The American right is partially defined by its embracing debunked conspiracy theories such as the big lie about the 2020 election and those involving all things COVID. While some conspiracy theories are intentionally manufactured by those who know they are untrue (such as the 2020 election conspiracy theories) other theories  might start by people being bad at reading things correctly. For example, consider the claim that there were microchips in the COVID vaccines because of Bill Gates.

The Verge does a step-by-step analysis of how this conspiracy theory evolved, which is an excellent example of how conspiracy claims arise, mutate, and propagate. The simple version is this: in a chat on Reddit, Gates predicted that people would have a digital “passport” of their health records. Some Americans who attended K-12 public schools have already used a paper version of this.  I have my ancient elementary school health records, which I recently consulted to confirm I had received my measles booster as a kid. As this is being written, measles has returned to my adopted state of Florida. The idea of using tattoos to mark people when they are vaccinated has also been suggested as a solution to the problem of medical records in places where record keeping is spotty or non-existent.

Bill Gate’s prediction was picked up by a Swedish website focused on biohacking which proposed using an implanted chip to store this information. This is not a new idea for biohackers or science fiction, but it was not Gate’s idea. However, the site used the untrue headline, “Bill Gates will use microchip implants to fight coronavirus.” As should surprise no one, the family tree of the conspiracy leads next to my adopted state of Florida.

Pastor Adam Fannin of Jacksonville read the post and uploaded a video to YouTube. The title is “Bill Gates – Microchip Vaccine Implants to fight Coronavirus,” which is an additional untruth on top of the untrue headline from the Swedish site. This idea spread quickly until it reached Roger Stone. The New York Post ran the headline “Roger Stone: Bill Gates may have created coronavirus to microchip people.”

Those familiar with telephone might see this as a dangerous version as each person changes the claim until it has almost no resemblance to the original. Just as with games of telephone, it is worth considering that people intentionally made changes. In the case of a game of telephone, the intent is to make the final version funny. In the case of conspiracy theories, the goal is to distort the original into the desired straw man. In the case of Bill Gates, it started out with the innocuous idea that people would have a digital copy of their health records and ended up with the claim that Bill Gates might have created the virus to put chips in people. In addition to showing how conspiracy claims can devolve from innocuous claims, this also provides an excellent example of how conspiracy theories sometimes do get it right that we should be angry at someone or something but get the reasons why we should be angry wrong.

While there is no good evidence for the conspiracy theories about Gates and microchips, it is true that we should be angry at Bill Gate’s COVID wrongdoings. Specifically, Gates used his foundation to impede access to COVID vaccines. This was not a crazy supervillain plan; it was “monopoly medicine.” As such, you should certainly loath Bill Gates for his immoral actions; but not because of the false conspiracy theories. As an aside, it is absurd that when there are so many real problems and real misdeeds to confront, conspiracy theorists spend so much energy generating and propagating imaginary problems and misdeeds. Obviously, these often serve some people very well by distracting attention from these problems. But back to the origin of conspiracy theories.

While, as noted above, people do intentionally make false claims to give birth to conspiracy theories, it also makes sense that unintentional misreading can be a factor. Having been a professor for decades, I know that people often unintentionally misread or misinterpret content.

For the most part, when professors are teaching basic and noncontroversial content, they endeavor to prove the students with a clear and correct reading or interpretation. Naturally, there can be competing interpretations and murky content in academics, but I am focusing on the clear, simple stuff where there is general agreement and little or no opposition. And, of course, no one with anything to gain from advancing another interpretation. Even in such cases, students can badly misinterpret things. To illustrate, consider this passage from the Apology:

 

Socrates: And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question—by Zeus I will:  Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones?  Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered.  Do not the good do their neighbors good, and the bad do them evil?

 

Meletus: Certainly.

 

Socrates: And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him?  Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer— does any one like to be injured?

 

Meletus: Certainly not.

 

Socrates: And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

 

Meletus: Intentionally, I say.

 

Socrates: But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbors good, and the evil do them evil.  Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you.  But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie.  If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me.  And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

 

Socrates’ argument is quite clear and, of course, I go through it carefully because this argument is part of the paper for my Introduction to Philosophy class. Despite this, every class has a few students who read Socrates’ argument as him asserting that he did not corrupt the youth intentionally because they did not harm him. But Socrates does not make that claim; central to his argument is the claim that if he corrupted them, then they would probably harm him. Since he does not want to be harmed, then he either did not corrupt them or did so unintentionally. This is, of course, an easy misinterpretation to make by reading into the argument something that is not there but seems like it perhaps should or at least could be. Students are even more inclined to read Socrates as claiming that the youth will certainly harm him if he corrupts them and then build an argument around this erroneous reading. Socrates claims that the youth would be very likely to harm him if he corrupted them and so he was aware that he might not be harmed.

My point is that even when the text is clear, even when someone is actively providing the facts, even when there is no controversy, and even when there is nothing to gain by misinterpreting the text, it still occurs. And if this can occur in ideal conditions (a  clear, uncontroversial text in a class), then it should be clear how easy it is for misinterpretations to arise in “the wild.” As such, a person can easily misinterpret text or content and sincerely believe they have it right—thus leading to a false claim that can give rise to a conspiracy theory. Things are much worse when a person intends to deceive. Fortunately, there is an easy defense against such mistakes: read more carefully and take the time to confirm that your interpretation is the most plausible. Unfortunately, this requires some effort and the willingness to consider that one might be wrong, which is why misinterpretations occur so easily. It is much easier to go with the first reading (or skimming) and more pleasant to simply assume one is right.

During the last pandemic, Americans who chose to forgo vaccination were hard hit by COVID. In response, some self-medicated with ivermectin. While this drug is best known as a horse de-wormer, it is also used to treat humans for a variety of conditions and many medications are used to treat conditions they were not originally intended to treat. Viagra is a famous example of this. As such, the idea of re-purposing a medication is not itself foolish. But there are obvious problems with taking ivermectin to treat COVID. The most obvious one is that there is not a good reason to believe that the drug is effective; people would be better off seeking established treatment. Another problem is the matter of dosing as the drug can have serious side-effects even at the correct dosage. Since I am not a medical doctor, my main concern is not with the medical aspects of the drug, but with epistemology. That is, I am interested in why people believed they should take the drug when there is credible evidence it would work. Though the analysis will focus on ivermectin, the same mechanisms work broadly in belief formation.

Those who were most likely to use the drug were people in areas hit hard by COVID and subject to anti-vaccine and anti-mask messages from politicians and pundits. These two factors are related: when people do not get vaccinated and do not take precautions against infection, then they are more likely to get infected. This is why there was such a clear correlation between COVID infection rates and the level of Trump support in an area. Republican political thought embraces authoritarianism and rejects of expertise. Conservatives also want to “own the libs” by rejecting their beliefs and making liberals mad. Many liberals wanted people to get vaccinated and wear masks, so “owning the libs” put a person at greater risk for COVID. Once a person got infected, they needed treatment. But why did they chose ivermectin over proven methods? This seems to be the result of how the right’s base forms their beliefs.

The right’s base seems especially vulnerable to grifters and thus inclined to believe what grifters tell them. This is not because they are less intelligent or less capable than liberals; rather it seems to result from two main factors. The first is that the American right tends to be more authoritarian and thus more inclined to believe when an authority figure tells them to believe. The second is that the American right has long waged war on critical thinking and expertise. Hence people on the right are less inclined to use critical thinking tools effectively in certain contexts and are likely to dismiss experts who they do not regard as trusted authority figures.

While ivermectin was studied scientifically, there is currently no evidence that it can effectively treat COVID. But a small and growing industry arose for providing people with unproven or discredited treatments for COVID. While some might be well-intentioned, much of it is grifting at the expense of those who have been systematically misled. As such, people believe ivermectin can help them because authority figures have told them they should believe it. But, of course, there is the question of why ivermectin was chosen.

One likely reason is that ivermectin has been shown to impede the replication of the virus. Someone who is misled by wishful thinking would probably not consider the matter further; but it is important to note that this test was conducted in the laboratory using high concentrations of the drug that probably exceeded what a human could safely use. To use an analogy, this is like saying that fire is effective in killing the virus. While this is true, it does not make it an effective treatment in humans. As such, there is a bit of truth to the claim that ivermectin can affect the virus. For some reason, certain people seem to consistently reason poorly in such contexts; I am inclined to chalk this up to wishful thinking.

There is also the fact that a single, unpublished paper influenced some countries to include the drug in their treatment guidelines. However, this paper was never published because the method used to gather the data is both irregular and unreliable. The company that gathered the data, Surgisphere, is already notorious for its role in scandals involving hydroxychloroquine studies. People seem to tend to believe the first thing they hear about something, especially if they want it to be true, hence this discredited paper held considerable influence. This is like the case in which those who think vaccines are linked to autism still believe in a long discredited study by a discredited doctor.

One might attempt to respond to this by arguing that there are other papers showing the effectiveness of ivermectin. While this would be a reasonable response if these papers were based on good data, they are not. As has been shown, they suffer from serious errors. But, once again, this does not seem to matter. People such as Preston Smiles, Sidney Powell and Joe Rogan promoted the drug and, of course, Fox News personalities praised it. It was hydroxychloroquine 2.0. This takes us back to the appeal to authoritarianism fallacy: people believed because authority figures told them to believe. There is also a fallacious appeal to authority in effect. For example, Joe Rogan is a talk show host and not a doctor; yet people believe him because he is a celebrity.

People might also be motivated to accept the “evidence” of bad data and poor methods because doing so can feel rebellious. By rejecting the methodology of the experts, they can see themselves as making up their own minds…by accepting what politicians and celebrities tell them. There might also haven been a conspiracy theory element at work as well; the idea that “they” do not want people to know about ivermectin (or whatever) and hence they want to believe it works.

Ivermectin became another front in the culture war. It must be said that the left contributed to the fight by mocking those who used the drug. But when it became a political battle, the base doubled down and defended it, despite a lack of evidence. That is, they professed to believe because doing so is the stance of their tribe.

There were efforts to conduct clinical trials of the drug, but these were bizarrely been met with hostility and threats from ivermectin proponents. On the positive side, there will be some data available from the people self-medicating. Unfortunately, it will not be very good data because it will mostly be a collection of self-reported anecdotes. Once again, the culture war of the right hurt people. Although, as always, some profited.

From the standpoint of reliably forming true beliefs, this approach is the opposite of what a person should take.  Believing medical claims based on political authorities, grifters and celebrities is not a reliable way to have true beliefs. Accepting flawed studies as evidence is, by definition, a bad idea from the standpoint of believing true things. But these belief forming mechanisms do have advantages.

Politicians, celebrities, and grifters obviously benefit from their base forming beliefs this way. Those who form the beliefs also get something out of it; they can feel the pleasure of expressing their loyalty, the reassurance of wishful thinking, the warm glow of unity with their tribe, and the hot fire of angering the other tribe. And in the end, isn’t that all that really matters to some people?

In a clever bit of rhetoric, people who opposed mask and vaccine mandates during the last pandemic used pro-choice terms. For example, a person opposed to getting vaccinated might say “my body, my choice.” This phrase is, of course, a standard part of pro-choice language. While some who did this were no doubt engaged in bad faith rhetoric or trolling, the analogy between abortion rights and the right to refuse vaccination is worth considering.

An argument by analogy will typically have two premises and a conclusion. The first premise establishes the analogy by showing that the things (X and Y) in question are similar in certain respects (properties P, Q, R, etc.).  The second premise establishes that X has an additional quality, Z. The conclusion asserts that Y has property or feature Z as well. The form of the argument looks like this:

 

           Premise 1: X and Y have properties P, Q, R.

           Premise 2: X has property Z.

           Conclusion: Y has property Z.

 

X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as chimpanzees and humans or apples and oranges. P, Q, R, and are also variables, but they stand for properties or features that X and Y are known to possess, such as having a heart. Z is also a variable, and it stands for the property or feature that X is known to possess. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of illustration-the things being compared might have more properties in common.

One simplified way to present the anti-vaccine (or pro-vaccine choice) analogy is as follows:

 

Premise 1: The right to choose an abortion is analogous to the right to choose to not be vaccinated.

           Premise 2: The right to choose an abortion is supported by the left.

           Conclusion: The right to choose to not be vaccinated should also be supported by the left.

 

While this analogy seems appealing to many anti-mask mandate folks, a key issue is whether it is a strong argument. The strength of an analogical argument depends on three factors. To the degree that an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument.

First, the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. This standard is based on the notion that the more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. Second, the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present. Third, it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument. So, is the analogy between the restrictive voter laws and mask mandates strong? To avoid begging the question by making a straw man, I will endeavor to make the best analogy I can—within the limits of truth.

The right to choose an abortion is often based on a principle of bodily autonomy; often expressed as “my body, my choice.” For the pro-choice, this principle warrants a person’s choice to have an abortion: it is their body, so it is their choice. While there is debate over the moral status of the aborted entity, an entity which might (or might not) be a person is killed by abortion. As such, the principle of bodily autonomy allows a person to kill another entity.

The right to forgo vaccination on the principle of bodily autonomy would seem to work in a similar manner. For those who are pro-choice about vaccines, this principle warrants a person’s choice to forgo vaccination: it is their body, so it is their choice. So far, so good. But, as with abortion, the choice does not just affect the person making the choice.

A person who forgoes vaccination willingly puts themselves and others in avoidable risk of infection and death. But, if a person can justly abort another entity as a matter of their choice, then one could infer that a person could thus put others at risk of illness and death as a matter of choice. But does the comparison hold here? I contend that because of critical differences, it does not.

First, while an abortion kills an entity there is good faith moral debate about whether the entity is a person. In contrast, a person who did not get vaccinated during the pandemic put those who are indisputably people at risk and, in many cases, without their choice or consent. One can, of course, argue that the aborted entity is a person and start up the anti-abortion debate. But this would have an interesting consequence.

If it is argued that the aborted entity is a person (or otherwise has sufficient moral status) and thus its right to life overrides the person’s right to bodily autonomy, then the same reasoning would apply to the pro-vaccine choice argument. Their bodily autonomy does not give them the right to put others at risk. As such, a person who argues in good faith that being pro-choice about abortions is like being pro-choice about vaccines must be for both or opposed to both. So, anti-abortion folks can only use the pro-choice bodily autonomy argument for vaccine choice in bad faith (or from confusion). In contrast, a pro-choice person need not be pro-vaccine choice. They can accept that the aborted entity is not a person or has a lower moral status than the person while accepting the obvious fact that the people who were harmed by the unvaccinated are people.

Second, an abortion kills a single entity while forgoing vaccination during pandemic puts everyone the person contacts at risk of illness and even death. Since those at risk are indisputably people, forgoing vaccination in a pandemic is far worse than an abortion. One can, of course, get into a debate about assessing harm in terms of probabilities and other considerations. For example, a person who forgoes vaccination might not infect anyone and if they do, no one they infect might get ill, and if they do get ill, then they might not die. In contrast, an abortion always kills the aborted entity. This becomes a debate about the right to harm other entities and assessing harm. But, if someone argues that a person does not have the right to harm another entity based on bodily autonomy, then this would apply to both abortion and vaccination: there should be no choice in either case.

Third, there is a difference in the cost for not being able to make the choice. If a person cannot choose an abortion, they can face great economic and social hardships. Our society is unkind to women, and it is especially unkind to mothers who lack support and resources. In contrast, the COVID vaccines are incredibly safeMuch safer than giving birth in the United States. Once again, if someone accepts the pro-vaccine choice reasoning, then they would also need to accept the pro-choice reasoning in the context of abortion.

As such, the attempt to use pro-choice language and draw an analogy between reproductive rights and anti-vaccine rights fails logically. However, some might see it as having rhetorical value or as a bit of fun in trolling the libs with their own slogans.

 

During the last pandemic, some organizations mandated vaccination against COVID-19. As another pandemic is inevitable, it is worth revisiting the moral issue of mandatory vaccination in response to a pandemic.

Schools have a well-established precedent for requiring students to be vaccinated, although there have been ways to opt out.  The moral justification is usually a utilitarian one: while there is a cost and possible harm arising from mandatory school vaccinations, this is outweighed by the harm these vaccinations prevent. Students are in close contact in closed spaces for long periods of time, putting them at risk. As such, allowing students (or, rather, their parents) to opt out of vaccines would put themselves and others at greater risk. Exemptions can, and should, be granted in cases where a person would be medically harmed by vaccination; but these are extremely rare cases. During a pandemic, the moral argument is even stronger as the risk and harm would be greater than in normal circumstances.

In terms of a moral objection to mandatory vaccinations at schools during a pandemic is that the long-term effects of a new vaccine on children and teens would not be known. As such, one could claim that possible harmful effects of the vaccine might outweigh the harms of being unvaccinated. While this is a legitimate concern, it is not unique: all past vaccines have raised the same concern. So far, the benefits have consistently outweighed the harms of vaccination. So unless there is evidence that a new vaccine presents a special problem, then it is as morally acceptable to require it during a pandemic as it was, for example, to require the polio vaccine when it was developed. This is not to deny that things can go wrong, but that we always must make such decisions without having certainty.

Employers requiring vaccination is more controversial. While some professions, such as healthcare workers and military personnel, are usually required to get vaccinated these are exceptions rather than the rule. Most professions, even those that involve working closely with other people, do not require vaccinations, even during a pandemic. There are also moral questions about what employers can compel their employees to do.

In general, the American right supports granting considerable power to employers over their employees. One example is at will employment which allows employers to fire employees at will. For example, if an employee refused to stop smoking (outside of the workplace) they could be fired. As another example, if an employee expresses political views on their own time that their boss dislikes, they can be fired. Given that the right generally supports employers having great power over their employers, one might think they  would accept that employers could mandate vaccination on the pain of being fired. While workers would be free to refuse, few can afford to quit their jobs and companies have great coercive power.

But the right has made vaccines part of their political war. While they would normally favor employers imposing what they wish on their employees, the anti-vaxxers on the right have opposed this mandate. They have shown that when corporations do not side with them in their manufactured culture war battles, they will turn against these businesses. This is presumably because they believe the political points they gain will outweigh a conflict with the corporations who help fund their re-elections.

While the right professes to be anti-vax because of their love of freedom, this is a bad faith claim. The right has been busy passing restrictive laws to “solve” problems that do not exist. For example, the right has been busy limiting access to voting based on their “big lie” about the 2020 election. If they cared about freedom, they would not be doing this. They have also been busy passing laws aimed at trans people, claiming that strict restrictions must be in place to protect people from (imaginary) dangers. Again, if they believed that freedom is so important, they would not be passing such laws. And if they really believed in protecting people from real harm, they would not be anti-vax.

The left generally favors workers’ rights and often seeks to at least slightly reduce the power disparity. As such, it would make sense for the left to generally hold that workers could refuse to be vaccinated without being fired. That said, the left also has concerns beyond the workplace, so some leftists might favor mandatory vaccination imposed by the state. This would typically be morally justified on utilitarian grounds: the state is supposed to use its coercive powers to protect citizens, and this could include requiring vaccination during the next pandemic.

My own view is, to state the obvious, that this issue is complicated. On the one hand, people have the moral right to control their bodies. This provides a moral foundation for arguing against vaccine mandates. On the other hand, all rights should be morally limited by the harm that might be done to others in exercising them. To use a silly example, I have the right to run as fast as I wish. But I do not have the right to charge into other people. This is because my actions could hurt them. As another example, while I do have the right to remove the brakes from my truck, I do not have the right to drive it on public roads after doing this. This is because I would hurt other people. In the case of the next pandemic, the harms would likely warrant mandatory vaccination just as people are required to have working brakes on their vehicles and forbidden from charging other people like deranged bulls.

 

It might seem like woke madness to claim that medical devices can be biased. Are there white supremacist stethoscopes? Misogynistic MRI machines? Extremely racist X-Ray machines? Obviously not, medical devices do not have beliefs or ideologies (yet). But they can still be biased in their accuracy and effectiveness.

One example of a biased device is the pulse oximeter. This device measures blood oxygen by using light. You have probably had one clipped on your finger during a visit to your doctor. Or you might even own one. The bias in this device is that it is three times more likely to not reveal low oxygen levels in dark skinned patients than light skinned patients.  As would be expected, there are other devices that have problems with accuracy when used on people who have darker skins. These are essential sensor biases (or defects). In most cases, these can be addressed by improving the sensors or developing alternative devices. The problem is, to exaggerate a bit, is that most medical technology is made by white men for white men. This is not to claim such biased devices are all cases of intentional racism and misogyny. There is not, one assumes, a conspiracy against women and people of color in this area but there is a bias problem.  In addition to biased hardware, there is also biased software.

Many medical devices use software, and it is often used in medical diagnosis. People are often inclined to think software is unbiased, perhaps because of science fiction tropes about objective and unfeeling machines. While it is true that our current software does not feel or think, bias can make its way into the code. For example, software used to analyze chest x-rays would work less well on women than men if the software was “trained” only on X-rays of men. The movie Prometheus has an excellent fictional example of a gender-biased auto-doc that lacks the software to treat female patients.

These software issues can be addressed by using diverse training groups for software and taking steps to test software for bias by using a diverse testing group. Also, having a more diverse set of people working on such technology would probably also help.

Another factor is analogous to user error, which is user bias. People, unlike devices, do have biases and these can and do impact how they use medical devices and their data. Bias in healthcare is well documented. While overt and conscious racism and sexism are rare, sexism and subtle racism are still problems. Addressing this widespread problem is more challenging than addressing biases in hardware and software. But if we want fair and unbiased healthcare, it is a problem that must be addressed.

As to why these biases should be addressed, this is a matter of ethics. To allow bias to harm patients goes against the fundamental purpose of medicine, which is to heal people. From a utilitarian standpoint, addressing this bias would be the right thing to do: it would create more positive value than negative value. This is because there would be more accurate medical data and better treatment of patients.

In terms of a counterargument, one could contend that addressing bias would increase costs and thus should not be done. There are several easy and obvious replies. One is that the cost increase would be, at worst, minor. For example, testing devices on a more diverse population would not seem meaningfully more expensive than not doing that. Another is that patients and society pay a far greater price in terms of illness and its effects than it would cost to address medical bias. For those focused on the bottom line, workers who are not properly treated can cost corporations some of their profit and ongoing health issues can cost taxpayer money.

One can, of course, advance racist and sexist arguments by professing outrage at “wokeness” attempting to “ruin” medicine by “ramming diversity down throats” or however Fox news would put it. Such “arguments” would be aimed at preserving the harm done to women and people of color, which is an evil thing to do. One might hope that these folks would be hard pressed to turn, for example, pulse oximeters into a battlefront of the culture war. But these are the same folks who professed to lose their minds over Mr. Potato Head and went on a bizarre rampage against a grad school level theory that has been around since the 1970s. They are also the same folks who have gone anti-vax in during a pandemic, encouraging people to buy tickets in the death lottery. But the right thing to do is to choose life.

As a philosopher, I annoy people in many ways. One is that I almost always qualify the claims I make. This is not to weasel (weakening a claim to protect it from criticism) but because I am aware of my epistemic limitations: as Socrates said, I know that I know nothing. People often prefer claims made with certainty and see expressions of doubt as signs of weakness. Another way I annoy people is by presenting alternatives to my views and providing reasons as to why they might be right. This has a downside of complicating things and can be confusing. Because of these, people often ask me “what do you really believe!?!” I then annoy the person more by noting what I think is probably true but also insisting I can always be wrong. This is for the obvious reason that I can always be wrong. I also annoy people by adjusting my views based on credible changes in available evidence. This really annoys people: one is supposed to stick to one view and adjust the evidence to suit the belief. The origin story of COVID-19 provides an excellent example for discussing this sort of thing.

When COVID first appeared in China, speculation about its origin began and people often combined distinct claims without considering they need not be combined. One set of claims is the origin of COVID. Some claims are that it is either naturally occurring or was engineered in the lab. At this point, the best explanation is that the virus is naturally occurring. But since humans do engineer viruses, it is possible the virus was engineered. The obvious challenge is to provide proof and merely asserting it is not enough. So, at this point my annoying position is that the best evidence is that the virus is naturally occurring, but new evidence could change my position.

Other claims are about the origin of the infection. Some claim it entered the human population through a wet market. Some claim it arrived via some other human-bat interactions. There is also the claim that it originated from a lab. All of these are plausible. We know diseases can originate in markets and spread. We know that labs are run by people and people make mistakes and can be sloppy at work. We know humans interact with animals and disease can spread this way.

Back at the start of the last pandemic, I favored the wet market hypothesis because it seemed  best supported by the available evidence. Diseases do jump from livestock to humans, so this claim was plausible. However, the possibility that the virus leaked from the lab has gained credibility. While there is not yet decisive evidence, this hypothesis is credible enough to warrant serious investigation. I do not have a vested interest in backing any particular hypothesis.

There are also claims about whether it was intentional. Some it was an accident. Some claim the virus was intentionally introduced, and nefarious reasons vary between the hypotheses. Accidents are regular occurrences and things are always going wrong. But people intentionally do evil and have various reasons for doing so, ranging from making money, to getting more power, to seeking revenge, to all the other reasons people do bad things. As it now stands, there is little or no evidence that a malign actor intentionally introduced the virus into the population. But evidence could certainly arise. People have done worse things. The malign actor hypothesis is also an umbrella: one must select specific evildoers as the culprit, though there could be many. As always, evidence is needed to support any claims.

It is important to distinguish between the different claims and to keep in mind that evidence that supports one claim might not support another claim often associated with it.

A common mistake is confusing how conjunctions work with how disjunctions work. In logic, a disjunction is an “or” claim which is true when one or both disjuncts is/are true. For example, if I say that I will bring beer or tequila to the party, then my claim is true unless I show up with neither. Showing up with one or the other or both makes that disjunction true.

In the case of a conjunction, both conjuncts must be true for the statement to be true. So, If I say I will bring hot dogs and buns to the party, then I must show up with both for my claim to be true. While it might seem like an odd and obvious mistake, people can treat a conjunction like a disjunction when they want to claim the conjunction is true. In some cases, people will do this intentionally in bad faith. This has been done in the case of COVID.

As noted above, the lab leak hypothesis for COVID has gained credibility. Because of this, some might conclude the virus was also manufactured. The person could think that because there is reason to believe the virus leaked from a lab, then it is also true that it was manufactured. If it is true that the virus was leaked, then one part of the claim “the virus was manufactured and leaked” would be true, namely that it was manufactured. So, someone might be tempted to take the entire claim as true (or make the claim in bad faith). After all, if it were true that the virus was leaked, then it would be true that it was leaked or it was manufactured. But this would be a matter of logic; it would thus also be true that the virus was leaked, or unicorns exist. As always, it is important to determine which part of a conjunction is supported by the evidence. If both claims are not supported, then you do not have good reason to accept the conjunction as true. The last annoying thing I will look at is the fact that being right does not mean a person was justified.

Suppose tomorrow brings irrefutable proof the virus was leaked from a lab. Those devoted to this claim would probably take this as proof they were right all along. On the one hand, they would be correct: they were right all along, and other people were wrong. But since at least Plato philosophers have distinguished between having a true belief and having justification for this belief. After all, one can be right for bad reasons, such as guessing or from prejudice. For example, a person who likes horror-sci fi might believe the lab leak because they like that narrative. As another example, a racist might accept the lab leak hypothesis because of their prejudices. A nationalist might go with the lab leak because they think China is an inferior country. And so on. But believing on these grounds would not justify the belief; they would have just gotten lucky. As such, their being right would be just a matter of luck—they guessed right based on bad reasons.

One thing people often find confusing about critical thinking and science is that a person can initially be justified in a belief that ultimately turns out false. This is because initial evidence can sometimes warrant belief in claims that are later disproved. In such cases, a person would be wrong but would have all the right reasons to believe. Some of this is because of the problem of induction (with inductive reasoning, the conclusion can always turn out to be false) and some of it is because humans have limited and flawed epistemic abilities.

People who do not understand this will tend to think these good methods are defective because they do not always get the truth immediately and they do not grasp that a person can be reasoning well but still end up being wrong. Such people often embrace methods of belief formation that are incredibly unreliable, such as following authoritarian leaders or unqualified celebrities.  If the evidence does turn out to eventually support these initially unjustified beliefs, they do not seem to get that this is how the process works: false claims, one hopes, eventually get shown to be false and better supported claims replace them. As such, those who rejected the lab hypothesis earlier because of the lack of evidence but are now considering it based on the new evidence are doing things right. They are adjusting based on the evidence. I suspect that some approach belief in claims like they might see belief in religion: you pick one and stick with it and if you luck out, then you win. But that is not how rational belief formation works.

What, then, about someone who believed in the lab hypothesis early on and was rational about it? Well, to the degree they had good evidence for their claim, then they deserve credit. However, if they believed without adequate justification, then their being correct was a matter of chance and not the result of some special clarity of reason. To close, people should keep advancing plausible alternatives as this is an important function in seeking the truth. So those who kept the lab hypothesis going because they rationally considered it a possible explanation do deserve their due credit.

During the last pandemic, I contracted COVID and it was the sickest I have been in my life. Not being a member of the ruling class, I had to rely solely on my immune system to get through it. I did not die but have had some lasting effects: persistent fatigue and breathing issues. These make running challenging and I struggle to get in over 40 miles a week, but it is likely that my years of running contributed to my ability to get through COVID.

When the vaccines became available to older Americans, I waited my turn. Florida eventually made them available to educators, but Governor DeSantis pointedly excluded higher education faculty and staff. Like most faculty at public colleges, I was required to return to the classroom. I was not overly concerned; surviving COVID is supposed to grant long-lasting immunity and being fired would be far more dangerous than getting COVID again.

Like everyone else on campus, I had to get bi-weekly COVID tests. Eventually the governor allowed everyone over 50 to get the vaccine, and I was able to get my first shot of Moderna at the community vaccination site on campus. I felt a bit rough after that shot. While waiting for my second shot, the possible issues with the Johnson & Johnson vaccine made the news and there were worries about vaccine availability. Fortunately, I was able to get my second shot.

While I got my vaccinations as soon as I could, some were hesitant. In some cases, this hesitation was rational: the vaccines were rolled out quickly by for-profit corporations and emergency use authorization were issued to allow their deployment. While testing was conducted, the timescale of the tests was limited, and possible long-term side effects were obviously a mystery at that time. Medical experts made educated estimates that the short-term benefits (not dying of COVID) outweigh any likely long-term effects. But these estimates were made based on many unknowns and it was (and is) rational to consider possible long-term consequences. That said, vaccines are well understood, and these vaccines were not crazy radical departures from established science. Given what we knew then, the rational bet favored getting the vaccine. Given what we know now, people should get the vaccine. Unfortunately, the current regime is appallingly anti-health and anti-science.

People also opposed getting vaccinated because of ideological reasons and this has only strengthened. Parents have, perhaps from the very best intentions, have condemned their children to illness and even death from preventable illnesses, like measles.

 Trump and some of his fellow Republicans politicized the pandemic for short term political gain at the expense of the well-being of citizens. While it is certain that some would resist vaccination on ideological grounds no matter what politicians say, Trump and his fellows fed this view and increased the size and intensity of the resistance to vaccination. Vaccination, like mask wearing, also became a macho issue: manly men might think that they do not need to be vaccinated.

At this point, the ideological battle is largely lost, and disease is emerging victorious across the United States. Biden did not try to compel people to get vaccinated, understanding that this would have caused people to double down on their opposition and give credence to the tyranny narrative. Instead, medical experts tried and are still trying to get employers, local doctors, and local leaders to encourage people to get vaccinated. Appeals to the public good have been weakened and the right seems to have completely abandoned this notion in so far as it involves people contributing to the public good. But there are those who will, correctly, point out that vaccination is not without risk.

When I first wrote about vaccination,  about 7 million people were vaccinated with the J&J vaccine. Six women between the ages of 18 and 48 developed cerebral venous sinus thrombosis (CVST) 6-13 days after getting their shot and one woman died. In response, the vaccine was suspended. Addressing this sort of situation is challenging. If you approach it with cold rationality and focus on the statistics, then you seem an uncaring monster, even when your objective is the safety and well-being of people. If you approach it emotionally and focus on the individuals impacted, then you seem caring and concerned. But making broad policy decisions based on such feelings can lead to large scale suffering and death. The solution is to follow our good dead friends Confucius and Aristotle: to hit the mean between the two extremes. If we are too coldly rational, then we will be seen as monsters and our efforts to do good will face opposition. If we are too emotional, then we can make bad decisions that hurt the many from a desire to protect the very few.

In terms of the cold facts, even if we assume that the vaccine caused the clots, then the odds of dying are (based on the available data) were about 1 in 7 million (for women 18-48). The odds of getting CVST are about 1 in 1 million (for women aged 18-48). These are objectively very good odds compared to other things that can kill you. The most sensible comparison is to the risk of death from COVID. While there are many factors that figure into your chances of dying from COVID, a person’s chances of dying from COVID are 36 to 78,571 times greater than dying from CVST from getting the J&J shot. There is also to cold fact that so far only women 18-48 have suffered from clotting, so people in other demographics might have no chance of dying from the vaccine. As such, if the choice is between the J&J vaccine or nothing, then the rational choice would have been the J&J vaccine. Likewise for other vaccinations, if we follow the cold calculations of survival.

As others have done, it is also instructive to re-consider the J&J vaccine in the context of other medications. While the types of clots caused are not identical, the odds of getting a blood clot from oral contraceptives is 3-9 in 10,000. The odds of getting a clot when not on oral contraceptive is 1-5 in 10,000 women and the odds of a women getting one while pregnant is 5-20 in 10,000. Like all analogies, this comparison is imperfect, but it does illustrate that even common medications are not without significant risk. Even the ubiquitous NSAIDs can have very serious side effects including death. While it might be thought that all these risks are the fault of irresponsible and greedy corporations, risks can be due simply to the interaction between chemicals and human bodies. After all, people can die from reactions to naturally occurring foods such as peanuts and shellfish.  Because of the complexity of human biochemistry and the variations between people, there is almost always the risk that a small percentage of the population will have an adverse or even fatal reaction to a pharmaceutical product, even when due care is taken. This is not to say that we should simply tolerate dangerous medicines, just that we need to be aware of what are likely to be unavoidable risks. 

As a final consideration, there are those who still argue that vaccination is a personal choice and they should be free to decide. On the one hand, they are right: a person has a general moral right to refuse medical treatment and vaccination. However, this does not entail that they have a right to freedom from all consequences of making this choice. To use an obvious analogy, a person can refuse to get the vaccinations that are required to travel to certain places, but this comes at the cost of not being able to travel. To use another analogy, a person has the right to own a car without brakes, but they do not have the right to take it out on the road.

On the other hand, the principle of harm would morally warrant requiring people to get vaccinated: the unvaccinated are reservoirs of the disease and “breeding grounds” for disease mutations. They could thus extend future pandemics significantly and thus endanger others and the economy. To the degree that they incubate new strains, they would also make it so that people would need to keep getting vaccinations against these strains. In short, this “freedom” would do considerable damage to society, which is good grounds for limiting a freedom. But as vaccines are part of the culture war, requiring them is becoming increasingly difficult, though doing so is as morally warranted as requiring people to have working brakes before getting on the road.

In closing, while vaccines are not without risk, vaccination is a safe and effective method of reducing the risk of getting sick or dying of a preventable disease. This is not to say that people should accept all vaccines uncritically, that would be a straw man of my position.

The United States recently saw another outbreak of the measles with most victims being unvaccinated. Critics of the anti-vaccination movement present incidents like these as proof the movement is not just misinformed but dangerous.  Not surprisingly, anti-vaccination folks are often derided as stupid. After all, the anti-vaccination arguments usually rest on untrue and often debunked claims. For example, the claim that vaccines cause autism is clearly untrue. Vaccination, in general,  has been conclusively shown to safely prevent diseases, although there are some risks.

It is tempting for those who disagree with the anti-vaccination people to dismiss them as to stupid to understand science. This, however, is a mistake.  One reason is purely pragmatic: those who are pro-vaccination want the anti-vaccination people to change their minds and calling them stupid, mocking and insulting them will only cause them to entrench. Another reason is that the anti-vaccination people are not, in general, stupid. There are good grounds for people to be skeptical towards claims about health and science. To show this, I will briefly present some points of concern.

One rational concern is the fact that scientific research has been plagued with a disturbing amount of corruption, fraud and errors. For example, the percentage of scientific articles retracted for fraud is ten times what it was in 1975. Once lauded studies and theories, such as those behind the pushing of antioxidants and omega-3, have proven riddled with inaccuracies. As such, it is not stupid to worry that scientific research might not be accurate. Somewhat ironically, the study that started the belief that vaccines cause autism is a paradigm example of bad science. However, it is not stupid to consider that the studies that show vaccines are safe might have flaws as well.

Another matter of concern is the influence of corporate lobbyists. For example, the dietary guidelines and recommendations set forth by the United States Government should be set based on the best science. However, guidelines are influenced by industry lobbyists, such as the dairy industry. Given the influence of corporate lobbyists, it is not foolish to think the recommendations and guidelines given by the state might not be correct.

A third point of concern is that dietary and health guidelines and recommendations undergo what often seem to be relentless and unwarranted change. For example, the government warned us of the dangers of cholesterol for decades, but this recommendation is being changed. It would, of course, be one thing if the changes were the result of steady improvements in knowledge. However, the recommendations often seem to lack a proper foundation. John P.A. Ioannidis, a professor of medicine and statistics at Stanford, has noted “Almost every single nutrient imaginable has peer reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome. In this literature of epidemic proportions, how many results are correct?” Given such criticism from experts in the field, it hardly seems stupid of people to have doubts and concerns.

There is also the fact that people do suffer adverse drug reactions that can lead to serious medical issues and even death. While the reported numbers vary (one FDA page puts the number of deaths at 100,000 per year) this is a matter of rational concern.  In an interesting coincidence, I was thinking about this essay while watching the Daily Show and one of my “ad experiences” was for Januvia, a diabetes drug. As required by law, the ad mentioned all the side effects of the drug and these include serious things, including death. Given that the FDA has approved drugs with dangerous side effects, it is hardly stupid to be concerned about possible side effects from any medicine or vaccine.

Given the above, it is not stupid to be concerned about vaccines. At this point, the reader might suspect that I am about to defend an anti-vaccine position. I will not. In fact, I am a pro-vaccination person. This might seem surprising given the points I just made. However, I can rationally reconcile these points with my position on vaccines.

The above points do show that there are rational grounds for taking a general critical and skeptical approach to health, medicine and science. However, this general skepticism needs to be rational and consistent. That is, it should not be a rejection of science but rather the adoption of a critical approach in which one considers the best available evidence, assesses experts by the proper standards (those of a good argument from authority), and so on. Also, it is important to note that general skepticism does not automatically justify accepting or rejecting specific claims. For example, the fact that there have been flawed studies does not prove any specific study about a vaccine is flawed. As another example, the fact that lobbyists influence the dietary recommendations does not prove that vaccines are harmful drugs being pushed on Americans by greedy corporations. As a final example, the fact that some medicines have serious and dangerous side effects does not prove that the measles vaccine is dangerous or causes autism. Just as one should be rationally skeptical about pro-vaccination claims one should also be rationally skeptical about ant-vaccination claims.

To use an obvious analogy, it is rational to have a general skepticism about the honesty and goodness of people. After all, people do lie and there are bad people. However, this general skepticism does not automatically prove that a specific person is dishonest or evil. That is a matter that must be addressed on the individual level.

To use another analogy, it is rational to have a general concern about engineering. After all, there have been many engineering disasters. However, this general concern does not warrant believing that a specific engineering project is defective or that engineering itself is defective. The specific project would need to be examined, and engineering is, in general, the most rational approach to building stuff.

So, the people who are anti-vaccine are not, in general, stupid. However, they seem to be making the mistake of not rationally considering specific vaccines and the evidence for their safety and efficacy. It is rational to be concerned about medicine in general, just as it is rational to be concerned about the honesty of people in general. However, just as one should not infer that a friend is a liar because there are people who lie, one should not infer that a vaccine must be bad because there is bad science and bad medicine.

Convincing anti-vaccination people to accept vaccination is challenging. One reason is that the issue has become politicized into a battle of values and identity. This is partially due to the fact that the anti-vaccine people have been mocked and attacked, thus leading them to entrench and double down. Another reason is that, as argued above, they do have well-founded concerns about the trustworthiness of the state, the accuracy of scientific studies, and the goodness of corporations. A third reason is that people tend to give more weight to the negative and tend to weigh potential loss more than potential gain. As such, people would tend to give more weight to negative reasons against vaccines and fear the alleged dangers of vaccines more than they would value their benefits.

Given the importance of vaccinations, it is critical that the anti-vaccination movement be addressed in a way that respects their legitimate worries and concerns. Calling people stupid, mocking them and attacking them are not effective ways of convincing people that vaccines are generally safe and effective. A more rational and hopefully more effective approach is to address their legitimate concerns and consider their fears. After all, the goal should be the health of people and not scoring political points or feeling smug superiority.

While the wealthy did very well in the pandemic, businesses and employees were eager to get back to normal economic activity. While the vaccines were not perfect, they helped re-open the economy. As another pandemic is certainly on the way, it is worth considering the issue of vaccine mandates again.

While there are various moral issues involving vaccines, one is whether employers have the right to require employees to get vaccinated. While this situation is somewhat unusual, it falls under the broader issue of employee rights.

In the United States employers hold vast power over their employees. This power stems from the doctrine of employment at will: an employer can fire an employee for almost any reason or no reason at all. Employees can, of course, quit for almost any reason at all or no reason at all. But employers generally hold an advantage: it is usually much easier for an employer to replace an employee than for an employee to find an equal or better job.

This doctrine allows employers to exert broad control over the lives of their employees within and beyond the workplace. For example, an employer can fire an employee for holding political views they dislike and even for social drinking or smoking outside of work. Employers also have a very broad right to surveil their employees at work or when using work equipment. While the government would need a warrant to read your work email or listen to your calls made at work, your employer can do that at will. In some cases, they can legally put cameras in bathrooms to monitor employees.

While some see this degree of employer power as wrong and even on par with tyranny, it is the default moral view in practice. That is, employers have the moral right to fire their employees at will with only very few exceptions. Under this doctrine, an employer would be within their rights to offer an employee the choice between being vaccinated and being fired just as they can do the same thing with almost anything else. Obviously, if this doctrine is rejected, then the ethics must be addressed in a different manner.

One reasonable approach is utilitarianism. This is the view that the morality of an action is determined by its positive and negative consequences for those who count morally. Actions whose negative consequences are greater than their positive consequences are wrong. Good actions are those whose positive consequences outweigh the negative. I, like many others, use this approach when addressing large-scale ethical matters such as public policy.

Assuming mandated vaccines are safe and effective, they would present little risk (though there are always risks). They also provide benefits during this next pandemic. Because of this, an employer could make the moral argument that employees must be vaccinated based on the positive consequences of reducing the likelihood and severity of their illness (which would impact the employer). There is also the fact that vaccination of employees would help protect co-workers and customers. An unvaccinated employee would be a health risk to themselves and others and thus it would be right for employers to mandate vaccination in most cases. Employees who would be harmed by the vaccine or who do not interact with other workers or customers could, of course, opt out.

One could make a broad moral argument against employer power and use this to argue that employers should not have the power to force employees to vaccinate (naturally, employees always have the right to quit to avoid doing anything they do not want to do). I do find this appealing because I think employers have too much power and workers too few rights in terms of how employers can coerce employees. That said, vaccination seems morally on par with safety mandates of other kinds that are aimed at protecting workers and customers from harms and these seem warranted on utilitarian grounds. A business could be morally responsible for not requiring vaccines if employees infect each other or customers.

One way to counter this argument is to argue that requiring vaccination is different from other safety requirements. To illustrate, an employee who is required to wear a hair net while preparing food can take that off at the end of their shift and it has no lasting impact. A vaccination is different as it is not something that could be removed at the end of the workday. Even safe vaccines come with risks that make them different from hair nets and gloves (though a person could be allergic to latex gloves). As such, these might be relevant differences that break the analogy.

This can, of course, be countered by the fact that vaccination is usually required to attend K-12 schools and college so there is a moral precedent to requiring vaccination. One could argue that school and work are different; the challenge would be showing how the differences break the analogy. Or one could also argue that schools should not require vaccination either, but the challenge is proving this rather than just assuming it. But it is worth considering that an employer could be morally responsible if an employee were harmed because they were required to get vaccinated to keep their job.

One can also make an appeal to rights, that people have the right to refuse medical procedures. I do agree that people have this right; but it is distinct from the right to be allowed to be unvaccinated if one is around people at work or school. By analogy, I agree that people have the right to use drugs, but this is distinct from the right to use drugs at work, such as while flying a plane.

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with theories of knowledge. The name is derived from the Greek terms for episteme (knowledge) and logos (explanation). Epidemiology is the study and analysis of the distribution, patterns and determinants of health and disease conditions in defined populations. While the names of the two fields sound alike, they are obviously different. But I propose a subbranch of epistemology that could be called “epistemic epidemiology” or perhaps given a silly name like “epistidemology.” This subbranch would not be focused on the epistemic features of epidemiology (which would also be interesting). It would not be about knowledge of diseases but about diseases of knowledge.

These diseases of knowledge can include corruption or infection of normally healthy epistemic systems as well as epistemic systems that are fundamentally pathological in nature. One goal of this subbranch would be to work out descriptive accounts of various epistemic diseases as well as theories of how such diseases arise, spread, and do damage. There would also be descriptive accounts of epistemic systems that are inherently pathological. Of special interest would be the nature and causes of epistemepidemics which are widespread epistemic pathologies in populations.

This subbranch, I propose, should be more than descriptive. Like ethics (and medicine) it should also be prescriptive: epistemic pathologies should be analyzed with the aim of curing (or replacing) them, so that people can have healthy belief forming systems. As would be expected, doing prescriptive epistemology will involve disputes and controversies like those in ethics and arguments will be needed to defend claims about which epistemic systems are pathological and how they might be treated. Fortunately, there are already two established areas of thought that will be useful here.

One area is what epistemologists call the ethics of belief (thanks to William Clifford). This area deals with such matters as the moral obligations we might have when forming beliefs. In fact, it could be argued that there is no need for epistemic epidemiology since the ethics of belief already covers the normative aspects of epistemology. While this view is reasonable, while epistemic epidemiology includes normative components it also covers non-normative areas that are not covered by the ethics of belief. An obvious example is that the ethics of belief does not address questions of why pathological epistemologies can be so widespread. So, just as medical ethics and medical epidemiology are distinct, the same holds for the ethics of belief and epistemic epidemiology.

A second area is the realm of logic, with special attention on critical thinking methods. While people can engage in endless debates about epistemic theories, what counts as defective (even pathological) reasoning is well established. Someone who insists on forming beliefs based solely on rhetoric would be in error; someone who insists on forming beliefs based on fallacies would seem to be pathological (pun intended). As such, logic provides an excellent toolkit, much like medical techniques provide an excellent tool kit for medical epidemiologists.

There would certainly seem to be important roles in this field for findings from neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology. For example, delusional disorder is a serious mental illness that has a profound impact on a person’s epistemic systems: they claim to have knowledge of something that is not true and will persist even in the face of evidence that should logically undermine their false belief. This is not to claim that all or even most false beliefs or epistemic flaws arise from mental illness but that the science of how such epistemically connected illnesses (might) work would be especially useful to addressing epistemic issues in general. Naturally, this matter must be addressed with due sensitivity and there is the obvious worry that the unscrupulous might weaponize claims about mental illness. Example of this sort of thing include when critics of President Trump are accused of having Trump Derangement Syndrome or when Trump supporters are accused of being mentally ill because of their support for Trump. This is, of course, analogous to how people use claims of disease to demonize migrants.

While it is essential to guard against weaponizing epistemic epidemiology, it is also important to be willing to apply it to outbreaks of epistemic pathologies. To use a terrifying analogy, can you imagine what would happen if the response to a medical pandemic were hijacked by political ideology and the scientific response was derailed?  As with disease outbreaks, the appropriate approach is to not engage in demonizing those impacted but by taking an objective approach aimed at analyzing and (if possible) recommending treatments. While there have long been widespread epistemic pathologies, the rise of mass media and social media have enabled these pathologies to become pandemics, and some are global in nature. National and global conspiracy theories provide excellent examples of the likely presence of pathological epistemic systems, though it is worth considering that even healthy epistemic systems can generate many false beliefs.

As with addressing medical pandemics, addressing epistemic pandemics is essential for the health, safety, and well-being of humanity. While philosophers have long struggled to help inoculate people with good logic, we must accept that a global effort is needed to address what is now a global problem. The first step is the easiest, which is the creation of this subbranch of epistemology.