While there are many virtues (and vices) relevant to my philosophy of violence, the virtue of courage is central. In this context, the virtue of courage is the ability to regulate the emotion of fear so that you feel the right amount of fear at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right cause, for the right purpose and in the right manner. Sorting out all these rights is challenging.

While cowardice tends to be condemned more than foolhardiness, both are vices. An excess of courage can lead a person to misjudge a situation and choose violence from overconfidence. But I am inclined to think that a deficiency of courage is the more dangerous vice, since fear distorts perception and judgment in ways that can lead to a person acting wrongly. As I found out in the “machete that wasn’t” incident, fear can enhance the misperception of objects, making a stick appear to be a machete or a phone look like a gun. This can cause a person to use what they think is justified violence as they protect themselves from, for example, a machete. Fear can also cause a person to misread other people and situations, such as perceiving innocent movements as dangerous. This can also cause people to use what they think is justified violence as they respond to someone they see as a clear threat. These are two of the many reasons why courage is an important virtue and why training for courage is a worthwhile endeavor.

Thanks to the problem of other minds I, unlike Bill Clinton, cannot feel your pain or your fear. I can only discuss my own internal experiences and infer, by analogy, that you have similar experiences. Based on my experiences, it seems that there are at least two modes of courage. The first is what I experienced in the “machete that wasn’t” incident and the second is the type I experience in the context of heights, such as flying.

When I (wrongly) perceived a person running at me with a machete, I felt a spike of fear. After that triggered a useful burst of adrenalin, the fear vanished and was replaced by cold, calm clarity. I was able to act with courage for the simple reason that I was no longer afraid. While getting a closer view of the “machete” allowed me to see it was just a big stick, the absence of fear no doubt also helped and allowed me to assess the situation more accurately. It also allowed me to act rationally rather than being driven by fear. This enabled me to speak to the person rather than simply attacking or endangering myself by fleeing in fear. I did not feel courageous and can best describe it as feeling utterly normal, as if I was still just running along peacefully or reading a book. Fortunately, I also did not feel fearless in the sense of being foolhardy and ready to engage in savage battle without care or concern. It, to go with my usual porridge metaphor, was just right—just what was needed to take the right action.

While I am a philosopher, I am interested in neuroscience, and I wonder what a brain scan at that moment would have revealed. While I was not aware of any fear (and hence, by definition, not feeling fear), perhaps those fear neurons were firing away as I ignored them. Which leads to the second mode of courage.

I am terrified of heights. While this might be understandable given that I had a ladder fail and suffered a quadriceps tendon tear, I was afraid of heights long before then. Getting on a ladder, being on a mountain, looking out the window of a tall building, and flying cause a welling of fear in my soul. I even feel it in video games. Even when my rationality tells me I am not in danger, I can feel the threat. Yes, I have tried various means of habituating myself to heights, but these have had no effect on my feeling fear. Last May, when I was flying home for my father’s funeral, I told the person (a retired NFL player) sitting beside me about my fear and he sensible asked me “Are you going to be a problem?” I assured him that I would not, and when he saw me showing no signs of concern during the takeoff, he relaxed his vigilance. That was when, of course, I struck. I am joking—otherwise you would have seen a YouTube video about an NFL player tackling a philosophy professor on a flight to Atlanta. While I appeared calm and acted normally, I was terrified the entire time—unlike my courage during a potential fight, my courage in the face of height manifests very differently. The fear is there the entire time. Sometimes it feels as if the fear is like a strong dog pulling on a leash, but I can keep it from running wild. Other times, it is like a wind I can feel, but one that has no power over me. The difference might be because they are different fears, because of a difference in my training, or perhaps I am far more afraid of heights than I am of fighting. Fortunately, the result is the same: I can act rationally as opposed to being driven about by fear. But I do find feeling fear more tiring than the absence of the feeling, although I can endure the fear of heights for hours (and I have yet to find my limit). I suspect that one difference is that my training in increases my confidence in dealing with potential violence, while there is no training I can do to counter the harms of falling from a great height. But I do admit, my fear of heights is excessive, even given the fact that a fall can easily injure or kill me. I am still trying to address this, although without success. But what about when people are trained to be afraid and then sent out on the streets with guns?

In the United States, there is a longstanding trend to train police to be warriors. While there are obvious concerns about seeing the police as warriors rather than those who protect and serve, Warrior-style police training teaches officers to feel, and act upon, fear by presenting the world as an extremely dangerous place where any interaction can kill them. Encouraging officers to view citizens as potential threats is likely to make them more afraid, especially if it is not countered by proper training in the virtues.

As discussed above and in the earlier essays, fear shapes perceptions in ways that increase the chances of unjustified and needless violence. An officer habituated to be afraid is more likely to see a phone as a gun and to interpret an innocent movement as a prelude to an attack. While officers should have a realistic view of dangers, their training should focus on habituating them to be masters of their fear rather than ruled by it. Unless, of course, the goal is to send frightened warriors out into the streets with the intention that they will be more likely to engage in violence. What makes matters even worse is the deluge of fear mongering and racism flowing forth from some media outlets and from some politicians. We, and the police are included in this, are told that minorities and migrants are a terrible threat, likely to engage in violence because they are members of gangs, physically dangerous and morally wicked. Anyone who is inundated with this is likely to have their fear increased, making it less likely they will act with courage—even if they wish to do so. While this is but one factor among many, it does help explain why some ICE agents and police officers use violence needlessly: they have been trained to be fearful warriors and deluged with a spew of terror towards the people they are interacting with. If the goal is for people to be needlessly and unjustly injured and killed, this all makes “sense.” But if we want protectors who serve the public good, we must change the training and the culture of fear propagated by the wicked.

In my previous essay I laid the groundwork for the discussion that is to follow about the anti-abortion  moral position and misogyny. As argued in that essay, a person can be anti-abortion and not a misogynist. It was also shown that attacking a person’s circumstances or consistency in regard to their professed belief in an anti-abortion  moral position does not disprove that position. It was, however, contended that consistency does matter when sorting out whether a person really does hold to an anti-abortion  position or is, in fact, using that as cover for misogyny.

Before Donald Trump, being openly misogynistic was generally a way to lose an election. As such, a clever (or cleverly managed) misogynist will endeavor to conceal his misogyny behind more laudable moral positions, such as professing to being pro-life. This, obviously, sells better than being anti-women.

 

Republicans typically profess that they are pro-life , but there is the question of whether they truly hold to this principle. Republicans are also regularly accused of being misogynists and part of this involves asserting that their anti-abortion stance is an anti-women stance. One way to sort this out is to consider whether a person acts consistently with their professed pro-life but not anti-women position. Since people are inconsistent though ignorance and moral weakness, this will not conclusively reveal the truth of the matter—but it is perhaps the best method of empirical investigation.

On the face of it, a pro-life position is the view that it is morally wrong to kill. If a person held to this principle consistently, then they would oppose all forms of killing and this would include hunting, killing animals for food, capital punishment, and killing in war. There are people who do hold to this view and are thus consistent. This view was taken very seriously by Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine and St. Aquinas. After all, as I say to my Ethics students, it would be a hell of a thing to go to Hell for eating a hamburger.

The pro-life  view that killing is wrong would seem to require a great deal of a person. In addition to being against just straight-up killing in war, abortion and capital punishment, it would also seem to require being against other things that kill people, such as poverty, pollution and disease. As such, a pro-life person would seem to be required to favor medical and social aid to fight things like disease and poverty that kill people.

As is obvious, there are many who profess being pro-life while opposing things that would reduce deaths. They even oppose such things as providing food support for mothers and infants who are mired in poverty. One might thus suspect that they are not so much pro-life as anti-woman. Of course, a person could be anti-abortion and still be opposed to society rendering aid to people to prevent death.

One option is to be against killing but be fine with letting people die. While philosophers do make this moral distinction, it seems a bit problematic for a person to claim that he opposes abortion because killing fetuses is wrong, but not providing aid and support to teenage mothers, the sick, and the starving is acceptable because one is just letting them die rather than killing them. Given this view, a “pro-life” person of this sort would be okay with a mother just abandoning her baby—she would simply be letting the baby die rather than killing her.

People who profess to be pro-life also often are morally onboard with killing and eating animals. The ethics of killing animals (and plants) was also addressed explicitly by Augustine and Aquinas. One way to be pro-life but hold that killing animals is acceptable is to contend that humans have a special moral status that other living things lack. The usual justification is that we are better than them, so we can kill (and eat) them. This view was held by St. Augustine and St. Anselm.

 However, embracing the superiority principle does provide an opening that can be used to justify abortion. One merely needs to argue that the fetus has a lower moral status than the woman and this would seem to warrant abortion.

Many people who profess a pro-life view also favor capital punishment and war. In fact, it is common to hear a politician smoothly switch from speaking of the sanctity of life to the need to kill terrorists and criminals. One way to be pro-life  and accept capital punishment and war is to argue that it is the killing of innocents that is wrong. Killing the non-innocent is fine.

The obvious problem is that capital punishment sometimes kills innocent people, and war always involves the death of innocents. If these killings are warranted in terms of interests, self-defense, or on utilitarian grounds, then the door is open for the same reasoning being applied to abortion. After all, if innocent adults and children can be killed for national security, economic interests or to protect us from terrorists, then fetuses can also be killed for the interests of the woman or on utilitarian grounds. Also, animals and plants are clearly innocent. Someone who is fine with killing people for the sake of interests or on utilitarian grounds yet professes to be devoutly pro-life might justifiably be suspected of being more anti-women than pro-life.

A professed pro-life position can also be interpreted as the moral principle that abortions should be prevented. This is, obviously, better described as anti-abortion rather than pro-life. One obvious way to prevent abortions is to prevent women from having them. This need not be a misogynistic view—one would need to consider why the person holds to this view and this can be explored by considering the person’s other expressed views on related matters.

If a person is anti-abortion, then she should presumably support ways to prevent abortion other than merely stopping women from having them. Two rather effective ways to reduce the number of abortions (and thus prevent some) are effective sex education and access to birth control. These significantly reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies and thus reduce the number of abortions. Not surprisingly, abstinence focused “sex education” fails dismally.

Being anti-abortion is rather like being anti-traffic fatality. Telling people to not drive will not really help. Teaching people how to drive safely and ensuring that protection is readily available does work quite well.

Because of this, if a person professes to be anti-abortion, yet is opposed to effective sex education and birth control, then it is reasonable to suspect misogyny. This is, of course, not conclusive: the person might have no dislike of women and sincerely believe that ignorance about sex is best, that abstinence works, and that birth control is evil. The person would not be a misogynist—just in error.

In closing, it must be reiterated that just because a person is inconsistent about their professed pro-life  moral principles, it does not follow that they must be a misogynist. After all, people are often inconsistent because of ignorance, because they fail to consider implications, and from moral weakness. However, if a person professes a pro-life  position, yet is consistently inconsistent in regards to their actions and other professed views, then it would not be unreasonable to consider that there might be some misogyny in play.