inconveniences and even major obstacles to vote; otherwise, they are lazy and unworthy. While it is reasonable to expect citizens to put in some effort, the burden of access rests on the government. While it is the duty of a citizen to vote, it is the duty of the government to allow citizens to exercise this fundamental political right without undue effort. That is, the government needs to make it as easy and convenient as possible. This can be seen as somewhat analogous to the burden of proof: it is not the obligation of the citizen to overcome burdens placed by the state; it is the obligation of the state to not impose needless burdens.

It could be objected that I only favor easy and equal access to the voting process because I am registered as a Democrat and Democrats are more likely to win when voter turnout is higher. If the opposite were true, then I would surely change my view. The easy and obvious reply to this objection is that it is irrelevant to the merit of the arguments advanced above. Another reply is that I do accept majority rule and even if Democrats were less likely to win with greater voter turnout, I would still support easy and equal access. And would do so for the reasons given above. That is, I believe in democracy even when doing so does not enrich my bank account or get me what I want.

One long standing Christmas tradition at Fox news is perpetuating their imaginary war on Christmas. While it is not a self-evident truth that Christmas is safe in the United States, the idea that there is such a war is as absurd as the claim that there is a war on pizza. Like Christmas, pizza is liked (if not loved) by nearly everyone. While Christmas is not here year-round, during the Christmas season (which seems to be October to January) the trapping of Christmas are as ubiquitous as pizza.

A long-standing Fox tactic has been to scour the United States for the few incidents that can be cast as attacks on Christmas and then elevate them into a war. This same approach could be used to “prove” that there is a war on pizza. There are, no doubt, a few incidents that can be presented as attacks on the truth and goodness of pizza. The problem is, obviously enough, that a few isolated incidents do not constitute a war, especially when the incidents are presented in an exaggerated manner. What is ironic about Fox pushing the idea of this war is Christmas is supposed to be a time for peace on earth and goodwill towards all. As such, Fox seems to have its own perpetual war on the spirit of Christmas.

A classic example is when Breitbart and Fox  suggested that a Jewish family was responsible for the cancellation of A Christmas Carol, which was supposed to be put on as a play by students in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. While it is true the family wanted their child excused from the play, the play was cancelled for other reasons. One reason was that changes in the education requirements set by the state made it difficult for classroom time to be used to prepare for the play. This does point to a problem in public education but does not constitute a war on Christmas.

The second reason the play was cancelled was to be respectful of the cultural and religious diversity of the students. While some might be tempted to see this as a war on Christmas, being respectful of religious diversity in public schools does not constitute an attack on Christmas. One way to look at this situation in a different light is to imagine that a public school was putting on a play with religious content that you strongly disagree with. If, for example, you are not a fan of Islam, imagine that the school was putting on a play about Ramadan. Or, as another example, that the play brought back that old-time religion and glorified Saturnalia. If either of these plays were performed at a public school, Fox and Breitbart would most likely cast these incidents as evidence of the war on Christianity.

An incident in which one’s faith fails to dominate is not evidence of a war on that faith or its holiday. Rather, it just shows tolerance and respect for others. Going back to the pizza analogy, to decide to not have a strict pizza only policy for school lunches is not a war on pizza. While most people like pizza, making everyone eat it all the time is neither fair or tolerant.

Since I grew up “acting” in school Christmas plays and watching them, I do have sympathy for the view that something valuable would be lost if schools cancel their Christmas plays. One solution is to have generic holiday plays. Another is to have a diversity of plays around the holidays to expose children to diverse religious views and holidays. These options do have problems but are perhaps better than cancelling a school Christmas play. Or perhaps not.

The untruths presented by Fox and Breitbart are morally problematic, but this is compounded by the fact that it was suggested that a Jewish family was responsible for the cancellation. As would be expected, there were the usual responses to this story from the internet: calls to identify the “responsible” family and to act. As many other incidents have shown, these sorts of online attacks can quickly escalate into unrelenting harassment and worse.

This ties into a classic anti-Semitic narrative and is consistent with the safe space that Trump had created for bigotry in his first term. While people who are not Jewish or have little knowledge of history might be inclined to dismiss worries about the anti-Semitism inherent in such suggestions, this was a real problem. While it would be a slippery slope fallacy to say that this story (or other incidents) will inevitably lead to something terrible, it would also be a mistake not to be concerned about where this path leads. After all, this sort of thing has played out many times and in places and it is best to address such things when they are small. After all, it is easier to extinguish a match than a forest fire. 

It must be noted that Slate and other news sites claimed that a Jewish family fled the country out of fear they would be harmed. While the family did express concern, it is now claimed that they left for vacation. While some might be tempted to accuse Slate and others of running fake news because of their mistake, there are two easy and obvious replies. The first is that there seems to be no intent to deceive people with a claim that was known to be untrue as Slate and others presented the information available at the time. The second is that Slate and others updated the report to reflect the new and presumably correct information. Correcting errors is not something that is done in fake news.

If the error by Slate and the others was due to failing to properly investigate the claims, then they can be justly criticized for not being properly diligent. However, if the error was not due to negligence then this should be regarded as a mere mistake and one that was corrected. Slate could also be criticized for going with the original dramatic headline about the Jewish family fleeing the country; but the main criticism should still be on the error. This one error does not, obviously enough, invalidate the rest of the reporting the other claims stand or fall on their own.

While Fox News’ war on Christmas and Christianity mythology has merely been annoying and stupid in the past, but they have the potential to cause real problems in the year to come, especially with the current administration.

Terrorism, like assassination, is violence with a political purpose. An assassination might also be intended to create terror, but the main objective is to eliminate a specific target. In contrast, terrorism is not aimed at elimination of a specific target; the goal is to create fear and almost any victims will suffice.

An individual terrorist might have any number of motives ranging from the ideological to the personal. Perhaps the terrorist sincerely believes that God loves the murder of innocents. Perhaps the terrorist was rejected by someone they were infatuated with and is lashing out in rage. While speculation into the motives of such people is interesting and important, behind all true terrorism lies a political motivation, although this motivation might be on the part of those other than the person conducting the act.

While a terrorist attack can create fear on the local level by itself, terrorists need the media and social media to spread their terror on a large scale. The media is always happy to oblige. While this coverage can be defended on the grounds that people have a right to know the facts, the coverage does have some important and (hopefully) unintended consequences.

One effect of extensive media coverage is to serve as an impact multiplier. The whole world is informed of the terrorist act and the group that claims credit gains terrorist credibility and status. This improves the influence of the group and enhances its ability to recruit as the group is getting free advertising. Assuming that aiding terrorists is morally wrong, this coverage is morally problematic.

A second effect of the coverage is that it fuels the spotlight fallacy. This is a fallacy in which a person estimates the chances that something will happen based on how often they hear about it rather than based on how often it occurs. Terrorist attacks in the West are very rare and what Americans should really be worried about, based on statistics, is poor lifestyle choices that are encouraged by businesses. These include the use of tobacco, over consumption of alcohol, misuse of pain killers, eating unhealthy food and driving automobiles. Since terrorist attacks are covered relentlessly in the news and the leading causes of premature death are not, it is easy for people to overestimate the danger posed by terrorism. And underestimate what will probably kill them.

A third effect of coverage is that it can make people victims of the fallacy of misleading vividness. This fallacy occurs when a person overestimates the chances that something will occur based on how vivid or extreme the event is. While the media typically exercises some restraint in coverage, terrorism is obviously scary to most and this can cause people to psychologically overestimate the threat.

Whether a person falls victim to the spotlight fallacy or misleading vividness, the result is the same: the person overestimates the danger and is thus more afraid then they should be. This has beneficial effects for those who wish to exploit this fear.

Obviously enough, the terrorists aim to exploit the fear they create. They want people to believe that they are in terrible danger and face an existential threat. Lacking the capacity to engage in actual war, they must make use of the strategy of terror. These two fallacies are critical weapons in their war and people who fall victim to them have allowed the terrorists to win.

One of the ironies of terrorism is that there are American politicians who exploit the fear created by terrorists and use it to influence people for their political ends. While they do not deploy the terrorists, they benefit from the attacks as much as the masters of the terrorists do.

Not surprisingly, they make use of some classic fallacies: appeal to fear and appeal to anger. An appeal to fear occurs when something that is supposed to create fear is offered in place of actual evidence. In the case of an appeal to anger, the same sort of thing is done, only with anger. This is not to say that something that might make a person afraid or angry cannot serve as actual evidence; it is that these fallacies offer no reason to support the claim in question and only appeal to emotions.

Interestingly, terrorists like ISIS and the American politicians that exploit them have very similar objectives. Both want to present the fight as a clash of cultures, the West (and Christianity) against Islam. They both want this for similar reasons: to increase the number of their followers and to keep the conflict going so it can be exploited to fuel their political ambitions. If Muslims are accepted by the Western countries, then the terrorist groups lose influence and propaganda tools and thus lose recruits. If Muslims accept the West, then the Western political groups exploiting fear of Islam also lose influence and propaganda tools and thus lose recruits.

Both the terrorists and their Western exploiters want to encourage Westerners to be afraid of refugees coming from conflict areas in the Middle East. After all, if the West takes in refugees and treats them well, this is a loss of recruits and a propaganda loss for the terrorists.  It is also a loss for those who try to build political power on fear and hatred of refugees. 

If refugees have no way to escape conflict, they will be forced to be either victims or participants. Children who grow up without education, stability and opportunity will also be much easier to recruit into terrorist groups.  This is all in the interest of the terrorists; but also, the Western political groups who want to exploit terrorism. After all, these groups are founded on identity politics and need a scary “them” to contrast with “us.”

This is not to say that the West should not be on guard against possible attacks or that the West should not vet refugees. My main point is that overreacting to terrorism only serves the ends of the wicked, be they actual terrorists or those in the West who would exploit this terror to gain power.

https://x.com/TurningPointOU/status/1994156726225129932?s=20

As a college student, I wrote many bad papers. As a college professor, I’ve graded hundreds of bad papers. I have also observed and criticized the manufactured culture wars of the right, such as the War on Christmas and rage about made up claims about Dr. Seuss and potato themed toys. I suspected it would only be a matter of time before a badly written college paper became part of the manufactured culture war.

On November 27, 2025 the Oklahoma Turning Point USA chapter tweeted “Transgender professor fails her student for quoting the Bible in her essay.” The posts asserts,  “We should not be letting mentally ill professors around students. Clearly this professor lacks the intellectual maturity to set her own bias aside and take grading seriously. Professors like this are the very reason conservatives can’t voice their beliefs in the classroom.” Given this claim, one might expect proof of a deranged professor. Interestingly, they posted what they claim is the full text of the student’s essay as well as what they claim are the comments made by the instructor and another professor. This post has set off another battle in the culture war, with the instructor being suspended and even the governor of the state getting involved.

If you read the essay, you will see that it is objectively not very good, although I would have assigned a better score than 0/25 if only because I am a kind grader and the student clearly wrote it herself and did not turn in AI generated text. If you read the instructors’ comments, they begin by making it clear that the grade is not based on the student’s beliefs and then go through, in careful and respectful detail, why the paper did not meet the requirements of the assignment. Reading through the paper and these comments, it is evident that the paper was evaluated fairly, albeit with a lower score than I would have assigned. But my fellow professors often say that I am far too kind.

In a better world, the student would have complained to the professor and perhaps gotten a chance to revise the paper so that it completed the assignment. But we do not live in that better world. As noted above, MAGA is “losing their minds” over the paper and it is now another manufactured fight in the manufactured culture war. But what is the point of this fight?

When I went to the post on X, I was surprised to see that they posted the essay and what they claimed were the comments by the instructor. As the sometimes savage and unkind comments on X noted, the essay is not very good (but about what one would expect from a rushed assignment near the end of the semester). As the comments also correctly note, the professor did not fail the student because they quoted the Bible or because of their views. The comments make it clear that the work did not meet the requirements of the assignment, which is a legitimate basis for a low grade. In a better world, people would look at the paper and comments and conclude the obvious: the grade of zero might be a bit harsh, but the paper was evaluated on its merits. There is no injustice here beyond what every student feels exists when they do not get the grade they want. But we do not live in that better world. So here is what seems to be going on.

First, when many on the right want to create a conflict, the truth does not matter. See, for example, the absurd War on Christmas or the claim that migrants are eating cats and dogs. Based on the response from the right, they do not care whether the essay was graded fairly, and they do not care what the professor wrote. They might believe in what they regard as a deeper truth about colleges and the veracity of any particular piece of “evidence” does not matter. They might know the truth but also know that the MAGA base either will not know or care. They might also have the sincere belief that the paper is good because they agree with the content. People do, after all, fall victim to belief bias in which they think that if they agree with a claim, then the reasoning for that claim must be good. But, as I point out to my students, there can obviously be bad arguments for claims that you agree with. I use the example of the debate between St. Anselm and Gaunilo over Anselm’s ontological argument to illustrate this: Gaunilo and Anselm both believed in God, but Gaunilo was critical of Anselm’s argument. I pick this explicitly because it involves God to show that even in a religious context there can critical assessment of arguments. But to be fair, this level of critical thought is difficult and is certainly discouraged by politicians, pundits and leaders.

Second, I suspect that the person posting the essay knows that it is bad and that the comments were reasonable. While this might seem absurd, it actually makes sense. By creating controversy with a poorly written essay with reasonable comments that resulted in the instructor being suspended and garnering nationwide attention, a clear message has been sent to intimidate professors: grade in accord with our ideology or be punished.  This will, as people like to say, have a chilling effect. It also provides unscrupulous students with a tool to improve their grades and intimidate professors, which is probably intended.  It will also do students a disservice by teaching them that if they express the right ideology, they are exempt from rational assessment and consequences. Which, one suspects, is another lesson this is supposed to teach.