Category: Ethics

In the before time, one Gay Pride Day Kraft posted an image of a rainbow Oreo cookie (sadly not yet a real product). Almost immediately, the group One Million Moms condemned Kraft and urged a boycott of Kraft foods for jamming their views down the throats of America. On an interesting side note, conservative groups seem oddly obsessed with the metaphor of things being jammed down their throats, but that is a matter for a psychologist rather than a philosopher.

One Million Moms was consistent in its condemnation of companies that indicate an acceptance of homosexuality. They condemned both DC and Marvel for having gay characters in their comic books. They also advocated boycotting J.C. Penney because the company hired Ellen DeGeneres as a spokesperson. They even went after the company for including a lesbian couple in its advertisement for Mother’s Day and for including a gay male couple in a Father’s Day advertisement. Naturally, One Million Moms was not alone in this—other anti-gay groups and individuals have protested companies that expressed acceptance of homosexual customers. More recently, transpeople have been the focus of the culture war.

Not surprisingly, there were people who condemned companies for being against homosexuality. For example, Chick-Fil-A donated about $2 million to anti-gay groups in 2009 and this concerned some customers. I know people who eat at Chick-Fil-A because of its anti-gay stance and people who refuse to do so for the same reason.

As might be imagined, corporate involvement in culture war issues raises interesting philosophical issues. One issue is whether companies should be involved in political causes, such as same sex marriage, trans rights or gun rights. Another is whether people should boycott companies that (seem to) support views they oppose.

If I made decisions for a company, I would avoid engaging in performative advocacy. This is based on the approach I take to being a professor: I am not there to preach an ideological agenda or make converts to my causes. I am there to provide an educational opportunity. By analogy, if I was running a company that made computers, my goal would be to make good computers and not engage in performative advocacy. That would not be the function of my company—it is not an ideology company but a computer company.

Naturally, in my personal capacity I do engage in advocacy and I should do so. However, I make it clear that my views are my own. I do not have the moral right to speak for my colleagues. Likewise, if I owned a company, it would be unreasonable and unethical of me to claim to speak for my employees in the context of ideology. But there are at least two obvious counters to the view that companies should avoid (performative) advocacy.

One counter is that a company that remains silent can be seen as tacitly accepting certain views. For example, a company that went along with segregation in the United States would be acting immorally by going along with that evil.

It might be objected that companies should go with whatever the law or practice of the day is, thus not being advocates one way or the other. While this is tempting, there do not seem to be any reasonable grounds for exempting the people running companies from ethics. Hence, the excuse of “I was just following the law and doing business” rings as hollow as “I was just following orders.” As such, companies do need to be concerned about the stances they take on issues that concern the business of the company. This does, of course, give them a reasonable out on issues that do not concern their business.

In the case of homosexuality or transgender issues, it could be argued that most companies do not need to take a stance on the issues, such as the ethics of same-sex marriage or trans athletes competing in sports. As such, they cannot be condemned for not taking a stance or engaging in advocacy one way or the other. However, it can be argued that even if they do not need to take a stance, they can and this leads to the second counter.

A second obvious counter is that companies have the moral right to engage in advocacy based on the right of free expression that the decision makers of the company possess. As far as the concern that company advocacy is questionable because the few decision makers for the company are claiming to speak for the entire company, there are two replies.

One is that while a company need not reflect the views of its employees as the employees are not obligated to endorse the advocacy views adopted by the decision makers of the company. That is, working for a company does not morally obligate the worker to accept the positions advocated by the company. So, someone could work for Kraft without being a supporter of same-sex marriage and their employment at Kraft should not be taken as an endorsement of what the rainbow Oreo stood for. Employees who find this too objectionable can, of course, quit—if they can find another job.

Second is that the company decision makers already make decisions about what the company does and deciding to take an advocacy position is just another decision. For example, Apple does not consult with the people who assemble iPads to see what they think about what the next version of iOS should be or what the EULA should contain. As such, they are not exceeding their authority over the company as an entity.

That said, the people who decide the advocacy roles and positions of the company are morally accountable for those roles and positions. As such, if they adopt an unethical position, they would be acting wrongly. There is also practical concern about the impact of such advocacy on the company’s bottom line. After all, (performative) advocacy is done with the intent of attracting or keeping customers and there is the question of which stance will result in the greatest profits. This is, of course, a practical rather than ethical question. Deciding to take a position based on the profit potential is, however, a matter of ethical concern. The company side is but one side of the cookie, there is also the consumer side. This will be discussed in the next essay.

 

 

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In my previous essay I looked at why I use AI generated images in my D&D products. As I noted, the essay offers an explanation rather than a justification for my using these images. As I admitted, I am wrong to use these images—but, as I also admitted, I do many bad things. So why is using AI images morally wrong?

One well-established argument is based on the claim that AI companies steal content.  Sometimes, AI companies engage in what seems to be unambiguous theft. For example, Anthropic, it was claimed, used over 7 million pirated works to train its model. A judge approved a $1.5 billion settlement against the company which is a fraction of the value of the company. Oddly, they can keep using this stolen content. Or rather not oddly, because that is how it works for corporations. If I stole software to use to write my D&D adventures, I would not be able to get away with paying a fraction of the cost of the software while being allowed to keep using it. But I digress.

In the case of images, the usual claim is that AI companies are stealing images by using them to train their AI models without the permission of the artists (or copyright owners). AI companies usually counter by claiming this is fair use, often asserting that this is analogous to how human artists learn to create art. An obvious flaw in this reasoning is that AI companies are converting the data harvested from images into a commercial product. One could, of course, get into a debate about the philosophy of mind and whether the AI model is learning like a human. The best available evidence shows that AI is not analogous to a human artist, though this could be disputed. But, for the sake of this essay and establishing I am doing wrong, I will concede that when images are used without permission to provide data for use in an AI model, this is theft. To use such a model to create images is to be involved in theft, which seems intuitively wrong.

As a philosopher, I tend to head towards general principles when discussing ethics, so I am not content to simply say that using AI images is wrong. I want to get at the general principle here, which is that knowingly doing business with a business that engages with theft is morally wrong. I know that AI companies steal, yet I do business with them. Hence, I am acting immorally. Those familiar with how American businesses operate can see where this is headed.

In the United States, employers steal billions from employers each year through wage theft. For example, in 10 states it is estimated that 2.4 million workers lose about $8 billion a year through minimum wage violations. Unsurprisingly, this includes my adopted Free state of Florida. While the mainstream media engages in routine moral panics about shoplifting epidemics, wage theft is larger than all other forms of property theft combined. As would be suspected, Walmart is accused of leading the nation in lawsuits claiming that it forced employees to work off the clock, skip legally mandated rest breaks, and so on. FedEx, Uber, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo have also been accused of large-scale wage theft. As would be expected, a company found guilty of wage theft usually pays a fine and no executives do jail time. This theft is usually profitable, since they tend to pay a fraction of what they have stolen—and obviously only when they get caught. Imagine if you could, for example, steal a $1,000 computer from Walmart and, if the government bothered to investigate and do something, only face paying a $500 fine and still get to keep the computer.

It is, of course, interesting to compare this with the consequences when a low-level employee is caught stealing from a business. In addition to stealing from employees, businesses also steal from customers.

While wage theft is obviously theft, there can be debate about which business practices are “merely” predatory or deceptive, and which are actual theft. For example, junk fees can be seen as a form of theft as can the automatic adding of subscriptions (memberships or protection plans) to a cart. Shrinkflation (reducing the size of a product while charging the same) and skimpflation (using lower quality ingredients or components) can be seen as theft. Overdraft and other banking fees can also be seen as theft. So, one could dispute whether most companies engage in theft based on one’s conception of theft. Unfortunately, companies also engage in unambiguous theft.

One of the most famous examples is, of course, when Wells Fargo opened millions of accounts without the permission of the customers. As always, no executive did prison time, but the company did agree to pay $3 billion in fines.

Companies also famously steal from the government by overbilling, substituting products, phantom billing, upcoding, tax evasion and so on. One might also consider government subsidies and bailouts as a form of theft. And if one wants to get into some philosophy, there are those who argue that “property is theft” because private ownership of resources allows owners to steal from workers. One can also argue that any business that makes a profit must be stealing, because they must be underpaying or overcharging or both. Naturally, these claims can be debated.

Given the nature of businesses in the United States, it seems almost impossible to avoid doing business with a company that is not stealing. As such, we are all probably engaged in immoral behavior when we knowingly do business with them. So, while I am doing wrong using AI generated images because these companies steal, I am also doing wrong when I purchase other goods and services. But what does this mean?

One might suspect I am trying to use a version of whataboutism beloved by the right. You have probably seen this fallacy in action on social media. This version is used to “argue” that someone is a hypocrite or mistaken for criticizing or expressing concern about something by asserting that they are ignoring or don’t care about some other thing. As a concrete example, if someone criticizes ICE for murdering an American citizen, then the whataboutism might be “why don’t you care about this American who was murdered by a migrant?”

This whataboutism is obviously bad logic. First, expressing concern about or criticizing one thing obviously does not prove that the person does not care about something else. After all, someone who is concerned about ICE murdering Americans can (and does) care when a migrant murders an American. That is, a person can be against murder. Second, a failure to express concern about another thing does not prove that the original concern or criticism is mistaken. For example, if I express concern about the prostate cancer that killed my dad, this obviously does not prove I do not care about the lung cancer that killed my friend. As with most fallacies, laying out the “logic” reveals the error being made.

As I am obviously aware of this fallacy, I am not claiming that people who say using AI images is wrong because the AI companies steal art are mistaken because they don’t condemn the theft done by other businesses in the same breath. I agree that using AI images is wrong. My point is that when we use goods and services provided by a business, we are almost certainly doing business with a thief and hence doing something wrong. In our current system, it seems unavoidable.

But does this mean that I think critics of AI images should shut up and stop criticizing my use of AI images? No. They are right to criticize me, as I am doing wrong.

While doing wrong is almost unavoidable in the system we are born into and endure, we do have a choice about what we will do, and we can decide that something is unacceptable and we will not do that. Even when we do other bad things. For example, take eating other living creatures. I eat meat, although I also know this is morally wrong. But I do draw moral lines and there are many creatures I will not eat, the most obvious ones being humans, cats, and dogs. I also have some seemingly idiosyncratic limits—like I will not eat veal, animal feet (probably something to do with being a runner), animal brains (that is rude), animal testicles (that is very rude), or animal faces (also rude). I even feel bad about eating plants, since they are alive and new research suggests they feel pain and might even see.

In the case of AI image generators, I have been willing to use them despite believing that I am acting wrongly. Just as I am willing to eat plants and some animals, even though I know I am doing wrong. Just as I drive my truck to work and fly home to visit my family, even though I know this is wrong. But there are obviously companies I will not do business with, such as Wells Fargo. I also think that the problem is not that I use products and services from companies that steal, it is that these companies are allowed to engage in theft. That is, the problem is larger than an AI company stealing images, the problem is an economic system built on theft.

 

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In the United States, the number of homeless shelters increased in the 1980s due to a variety of factors (mostly Reagan). One factor was a recession which resulted in more people being unable to afford housing. A second factor was a shift away from single room housing. Though limited in size, this was cheaper than the alternatives. Back in the early 1990s, some of my fellow graduate students lived in singles, but these seemed to be (like most graduate student housing) relics from another time. A third factor was the infamous closing of mental institutions and reduction in care for the mentally ill. While proponents of the approach lauded the cost savings, some critics saw it as simply dumping people onto the streets.

In the face of this surge in homelessness religious groups, charitable organizations and local governments increased the number of homeless shelters. The intent was to provide people with a place to stay until they could sort things out and secure a permanent home. This approach does make some sense and did work in some cases. After all, it seems reasonable to infer that people become homeless because of problems (financial, mental and so on) and that once these problems are fixed, then a person will be ready to have a home. Unfortunately, this approach did not prove successful and there are now about 771,480 people without homes.

Fortunately, an alternative approach had a more positive impact. This approach reverses the old approach: rather than “fixing” people so that they are ready for permanent homes, this approach involves getting the homeless into more home-like shelters or permanent housing. Those who need treatment are given treatment and the results seem to have been positive.

While this approach seems to have merit, there is the stock concern that the state funded programs are wasting the taxpayers’ money by supporting free riders. Somewhat ironically, the troubled economic times that increase homelessness also decrease the funding available for such programs and gives some support to claims that scarce financial resources should be better used, perhaps by allowing more tax breaks for the job creators or bailing out corporations whose bad decision making wrecked them. As such, there seem to be two main arguments against funding such programs with state money.

The first is a utilitarian argument. As there is less state money available than what was normal before it is even more important that the money be spent effectively. Putting money into shelters, programs and permanent housing for the homeless would yield fewer positive results than using the money elsewhere (such as deficit reduction, tax breaks for the rich or maintaining infrastructure). As such, the money should be spent in these other areas rather than in addressing the problem of homelessness.

This argument can, of course, be countered by showing that the money spent on addressing homelessness would be less than the cost of not addressing the problem. If this is the case, then the cost argument favors spending the money rather than incurring the costs that can be avoided or mitigated by spending.

While homelessness is clearly bad for the people who are homeless, it is also costly to society. One area of cost is the medical costs of homelessness. On average, homeless people average hospital stays longer than comparable non-homeless people. Also, since homeless people tend to not have insurance, the cost is born either by the state (that is, us) or by those with insurance (in the form of increased premiums).

Not surprisingly, people do become homeless because of medical problems and medical problems are caused or worsened by being homeless. Those who are homeless are more likely to become ill than those who have homes and are more likely to suffer from problems of greater severity. As such, homelessness adds a burden to the health care system, especially the emergency rooms. Addressing the problem of homelessness would help reduce these costs. That said, no doubt some people profit off this problem and they would argue that this is a good thing.

Another area is crime and prisons. People who are homeless tend to spend more time in prison than the non-homeless, especially since the United States tends to address many social problems by criminalizing them. In some cases, they are arrested for “general” criminal activity, but they are often arrested for breaking laws that are aimed specifically at the homeless, such as laws against loitering and begging. That is, they are arrested because they are homeless. While this laws are often pitched as a means to coerce the homeless to go elsewhere and be someone else’s’ problem, they also help feed “customers” into the for-profit prison system.

While prisons can be quite profitable for the private companies that run them, it is expensive to imprison people. The prices vary greatly. For example, a prison stay in California costs $127,788 a year. While those who profit from prisons will not see it this way, reducing homelessness would be a good thing because it would mean fewer people in prison and lower the cost to the taxpayers. Those who profit from prisons will, of course, wish to ensure that people keep suffering from homelessness as long as this increases the chances they are imprisoned. After all, every prisoner means more profit.

A third factor is the cost of emergency shelters, which are the traditional homeless shelter.s These shelters are more expensive than the cost of a permanent residence. As such, permanent housing would provide savings over temporary shelters.

Naturally, it is reasonable to wonder what impact the permanent home programs might have on the cost to society of homelessness. Studies have shown that these do save money, although they do obviously cost money to implement.

Of course, these savings assumes that the temporary shelters would be funded. For those willing to allow homeless people to live on the streets or who want to drive them away to become someone else’s problem, this sort of program would not yield the highest savings. After all, the cost of housing the homeless on the street is nothing. Of course, this would not reduce the other costs associated with homelessness and would almost certainly increase them. After all, people living on the street are more likely to get ill or injured and more likely to be arrested. But, as noted above, these could be profitable features for some or a chance to inflict harm (cruelty is, after all, often the point).

Of course, changing the law so that people can be refused even emergency medical care if they cannot pay and ending all state-funded treatment programs for addiction and mental illness could reduce the medical costs. That is, we could entirely abandon the homeless, other than imprisoning them when they are arrested. Of course, there would remain the question as to whether this would result in a cost saving. After all, the abandonment approach might result in a large enough increase in number of homeless people being imprisoned to offset the savings from abandonment. Naturally, this does not consider the moral cost of abandonment, just the financial cost.

Overall, the evidence does seem to be that providing permanent housing for the homeless would be a cost saver, though perhaps not as big a cost saver as the complete abandonment of a sort worthy of fiends. The second argument is a moral argument or, rather, various moral arguments. One stock argument is based on the idea that we have no moral obligations to others and hence not obligation to help the homeless. On this view, we could provide such support, but we are not obligated to do so.

A second stock argument is that providing such support is immoral because it creates a culture of dependency. That is, by providing the homeless with permanent homes and treatment for any health problems they might possess they are learning to depend on others and will be unable to carry their own weight. While not supporting them might seem harsh, the argument is that this sort of “tough love” will enable then to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Those who make this argument are often the wealthy who are bailed out by the government when their bad decisions cause their businesses to fail or who are lavishly gifted state subsidies.

While this line of reasoning has some appeal, one obvious reply is that this approach is like responding to a broken leg by refusing to treat it because putting a cast on a broken leg will just make the person dependent on the cast.  As with a broken leg, a person whose life is broken needs support until they can stand on her own again.

One reply to this is that while this might hold for those who will be able to stand on their own, it does not address the problem of those who will remain dependent forever. These people, it can be argued, are just parasites and should not be supported.

I do, of course, agree that someone who is just free riding the system should not be supported. However, the number of people who will intentionally become homeless and unemployed just so they can free ride seems to be rather low (but probably more than zero). After all, most people want to be self-supporting rather than dependent on others. To deny people who need the support to rebuild just because some small percentage of poor people would free ride seems as unreasonable as getting rid of handicapped parking because some people will get a decal for those spaces that they are not really entitled to.  It can also be countered that supporting a free rider in such a program would be cheaper and less damaging than having them free riding on the alternative system.

Another moral argument against providing support for other people is that those being supported are stealing from the taxpayers by having their housing and treatments paid by others. As such, the homeless are morally wrong and we should not enable their theft by allowing such programs. Alternatively, the homeless people could be cast as being pawns used by the politicians who are stealing money from taxpayers and giving it to the homeless. Or, for extra immorality, the homeless and those who enable such support can be seen as being in wicked (or at least misguided) cahoots.

One obvious reply is that by this sort of reasoning we all spend years as thieves. After all, as children we live off our parents (or whoever is keeping is alive), we steal education from the state (or whoever is paying for it), and until we pay enough in taxes to pay for all the public goods and services we use we are stealing every time we walk down a public sidewalk, drive on a public street or go to free a public park. We also steal from all those who have come before us and who enabled us to live in a modern society with technology, medicine and such. That is, we are all beneficiaries of the labor, money and ideas of others. As such, it would be hypocritical to regard the homeless as thieves because others assist them. It would be especially hypocritical of the wealthy who benefit from tax cuts, subsidies, bailouts and government contracts.

The obvious reply is that the non-homeless who do pay taxes (and presumably pay off their financial debt to their families) eventually pay back what they stole (or borrowed) from society when they were young thieves. Of course, the same could be said of the homeless, if they are able to return to society and work, they can repay what they owe to others.

This does not, however, address the problem presented by those who will either never be able to return to contributing to society or who will not be able to repay what they cost society, perhaps because of mental illness. The obvious reply is that it would seem unreasonable to see such people as thieves. It could, of course, be argued that we should be rid of those who cannot support themselves—but this would be a different moral argument than the one based on thievery. And would take us into a monstrous place.

What, then, about people who could return to society but elect to be free riders? That is, their situation is entirely a matter of choice and tomorrow they could pay their own way. In this case, it would be reasonable to regard these people as thieves. After all, they are taking what they could earn by honest labor and there would be (by the scenario presented) no justification for them receiving support. These do seem to be limited cases, unless we consider the wealthy people supported by the public. As argued above, the fact that very few people might exploit something intended to help people in need does not give an adequate reason to treat everyone in such a program as being an exploiter.

Considering the above arguments, providing permanent housing for the homeless seems to be both a cost saver and morally acceptable.

 

 

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One of the main arguments against heat safety regulations is based on a general profit argument: regulation will cost industry money. On the face of it, this seems intuitive: surely safety regulations would impose costs, such as the cost of providing shade, water and breaks. At the very least, if workers are taking breaks, they are not working in those breaks. So, the regulations will cost money, and the owners will lose profit.

If we suppose that this is true, given what we know about the harm of heat exposure (such as death), then opposing such regulations would be evil because it values profit over human well-being. Obviously, those who are willing to hurt (even kill) other people for profit will disagree with me. However, the fact is that effective safety practices increase profits.

The most popular example of this is how Paul O’Neil became the CEO of Alcoa in 1987 with the goal of zero worker injuries. O’Neil knew that improving worker safety in the right ways would also benefit the bottom line and was proved right.

In general terms, good safety practices can improve profits by reducing downtime and lost productivity. They can also reduce the costs imposed by damaged equipment, hiring, retaining and insurance. In general, good safety practices provide a positive return on investment per dollar. But what about heat safety? Would that help the bottom line?

Heat and dehydration reduce productivity for obvious reasons. For those who doubt this, it is easy to test by heat suicide: get out in the heat and do hard work without breaks or hydration to see what happens. Do not do this since it could kill you. Heat and dehydration also cause confusion and impair thinking; this leads to more accidents and bad choices that can impact the bottom line. There are also medical costs with heat exposure (which businesses try to pass on to workers, of course) and the fact that needlessly harsh working conditions lead to labor shortages as people do not want to work in such conditions. This is one of the many reasons American businesses often like illegal migrant labor: they can coerce them into working in dangerous conditions and pay them less. But getting back to why heat safety is good.

Hydration and shade breaks allow workers to recover and work at an overall higher efficiency than if workers were forced to push through heat. Again, you can (but should not) test this yourself. Given that safety practices improve profits, why would business leaders fight even good regulations that would make them more money?

While motivations can be difficult to prove, a reasonable inference would be that causing suffering and harm is the point. After all, if they would make more money by following good safety practices, then they are not being motivated by money. A good hypothesis would be that they are cruel, and evil given that they would be doing cruel and evil things. But when confronted with such claims, business geniuses have some replies.

One stock reply is that they are not evil, they are just operating withing the present value bias (discounting the future). A business leader might know that good heat safety practices would make more money in the long term, but they might claim that it is more profitable right now to not follow those practices. While this is still evil, it also seems untrue in the case of heat safety: heat safety now yields profits now. As such, even the short-term profit argument fails. So, a business leader would need to be either ignorant or extra evil (or both).

Another reply is the “someone else will do it, so I should too.” One could try to justify not following good heat safety practices by claiming that complying will put a business at a disadvantage against those who do not comply. One could, of course, apply that to many things that are regulated. This is like someone arguing they should sell cocaine or murder their business rivals because someone else will do the same. Also, heat safety practices give a business an advantage over those that do not do this; so opposing effective heat safety just reveals one is ignorant or evil (or both).

 

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Living in my adopted state of Florida, I have become accustomed to heat warnings and the local radio station providing advice on how to keep kids from being killed by the heat. Based on my own experience as a runner and doing work outside in the summer, I know that the Florida heat and humidity quickly take a toll. This is also backed up by science and anyone who doubts the effects of heat can do a proof by heat suicide test, which I recommend against for obvious moral and practical reasons.

Florida and other states are experiencing what was once considered unusual heat and a few years ago Miami-Dade County considered a rule that would require 10-minute shade and water breaks for outdoor workers on very hot days. Recognizing the danger, the state legislature leapt into action, passing House Bill (HB) 433 which forbids cities and counties from enacting local laws requiring employers to provide heat exposure protection to outdoor workers. As would be expected, the state legislature did not pass any statewide laws protecting workers and deferred to the federal OSHA regulations. Unfortunately for workers, OSHA currently lacks specific heat regulations and instead relies on the General Duty Clause. While one might argue that the generality of the clause suffices in providing heat protection for workers, in practice the vagueness makes enforcement difficult. For example, since the law does not define “excessive heat” or specify the exact number of minutes for rest a business can argue that the law is being applied unfairly if they are cited for violations. As would be suspected, industries with outdoor workers affected by heat generally oppose specific standards.

The main argument given in favor of HB 433 was that it would prevent a patchwork of local regulations that would hurt industry. This argument does have some appeal and a business that operates in multi jurisdictions would face difficulties in being aware of and complying with the various laws. That said, the Republican backers of this law profess to favor local control. As one would suspect, they favor local control when the locals are passing laws they like but oppose local control when they dislike the laws. One can say the same of Democrats. This is like the use of states’ rights arguments—people favor states’ rights when the states are doing what they like and the Federal government is not but oppose them when the opposite is true. The abortion and migration issues provide a good example of this as Republicans favor state rights for limiting abortion but oppose it when states oppose Trump’s migration policies and actions, such as when states complain about ICE agents killing people.

To be fair and balanced, the issue of local control is one that can be debated in good faith. As a general principle, I do favor local control based partially on my agreement with a principle of autonomy that provides a presumption of choice at the individual level and requires justifying each step up in imposition. But these step ups can be justified often because of what seems to be a paradox of liberty and rights: liberty and rights require placing limits on liberties and rights. While this might initially seem Orwellian, it makes sense when you consider examples. For example, your freedom of expression requires limiting the freedom of others to silence you. As another example, your right to life requires limiting the rights of others to keep you safe. To use a silly example, I support a general law against murdering people and not allowing individuals, cities or counties to pass laws allowing murder. For social policies and laws, I also usually operate using the principle of utility—judging these by the harm and benefit.

Getting back to the heat safety issue, one could argue that heat safety should not be left up to cities and counties because allowing such regulation would cause too much harm. This would certainly make sense if Florida had statewide heat laws or if the national law was effective. But this is not the case. As such, the effect of the law is to prevent local governments from protecting workers from the serious dangers of heat. It is thus not surprising that Florida is exceeded only by Texas in the number of workers killed by heat exposure. Does this mean that the state legislature is morally accountable for the injuries and deaths caused by the lack of regulations? The obvious answer would be that they bear some responsibility by failing to provide protection and preventing local governments from doing so. One might wonder why industry leaders oppose such regulations. Well, not much—I am sure everyone immediately thought “money.”

When I was younger and more naïve, I tended to think business leaders did evil things because they value profit more than the well-being of other people. This would at least make some sense; they were hurting people to get something they wanted. But the more I learned about business, the more it seemed that business leaders sometimes acted in ways that hurt people but also resulted in lost profits. This would seem to mean that these business geniuses were either ignorant and evil (doing harm, thinking it would profit them) or extra evil (doing harm despite knowing it would cost them profits). As a philosopher and not a politician, I cannot just make accusations without evidence, so let us work through the arguments.

While the arguments against safety regulations about heat do focus on heat, they also follow a standard template used to argue against regulations on general. One stock argument is to claim that regulation would impose a “one size fits all” standard that fails to consider important differences. While this does have some merit, this problem arises for almost any law, and the challenge is to write laws that address this concern. If this argument had merit, then it would also apply to almost any law—which is something that could be accepted (some anarchists, for example, might buy this).

A second argument is that regulation results in micromanagement that will waste time and money. As someone who just had to use my own money to complete four hours of continuing education training and engage in extensive record keeping complying with the new Florida laws regulating homeowners’ associations, I get this objection. I am an uncompensated volunteer HOA director for my neighborhood because the law also requires three officers and everyone else was sensible enough to avoid the headache, cost and annoyance of complying with hundreds of pages of laws.

As a professor who heads up the GENED committees at my university, I am compelled by the state to spend hours completing tasks to ensure that we are complying with all the new laws micromanaging education. So, I feel this objection and feel that it has merit every time I have do some paperwork that seems like imposed nonsense because of  the Republican culture war against “wokeness” and “DEI.”

That said, the problem is not requiring people to comply with a law and provide some documentation. The problems are defective laws and excessive paperwork. In the case of heat regulations, the solutions to heat exposure are simple and well understood (shade breaks and hydration) and documentation could and should be minimal. So, saying that there are laws that impose too much work is a criticism of those laws, not law in general. Unless, once again, one is an anarchist.

A third argument is the “we’ll be good” argument. The strategy is to argue that regulation is not needed because businesses will act well on their own, perhaps because they allege to care about their workers. This can have some appeal in that if people will, in fact, behave well without laws, then laws are not needed. For example, when states pass bathroom bills alleging that transpeople will attack women in bathrooms, they are passing a law that is not needed because transpeople generally do not attack people in bathrooms and laws already exist to protect people from being attacked. But we know from history that enough businesses will do bad things that they need to be regulated, just like we know that sexual assault and theft are enough of a problem that we need laws against them.

A fourth argument is the classic appeal to small business. Big industries with big businesses often argue that a law will hurt a small business and then use this to argue that the law should not be passed. This can be a fair point. For example, I am a director for a tiny HOA with under 20 houses that barely has any money for expenses and yet I must comply with rules designed for larger operations. To be fair and balanced, the HOA law does divide HOAs into two main groups (three in some cases) that allows smaller HOAs to be less burdened by the law. While this example shows that someone can be annoyed by a law applying to a small business, it also shows that laws can be crafted to account for the difference (and usually are). So, if a heat regulation destroyed small businesses, one could argue for exemptions. But there is the obvious question of whether such laws would be harmful. I’ll address this in the next essay.

 

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While many culture wars raged in the 1980s, I fought in the Game Wars. In this war, computer/video games and Dungeons & Dragons were under attack, with the mildest criticism being that these activities were a waste of time. While modern culture wars usually involve claims of (typically made up) dire harm, it is still worth considering this criticism as culture war never ends and never changes.

Back in the 1980s, I was often accused of wasting my time playing games, be they computer games or tabletop games like AD&D or BattleTech. In some cases, these criticisms were benevolent—friends and relatives were concerned for my wellbeing (one of the greatest sins a New Englander could commit is wasting time). Some other folks were merely deriding my choices.

The criticism that an activity is a waste of time is a value claim. While people who make this criticism are usually not consciously applying a normative theory, they claim the activity does not have (or produce) enough value to be worth doing, usually relative to activities they see as valuable. For those who like normative theories, this could be presented in consequentialist terms: if a person is doing an activity that lacks value, they are not generating value. They should be generating value, so they should be doing something else. This criticism is based on what the critic thinks other people should (and should not) be doing. As people like to think of time as a currency, wasting time can also be presented as spending the currency of time unwisely, as one might waste money. During the 1980s (and beyond) I often faced such criticism.

When I was in college and started studying philosophy, I wondered why I was expected to defend the value of gaming to people who spent hours chugging beer and watching other people play sports. Laying aside my residue resentment, there is a philosophical question about where the burden of proof falls when someone claims an activity is a waste of time. There is the pragmatic answer, which is determined by imbalances of power. For minors, those with power can include their parents. For example, a child might need to convince a parent that playing D&D is not a waste of time, so they are allowed to play. For almost all of us, those with power include the politicians who can pass laws banning or restricting activities. As an example of this, I offer the philosophy major.

Every philosophy major has been asked what they will do with their degree and, as a professor at a public university in my adopted state of Florida I have been repeatedly compelled to defend the major. In this pragmatic case, the goal has been to persuade those compelling me to show that the major is not a waste of time by convincing them that it results in something they value (this always involved employment and income). As they have the power to end the major, they can simply put the burden of proof on me.

There is also the pragmatic context of social cost and annoyance—people who can impose that cost or annoy those doing the activity with their criticism can thus impose the burden of proof simply by demanding it as a condition to cease their criticism.

As this essay appears in a philosophical context, I infer that many readers are familiar with the claim that philosophy itself is useless (a waste of time). Bertrand Russell (1912) has perhaps the most famous reply to this criticism, although Frankfurt (2005) has the best titled response in his work Bullshit.  My experience defending gaming prepared me to defend philosophy and my experience in philosophy now enables me to discuss the waste of time criticism philosophically.

In the case of gaming in the 1980s, the challenge we gamers faced was to show that it has value. One could also frame this challenge in terms of establishing that gaming has meaning and can be part of a meaningful life. In terms of addressing the challenge, a key issue is whether the goal is to persuade the critics that gaming has value or if the goal is to prove that gaming has value. This would, of course, apply to any activity one is defending.

If the goal is to persuade the critics, victory is getting them to stop saying the activity is a waste of time or to even acknowledge that it has value. If the goal is to prove that an activity has value, then this is a matter of logic—what is needed are plausible premises and good logic. In the case of any culture war, the goal is always persuasion, and logic is not very effective in this role.

As the waste of time criticism is based on the view that the activity does not produce adequate value, responding to it requires showing that it does. One way to do this is to operate within the concept of value used by the critic and show that the activity does produce what they value. As an anecdotal example, I was able to silence some people who said gaming was a waste of time by showing them I got paid to write gaming material. As another anecdotal example, I have defended the philosophy major by providing the latest employment and salary data for philosophy majors.

Another option, which is usually more difficult, is to convince the critic to accept a concept of value under which the activity does generate value. For example, people who defend philosophy often try to argue that the non-monetary value it produces is valuable. During the Game Wars both approaches were used. And we eventually won that war. But war never changes and never ends. So, how was that war won and how might similar wars be won in the future?

In pragmatic monetary terms, the culture war over video games was clearly won when gaming moved from a niche nerd activity to a billion-dollar marketplace ruled by corporations like Microsoft, Sony, EA, Ubisoft and Valve. Of course, this path of “victory” might have come with a higher cost than if the war had been lost. But under capitalism an obvious way to persuade many people that an activity is worth doing is to show how it generates money.

In more artistic terms, the cultural elites signaled their acceptance of the value of gaming with the 2012 The Art of Video Games at the Smithsonian American Art Museum and the MoMA exhibit the same year. Getting the cultural elites to accept something as valuable obviously helps in persuading some people that the activity is not a waste of time. In terms of mass acceptance, it makes sense to give the smart phone some credit here. As mobile games appeared, almost everyone with a smartphone became a casual gamer, thus making it harder for people to see gaming as a waste of time.

While tabletop role playing games are not as profitable as video games and are perhaps not seen as artistic as video games, Critical Role (and its animated series on Amazon Prime like The Legend of Vox Machina) and Netflix’s Stranger Things show that D&D is now a valued part of the culture. The victory parade for D&D was when Brennan Lee Mulligan ran a D&D game at the Hollywood Bowl on June 1, 2025. I remember, vividly, declaring to my D&D group that we had won the war. Anecdotally, it has been a long time since anyone accused me of wasting my time gaming. But I must admit it still feels a bit weird when people are impressed that I’ve published so much gaming stuff.

Some might think that there is more to the war over waste and worth than appeasing or persuading those with power and that there is also a philosophical issue here. As a veteran of the culture wars, I know that these pragmatic fights are won (or lost) with persuasion rather than logic. But, as a philosopher, I agree that there is obviously an important philosophical issue worth considering when we discuss whether something is a waste of time.

These discussions raise the question of value in terms of what is worth our time and what is not. As would be suspected, this discussion always runs hard into the subjective vs objective debate in value theory. Is the question of whether an activity a waste a matter of what it is worth to the person doing it or those with the power to stop them or is there an objective basis to such discussions? Or something else? This is obviously not going to be settled, so the rational approach is to consider arguments for and against an activity having worth within the context of arguments for a particular theory of value. So, the challenge is developing a theory of value and then assessing an activity within that theory. Obviously, one could embrace the pragmatic approach discussed above, which is how it plays out in practice and how I fight the culture wars. But I fight them in good faith—I only try to persuade people to believe what I can also support with (largely ineffective) logic.

 

 

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When discussing liberty in my ethics class, I use the example of the time the mayor of New York considered a ban on selling sweetened drinks larger than 16 ounces. When considering an imposition on liberty to protect people from harm, there are factual and moral issues that should be addressed. General factual issues include whether the harm is real and whether the imposition on liberty would address the harm effectively. As would be suspected, politicians often make up harms (often as part of the culture wars) or propose ineffective solutions to real harm.

In the case of the danger of “big sodas”, there are two key factual issues. The first is whether such large drinks are harmful (the harm is usually claimed to be obesity). The second is whether imposing a ban on big sodas would be effective. The same sort of reasoning would apply to other proposals to limit liberty to protect people from harm.

When the ban was proposed, the folks in businesses that profit from “big soda” claimed the drinks are not the cause of the problem. On the one hand, one could say they are wrong. After all, it makes sense that consuming large quantities of high calorie beverages (a 12 ounce soda has 124-189 calories) would contribute to people being overweight. On the other hand, it can be argued that these drinks are not the problem. After all, big drinks are not the only (or even main) source of calories for most people and hence they are just one contributory cause among many. One could also claim that people are not compelled to consume large beverages and people are often obese because of their choices. One could claim that these drinks make it easier to be obese, but they don’t seem to be the primary villains in the obesity epidemic, so to speak.

As a general principle, I hold that any imposition of liberty must be effective at addressing real harm if it is to have any reasonable chance of being justified. In the case of banning big drinks, the obvious flaw is that people can just get refills or buy multiple drinks. People buy multiple burgers or tacos and could adjust easily to getting multiple drinks. To be fair and balanced, an imposition need not be perfect but there is reasonable concern about whether the effectiveness of a proposed imposition adequately addresses the alleged harm. This is but one example and the same consideration would apply to other similar proposals, such as banning a food additive or other food product.

While the factual matters are of concern, what is of philosophical interest is whether the state has a right to impose such bans. As might be imagined, it is easy to argue for and against this right using the very same principles.

One reasonable principle is that the state has a legitimate role in preventing harm to the citizens and has a right to use its compulsive power in this capacity. The most obvious examples of this include the state’s role as a military protector and its role as the police (to the extent the police protect). Another reasonable principle, taken from John Stuart Mill, is that the state does not have a right to impose on the liberty of individuals except in cases in which the individual’s actions could cause unwarranted harm to others. For example, the state has a right to prevent citizens from murdering each other. Arguing that the state has the right to keep people from offending each other is a much heavier lift.

In the case of a drink ban, it could be argued that the state is acting to prevent harm to the citizens and is thus operating within its legitimate rights. After all, the easy accessibility of high calorie foods in high volume servings makes it easier for people to over-consume calories and this leads to increased obesity. Obesity presents a clear health threat to individuals as well as imposing significant costs on society (such as lost productivity and increased medical costs). As such, the state would be acting rightly in banning such sweet drinks. Or so one might argue. Again, this same reasoning could be applied to other alleged dangers, such as guns, same-sex marriage or video games.

One easy reply is to contend that such a ban would not be effective (as argued above) and hence would be an imposition on liberty that fails to achieve its stated goal. It seems reasonable enough to accept that the state should not restrict liberty when doing so would not achieve the stated goal of the imposition. This is because the justification for the imposition is that it will reduce or prevent harm.

Another reply, and the one I favor, is that even if such a ban was effective, it would be an illegitimate violation of liberty. The state does, of course, have a right to protect people from toxic ingredients, especially when the consumer does not know such ingredients are in their food. To use a specific example to illustrate this, the state would be acting legitimately by banning companies from surreptitiously using lead acetate in place of sugar as sweetener. This is because this substance is known to be toxic and most customers would not willingly consume “sweet lead.” In this case, the state would be protecting the customers from being harmed by the manufacturers. After all, companies should not have the liberty to poison ignorant customers. Unfortunately, in the US companies can easily sneak new chemicals into our food. One striking example was the use of Tara flour by Daily Harvest in one product. Tara flour was found to be a hepatoxin and the FDA now bans it.

In the case of sweet drinks, the customer knows what they are getting: a high calorie (typically low nutrient) drink. While it is unwise and unhealthy to consume large amounts of such drinks, if the consumer is freely making the choice to drink the beverage and is aware of its contents and effects, then the state has no right to impose on the individual’s liberty. As usual, John Stuart Mill’s arguments in favor of liberty apply here. Naturally enough, the state would be well within its rights to require companies to provide information about the beverages so that they can make informed choices. However, treating adults as if they were children in this regard is not acceptable nor within the legitimate rights of the state. After all, what is solely the business of the individual is not the business of the state and how much sweet drink a person consumes would seem to be solely his or her business. The choice is thus the right of the individual, be it a good choice (to avoid sweet drinks) or a bad choice (to consume mass quantities of sugar water).

The obvious reply to this is that the harm done by obesity is not limited to the individual. Obesity increases health care costs for everyone, impacts productivity, and has other consequences that extend beyond the individual. Given that the obesity of an individual harms others, then it would seem that the state would have the right to step in and impose restrictions to counter obesity. After all, while people have the liberty to be as obese as they can and want to be, they do not have the right to expect the rest of society to bear the consequences and costs of their poor choices. After all, that is the job of the companies that are “too big to fail.”

 To modify a stock line from the right in the US, why should the rest of us subsidize the cost of obesity–that would be a socialism of fat.  If this reasoning is plausible, then there seem to be two reasonable alternatives (and, of course, there might be others).

The first is that the state should act within its legitimate rights to endeavor to counter causal factors that significantly contribute to obesity (such as high-volume high calorie beverages). The second is that individuals who wish to enjoy the liberty to be as fat as they choose to be would need to take full responsibility for the consequences of their choices. They would, for example, need to opt out of state medical support in regard to any conditions caused by or aggravated by their obesity, perhaps by purchasing special insurance. Provided that an individual was willing to eliminate the harm their choices would impose on others, then they would have the right to do as they please. This is analogous to how certain states allow people to ride motorcycles without helmets if they have adequate insurance. Perhaps people could receive special ID cards proving they have obesity insurance and this would allow them to purchase large beverages (and other such things). Then again, this might just be silly.

A second reply to the liberty argument is that it could be argued that the sweeteners used to create sweet drinks is actually a toxic substance. Interestingly enough, lead acetate was once used as a sweetener until it was established that it is, in fact, toxic. As such, it is not wildly implausible that sweeteners in use are toxins that should be properly regulated. While it is easy enough to dismiss the idea that, for example, sugar could be toxic because it just sounds silly, it should be assessed based on scientific evidence. If sweeteners were not harmful, then an objective scientific investigation would show this. As such, those who think that it is silly to consider sugar and other sweeteners as toxic should insist on objective and extensive evaluation. After all, doing so would silence the rational critics of sweeteners and provide hard evidence to counter attempts to ban or restrict sweeteners and products that use them, such as sweet drinks.

My own view on the matter is that people have a right to the liberty of self-abuse (even self-destruction). However, this liberty does not allow them to impose on others. As such, the freedom to be fat comes with the responsibility of ensuring that other people are not forced to bear the price that the individual alone should pay. As the hackneyed saying goes, freedom is not free-and this goes for fat freedom as well. But while we are following hackneyed sayings, we should also consider stopping the practice of repeatedly using tax dollars to save the ruling elites from their endlessly bad decisions. After all, freedom isn’t free.

 

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Way back in 2012 the Washington Post published a story about how teenage Mitt Romney took offense at the long hair of fellow student John Lauber. Lauber was often teased for being a nonconformist and suspected of being a homosexual. One day young Romney and some friends overpowered Lauber and cut his hair. Apparently, no disciplinary action was taken against Romney. As time begins to run out of me, I have taken to reflecting on my own past, with a focus of sins that I might need to atone for. A key question is, of course, whether the man of today is accountable for the sins of the boy of yesterday. I’ll use Mitt as the focus of the discussion, in part because I am nostalgic for a time when even youthful misdeeds by Republicans seemed they might matter.

Intuitively, under normal circumstances a person is morally accountable for his actions. There are, of course, clear and obvious exceptions to this. In the case of teenage Romney, he seems morally accountable. He does not seem to have been coerced or compelled.

However, it is fair and reasonable to counter this view with the obvious: this took place when Romney was a teenager. Research on the teenage brain has confirmed what has long been believed: teenagers often have poor impulse control and assess actions differently than adults. Stereotypically, young males are supposed to be even more prone to bad behavior. Thinking back on my own teens, the research matches my own experiences.  I can recall numerous instances in which either I or other people did rather stupid things. In some cases, I was the perpetrator. For example, when I started playing D&D we thought it would be a great idea to engage in live combat with homemade medieval weapons. During one fight, I whacked my friend Mike in the back of head with a wooden flail and drew blood. Lots of blood. Sometimes I was the victim, like the time I had my shorts ripped off on a track team run and was forced to run back to school wearing just a jock and my shoes. For male readers who are beyond their teens, I suspect that the same is true.

While it is tempting to excuse our sins because our brains were immature, this does not seem to be enough of a basis to completely excuse bad behavior. After all, having a teenage brain does not preclude a person from making sound moral judgments. It does, however, mean that teenagers are not as good at it as adults and hence should be held less accountable than adults.

John Stewart Mill noted the difference between children and adults in his writing on liberty in terms of decision-making ability. On his view, this reduced the degree of liberty they should be allowed. From a moral (and legal) standpoint it is important to consider the extent to which an immature brain affects judgment and impulse control. After all, it is to this degree that children should be morally (and legally) excused in their actions. This difference is, of course, already recognized in some laws: in general, children are not tried as adults and in the United States and there are juvenile courts just for kids. But, as one would expect, the United States incarcerates youth at a rate much higher than the rest of the world.

We do not know how much impact the immaturity of the brain has on judgments and behavior. However, it is sufficient for my purposes to say that teenage Romney’s immature brain probably had some impact on his decision to attack Lauber, just as it did in my decision to whack my friend with a flail. Whacking  a  friend with a flail is not something I would do today, outside of a video game.

However, it seems reasonable to claim that teenage Romney should not be held as accountable as an adult would be in similar circumstances. Likewise for the teenage flail wielding LaBossiere. I will admit that I am unsure of the degree to which accountability should be reduced, but it does seem quite sensible to hold children less accountable than adults, and this should clearly extend to all of us.

In addition to the question of how accountable a person is for the action at the time of the action; there is also the question of what the sins of the past reveal about the person of the present. In the case of Mitt Romney, the clear concern was what this incident from his teenage years told the people of the United States about his fitness to be president. While Romney’s case was somewhat extreme, similar questions can be asked of all of us. For example, what does the flail incident reveal about my fitness to be a professor of philosophy? If I ran for office, should that incident be brought up by the press? What about the time I…wait, my imaginary lawyer has advised me to not speak of great egg madness of 1984.

When assessing past incidents as indicators of current character, an important point of concern is the seriousness of the action. For example, the fact that I got into a couple minor scuffles in school does not show that I am a person of bad character now. As another example, if someone committed an unprovoked brutal murder as a teenager, then this would indicate that they could be an evil person today.

In Romney’s case, the incident was somewhat serious. After all, he was involved in what seems to have been assault and battery. Likewise for the time I whacked my friend with the flail (or the time my shorts were stolen). As such, Romney’s incident and my own seem worth considering when assessing current character. While it is a tautology, it does make sense to say that we are what we did. That is, the person I am now is the result of what I did in the past. Because of this, my past actions (and anyone else’s) would be relevant to assessing who I am now.

But, of course, a person is more than just a sum of past actions. These actions impact the person and what a person does can change them so that they would no longer do what they once did. People can change for better (or worse). As such, it would not do to simply look at a specific incident and take it to define the person of today. Rather, it must be taken in context of the person’s life. How a person responds to the past action is also relevant to determining the person’s current character.

In my own case, and in the case of my friends, we generally managed to become decent adults. While I whacked my friend with a flail, I grew up to be a calm professor of philosophy. My friends turned out well, too.  Naturally, I remember the flail incident (and others) very well and I feel bad about what I did. This is one reason why I became the calm philosophy professor I am today who would not hit someone with a flail. As such, the flail incident does not show that I am currently a person of bad character.

In the case of Romney, there has been no evidence that he is prone to attacking people and cutting their hair. What was somewhat worrisome is that he initially denied remembering the incident.

On the one hand, a case could be made that Romney honestly did not remember. After all, people forget things. No doubt there are some rotten things that I did as a kid that I have forgotten that other people (such as my parents or sister) remember. Perhaps Romney honestly did not remember. Naturally, some folks might see this as a sign of bad character in that the attack did not make enough of an impression to remain in his mind. After all, I vividly remember hitting my friend with the flail. But I suspect that other people remember some bad things I did as a kid that I have forgotten.

On the other hand, politicians often claim they do not remember an incident in which they (allegedly) did wrong. This always strikes me as an odd tactic, especially when there is evidence and it is something they should remember (barring mental deterioration). A claim to not remember a misdeed certainly says something about a person’s current character. Admitting the misdeed, showing remorse and an improvement in character is, I would contend, says something far better about a person. Unless, of course, it is just a clever move to look good. But I am, in fact, sorry about whacking Mike with the flail.

 

 

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8Having fought in them since the 1980s, I know that America’s culture wars never change. My early tours of duty in the culture wars were on the gaming fronts, and I was forced into the fight during the 1980s. And have been fighting ever since. The culture warriors who start wars are usually unimaginative and lazy. Hence, they use the same rhetorical tactics and fallacies each new war.

On the one hand, endlessly refuting the same bad logic and rhetoric is exhausting. On the other hand, I can reuse my criticisms by updating them for the latest content allowing us all to fight a lazy, unimaginative war. To help others who are exhausted by these eternally stupid fights I am writing a series of essays focused on the tactics used in one type of culture war. When the next culture war starts, you can probably just use the templates discussed in this and the following essays to logically counter the culture warriors. That said, not every culture war front uses the same arguments and there is a slight chance that the culture warriors might come up with a new method.

As a veteran of the culture wars of the 1980s serving on the gaming front I saw the fight over technology, mainly video/computer games but also including the Walkman. Another part of the front was the war over tabletop role-playing games, specifically Dungeons & Dragons.

I started playing computer games in the 1970s. While my memories are faded, I recall my dad taking me to Old Town High School (where he taught math and computer science) on the weekends or after school. To keep me occupied, he let me play games like Trek and Hunt the Wumpus on a Digital DECWriter II that dialed into the University of Maine main frame. I’ve been a gamer since.

I was introduced to D&D by my mother in 1979; she had heard it would help kids like me socialize. I played for a decade before becoming a professional write and made some ramen noodle money writing for GDW, TSR, Chaosium and R. Talsorian Games while I was in graduate school. As I’m writing this, I am running a D&D 5e campaign and still publishing.

Younger people reading this might wonder about my reference to computer games and D&D as part of the culture war. After all, gaming is a billion-dollar worldwide industry and an accepted part of the culture.  But this is because we won. That war. While that fight can be seen as a matter of mere historical interest, the culture war never changes, and we see the same tactics used in the last war on gaming deployed today against other targets. One tactic is what is now known as “think of the children.”

The first known use of “think of the children” is believed to be in the1964 Walt Disney Pictures film Mary Poppins. The movie opens with Mrs. Banks trying to persuade a nanny not to quit. In popular culture, it is best known for being used by Helen Lovejoy on the Simpsons. In philosophy, it is recognized as a fallacy or a rhetorical tool, depending on how one defines the terms and how “think of the children” is used.

Oversimplifying things, a rhetorical tool draws its persuasive power from emotions or psychological factors. From the standpoint of logic, rhetoric is inert—it adds nothing (and subtracts nothing) from whatever logic might also be present. Rhetoric can be thought of as pure flavoring, making things “taste” better or worse. It would be a mistake to believe a claim based solely on a rhetorical tool. This is not to say that the claim must be false, just that a rhetorical tool provides no evidence for a claim.

As would be suspected, “think of the children” draws its power from the emotional concern most humans have for children. Even those who feel no such concern, such as some politicians, often know that they at least need to pretend to have such concern. When used as a rhetorical tool its function is to make people feel (or pretend to feel) negatively towards something that is alleged to be harmful to “the children” or feel positively towards something that is alleged to be beneficial for “the children.” The simplest way to use this is to simply say some variant of “think of the children” and rely on its emotional impact to influence people. It can also be used to empower fallacies by adding extra emotional impact.

For example, “think of the children” is often used as part of the scare tactics fallacy. This is a fallacy in which something intended to invoke fear is substituted for evidence. The error is, obviously enough, that a feeling of fear is not evidence for a claim. As another example, it is also often paired with an appeal to anger. As might be guessed, this fallacy uses something intended to invoke anger in place of evidence for a claim. It must be noted that something that causes fear or anger could also serve as evidence for a claim. For example, the fact that children are especially vulnerable to the harm of environmental pollution can be frightening and the fact that our environment is constantly being polluted might make someone angry. But the vulnerability of children to environmental pollutants can, in a developed argument, provide a reason to believe that pollution should be reduced. The fact that children are especially vulnerable to harms such as pollution, sexual abuse by authority figure (like police, clergy and coaches), and hunger does serve to enhance the rhetorical power of “think of the children” and this routinely exploited. To be fair and balanced, people do sometimes use “think of the children” in good faith because they believe there is a danger. But in most culture war battles it is used in bad faith by those who know they are exaggerating (or fabricating) the danger or who do not care about “the children.”

While a person’s motivation is irrelevant to the quality of their logic or the truth of their claims, it is reasonable to check to see if they are operating in bad faith. One way to test this is to check for consistency. If someone, for example, claims to be motivated to protect the children from a perceived threat by drag queens, they should be equally concerned about the danger presented by pollution, lack of health care, hunger, poverty, and other things that indisputably harm children. But since motivation is irrelevant to logic (but not morality) the main concern is how to tell when “think of the children” is used fallaciously.

While there are various ways to use it to empower other fallacies, the general fallacy occurs when the argument depends on the emotional appeal to “think of the children” and fails to establish a connection between the alleged harm (or benefit) and the children. For example, during the war on video games and D&D it was often simply asserted that these games would harm children and hence they should be dealt with appropriately. The error was accepting the conclusion without having adequate evidence to support the claim of harm. No doubt some people sincerely felt that games were dangerous, but however sincere their fear or concern for “the children” might have been, these feelings are no substitute for evidence.

Recently, my adopted state of Florida (and other states) has been waging war on books that reference minorities and LGBT+ people by using “think of the children.” As another example, “think of the children” is being employed to support proposals mandating age verification on the internet. Critics note that “think of the children” scare tactics are being used so that corporations and governments will be able collect more private data and more effectively track people across the internet under the guise of protecting the children.

While we should protect children from real harms (such as pollution, poverty, poor education, lack of health care and hunger) when someone invokes “think of the children” it is wise to check if there is evidence for the alleged connection between the alleged harm (or benefit) and children. If someone is only offering an emotional appeal, this does not mean they are in error, but it means that you have no reason to accept their claim based on what they have provided. It is also wise to check to see if they are acting in good faith. If they seem to otherwise fail to “think of the children” when it comes to such things as pollution, health care, hunger, education and poverty, then it is wise to be suspicious they have other motivations and are, perhaps, merely engaged in a culture war fight. And war never changes.

 

 

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The American right’s war on trans rights began with the loss of its war against LGBQ rights. The battle that marked the end of that war (for the time being) was when the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage. As demonizing LGBQ Americans was no longer a very effective political game, the right needed a new vulnerable group to demonize, and they picked trans Americans as a new target.

In 2016 North Carolina passed the first “bathroom bill” and the Obama administration responded with a guidance letter stating that Title IX required public schools to allow transgender students to use bathrooms matching their gender identity. Under the first Trump regime, the Obama era guidance was rolled back, and Trump banned transgender soldiers from serving in 2017.

When it became clear that the fear mongering and demonizing used to push bathroom bills had no basis in reality, in 2020 the right turned to banning female transgender athletes from sports. After that, the right focused on targeting trans Americans in the context of medical care, education and legal recognition. Given that about 1% of Americans are transgender, the right’s obsession with passing laws hostile to trans Americans might strike rational people as odd. This is especially true of their focus on transgender women in sports. When the NCAA allowed transgender athletes to compete, there were fewer than 10 such athletes in the United States. It is estimated that there are about 300,000 transgender youth (age 13-17) and about 13% of them participate in sports, compared to 50% of the general population. The Olympics saw hardly any transgender athletes and the professional sports leagues currently have none. While some might see this as a triumph for the anti-trans laws, the low numbers predate the bans. The war on trans is a manufactured fight targeting a minute fraction of the population, especially the moral panic over trans athletes. While some on the left have decided it would be expedient to throw trans Americans under the political bus (sacrificing a tiny minority in the hopes of political gains), I support trans rights and feel that it is somehow worse to abandon such a small minority.

As a philosopher, my usual essays are argumentative: I advance logical arguments in rational support of my view and consider opposing arguments.  In some cases, I have succeeded in changing minds about trans rights with facts and logic. These have been situations involving running friends who worried, in good faith, that they would be robbed of their places by transwomen. Since their concerns were held in good faith, learning the truth changed their view—they knew they had nothing to worry about.

From the standpoint of facts and logic, the right’s war on trans is without a foundation—it is built on lies, fear, and bad logic. But this approach can be very persuasive, since the goal of persuasion is to get people to believe a claim whether it is true or not. In contrast, good reasoning is burdened by the need to have plausible premises and strong (or valid) logic. As our good dead friend Aristotle noted, logic is the weakest form of persuasion.

In this essay I will do something different. I will tell you the story of why I support trans rights not as a logical argument but to move you to reflect on your feelings about trans rights as well. I’m also writing this to explore why I think what I think. As a philosopher, I must point out that my motivations are irrelevant to the truth of my claims; but the goal here is not proof but to sort out feelings and motivations. It’s good to know why we think what we do. If we do not reflect, we won’t know what we really believe and we won’t know whether we are being played and manipulated by others.

I’m a straight guy who has never had any doubts about being male. I do not understand what it is like to be transgender, yet I support transgender rights. On reflection, I find that some of the reasons go back to my youth.

When I was a kid, I was infamously skinny and had the weird habit of keeping my belt very tight. Like all kids, I know I had a great reason for doing my weird thing but have no idea why now. I was, of course, mocked for being so skinny and one of my mother’s friends nicknamed me “cinch belt”, which stuck. This helped me understand being mocked and subject to cruelty simply because of who I was. Something similar has probably happened to many other people. I was also misgendered once, which stuck with me.

When I was a young boy my parents would let me get shaggy between haircuts—they were both public school teachers and we did many things to save money (like how I would get one pair of sneakers a year). One time at a store, the woman behind the register identified me as a girl (I’m not sure if she was mocking me for my hair length or thought I was a girl). As a boy, I was horrified and upset by this. I insisted on getting my hair cut and it is probably one of the reasons I have wicked short hair today. But I will never forget how it felt to be misgendered, even in such a minuscule way. I can extrapolate to how trans people feel when people misgender them and recognize how much it must hurt when this is backed by cruel laws.

I usually go by “Mike” as “Michael” was reserved for use when I was in trouble. Naturally, people liked to mess with me by calling me “Mikey” as an insult and provocation. I would politely tell people not to call me that but, as would be expected, some people would persist in trying to insult and provoke me. This is a tiny thing, but it helps me understand how people feel when others refuse to use their preferred pronouns. I can imagine how I would feel if a law was passed that made people to call me “Mikey” and forbid me from using my name. If you have a nickname you hate, imagine a law being passed that mandated that people call you that.

When I was 13, I started playing Dungeons & Dragons. In the 1980s D&D was caught up in the Satanic Panic and I was accused by people of being in league with Satan (or at least being corrupted by him). This moral panic was, of course, unfounded and it taught me how moral panics are created and inflicted on people. Because of my experience with being the target of this moral panic, I have sympathy for other targets, and this obviously includes trans people. My last story is about running and, of course, the Supreme Court just upheld laws banning transgender athletes.

When I was in 7th grade my father decided I needed to play football, so I had to join the team. As mentioned above, I was a skinny kid. Football did not go well, and I knew that it was not what I wanted to do. I walked away from practice and ended up quitting. As would be expected, I was mocked endlessly for this. My grandfather would bring it up every time I saw him, until one fateful day. But after that I had no interest in sports. Until one fateful day.

My parents were divorced when I was 15, which messed me up. In those days, we just suffered through things without support and I spiraled downward. My school performance was so bad I was dropped down a division and things were not going well. Fortunately, I recovered enough to want to do better and decided to turn my life around. Part of this involved a desire to be on a sports team. I played basketball as a young kid and even attended basketball camp, so I tried that. After the first tryout, the coach said they had an important position, that of manager. I said, “coach, I have to do a sport.” He replied, “Winter track has to take everyone.” So, I joined the track team. In those days, running was looked down on. But it was still a sport.

The track coach tested new team members to see what they could do, starting out with prestigious events like hurdles, sprints and jumping. Those who were not strong enough to throw the shot put and were good at nothing became distance runners. So, I ended up running the 880, mile and 2 mile. I was okay. When I went to college, I was on the Junior Varsity team but my lack of a sense of direction caused me to get lost and run many extra miles during practice.  This made me into a good runner—I ended up being All Conference two years in cross country, which is good for a kid who walked away from football practice. Perhaps most importantly, I won the Peter Ott’s 10K in Camden, Maine—where my grandparents lived. I never heard a thing about football after that, especially since I was mentioned in the town newspaper as their grandson. If you are wondering about how this story relates to trans rights, the idea is this. Other people wanted me to be a football player, but I was not a football player but a runner. Football made me miserable and running makes me happy. Because of this experience, I think that people should have the right to be who they are—otherwise they will be miserable. At this point someone on the right will probably say that I must also defend pedophiles—this always comes up when talking about trans rights as it did with LBG rights. But I obviously do not defend pedophiles, and my view on this is stolen from J.S. Mill’s essay on liberty: people should be free to be what they are, if they do not harm others. Pedophiles obviously hurt other people.

I do not understand what it is to be transgender but, to use a silly example, I also do not understand what it is to be a devoted sports fan. As a kid I found being a sports fan boring and as an athlete I see watching sports as on par with watching other people eat. I see the value in sports and eating, but not in being a fan. I don’t get fanatical sports fans or fans of celebrities when that is a central part of their life. It seems weird and irrational to me. In my younger days, I must confess, I was a bit of an elitist about this—mostly because I still had resentment about people calling me “gay” for not wanting to watch football. But I learned to accept that just as I was a runner, other people were sports fans. Or fans of some celebrity. I learned to accept them and at least tolerate their way of being. If they do not hurt other people, they should be free to be who they are. I feel the same way for transgender people—I don’t understand what it is to be them, but they have as much right to be themselves as I do. Obviously, the right claims that transpeople are a danger—but this takes us to facts and logic, which prove the right is wrong. As it usually is.

 

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