Category: Ethics

Way back in February of 2015 Laura Kipnis’ essay “Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe” was published in the Chronicle of Higher Education. Though controversial in content, it was a balanced consideration of campus codes governing relationships between students and professors. In response to this essay, Kipnis was subjected to what she rightly called a Title IX Inquisition. While the legal issues of such codes are interesting, my main concern as a philosopher is with their ethics.

I will begin by getting the easy stuff out of the way. As universities are obligated to provide a safe environment conducive to learning, they should have rules that protect students. Since universities are obligated to ensure grades are assigned on merit, they should have rules forbidding exchanging goods or services (including sexual services) for grades. Crimes such as sexual assault and rape should be handled by the police, though universities should also have rules governing the employment of professors who are convicted of such crimes.

It is also relatively easy to settle the issue of whether universities should forbid consenting relationships between professors and students when the professor has power over the student. This would include such things as the student being enrolled in the professor’s class or serving as their TA.  After all, if a student is involved with a professor, then the student might have an unfair advantage relative to other students. This is distinct from the explicit exchange of a grade for sexual favors. Rather, this is a matter of positive bias in favor of the student that can result in special treatment. For example, a professor might grade her boyfriend’s paper much easier than those of other students. 

While sexual relations can lead to bias, these are not the only relations that can have this effect. A professor who is friends with a student or related to a student can be biased in favor of that student. This is distinct from explicit nepotism in which grades are decided based on the relationship. So, if the principle is based on the potential for bias, then students who are friends, relatives or otherwise comparably connected to the professor would also need to be forbidden from being in such roles.

It can, obviously, be argued there is a relevant difference between sexual relations and non-sexual relations that would justify forbidding a professor from dating a student in, while still allowing them to have a friend or relative as a student. Alternatively, a university could have a general ban on professors having students with whom they have a potentially biasing relationship, be it sexual, platonic, or family relationship. As a general policy, this has considerable appeal on the grounds of fairness. It can, however, be countered on the grounds that a professional should be able to control bias in favor of friends and family. But this view opens the door to the claim that a professional should also be able to control bias in the case of a romantic relationship. However, most would certainly be skeptical about such a claim. I recall from my own graduate school days the comments students would make about students who were involved with their professor or TA. Put in polite terms, they expressed skepticism about the fairness of the grading.

My considered view is a conditional one: if a professor can maintain objectivity, then the unfairness argument would have no weight. However, it is reasonable to think that many professors could not maintain such objectivity, thus justifying a general rule forbidding relationship. After all, rule are not crafted with the best people in mind, but those that are less than the best.

The fairness argument could not, of course, be used to justify forbidding professors from dating students who are not and will not be in their classes (or otherwise under them in a professional capacity). So, for example, if an engineering professor were to date an English Literature major who will never take any of the classes she teaches, then there would be no concerns about fairness.

As harassment and coercive relationships should always be forbidden, there would thus seem to be no grounds for forbidding such a consensual relationship between two adults. However, there are good arguments in favor of this general forbiddance.

There are excellent practical reasons to forbid romantic or sexual relationships between students and professors even when there is no coercion, no harassment, and no unfairness. One practical reason is that relationships usually fail and often fail in dramatic ways, and it could be problematic for a university to have such drama play out on campus. Another practical reason is that such relationships can be a legal powder keg in terms of potential lawsuits against a university. As such, university administrators sensibly think that their money and brand should be protected by forbidding such relationships.

From a moral perspective, the concern is whether there are grounds for forbidding such relationships (other than, of course, a utilitarian argument about the potential for brand damage or lawsuits).

One standard argument is that there is always a power disparity between professors and students, and this entails that all such relationships are potentially coercive. Even if most professors would not consciously coerce a student, rules are not made for how the best people would act but for what those who are less than best are likely to do. As such, a blanket ban on relationships is necessary to prevent the possibility of coercive relationships between students and professors. It is thus morally justified.

It might be objected that a rule against coercive relationships would suffice and that if the professor has no professional relationship with the student, then they should be treated as consenting adults. After all, a professor in such a situation would seem to have no power over the student and coercion via professional position would not be possible. So, they should be free to have a relationship.

It could be countered that a professor always has power over a student in virtue of being a professor, even when the professor has no professional relationship with the student. While a professor might have some “power” in regard to being older (usually), having some status, having more income (usually), and so on, these do not seem to be distinct from the “power” one adult could have over another outside the academy and in the dating world.

One could argue that there seems to be nothing specific to being a professor that would give a professor power over the student that would make the relationship automatically coercive. As such, there would seem to be no grounds for forbidding the relationship.

It could be objected that students are especially vulnerable to the power of professors and lack the autonomy needed to resist this power. As such, the university must act in a paternalistic way and forbid all relationships—to protect naïve and powerless students from the cunning, powerful predatorial professors. This would be analogous to laws that protect minors from adults because minors cannot give informed consent. If college students are analogous to (but not legally) minors, then the same reasoning would apply. But this approach seems insulting to the students and would suggest that changes to the age of consent would be warranted. So casting adult students as analogous to children is probably not a good idea.

A reasonable approach is to point out that there is no guarantee that a professor might not end up being in a position of relative power and it would be unreasonable to depend on some sort of informal honor system in which students and professors promise to never be in such a situation. Hence, a blanket ban on such relationships would seem warranted. This is analogous to how a professional should never date co-workers or clients of their business, even if they currently have no professional interaction. Since they could have such interaction someday, they should not risk having a relationship.

There are also other moral grounds for forbidding such relationships that are not based on concerns about power disparities. For example, a case can be made that a professor being involved with a student would simply be unprofessional and hence unethical.

From a legal, practical and moral standpoint, the best policy would seem to be for professors and students to not have romantic relationships.

American gun rights groups, such as the NRA (National Rifle Association), have long argued that citizens need to be armed as a defense against government tyranny. The traditional narrative has been that “the left” would send agents of the state to “take your guns.” In recent years, right wing protestors and demonstrators have often made a point of being well-armed, sometimes looking like they were LARPing a Call of Duty game. White Americans have also enjoyed a right to use violence in “self-defense” against people of other colors, with the Kyle Rittenhouse case being a famous example.

As many pointed out on Facebook and other social media sites, the NRA and other gun rights groups remained silent when the Trump regime sent ICE to impose the president’s whims and act on his petty grievances. But the killing of Alex Pretti by ICE triggered a response.

While the evidence seems clear that Alex was executed by ICE agents, the Trump regime immediately claimed the ICE agents acted in self-defense. Obviously, no investigation had been conducted, and the Trump regime has blocked efforts of local law enforcement to investigate the shooting. Alex was legally carrying a gun, and Bill Essayli, the first assistant U.S. attorney for the Central District of California, said, “if you approach law enforcement with a gun, there is a high likelihood they will be legally justified in shooting you,” finishing with “Don’t do it.” This was a rhetorical mistake on his part, as it triggered an immediate response from gun activists as well as gun rights groups. A response from Gun Owners of America was that “federal agents are not ‘highly likely’ to be ‘legally justified’ in ‘shooting’ concealed carry licensees who approach while lawfully carrying a firearm. The Second Amendment protects Americans’ right to bear arms while protesting — a right the federal government must not infringe upon.” Essayli seems to have attempted to move the goal posts in the face of this criticism or, as his defenders would say, “clarified his remarks.” Gun rights activists do have grounds for concern and those on the right probably feel that they have been betrayed.

As noted above, people on the right often show up at protests and demonstrations well-armed. In states that allow open carry, people sometimes make a point of openly carrying their weapons. But there seems to have been a social contract that the police would leave armed whites alone, if they were not committing crimes.  But Alex, who was a white gun owner, was killed while doing nothing wrong and the narrative used against him was anti-gun rights. As such, Essayli’s statement would sound like a threat to people who believe in Second Amendment rights. So, the criticism of Essayli and these specific actions of ICE are consistent with the values and warnings expressed by the right leaning gun rights groups. That said, the Gun Owners’ of America also accused the left of “antagonizing” ICE agents. This could be seen as a gesture to the Trump regime to show their solidarity with the President and ICE’s actions. On this view, the condemnation of Essayli and “the left” can be seen as a warning for officials to adjust their rhetoric rather than a true condemnation of ICE’s unrestrained violence. After all, these groups did not issue statements about the killing of Renee Good and their condemnation has focused on the demonization of the gun and gun ownership rather than primarily on the killing. As such, the right leaning gun rights groups face a quandary here: they want to defend gun rights but also want to blame and condemn “the left.”

To be fair and balanced, some gun rights activists have condemned the killing and have noted that ICE presents a threat that crosses the left/right boundary in the United States. This is a reasonable view for although liberals tend to favor gun control and conservatives tend to favor gun rights, taking away or protecting gun rights is not a matter of left versus right. Rather, taking away or protecting rights is on the authoritarian axis of politics, and this can be left or right. Jokingly, I call authoritarians on the left “authoritarians in red” and those on the right “authoritarians in black.” While the right often aligns itself with authoritarian views in the United States, those who are truly in favor of gun rights and sincerely oppose government tyranny should oppose the tyranny being imposed by the Trump regime, especially the use of ICE. But there are presumably those who think that gun rights should depend on both a person’s color and their political views, such that law enforcement should leave the right and white alone, while they should be free to kill the left or non-white.

While the Trump regime has attempted to demonize Alex, he seems to have been a kind, caring person who worked as a registered nurse for the United States Department of Veteran’s Affairs. While the Trump regime is surely hoping his killing will intimidate people by sending the message that ICE will kill even people like Alex if they oppose the whims of Trump, it does run the risk of galvanizing Americans by making it clear that no one is safe from the Trump regime. It is a sad and terrible thing that he was killed, and the world is a worse place because of his absence.

 

While casting Democrats as wanting to impose big government, Republicans profess a love for small government and local control. However, as J.S. Mill noted, people rarely follow consistently applied principles about what the state should do. It is not surprising that Republicans are for local control, unless the locals are not doing what they want. Then they use the power of the state against local government. For example, laws that forbid local governments from passing laws to restrict fracking.

Even in oil industry friendly states such as Oklahoma, local governments have tried to impose restrictions on fracking. As might be imagined, having a fracking operation next door is disruptive because of the lights, noise, heavy truck traffic and contamination. In Oklahoma there is also the added concern of earthquakes linked to disposal wells. Since places that did not have earthquakes before fracking do not have earthquake resistant structures, these new quakes pose threats to property and public safety.

In general, local governments acted because the locals believed that state government was not doing enough to protect their well-being. State legislatures tend to be very friendly with the oil and gas industry. This makes sense, because of their economic importance in these states. While lobbying is not cheap, it is a small price to pay to ensure that state legislatures pass laws forbidding local governments from acting contrary to the interests of the oil and gas industry. Otherwise, the industry would need to influence (or purchase) all the local governments and this would be both costly and time consuming. It makes more sense to pay the state government to make the local governments comply to the will of the industry.

Since I favor individual autonomy, it is hardly surprising that I also favor local autonomy. As such, I see such laws as wrong.

The most obvious type of arguments to use against such laws are all the general arguments Republicans advance in favor of local control when the locals are doing what Republicans want them to do. After all, if these arguments show local control is good and desirable, then these arguments should apply to this situation as well. But, as noted above, the “principle” most people follow is that others should do what they want and not do what they do not want them to do. Consistency is rare and almost nonexistent in politics.

One argument in favor of having the state impose on the local governments is based on the fact that having a patchwork of laws can be cause problems. The flip side of this is, obviously, that having a consistent set of laws across the state (and presumably the entire country) is generally a good thing. Assuming that the laws are good, of course.

In the case of regulating the oil and gas industry, the argument rests on the claim that having all these different local laws would be confusing and costly. It is better to have laws for the industry that cover the entire state (and, to follow the logic, the entire country or world). Interestingly, in the Before Time when the EPA advanced a similar argument for regulating water, Republicans rushed to attack because of their inconsistent love for local rule. Once again, this is hardly a shock: the patchwork argument is not applied consistently, just when a party wants to prevent local control.

Applied consistently, the patchwork argument has its appeal. After all, it is true that having laws vary with each locality can be confusing and have some negative consequences. For example, if the color of traffic lights was set by localities and some decided to go with different colors, then there would be problems. As another example, if some local governments refused to recognize same sex-marriage when it is legal in the state, this could lead to various legal problems (such as inheritance issues or hospital visitation rights). As such, there are be good reasons to have a unified set of laws rather than a patchwork.

That said, it can be argued that the difficulties of the patchwork can be outweighed by other factors and one can always apply a utilitarian argument. If it can be shown that allowing local autonomy on a matter creates more good than the harm created by having a patchwork of laws, then that would be an argument in favor of local autonomy in that matter. In the case of local control of the gas and oil industry, this would be a matter of weighing the harm and the benefit to all those involved (and not just the oil and gas industry). I am inclined to think that allowing local control would create more good than harm, but I could be wrong. Perhaps the benefits to the state as a whole outweigh the damage done locally. That is, the few must sacrifice for the many (albeit against their will). But perhaps the many are suffering for the few stockholders, which would seem to be wrong.

Another moral argument can be built on property rights. In the case of fracking, the oil and gas companies do own the mineral rights. As such, they do have legal property rights to the resources. However, the people who own the property above the minerals also have rights. These presumably include a right to safety from environmental contamination, a right to not have their property values degraded, a right to a certain quality of life in regard to noise and light, and so on for other rights. The moral challenge is, obviously enough, balancing these rights against each other. Working this out is, in the practical sense, a matter of politics. But this often means that money makes right.

Since local governments tend to be more responsive to locals than the state government, it could be argued that they would be biased against the oil and gas industry and hence this matter should be settled by the state to avoid an unfair resolution. However, it can be argued that state governments are often influenced (or owned) by the oil and gas industry. This would seem to point towards the need for federal regulation of the matter (assuming that the federal government is more objective) which is something that Republicans tend to oppose, despite it being the logical conclusion of their argument against local control. Interesting, arguments advanced to claim that the federal government should not impose on the local control of the states would seem to apply to the local government. That is, if the federal government should not be imposing on the states, then the states should not be imposing on the local governments. But it must also be noted that the Republicans favor federal imposition on the states, if they like what is being inflicted on the states.

Police shootings of unarmed black Americans raise the question of why they occurred. While some might quickly claim the explanation is racism and brutality, the most plausible account involves several factors.

The first, which is connected to racism, is implicit bias. Studies involving simulators show that officers are more likely to use force against a black suspect than a white suspect. This has been explained in terms of an implicit negative bias. These studies show that even black and Hispanic officers are more likely to use force against black suspects. The studies also show civilians are more likely than officers to use force and exhibit more racial bias.

One reason why an implicit bias can lead to the use of force is how it shapes actions and perception. When a person thinks they are at risk, they become vigilant and anticipate the possibility they will be attacked. As such, the person starts to see the world through a “threat filter.”  So, for example, a person reaching rapidly to grab his wallet can be seen as reaching for a weapon. Perceptual errors occur often. For example, people who are afraid of snakes often see every vine or stick as a snake. These perceptual errors also help explain shootings: someone might think they saw the suspect reaching for a weapon.

Since the main difference between officers and civilians is most likely the training, it is reasonable to conclude that the training is having some positive effect. However, the existence of racial disparity in the use of force shows there is still a problem. One point of concern is that the bias might be so embedded in American culture that training will not eliminate it. As such, eliminating bias in police requires eliminating it in society, which goes far beyond addressing problems with policing. But is something that should be done.

A second often mentioned factor is “warrior culture.” Visually, this is exemplified by police use of military equipment, such as armored personal carriers and combat infantry equipment. However, the warrior culture is not just a matter of equipment, but also one of attitude. While police training includes conflict resolution, there is a significant emphasis on combat skills, especially firearms. On the one hand, this makes sense. People who are going to be using weapons need to be properly trained. On the other hand, it is reasonable to be concerned that there is more focus on combat training than the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Since I have seen absurd and useless “training” in conflict resolution, I understand there are concerns about such training. I also understand that conflict resolution is often presented as if it is just “holding hands and drinking chamomile tea together” and hence not appealing to people who are interested in “real” police work. However, it is a critical skill. After all, in a crisis people fall back on habit and training. Those who train primarily for combat will fall back on that skill set. Naturally, there is the worry that too much emphasis on conflict resolution could put officers in danger. However, this is a practical matter that can be addressed.

A critical part of conflict resolution training is also what Aristotle would see as moral education: developing the right sort of character to know when and how to act correctly. As Aristotle said, it is easy to be angry, but it is hard to be angry at the right time for the right reasons, towards the right people and to the right degree. As Aristotle also said, this is hard, and most people are bad at it. This does present a challenge even for a well-trained officer since conflict resolution involves (at least) two people and the person they are dealing with is probably horrible at it. One possible solution is training for citizens, in interacting with the police (and each other). Expecting the full burden of conflict resolution to fall upon the police is unfair and not a successful strategy.

The final factor I will consider is the principle of the primacy of officer survival. A primary goal of police training and practice is officer survival. It would, obviously, be absurd to claim that police should not be trained in survival or that police practices should not put an emphasis on the survival of officers.  However, there are legitimate concerns about the consequences of this approach.

Part of the problem, as some see it, links to the warrior mentality. The police, it is claimed, are trained to see their job as incredibly dangerous and policing as a combat mission. This, obviously enough, shapes the reaction of officers, which ties into perceptual bias. If an office believes she is going into a combat zone, she will perceive people and actions through this “combat zone filter.” So, people will be seen as more threatening, actions will be more likely to be interpreted as hostile and objects will be more likely to be perceived as weapons. As such, it makes sense that training officers for survival by getting them to see police work as a combat mission would cause more civilian causalities than would alternate approaches.

Naturally, it can be argued that officers do not, in general, have a “combat zone” attitude and that academics are presenting the emphasis on survival in the wrong way. It can also be argued that the “combat zone” attitude is real but is also correct since some people target police officers and almost any situation could become a battle for survival.  As such, it would be morally irresponsible to fail to train officers for survival, to not instill in them a proper sense of fear, and to not engage in practices that focus on officers making it home at the end of the shift. Even if this approach results in more civilian deaths, including the deaths of unarmed civilians.

This leads to a moral concern about the degree of risk a person is obligated to take to minimize the harm to another. This matter is not just connected to the issue of the use of force by police, but also the broader issue of self-defense.

I do assume there is a moral right to self-defense and that police officers do not lose this right when acting in their professional capacity. That is, a person has a right to harm another person when legitimately defending her life, liberty or property against an unwarranted attack. Even if such a right is accepted, there is still the question of the degree of force a person is justified in using and to what extent a person should limit her response to minimize harm to the attacker.

In terms of the degree of force, the easy and obvious answer is that the force should be proportional to the threat and sufficient to end the threat. For example, when I was a boy, I was subject to the usual boy versus boy violence. Since these attacks usually just involved fists and grappling, a proportional response was to hit back hard enough to make the other boy stop. Grabbing a rock, a bat or pulling a knife would be disproportional. As another example, if someone is shooting at a police officer, then she would certainly be right to use her firearm since that would be a proportional response.

One practical and moral concern about the proportional response is that the attacker might escalate. For example, if Bob swings on Mary and she lands a solid punch to his face, he might pull out a knife and stab her. If Mary had simply shot Bob, she would not have been stabbed because Bob would be wounded or dead. As such, some would argue that the response to an attack should be disproportional and aimed at ending the encounter through superior force. In terms of the moral justification, this would rest on the fact that the attacker is engaged in an unjust action and the person attacked has reason to think, as Locke argued, that the person might intend to kill her.

Another practical and moral concern is that if someone “plays fair” by responding in a proportional manner, she risks losing the encounter. For example, if Big Bertha swings on Small Sam and Sam sticks with his fists, Bertha might be able to beat him. Since dealing with an attacker is not a sporting event, the idea of “fair play” seems absurd—hence the person who is unjustly attacked has the moral right to respond in a disproportional manner. 

However, there is also the counter-concern that a disproportional response would be excessive in the sense of being unnecessary. For example, if Bertha swings at Sam and Sam shoots her four times with a twelve gauge, Sam is now safe. But if Sam could have used a Taser to stop Bertha, then the use of the shotgun would seem to have been wrong—after all, he did not need to kill Bertha in order to save himself. As such, it would seem reasonable to hold to the moral principle that the force should be sufficient for defense, but not excessive.

The obvious practical challenge is judging what would be sufficient and what would be excessive. Laws that address self-defense are usually vague: a person can use deadly force when facing a “reasonable perceived threat.” That is, the person must have a reasonable belief that there is a threat and there is usually no requirement that the threat must be real. To use the stock example, if a man points a realistic looking toy gun at an officer and says he is going to kill her, the officer will have a reasonable belief that there is a threat. Of course, there are problems with threat assessment. As noted above, implicit bias, warrior mentality and survival focus can cause a person to greatly overestimate a threat (or see one where it does not exist).

The challenge of judging sufficient force in response to a perceived threat is directly connected with the moral concern about the degree of risk a person is obligated to face to avoid (excessively) harming another person.  After all, a person could “best” ensure her safety by responding to every perceived threat with maximum lethal force. If she responds with less force or delays her response, then she is at ever increasing risk. If she accepts too little risk, she would be acting wrongly towards the person threatening her. If she accepts too much risk, she would be acting wrongly towards herself and anyone she is protecting.

A general and generic approach would be to model the obligation of risk on the proportional response approach. That is, the risk one is obligated to take is proportional to the situation at hand. This then leads to the problem of working out the details of the specific situation. Which is to state the obvious: the degree of risk rests heavily on the circumstances.

However, there are general factors that would impact the degree of risk on is obligated to take. One would be the relation between the people. For example, it seems reasonable to hold that people have greater obligations to accept risk to avoid harming people they love or care about. Another factor that seems relevant is the person’s profession. For example, soldiers are expected to take some risks to avoid killing civilians, even when doing so puts them in some danger. To use a specific example, soldiers on patrol could increase their chance of survival by killing any unidentified person (adult or child) that approaches them. However, being a soldier and not simply a rampaging killer requires that soldiers accept some risks to avoid murdering innocents.

In the case of police officers, it could be argued that their profession obligates them to take greater risks to avoid harming others. Since their professed duty is to serve and protect, it can be argued that the survival of those who they are supposed to protect should be given equal weight to the survival of the officer. That is, the focus should be on everyone going home. In terms of how this would be implemented, the usual practice would be training and changes to rules regarding use of force. Limiting officer use of force can be seen as generating greater risk for the officers, but the goal would be to reduce the harm done to civilians. Since the police are supposed to protect people, they are (it might be argued) under greater obligation to accept risk than civilians.

One obvious reply to this is that some officers already have this view and take considerable risks to avoid harming people, even if they would be justified in using force. These officers save many lives, although sometimes at the cost of their own. Another reply is that this sort of view would get officers killed because they would be too concerned about not harming suspects and not concerned enough about their own survival. That is a reasonable concern and there is a challenge of balancing the safety of the public and the safety of officers.

While Aristotle was writing centuries before wearables, his view of moral education provides a foundation for the theory behind the benign tyranny of the device. Or, if one prefers, the bearable tyranny of the wearable.

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle addressed the practical problem of how to make people good. He understood merely listening to discourses on morality would not suffice. In an apt analogy, he noted that such people would be like patients who listened to their doctors but did not carry out their instructions: they will get no benefit.

His solution is one that is both endorsed and condemned today: using the compulsive power of the state to make people behave well and thus become habituated. Most are happy to have the state compel people to act as they would like them to act; yet equally unhappy when it comes to the state imposing on them. Aristotle was also aware of the importance of training people from an early age, something later developed by both the Nazis and Madison Avenue.

While there have been attempts in the United States and other Western nations to use the compulsive power of the state to force people to engage in healthy practices, these are often unsuccessful and opposed as draconian violations of the right to be unhealthy. While the idea of a Fitness Force chasing people around to make them exercise seems funny, I would oppose such impositions on both practical and moral grounds. However, most need external coercion to force them to engage in healthy behavior. Those who are well-off can hire a personal trainer or fitness coach. Those who are less well-off can appeal to the tyranny of friends who are already self-tyrannizing. However, there are problems with relying on other people. This is where the tyranny of the device comes in.

While the quantified life via electronics is in its infancy, there is already a multitude of devices available including smart watches, smart rings, smart plates, smart scales, and smart forks. All these devices offer measurements of activities to quantify the self and most of them offer coercion ranging from annoying noises to automatic social media posts (“today my feet did not patter, so now my ass grows fatter”), to the old school electric shock (really).

While the devices vary, Aristotle presented their basic requirements back when lightning was believed by some to come from Zeus. Aristotle noted that a person must do no wrong either with or against their will. In the case of fitness, this would be acting in ways contrary to health.

What is needed, according to Aristotle, is “the guidance of some intelligence or right system that has effective force.” The first part of this is that the device or app must be the “right system.” The device must provide correct guidance in terms of health and well-being. Unfortunately, matters of health are often ruled by fad and ideology.

The second part is the matter of “effective force”, so the device or app must have the power to compel. Aristotle noted that individuals lack such compulsive power, so he favored the power of law. Good law, he claimed, has practical wisdom and compulsive force. However, unless the state is going to get into the business of compelling health, this option is out.

Interesting, Aristotle claims that “although people resent it when their impulses are opposed by human agents, even if they are in the right, the law causes no irritation by enjoining decent behavior.” While this does not seem entirely true, he did seem to be right in that people find the law less annoying than being bossed around by individuals acting as individuals (like a bossy neighbor telling you to turn down the music).

The same could be true of devices. While being bossed around by a person (“hey fatty, you’ve had enough ice cream, get out and run”) would annoy most people, being bossed by an app or device could be less annoying. In fact, most people are already conditioned by their devices and obey their smartphones. Some people obey even when it puts people at risk, such as when they are driving. This provides a vast ocean of psychological conditioning to tap into, but for a better cause. So, instead of mindlessly flipping through Instagram or texting words of nothingness, a person would be compelled by their digital masters to exercise more, eat less crap, and get more sleep.  Soon the machine tyrants will have very fit hosts to carry them around.

So, Aristotle has provided the perfect theoretical foundation for designing the tyrannical device. To recap, it needs the following features:

 

  1. Practical wisdom: the health science for the device or app needs to be correct and the guidance effective.
  2. Compulsive power: the device or app must be able to compel the user effectively and make them obey.
  3. Not too annoying: while it must have compulsive power, this power must not generate annoyance that exceeds its ability to compel.
  4. A cool name.

 

So, get to work on those devices and apps. The age of machine tyranny is not going to impose itself. At least not yet.

After the financial class burned down the economy again, local governments once more faced a reduction in their revenues. As the economy recovered under a Democrat President, the Republicans held or gained power in many state governments, such as my own adopted state of Florida. With laudable consistency with their professed ideology, Republicans cut taxes for businesses, the well off and sometimes almost everyone. While the professed theory is cutting taxes increases revenue for state and local governments, shockingly enough the opposite happens: state and local governments run short of funds needed to meet the expenses of operating a civilization.

Being resourceful, local leaders then seek other revenue streams to pay the bills. While cities like Ferguson provided well-known examples of a common “solution”, many have embraced the idea of law-enforcement as revenue stream. While the general practice of getting revenue from law enforcement is nothing new, the extent to which some local governments rely on it shocking. How the system works is also often shocking as it can be a shakedown system one would expect to see in a corrupt country unfamiliar with the rule of law or the rights of citizens.

Since Ferguson, where Michael Brown was shot on August 9, 2014, has been the subject of extensive study, I will use the statistics from that town. Unfortunately, Ferguson does not appear to be unique or even unusual.

In 2013, Ferguson’s court dealt with 12,108 cases and 24,532 warrants. This works out to an average of 1.5 cases and 3 warrants per household in Ferguson. The fines and court fees that year totaled $2,635,400, making the municipal court the second largest revenue stream.

One concern that was addressed by the media was that the legal system disproportionally target blacks. In Ferguson, as in many places, most of the cases handled by the court are from traffic stops. Ferguson is 29% white, but whites make up only 12.7% of those stopped. When a person is stopped, a black citizen will be searched 12.1% of the time, while a white citizen will be searched 6.9% of the time. In terms of arrest, a black citizen was arrested 10.4% of the time and a white citizen was arrested 5.2% of the time.

The usual reply to such disparities is to claim that blacks commit more crimes than whites. If it were true that black Americans were being arrested in proportion to the rate at which they were committing crimes, then this would be (on the face of it) fair. However, this is not the case. Even though blacks were more likely to be searched than whites, police discovered contraband only 21.7% of the time. Whites who were searched were found with contraband 34.0% of the time. Also, 93% of those arrested in Ferguson were black. While not logically impossible, it would be odd that 93% of the crime in the city was committed by black citizens.

Naturally, these numbers can be talked around or explained away. It could be argued that blacks are not being targeted as a specific source of revenue, and the arrest rates are proportional and just. This still leaves the matter of how the legal system operates in terms of being focused on revenue.

Laying aside race, Ferguson stands out as an example of how law enforcement can turn into a collection system. One key component is, of course, having costly fines. For example, Ferguson had a $531 fine for high grass and weeds, $792 for Failure to Obey, $527 for Failure to Comply, $427 for a Peace Disturbance violation, and so on.

If a person can pay, then the person is not arrested. But, if a person cannot afford the fine, then an arrest warrant is issued, and this is the second part of the system. The city issued 32,975 arrest warrants for minor offenses in 2013 and the city had a population of 21,000 people at that time.

After a person is arrested, they face even more fees, such as court fees and these can quickly pile up. For example, a person might get a $150 parking ticket they cannot pay. They are then arrested and subject to more fees and more charges. This initial ticket might grow to a debt of almost$1,000 to the city. Given that the people who tend to be targeted are poor, it is likely they will not be able to pay for the initial ticket. They will then be arrested, which could cost them their job, thus making them unable to pay their court fees. This could easily spiral into a court-inflicted cycle of poverty and debt. This, obviously enough, is not what the legal system is supposed to do. Unless, of course, it is.

From a moral standpoint, one problem with using law enforcement as a revenue stream is the damage it does to the citizens who cannot afford the fines and fees. As noted in the example above, a person’s life could be ruined by a single parking ticket. The point of law enforcement in a just society is to protect the citizens from harm, not inflict ruin.

A second moral concern is that this system seems to be racketeering. It makes a threat of arrest and court fees, and then offers “protection” from that threat in return for a fee. That is, citizens are threatened so they will buy their way out of greater harm. This is hardly justice. If it was practiced by anyone other than the government (or a corporation), it would be criminal racketeering and a protection scheme.

A third moral concern is exploiting the citizens by force and threat of force damages the fundamental relation between the citizen and the democratic state. In feudal states and in the domains of warlords, one expects the thugs of the warlords to shake down the peasants. However, that sort of thing is contrary to the nature of a democratic state. As happened during the revolts against feudalism and warlords, people will sometimes revolt against such oppression, and this is to be expected. Robin Hood is, after all, the hero and the Sheriff of Nottingham is the villain. But some folks in law enforcement take Darth Vader to be the hero, so…

This is not to say that there should never be fines, penalties and punishments. However, they should be proportional to the offenses, they should be fairly applied, and should be aimed at protecting the citizens, not filling the coffers of the kingdom. As a final point, we should not be cutting the taxes of the rich and shift costs to the poor. That is unjust and will result in dire social consequences. But the obvious problem is that these systems are working as intended.

On May 3, 2015 the American Freedom Defense Initiative put on a contest in which cartoonists drew images of Muhammad for a cash prize. To most Muslims, such portrayals of Muhammad are deeply offensive. As such, it is reasonable to infer that the event was intended to be provocative, especially since the event was well protected with armed security forces. As such, it was hardly shocking when two gunmen attacked the event. These armored and heavily armed men were killed by a traffic officer armed only with a pistol. At the time, ISIS claimed credit for the attack.

As I have argued in previous essays, violence in response to offensive artwork or other forms of expression is not warranted. As such, there is no need to re-hash those arguments to argue the attack was morally wrong. Outside of the realm of violent extremists, I doubt there is much dispute over this point. As such, I will proceed to the main matter I wish to focus on.

Back in 2015, Indiana made headlines with its religious freedom act. There is also the recurring talking point that religious liberty and religion are under attack in America. One example given of the threat to religious liberty was the requirement that employers of a certain size provide insurance coverage that covered birth control for full-time employees. Another example over used is the legalization of same sex-marriage. A third example is that some states have laws that forbid discrimination against people because of their sexual orientation. This is supposed to violate religious liberty by forbidding, for example, a Christian baker to discriminate against a same-sex couple that wants to buy a wedding cake.

Though I have written about specific cases, my general view is based on the principle that religious rights do not grant a right to violate the rights of others. To use an easy and obvious example, a religion that claimed human sacrifice as a basic tenet of its faith should be denied the right to engage in this practice. After all, the right to life trumps the right to practice one’s faith on others against their will.

In the case of discrimination against same-sex couples, I follow the same principle: the freedom of religion is bounded by the principle of harm. Since same-sex couples are members of the civil society and being able to engage in free commerce is a basic right in capitalism, to deny them the right to goods and services because of their sexual orientation would harm them. While it might be countered that selling a cake to a same-sex couple would harm the Christian baker, it is not clear what harm is being done. After all, she is selling a cake and selling an item is not an endorsement of the purchaser. If, for example, Nazis are buying my books on Amazon, I am not thereby endorsing Nazism.

In the case of a company being required to provide coverage that includes birth control, the company is not harmed by this. The company is not required to use birth control, directly hand it to the employees, or endorse it. They are merely required to provide employees with the opportunity to have such coverage if they desire it. It is, in fact, a form of compensation. It certainly does not violate the rights of an employer if employers spend their salaries as they wish, even on birth control.

While the laws purported to defend religious freedom do not, for obvious reasons, specify that they are aimed at defending a specific variety of Christianity, it is evident that the concern is not about defending religion in general. If it were, the event in which people competed to draw cartoons of Muhammad would have been condemned by all the folks supporting the religious “freedom” laws and those who claim religion is under attack in America. After all, holding an event explicitly aimed at mocking a religion and provoking members of a faith is an attack on religion. This event was far more of an attack on religion than forbidding bakers from discriminating against same-sex couples.

While I think people should not engage in such offensive behavior (I also believe that people should not burn American flags or urinate on crosses), my consistency requires that I must accept the freedom of people to engage in such offensive behavior.

This is, as with the case of the wedding cake, based on the principle of harm: restricting freedom of expression because the expression is offensive creates more harm than it prevents. Part of this is because while there is a right to freedom of expression and it can be wrong to offend people, there is no right to freedom from being offended. That said, members of civil society do fall under moral expectations of polite behavior. So, while there is no right to forbid people from urinating on crosses they own, burning American flags they own or drawing cartoons of Muhammad, a decent human being will consider their actions and act with respect for the views of others. That is what good people do. I admit, I have not always lived up to that myself and that is a failing on my part.

It is, of course, possible to cross from mere offense to actual harm. This boundary is, unfortunately, not always sharp and admits many gray zones. Fortunately, though, the principle is clear: mere offensiveness does not warrant forbiddance, and religious freedom does not warrant unjustly imposing on the rights of others.

One interesting narrative about the riots in Baltimore involved the concept of the rule of law. Put roughly, the rule of law is the idea that the law should govern rather than the arbitrary decisions of those in power. The notion is sometimes applied to the citizens as well, that citizens should follow the rule of law to resolve conflicts—as opposed to engaging in activities such as riots or vigilantism.

Thinkers such as John Locke have argued that the rule of law is preferable to that of the state of nature. These arguments are generally persuasive, especially since Locke emphasizes the moral responsibilities of the state in regard to the good of the people. That is, he does not simply advocate obedience to whatever the laws happen to be but requires that the laws and the leaders prove worthy of obedience. Laws or leaders that are tyrannical are not to be obeyed but are to be defied and justly so.

Since I find Locke’s arguments appealing, it is hardly surprising that I favor rule of law when the laws are good and the leaders are acting for the good of the people. When the government has moral legitimacy, the laws and the leaders have the right to expect people to follow the laws and listen to the leaders. However, when the laws or leaders violate the basic agreement, then their legitimacy evaporates.

Some conservatives spoke of the tyranny of Obama and how the Democrats wished to create a tyrannical state. They are right to be worried about tyranny. However, their timeline is in error: tyranny was already present in 2015 and has strengthened since.  

John Locke provides the following definition of “tyranny”: “Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.  And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage.”

The United States meets this definition. In 2014, researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted a study to determine the extent to which laws reflect the views of the majority versus the interests of those in power. This study, titled “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” , used data gathered from 1981 to 2002.

The researchers examined about 1,800 polices from that time and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups. The results were hardly surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”

While following these laws would be to conform to the rule of law, it would also be to embrace tyrannical laws crafted for the advantage of those holding power and not the good of the people.

While the people who riot are probably unfamiliar with this research, they know the obvious: they live within a political and economic system that serves the “private, separate advantage” of the elite class and has little to offer them. As such, it should be no shock that some people do not embrace the rule of such law. If they are striking out against these laws and their riots are a revolt, they are revolting against a tyrannical system, one that serves the interests of the powerful few and not the good of the people. Or to be fair to those who were critical of the riots, perhaps they are just breaking things.

Continuing with tyranny, Locke notes that “Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another.”

Sadly, this is an accurate description of the excessive use of force against citizens by some police officers. Baltimore, as has been widely reported, has paid out millions of dollars in settlements due to the wrongful use of force by police against citizens. As folks on the right love to say, not all police officers are bad and there are excellent officers. However, even a cursory examination of the problems with policing in American cities shows that Locke’s definition of tyranny is routinely met. As such, it is evident that the rule of law was already broken well before the riots. And is being shattered in 2025.

While Locke did not use this phrase, the rule of law is a two-way street and those who are charged with enforcing the law must also obey that law, otherwise it would be unreasonable to expect obedience from the citizens. As such, the most obvious step to restoring rule of law is to ensure that those charged with enforcing the laws are also following the laws. This was true in 2015 and is still true today.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Veggies

On April 12, 2015 Freddie Gray died in police custody. For some, this was part of a pattern of police violence. For others (such as Fox hosts), this was just another isolated incident.

The initial protests to this death were peaceful and it was hoped by many that Baltimore would avoid the violence that marked other protests (including riots in Baltimore’s own past). This hope was shattered in an outbreak of violence and destruction.

One obvious concern is the identity and the nature of those engaged in violence. According to some narratives, the rioters were thugs or outsiders taking advantage of the situation to engage in destruction, theft and violence. That is, they are opportunists and not protestors.

The United States does have a history of costly and pointless riots that are not protests. These are, of course, sports riots. One outstanding example is the 1992 riot in the aftermath of the Chicago Bulls vs. the Portland Trail Blazers. The damage was estimated at $10 million. There have been other lesser riots, such as that following the 1999 Michigan State vs. Duke game that resulted in about $250,000 in damage (and whose iconic photo is a shirtless white bro “flashing the horns” atop a burned-out car). My adopted state of Florida also sees violence and property damage during Spring Break, although California did seem interested in getting into the spring break riot game.

Given that Americans are willing to riot over sports and spring breaks, it is reasonable to consider that the rioters in Baltimore were not protesting but were motivated by other reasons, perhaps just wanting to break and burn things.

There are some narratives that cast at least some of the rioters as having also been protesting. That is, their motivation is not just to steal, break and burn but to express their anger about the situation. One way to explore motivations is to consider the situation in Baltimore. That is, to see if there were legitimate grounds for anger and whether these factors might have provoked people to violence and destruction. 

Baltimore was (and still is) a paradigm of the brutal race and class divisions in the United States. It has the historical distinction of being the first city to pass a citywide segregation law (segregating each residential block by race) and the legacy of this law persists as Baltimore remains a segregated city. In the center of the city, 60% of the population is black. The suburbs are predominantly white. Despite there being laws against forced segregation, the United States is still highly segregated. This provides grounds for anger.

Baltimore also exemplifies the stark class divisions in the United States. Back in 2015, 150,000 of the city’s 620,000 were classified as poor (the average income for a family of four being $23,492). The unemployment rate was close to 10%. As the American Revolution showed, people get angry and violent in response to perceived economic injustice. Given the massive disparity between economic classes in the United States and their support by the structures of law and authority, what is shocking is not that there is an occasional riot but that there are not daily riots. As such, there were sufficient grounds for anger. Naturally, some people claimed that this poverty is because the poor are lazy: if they would only work hard for the job creators, they would not be poor. This view ignores the reality of poverty in America, but it is a beloved narrative of those who are doing well.

Not surprisingly, Baltimore also has had serious issues with crime. Drug addiction was a serious problem and the city was 5th in the number of murders per year in 2014. It was, however, 15th in the number of violent crimes per year. Crime is, of course, a complex matter. Some claim that this sort of crime arises from poverty, oppression and lack of opportunity (as opposed to the ‘crimes’ of the financial classes, such as destroying the world economy). There is, of course, a correlation between crime and these factors. Some claim that people turn to crime because of moral defects rather than these factors. This does have some merit. After all, a look at the financial sector and halls of power show evil behavior that is clearly not caused by poverty.

Like other US cities, there was also an issue with how the police treat their fellow citizens. In 2011 the city paid $6.3 million settling police misconduct claims. Between 2011 and 2012 there were 156 such lawsuits. The number did decline to 156 from 2013 to 2014. While it is reasonable to consider that not all these suits had merit, what happened to Gray does provide reason to suspect that there are grounds for being concerned about policing in the city.

When people think they are being oppressed and subject to brutality, they respond with anger. For example, one can see the rage the fine folks on Fox express when they speak of the War on Christmas and how Christians are being mistreated and persecuted in America. One can only imagine the anger that arises when people really are subject to mistreatment. As such, there seem to be legitimate grounds for anger.

While the anger of those engaged in violence might have been justified, there is still the obvious concerns about whether such behavior is morally acceptable and whether such behavior is effective in achieving goals.

On the face of it, much of the violence and destruction would seem to be difficult to justify morally. Most of the destruction seemed to involve community infrastructure and the property of people who were not responsible for what provoked the protests. While the anger against the police was understandable, the attacks on reporters and firefighters were unjustified. The reporters did nothing meriting being attacked and the firefighters were trying to keep the city from burning down, which is certainly a laudable goal. Crudely put, if the violent (alleged) protestors were striking against injustice, they were (mostly) hitting the wrong targets. To use an analogy, if Bob has wronged Sam and Sam smashes Sally’s windows because he lives near her and cannot get at Bob, then Sam has acted wrongly, no matter how badly Bob wronged him.

It might be countered that the destruction is morally acceptable because the (alleged) protestors are striking out against an unjust social order. The obvious reply is that while this might have some abstract appeal, the real damage is being done mainly to the innocent rather than the guilty. As such, the violence and destruction seem to have been immoral.

A second issue, which can connect to the moral issue, is the effectiveness of violence as a means of protest and social change. Obviously, violence can be very effective in achieving goals. We Americans can point to our own Revolutionary War and the wars won against everyone from the Apache to the Japanese. However, violence is only effective when one has enough power to achieve one’s goals through that violence. Since the rioters went up against the police and the National Guard, it makes sense why they could not achieve victory through force of arms.

However, a case can be made that violence gets attention. Peaceful protests, one might argue, sound nice but are easy to ignore. After all, “change things or we will peacefully protest again” has less power than “change things or there will be cop cars burning in the streets and the authorities will have to explain why they are losing control of the city.” Interestingly, many of the pundits who praised the property destruction that occurred during the Boston Tea Party are quick to condemn contemporary protests they do not like. These pundits also praise other violence they approve of but lack a consistent principle regarding violence as a means of achieving goals beyond they like violence aimed at goals they like and dislike violence that is aimed at goals they dislike.

A moral case can be made against violence, such as that famously made by Dr. King. When there is the possibility of redress and justice through peaceful means, then non-violence seems to have an obvious advantage over violence: people are not hurt or killed, and property is not destroyed. However, the fact that a major American city had to be patrolled by the National Guard showed once again that there are deep and profound problems in civil society. In 2025, it is equally evident that these underlying problems have not been addressed, and things are just getting worse.

 

 

According to my iron rule of technology, any technology that can be misused will be misused. Drones are no exception. While law-abiding citizens and law writing corporations have been finding legal uses for drones, enterprising folks have been finding other uses. These include deploying drones as peeping toms and using them to transport drugs. The future will see even more criminals (inside and outside governments) using drones for their crimes.

Two main factors making drones appealing for criminal activity is they allow a criminal to commit crime at a distance and with anonymity. This, obviously enough, is what the internet did for crime: criminals can operate from far away behind a digital mask. Drones allow criminals to do in the physical world what they have been doing in cyberspace. Naturally, the crimes that drones will permit will be different from the “old” cybercrimes.

Just as there is a large market for black market guns, it is easy to imagine a black market for drones. After all, it would be stupid to commit crimes with a legally purchased and traceable drone. A black-market drone that was stolen or custom built would be difficult to trace to the operator. Naturally, there is also a market for untraceable drone controllers. As with all technology, the imagination is the limit as to what crimes can be committed with drones.

In my essay on little assassins, I discussed the use of drones in assassination and spying missions. While large drones are deployed in these ways by states, advancements in drone technology and ever-decreasing prices will mean that little assassins will be affordable. This will allow them to be deployed in criminal enterprises involving murder and spying. For example, a killer drone could be an ideal way for a spouse to knock off a husband or wife to collect insurance money.

It is also easy to imagine drones being used for petty crimes, such as shop lifting and vandalism. A drone could zip into a store, grab items and zip away. A drone could also be equipped with cans of spray paint and  allow a graffiti artist to create masterpieces from a distance or in places that would be difficult for a human to reach.

Speaking of theft, drones could also be used for more serious robberies than shop lifting. For example, an armed drone could be used to commit armed robbery: “put the money in the bag the drone is holding, or it will shoot you in the face!”

Drones could also be used for poaching; to locate and kill endangered animals. Given the value of some animal parts, drone poaching could be viable, especially if drone prices keep dropping and the value of certain animal parts keep increasing. Naturally, drones will also be deployed to counter poaching activities.

While drones are already being used to smuggle drugs and other items, we should expect enterprising criminals to follow Amazon’s lead and use drones to deliver illegal goods. A clever criminal will consider making her delivery drones look like Amazon’s (or even stealing some of them). While a drone dropping off drugs to a customer could be “busted” by the cops, the person making the deal via drone would be hard to catch, especially since they might be in another country. Or even an AI looking to fund the revolution with drug money.

No doubt there are many other criminal activities that drones will be used for that I have not discussed. I know that if there is a crime a drone can be used to commit, someone will figure out how to make that happen.

While drones will have many positive uses, it is a good idea to consider how they will be misused and develop strategies to counter these misuses. This, as always, will require a balance between the freedom needed to utilize technology for good and the restrictions needed to limit the damage that can be done with it.