Category: Ethics

Opposition research is gathering information intended to damage or discredit political adversaries. While the intent to find damaging or discrediting information might seem morally problematic, it can be neutral or even laudable. If the intent is to damage adversaries for political advantage, then this is not laudable but could still be ethical. After all, good might come from using opposition research to harm a bad opponent.

 The intent is to provide citizens with relevant and true information so they can make informed decisions, is morally laudable. This information allows for better decision making and can produce better results than making decisions with false or irrelevant information.

 While motives are relevant to assessing ethics, the morality of the motives is distinct from the morality of the research and its results.  This is because bad people with bad motives might do ethical research (for whatever reason) and end up doing good. For example, a selfish and corrupt politician might expose a worse villain. As would be expected, good people with good motives might engage in morally questionable research or end up causing harm, all from the best of intentions. For example, a researcher might use a questionable source and justify this by telling themselves that their good end justifies this means. As a final point about researchers, their ethics are irrelevant to the truth of the information they gather. To think otherwise, would be to fall into an ad hominem or genetic fallacy. In general terms, this is when an irrelevant negative assertion about a source is taken as evidence against their claim(s).  This is distinct from considering the ethics of the researchers when assessing their credibility. After all, bias reduces credibility and is relevant when assessing their likely honesty. Now to the ethics of research.

For this essay and those that follow in this series, it will be assumed that there are at least some moral limits to opposition research. Without this assumption, writing about the ethics of opposition would be limited to “anything goes.” One could refute this assumption by employing the approach of sophists both ancient and modern. The ancient sophists argued in favor of skepticism, relativism and the view that all that matters is success (or winning, if one prefers). On this view, there would be no moral limits on opposition research for two reasons. One is that skepticism and relativism about ethics results in the rejection of the idea of objective ethics. The other is that if success is all that matters, then there are no limits on the means that can be used to achieve it. What matters to the sophist, in terms of opposition research, is acquiring (or fabricating) information that can damage a political adversary and thus increase the chances of success.

In terms of arguments in favor of their being moral limits, one excellent place to start is by considering the consequences of having limits versus not having them. As noted above, good political decisions, such as deciding how to vote, require that citizens have relevant, true information. Opposition research that provides or aims at providing relevant and true information would enable citizens to make better decisions and (probably) produce better results. In contrast, taking the view that all that matters is victory will tend to produce worse results for the general good. There can be exceptions: a well-informed public might make terrible choices, and an utterly selfish person solely focused on their gain might end up somehow doing good. As would be expected, the general debate over whether there should be ethical limits on anything goes far beyond the possible scope of this short essay.

In the essays that follow, I will also make a case for there being ethical limits on opposition research. The gist of this argument is that if the essays are logically appealing, then that provides a reason to accept that there should be at least some limits on opposition research.  The assessment of the ethics of the research involves considering three key factors: the methods used, the sources and the content. There will be an essay on each.

8

Asteroid and lunar mining are the stuff of science fiction, but there are those working to make them a reality.  While the idea of space mining might seem far-fetched, asteroids and the moon contain useful resources. While the idea of space mining probably brings to mind images of belters extracting gold, one of the most valuable resources in space is water. Though cheap and plentiful on earth, it is very expensive to transport it into space. While the most obvious use of space water is for human consumption, it also provides raw material for fuels and many uses in industry. Naturally, miners will also seek minerals, metals and other resources.

My love of science fiction, especially GDW’s classic role playing game Traveller, makes me like the idea of space mining. For me, that is part of the future we were promised. But, as a philosopher, I have ethical concerns.

As with any sort of mining, two moral concerns are the impact on the environment and the impact on humans. Terrestrial mining has been devastating to the environment. This includes the direct damage caused by extracting the resources and the secondary effects, such as lasting chemical contamination. These environmental impacts in turn impact human populations.  These impacts can include directly killing people (a failed retaining wall that causes drowning deaths) and indirectly harming people (such as contamination of the water supply). As such, mining on earth involves serious moral concerns. In contrast, space mining would seem to avoid these problems.

Unlike the heavily populated planet earth, asteroids and the moon are lifeless rocks in space. As such, they do not seem to have any ecosystems to damage. While the asteroids that are mined will often be destroyed in the process, it is difficult to argue that destroying an asteroid would be wrong based on environmental concerns. While destroying the moon would be bad, mining operations there would seem to be morally acceptable because one could argue that there is no environment to worry about.

Since space mining takes place in space, the human population of earth will (probably) be safely away from any side effects of mining. It is worth noting that should humans colonize the moon or asteroids, then space mining could harm these populations. But, for the foreseeable future, there will be no humans living near the mining areas. Because of the lack of harm, space mining would seem to be morally acceptable.

It might be objected that asteroids and the moon be left unmined despite the absence of life and ecosystems. The challenge is making the case why mining lifeless rocks would be wrong. One possible approach is to contend that the asteroids and the moon have rights that would make mining them wrong. However, rocks do not seem to be the sort of thing that can have rights. Another approach is to argue that people who care about asteroids and the moon would be harmed. While I am open to arguments that would grant these rocks protection from mining, the burden of proof is on those who wish to make this claim.

Thus, it would seem there are not any reasonable moral arguments against the mining of the asteroids based on environmental concerns or potential harm to humans. That could, of course, change if ecosystems were found on asteroids or if it turned out that the asteroids performed an important role in the solar system that affected terrestrial ecosystems. While this result favors space mining, the moral concerns are not limited to environmental harms.

There are, as would be suspected, the usual moral concerns about the working conditions and pay of space miners. Of course, these concerns are not specific to space mining and going into labor ethics would take this short essay too far afield. However, the situation in space does make the ethics of ownership relevant.

From a moral standpoint, the ethics of who can rightfully claim ownership of asteroids and the moon is of great concern. From a practical standpoint, it is reasonable to expect that matters will play out as usual: those with guns and money will decide who owns the space rocks. If it follows the usual pattern, corporations will end up owning the rocks and will exploit them. But how things will probably play out does not determine how they should play out. Fortunately, philosophers considered this sort of situation long ago,

While past philosophers probably did not give much thought to space mining, asteroids (and the moon) fit into the state of nature scenarios envisioned by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke.  They are resources in abundance with no effective authority over them. Naturally, the authorities can do things on earth to people involved with activities in space, but it will be quite some time before there are space police (though we have a Space Force).

Since there are no rightful owners (or, alternatively, we are all potentially rightful owners), it is tempting to claim the resources are there for the taking. That is, the resources belong to whoever, in Locke’s terms, mixes their labor with it and makes it their own (or more likely their employer’s own). This does have a certain appeal. After all, if me and my fellows in Mike’s Space Mining construct a robot ship that flies out to asteroid and mines it, we seem to have earned the right to those resources through our efforts. Before our ship mined it for water and metal, these valuable resources were just drifting in space, surrounded by rock. It would thus seem to follow that we would have the right to grab as many asteroids as we can. To be fair, our competitors would have the same right. This would be a rock rush in space.

But Locke also has his proviso: those who take from the common resources must leave as much and as good for others. While this proviso has been grotesquely violated on earth, the asteroids provide us with a new opportunity to consider how to share (or not) these abundant resources.

It can be argued that there is no obligation to leave as much and as good for others in space and that things should be on a strict first grab, first get approach. After all, the people who get their equipment into space would have done the work (or put up the money) and hence (as argued above) be entitled to all they can grab and use or sell. Other people are free to grab what they can, if they have access to the resources needed to reach and mine the asteroids. Naturally, the folks who lack the resources to compete will end up, as they always do, out of luck. 

While this has a certain selfish appeal, a case can be made for sharing. One obvious reason is that the people who reach the asteroids first to mine them did not create the ability to do so out of nothing. After all, reaching the asteroids will be the result of centuries of human civilization that made such technology possible. As such, there would seem to be a general debt owed to humanity and paying this off would involve contributing to the general good of humanity. Naturally, this line of reasoning can be countered by arguing that successful miners will benefit humanity when their profits “trickle down” from space. It could also be argued that the idea of a debt to past generations is absurd as is the notion of the general good of humanity. This is, of course, the view that the selfish and ungrateful would embrace.

Second, there is concern for not only the people who are alive today but also for the people to be. To use an analogy, think of a buffet line at a party. The fact that I am first in line does not give me the right to devour everything I can stuff into my snack port. If I did that at a party, I would be rightly seen as a terrible person. It also does not give me the right to grab whatever I cannot eat so I can sell it to those who have the misfortune to be behind me in line. Again, if I did that, I would be rightly regarded as a horrible person who should be banned from parties. So, these resources should be treated in a similar manner, namely fairly and with some concern for those who are behind the first people in line. As such, the mining of space resources should include limits aimed at benefiting those who do not happen to get there first to grab the goodies. To be fair, behavior that would get a person kicked out of a party is often lauded in the business world, for that realm normalizes and lauds awful behavior.

In closing, it should be noted that space is really big. Because of this, it could be argued that there are plenty of resources out there, so it is morally acceptable for the people who get there first to grab as much as they can. After all, no matter how much they grab, there will be plenty left. While this does have some appeal, there is an obvious problem: it is not just a matter of how much is out there, but how much can be reached at this time. Going back to the buffet analogy, if I stuffed myself with as much as I could grab and started trying to sell the rest to others behind me in line, then yelling “there are other buffets out there” would not get me off the moral hook.

 

Shortly after the #metoo movement began gaining nationwide attention, a female student arrived at my office and started to close the door as she introduced herself. While admitting this is embarrassing, I felt a shiver of fear. In an instant, my mind went through a nightmare scenario: what if she is failing and is planning on using the threat of an accusation of sexual harassment to get a passing grade? Quieting this irrational worry, I casually said “Oh, you can leave the door open.” She sat down and we talked about her paper. In a bit of reflection, I realized that this was a reversal: it is usually the woman who feels the shiver of fear when a man is closing the office door.

To head off any criticisms about inconsistency, I’ve always had a literal open-door policy for all students. This originated in my grad school days when a female friend told me that when a male professor closes his office door on her, she feels trapped and vulnerable. As various cases indicate, her fear was not unfounded. Now that I have my own office, I always keep the door open. As such, it was ironic that I would be one scared by the closing of my office door by a woman.

Like everyone else, I have fears. An important question about a fear is whether it is rational. To illustrate, I will use my fear of heights. Part of this fear is rational: I suffered a full quadriceps tear when a ladder went out from under me. So, being wary about ladders, roofs and the edges of tall things like mountains is sensible. However, my fear also extends to flying. This fear, I know, is irrational. While accidents do occur, being inside a commercial airliner is one of the safest places a normal person can be. I have never been in airplane crash or mishap, so there is not even an instigating incident to explain this fear.

While I have been told and have told myself that flying is nothing to fear, this does not work. Statistics and proof do not change how I feel. I deal with it using Aristotle’s method: I make myself face my fear over and over until I can function normally—despite being terrified. Because of my fear of flying, I do not dismiss other peoples’ fears, even when they might seem unfounded or even silly. As such, when men claim to be terrified of false accusations of sexual assault, I do not dismiss this fear. This is, I am obligated to say, a fear I have felt.

As with any fear, an important question is whether the fear of a false accusation is rational. Is it like the sensible fear that leads me to be careful on roofs or is it like the irrational fear of flying that causes me needless discomfort? As with any fear, this cannot be judged by the strength of the feeling—this gives no indication of the likelihood of a bad thing happening. To illustrate, most people are not terrified of the health complications from a poor diet and lack of exercise but are afraid of shark attacks. But poor health habits are much more likely to kill a person than a shark attack. Sorting out the rationality of fear is a matter of statistics, although the specific context does matter. For example, if I jump into shark infested water while covered in blood, my odds of being attacked would be higher than usual. As another example, a person surrounded by women who are scheming, unethical liars would have greater odds of being falsely accused of assault.

While it is challenging to have accurate data about false accusations, the best available data shows that between 2% and 10% of accusations are shown to be false. The FBI claims that 8% of rape accusations are found to be false.  In contrast, unreported cases of assault (which, one must admit, are hard to quantify) are much higher than the number of false accusations. The best evidence suggests that only 35% of sexual assaults are reported. As such, an assault is unlikely to be reported and the odds of a false accusation are extremely low.

But one might insist that false accusations do happen. This is true, but the data shows the typical false allegation is made by a teenage girl trying to get out of trouble. So, the notion that women use false accusations to destroy men is not well supported. This is not to say that this is impossible, just that it is extremely unlikely. Going back to my fear of flying, the fear is not irrational because a crash could never happen. Rather, it is irrational because the fear is disproportional to the likelihood of a crash. So, the terror we men feel about being falsely accused of sexual assault is like my fear of flying: it is not a fear of the impossible, but a fear of the extremely unlikely.

There are, however, people who do have a reasonable fear of being wrongfully accused and convicted. These are black people (and other minorities). Many of those who are vocal about their fear of men being falsely accused of sexual assault have little or no concern about the wrongful accusation and conviction of minorities and express faith in that aspect of the legal system. This is an inconsistent view: if false accusations leading to harm are awful and something to worry about, then the false accusations against minorities should be seen this way. One might suspect that the worry does not stem from a passion for justice, but fear of accountability.

Imagine I am the CEO of a corporation whose factory farming practices drew the attention of the Humane Society and legislation has now been proposed to reign in my cruel excesses. If I appeared in a video complaining about the Humane Society forcing me to be less cruel and this would have a tiny impact on my vast wealth, few people would be sympathetic. If I was smart and evil, I would use astroturfing instead of honesty. Astroturfing involves concealing those behind a message or organization to make it seem that it arose and is funded by grassroot participants. In this imaginary scenario, I could hire a company to lay down some AstroTurf for me.

 While astroturfing can be a complicated, it usually involves three basic techniques. The first is using positive names for the shell organization(s). For example, my Astroturf organization might be called “Friends of Friendly Farming”, which is much more appealing than “Cow Cruelty Crusaders.”

A second technique is using commercials depicting the “common folk” who just happen to be extremely concerned about the issue. For example, my commercial might feature a mother venting her rage that meat would be unaffordable for her family if the wicked Humane Society had its way.

The third and key part of astroturfing is that those behind it remain anonymous. After all, if people knew that I was behind Friends of Friendly Farming, they would find it less appealing. Since astroturfing is inherently deceitful, it would seem to be immoral. But what, if anything should be done about it?

The use of deceptive names is unethical because of their rhetorical influence over people who might not otherwise support the group if its name matched its purpose. Going back to my example, most would find “Friends of Friendly Farming” appealing. But most would not be won over by “Make Sure Mike Keeps Making Money by Being Mean to Animals.” This technique is like advertising and labelling unhealthy junk food made in China as patriotic, healthy, “Yankee Snacks”. That is, it is deceit. However, just because something is unethical does not entail that it should be illegal.

While the First Amendment does not explicitly protect the right to deceptive speech, laws aimed at requiring honest naming for groups would seem unlikely to withstand scrutiny. There are also practical concerns about enforcement and the potential for abuse of such laws. For example, Republicans would presumably use such laws to insist that all liberal and moderate groups label themselves as “Woke Marxist Transgender Anti-American Vermin.”

 There is also the problem of sorting out whether terms, especially value terms, are being applied correctly. Value terms are especially challenging, given the extent to which even good faith disagreement about them exists. For example, determining whether a group called “Righteous Americans for Righteous Justice” is righteous and for righteous justice would be difficult. As such, while the use of intentionally deceptive names is unethical, it should not be illegal.

The use of dishonest and deceptive commercials is also unethical. They are like listing false ingredients on a food label to get people to buy it. It is also like catfishing. This is when a person pretends, online, to be someone desirable as part of an intentional deception. As with deceptive names, the use of actors portraying “common folk” with strong views on the issue is probably protected by the right to free expression.  There is also the fact that politicians favor allowing considerable leeway in certain deceptive practices, usually determined by which industry is bankrolling their re-election.  

As noted above, the essential quality of astroturfing is that the real parties remain anonymous, hidden behind an appealing shell. In addition to being unethical, this anonymity makes it difficult to assess the case made by those speaking for the anonymous entity. This is because the identity of the source of a claim is necessary to assess the credibility and possible bias of that source. While claims obviously stand or fall on their own, the identity of the source is critical to the practical matter of judging claims.

While there might be a right to deceptive (or persuasive, if one prefers) speech, there is not a right to anonymous speech. Requiring those funding groups and ads to identify themselves does not limit their right of free expression and it serves, as noted above, to protect the right of the listeners to properly assess the claims intended to influence them. Naturally, there are cases in which anonymous speech is morally acceptable—such as in oppressive regimes.

Those who engage in astroturfing might claim they would be harmed if their identities were known. After all, they want to be anonymous because they believe that if people knew their identities, then their efforts at persuasion would be less effective. As such, not being allowed to remain anonymous would harm them.

The easy and obvious response to this is that people do not have a moral right to remain anonymous simply because people would be less likely to be persuaded if they knew their identity. Using an analogy, a company wanting to sell dog meat could not justly claim it would be harmed if it was not allowed to hide the identity of the meat. In such cases, the right to know trumps the right of free expression. As such, it would be reasonable to have laws that forbid such anonymous funding. Naturally, moral exceptions can be made in oppressive countries that engage in unjust persecution.

While one of many heroes in the Iliad, Odysseus is the main character of the Odyssey. He is characterized as possessing many positive traits, especially intelligence. While President Trump clearly lacks the intellectual keenness and skill at counsel of Odysseus, there are some interesting parallels between the two.

 Odysseus is famously presented as a skilled deceiver and fond of adultery (his own, of course). While his fellow heroes benefit from his cunning, Achilles and others regard him as a liar and condemn him for this. For the heroes of the Republican party, Trump occupies a similar role: they are pleased when he wins and assists them in winning but once found his lies and immoral actions (such as adultery) troubling. Trump, like Odysseus, is a master of deceit and disguise. For example, Trump has presented himself as a populist enemy of the elites while, at the same time, surrounding himself with billionaires.  Like Odysseus, Trump achieves victory through cunning and deceit—and thus deserves all the praise due such success.

While no one likes to lose, both Trump and Odysseus are obsessed with wining. Odysseus makes it clear that he wants to win in everything. One of Trump signature lines was that were he president, we would win so much we would be tired of winning.  Trump did lose his second run for President but won in his third attempt. There is even talk of a third term. While winning is generally seen as good, there is the question of what it means to be a victor.

In the case of Odysseus, being a victor means getting what he desires, despite the contrary wishes of friends or foes. “Odysseus’ outlook threatens to make nonsense of morality in the broadest sense: including those values that provide a guide for conduct in situations affecting the well-being of others, imposing constraints on what one may do in pursuit of personal gain.” Odysseus is thus someone who “disregards moral constraints to do anything at all in pursuit of his or her own goals.” Trump, famously, takes  the same approach: he pursues what he wants and does not let concerns about ethics or the interests of others interfere. While this might seem to make both Odysseus and Trump villains, it must be remembered that Odysseus is the (complicated) hero of the Odyssey. Likewise, Trump is a hero to his followers. This raises the question of how this is possible.

One tempting explanation is that Trump’s followers are somehow still deceived: they do not know what Trump truly is. If they knew, they would abandon him. But this view is, in many cases, implausible. While Trump’s supporters claim he is honest, religious, and acting in their interest their support is (usually) not the result of ignorance. Rather, as others have argued, they see Trump as acting against their enemies and his unethical behavior as justified because it is aimed at these enemies. Trump is, as his followers point out, “winning” and fighting against the “enemies of the people.” In this regard, Trump is much like Odysseus. He exemplifies the pre-Socratic “warrior-king” virtues. This is being strong, doing anything to win, and  providing his friends with a cut of the spoils.

Most importantly, this “warrior-king” promises to harm the perceived enemies of his followers and those they disike. If the “warrior-king” convinces his followers that he is hurting their enemies and protecting their share of the loot, they praise and follow him. If Trump was seen as losing, if he stopped attacking their enemies and could no longer convince his followers that he is protecting their share of the loot, then he would lose support. However, as long as he keeps hurting the right people and is seen as winning, then the loyalty of his base is assured. Ethical violations do not matter, unless they are violations that help the enemies of his followers. As such, his followers do not care about his adultery, they do not care about his lies, and they do not care about any collusion, crimes or other misdeeds. What matters to them is what matters to Trump: believing they are winning, and their enemies are losing.

In 1985 Officer Julius Shulte responded to a missing child report placed by the then girlfriend of Vernon Madison. Madison snuck up on the officer and murdered him by shooting him in the back of the head. Madison was found guilty and sentenced to death.

As the wheels of justice slowly turned, Madison aged and developed dementia. He was scheduled to be executed in January 2018 but the execution was delayed and the Supreme Court heard his case. The defense’s argument was that Madison’s dementia prevents him from remembering the crime and his execution would violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The prosecution seemed to agree that Madison could not recall the crime but argued he should be executed because he can understand that he will be put to death for being convicted of murder. In a 5-3 opinion, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment may permit executing a prisoner even they cannot remember committing their crime, but it may prohibit executing someone suffering from dementia or another disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The Court also held that if a prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for their sentence, the Eighth Amendment forbids their execution. While the legal issue has been settled (for now), there still remains philosophical questions.

While metaphysics might seem far removed from the courts, as John Locke noted, “in this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment…” The reason for this is obvious: it is only just to punish (or reward) the person who committed the misdeed (or laudable deed). Locke is talking about metaphysical personal identity: what it is to be a person and what it is to be the same person across time. As such, he is using the term technically and not in the casual sense in which terms like “person” and “man” or “woman” are used interchangeably.

In the normal pursuit of legal justice, the practical goal is to find the right person and there are no worries about the metaphysics of personal identity. But in unusual circumstances, the question can arise as to whether what seems to be the same person really is the same person. For example, one might wonder whether a person with severe dementia is the same metaphysical person who committed the long ago crime.  Appropriately enough, John Locke addressed this problem in considerable detail.

In discussing personal identity, Locke notes that being the same man (or woman) is not identical with being the same person. For him, being the same man is a matter of biological identity: it is the same life of the body through which flows a river of matter over the years. Being the same person is having the same consciousness. Locke seems to take consciousness to be awareness and memory. In any case, he hinges identity on memory such that if memory is irretrievably lost, then the identity is broken. For example, if I lose the memory of running a 5K back in 1985, then I would not be the same person as the person who ran that 5K. I am certainly a slower person, even if I am the same person. If a loss of memory does entail a loss of personal identity, then perhaps a “memory defense” could be used: a person who cannot remember a crime is not the person who committed the crime.

Locke does consider the use of the memory defense in court and addresses this challenge with practical epistemology. If the court can establish that the same man (biological identity) but the defendant cannot establish that they have permanently lost the memory of the misdeed, then the matter will be “proved against them” and they should be found guilty. Locke does remark that in the afterlife, God will know the fact of the matter and punish (or reward) appropriately. However, if it can be established that the person does not remember what the man (or woman) did, then they would not be the same person as that man (or woman). For Locke punishing a different person for what the same man did would be unjust.

While there is the practical matter of knowing whether a person has forgotten, this seemed to have been established in the Madison case. While people can lie about their memory, dementia seems impossible to fake, as there are objective medical tests for the condition. As such, concerns about deception can be set aside and the question remains as to whether the person who committed the crime is still present to be executed. On Locke’s theory he would not—the memories that would forge the chain of identity have been devoured by the demons of dementia.

There are, of course, many other theories of personal identity to choose from. For example, one could go with the view that the same soul makes the same person. One must simply find a way to identify souls to make this work. There are other options to pull from the long history of philosophy. It is also worth considering various justifications for punishment in this context.

Punishment is typically justified in terms of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. While rehabilitation might be possible in the afterlife, execution cannot rehabilitate a person for the obvious reason that it kills them. While the deterrence value of execution has failed to deter the person to be executed, it could be argued that it will deter others—which is a matter of debate. It could be argued that executing a person with dementia will have deterrent value. In fact, it could be contended that showing that the state is willing to kill even people with dementia would make the state even more terrifying. For the deterrence justification, the metaphysical identity of the person does not seem to matter. What matters is that the punishment would deter others, which is essentially a utilitarian argument.

The retribution justification takes us back to personal identity: retribution is only just if it is retribution against the person who committed the crime. It could be argued that retribution only requires retribution against the same man (or woman) because matters of metaphysics are too fuzzy for such important matters. One could also use the retribution justification by advancing another theory of personal identity. For example, at one point David Hume argues that a person is a bundle of perceptions united by a causal chain (rather like how a nation has its identity). On his view, memory discovers identity but (unlike for Locke) it is not the basis of identity. Hume explicitly makes the point that a person can forget and still be the same person; so, Madison could still be the same person who committed the crime on Hume’s account. However, Hume closes his discussion on personal identity in frustration: he notes that the connections can become so tenuous and frayed that one cannot really say if it is the same person or not. This would seem to apply in cases of dementia and hence Madison might not be the same person, even in Hume’s view.

This view could be countered by arguing that it is the same person regardless of the deterioration of mental states. One approach, as noted above, is to go with the soul as the basis of personal identity or make an intuition argument by asking “who else could it be but him?” One could, of course, also take the pragmatic approach and set aside worries of identity and just embrace what the court decided. Vernon Madison was not executed but died on February 22, 2020.

It is common practice to sequence infants to test for various conditions. From a moral standpoint, it seems obvious that these tests should be applied and expanded as rapidly as cost and technology permit (if the tests are useful, of course). The main argument is utilitarian: these tests can find dangerous, even lethal conditions that might not be otherwise noticed until it is too late. Even when such conditions cannot be cured, they can often be mitigated. As such, there would seem to be no room for debate on this matter. But, of course, there is.

One concern is the limited availability of medical services. Once an infant is sequenced, parents will need experts to interpret the results. If sequencing is expanded, this will involve dividing limited resources, which will create the usual problems. While the obvious solution is to train more people to interpret results, this faces the usual problems of expanding the number of available medical experts. Another resource problem will arise when problems are found. Parents who have the means will want to address the issues the tests expose, but not everyone has the resources. Also of concern is the fact that conditions that can be found by sequencing can manifest at different times: some will become problems early in life, others manifest later. This raises the problem of distributing access to the limited number of specialists so that infants with immediate needs get priority access.

One obvious reply to the concerns about access is that this is not a special problem for infant sequencing; it runs broadly across health care. And, of course, there is already a “solution”: the rich and connected get priority access to care. The same “solution” will presumably also be applied in the case of sequencing infants.

Another sensible reply to these concerns is that these are not problems with sequencing, but problems with the medical system. That is, shortages of medical experts and difficulty in accessing the system based on need. Sequencing infants will put more burden on the system and this does raise the moral question of whether the burden will be worth the return. On the face of it, of course, improving medical care for infants would seem to be worth it.

A second concern about sequencing is that, like other medical tests, it might end up doing more harm than good. On the face of it, this might seem an absurd thing to claim: how could a medical test do more harm than good? After all, knowing about potential health threats ahead of time is analogous to soldiers knowing of an upcoming ambush, or a community knowing about an incoming storm before it arrives. In all these cases, foreknowledge is good because it allows people to prepare and makes it more likely that they will succeed. As such, sequencing is the right thing to do.

While this view of foreknowledge is plausible, medical tests are not an unmitigated good. After all, medical tests can create anxiety and distress that create more harm than the good they do. There is also an established history of medical tests that are wasteful and, worse, those that end up causing significant medical harm. Because of the potential for such harms, it would be unethical to simply rush to expand sequencing. Instead, the accuracy and usefulness of the tests need to be  determined.

It might be countered, with great emotion, that if even a single child is saved by rapidly expanding sequencing, then it would be worth it. The rational reply is, of course, that it would not be worth it if expanding the sequencing too quickly ended up hurting many children. As such, the right thing to do is to address the possible risks rationally and avoid getting led astray by fear and hope.

 

By JStark1809 / Deterrence Dispensed

In 2013 Defense Distributed created a working pistol using a $8,000 3D printer. This raised the specter of people printing guns and created quite a stir. The company made the news again in 2018 when Cody Wilson, an anarchist and owner of the company, was the subject of a lawsuit aimed at banning him from selling files for printing guns. As expected, this re-ignited the moral panic of 2013. Most recently, it is alleged that UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson was killed with a printed pistol and silencer.

While the idea of criminals, terrorists and others printing their own guns might seem alarming, it is important to consider the facts. As has often been pointed out, the 3D printer needed to make a functioning gun costs about $5,000 on the low end. By comparison, an AR-15 costs between $800 and $1200, while decent 9mm pistols are in the $400-700 range.  As such, 3D printing a gun does not make much financial sense unless a person is making guns in bulk. If a person wants a gun, they can easily buy several good guns for less than the cost of the printer. 

A second important point is that the most basic printed gun is not much of a gun: it is a single shot, low caliber weapon. While it could hurt or kill a person, it would be almost useless for someone intending to engage in a mass shooting and probably not very useful in most criminal endeavors. A criminal or terrorist would be foolish to choose such a weapon over a normal gun. While better guns can be printed, as the shooting of Thompson seems to illustrate, they are not as good as a manufactured firearm.

One reasonable reply to this view is to note that there are people who cannot legally own guns but who can own a 3D printer. These people, the argument goes, could print guns to commit their misdeeds. The easy and obvious reply is that a person willing to break the law to illegally possess a printed gun (and use it in crimes) can easily acquire a manufactured gun for less than the cost of the printer.

It can be countered that there are, for whatever reason, people who want an illegal gun but are unable or unwilling to buy a manufactured gun illegally. For them, the printed gun would be their only option. But guns can be made using legal hardware readily available at a hardware store. This sort of improvised gun (often called a “zip gun”) is easy to make. Directions for these weapons are readily available on the internet and the parts are cheap. For those who cannot acquire bullets, there are evenplans to make pneumatic weapons. Printing a gun just automates the process of making a homemade gun at a relatively high cost. So, the moral panic over the printed gun is fundamentally misguided: it is just a technological variant of the worry that bad people will make guns at home. And the reality is that the more sensible worry is that bad people will just buy or steal manufactured guns.

While people do make their own guns, people prefer manufactured guns when engaging in crimes and terrorist attacks for obvious reasons. Thus, being worried about the threat posed by 3D printers and gun plans is like being worried about hardware stores and plans for zip guns. While people can use them to make weapons, people are more likely to use them for legitimate purposes and get their weapons some other way, such as buying or stealing them.

One could persist in arguing that the 3D printed gun could still be the only option for some terrorists. But I suspect they would forgo making homemade guns in favor of homemade bombs. After all, a homemade bomb is far more effective than a homemade gun for terrorism. As such, there seems to be little reason to be worried about people printing guns to commit crimes or make terrorists attacks. Manufactured guns and more destructive weapons are readily available to everyone in the United States, so bans on printing guns or their plans would not make us any safer in terms of crime and terrorism. That said, a concern does remain.

While printing a gun to bypass the law makes little sense, there is the reasonable concern that people will print guns to bypass metal detectors. While the stock printed gun uses a metal firing pin, it would be easy enough to get this through security. The rounds would, of course, pose a bit of challenge—although non-metallic casings and bullets can be made. With such a gun, a would-be assassin could get into a government building, or a would-be terrorist could get onto a plane. Or so one might think.

While this is a matter of concern, there are two points worth noting. First, as mentioned above, the stock printed gun is a single-shot low caliber weapon, which limits the damage a person can do with it. Second, while the gun is plastic, it is not invisible. It can be found by inspection and would show up on an X-ray or body scan. As such, the threat posed by such guns is low. There is also the fact that one does not need a 3D printer to make a gun that can get past a metal detector.  

While the printers available to most people cannot create high quality weapons, there is the concern that advances will allow the affordable production of effective firearms. For example, a low-cost home 3D printer that could produce a fully functional assault rifle or submachinegun would be a problem. Of course, the printer would still need to be a cheaper and easier option than just buying or stealing guns, which are incredibly easy in the United States.

As a final point of concern, there is also the matter of the ban on gun plans. Some have argued that to make the distribution of these plans illegal violates the First Amendment, which provides a legal right. There is also the moral right of free expression. In this case, like other cases, it is a matter of weighing the harms of the expression against the harm inflicted by restricting it. Given the above arguments, the threat presented by printable guns does not warrant the restriction of the freedom of expression. As such, outlawing such plans would be immoral.  To use an analogy, it would be like banning recipes for unhealthy foods and guides on how to make cigarettes when they are readily available for purchase everywhere in the United States.

 

 

 

The received wisdom is that when Americans buy vehicles, they consider gas mileage when gas prices are high and mostly ignore it when gas prices are low. As this is being written, gas prices are relatively low and gas mileage concerns are probably low on the list for most buyers. As such, it is not surprising that the Trump administration has decided to lower the fuel efficiency standards of the Biden administration. This is consistent with the Trump administration’s approach of trying to undo what Biden did, primarily because it was done by Biden. He had a similar approach to the Obama administration.

When the Trump administration did the same thing in his first term, they said the standards were “wrong” and were set as a matter of politics. One plausible economic reason to oppose fuel efficiency in cars and light trucks is that more efficient vehicles also cost more. This economic argument can be retooled into a moral argument: saving consumers money is the right thing to do. But there is also an economic argument in favor of greater fuel efficiency.

While gas prices can vary greatly, increased fuel efficiency will offset increased vehicle costs and result in the consumer saving money. As such, the long-term economic argument favors fuel efficiency. As before, this can be retooled into a moral argument that saving Americans money is a good thing. But consumers saving money would seem to mean lower profits for the fossil fuel industry.

If, for example, an efficient vehicle saves me $4,000 in fuel costs over its life, then that is $4,000 less for the fossil fuel industry. While few would shed tears over lost profits for the industry executives, the broader impact must also be considered. While the executives reap the most benefits, the fossil fuel industry also includes the people working at gas stations and in the production and distribution of the fuel. If the harm done to these people outweighs the good done for the consumers, then increased fuel efficiency would, on utilitarian grounds, seem to be wrong. But it seems unlikely that the savings to consumers would cause more harm than good. After all, if we compare the benefit of the average American saving money to the  harm of a microscopic loss of profit for fossil fuel CEOs, then efficiency seems to be the right choice. In addition to the economic concerns and the associated ethical worries, there are also concerns about health.

While the Trump administration does not seem to care about the harms of pollution, about 50,000 deaths each year result from the air pollution caused by traffic. There are also many non-lethal health impacts of this pollution, such as asthma.  Increased fuel efficiency means vehicles burn less fuel, thus reducing the air pollution they produce per mile. Because of this, increasing fuel efficiency will reduce deaths and illnesses caused by air pollution. This health argument can be retooled easily into a moral argument: increasing fuel efficiency reduces pollution deaths and illness, and, on utilitarian grounds, this would be morally good. But this argument only works with those who care about the lives and health of others. That is, it should work with people who profess to be pro-life. But it will not, for the usual and obvious reasons.

It is reasonable to ask about how significant the reduction in deaths and illness might be. Arguments can also be made to try to show that the reduction in pollution would not be significant enough to justify increasing fuel efficiency on these grounds. It also should be noted that we, as a people, tolerate roughly 40,000 vehicle deaths per year. As such, continuing to tolerate deaths from air pollution is also an option. Tolerating deaths and illness for convenience and economic reasons is as American as apple pie.

For those not swayed by health concerns, there are national security and economic arguments that have been advanced for increasing fuel efficiency and they can still be applied today. One argument is that increased fuel efficiency will reduce our dependence on foreign oil and make us safer. This security argument can also be presented as a moral argument based on the good consequences of increased security.

Another argument is based on the claim that buying foreign oil increases our trade deficit and this is economically harmful to the United States. Because of the negative consequences, this argument can also be refit as a moral argument in favor of increasing fuel efficiency. Given the Trump administration’s professed obsession with national security and trade deficits, these arguments should be appealing to them. But it is not.

Given the above arguments, there are excellent reasons to maintain the goal of increasing the fuel efficiency of cars and light trucks. While there are some reasons not to do so, such as helping the fuel industry increase profits, this would be the wrong choice.

 

The United States has been waging a war on drugs and the drugs are winning: in 2016 63,000 people died from drug overdoses. The path from prescription opioids to heroin has resulted in over 15,000 deaths from heroin overdoses. The addition of fentanyl made things even worse.

Because of slowly shifting attitudes and the fact that the opioid epidemic hit white Americans and cut across our economic classes there was increased interest in treating addiction as a medical issue. This change is long overdue and could help provide some solutions to drug abuse.

One approach to reducing deaths has been safe injection facilities. A safe injection facility, as the name states, is a place where people can safely inject drugs under the supervision of people trained and equipped to deal with overdoses. These sites also provide clean needles, reducing the risk of infection and disease. Looked at from a legal viewpoint, these sites are problematic: they enable illegal activity, although the intention is to mitigate rather than contribute to the harms of drug abuse. While the legality of such facilities is a matter for law makers and judges, they also raise an ethical issue.

As with most large-scale social ills, a good starting point in the moral discussion is utilitarianism. This is the view that the morality of an action is determined by weighing the positive value it generates against the negative value for the morally relevant beings. An action that creates more positive value than negative value would be good; one that did the opposite would be evil. Bentham and Mill are two famous examples of utilitarians.

There are numerous positive benefits to injection clinics.  Because trained people are present to deal with overdoses, these facilities reduce overdose deaths. For example, there were 35% fewer fatal overdoses in the area around a Canadian injection facility after it opened. In contrast, other methods of addressing overdose saw only a 9.3% reduction in overdose deaths. While more statistical data is needed, this does point towards the effectiveness of the facilities. For folks who profess to be pro-life, supporting such facilities should be an easy and obvious choice.

Because the facilities provide clean needles, they reduce the occurrence of infections, and this saves the community money as sick drug addicts often end up being treated at public expense. Clean needles are much cheaper than emergency room visits.

If all the facilities did was provide needles and try to keep addicts from dying, then it would be reasonable to argue that they are just bailing out a sinking boat rather than plugging the holes. Fortunately, such facilities also refer their visitors to addiction treatment and some people manage to beat their addiction.

While significant statistical data is still needed, an analysis indicates that each dollar spent on injection facilities would save $2.33 in medical, law enforcement and other costs. From an economic and health standpoint, these are significant positive factors and help make a strong moral case for injection facilities. However, proper assessment of the matter requires considering the negative aspects as well.

One point of concern is that the money spent on injection facilities could be better spent in other ways directly aimed at reducing drug use. Or perhaps on other things, such as education or community infrastructure. This is a reasonable point, and a utilitarian must be open to the possibility that these alternatives would create more positive value. While this is mainly a matter of an assessment of worth, there are also empirical factors that can be objectively assessed, such as the financial return on the investment. Given the above, injection facilities do seem to be worth the cost; but this could be disproven.

Another point of concern is that although injection facilities refer people to treatment programs, they enable people to use drugs. It could be argued that this helps perpetuate their addiction. The easy and obvious reply is that people would still use drugs without such facilities; they would just be more likely to die, more likely to get sick, and less likely to enroll in addiction treatment programs. So, those who care about other people should support these facilities. Those who favor human suffering should oppose them.

A third matter of moral concern is that, as noted above, injection facilities enable illegal activity. It could be argued that this might damage the rule of law and have negative consequences that arise when laws are ignored. The easy and obvious counter is that the laws should be changed as treating drug use as a crime rather than a health issue has proven to be a costly disaster. Even if the laws were not changed, it can be argued that morality trumps the law. After all, if people should obey the law because it is the right thing to do, then unjust or immoral laws would be self-undercutting. The cynical might also note that the rule of law has been openly shown to be a lie and to allow people to suffer for this delusion would be a grave moral mistake.

A final point is that the utilitarian approach could be rejected in favor of another moral theory. There are many other approaches to ethics. For example, under some moral theories actions are inherently good or bad. On such a view, enabling drug use could be regarded as wrong, even if the consequences were positive. While this sort of view can provide the satisfaction of being among the righteous, it can impose a high cost on others, such as those dying from overdoses. But to be fair to these moral theories, they also provide the foundation for moral arguments against views that terrible means can be justified by the ends.

Considering the above arguments, while there are some concerns about the ethics of aiding people in using drugs, the strongest moral case favors injection facilities. As such, the laws should be changed to allow them to operate legally.