Category: Ethics

 

While the United States is the richest country on earth, people asking for money is a common occurrence. Last week, when I went to CVS to get my COVID shot, a person laying on the sidewalk asked me for money. I’m often approached while grocery shopping and even while running. Although I have been told I am just helping to buy someone drugs or beer, I routinely give people cash. This is a moral choice, and I would be going against my own professed principles if I did not help people, even when they might be deceiving me about what they will purchase. But some people find panhandling a problem and not in terms of people needing to beg for money.

Local officials sometimes believe panhandlers are detrimental to businesses and tourism and there have been efforts to ban begging. While local governments try to craft laws to pass constitutional muster, their efforts have generally proven futile in the face of the First Amendment. While the legal questions are addressed by courts, there remains the moral question of whether banning panhandling can be morally justified.

One starting point for a moral argument for banning panhandling is a utilitarian approach. Local officials generally want bans because they believe panhandlers are bad for businesses and tourism. For example, if potential customers are accosted by panhandlers on the streets around businesses, then they are less likely to patronize those businesses.

As another example, if a city gets a reputation for being awash in panhandlers who annoy tourists with, then tourism might decline. From the perspective of the business owners and the local officials, these effects would have negative value that outweigh the benefits to the panhandlers of being able to ask for money. There is presumably also utility in encouraging panhandlers to move away to other locations, thus removing the financial and social cost of having panhandlers. If this utilitarian calculation is accurate, then banning panhandling would be morally acceptable. Of course, if the calculation is not correct and such a ban would do more harm than good, then the ban would be morally wrong.

A second utilitarian argument is the safety argument. While panhandlers generally do not engage in violence (they are asking for money and not trying to rob people), some claim they do present a risk. One concern is that by panhandling in or near traffic, they put themselves and others in danger. If this is true, then banning panhandling would be the right thing to do.  If, however, the alleged harm does not justify the ban, then it would be morally unacceptable.

There is also the reply that safety concerns could be addressed by having laws that forbid people from obstructing the flow of traffic and being a danger to themselves and others. Presumably these laws already exist in most places. There is also the concern that the safety argument would need to be applied consistently to all such allegedly risky behavior around traffic, such as people engaging in political campaigns or street side advertising.

One can advance a utilitarian argument in favor of panhandling based on the harm that could be done by restricting the panhandlers’ rights. Following Mill’s classic argument, if panhandlers are not harming people with their panhandling, then it would be wrong to limit their freedom to engage in this behavior. This is on the condition that panhandling is merely annoying and does not involve threatening behavior or harassment. After all, politicians are allowed to annoy us with texts and emails begging for money, so they would be hard pressed to consistently oppose panhandling while asking us for money.

It could be objected that panhandling does cause harm. As noted above, the presence of panhandlers could harm local businesses. People can also regard panhandling as an infringement on their freedom to not be bothered in public. While this does have some appeal, this justification of a panhandling ban would also justify banning any public behavior people found annoying or that had some perceived impact on local businesses. This could include public displays of expression, political campaigning, preaching in public and many other behaviors. In short, the problem is that there is not something distinct about panhandling that would allow it to be banned without also justifying the ban of other activities. To simply ban it because it is panhandling would seem to solve this problem but would not. After all, if an activity can be justly banned because it is that activity, then this would apply to any activity. After all, every activity is the activity it is.

Those who prefer an alternative to utilitarian calculations can easily defend panhandling against proposed bans by appealing to a right of free expression and behavior that is not based on utility. If people do have the moral right to free expression, then reasons would need to be advanced that would be strong enough to warrant violating this right. As noted above, an appeal could be made to the rights of businesses and the rights of other people to avoid being annoyed. However, the right to not be annoyed does not seem to trump the right of expression until the annoyance becomes significant. As such, a panhandler does have the right to annoy others by asking for money, but if it crosses over into actual harassment, then this would be handled by the fact that people do not have a right to harassment.

In the case of businesses, while they do have a right to engage in free commerce, they do not have a right to expect people to behave in ways that are conducive to their business. If, for example, people found it offensive to have runners running downtown and decided to take their business elsewhere, this would not warrant a runner ban. But, if runners were blocking access to the businesses by stretching in the entrances, then the owners’ rights would be violated. Likewise, if panhandlers are disliked by people and they decide to take their business elsewhere, this does not violate the rights of the businesses. But, if panhandlers started harassing people and blocking access to the businesses, then this would violate the rights of the owners.

 

While pharmaceutical companies profited from flooding America with opioids, this inflicted terrible costs on others. Among the costs has been the terrible impact on health. One example of this is endocarditis.

Endocarditis is an abscess on a heart valve. While not limited to drug users, it can be caused by injecting opioids. As opioids were pushed onto the American people, it is no surprise that the number of drug users suffering from endocarditis increased significantly.  The treatment of endocarditis involves a very expensive surgery and many drug users getting this surgery are on Medicaid. To make matters worse, people often return to opioid use after the surgery and this can lead to another expensive surgery, paid for by Medicaid. This raises moral concerns.

There is the moral issue of whether Medicaid should even exist. On the one hand, a compelling moral argument can be made that just as a nation provides military and police protection to citizens who cannot afford their own security forces or bodyguards, a nation should fund medical care for those who cannot afford it on their own. On the other hand, a moral argument can be made that a nation has no obligation to provide such support and that citizens should be left to fend for themselves regarding health care. Naturally enough, if the nation is under no obligation to provide Medicaid in general, then it is under no obligation to cover the cost of the surgery in question. On this view, there is no need to consider the matter further.

 However, if the state should provide Medicaid, then the issue of whether the state should pay for endocarditis surgery for opioid addicts arises. It is to this discussion that I now turn.

While it is harsh to argue against paying for an addict’s heart surgery, a moral case can be made in favor of this position. The most obvious way to do this is on utilitarian grounds. As noted above, surgery for endocarditis is very expensive and uses financial and medical resources that could be used elsewhere. If more good could be done by using these resources elsewhere, the utilitarian conclusion is that this is what should be done. This argument can be strengthened by including the fact that addicts often return to behavior that resulted in endocarditis, thus creating the need for repeating the costly surgery. From a utilitarian perspective, it would be morally better to use those resources to treat patients who are less likely to willfully engage in behavior that will require them to be treated yet again. This is because the resources that would be consumed treating and retreating a person who keeps inflicting harm on themselves could be used to treat many people, thus doing greater good for the greater number. Though harsh and seemingly merciless, this approach seems justifiable on grounds like the moral justification for triage.

Another approach, which is even harsher, is to focus on the fact that the addicts are giving themselves endocarditis and sometimes doing so repeatedly. This provides the basis for two arguments against public funding of their treatment.

One argument can be built around the idea that there is no moral obligation to help people when their harm is self-inflicted. To use an analogy, if a person insists on setting fire to their house and it burns down, no one has a moral responsibility to pay to have their house rebuilt. Since the addict’s woes are self-inflicted, there is no moral obligation on the part of others to pay for their surgery and forcing people to do so (by using public money) would be like forcing others to pay to rebuild the burned house.

One way to counter this is to point out that many health issues are self-inflicted by a lack of positive behavior (such as exercise and a good diet) and an abundance of negative behavior (such as smoking, drinking, or having unprotected sex). If this principle is applied to addicts, it must be applied to all cases of self-inflicted harm. While some might take this as a refutation of this view, others might accept this as reasonable and warranting a state of nature approach to medicine in which everyone is on their own.

Another argument can be built around the idea that while there could be an obligation to help people, this obligation is limited. In this case, if a person is treated and knowingly returns to the same harmful behavior, then there is no obligation to keep treating the person. In the case of the drug addict, it could be accepted that the first surgery should be covered and that they should be educated on what will happen if they persist in their harmful behavior. If they then persist in that behavior and need the surgery again, then public money should not be used. To use an analogy, if a child swings their ice cream cone around and is surprised when the scoops hit the ground, then it would be reasonable for the parents to buy the child another cone. If the child swings the new cone around and the scoops hit the ground, then the child can be justly denied another cone.

An obvious counter is to contend that addicts are addicted and hence cannot be blamed for returning to the behavior that caused the harm. They are not morally responsible because they cannot do otherwise. This does have some appeal but would seem to justify requiring addicts to also undergo treatment for their addiction and to agree to monitoring of their behavior. They should be free to refuse this (which, ironically, assumes they are capable of free choice), but this should result in their being denied a second surgery if their behavior results in the same harm. Holding people accountable does seem to be cruel, but it could be argued that the alternative is unfair to other citizens. It would be like requiring them to keep rebuilding houses for a person who persists in setting fires in their house and refuses to takes steps to stop doing this.

These arguments can be countered by arguing that there is an obligation to provide such care regardless of how many times an addict returns to the behavior that caused the need for the surgery. One approach would be to build an analogy based on how the state repeatedly bails out big businesses every time they burn down the economy. Another approach would be to appeal to the value of human life and contend that it must be preserved regardless of the cost and regardless of the reason why there is a need for medical care. This approach could be noble or, perhaps, foolish.

 

When Middlebury invited Charles Murray to speak, the event was disrupted by student protestors and both Murray and Professor Allison Sanger were assailed on campus. This incident sparked reflection on the campus and beyond. Peter Singer, a philosopher who is no stranger to controversy,  had his talk disrupted by people who disagree with his views. The process of shutting down a speaker by disruption is the heckler’s veto.

Critics have claimed that such disruptions prove the left believes free speech extends only to those they agree with. On the one hand, this does have some merit: some notable disruptions have been aimed at speakers whose views are generally opposed by the left. On the other hand, such disruptions have also been opposed by others on the left. As such, claiming the left opposes free speech they disagree with is no more (or less) accurate than saying the right opposes local control when they disagree with it, such as when local governments want to ban fracking or impose gun control. While speculating about whether “the left” is against free speech is interesting, the focus of this essay in on the ethics of the heckler’s veto.

The extreme version of the heckler’s veto is violence, such as that directed against Murray and Sanger. Richard Spencer, who is regarded by some as a Nazi, was famously punched for his views, igniting a debate about the ethics of punching Nazis. When protests occurred on campuses over Gaza, violence was often used to silence the protestors. This violence included state and university sanctioned police violence. The right, which had been outraged about “the left” silencing speakers was generally on board with this.

The standard version of the heckler’s veto is, as the name indicates, heckling to prevent a speaker from being heard or interfering until they give up. The hallmark of this sort of heckler is that they are not trying to engage and refute the speaker, they are endeavoring to prevent the speaker from being heard.

One approach is to take the standard view that as long as the speaker is not engaged in directly harmful speech (such as slander or calls for violence), they should be free to speak without disruption. A more sophisticated approach is to use a utilitarian method of weighing the harms and benefits of allowing the speaker to exercise the right to free speech. For example, if punching Nazis to silence them sends the message that Nazism will not be tolerated and this reduces the hate crimes committed in the United States, then such punching could be defended as good. For those who see protesting against Israel as bad, they could argued that the good of silencing protestors warrants disrupting protests, perhaps even with violence.

An alternative to the utilitarian approach is to argue that there are some things, such as Nazism and sexism, whose badness entails people should not be permitted to speak in favor of them even if doing so created no meaningful harms. While I do see the appeal in the “there are things we must not allow to be said” approach, there is the challenge of showing that even without any harm being caused, such speech is simply wrong. One obvious approach, which I will not develop here, is that publicly speaking in favor of such things will always cause meaningful harm.

One interesting approach to heckling is to point out that it seems to be a tactic for those who cannot refute the views they oppose; it is the noisy refuge of the logically or rhetorically incompetent. If the views being expressed by the offending speaker are wrong, then they should be refutable by argumentation. If all someone can do is yell and disrupt, they should remain silent in favor of someone who can refute the speaker. For example, those who disagreed with Murray could have made their points by arguing against him.

A practical reply is that the audience might not be given the opportunity to engage in a possibly lengthy refutation of the speaker. As such, they must engage in heckling to prevent the speaker from speaking. A reasonable counter to this is that while a person might not have the chance to engage at the actual event, they have an opportunity at refutation via other venues, such as social media.

Another reply to this is that allowing the speaker to speak on a campus lends legitimacy and normalizes the speaker’s views, even if the views are not explicitly endorsed. As such, if a speaker cannot be prevented from being invited, then they must be silenced by disruption to prevent their views from gaining a platform.

While this does have appeal and schools should consider the educational merit of speakers, having a person speak on campus does not entail that the school endorses the views and does not automatically make them legitimate. To use the obvious analogy, using the Communist Manifesto and Mein Kampf in a political science class does not endorse or legitimize these works. Likewise, inviting someone with right wing views or who is critical of Israel to a debate does not entail that the school endorses these views or make them automatically legitimate. Just as reading books containing ideas one might not agree with (or even hate) is part of education, so too is listening to speakers expressing such ideas. As such, heckling speakers to silence them would be on par with censoring books to keep people from reading them or movies to keep people from seeing them. Critics of the right are, no doubt, thinking that is exactly what the right does, and this exposes the hypocrisy of their claims that they are protecting freedom from the left.

The educational value argument can be countered by making use of  one of Plato’s arguments for censorship in the Republic. Plato argued that exposure to certain types of art would corrupt people and make them worse. For example, someone who was exposed to violent works of art could become corrupted into becoming violent. Plato’s solution was to ban such art.

In the case of speakers, it could be argued that they must be silenced by heckling because their speeches would corrupt members of the audience. For example, one might claim that listening to Murray talk about his work would corrupt audience members with racism and poor methodology. As another example, one might argue that allowing people to protest Israel’s actions would corrupt the audience This argument assumes, as does Plato’s, that most people lack the ability to defend themselves from such corrupting power. Since the hecklers think the speaker is wrong, they presumably think that most people are either incapable of discerning right from wrong or are just awaiting the right trigger to cause them to embrace evil. On this view, the hecklers would be heroes: those strong enough to resist the siren song of evil and loud enough to drown it out. For those who agree with Plato, Aristotle or Stanley Milgram, this argument should be appealing: most people are easily swayed towards misdeeds and few are influenced by either arguments or fine ideals. Those who dislike Trump and attribute his election in part to defects in voters would also find this approach appealing. And, of course, no discussion of this sort would be complete without a mandatory reference to Hitler and his ability to win over the people.

But, of course, no discussion of this sort would be complete without noting how heckling is like any other tool in that it can be used by the good and the evil alike. Naturally, the people using it will usually think they are on the side of good and their foes evil. Their foes are likely to think the opposite. Since sorting out what is good and bad requires consideration and discussion, silencing people would interfere with sorting these things out. As such, I am opposed to heckling, even if I disagree strongly with the target. That said, one might be tempted by Plato’s argument that the ears of the many must be protected from corrupting words and that it is up to the philosophers to decide which words are corrupting and which are wholesome.

 

While the right to free speech is fundamental to classical liberalism, contemporary liberals are often accused of being its enemy. Two examples include incidents at Berkeley and Middlebury. As always, the matter of free speech is philosophically interesting, especially when it involves higher education.

One important distinction in the context of rights is that of the negative versus the positive. A negative right is not an evil right; rather it is a freedom such that the possessor is not entitled to be provided with the means to exercise the right. It is a right to not be interfered with.

A positive right is an entitlement to the means needed to exercise the right. For example, the United States currently grants citizens a right to public K-12 education. In addition to having the liberty to seek this education, it is also provided (by the taxpayers). In contrast, college education is usually a negative right: students have the liberty to attend college but are (generally) not provided with free education.

The right to free speech is a negative right; it is intended as a protection from impediment rather than an entitlement to the means of expression. To use an obvious example, while I have the right to express my views no one is obligated to provide me with free radio or TV time in which to do so.

While university personnel have no right to unjustly interfere with free speech, they are usually under no moral obligation to provide people with speaking opportunities on campus. For example, while I might be invited to speak at Harvard, Harvard has no obligation to provide me with a room just because I might want to talk about philosophy.

Decisions about who to invite and who to allow to speak in official venues are often made on pragmatic grounds, such as which speakers will boost the reputation of the school or who happens to be friends with top administrators. There are also practical concerns about the cost of the speaker, the likelihood of trouble arising, and the extent of the interest in the speaker. While these practical concerns are important, decisions about who to invite (and who to exclude) should also be made on principled grounds.

One reasonable principle is that decisions should be made based on the educational value of the speaker campus, broadly understood. Since universities are supposed to educate students, it makes sense for them to operate on this principle. Speakers who offer little or nothing in the way of educational value could be justly denied invitations. Of course, education is not the only concern of a university in terms of what it offers to the students and the community. Speakers who offer things of artistic value or even mere entertainment value should also be given due consideration.

One concern about decisions based on these factors is that there can be good faith debate about which speakers have the merit to warrant their invitation. For example, the incident at Middlebury arose because some see Charles Murray’s co-authored controversial book The Bell Curve as  based on pseudoscience and bad methodology. While these matters can be clouded with ideology, there are established standards regarding educational merit regarding such things as methodology and legitimacy. The main problem lies in their application, but this is not a problem unique to picking speaker as it extends across the academy. Fortunately, the basic principle of merit is reasonable clear but the real fights take place over the particulars.

Another seemingly sensible principle is a moral one; that those invited should reflect the values of the institution and perhaps the broader society. At the very least, those invited should not be evil and should not be espousing evil.

This principle does have some problems. One is deciding what conflicts with the values of the institution. Another is that it is difficult to speak of the values of the broader society, given the considerable diversity of opinions on moral issues. When people use this approach, they usually refer to their own values and fall prey to the cognitive bias that leads them to assume their values are shared by society. There is the enduring problem in ethics of sorting out good and evil. There is also the concern about whether academic or artistic merit can offset moral concerns. For example, a Catholic university might see a pro-choice philosopher as endorsing a morally wrong position, yet think that having this philosopher engage a pro-life philosopher in a campus debate to have educational merit. As another example, a liberal institution might regard an extreme libertarian as having morally problematic views yet see educational merit in having them present their arguments as part of a series on American political philosophy.  As with the matter of merit, there are rational and principled ways to approach ethical concerns but this is even more fraught with controversy than questions of assessing educational merit.

While I agree that speech can cause harm, I hold to a presumption in favor of free expression. As a principle, this means that if there is reasonable doubt as to whether the merit of a speech outweighs moral concerns about the speaker or content, then the decision should favor free expression. This is based on the view that it is better to run the risk of tolerating possible evil than to risk silencing someone who has something worth saying. As such, I generally favor a liberal (in the classic sense) approach to inviting speakers to universities.

Americans tend to favor free expression for those they agree with and oppose it for those they dislike. When campuses attempted to exclude right wing speakers, the right expressed its devotion to free expression, speaking of the free market of ideas. As was expected, when college students and faculty recently protested the treatment of the Palestinians by Israel, the right supported a crack down on free expression and on some campuses riot police were turned lose on students and faculty. The right has also worked hard to restrict the content of college classes, enacting laws imposing what they call “reforms.” For example, my adopted state of Florida professes to be all about freedom, but this is only for the freedom to express views that accord with the ideology of the right. It could be countered that “the left” takes a similar approach when it is in power, allowing free speech it approves of. While such finger pointing might feel good, it also shows that Americans are not as committed to free speech as we claim.

 

The first time I was summoned for jury duty in my adopted state of Florida, a lawyer in the jury pool told me that they would not pick either of us. He was right: when the lawyer asked me my profession it looked like both lawyers crossed out my name on their sheets and I was not picked. This kept happening until my last summons on November 12, 2024. At last, I was selected for a jury. It did turn out that I was the alternate, which might have some connection with my being a philosophy professor. The outcome of the trial made the local newspaper. I thought I would provide some useful information about jury duty and share some of what I learned.

Since I live in Leon County in Florida, my state summons brings me to the courthouse in Leon County. If you happen to live here, the same would happen to you. While the specific details vary, most courts operate in similar ways. In my case, it began with the distinctive summons via the mail. As there can be a fine and even jail time for not responding, be sure to respond even if you believe it is not your duty to do so.

In Leon County, you can respond online via the e-Response system. If you are familiar with government websites, you know what to expect; it is like a trip back to the late 1990s or early 2000s. But the software is serviceable. I recommend signing up for the text and email alerts, otherwise you will need to call the night before to learn whether you need to report or not. Because most cases do not go to trial, there is a decent chance you will not even need to report. You can also request a delay or even be excused. If you have a reasonable request, they will work with you. For example, a few years ago I had non-refundable plane tickets, and they rescheduled me for another time for service.

If you do have to report, do so. As noted above, there can be consequences for failing to report. Here in Leon County there is a juror parking lot at 123 North Martin Luther King Jr Blvd. and other courts probably have similar arrangements. There is a shuttle that goes from the lot to the courthouse. Be sure to bring your summons with you.

When you arrive, you’ll go through a process like that at the airport: your stuff will be x-rayed and you’ll walk through a metal detector. Obviously, leave any weapons at home. While courts vary, you can usually bring electronics, drinks and food to the jury selection. Once you are in the jury courtroom, you’ll get a short talk or video on jury duty and then a judge will administer an oath. After that, you’ll wait to be taken to another courtroom. My day was a busy day, with juries needed for three trials. My group consisted of 40 people, selected at random. We were then split into two groups, one of 21 people (including me) and another 19 people. The number is likely to vary with the nature of the trial.

The group of 21 was put in the juror box, while the other 19 sat in the spectator seats. Each of the 21 answered a set of questions, such as our age, marital status, profession, and whether we knew anyone involved in the trial. Next, the prosecutor and defense attorney asked us questions.

In my group, only three people were clear they did not want to be there, two said they had medical reasons, and one was a new mother. Those who were taking an unpaid day off from work also did not want to be there, since the state only pays jurors about $15 a day, something that makes jury service a real burden for some people, especially for long trials. The judge was clear that the court did not want to burden people, and he acted upon this, excusing the three people who expressed reasons why serving would be burdensome. These three were replaced from the second group, and the additions were questioned.

After this, I and six other people were selected.  We were told when to report (8:30 am) and where to park (validated parking). While courts vary, we had to provide our own lunch (we could leave for lunch or stay) although snacks and drinks were provided. We could bring electronics, although we had to leave bags and such in the jury room and keep our phones off.

The prosecutor and public defender were both professional, competent and serious. The state presented a carefully considered and well evidenced case, while the defense attorney worked hard to provide the best defense possible for his client. The judge ran the courtroom with skill and compassion. My fellow jurors took their duty seriously, taking detailed notes, paying careful attention and abiding by the rules. Seeing all this helped restore some of my faith in people, despite the obvious fact that I was in a criminal trial. While there are courts that are indeed awful, my experience with Leon County courts (albeit only as a juror) has shown that we are fortunate here.

After both sides rested their cases, court adjourned and then we returned the next day. After the closing arguments, I was revealed as the alternate and had to wait outside the jury room while the bailiff retrieved my stuff. I was then escorted out of the building and returned home.

As an ethicist, I have often been critical of the bad aspects of our legal system, but this trial was conducted in a just and fair manner. This, of course, contrasts with some other aspects of our legal system. In general, it seems that across the United States marginalized people who lack power and resources suffer in the legal system as they are often targeted by the police, exploited for income, and lack the money to hire the best defense. As such, they are often the victims of the legal system. The upper classes tend to get premium justice as they are usually protected by the law and police rather than targeted and can, of course, buy the best lawyers. The folks in the middle seem to get the fairest justice, since they are not targeted and have enough resources to get a decent defense. But they lack the privileges of the upper classes and hence are subject to the law. Which is how it should be for everyone.

While the anti-abortion movement claimed a great victory when the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, the Republican Party has learned that this victory proved deeply unpopular with the American people. While Democrats favor abortion rights more than Republicans, 64% of surveyed voters say abortion should be always or mostly legal. While some Republican controlled state legislatures have imposed extreme restrictions on abortion rights, abortion rights supporters have won in several state ballots. As this is being written several more states (including my adopted state of Florida) have abortion rights measures on the ballot. Given that the anti-abortion view is held by a minority of voters, it is likely that these measures will pass in many states.

Because the anti-abortion position of the Republican party has proven unpopular and has imposed a political cost, the party’s rhetoric has shifted. The current rhetorical spin is that the Republican party is not against abortion rights. Rather, the party is for states’ rights.  Those critical of this rhetoric like to point out that appeals to states’ rights was also a tactic employed by the southern states to defend slavery. While the analogy is imperfect, the comparison does have some merit.

The states’ rights argument for slavery amounts to contending that the states should have the freedom to decide whether they will allow slavery, and this is usually phrased in terms of an appeal to democracy. That is, the citizens of the state should vote to decide whether some people can be denied freedom and be owned. An obvious defect with this reasoning is that it rests on the assumption that it is a matter of freedom of choice to take away freedom of choice.

A similar defect arises with the states’ rights rhetoric in the abortion debate. If it is accepted that the citizens of the state have the right to decide the issue of abortion because they should be free of federal law, then it is problematic to argue that the state has the right to take away the freedom of women to decide whether they get an abortion. If choice is important, then having legal abortion allows women to choose: a woman is not mandated to have an abortion nor forbidden, so she can make the choice. Hence, this rhetorical move entails that abortion should be legal nationwide.

Someone might counter this by taking the anti-abortion stance that women should not be allowed that choice, perhaps by drawing an analogy with murder. After all, they might argue, we would not want people free to chose murder. But the problem with that reply is that by using the states’ rights rhetoric, the Republican party has acknowledged that the legality of abortion should be a matter of choice, and this makes it difficult to argue that abortion should not be a choice for individual women.

While intended to address the backlash from the unpopularity of the success of the anti-abortion movement, this rhetoric has caused backlash from that movement. Some anti-abortion activists have urged their followers to withdraw their support of Trump. There is the question of how much impact this will have on the election, given that anti-abortion voters will almost certainly not vote for Harris. But it might cause a few single-issue voters to stay home on election day or not vote for Trump.

Pro-abortion rights people are almost certainly not going to be fooled by this rhetoric, since they know this is a rhetorical shift and not a change in policy or goals. While it might win over a few of the undecided voters, it seems to have two effects. The first is that it gives Republicans an established rhetorical talking point to use whenever they are asked about abortion. The second is that it provides those who want to vote for anti-abortion Republicans but who are not anti-abortion themselves a way to rationalize their vote. They can insist the Republican party is “pro-choice” because their new rhetorical position is that the states should chose. But not that women should chose.

The states’ rights rhetorical move could be an effective strategy. While the anti-abortion movement would prefer a federal abortion ban, having the states decide is better for them than having abortion legal nationwide. After all, some states have put abortion bans in place and these have been wins for the movement. But the obvious downside for this movement is that some states have put in place protections for abortion rights, despite the anti-abortion movement’s desire to make the choice for everyone.

In closing, the states’ rights argument is a position that cannot be effectively defended, because its foundation is the principle of choice, and this entails that it is the women who should make the choice for themselves.

 

During his debate with Vice President Kamala Harris, former President Donald Trump was provoked into repeating the debunked claim that migrants in Springfield, Ohio had stolen and eaten pets. Vice Presidential candidate J.D. Vance, an Ohio native, has doubled down on the debunked pet eating claims. In an interesting move, he admitted that he is willing to “create stories” to bring attention to problems in Springfield.  As a philosophical approach requires applying the principle of charity, it must be noted that Vance attempted to clarify his claim by asserting that “I say that we’re creating a story, meaning we’re creating the American media focusing on it.” Unfortunately for Springfield, the false claim has also focused the attention of people outside the media. Springfield has faced bomb threats that closed schools and the community has been harmed in other ways. Local officials and the Republican governor of Ohio have attempted to convince people that the claims made by Trump and Vance are untrue. But despite the claim being thoroughly debunked, it persists.  In this essay, I will focus on Vance’s view that creating such stories is justified.

One reasonable criticism of Vance’s approach is to argue that if there are real problems, then the truth should suffice. If, as Vance and Trump claim, the situation in Springfield is dire, then they should be able to provide evidence of that dire situation and that should suffice to get media attention.

In support of Vance’s view, it could be argued that the media tends to focus on attention grabbing stories. It is also true that the media and politicians often ignore problems the American people face, such as wage theft. In terms of making a reasonable case for Vance’s view of storytelling to focus media attention, a utilitarian moral argument could be advanced to support the general idea of telling an untrue story to get media attention focused on a real problem. The approach would be a standard utilitarian appeal to consequences in which the likely harms of the untruth would be weighed against its likely benefits. As with any utilitarian calculation, there is also the question of who counts in the calculation of harms and benefits.  If the media is ignoring a real problem and only an untrue story will bring attention to the real problem, then the good done by the falsehood could outweigh the harms of dishonesty. But the untruth about Springfield does not seem to meet these conditions.

Trump and (to a lesser extent) Vance command media attention. Almost everything Trump expresses publicly ends up in the news. As such, there is no lack of media coverage of what Trump and Vance say and if either of them spoke about the “real problems” in Springfield, their speeches and claims would get media attention. They have no need to create stories to get attention and if there are real problems, then the truth should suffice. The only reason for people with such media access to create a story to get attention is that the truth will not suffice to support their claims.

There has also been media coverage of real problems in Springfield, such as the strain put on community resources and the challenges of assimilating migrants. Hence, there is no need to create stories to draw attention to these issues. But these are clearly not the problems that Trump and Vance wish to solve for the people of Springfield. After all, it seems that Trump’s proposed “solution” to the real problems in Springfield is mass deportation. Vance has also claimed, incorrectly, that the migrants are there illegally. His claim seems to be that he disagrees with the legal process by which the migrants are there legally and hence they are, on his view, there illegally. This does not seem to be how the law works. Given this, the pet eating story makes sense: the story was not created to draw attention to real problems, it was created to “justify” the deportation of migrants and to create support for this by making people afraid and angry. If migrants presented a real and significant threat, Vance and Trump would not need to create stories. They could simply present an abundance of evidence to prove their claim. The fact that they need to rely on the debunked story only serves as evidence that they lack evidence to support their view.

If we consider all the people who are likely to be affected by this untruth, then Vance’s approach is clearly morally wrong. As noted above, Springfield has already been harmed by this story. It has also served to fan the flames of racism and prejudice in general, inflicting harm across the United States. This shows that the making up stories of the sort Vance is talking about is not justified on utilitarian grounds.

But if the scope of moral concern is narrowed down to Trump and his supporters, then it can be argued that the story does benefit them. While Trump and Vance might seem foolish, evil and crazy to some for making and doubling down on this repeatedly debunked claim, their anti-migrant stance and this sort of remark could appeal to Trump’s base. While the polls vary, as this is being written Trump is predicted to have at least a 50% chance of winning, which suggests that this story might be benefiting him. In which case, Vance can justify creating stories on the grounds that deceit helps him and Trump while the truth would hurt them. But if Trump loses and this story plays a role, then it would have turned out that it was bad for Trump.

 

On September 18, 2024, thousands of pagers exploded in Lebanon, killing several people and injuring thousands. The next day, walkie-talkies exploding, killing and injuring more people. As the attack targeted Hezbollah members, Israel has been blamed for the explosions.

While some initially believed that malware was used to overload the batteries, experts now believe that explosive material was placed within the pagers somewhere along the supply chain. While the exploding pagers were Gold Apollo brand, the company claims that they were manufactured under license by another company, BAC. Manufacturing under license is a common practice and hence would not have seemed suspicious. This attack raises ethical concerns.

On the face of it, killing and injuring people is morally wrong. But as we routinely engage in violent disputes, we have developed an entire ethics of violence that deals with issues of when we can morally kill people, ethical means of killing, and morally acceptable targets. If a nonstate actor, such as a criminal organization or lone psychopath had launched such an attack against civilians, it would be rightfully condemned by all as an evil action. After all, only an evil person would try to kill thousands of people with exploding pagers. But since the intended targets were members of Hezbollah and this organization is in conflict with Israel, some would argue that this attack falls under the ethics of violence in the context of state and group conflicts. This, as many philosophers who specialize in the ethics of conflict would argue, is a key factor in assessing the morality of the attack. In this context, some would argue, the attack must be subject to a nuanced analysis and cannot be simply categorized as immoral because people were killed and injured.

Those presenting a moral defense of the attack would most likely focus on the fact that Israel allegedly targeted members of Hezbollah as part of an ongoing conflict. A critic would point out that the explosive devices killed and injured people who were not members of Hezbollah, including children. Those defending the attack would point out that such collateral casualties are an acceptable part of conflict and note that a conventional military attack against Hezbollah (such as airstrikes) would have killed many more innocent people as well as causing property damage. That is, the use of pager bombs has a moral advantage over less focused attacks. One could also argue that the attack was directed against Hezbollah’s communication system and enemy communication systems are usually considered morally legitimate targets in conflict, even when targeting them kills people.

Those who see the attack as immoral would certainly focus on the fact that the bombs were detonated without those controlling them knowing who might get hurt. And, in fact, children and people who are not members of Hezbollah were harmed.  On this view, the attack could be seen as indiscriminate. Those defending the attack can, of course, point out the awful truth that attacks that are even more indiscriminate are often claimed to be morally acceptable. That is, we have a moral tolerance for collateral death and injury that makes the attack acceptable or perhaps even praiseworthy in its relative restraint compared to, for example, airstrikes against schools and hospitals that are claimed to target enemies.

One might also express moral concern about the means of the attack, that an exploding pager is a morally dubious weapon. While conventional weapons are indeed terrifying, transforming a mundane device like a pager into a weapon of war seems aimed at creating terror: you might think that perhaps any device at any time could kill you. Defenders of the attack might note that that same fear can be created by conventional means, such as airstrikes or artillery barrages that could happen at any time. There are also more general moral concerns about the implications of how the attack was possible.

While the details are not yet known, it seems most likely that Israel (allegedly) got control over part of the supply chain for the pagers and was able to install explosives. In addition to the practical concerns this raises, there are also moral concerns.

As experts have noted, this is the first large scale attack of its type. While the idea has been around a long time, this attack has put the concept into the world news and hence into the minds of people who could do the same thing. While such an operation would be challenging for small scale actors, it is obviously something that a state actor could do and is also within the means of a well-funded terrorist or criminal organization. As such, one moral harm of the attack is that the effectiveness of this means of attack has been proven and advertised. It is probably only a matter of time before similar attacks are launched. To help prevent this, companies will need to strengthen their supply chain security to prevent tampering, and efforts will need to be made to check devices to ensure they are safe.

But there is the obvious concern that companies could be in on such attacks and hence better supply chain security would not help when the threat is the company handling such security. It is also easy to imagine state actors using this method of attack.  I suspect that some people in the United States are now thinking that phones imported from China should be checked for explosives. Or worse, such as biological or chemical weapons concealed in devices. Imagine, as a horror scenario, a smart device that releases bacteria or viruses when sent the right command.

There is also some psychological harm as people are now probably a bit worried about their phones and other devices. While we did need to be concerned about our smart devices being compromised, we now need to think about the possibility of explosives in those devices. After all, it just requires a small amount of explosives and a data connection like wi-fi or a cell network to make almost any device into a remote-controlled bomb. This has been true for a long time, but now we not only know it can happen we feel it can happen because we have seen it. And that can cause fear. This is the type of attack that changes the shape of conflict.

 

I agree with JD Vance that kids should get votes. My disagreement with him is that these votes should be cast by the kids and not given to the parents. In my previous essay, I argued why parents should not get these “extra” votes. In this essay, I will argue why kids should get to vote.

On the face of it, there should be a presumption of voting rights: each citizen of the United States should have the right to vote unless an adequate reason is given to deny a person this right. In terms of justifying this presumption, the obvious justification comes from the social contract theory that provides the basis of American political philosophy. The general idea is that legitimate political authority derives from the consent of the governed and voting is a means of ongoing consent to the ongoing political authority. To the degree that the United States denies citizens the right to vote, it undercuts its own legitimacy. Thus, the burden of proof rests on those who would restrict voting and not on those who favor the right. There are, of course, arguments that children should not have the right to vote, but these can be countered.

One general class of arguments focuses on the alleged defects of children. The reasoning is that because children are defective relative to adults, they should not have the right to vote. One alleged defect is epistemic in nature: children lack the knowledge and information needed to vote in an informed manner. The obvious reply to this is that adults are not denied the right to vote if they are ignorant and ill-informed, which is often the case. While citizens should be knowledgeable and vote in an informed manner, this is not the foundation for the right to vote—it is, once again, the need for the state to secure consent to have legitimacy.

Another alleged defect is a matter of character: children are supposed to be irrational, impulsive and unable to make good decisions. To use a silly example, that children might vote to make cake legally a vegetable. But this does not distinguish them from adult voters, who often vote in ways that are irrational, impulsive and not good decisions in both the practical and moral sense. Opponents of Trump tend to see Trump voters this way, while still supporting their right to vote. Trump’s proponents tend to see Democrats this way, although they usually do not propose stripping all Democrats of the right to vote. While voters should be ethical and rational in their voting, these are not necessary conditions for this right.

There is also the alleged defect that children would be easily swayed and duped by unscrupulous politicians. While it is true that children can be less discerning and more trusting than adults, American politics shows that adult voters are easily swayed and duped. After all, Trump voters claim that Democrats are duped by Democratic politicians and critics of Trump point to his relentless duplicity and lack of scruples. So, both sides will agree that voters are duped, they just disagree as to who the dupes are. As such, if effective critical thinking skills were required for the right to vote, many adults would need to be stripped of this right. And, as noted above, the right to vote is not based on the ability to vote well, but the moral view that the legitimacy of the state depends on ongoing consent.

While this is but a single example, Mike Lindell provided an excellent example showing how a child, in this case Knowa De Brasco, can be rational and informed and an adult (who gets to vote and gets on the news as a pundit) can be ill informed, impulsive and irrational. While De Brasco and Lindell are both somewhat unusual, they do stand in for significant numbers of people: informed children and irrational adults. As such, the argument that children are defective relative to adults and should not have the right to vote is not a compelling argument—unless we wish to strip Mike Lindell and those like him of his voting rights. Which we should not do.

Another type of argument involves pointing out that rights and privileges are age gated in the United States. For example, the legal drinking age is 21. As another example, the legal age for marriage varies as four states have no official minimum age and other states range from 15 to 18. There are also age gates on driver’s licenses, being able to rent a car, and being able to enlist in the military. From a moral standpoint, the usual argument for restricting such rights (and liberties) is the sort presented by J.S. Mill in his discussion of liberty. Roughly put, children could be harmed by poor decisions if they had the freedom to make certain choices and they lack the faculties to reliably make good choices. This does raise an obvious problem for adults: if an inability to make good decisions should deny a person the right to make such decisions, then adults should never get the right to make such decisions. After all, if they made the wrong decision, they would have shown they should not have the right to make that decision. But, back to children.

While children use the same logic and critical thinking as adults, their brains are still developing and thus they are inclined to make what many adults would see as risky or bad choices. As such, it is reasonable to put age some gates in place—although there can be good faith and rational debate about what these should be. The justification is to protect children from harm until they are more capable of dealing with the consequences of bad decisions. Or have the agency to be accountable for such decisions. But this argument does not apply to the right to vote.

While a child might make a bad decision when casting their vote, the voting will not cause them the sort of direct harm that, for example, underage drinking or marriage could cause. The worst that can happen is what could happen to any adult voter: they will vote for someone or something that ends up causing them harm, such as voting for a politician who cuts education funding for the kid’s school or opposes gun control legislation that might reduce school shootings. As such, the protection from harm argument does not apply to voting, since voting does not cause direct harm to the voter.

One final argument I will consider is a practical one, that young kids who cannot read or work a voting machine on their own would not be able to vote. But this could be addressed by assisting children who want to vote (as adults are assisted) or by setting the voting age based on when kids would usually have the basic abilities needed to physically cast a vote; this would be at least by age 5, since that is when kids usually start school. And if they can handle going to school, they are ready to vote and would, generally, not do any worse than adults.

 

Both Vice President Harris and former President Trump have promised to eliminate taxes on tip income. Critics of both have raised the obvious points that Harris could (attempt) to do this now and Trump could have done it when he was President. While this tax cut sounds appealing as a political move, there are questions about whether it is a good idea from both a moral and practical standpoint.

On the positive side, eliminating taxes on tips would be directly beneficial to workers who receive a significant tip income. Being able to keep more of their income means that they would have more money to address the high cost of life in today’s economy of high rent and grocery bills. As tipped workers tend to be in the lower economic classes, this tax break has an extra appeal since it will mostly help lower income people. That said, there is the usual concern about tax changes that people will find ways to exploit and abuse this tax elimination. For example, it would not be surprising to see wealthy people suddenly receiving substantial tip income in addition to their capital gains income. But this is not a defect with eliminating taxes on tips itself, although there are concerns about this proposal.

One concern is that the proposal does not address the fundamental problem with jobs that rely on tips. While tipping has greatly expanded, it has not always been practiced in the United States and was once looked upon in a negative light. Like many bad things in America, the negative aspects of tipping can be traced back to slavery: freed slaves sometimes worked jobs for no pay, relying on tips from customers to have an income. While there is now a federal minimum wage for tipped workers, this wage is currently $2.13 an hour (although some states have higher minimum wages).

This means that the income of tipped workers relies heavily on chance. For example, whether a waiter does well on their shift comes down to luck with the generosity of customers. While some might say that a waiter can increase their tips through hard work or skills, this is obviously not consistent. A hard-working waiter might get a lousy tip from a stingy customer while a bad waiter might catch the eye of a customer in some manner and “earn” a big tip. While eliminating the tax on tips does increase take home income, it does nothing to make the income of those who work for tips more consistent. Also, it could be argued that mandating a higher minimum wage for such workers would provide more benefit.

Employers of tipped workers have an obvious incentive to favor the tax cut over any increase in wages, since tips shift the burden of paying the workers from the employer to the customer. In effect, the worker is a short-term employee of the customer, but the customer is not required to compensate them fairly (or at all) for their labor. In defense of this practice, it can be argued that in the case of restaurants, the margins are so tight that this is the only way for the restaurant owners to make a profit. It could be countered that the cost of service should be added to the cost of the food, and this should be paid to the workers. This does have some appeal, since people who tip are already paying more for their food. The main arguments against involve claims that this would cause people who do not tip or who are willing to tip but not willing to pay more for the food itself to cease patronizing the restaurant that adopted such a policy. These do have some appeal, if the claims are true. But the strongest moral arguments against eliminating the tax are based on fairness.

The first fairness argument is that it just as the employer of tipped workers shifts the burden to the customer, the elimination of taxes on tips would shift their tax burden to everyone else who pays taxes. These are the people who make enough to pay taxes but not so wealthy that they can avoid taxes. This is, of course, not a special problem with the elimination of the tax on tips but a general problem with any tax cut. The funds to pay for the military, subsidies to farmers, Trump’s Secret Service protection, border security, and the PPP “loans” for wealthy Republican politicians during Trump’s presidency have to come from somewhere and each tax cut shifts the burden. The obvious response is that the tax cuts can be addressed by spending cuts. But these are unlikely if Harris wins and if Trump wins the cuts would most likely hurt the lower income tipped workers. But if this tax cut was offset by making the wealthy pay at least some of their fair share, then that would make it more morally acceptable in terms of fairness. Instead of redistributing wealth in the usual upward direction, this would at least redistribute some of it back to the workers.

The second fairness argument is that only workers receiving tips benefit from the tax cut. Other workers who make the same income would be paying more taxes despite this sameness of income. A reply to this is to point out that the tax system already favors certain types of income. The maximum capital gain tax is significantly lower than the maximum tax on income from jobs. But at least this special category would benefit workers. The counter to this is to point out that such differences seem fundamentally unfair as income is income and granting special benefits seems unjust.

In closing, since tipped workers tend to be in the lower economic classes, eliminating taxes on tips has a certain moral appeal and it would seem wicked to oppose this. That said, this approach does not meaningfully address the fundamental problem with tip-based jobs and there are fairness concerns in terms of shifting the tax burden and granting some workers a tax cut based solely on the type of income. A better approach would be to address the fundamental problem with tipping, but it is unlikely that Harris would do so and certain that Trump would not.