Category: Politics

In response to a video I did on D&D and racism, a viewer posted “yet another racist feeling guilt trying to project their racism onto others, but this one attempting to use logic and his “appeal to superiority” with his college knowledge…” I do not know whether this was sincere criticism or trolling, but the tactics are common enough to be worth addressing.

There is a lot going on in that single sentence, which is itself a rhetorical tactic analogous to throwing matches in a dry forest. Throwing matches is quick and easy; putting out the fires takes time and effort. But if they are not addressed, the “match thrower” can claim they have scored points. This creates a nasty dilemma: if you take time to respond to these matches, you are using way more time than the attacker, so even if you “win” you “win” little because they have invested so little in the attacks. If you do not respond, then they can claim victory. While this would also be an error on their part since a lack of response does not prove that a claim is correct, it could give them a rhetorical “victory.”

The references to using logic and “college knowledge” seem to be a tactic I have addressed before, which is the “argument against expertise.” It occurs when a person rejects a claim because it is made by an authority/expert and has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Authority/expert A makes claim C.

Conclusion: Claim C is false.

 

While experts can be wrong, to infer that an expert is wrong because they are an expert is absurd and an error in reasoning. This can be illustrated by a person concluding that there must be nothing wrong with their car solely because an expert mechanic said it had an engine issue. That would be bad reasoning.

The person is also using an ad hominem and a straw man attack. In the video I explicitly note that I am giving my credentials to establish credibility and note that I should not be believed simply because I am an expert in philosophy and gaming: my arguments stand or fall on their own merit. As such, the “appeal to superiority” is unfounded but provides an excellent example of combining a straw man with an ad hominem.  These are common bad faith tactics, and it is wise to know them for what they are. I now turn to the focus of this essay, which is the tactic of accusing critics of racism of being the real racists.

The easy part to address is the reference to guilt arising from being racist. Even someone is motivated by guilt, it is irrelevant to the truth of their claims and this is just another ad hominem attack. As far as projecting racism, this is just part of the claim that the critic of racism must be racist. While the accusation of racism can be seen as a rhetorical device, there does seem to be an implied argument behind it and some take the time to develop an argument for their accusation of racism. Let us look at some versions of this argument:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about an aspect of racism or racist R.

Conclusion: Person A is a racist because of C.

 

While not a specific named fallacy, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Consider the same sort of logic, which is obviously flawed:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about an aspect of corruption or a corrupt person.

Conclusion: Person A is a corrupt person because of C.

 

Being critical of corruption or a corrupt person does not make you corrupt. While a corrupt person could be critical of corruption or another corrupt person, their criticism is not evidence of corruption. Two other bad arguments are as follows:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about aspect of racism or racist R.

Premise 2: Person A is a racist because of C.

Conclusion: Criticism C is false.

 

This is obviously just an ad hominem attack: even if A was a racist, this has no bearing on the truth of C. Consider an argument with the same sort of reasoning:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about an aspect of corruption or corrupt person R.

Premise: Person A is a corrupt person because of C.

Conclusion: Criticism C is false.

 

This is quite evidently bad logic; otherwise, anyone who criticized corruption would always be wrong.

 

A variant, equally bad, is this:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about aspect of racism or racist R.

Premise 2: Person A is a racist because of C.

Conclusion: R is not racist.

 

While not a named fallacy, it is still bad logic: even if person A were a racist, it would not follow that R is not. Once again, consider the analogy with corruption:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes criticism C about an aspect of corruption or corrupt person R.

Conclusion: Person A is a corrupt person because of C.

Conclusion: R is not corrupt.

 

Again, the badness of this reasoning is evident: if it were good logic, any accusation of corruption would be automatically false. At this point it can be said that while these bad arguments are really used, perhaps there are some good arguments that prove that being critical of racism or racists makes a person a racist or proves their criticism is false.

I do agree that there are cases in which critics of certain types of racism are racists. An obvious example would be the Nation of Islam: they assert, on theological grounds, that blacks are innately superior to whites. Someone who believes this could be critical of racism against themselves and they would be a racist criticizing racism (of a specific type). But it is not their criticism of racism that makes them racist; it is their racism that makes them racist.

What is needed is an argument showing that being critical of racism makes someone a racist. That is, if the only information you had about any person was the full text of their criticism you would be able to reliably infer from the criticism that they are racist. Obviously enough, if the criticism contained racism (like a Nation of Islam member criticizing white racism because of their view that blacks are inherently superior to whites) one could do this easily. But to assume that every criticism of racism must contain racism because it is a criticism of racism would beg the question. Also, pointing to racists who make a criticism of racism and inferring that all critics who make that same criticism are thus racists would be to fall into the guilt by association fallacy. And, of course, even if a critic were racist, it would be an ad hominem to infer their criticism is thus false. A racist can rightfully accuse another racist of racism.

 While the “ideal” argument would show that all criticisms of racism make one racist (and, even “better”, disprove the criticism) such an argument would be suspiciously powerful: it would show that every critic of racism is a racist and perhaps automatically disprove any criticisms about racism. Probably the best way to argue for such an argument is to focus on showing that being critical of racism requires criticizing people based on their race and then making a case for why this is racist. The idea seems to be that being critical of racism requires accepting race and using it against other races (or one’s own), thus being racist. But this seems absurd if one considers the following analogy.

Imagine, if you will, a world even more absurd than our own. In this world, no one developed the idea of race. Instead, people were divided up by their earlobes. Broadly speaking, humans have two types of earlobes. One is the free earlobe—the lobe hangs beyond the attachment point of the ear to the head. The other is the attached earlobe: it attaches directly to the head. In this absurd world, the free lobed were lauded as better than the attached lobed. Free lobed scientists and writers asserted that the free lobed are smarter, more civilized, less prone to crime and so on for all  virtues. In contrast, the attached lobed were presented as bestial, savage, criminal, stupid and immoral.  And thus, lobism was born. The attached lobed were enslaved for a long period of time, then freed. After that, there were systematic efforts to oppress the attached lobed; though progress could not be denied. For example, a person with partially attached lobes was elected President. But there are still many problems attributed to lobism.

In this weird world some people are critical of lobism and argue that aside from the appearance of ear lobes, there is no biological difference between the groups. Would it make sense to infer that their criticism of lobism entails that they are lobists? That they have prejudice against the free lobed, discriminate against them and so on? Does it mean that they believe lobist claims are real: that the lobes determine all these other factors such as morality, intelligence and so on? Well, if critics of racism must be racists, then critics of lobism must be lobist. If one of us went into that world and were critical of lobism, then we would be lobists. This seems absurd: one can obviously be critical of lobism or racism without being a lobist or racist.

As noted in previous essays, Wizards of the Coast (WotC) created a stir when they posted an article on diversity and D&D. The company made some minor changes to the 2024 version of the game which generated some manufactured controversy.  The company took the approach of “portraying all the peoples of D&D in relatable ways and making it clear that they are as free as humans to decide who they are and what they do.” They also decided to make a change that “offers a way for a player to customize their character’s origin, including the option to change the ability score increases that come from being an elf, a dwarf, or one of D&D’s many other playable folk. This option emphasizes that each person in the game is an individual with capabilities all their own.”

While the AD&D Monster Manual allowed individual monsters to vary in alignment and Dungeon Masters have always broken racial stereotypes in their campaigns, there has also been a common practice to portray races and species in accord with established in-game stereotypes. Drow and orcs are traditionally monstrous and evil while elves and dwarves are usually friendly and good.

AD&D also established the idea that fantasy races have specific physical and mental traits. AD&D also set minimum and maximum scores for the game stats. For example, half-orcs have a maximum Intelligence score of 17, a Wisdom score limit of 14, and their highest possible Charisma is 12. The game also divided characters by sex; females of all the races could not be as strong as the males. A PC’s race also limited what class they could take and how far they could progress. Going back to half-orcs, they could not be druids, paladins, rangers, magic users, illusionists, or monks. They could be clerics, fighters or thieves, albeit with limits on their maximum level. They were, however, able to level without racial limits as assassins. This is why AD&D players are suspicious of half-orc PCs; they are probably evil assassins. As a side note, the only PCs I have killed as a player have been half-orc assassins who decided tried to assassinate me. Given that race has been such an important part of D&D, it is no wonder the changes upset some players.

While some assume all critics of the changes are racist, I will not make that mistake. There are good, non-racist arguments for not changing the game. The problem is that racists (or trolls using racism) also use the same arguments. A difference between the two, aside from the racism, is that honest critics are arguing in good faith while racists (and trolls using racism) are arguing in bad faith. The main distinction is in their goals: a good faith critic opposes the changes for reasons they give in public. Those arguing in bad faith conceal their true motives and goals.

Some claim the people making the bad faith arguments are probably just trolls and not racists. But this distinction does not matter. Consider the following analogy. Imagine Sally takes communion at church. The wine tastes odd and later someone Tweets at her “did u like the atheist piss in ur blood of Christ? Lol!” Consider these three options. First, the person does not have a real commitment to atheism and is just trolling Sally to get a reaction. Second, the person hates Sally personally and was out to get her. Third, the person is an atheist who hates religious people and went after Sally because she is religious.

On the one hand, the person’s motives do not really matter: Sally still drank their urine. That is, the harm done does not depend on why it is done.  On the other hand, one can debate the relative badness of the motivations—but this does not seem to change the harm. Going back to racism, the person’s motivation does not matter in terms of the harm they cause by defending and advancing racism. Now, to the argument.

A good-faith argument can be made by claiming there is in-game value of having distinct character races, such as allowing people different experiences. Just as having only one character class would be dull, only having one basic race to play would also be dull. So, just as the classes should be meaningfully different, so too should the fictional races. While there are legitimate concerns about how racists can exploit the idea that races differ in abilities, it can also be argued that people understand the distinction between the mechanics of the fantasy world and reality. It can also be argued that we can stop the slippery slope slide from accepting fantasy races as different while not embracing real-world racism. One could even make a positive argument: people playing the game get accustomed to fictional diversity and recognize that PCs of different types bring different strengths to the party, something that extends analogically to the real world.

Unfortunately, this same sort of argument can be used in bad faith. One tactic is to use this argument but then slide into alleged differences between real people and then slide into actual racism. As a concrete example, I have seen people begin with what seems to be a reasonable discussion of D&D races that soon becomes corrupt. One common racist (or troll) tactic is to start by bringing up how D&D has subraces for many PC races. There are subraces of elves, dwarves, halflings and others that have different abilities. The clever racist (or troll) will suggest there should be human subraces in the game. On the face of it, this seems fine: they are following what is already established in the game. At this point, the person could still be a non-racist who likes the idea of fantasy subraces and thinks it would be cool to have different options when they play a human. But the racist will move on to make references to real-world ethnic groups, asking how one would stat whites, Asians, African-Americans and so on. The person can insist that they are just following the logic of the game and they seem to be right. After all, if the game has many sub-races with meaningful differences, then the same could apply to humans. And this is exactly how a racist can exploit this aspect of the game. A persuasive racist can convince people that they never moved from discussing D&D into racism and they can use the honest critics as cover. This shows why the change has merit, it could deny racists a tool.

Being an old school gamer, I do like the idea of distinct races in games. This is because of the variety they offer for making characters. While I do not want to yield this to the racists, I can see the need for a change to counter the racists. This would be yet another thing made worse by racists.

A second argument is a reductio ad absurdum argument. The idea is to assume that something is true and then derive an absurdity or contradiction from this assumption. This shows that assumption is false. In the case of races in D&D, some people have noted that the proposed approach would logically lead to all creatures in the game being the same. One person, I recall, asserted that the proposed changes entail that tigers and beholders would have the same stats. Another person joked (?) that this would also mean that gnolls would be “friendly puppers.” The idea was, of course, to show that assuming the changes should be accepted would lead to absurd results: no one wants monsters to all have the same stats and no one wants all the game creatures to be good. 

While this could be a good faith argument, there are some concerns. One is that reducing the changes to absurdity in this manner seems to require using the slippery slope fallacy or at least hyperbole and the straw man fallacy. No one is seriously proposing to give all monsters the same statistics or that they will all be morally good. In terms of the slippery slope, no reason has been given that WotC would take the changes to these absurd extremes. At best these would be poor good faith arguments. Depending on where a person goes with them, they could also be bad faith arguments; after all, they do mirror the real-world racist arguments that claim it is absurd to think everyone is perfectly equal and then argue for racism.

I obviously do not think that all monsters should have identical stats nor that all monsters should be good. But this is consistent with the changes and one can easily adopt them and avoid the slippery slope slide into absurdity. In closing, whatever changes WotC makes to D&D, they have no control over what people can do in their own campaigns.

A few years ago, Wizards of the Coast(WotC), who own Dungeons & Dragons, issued a statement on diversity. As would be expected, the responses split along ideological lines and the culture war continues to this day. The D&D front of the culture war is personal for me. I started playing D&D in 1979 and have been a professional gaming writer since 1989. This ties me into the gaming aspect of the war. I am also a philosophy professor, so this ties me into the moral and aesthetic aspects of this fight.

The statement made by WotC has three main points. The first addresses race in the real world. The second addresses the portrayal of fictional races, such as orcs and drow, within the game. The third addresses racism from the real world within the game, with the example of how a Romani-like people were portrayed in the Curse of Strahd. In this essay I will focus on the in-game issues.

Before getting to the in-game issues, I will pre-empt some of the fallacious arguments. While it is tempting to use straw man attacks and hyperbole in this war, WotC cannot prevent gamers from doing as they wish in their own games. If you want your orcs to be evil, vegans, mathematicians or purple, you can and there is nothing WotC or Hasbro can do. Any change of WotC policy towards D&D races (or species) only applies to WotC. As such, the only censorship issue applicable here is self-censorship.

As always in the culture war, there were (and are) ad hominem attacks on folks at WotC. Most of these attribute “wicked” motives to them and take these alleged motivations as relevant to the correctness of their claims. In some cases, the criticism is that WotC is engaged in “woke marketing” to sell more products. While this can be evaluated as a business strategy, it proves nothing about the correctness of their position. In other cases, those at WotC have been accused of being liberals who are making things soft and safe for the dainty liberal snowflakes. This is also just an ad hominem and proves nothing. One must engage with the actual claims rather than flail away with insults.

To be fair, one can raise legitimate questions about the ethics of the folks at WotC: their motives do matter when assessing them as people. If this is merely cynical snowflake marketing, then they could be criticized as hypocrites. But their motives are still irrelevant to the assessment of their position and plans. It is to this that I now turn.

While the Monster Manual from AD&D does allow for monsters to differ in alignment from their standard entries in the book, many fictional races in the game have long been presented as “monstrous and evil.” These famously include orcs and the drow (a type of elf). The concern expressed by WotC is that the descriptions of these fictional races mirror the way racism manifests in the real world. Their proposed fix was to portray “all the peoples of D&D in relatable ways and making it clear that they are as free as humans to decide who they are and what they do.” In the case of real-world racism manifesting in their products, such as the depiction of a fictional version of the Romani, they plan to rewrite some older content and ensure that future products are free of this sort of thing. These changes raise both moral and aesthetic concerns.

One way to defend the traditional portrayal of fictional races in D&D is to, obviously enough, appeal to tradition. Since Tolkien, orcs have been portrayed as evil. Since the G and D series of modules,  D&D drow have been evil. The obvious problem with this defense is that it the appeal to tradition is a fallacy, one I have addressed at length in other essays.

Another way to defend the idea that some fictional races are inherently evil (or at least almost always evil) is to use in-game metaphysics. Until recently, good and evil were objective aspects of the standard D&D world. Spells could detect good and evil, holy and unholy weapons inflicted damage upon creatures of opposing alignments, and certain magic impacted creatures based on their alignment. Demons and devils are, by their nature, evil in classic D&D. Angels and other celestials are, by nature, good in classic D&D. While alignment does have some role in D&D 5E, this role is miniscule by way of comparison.

In most D&D worlds, gods of good and evil exist and certain races were created by such gods. For example, the elves have mostly good deities, with the most obvious exception being the goddess Lolth, the queen of the demonweb pits. As such, the notion of races that are predominantly evil or good makes sense in such game worlds. As good and evil are metaphysically real, creatures could be imbued by divine and infernal powers with alignments.

While this defense does have its appeal, it raises an obvious concern: in the real-world people defend real racism with appeals to good and evil. They invoke creation stories to “prove” that certain people are better and others inferior. As the folks at WotC note, fantasy worlds often mirror the racism of the real world.

One reply to such concerns is to point out that most people can distinguish between the fictional world of D&D and the real world. Casting orcs and drow as evil and monstrous, even using language analogous to that used by racists in the real world, is nothing to be concerned about because people know the difference. The player who curses the “foul green skins” in game will not thus become a racist in the real world and curse the “wicked whites.” Thus, one might conclude, WotC stands refuted. There is, however, an ancient philosophical counter to this reply.

In the Republic Plato presents an argument for censorship based on the claim that art appeals to emotions and encourages people to give in to these emotions.  Giving way to these emotions is undesirable because it can lead to shameful or even dangerous behavior. On his view, viewing tragic plays might lead a person to give in to self-pity and behave poorly. Exposure to violent art might cause a person to yield more readily to the desire to commit violence. While Plato does not talk about racism (because the ancients had no such concept), his argument would apply here as well: engaging in fictional racism can lead people to racism in the real world. As such, Plato would presumably praise WotC for this action.

At this point it is reasonable to bring up the obvious analogy to video games. While the power of video games to influence ethics would seem to be an empirical matter, the current research is inconclusive because the “…evidence is all over the place” —so it currently comes down to a matter of battling intuitions regarding their power to influence. So, I will turn to Plato’s most famous student.

As Aristotle might say, players become habituated by their play.  This includes not just the skills of play but also the moral aspects of what is experienced in play. This, no doubt, is weaker than the influence of the habituation afforded by the real world. But to say that D&D games with moral components have no habituating influence is analogous to saying that video games with hand-eye coordination components have no habituating impact on hand-eye coordination beyond video games. One would have to assert players learn nothing from their hours of play, which seems unlikely.

I am not claiming that D&D takes control of the players in a Mazes and Monsters scenario, just that experiences shape how we perceive and act, something that is obviously true. So, I do not think that people who play in D&D games casting orcs and drow as monstrous and even those that mirror real world racism would make players into white supremacists. Rather, I agree with the obvious claim: our experiences influence us and getting comfortable with fictional racism makes it slightly easier to get comfortable with real world racism.

For those who prefer Kant, one could also advance a Kantian style argument: it does not matter whether the in-game racism that mirrors real world racism has an impact on people’s actions or not, what matters is whether such racism is wrong or right in and of itself. If racism is wrong, then even fictional racism would thus be wrong.

As someone who regularly games, I can see the obvious danger in the arguments I have just advanced: would not the same arguments apply to a core aspect of D&D, namely the use of violence? I will address these matters in the next essay.

During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Leon County in my adopted state of Florida mandated the wearing of face coverings in indoor, public spaces. There were numerous exceptions, such as while exercising (at a distance) and for health reasons. Those who violate the ordinance faced an initial $50 fine which increased to $125 and then up to $250. As would be expected, this ordinance was met with some resistance. Some even claimed that the mask mandate was tyranny.

While discussing the tyranny of the mask during COVID-19 has some historical value, there is also the general issue of whether such health focused mandates are tyrannical. After all, it is just a matter of time before the next pandemic and the state might impose mandates intended to keep people safe. Or it might not, depending on who is in charge.  

One challenge is agreeing on a serious definition of “tyranny” beyond “something I don’t like.” Since American political philosophy is based heavily on John Locke, he is my go-to for defining the term.

Locke takes tyranny to be the “exercise of power beyond right.” For him, the right use of power is for the good of the citizens and a leader’s use of power for “his own private separate advantage” is exercising that power “beyond right.” Locke also presents some other key points about tyranny, noting that it occurs when “the governor, however entitled:

 

  • Makes his will and not the law the rule
  • Does not direct his commands and actions to the preservation of the properties of his people.
  • Directs them to the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.”

 

Did the ordinance, and similar impositions, meet the definition? On the face of it, it did not. After all, the aim of the ordinance seemed to be for the good of the citizens: it was aimed at reducing the chances of infection. It was also aimed at allowing businesses and other public places to remain. That is, it was aimed at the preservation of the properties of the people. There is no evidence that those in office used the ordinance for their “own private separate advantage” or were trying to satisfy some “irregular passion.”

It could be argued that while the objectives of the ordinance were not tyrannical, the ordinance involved exercising power “beyond right.” That is, the ordinance overstepped the legitimate limits of the power of the governing body. Since I am not a lawyer, I will focus on the moral aspect: do authorities have the moral right to impose a mask requirement or similar health measure on the people?

While people tend to answer in terms of their likes and dislikes, I will follow J.S. Mill and use principles I consistently apply in cases of liberty versus safety. As in all such cases, my first area of inquiry is into the effectiveness of the proposed safety measures. After all, if we are giving up liberty to gain nothing, this would be both foolish and wrong.

While there is some debate over the effectiveness of masks, the consensus of experts is that they do help prevent the spread of the virus. There is also the intuitively plausible argument that face coverings reduce the spread of the virus because they reduce the volume and distance of expulsions. They also block some of what is incoming. Medical professionals have long used these masks for these reasons. In future pandemics, we will also need to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed measures in good faith.

But wearing a mask is not without its costs. Aside from the cost of buying or making masks, they are uncomfortable to wear, they interfere with conversations, and it is hard to look good in a mask. While breathing does require a tiny bit more effort, this is generally not a significant factor for most. Those with pre-existing conditions impacting their breathing are more likely to be severely impacted by COVID-19—but they will need to rationally weigh the relative risks. Anecdotally, I did not find the masks problematic for normal wear, but I used to run wearing a face mask during the Maine winters to keep my face from freezing. That said, the “paper” masks were uncomfortable to wear when they were soaked with sweat, but I was almost always able to rely on distancing while running.

Weighing the effectiveness of the masks against the harm, they seem to have had a decisive safety advantage: by enduring some minor discomfort for short periods of time you could reduce your risk of being infected with a potentially lethal disease. You also reduced the risk of infecting others. Again, whatever measures are proposed during the next pandemic will also need to be assessed in this way.

The second issue to address is whether the gain in safety warrants the imposition on liberty. After all, some people did not want to wear masks, and it is an imposition to require this under the threat of punishment. My go to guide on this is the principle of harm presented by J.S. Mill.

Mill contends that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” I will rely on Mill’s arguments for his principle but agree it can be criticized in favor of alternative principles.

During the discussion of his principle Mill argues that we (collectively) have no right to infringe on a person’s liberty just because doing so would be good for them or even to prevent them from harming themselves. As long as their actions impact only themselves, their liberty is absolute. Applying this to the masks, if they only served to protect a person from infection, then Mill’s principle would forbid their imposition: people have the liberty of self-harm. If this had been true, I would have agreed with those who saw masks as tyranny: they have the moral right to put themselves at risk if doing so does not harm others. As they say, their body, their choice.

To use an analogy, If I want to go shooting without wearing any eye protection (and I have medical insurance), I have the right to be stupid and risk losing an eye. But the masks do more than protect the wearer; they also protect other people. If I go out without a mask and I am unaware I am infected, I am putting other people in greater danger—I am potentially harming them. As such, it is no longer just my business, it is their business as well.

Going back to the gun analogy, I do not have a right to just shoot my gun around whenever and wherever I want since doing so puts other people at risk of injury and death. I can be rightfully prevented from doing this. To use another analogy, while I think a person has the moral right to turn off their airbag in their car and face a greater risk of injury or death, they do not have the right to remove their brakes since that would put everyone in danger.

The obvious conclusion is that the imposition of masks was not tyranny. In fact, it is an excellent example of how the state should exercise its power: for the protection of the citizens based on the best available evidence. When the next pandemic arrives, the same approach should be taken. Assuming that the government tries to do anything to address it.

In the previous essay I discussed guilt by association. Not surprisingly, there is an equal but opposite temptation: to refuse to acknowledge bad elements in groups one likes. Giving in to this temptation can result in committing a version of the purity fallacy which could be called the Denial of Association.

This version of the fallacy occurs when a negative claim about a group based on certain members is rejected by asserting, without adequate support, that the alleged members are not true members of the group. This fallacy is also known as the No True Scotsman fallacy thanks to the philosopher Anthony Flew. For example, if a 2nd Amendment rights group is accused of being racist, they might say that those displaying racist symbols at their events were not real members. This version of the fallacy has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Negative claim P has been made about group G based on M members of G.

Premise 2: It is claimed, without support, that the members of M are not true members of G.

Conclusion: Claim P is false.

 

This reasoning is fallacious because simply asserting that problematic alleged members are not true members does not prove that the claim is not true about the group. As always, it is important to remember that fallacious reasoning does not entail that the conclusion is false. A group’s defender could commit this fallacy while their conclusion is correct; they would have simply failed to give a good reason to accept their claim.

Like many fallacies, it draws its persuasive power from psychological factors. Someone who has a positive view of the group has a psychological, but not logical, reason to reject the negative claim. Few are willing to believe negative things about groups they like or identify with. In Flew’s original example, a Scotsman refuses to believe a story about the bad behavior of other Scotsmen on the grounds that no true Scotsman would do such things. People can also reject the claim on pragmatic grounds, such as when doing so would provide a political advantage.

The main defense against this fallacy is to consider whether the negative claim is rejected on principled grounds or is rejected without evidence, such as on psychological or pragmatic grounds. One way to try to overcome a psychological bias is to ask what evidence exists to reject the counterexample. If there is no such evidence, then all that would be left are psychological or pragmatic reasons, which have no logical weight.

Sorting out who or what belongs in a group can be a matter of substantial debate. For example, when people displaying racist symbols show up at gun rights events or protests the question arises as to whether the protesters should be regarded, in general, as racist. Some might contend those openly displaying racist symbols should not define the broader group of protesters. Others contend that by tolerating the display of racist symbols the general group shows that it is racist. As another example, those peacefully protesting police violence generally disavow those who engage in violence and vandalism and claim that the violent protesters do not define their group. Others contend that because violence and looting sometimes occurs adjacent to or after peaceful protests, the protesters are violent looters. College students peacefully protesting Israel’s actions contend that they are not antisemitic and disavow antisemitism, but their right-wing critics claim they are antisemitic. In some cases, there are actual antisemites involved. In other cases, merely criticizing Israel is cast as antisemitic.

Debates over group membership need not be fallacious. If a principled argument is given to support the exclusion, then this fallacy is not committed. For example, if a fictional 2nd amendment rights organization “Anti-Racists for Gun Rights” (ARGR) was accused of being racist because people at their protest displayed racist symbols, showing that none of the racists were members of ARGR would not commit this fallacy.

As another example, if peaceful protesters show that those who engaged in violence and looting are not part of their group, then it would not be fallacious for them to reject the claim that they are violent on the grounds that those committing the violence are not in their group. As a third example, if college students peacefully protesting Israel show that the people shouting antisemitic slogans at the protest were neo-Nazis from off campus, then they would not be committing this fallacy.

Sorting out which people belong to a group and how the group should be defined can be challenging; but should be done in a principled way. To define a group by the worst of those associated with it runs the risk of committing the guilt by association fallacy. Denying that problematic members are not true members of a group runs the risk of committing the denial of association fallacy. While both fallacies are psychologically appealing and can be highly effective means of persuasion, they have no merit as arguments.

As a practical matter, the unprincipled use both fallacies in efforts to advance their goals in bad faith. After all, what matters to them is “winning” rather than what is true and good.

It is tempting to define a group you do not like by the worst people associated with it, but this can lead to committing the fallacy of guilt by association. To illustrate, conservative protests sometimes include people openly displaying racist symbols and this can lead leftists to conclude that all the protestors are racists. As another example, protests against Israel’s actions sometimes include people who make antisemitic statements, and this leads some people to categorize the protests as antisemitic. While this is often done in bad faith, people can sincerely make unwarranted inferences about protests from the worst people present.

Since people generally do not make their reasoning clear, it often must be reconstructed. One possible line of bad reasoning is the use of a hasty generalization. A hasty generalization occurs when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on a sample that is not large enough to adequately support the concussion. It has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Sample S (which is too small) is taken from population P.

Premise 2: In Sample S X% of the observed A’s are B’s.

Conclusion: X% of all A’s are B’s in Population P.

 

This is a fallacy because the sample is too small to warrant the inference. In the case of the protesters, inferring that most conservative protesters are racists based on some of them displaying racist symbols would be an error. Likewise, inferring that most people protesting Israel are antisemitic because some of them say antisemitic things would also be an error. At this point it is likely that someone is thinking that even if most conservative protesters are not open racists, they associate with them—thus warranting the inference that they are also guilty. Likewise, someone is probably thinking that people protesting Israel are guilty of antisemitism because of their association with antisemites. This leads us to the guilt by association fallacy.

The guilt by association fallacy has many variations but this version occurs when it is inferred that a group or individual has bad qualities because of their  (alleged) association with groups or individuals who have those qualities. The form of the fallacy is this:

 

Premise 1: Group or person A is associated with group or person B

Premise 2: Group or person B has (bad) qualities P, Q, R.

Conclusion: Group A has (bad) qualities P, Q, R.

 

The error is that the only evidence offered is the (alleged) association between the two. What is wanting is an adequate connection that justifies the inference. In the conservative protester example, the protesters might be associated with protesters displaying racist symbols, but this is not enough to warrant the conclusion that they are racists. More is needed than a mere association. The more is, as one would imagine, a matter of considerable debate: those who loath conservatives will tend to accept relatively weak evidence as supporting their biased view; those who like the protesters might be blind even to the strongest evidence. Likewise for people protesting Israel. But whatever standards are used to judge association, they must be applied consistently—whether one loathes or loves the group or person.

As noted above, people who have protested Israel have been accused of association with antisemites. But the same standards applied to conservative protesters need to be applied: to infer that because some protesters have been observed to be antisemitic then most (or all) are as well would commit the hasty generalization fallacy. Naturally, if there is evidence showing that most conservative protesters are racist or evidence showing that most (or all) people who protest Israel are antisemitic, then the fallacy would not be committed.

To infer that those protesting Israel are antisemitic because some associated with the protests are antisemitic would commit the guilt by association fallacy, just as the fallacy would be committed if one inferred that conservative protesters are racists because they are associated with racists. Obviously, if there is adequate evidence supporting these claims, then the fallacy would not be committed.

The philosophical debate over the power and purpose of the state is ancient, but COVID-19 provided a new context for the discussion. Responding to a pandemic requires a robust state and the emergency can be used to justify expanding state power. While such an expansion can be warranted, people should resist setting aside their critical faculties in the heat of a crisis.

One concern is that a pandemic (or any crisis) will be used to infringe upon liberty without addressing the crisis. While a crisis often claims reason as an early victim, the expansion of state power to protect us should be carefully considered in terms of both the loss of liberty and its effectiveness in addressing the crisis. An expansion that does not make us safer is unjustified as we would give up liberty in return for nothing. If the expansion of power makes us safer, then we should still weigh the benefits against the cost, although this assessment will vary. For example, someone who is very afraid of a threat will have a different assessment than someone who thinks it is minor or even a hoax. As another example, someone who values one liberty (say the right to keep and bear arms) will see things differently from someone who does not value that liberty.  While a rational assessment will always have a subjective element, a good faith evaluation is critical. Unfortunately, misinformation and disinformation come into play in such assessments. And, of course, emotions will be factors.

While a rational assessment of expanding the power of state is always important, it is even more important during a crisis. This is because people will be heavily influenced by the strong emotions arising from the crisis and politicians will be trying to exploit this opportunity to expand their power. Businesses and individuals will also try to profit from the expansion of power, often at the expense of others. For example, if the state imposed mandatory tracking during a pandemic, tech companies would be eager to exploit this financial opportunity.

It can be objected that during a crisis there is no time for rational, objective assessment and attempting to do so would be foolish and wrong. While a crisis usually requires immediate action, if there is time to expand state power, then there is time to think about whether to do so. I am not advocating dithering about in pointless debate but advocating giving due consideration to the expansion of state power. It would be foolish and wrong to act without thought.

During the last pandemic, the United States suffered because it did not expand the power of the state in a rational manner. Our leaders knew a crisis was on the way, but many of them delayed, hesitated and took small steps rather than acting aggressively. This was a case where speed was important and the failures were not due to a needless expansion of state power, but a failure to exercise power effectively and decisively.

In addition to carefully considering the expansion of the state’s power, one must also consider the duration of the expansion. An expansion of power that might be justified in a crisis is likely to be unwarranted and unnecessary when the crisis ends. Since rulers are rarely inclined to give up an expansion to their power, it is essential to place a clearly defined and automatic limit on any expansion of power. As a crisis might last longer than predicted, there also need to be rules for how they can be renewed. Otherwise, these expansions can become permanent to the detriment of the people.

There is also the concern that expansion of power can create bloat, such as new positions and entire departments. Such bloat can waste resources and cause inefficiency, something is problematic even in normal times. Bureaucracies tend to grow over time rather than shrink, so the expansion must be limited. That said, there is also a risk in reducing the state too much so that it will be unable to address a future crisis (which is what Musk and Trump seem to be doing as this is being written). The challenge is finding the right balance between being too big and too small; to get it just right. As people often discount the future and engage in wishful thinking, it is challenging to convince people to spend resources to address a crisis that might occur or even one that will occur but at an unknown time. Thus, the expansion and reduction of the state should be carefully considered based on a rational assessment of likely future need. Unfortunately, this approach usually does not win elections.

While expanding state power to respond to a crisis is what people most often think of, a state can also respond by reducing its power. For example, rulers might weaken or suspend regulations or protections for citizens. On the positive side, weakening or even suspending some regulations can be beneficial. For example, during the next pandemic there will be a need to rapidly expand hospitals, so it would be reasonable to suspend or weaken some rules that would impede this. As another example, a need for test kits and treatments can justify weakening or suspending some regulations that would slow things down. Doing so is not without risks but can be justified as one justifies how ambulances drive: going fast and breaking the normal traffic rules creates a danger, but this is supposed to be outweighed by the need for speed.

Just as the expansion of the state must be justified, assessed and kept on a time limit, the same applies to reducing the state. There are obvious concerns that weakening or suspending regulations could do more harm than good. There is also the concern that the unethical will exploit the situation in harmful ways. For example, an unethical pharmaceutical company might exploit weakened regulations to maximize profits. As another example, tech companies might exploit the weakening of privacy laws to gather data they can monetize in harmful ways. Planning for likely crises is what good leaders do; perhaps some will emerge in the next pandemic.

Anyone familiar with sports knows that if team members don’t work together, things will go badly. So good athletes set aside internal conflicts when on the field and come together to win. This does not mean that an athlete should accept anything a teammate might do without complaint. For example, a good athlete would not allow a teammate to cheat or a coach to abuse athletes. As another example, a good athlete would not tolerate a teammate committing domestic violence or engage in dog fighting. While we belong to various competing teams, such as nations, during a pandemic we should all be on the same team since we are playing a deadly game of humans versus pathogens.

Since we should be on the same team during a pandemic, we should set aside our differences and work towards victory. If we fight, bicker and compete against each other, we are hurting the team. If we cooperate, we will help Team Human. As with sports, the more power a person has, the more important it is that they work with the team and set aside less important concerns at least for the duration of the game. While it would be unreasonable to think everyone will be a good team player, there is still the expectation that team members will not try to cause needless conflict or interfere with the effort to win. Unfortunately for the world, there will be people who are bad at being team players, and even some who will actively  cause harm during the next pandemic.

While there are examples outside of the United States, I am an American and have some responsibility for my leaders and fellow citizens. During the last pandemic, Trump was president and can be seen as the head coach of the team America. He should have directed the team to victory, inspired the players and done his job properly.

As noted in other essays, rather than being honest about the facts of the pandemic, Trump and his allies downplayed it and then floated stories about hoaxes. Rather than listen to medical experts, Trump and his fellows spread disinformation and misinformation. Trump and his fellows also delayed our response to the virus, something that cost us dearly. What Trump and his fellows should have done is play for Team Human.  To use an analogy, Trump was like a coach who refused to acknowledge that an opposing team was even on the field. Like a bad coach, Trump insisted his team would not need to practice and prepare, that it would be an easy win. And he lied to the team.

During the pandemic, Trump was consistently Trump.  First, he  engaged in conflicts with governors. Part of the problem was that Trump saw himself as making business deals rather than being the leader of a country in crisis. Another part of the problem is that Trump apparently cannot avoid petty fights. He takes things very personally, something that has generally not been true about other American presidents. For example, while Bush was criticized about his handling of Katrina, Bush did not withhold help because  governors failed to appease his ego. To continue the team analogy, Trump was a like a coach who retaliates against the assistant coaches if they  do not appease his ego. Criticism, however legitimate, was met with hostility and punished. This actively harmed the team.

It could be objected that the governors were also to blame. They had a responsibility to work with his flaws to get what their state needed. So, if the governor of NY needed to praise Trump to keep him from vindictively denying the state full assistance, then he must praise Trump. While this makes pragmatic sense, it is morally horrific. In a democratic country it is not the duty of governors or citizens to appease the ego of the president to get them to do their job. It is the duty of the president to do their job, even in the face of criticism. That is how a responsible government is supposed to work. If a leader cannot step up and do the job, they should step aside. Going back to the team analogy, if a narcissistic coach is damaging the team, the solution is not for the assistant coaches to work harder to appease his ego. The solution is to get a new coach.

Second, Trump advanced the conspiracy theory that medical professionals are stealing protective equipment, citing an unnamed distributor who (allegedly) claimed that the hospital was buying too much equipment for its needs. Pushing this conspiracy theory was damaging. Trump  likes conspiracy theories and often used them to shift blame from himself. But this does the team no good. Going back to the analogy, this would be like the head coach falsely accusing team trainers of stealing supplies and blaming them for his failure to ensure that the supplies would be available for the big game.

Trump supporters might, at this point, accuse me of hypocrisy: “How can you speak of unity while criticizing Trump?” The first reply is from basic logic: even if I were a hypocrite, this would not refute my claims. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to the ad hominem tu quoque. One version of this fallacy involves concluding that because a person’s actions are inconsistent with their claim, their claim must be wrong. But this is bad logic. For example, suppose that Bill claimed adultery is wrong and then committed adultery. This would show that he was a hypocrite but would not disprove his claim.

The second reply is that my view is that we should have critical unity. This is not uncritical unity in which people are expected to just go along with whatever the leaders say and do. Uncritical unity can be worse than a lack of unity. For example, imagine if everyone simply went along with Trump’s initial claims about the virus and no one ever pushed back against his misinformation and disinformation. Things would have been much worse. As another example, imagine that during the next pandemic a “radical leftist” state government legally seized  the property of the rich to distribute the resources to help people survive. Trump supporters would obviously not respond by saying “well, we must unite behind our leaders” and go along with this.

The critical part of critical unity in a crisis does need to have limits. The criticism should be grounded in truth, based in principle and aimed at addressing real problems. Criticizing Trump’s disinformation, misinformation, conspiracy theories, and so on while urging unity is critical unity. I apply the same standards across the political spectrum. So, for example, if a Democratic leader spreads pandemic disinformation or refuses to do their job because they are spatting with a Republican, then I would be critical of them. I will also be supportive across the spectrum when leaders are stepping up and doing the best they can. For example, I disagreed with Ohio Governor Mike DeWine on some things (although we both went to college in Ohio) but I credited him for his serious response to COVID-19.

The lesson here is that we need to have unity in times of crisis (which is obvious), but it would be unwise to have unthinking and uncritical unity (which is equally obvious). While we should work with our leaders, they need to prove worthy of our uniting under their leadership. Trump served as paradigm example of how a leader can actively divide rather than unify in a time of crisis. If he or a similar person (be they a Democrat or Republican) is president during the next pandemic, we can expect things to go just as badly.

As the COVID-19 pandemic played out, Trump wavered on social distancing. One reason was that billionaires  argued for getting back to work during the pandemic. In  neutral terms, their argument was that the harm of maintaining  social distance would exceed the harm caused by sending people back to work.  This is a classic utilitarian approach in that the right action is the one that creates the greatest good (or the least harm).  Lieutenant Governor  Dan Patrick  advanced a similar, but much harsher argument. On his view, the damage done to the economy by trying to protect people s far outweighs the harm done by putting people at risk. He went so far as to claim that he would be willing to die for the economy and seemed willing to sacrifice other seniors as well. While this was not a mainstream view, it got some traction on Fox News. While some billionaires and Patrick acknowledge a downside to their proposals, some claimed the deaths would be good, another plus rather than a minus.

While it is tempting to dismiss the billionaires as greedy sociopaths who would sacrifice others to add to their vast fortunes, they do raise a moral problem: to what extent should some people be sacrificed for the good of others? We allowed, and rightly praised, sacrifices by health care workers, grocery store workers and many others who risked themselves for others. As with the billionaires’ argument, this can be morally justified on utilitarian grounds: the few put themselves at risk for the good of the many. They kept the rest of us alive by taking care of us, ensuring food remained available and so on. It is inarguable that these sacrifices were good, essential and heroic. It is also inarguable that some of them died because they stayed at their posts and did what must be done to keep the rest of us and our civilization alive. For essential goods and services, the risk seemed morally acceptable; especially from the viewpoint of people who were not themselves in danger. But what about the broader economy?

The billionaires were correct that a badly damaged economy would harm workers. As evidence, consider what happened to workers during the depressions and recessions inflicted upon them in the past. Things were already bad for many before the pandemic and the economic damage made things worse. As such, there was certainly a good argument for getting the economy back on track as soon as possible. But did the utilitarian argument support the billionaires’ view?

When engaging in an honest utilitarian calculation of this sort, the three main factors are values, scope and facts. In the case of the facts, one must honestly consider the consequences.  The scope determines who counts when assessing the harms and benefits. The values determine how one weighs the facts, what is considered good and what is seen as bad. It is a fact that the social distancing practices did economic damage. Many people were unable to work, many businesses closed or operated at minimum levels and so on. It was also a fact that relaxed social distancing to get people back to work resulted in more infections which caused more suffering and death. The billionaires and those who disagree with them agreed on these facts; but they disagreed about matters of scope (who counts) and value (what counts more). The billionaires showed no concern for the well-being of workers and it would be absurd to think they suddenly started to care. As such, the scope of their concern was, at most, their economic class of billionaires. In terms of values, the billionaires value money, more so than the well-being of workers (otherwise they would provide better pay and benefits). As such, their argument made sense to them: relaxing the restrictions benefited them financially and the harm would, as always, be suffered by other people. Those who think that everyone counts and who value life and health over profits for billionaires saw the matter differently.

It could be objected that while the billionaires are interested in their profits, they are also correct that workers would have been hurt more by the ongoing economic damage. As such, it was right to relax the restrictions because it was also better for the workers.  There are two main replies to this argument. The first reply is to argue that the billionaires were wrong in their assessment: even in their economic terms, relaxing the restrictions caused more economic damage than keeping them in place. To use an analogy, imagine a business in a large building that is on fire. One could argue that having the fire trucks pump water into the building will do a lot of damage and that the fire should be allowed to burn out while employees continue to work. But this can be countered by pointing out that allowing the building to burn will do far more damage in the long term and kill more people.  As such, unless the goal is short-term profits and long-term disaster, then it would have been best to keep social distancing in place until it was medically unnecessary.

The second reply is that people suffered, as they have for a long time, because of the economic and social structures we have constructed. We had vast resources to mitigate the harm that was done—the problem is that these resources were (and are) hyper concentrated into the hands of a few and most people lacked the resources to endure the pandemic on their own (and many lacked the resources to endure “normal” life before the pandemic). The truth is that we could have gotten through the economic harm of the pandemic better if we had been more willing to share the resources and wealth that we all created. It was ironic that the billionaires had a fix on hand for many of the harms they predicted: the economic and social structures could have been radically changed for the good of us all, rather than focused on the good of the elites

The lesson I hope we learned here is that the sacrifices of those in essential areas, like those working to provide food and health care, are morally justified and laudable. Another lesson is that the sacrifices extracted from the many by the few to expand their wealth are neither justified nor laudable. What is perhaps more horrifying than the billionaires’ view that people should die for the economy is that they believe they can make such statements in public with impunity and without fear of consequences. I hope that more people will see this for what it is, and they will work to change the world. Unfortunately, many have chosen the side of the billionaires once again and now they openly rule the oligarchy of America.

As COVID-19 ravaged humanity, xenophobia and racism remained alive and well. For example, an Iranian leader  played on fears of America and Israel. He advanced, without evidence, the claim that the virus was created specifically to target Iranians. In addition to conspiracy theories that the Chinese engineered the virus (either to reduce their own population or for use against other nations) there was also a worldwide rise in xenophobia and racism against Asians.

One reason for the xenophobia and racism is that people were looking for a visible enemy upon which to take out their fear and anger. Many people felt helpless and afraid during the pandemic and as humans are inclined to focus on other humans as threats, there was a rise in xenophobia and racism. People are also inclined to seek an intelligence behind dangers, as they did when they attributed natural disasters to gods. Since humans suffer from in group bias and evil leaders feed xenophobia and racism, it is no surprise that people are sought a scapegoat for the  crisis: someone must be to blame. Someone must pay.

The United States, with a long tradition of racism against Asians, saw an increase in xenophobia and racism. While most incidents were limited to verbal hostility, racism in the context of disease raises serious concerns. The United States has a history of weaponizing racism in the context of diseases and we should be on guard against this, because leaders try to appeal to their base and divert attention away from their failings. An example of an American leader’s effort to use xenophobia and racism is Donald Trump using the term “Chinese virus” in place of “coronavirus” or “COVID-19.”

Trump did have excellent, albeit evil, reasons to use these terms. One is that it appeals to parts of his base. This dog whistle sends the message he is speaking to them.  A second reason is that it shifted blame from Trump’s inept and harmful early handling of the pandemic. By presenting it as a Chinese virus Trump created the appearance the threat is the responsibility of a foreign power (and people) and attempted to mitigate his responsibility. Third, it helped create an “us versus them” mentality, with the “them” being other people rather than the virus. Unfortunately, while Trump gained some apparent advantages from this approach, it came with a high cost.

There are those who will defend Trump and take issue with my criticism of him. My first response is that Trump is just an example for the problem of xenophobia and racism. If a Trump defender claims he was not engaged in any racism or xenophobia, then I would refer to the United States being blamed by other for the virus. I suspect a Trump supporter would agree that the xenophobia of other countries towards the United States was not helpful and was, in fact, detrimental.

My second response is that Trump engaged in in open racism and xenophobia. He used the well-worn xenophobic and racist trope of the foreign disease and the diseased foreigner—which was also used in the racism aimed at the allegedly diseased caravans heading towards the United States from the south. That Trump’s defenders had to engage in relentless efforts to explain away his seemingly racist claims undercuts their own case. One would have needed to argue Trump unintentionally but constantly used racist tropes and language. While not impossible, it does strain the boundaries of possibility.

Another piece of evidence is that Trump used his infamous sharpie to cross out “Corona” in his speech and replace it with “Chinese”, showing his use was intended, rather than a slip.  His defenders could engage in verbal gymnastics to explain this. One strategy was to argue Trump used the phrase “Chinese virus” as “Spanish flu” was used. While this approach has some appeal, using the phrase “Spanish flu” is also problematic. Labeling a disease with a specific country or ethnicity tends to lead to stigma and racism. As such, using the “Spanish Flu” defense is like defending the use of “wetback” by saying that people also used “wop.”

A second strategy is to argue that Trump was just referring to where it came from and, for bonus points, one can point out that it was originally called the “Wu Han virus.” One can say that it cannot have been racist or xenophobic for Trump to use “Chinese virus” because the Chinese used “Wu Han virus.” The easy and obvious reply is that the use of the term “Wu Han virus” was also seen as problematic, for the same reasons that “Spanish flu” and “Chinese virus” are problematic. To use an analogy, this would be like a Chinese leader talking about “Caucasian flu” and saying that was just fine because, for example, Americans first started using a term like “Connecticut flu” when the disease first appeared in Connecticut. Since Trump decided to refer to it as the “Chinese flu” and there are no good reasons to use that term, the best explanation is the obvious one: Trump used a xenophobic and racist dog whistle, cashing in on the well-worn trope of the diseased foreigner and the foreign disease. For those who would try to present this in a positive light, one must ask why do this? And why defend him against the umpteenth reasonable charge of racism and xenophobia?

As noted above, there was already racism and xenophobia against Asians (and Asian Americans) and Trump’s insistence on calling it the “Chinese virus” was likely to have contributed to the uptick in such incidents. Using this sort of label also put the United States at odds with other counties. And other countries blaming us had the same effect. Having Americans turn against other Americans is harmful, especially during a crisis in which community unity is an important part of our survival toolkit. It is also harmful to create conflict between nations when cooperation will improve our response to pandemics. A pandemic is a war between humans and a disease. Creating conflict between humans might serve the selfish goals of some leaders, but it harms humanity. As such, a key lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic is that using racism and xenophobia will only make things worse. As it always does.