Category: Ethics

The fact that college admission is for sale is an open secret. As with other forms of institutionalized unfairness, there are norms and laws governing the legal and acceptable ways of buying admission. For example, donating large sums of money or funding a building to buy admission are within the norms and laws. But there was admission scandal in which celebrities and other elites broke the rules to get their children into elite colleges. On the face of it, there is no need to argue that what they did was morally wrong. What is more interesting is considering the matter in the context of fairness.

On the surface, the actions of the accused are clearly unfair. While the tactics varied, they included altering admission test results, bribing coaches to accept non-athletes as recruited athletes, and the classic direct bribe. Interestingly, most comments on these misdeeds noted the elites could have used traditional legal and accepted methods of purchasing admission. These methods are unfair because admission was not based on the students’ merits, thus they might have unjustly taken the places of students who merited admission. While the parents did act unfairly, it is worth considering this unfairness within the broader context of our society.

As many others have pointed out over the years, even the normal admission system is unfair. Poor children will almost always attend inferior schools and have far less opportunity to engage in the application enhancing activities available to the well-off. Poor children will also usually not be able to afford tutors, test preparation training, personal statement coaches and so on. They will also usually lack connections that influence admission. In contrast, wealthy children will enjoy a cornucopia of admission advantages. While there were programs and other efforts to provide some microscopic mitigation of disparity, the Trump administration is intent on defunding and dismantling most of these. As such, the disparities in admissions will grow.

It might be countered that some people rose from poverty to attend elite institutions and go on to great success, while some born into wealth have been failures. The obvious reply is that while these stories are interesting, they are just anecdotes and what matters is the general statistics. While some people succeed despite incredible odds, these few examples only show getting out of poverty and into an elite school is extremely unlikely. If people regularly arose from poverty, such success stories would be unremarkable.

In general, college admissions are like a race in which some people must run on foot, some get bikes, some get cars, and some get rocket ships. While one can talk about the merits of people in this race, the competition is fundamentally unfair in intentional ways. I do, obviously, recognize that people vary greatly in abilities. My point is, to stick to the analogy, that even the most talented runner is not going to win against someone who gets to race with a car.

While the elites cheated, they cheated in an already unfair race. To continue the analogy, their children were already driving fast cars in competition with people forced to run. These parents did things analogous to cutting the course and using illegal modifications on their cars. While this certainly matters, it does not matter that much from the perspective of those who were already competing by running. Again, I am not denying that people do vary in ability or that no one ever wins this race on foot or that no one crashes their metaphorical car. My point is that if fairness truly matters, then we should not just be outraged when the elites cheat in an already unfair system, we should be outraged by the unfair system.

During Trump’s first term, a New Jersey teacher was accused of bringing politics into the classroom in the form of an anti-Trump t-shirt.  In his second term, Trump’s administration has aggressively targeted education and this includes the threat to eliminate the Department of Education. As such, it makes sense that educators feel threatened and might be tempted to respond within their classrooms. As a professor at a state university, I am both an educator and a public employee and these two roles can conflict because of the distinct duties of each.

An educator at a state institution is a public employee. While being a state employee does not rob a person of their right to free expression, it does impose limitations on this right above and beyond the usual moral limits. As an example of the usual moral limits, there is a popular example about not having the right to yell about a non-existent fire in a crowded theatre.

As public employees are paid by the taxpayers to do a job, it is reasonable that they do not have the right to express political views to the public while working. As an analogy, I do not have the right to sell my books to students during class. Likewise, I do not have the right to try to sell my politics to students during class. There is also the matter of professionalism: while I am on the clock, I am representing my institution and not myself. As such, I am morally obligated to distinguish between my own views and those of the institution.

It might be objected that elected public officials, such as Governor DeSantis of my adopted state of Florida, use their offices for political activities that benefit themselves and their party. As such, it is morally unfair to deny the same opportunity to other public employees. One counter is that elected public officials are politicians, so politics is their job. That said, there are moral concerns about politicians using public resources for their re-election or to campaign against a ballot initiative; but this is more a matter of the use of public funds than a free-speech issue. As such, it seems morally acceptable to insist that public employees refrain from political activities while on the clock. But perhaps being an educator is a relevant difference.

On the one hand, it could be argued that even in political science classes the educator does not have the right to preach their politics. After all, the function of the educator is to teach rather than preach. If a teacher takes a clear stance on a political issue, then students might feel pressured to accept it. There is also the concern that expressing political views will alienate students and harm their education. For example, a teacher who expresses anti-Trump views can create a hostile learning environment for MAGA students.

On the other hand, it can be argued that educators do not surrender their right of free expression in the classroom.  If they use it responsibly in the classroom, they have the right to express their political views. This view is appealing at the college level. Professors are supposed to have positions on intellectual and academic issues, and these include political issues.  That is, they should be able to profess. But the proper role of a professor is a matter of debate. One classic ideal is the professor as one who professes by advancing their positions on the academic issues and inviting students to engage them. This does raise the usual concerns about the power disparity and, of course, the matter of grades. Another classic ideal is the professor neutrally presenting theories and ideas by laying out the ideas and letting students decide which they like best. The problem with this approach is it does not help students determine which ones are better and this would be a problem in engineering, math and science classes in which there are better and worse answers.

My practical solution to the problem has been to stick to the general issues of politics when they are relevant to the course.  Since I do not want my students to just repeat what I think on paper and tests, I am careful to present the positions fairly. If pressed for my opinion in class, I will refer to any writings I have done and warn them to never uncritically accept what I have written. I also make it clear that paper grades are not based on whether I like their view but on how well they argue for their view. When I use examples of politicians (usually for fallacies and rhetoric) I do try to include examples across the spectrum. However, the party in power does tend to be the subject of more examples than the party out of power for the obvious reason that they provide more examples.

While there are safe ways to enter the United States, there are also areas of deadly desert that have claimed the lives of many migrants. Americans have left water and other supplies in these areas, for example the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson organized No More Deaths to provide support and reduce the number of deaths.

 This group seems to be on solid theological footing, following the guidance of Deuteronomy 10:18-19: “For the Lord your God…loves the strangers, providing them food and clothing.  You shall also love the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” However, this kindness has resulted in arrests. Four women from the group were sentenced for leaving water for migrants. They were not charged with providing humanitarian aid; rather they were charged with abandoning personal property and entering the area without a permit. While they were released with a fine and probation, Scott Warren was arrested and charged with a felony for harboring migrants—in this case, harboring was giving the migrants food and water.  While one cannot know what is in the hearts of others, No More Deaths seems dedicated to reducing deaths as opposed to having a nefarious intent to smuggle in criminals. However, their actions are illegal as they are abandoning personal property (or littering) and rendering aid to people try to illegally cross the border. to cross the border. But what is illegal need not be immoral, so the question remains as to whether they are acting wrongly.

One reasonable approach is to see this as a religious group exercising their freedom of religion. Conservatives have been supportive of companies that do not want to accept the birth control mandate of the Affordable Care Act and of business owners who do not want to provide goods and services to same sex couples getting married. If it is morally acceptable to grant exceptions to laws on religious grounds to allow for discrimination, then it would be odd to deny exceptions to laws on religious grounds for rendering humanitarian aid (as commanded by God). However, conservative support for religious liberty aimed at kindness rather than discrimination is lacking. While there is a conservative narrative that Christians are being persecuted, being prosecuted for acting on kind religious beliefs is apparently not persecution.

One reply is to contend that religious exceptions are not universal and that while allowing people to refuse service to same sex couples is a matter of religious freedom, allowing people to aid those dying in the desert is not. In any case, my main concern as a philosopher is with the ethics of the matter rather than the religious aspects.

One approach to this issue is utilitarian in which the ethics of an action depends on its consequences. On the face of it, providing water in the desert is morally right. After all, the water can prevent suffering and death, and this is good. One could also use the golden rule: if I was dying in the desert, I would want the aid of others. As such, it would be immoral of me to deny aid to others. Another approach is to embrace deontological ethics, that there is an obligation to aid others who are in need. All these approaches show providing water would be the right thing to do. They can, however, be countered.

The utilitarian argument can be countered by contending that providing water does more harm than good. One possible argument would involve trying to show that providing water encourages migrants to try to cross the border in dangerous areas, thus increasing their chance of dying. Another approach would be to argue that providing such aid encourages migrants to cross the border illegally, perhaps because they think Americans are generous and welcoming. The obvious counter is that migrants try to cross the border even without the hope that Americans will provide water and without being tricked into thinking Americans are generous and welcoming. As such, targeting people providing water would not deter migration; it would only result in more suffering and death. Some claim that this is the intended consequence. Given that conservatives focus mostly on a religious freedom to discriminate, this makes sense.

In reply to the golden rule, it could be pointed out that if I was a criminal, I would want others to aid me in my criminal endeavors but it would not be right to do so. A reasonable counter to this is to contend that the people providing water are not aiming to aid criminal activity but trying to prevent deaths. To use an analogy, a doctor who treats a wounded criminal to save their life is not aiding in their crime.

Deontology does provide a counter: one could argue that there is a duty to obey the law. The problem is, of course, that there are many wicked laws and one cannot have a moral duty to do evil. But it could be argued that the laws used to prevent aid to migrants are just and righteous laws and should be obeyed, even in the face of death. After all, the migrants are breaking the law willingly, they are not compelled to enter the desert.

But providing water in the desert is morally acceptable because doing so will reduce human suffering and death. Since migrants cross the desert even without such aid, arresting people for providing humanitarian aid would not impact migration (except by increasing migrant deaths). While the United States does have the right to control its borders, it does not have the right to use the desert to kill migrants trying to enter the country and it does not have the right to use such a threat to deter migration. As the bible notes, there are moral obligations binding us together across national borders. But religious liberty exemptions for laws seem to be only for cruelty and not for kindness.

While conservatives are usually not overly concerned with racism and have been willing to tolerate the racism of their fellows, they delight in accusing Democrats of racism. If this Democrat is a woman and Muslim, so much the better.

This sort of allegation is probably satisfying. First, there is the value in scoring political points against Democrats. Second, it is no doubt pleasant to turn the tables on Democrats. Third, such attacks provide cover for the racism of certain conservatives: how dare the Democrats attack, for example, Trump for being a racist when they have racists among them? While it is ironic to attack Democrats for alleged racism to protect racists, it seems a popular strategy on the right. This is not to say that racist Democrats should get a pass, but this tactic is based on a fallacy.

A favorite target of conservatives is  Democrat Ilhan Omar. Omar has been critical of Israel and its influence over American politics. Unfortunately for the Democrats, but fortunately for the Republicans, she has used terms like “hypnotize” and “allegiance” that can be interpreted as linking to anti-Semitic tropes. Her words were not overtly anti-Semitic as one must interpret them through the lens of these tropes. If she had said the same words about another country, they would seem innocuous. For example, her use of “allegiance” was taken as referring to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. However, if she had accused Trump of having an allegiance to Russia, this would obviously not appear anti-Semitic to anyone.

An obvious concern, which has been raised by others, is that criticism of Israel can easily be cast as anti-Semitism by analyzing every word of the criticism to find some connection to anti-Semitism. Even if a critic is scrupulous in their word choices, it would be easy to make an accusation of anti-Semitism. For example, any criticism of the influence of Israel lobbying congress using money can easily be cast as an anti-Semitic attack based on antisemitic stereotypes of Jews, money and conspiracies.

Interestingly, critics of Israel find themselves in a situation that conservatives often claim to face, that their non-racist words and actions are wrongly interpreted as racist. More generally, this is the complaint about political correctness and not being able to “say things” anymore. Oddly enough, conservatives did not rush to defend Omar from political correctness. As an example, when a conservative makes a monkey reference involving a black person, their defenders will profess ignorance of the racist monkey trope and assert that the person was using the reference in a perfectly non-racist manner.

While the lamentations of conservatives about political correctness are often veiled defenses of racism and sexism, their concerns do contain some merit. A person’s words can be wrongly taken as racist, especially when people are hypersensitive and are actively trying to interpret the words as racist. And almost any criticism can be seen as racist. For example, criticism of Obama was sometimes cast as racist, even when it seemed to be limited to his policies and actions. As such, there is a real problem here: if criticizing a black person must be racist and criticizing Israel must be anti-Semitic, then there would be no way to offer legitimate criticism of a black President or Israel. It is obviously absurd to think that Obama or Israel should be exempt from criticism because such criticism must be racist or anti-Semitic. There are many legitimate criticisms of both that have nothing to do with racism. As such, it would be absurd to dismiss such criticism as automatically racist. So, criticizing Israel is no more automatically anti-Semitic than criticizing Obama is automatically racist or criticizing Elizabeth Warren is sexist.

There is, however, the problem of the opposite extreme: that having grounds for legitimate criticism entails that the criticism is not racist. For example, while there are legitimate grounds to criticize Israeli influence over congress, couching this criticism in terms of an international Jewish conspiracy and remarking that Jews are the secret bankers controlling America would be antisemitic. As such, while criticizing Israel can be antisemitic it need not be.

Several years ago, Singer R. Kelly was jailed and accused of sexually abusing teenagers and attempting to force his hairdresser into performing oral sex. His lawyer, Steve Greenberg, employed the “rock star rape defense”: “He did not force anyone to have sex. He’s a rock star. He doesn’t have to.” This tactic has been employed by others and is worth examining.

Presented more formally, the Rock Star Defense has the following form:

 

Premise 1: If someone is a “rock star”, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not force anyone to have sex.

 

On the face of it, this might seem to be a good argument.  This is because it looks like modus ponens, a valid deductive argument better known as affirming the antecedent. However, it only resembles this argument. To be  modus ponens, it would need to look like this:

 

Premise 1: If someone is a rock star, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not have to force anyone to have sex.

 

The problem is that even if it were true that “rock stars” do not have to force anyone to have sex it does not follow that a “rockstar” did not force someone to have sex. After all, people do things they do not have to do. To use a non-criminal example, a person who owns a working vehicle does not have to walk, but they can choose to do so.  But the “rockstar” defense could be developed as an extended argument:

 

Argument 1

Premise 1: If someone is a rock star, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X does not have to force anyone to have sex.

 

Argument 2

Premise 1: If someone does not have to force anyone to have sex, then they will not force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2 (conclusion of Argument 1): X does not have to force anyone to have sex.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not force anyone to have sex.

 

Since both arguments are example of modus ponens, they are valid deductive arguments and the logic is unassailable. However, there is the question of whether the premises are true. While it could be debated whether a person is a “rockstar”, the general issues are whether rock stars do not have to force anyone to have sex and whether not having to force anyone to have sex entails that one would not force anyone to have sex.

The claim that rock stars do not have to force anyone to have sex is probably based on the assumption that anyone would willingly have sex with them because of their fame or fortune. As such, they would not need to force anyone to have sex because they would do so willingly.

While it is true that a rock star can probably find someone willing to have sex with them because they are a rockstar, it is not true that anyone (in the sense of everyone) would be willing to have sex with them. Even people who are fans of a celebrity might not want to have sex with them. As such, while a rock star can find at least one person to have sex with them willingly and thus do not need to use force to have sex, it does not follow that everyone they had sex with did so willingly.

The rockstar rape defense can also be undercut by comparing it to a rockstar shoplifting defense. A celebrity accused of shoplifting could argue that they did not steal because they are celebrities and do not need to shoplift. However, celebrities obviously do shoplift—the fact they do not need to shoplift does not entail that they did not shoplift . Likewise, even if a celebrity could have consensual sex with somebody, it does not follow that they did not assault or rape somebody else.

In light of the above, the rock star defense has no merit. This does not, of course, entail that someone is guilty because they use the defense. However, any jury should dismiss the rock star defense as absurd.

 

While the United States is experiencing a backlash from when Black Lives Mattered, there are still social expectations that set the allowed forms of racism. While racism is the foundation of United States immigration policy, blatantly attacking migrants for their color is considered impolite, at least for now. While there are various rhetorical approaches to attacking migrants, the focus of this essay is on the well-worn claim that migration needs to be restricted because migrants bring disease.

Ironically, migrants to the United States make up 16% of healthcare workers, including 29% of physicians and 24% of dentists.  It is more likely that a migrant will prevent or treat a disease than cause one. If the goal is to improve health outcomes, restrictions on migration would have a negative effect. While some might worry about migration and disease in sincere ignorance, it is primarily a tool of fear and racism. But is it true that migrants present no health risks?

If the standard is that migrants must present zero health risk, then this cannot be met: there is a non-zero chance a migrant pass on an illness to an American. And it is true that migration increases the number of cases of illness: more than zero Americans will catch some illness from migrants. However, this does not warrant regarding migrants as health threat. After all, there are non-zero cases in which a migrant saves a life or does something else heroic. But it would be odd to speak of the great promise of a wave of migrant heroism—except in the economic sense. Likewise, speaking of the threat of a wave of migrant disease would is unfounded. It is also worth noting that Americans having more babies or travelling between states also increase the spreading of disease, but this is not seen as a good reason to prevent people from reproducing or travelling.

When I point out that migrants do not present a  meaningful health threat, a common response is that must mean I support  open borders  and allowing people to  flood the United States without regulation and without any concerns about their health. My reply is that this entails nothing about my view of immigration policy, except that I do not think that fears of diseased migrants should shape border policy. While I am not terrified of diseased hordes invading America, I do still have health concerns about the movement of people.

The fear that migrants can bring devastating diseases to the Americas is based on historical fact. When Europeans arrived in what they called the New World they brought with them Old World diseases that proved devastating to the native populations. Smallpox decimated the native people, thus greatly European conquest of these lands. If the natives had been able to enforce strong borders and keep the Europeans out, history would be radically different. As would be suspected, modern opponents of migration to the United States do not use this example when making their disease argument. In part this is because it would make clear that most Americans are migrants or descendants of recent migrants. There is also the fact that the situation now is different.

Back in the 1500s the native people had little or no resistance to European diseases and there was no modern medicine. The situation is different today. Migrants coming to the United States will generally not be bringing in unknown diseases that will be devastating because there is no health care. That said, we should very worried about the impact of the Trump administration on America’s fragile and overpriced health care system.

While we will be having another pandemic soon, it is unlikely to arise from migrants coming into the United States. As such, legitimate worries about pandemics do not warrant restricting general migration. After all, what generally occurs is vaccinated people migrating from countries with health care systems to the United States.

A legitimate concern is that other countries might suffer from health care failures.  For example, Venezuela’s health care system was undercut due to the corruption and mismanagement of its government. One consequence was an outbreak of measles. Health care professionals have left Venezuela and its citizens have also attempted to flee. As such, we might see people fleeing a failing country with a broken health care system, thus making the spread of disease a real concern.

Normally, this sort of thing would not be a serious problem. In the case of measles, vaccination is safe and effective. It was also widespread. However, some Americans have decided to forgo vaccinating their children. America has thus intentionally made itself vulnerable to measles. While measles and other diseases will spread internally, we also need to worry about other countries failing at public health and allowing these diseases to spread. As this occurs, we might see a return to diseases spreading among unprotected populations. However, this time the lack of protection will be intentional as people will have chosen to condemn their children to illness, perhaps with the best intentions.

While proponents of the disease argument against migration will want to take advantage of these self-inflicted failures, even this scenario does not warrant the migration restrictions they favor. After all, measles is already here and does not need to be brought across the border. Rather than showing that the United States needs to tighten up the borders, this situation shows that the United States must tighten up the vaccination requirements for citizens to ensure that they are protected from diseases that are already here. Vaccines and health care, not a wall, will keep us safe from disease. While it might seem odd for the same people to push an anti-vax and “immigrants cause disease” view, this does make sense. They are both ideological movements built on fear and ignorance seemingly designed to maximize harm.

A few years ago, Gucci created controversy with its black balaclava jumper. The jumper could be pulled up to cover a person’s mouth and featured big red lips that echoed blackface. The designer refuted this, claiming he was inspired by the works of a performance artist Leigh Bowery. Katy Perry, no stranger to accusations of cultural appropriation, was also accused of having blackface shoes in her line of shoes. Her defenders noted that these shoes come in many colors and all have the same face. Unlike cases when a person wears blackface, cases such as the Gucci and Perry incidents admit of ambiguity  and allow room for plausible denial. While the United States had a brief phase in which Black Lives Mattered, the pushback efforts have yielded fruit, and it seems reasonable to re-consider topics such as black face.

One approach to determining whether an object, like a shoe, is a form of black face is to consider the creator’s likely intentions. If a designer did not intend to create a blackface object, then it would seem reasonable to infer that the object is not a work of blackface. This is because being a blackface object is more than how an object looks; it must be created (or used) for that purpose.

In support of this view, it can be argued that since an object of blackface is racist, it requires racist intent to create it. A person who creates an object that looks like a blackface object without racist intent cannot be justly accused of racism. To use an analogy, suppose a designer created something in which some see pornographic images.  If the designer did not intend this, they should not be considered pornographers, and the work should not be considered pornography.

As a practical matter, the challenge is determining intent. While this can be difficult, the sensible approach is to consider the person’s history and their explanation of their inspiration and goals. If they have no history of racism and deny that they intended to create a blackface object, then it would be reasonable to believe them.

It could be objected that the creators cannot plead ignorance. While they might not have intended the works to be blackface objects, they should have realized how they would be seen. After all, anyone familiar with American culture and history should recognize such objects and they should be aware of the consequences of selling them. To use an analogy, a designer who unintentionally creates a work that would obviously be seen as pornographic, should be aware of this. If they put it on sale while denying awareness, then they would be selling pornographic images.

It could be replied that a creator might be unaware of the history of blackface or that they do not see the objects as blackface objects. Using the pornography example, a designer might be unable to see what other people think they see. If a designer has no knowledge of the history of blackface or cannot see that their work would be seen as blackface, then they could be excused. Some might insist that they should be aware of history and that they cannot honestly say that they did not see a problem before it was pointed out by others. But perhaps an object being blackface is not a matter of what is in the mind of the creator, but what is in the eye of the beholder.

Behind the saying “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is the aesthetic theory that beauty is a subjective quality dependent on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver. This saying could be modified for perceptions of racism: “blackface is in the eye of the beholder.” The underlying principle would be that whether an object is blackface depends on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver.

If blackface is in the eye of the beholder, then it is up to the beholder to determine whether an object is blackface. This could also apply to racism or sexism in general. This might be a matter of judgment or a matter of feeling, depending on the broader aesthetic theory in play. One possible problem with this principle is that whether an object is blackface would seem to be subjective. As such, those who do not see an object as blackface would be as right (or wrong) as those who see it as blackface. However, there is a way to grant some people a privileged right to judge (or feel).

A way to argue for this is to draw an analogy to insult. Whether something is an insult, it could be argued, depends on the target. If the target does not judge or feel that the alleged insult is an insult, then it is not. If the target judges or feels the alleged insult is an insult, then it is. In the case of objects alleged to be blackface, there is the question of who has a privileged position of judgment.

The easy and obvious answer is that target of any potential blackface object would be black people. As such, whether an object is a blackface object would be decided by the judgment or feeling of black people. While one could get bogged down in the problem of group consensus, there are two approaches here. One is to accept the majority opinion. The other would be to judge at the individual level so an object could be blackface for one person but not another. While messy and inexact, this does seem to reflect the messy and inexact reality of such judgments (or feelings). Thus, an object would be blackface if most black people judged (or felt) that it was. Alternatively, it could be done at an individual level: an object would be blackface for an individual if they judged (or felt) it was blackface.

It could be objected that by this definition, anything could be blackface and anything could be racism. Alternatively, one could argue that if blackface or racism is subjective, then this could be used to avoid accusations of racism. That is, any accusation could be met with “that is just how you feel.”

The solution is a messy one: as with disputes over beauty or insults, there would need to be philosophical arguments and the better arguments should settle things. Even if blackface is in the eye of the beholder, better and worse cases can be made that a judgment is reasonable. That no perfect resolution is possible should be expected.

But some might object that being accused of racism has consequences. A person’s career could be ended and their life ruined and surely this should not be left up to subjective judgments or feelings. Turning back to the analogy of insults, there is the question of whether the person making the alleged insult intended to be insulting or not. This can be investigated by considering their history, character and the context of the situation. Likewise, if a work is judged (or felt) to be a blackface object, there is still the question of the intent of the creator. While one cannot know the true heart and mind of another, the creator’s history and character as well as the context can be assessed to reach a plausible conclusion. As such, a person could create a blackface object without intent and without being a racist, just as a person could insult another without intending it. In such cases, the object should be condemned but the creator should be held innocent. Naturally, if the creator’s history and character and the context provide evidence of racism, then that is another matter.

According to the FDA, it “is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.” Given this mission, the FDA should put the interest of public health ahead of other concerns, such as the profits of a pharmaceutical company. While many at the FDA are dedicated to this mission, federal agencies are routinely captured by industry. So, it is not surprising that the FDA has benefited companies at the expense of public health. Charles Seife wrote an article that appeared in the February 2018 issue of Scientific American. While there are legal issues here, my concern is with ethics

On the face of it, the moral problem is easy to solve. As the FDA is tasked with protecting public health, its moral duty is to do that. Putting public health at risk to benefit a company or individual would be wrong. Part of the problem, as noted by Seife, is that the FDA is secretive, which makes it difficult for the public to know about the FDA and the products it approves. Another part of the problem, also noted by Seife, is that the FDA seems willing to allow research misconduct to remain unreported. Under the current administration, it seems likely that things will only get worse.

While it is tempting to see evidence of misdeed when drugs are recalled or given new warnings, it must be noted that this should be expected even when products are properly evaluated. This is because of how inductive reasoning used in product trials works. While inductive logic is essential, it has a fundamental problem that is called, shockingly enough, the problem of induction. Since an inductive argument’s conclusion always “leaps” beyond its premises, the conclusion of such an argument can always be false, even when all the premises are true. Since the controlled experiments of the trials are inductive, they can be properly conducted  and still yield a false conclusion. These trials are then generalized to the entire population, which is another inductive argument and another chance for things to go wrong.

For example, even a large sample will not contain every genetic or physiological variation relevant to drug interactions. As such, a drug that was safe in the trials might have unexpected results out in the wild. So, one should not rush to judgment if an approved drug needs a warning label revision or has unexpected effects on some people. That said, the concern about how the FDA operates remains, as Seife’s research indicates.  As such, the FDA seems to have acted wrongly by putting corporate interests ahead of public health. It remains to be seen what the future will bring, but even under traditional administrations, the FDA has engaged in bad behavior. If even this modest oversight is stripped away, things will become much worse.

An obvious solution is to make the FDA’s process and data available to the public. Under this solution, the public would have access to everything that occurs within the FDA as well as all the information provided to the FDA by the companies whose products are being evaluated. While this would solve the problems noted above, there are reasonable concerns about such complete transparency.

Allowing full public access to the FDA’s information would also allow the same access to competing pharmaceutical companies (and others with a financial interest in the data). Such transparency would allow access to a company’s trade secrets, commercial and financial information.  This could cause “substantial competitive injury” and would be like playing poker while being forced to let everyone see your cards. Because of the potential harm, such full transparency would seem to be wrong.

It could be countered that all companies would be on equal footing, and no one would have an advantage. Going back to the poker analogy, if everyone must show their cards, no one has an advantage. The obvious problem is that foreign companies that do not undergo FDA approval would have access to the data and this could give them an edge against companies that sought FDA approval.

Another counter is to argue on utilitarian grounds: even if transparency harmed companies, the advantage to public health would outweigh this. But this could be countered by arguing the reverse. As these concerns are reasonable, complete transparency is morally problematic under the current economic system. As such, what would seem to be needed is an approach that protects the public while also protecting the legitimate interests of companies.

As Seife noted in his article, the information the FDA has kept from the public includes data about harmful side-effects and concerns about the efficacy of products. This information has been redacted or withheld based on the harm that would be done to the company if the truth were known. While it is true that releasing such information could harm a company’s profit, this is not a morally acceptable reason. After all, the mission of the FDA is to protect public health; protecting private profit at the expense of public health is a violation of this mission.

While a company or individual does have a right to keep certain information private, this right does not extend to concealing danger to others. To use an analogy, while I do have the right to keep my medical records private, I do not have the right to keep it a secret if I were infected with Ebola. To use another analogy, while a company would have a right to keep its manufacturing process for snacks secret, it has no right to keep secret the fact that the main ingredient is rats. The public does not have a right to know their trade secrets; but they do have a right to know if the snacks contain rats. Likewise, while the public does not have a right to know the legitimate trade secrets of a drug company, they do have the right to know the side-effects and efficacy of the drugs they take. As such, the FDA can fulfil its proper mission of protecting public health while also protecting legitimate trade secrets. Companies that want to profit on concealing data from the public with FDA collusion might be dismayed by this, but they have no moral right to expect this—especially when they can still make massive profits by making safe and efficacious drugs.

Considering the actions of the current administration, it is terrifying to consider how much worse things could become. Information about side-effects and ineffective drugs have been concealed in the past, but Trump and Musk are dedicated to dismantling the federal government, including the FDA. In the best of times, it did not protect us very well and it is reasonable to think it will become much worse. While it is always wise to be cautious about drugs and procedures, it would be prudent to be extremely cautious about forthcoming FDA approvals.

Joyce Short, a victim of deception, has argued that rape by fraud should be a crime. Pragmatically, the legal issues are the most important; but its moral aspects are philosophically important.

To set the context for the discussion and avoid straw person attacks, those arguing that rape by fraud should be a crime are focusing on significant fraud rather than absurd cases. To illustrate, a person who engages in hyperbole about their wealth or engages in bragging about their awesomeness would not be targets of these proposed laws. Rather, the arguments for the proposals are based on cases such as Short’s in which someone engages in significant and sustained deception to gain sexual access. Another example is the case of Abigail Finney. One of her boyfriend’s friends had sex with her by pretending to be him. While the man was chided by the court, he was not convicted of any crime. From a legal standpoint, rape and assault are currently narrowly defined and using fraud, rather than force, is (usually) not a crime. From a moral standpoint, this seems incorrect.

One argument for why the use of fraud to gain assent is wrong is that fraud is wrong. While the goal of the fraud does matter, fraud itself is immoral and using it to trick a person into assenting to sex would thus be immoral.

Another argument for this type of fraud being morally wrong and one that ties into the legal argument, is to draw an analogy between crimes of fraud and using fraud to trick a person into assenting to sex.

While specific laws about fraud vary, the general idea is that the perpetrator intentionally deceives the victim with the intent of persuading the victim to part with property. A key aspect of fraud is that without the deceit, the person would not have parted with their property.  For example, if someone calls a victim and pretends to be an IRS agent to trick them into providing an Apple gift card number, then they are attempting fraud. After all, the person would not give Apple gift card numbers to strangers who call asking for them.

While it might seem odd to see a person’s body as their property, Locke argues for this in his discussion of property rights. He argues that a person’s right to property, such as a house, arises from their ownership of their body.  So, it could be argued a person who uses deceit to acquire sex is morally (and legally) like someone who uses deceit to steal any property. Or, perhaps a better analogy would be stealing access to property, such as using fraud to get a hotel room or a rental car. If it is immoral and illegal to use deceit to steal property or access to it, then the same should apply to using deceit to steal access to a person’s body.

It could also be argued that using deceit to acquire sex is analogous to a theft of services. If someone uses deceit to steal the services of a business, then that would be a crime (and probably wrong). The same should apply to stealing sex by using deceit. One concern is that characterizing sex as a service would seem to imply that people engage in a prostitution when they engage in sex. While this might seem unappealing, it can be argued that consensual sex is an exchange. Naturally, one could note that under capitalism, everything is a good or a service, so seeing acquiring sex by deceit as a theft of service makes sense in our economic system.

While fraud might not seem as bad as the use of force, it is recognized as an immoral and criminal tool and to not apply the same principle to sex would be inconsistent and unprincipled. This would be on par with making violent theft a crime but allowing people to freely engage in theft by deceit.

One counter argument is to contend that a person who assents to sex with a deceiver is still (probably) consenting to have sex with them. To illustrate, imagine a man who creates the false appearance of wealth and success intending to use it to get women to have sex with him. While his targets could say that they would not have had sex with him if they had known he was not rich, it would seem odd to conclude that he should be charged with a crime despite his immoral behavior.

As another example, imagine a woman who uses plastic surgery, makeup and padded clothing to improve her attractiveness. Imagine that a man would not have had sex with her if he knew how she really looked (they have sex in the dark). While she did deceive him and this would be immoral, it would be odd to say that it should be considered a crime.

One final objection is to argue that personal relations should not be regulated by the state. To use an analogy, imagine that Sam pretends to have the same hobbies and interests as Dan so that he can become his friend. Sam does not really care about Dan, but Dan has an awesome boat, a beach house and goes on amazing trips around the world. By pretending to be Dan’s friend, Sam gets to ride in the boat with Sam, stay in the beach house with Sam and go on trips with Sam. Even if Dan forms a one-way emotional bond with Sam and is deeply attached to him, Sam does not seem to be engaged in criminal activity (although he would be a morally awful person) if he simply plays the role of a fake friend. Obviously, if he used deceit to steal the boat, house or money from Dan, that would be different. By analogy, one could argue, using deceit to get assent to sex in similar sorts of circumstances would be immoral but should not be considered a crime.

The easy and obvious counter to such concerns is to note that morality and the law distinguish between degrees of severity regarding immorality and crimes. As such, while these specific examples show immoral behavior in the form of intentional deception, they do not seem to rise to the level of crimes. But there can be cases in which the nature of the fraud should make the act criminal. This shows the legal and moral importance of crafting laws that make such distinctions. While some might object that this would be too hard, the law and ethics already address equally complex matters successfully.

 

For those not familiar with blackface, it originated as makeup for portraying caricatures of black people. In the United States, it is generally considered unambiguously racist. While the use of blackface in the arts has largely ceased (though there is still controversy about white actors taking non-white roles) it has persisted in popular culture. It is most likely to be seen at costume parties, such as on Halloween. As might be suspected, the revelation that a public figure appeared in blackface can be a career ender. A few years ago, Mile Ertel resigned as the Secretary of State of my adopted state of Florida when photos of him in blackface surface.  He dressed up as a black Katrina victim two months after the storm and his defenders argued that this past behavior should not have been held against him.  While Ertel is a Republican, blackface is bipartisan.

The release of a photo from his 1984 medical school yearbook (showing one person in blackface and another in Ku Klux Klan gear) has created a bit of a problem for the former governor of Virgina, the Democrat Ralph Northam. Since the incident occurred in 1984, his defenders argued that he should not suffer the consequences of this past action.

One time-based defense for someone who used blackface is to argue they were not aware of its history and implications and did not have racist intention. People do dress up in non-racist costumes that are odd and problematic that they think are just fine, especially when alcohol is involved.

This defense is not entirely absurd. Everyone has done stupid things from ignorance rather than malice. Also, everyone has done wrong because of lapses in judgment or due influences like alcohol or peer pressure. While it would be a fallacy to argue that something is acceptable because it is commonly done, it is reasonable to argue that judgments of behavior should consider the realities of human behavior: we consistently do dumb things for dumb reasons.

While blackface is racist, if a person used it in sincere ignorance and apologize when informed of the truth, then they should be forgiven. The problem is that the history of blackface is well known in the United States. While a very young child could reasonably claim ignorance, others would be hard-pressed to claim ignorance. They could, however, use the aberration defense: that although they did not act in ignorance, they are not racist.

While it might seem absurd to say that a person could do something racist without being racist, there is an analogy to lying. While a person who lies is a liar when they lie, it would be absurd to label a person who is usually honest a liar because they have lied. Likewise, a person who is generally not racist, but has engaged in some out of character racist behavior, should not be labeled as a racist. Naturally, there would be exceptions. The key question is whether the incident is an aberration or arising from their established character. This is where time becomes a critical factor.

To steal from Aristotle, assessing a person’s actions requires considering whether they are acting from a fixed and permanent disposition. If a person has the vice of racism, they would be consistent in their racism, and it would not be an irregular or aberrant behavior on their part. Someone who is not a racist might have done some racist acts in their past, but if these acts are few and relatively minor, then they should not be considered a racist. To use an analogy, a person who has told a few lies in the past but is generally honest should not be condemned as a liar. The same works for virtues: someone who acted bravely once but is otherwise consistently cowardly would not be a brave person.

As such, while appearing in blackface would be racist, the person should be judged not by a single racist or ignorant action. The person’s reasons for the action must be considered and, importantly, their general character must be assessed. As such, while Ertel and Northam should not have put on blackface, the act itself does not suffice to determine whether they are racists who engaged in habitual racism or non-racists who did something racist. Their complete character and history must be considered.

It could be objected that the principle of judging people based on their character and broad history of behavior rather than on a single incident is unacceptable. In the case of blackface, it could be argued that the offense is so serious that it forever marks a person, rendering them eternally unfit for public office. But the idea of eternal offenses is problematic as it makes redemption impossible.