While it can be argued that “toxic masculinity” is useful, I still feel a bit uncomfortable about the phrase. While it would be natural to accuse me of fearing an attack on my maleness, my concern is a pragmatic one about the consequences of the term. Which, from a utilitarian standpoint, also makes it a moral one.

As a man, I am familiar with how some other men react to the phrase “toxic masculinity.” The reaction of toxic males is as one would expect, they are outraged that their misdeeds and moral flaws are being challenged. However, non-toxic males can also react negatively to the phrase, typically because they feel it is applied unfairly to all men. While some radicals think all men are evil), this is not how the term is commonly used. After all, if masculinity itself was seen as evil, it would be pointless to talk about toxic masculinity. Doing so would be analogous to speaking of toxic toxins. As such, defenders of the phrase “toxic masculinity” can say it is like saying “contaminated spinach” as this doesn’t claim that all spinach is contaminated. Likewise, saying “toxic masculinity” is not claiming that all masculinity is toxic, just the toxic variety.

This is appealing and when someone uses the phrase in this manner, one can sort out their intent. That said, the use of the phrase can still upset non-toxic men and getting into the nuances of intention often fails to persuade them. After all, when people feel attacked, they rarely pause for a philosophical analysis. As such, using the phrase can have the negative consequence of alienating and upsetting men who do think that men should behave virtuously. It can also cause some men to double down on their toxicity. As such, there is a pragmatic problem with the phrase.

One reply to this would be to argue that only snowflakes and bad men would be angered by it. The snowflakes should “man up” and it is fine that the bad men are angry. They are, after all, criticized for being evil and evil people hate that. While this does have some appeal, it is worth considering how non-toxic (or “curable”) men might feel about the phrase and whether another approach might be better.

Consider, if you will, if the term “toxic” was used to refer to various groups who have members who behave badly and have vices (which would be everybody). To illustrate, consider the phrases “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality”, “toxic transgenderism”, “toxic feminism” and so on. If someone did a YouTube video about “toxic blackness” or “toxic homosexuality” while insisting that they were only concerned about blacks or homosexuals who behaved badly and not in attacking blacks or homosexuals in general, they would be met with skepticism. Even if the person was completely sincere and carefully argued that their concern was with the toxic members of these groups, then they would probably still be doubted.

The obvious reply would be to argue that “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality” and such differ from “toxic masculinity.” While such a case can be made, it does seem reasonable to consider that just as many would find “toxic blackness” and “toxic homosexuality” offensive, many non-toxic men might think “toxic masculinity” is offensive.

From a pragmatic standpoint, the main concern is whether the phrase “toxic masculinity” creates more harm than good in terms of persuading men to behave better.  If it does create more harm, then another approach should be considered in its place.

While toxic masculinity faced some criticism, it seems to have emerged victorious. While the term is not used as often as it was, I am still somewhat uncomfortable with it. This discomfort is not because I am a man. Unlike more fragile “men”, I am not threatened by criticism. I can distinguish between criticisms of bad behavior by men and the rare attacks on men simply for being men. My slight discomfort arises two sources. The first is based in ethics and the second arises from pragmatic considerations. I will look at the first in this essay and the second in the following essay.

While this oversimplifies matters, my ethical view includes an acceptance of universal principles. One implication is that if something is wrong to do, then it is wrong for anyone to do. I am aware of the principle of relevant difference: that a difference in the application of ethics can be justified by a difference that warrants this.

For example, some argue that while it is wrong for members of one ethnicity to “put on the face” of another, there are exceptions. One illustration is that is seen as acceptable for Michael Che to “go undercover” as a white female liberal, but the idea of Colin Jost going undercover as a black girl is seen as utterly unacceptable. The moral justification for this rests on the relevant differences between a black man putting on “white face” and a white man putting on “black face.” These differences are connected to the history of racism and power differences. Naturally, people disagree about whether these differences are relevant. In such cases of relevant differences between ethnicities, it makes sense to reference ethnicity when discussing ethics. The same sort of reasoning applies to sex or gender issues.

For example, some argue that male comedians would be sexist if they used the same type of humor as female comedians who do routines about the failures and defects of men. In such cases, the ethics of a joke would thus depend on the gender or sex of the person telling it and the target of the joke. Using these examples, it would thus make sense to talk about toxic white comedy or toxic male comedy because the whiteness or maleness of the comic would be essential to the wrongness of the comedy. But what about toxic masculinity, considered in terms of moral misdeeds and moral vices?

For toxic masculinity what matters is the ethics of the behavior and its consequences rather than on whether the actions are done by men. To illustrate, the moral concern about sexual harassment is with its wrongness and not the gender or sex of the harasser. After all, while most sexual harassment is done by men, it is not restricted to us and its wrongness does not stem from the gender pf the perpetrator. It is equally wrong for a female to engage in sexual harassment. To focus on toxic masculinity would seem to imply that the vices and moral misdeeds are wrong because they are the misdeeds and vices of males, which would seem to be an error.

One reasonable counter is to argue that while the general misdeeds and vices that make up the evils of toxic masculinity are not limited to males, focusing on males make sense because males are the main offenders. Doing so, one might argue, does not exclude focusing on similar misdeeds by females.  It is just that there are less toxically masculine females to worry about.

Another reasonable counter is that the vices and misdeeds of males that are grouped under the label of “toxic masculinity” are male in character because of the masculinity part. That is, they are vices and misdeeds that arise from a concept of maleness, and it is appropriate to use the term. This has considerable appeal and could counter my initial concern. As such, my next essay will focus on pragmatic concerns.

Mark Zuckerberg’s recent crisis of masculinity reminded me of an earlier round in the endless culture war over gender roles.  In the not-so-distant past, the marketing departments of some major corporations decided that pretending to value positive masculinity would increase profits. Gillette attempted this with the Best Men Can Be themed advertisement. The name was based on Gillette’s classic advertising line, “the best a man can get.” This campaign did ignite a response, but not what the marketing department wanted. To be fair, the marketing department probably thought no decent person could get mad at a mild endorsement of minimal male decency. And they were right.  

As would be expected, people like Piers Morgan and James Wood responded harshly. In the case of Morgan, he accused Gillette of virtue signaling, fueling the “global assault on masculinity” and called for us to “let boys be damn boys” and to “let men be damn men.” Woods claimed Gillette was jumping on the “men are horrible” bandwagon and said he was done with buying Gillette products. Other men were not upset, noting  its message appeared to be “Don’t be a jerk. Don’t raise a jerk. Call out other men being for jerks.” And some pointed out Gillette was just trying to sell more razors. While I will not attempt to see it through the eyes of those who hate it, I will address the philosophical aspects of virtue based advertising.

While some loathed the content of the advertisement, it is advancing a set of values, advocating certain behavior and encouraging men to serve as role-models by acting on those values. It is, of course, doing this to sell razors and shaving cream. From a moral standpoint, this raises two questions. The first is whether the values are morally good. The second is whether motivation is relevant.

Since I generally follow Aristotle’s virtue theory, I think that people should be the best they can be. Intuitively, this is morally commendable. That men should be the best they can be seems to be morally obvious and the burden of proof would rest on those who would deny it. The real dispute is over what it means to be the best.

Each society and subgroup have its own notion of the best man, and the easy approach is to go with what they say. The obvious problem with is approach is that moral relativism collapses into subjectivism, and it then collapses into moral nihilism. So “morally best” would end up referring to nothing. This puts an end to moral discussion, so one must accept moral objectivity for the discussion to progress.

While the response to from Morgan and Woods would suggest the values it advances are wicked, this is not true. The values endorsed seem to be classic virtues, such as respect and courage. For example, one man rushes to stop a group of boys who are attacking another boy, which is a virtuous act. As another example, a man is shown talking another out of harassing a woman, which is also a virtuous act. To treat others with respect and to protect those who need protection certain is what good men should do, hence it is odd to condemn the ad. But perhaps the critics did not take issue with these values, but with another aspect of the ad.

While the ad ends with displays of virtuous behavior, it begins by showing men and boys behaving badly, such as talking over a woman at a business meeting and laughing at sexual harassment in a sitcom. It does make sense that the likes of Morgan and Woods would be angry at this. They see it as an attack on men aimed at showing that all men are terrible. The problem with this interpretation is the ad does not say that all men are horrible. As noted above, the second part of the ad presents men acting ethically. As such, the ad simply says the obvious: some men are awful, some are good. Its message is also quite benign: don’t be awful, be the best you can be. There seems to be nothing here to take issue with, unless one thinks that behavior such as bullying and sexual harassment are morally commendable. In that case, the problem lies with those who think this and not with the ad.

Some might object to being preached at by a company trying to sell goods or services by virtue signaling. This is a reasonable objection, and people are free to not watch the ads or complain about this technique. However, the motivation of the company is irrelevant to the correctness (or incorrectness) of the claims and values in the ad. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to an ad hominem, that the motivation of someone making a claim makes the claim false. Even if Gillette was cynically trying to sell more razors and shaving cream and did not give a damn about men being their best, the claims and values presented in the ad stand or fall on their own. Naturally, it is reasonable to condemn or praise the folks at Gillette based on their motives, but that is another ethical issue distinct from whether some men behave badly and whether being the best men means acting in the ways presented in the ad.  I agree that if Gillette or another corporation is cynically exploiting values it does not endorse, then that is morally dubious behavior—but, once again, this is not relevant to whether the claims and values expressed are right or not.

In a tragic aircraft accident, sixty-seven people died. In response to past tragedies, presidents ranging from Reagan to Obama have endeavored to unite and comfort the American people. Trump intentionally decided to take a different approach and used the tragedy as an opportunity to advance his anti-DEI agenda.

While Trump acknowledged that the cause of the crash was unknown, he quickly blamed DEI. When a reporter asked him how he knew this, he asserted it was because he has common sense. He also claimed that the crash was the fault of Biden and Obama and that it might have been caused by hiring people with disabilities.

In one sense, Trump is right to blame past administrations. The federal government has allowed the quality of air traffic safety to decline, and one might trace this back to at least Reagan who famously fired the striking air traffic controllers. As with many areas concerned with the safety of the American people, there is a shortage of staff, chronic underfunding and a problem with obsolete technology. Past administrations (including Trump’s) and congress bear responsibility for this. So, I agree with Trump that past leaders bear some of the blame for the tragedy. But I disagree with his false DEI claim.

As is always the case, rational people spend time and energy trying to debunk and refute Trump’s false claims. While this should be done, there is the question of whether this has any practical effect in terms of changing minds. At this point, it seems certain that America is firmly divided between those who reject Trump’s lies and those who accept them or do not care that he is lying. But I’m all about the desperate fight against impossible odds, so here we go.

Trump’s claim that the crash was caused by diversity hires of people with disabilities is easy to debunk. The FAA has strict requirements for air traffic controllers and someone who was incapable of doing the job would not be hired. After all, being an air traffic controller is not like being a member of Trump’s cabinet. As others will point out, this baseless attack on people with disabilities echoes the Nazis.  Trump supporters will presumably respond to this criticism by saying that “liberals” always compare Trump to the Nazis. While some comparisons are overblown, there is a reason why this occurs so often. And that is because Trump and his henchmen are often at least Nazi adjacent. Proud American Nazis know this is true and wish that their fellows had more courage. So, the questions “why do the libs always compare Trump and his henchmen to Nazis?” and “why do Nazis like Trump and his henchmen?” have the same answer. Meanwhile, the “normies” are baffled and the mainstream media generates think pieces debating the obvious. But what about Trump’s DEI claims?

One problem with engaging with these DEI claims is that the engagement provides them with a degree of legitimacy they do not deserve. Doing so can create the impression that there is a meaningful debate with two equally plausible sides. As many others have pointed out, when Trump and his ilk talk about DEI, this is just a dog whistle to the racists and sexists. These bigots know exactly what he means as do the anti-racists; but they disagree about whether bigotry is good. As to why Trump and his ilk bother with dog whistles, there seem to be two reasons.

One is that being openly racist or sexist is seen as crude and impolite. Polite bigots use dog whistles in public, reserving their open racism and sexism for private conversations. People can also convince themselves that they are good because they are not openly using racist or sexist terms.

The other is that there are non-bigots who cannot hear the dog whistle and believe, in good faith ignorance, that DEI might be the cause of these problems. If pressed, they will deny being racist or sexist and will claim that DEI might arise from good intentions but is bad because it puts incompetent people into jobs that are not qualified for. And hence things go wrong. If they are asked about why these people are assumed to be incompetent and whether women, minorities, old people, and people with disabilities can be competent, they will usually grow uncomfortable and want to change to topic. These people are still in play. While the bigots want to recruit them using dog whistles to onboard them into bigotry, they will settle for them remaining cooperatively neutral. If a “normie” expresses doubt about charges of racism or sexism or defends attacks on DEI, this provides cover and support for the bigots, and they are happy to exploit this cover. But “normies” are potential recruits to the side of good, since they have a mild dislike of racism and sexism that can be appealed to. One challenge is convincing them to hear the dog whistles for what they are. This is difficult, since it requires acknowledging their own past complicity in racism and sexism while also facing uncomfortable truths about politicians and pundits they might like and support.

The danger in trying to win over the “normies” is that one must engage with the DEI claims made by Trump and his fellows, which (as mentioned above) runs the risk of lending them legitimacy by creating the appearance that there is something to debate. But it seems that the only way to reveal the truth is to engage with the lies, as risky as that might be.

As a philosopher, my preference is to use good logic and plausible claims when arguing. After all, the goal is truth, and this is the correct approach. However, logic is awful as a means of persuasion and engaging people with facts is challenging because for every fact there seems to be a thousand appealing lies. But there might be some people who can be persuaded by the fact that DEI is not to blame for the crash nor is it to blame for the other things, such as wildfires, that the right likes to blame on it. That said, the core of the fight is one of values.

For someone to believe that DEI results in the hiring of incompetent people, they must believe that white, straight men have a monopoly on competence and that everyone else is inferior to a degree that they are unsuitable for many jobs. So, one way to engage with a possible “normie” about DEI is to ask them what they have in their hearts: do they feel that only straight, white men are truly competent and that everyone else is inferior and suitable only for race and gender “appropriate” roles? If they do not find this bigotry in their hearts, there is hope for them.

 

Feminists tend to criticize the portrayal of female superheroes in comics.  This criticism is usually body types of female heroes, the poses, and skimpy. One response is the Hawkeye Initiative in which Hawkeye (or another male superhero) is drawn in the same pose and costume type as a female superhero. As would be imagined, the male hero looks absurd when so posed and costumed, which is the point of the criticism.

While the presentation of female superheroes in comics is a first world problem, it does raise important concerns about potential harms, such as perceptions of body image.  But my interest here is in superhero costumes from a practical standpoint. While I am no expert on fashion, I draw on my experiences as an athlete, martial artist and gamer to guide the discussion.

In the realm of fiction, being a superhero generally means being very physically active and engaging in combat. This means that a sensible superhero would have a costume designed to take these into account.

While I am not a superhero, decades of competitive running give me some insight into what to wear when engaged in physical activity. One important factor is mobility, as you need to be able to move properly in athletic clothing. One approach is loose fitting clothing that allows a lot of motion (such as running shorts) while another is the tight-fitting spandex (such as running tights) that also allow free motion. The idea of heroes wearing tights makes sense for the same reason it makes sense for runners to wear them. Another important factor is temperature management. Most heroes will generate body heat and sweat when they are active. So, they will need to be able to stay cool while active but also remain warm when they are just patrolling or engaging in dramatic dialogue.

As a runner, I wear as little as possible when I am running in warm weather. These are just shorts, socks and shoes.  Many other runners are similar, with women generally adding the legally necessary coverage. Presumably a superhero that runs about would want to wear as little as possible. As such, in warm weather superheroes dressed in super versions of running clothes would make sense and they would have lots of skin exposed.  This assumes that the superheroes need to stay cool when being active. A superhero that had no need to sweat could wear whatever they wished—the concerns of mere sweaty mortals would not matter to them.

Considering this, it would make sense for female superheroes to wear the same amount of clothing as competitive runners: not much. However, the same would also apply to male superheroes.

While wearing minimal clothing is a good idea when active under warm conditions, like runners facing cooler weather, superheroes would alsoneed to cover up more to remain comfortable and perhaps avoid hypothermia. Practical and sensible superheroes should also consider following a standard practice of runners: wearing more clothing to warm up or when waiting to compete, then shedding clothing when it is time to get down to business. Since hanging out all day in sweat-soaked clothes is uncomfortable, sensible heroes would also change costumes when they can. And shower.

Unlike runners, superheroes engage in combat, and this imposes another set of practical considerations. Since superheroes tend to fight hand to hand, it would be unwise to have costumes that provide a foe with easy handholds. As such, tight costumes without extraneous material would be the best choice. Capes would, as always, be a poor choice.

When engaging in combat, it has always been a good idea to have protective gear. Some of this protection is intended to deal with the incidentals of combat, such as ending up in contact with rough surfaces (like being knocked down in the street) but most of it is supposed to provide protection against attacks. This protection usually takes the form of armor, ranging from ballistic clothing to powered armor (like Iron Man wears).

Armor does have the usual trade-offs: it tends to restrict movement, tire out the wearer quicker, and create overheating problems. As such, heroes that rely on speed and freedom of movement might be inclined to avoid armor or at least keep it to a minimum. The classic Batman, for example, did not wear any armor. However, as anyone who plays games like D&Ds or faces combat in the real world knows, armor is usually a good idea when other people are trying to kill you.

To be effective armor must at least cover the important parts (usually the head and torso) and that means exposing a lot of skin is a bad idea. As such, the “classic” fantasy drawings of heroines in armor are absurd. Or, as a veteran D&D player put it, “if the enemy can see your cleavage, they can cut your boobs.” And no one wants their boobs cut.

Superheroes who have powers that make them invulnerable or otherwise grant great defensive powers do not need to rely on armor and they can safely wear whatever they like; such as Power Girl’s famous cleavage window costume. While the classic Wonder Woman relied on her magical bracelets, the updated version seems to be close to Superman in her ability to withstand damage. As such, she would not need to rely on armor for protection. Superman, of course, does not need armor since his skin is almost certainly stronger than almost anything he could find on earth. As such, a superhero who still had to deal with the sweating problem but did not need armor would want to wear as little as possible, be they male or female. Perhaps this explains why Wonder Woman still dresses the way she does.

 

While homophobia can still be exploited for political advantage, it is not as effective as it used to be. In response to its diminished political value, the American right embraced transphobia. Before this, most Americans gave little thought to such matters as transpeople competing in sports and bathroom bills. Now that Trump has reclaimed the Whitehouse, it is certain that transphobia will continue to be pushed onto the American people and exploited for political advantage. This will give rise to various moral questions, centered around sports and bathrooms. The right seems extremely interested in bathrooms and who is using them. While one could simply assume that their views are, at best, based on ill-founded but sincere fears, there is the moral question of whether transpeople should be allowed to choose their bathrooms.

One way to approach this moral issue is to consider the matter in utilitarian terms. This requires weighing the likely harms and benefits of allowing or denying this choice. If our overall goal in politics is to serve the good of the people, this is a reasonable approach. It also does not beg any questions as it requires an honest evaluation of the harms and benefits to everyone.

A utilitarian assessment would favor bathroom choice. This is because the two most used arguments against bathroom choice are defeated by the facts. One argument is that allowing bathroom choice would put people in danger. This argument has considerable rhetorical power that derives from fear. After all, the idea that women and girls will be attacked in bathrooms is frightening. But does it have any logical force? Because some states allow bathroom choice, we have data about the danger. Currently, the evidence shows that there is no meaningful danger. As some wits enjoy pointing out, more Republican lawmakers have been arrested for bathroom misconduct than transgender people. As such, those worried about misdeeds in bathrooms should be focusing on the threat presented by Republican lawmakers. The other argument is the privacy argument, which falls apart under analysis.

While some might advance these arguments in good faith, there are those who oppose bathroom choice because they dislike of transgender people and make the “transgender people are icky argument.” This “argument” has no merit on the face of it, which is why it is not advanced as a reason by opponents of bathroom choice. Instead, as noted above, politicians and pundits rely on false claims about danger, using the psychological force of these lies in place of the logical force of evidence. But can a good argument be made for restricting bathroom choice?

A stock problem with utilitarian arguments is they can be used to justify violating rights. This occurs in cases where the benefits received by a numerical majority come at the expense of harm done to a numerical minority. However, it can also arise in cases where the greater benefits to a numerical minority outweigh the lesser harms to a numerical majority. In the case at hand, those opposed to bathroom choice could argue that even if bathroom choice benefits transgender people far more than it harms people who oppose it, the rights of anti-choice people are being violated. This then makes the matter one of competing rights.

In the case of public bathroom facilities, such as student bathrooms at schools, members of the public have the right to use them; that is the nature of public goods. There are, however, reasonable limits placed on access. For example, the public is not allowed to go into a school during normal hours to use the bathrooms. Similarly, the bathrooms in courthouses and government buildings are often not open to anyone to wander off the street and use. So, like all rights, the right to public bathrooms does have limits. It can thus be assumed that transgender people have bathroom rights as do people who oppose bathroom choice. What is in dispute is whether the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to not be forced to share bathrooms with transgender people. Or whether the right of anti-choice people to force transgender people to use specific bathrooms overrides the right of transgender people.

Disputes over competing rights are often settled by utilitarian considerations, but the utilitarian argument already favors bathroom choice. As such, another approach is needed, and a reasonable one is the consideration of which right has priority. This approach assumes that there is a hierarchy of rights, and that one right can take precedent over another. Fortunately, this is intuitively appealing. For example, while people have a right to free expression, the right to not be unjustly harmed trumps it. This is a reason why libel and slander are not protected by this right.

So, the bathroom issue comes down to this: does the right of a transgender person to choose their bathroom have priority over the right of an anti-choice person to not encounter transgender people in the bathroom? My inclination is that the right of the transgender person has priority over the anti-choice person. To support this, I will use an analogy to race.

Not so long ago, there were separate bathrooms for black and white people. When the end of race segregated bathrooms was proposed, there were dire warnings that terrible things would occur if bathrooms were integrated. Obviously enough, these terrible things did not take place. Whites could have argued that they had a right to not be in the same bathroom as blacks. However, the alleged white right to not be in a bathroom with blacks does not seem to trump the right of blacks to use the bathroom. Likewise, the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom would seem to trump the right of anti-choice people to exclude them.

It can be objected (using a slippery slope approach) that if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then bathrooms should be gender neutral. While many will have an emotional reaction to the idea, there is the historical question of why bathrooms were segregated to begin with.  While people might think this has always been the case, the first regulation requiring separate facilities for men and women was not passed in the United States until 1887. The ideological rational behind the separation was the view that women are weaker and needed protection in public spaces. But this separation was not limited to bathrooms as women had their own reading room in public libraries and even their own train cars. But these other gender segregated areas eventually vanished in most of the United States. We do not, for example, have women only seating sections on planes. As such, while it might seem odd to accept gender neutral bathrooms, it was once odd to suggest integrated libraries and transportation, which are now accepted without a thought in most of the United States. One can, of course, raise the danger and privacy arguments against allowing gender neutral bathrooms, but attacking people and harassing them are both already crimes, whether they occur in bathrooms or not. Bathrooms can also be designed to allow privacy (enclosing or replacing urinals and making stalls peep proof). To be fair, it can be argued that a person using the bathroom is more vulnerable to attack and that bathrooms usually only have one exit, making escape more difficult. Given the number of men who seem onboard with “your body, my choice”, women are now even more justified in being wary of men and hence a case can be made to keep bathrooms separate to keep men out.

But making this argument in good faith would require considering all areas where men are likely to harm women and establishing gender segregation in these areas. This would be most, if not all, areas in the United States showing that it is not bathrooms that are the danger, but bad men.

While the anti-abortion movement claimed a great victory when the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, the Republican Party has learned that this victory proved deeply unpopular with the American people. While Democrats favor abortion rights more than Republicans, 64% of surveyed voters say abortion should be always or mostly legal. While some Republican controlled state legislatures have imposed extreme restrictions on abortion rights, abortion rights supporters have won in several state ballots. As this is being written several more states (including my adopted state of Florida) have abortion rights measures on the ballot. Given that the anti-abortion view is held by a minority of voters, it is likely that these measures will pass in many states.

Because the anti-abortion position of the Republican party has proven unpopular and has imposed a political cost, the party’s rhetoric has shifted. The current rhetorical spin is that the Republican party is not against abortion rights. Rather, the party is for states’ rights.  Those critical of this rhetoric like to point out that appeals to states’ rights was also a tactic employed by the southern states to defend slavery. While the analogy is imperfect, the comparison does have some merit.

The states’ rights argument for slavery amounts to contending that the states should have the freedom to decide whether they will allow slavery, and this is usually phrased in terms of an appeal to democracy. That is, the citizens of the state should vote to decide whether some people can be denied freedom and be owned. An obvious defect with this reasoning is that it rests on the assumption that it is a matter of freedom of choice to take away freedom of choice.

A similar defect arises with the states’ rights rhetoric in the abortion debate. If it is accepted that the citizens of the state have the right to decide the issue of abortion because they should be free of federal law, then it is problematic to argue that the state has the right to take away the freedom of women to decide whether they get an abortion. If choice is important, then having legal abortion allows women to choose: a woman is not mandated to have an abortion nor forbidden, so she can make the choice. Hence, this rhetorical move entails that abortion should be legal nationwide.

Someone might counter this by taking the anti-abortion stance that women should not be allowed that choice, perhaps by drawing an analogy with murder. After all, they might argue, we would not want people free to chose murder. But the problem with that reply is that by using the states’ rights rhetoric, the Republican party has acknowledged that the legality of abortion should be a matter of choice, and this makes it difficult to argue that abortion should not be a choice for individual women.

While intended to address the backlash from the unpopularity of the success of the anti-abortion movement, this rhetoric has caused backlash from that movement. Some anti-abortion activists have urged their followers to withdraw their support of Trump. There is the question of how much impact this will have on the election, given that anti-abortion voters will almost certainly not vote for Harris. But it might cause a few single-issue voters to stay home on election day or not vote for Trump.

Pro-abortion rights people are almost certainly not going to be fooled by this rhetoric, since they know this is a rhetorical shift and not a change in policy or goals. While it might win over a few of the undecided voters, it seems to have two effects. The first is that it gives Republicans an established rhetorical talking point to use whenever they are asked about abortion. The second is that it provides those who want to vote for anti-abortion Republicans but who are not anti-abortion themselves a way to rationalize their vote. They can insist the Republican party is “pro-choice” because their new rhetorical position is that the states should chose. But not that women should chose.

The states’ rights rhetorical move could be an effective strategy. While the anti-abortion movement would prefer a federal abortion ban, having the states decide is better for them than having abortion legal nationwide. After all, some states have put abortion bans in place and these have been wins for the movement. But the obvious downside for this movement is that some states have put in place protections for abortion rights, despite the anti-abortion movement’s desire to make the choice for everyone.

In closing, the states’ rights argument is a position that cannot be effectively defended, because its foundation is the principle of choice, and this entails that it is the women who should make the choice for themselves.

 

In discussing the ethics of trans athletes competing, some people have made the claim that trans athletes would be cheating if they competed against non-trans women. This requires sorting out the notion of cheating. One obvious approach is to a make a moral comparison between transition and obvious forms of cheating, such as using banned performance enhancing drugs.

Cheating, of the sort that can morally be condemned, requires an intention to cheat and action taken to that end. As such, for a trans athlete to be condemned as a cheater simply by transitioning and competing, it would need to be shown that they did so with the intention of gaining an unfair advantage. Whether they gain an advantage or not would be relevant to the effectiveness of the alleged cheating, but morally the intent to cheat and taking the action to cheat should be condemned whether successful or not. It seems unlikely that trans athletes are intending to cheat and the idea that they gain an unfair advantage can be questioned.

One reason is that if their motivation to transition is solely to gain an unfair advantage, there are easier ways to cheat, such as with performance enhancing drugs. It would be odd for a person to go through the process of transitioning when they could gain an advantage by much simpler means. After all, as noted in the previous essay, an athlete who would be a top competitor as a trans athlete would already need to be a very good athlete and performance enhancing methods might suffice. It could be argued that the advantage gained by transitioning would be greater, but this runs into problems.

There is also the obvious fact that the relative gain weighed against the cost shows that people would be unlikely to “cheat” by transitioning. Transitioning comes with a very high cost when considered solely as a method of “cheating” and sexism towards women’s sports means that the relative gain would be low. Women’s sports tend to have less prestige and less financial reward (although this is changing to some degree). To have a rational incentive to “cheat” by transitioning, a male athlete would need to be good enough to beat top female athletes to get the rewards they desire, but not good enough to get similar (or better) rewards by using some other means. For example, there is often a significant pay gap between men’s and women’s teams that has made being on a losing men’s team more profitable than being on a winning women’s team. To be fair, as women’s sports gain more equality in compensation and prestige, then the incentive to transition to “cheat” would increase; but this would still undergo radically altering one’s entire life to do this, including facing prejudice and abuse for doing so.  An athlete would also have to plan out this “cheating” well in advance, while also knowing that they will be a good enough athlete. As such, it seems unlikely that an athlete would decide to undergo transition solely to gain an advantage in sports, even if they were able to plan it all out. While athletes do sacrifice for their sport, the cost imposed on trans people by others seems far too high for someone to do this just to gain that alleged advantage. As such, it is unlikely that trans athletes are engaged in cheating.

It might be argued that even if someone is sincere in their transition, they could still be “cheating” if the advantage they are alleged to gain is a factor or if they are willing use that alleged advantage. This could be seen as like being sincerely someone’s friend, but also being their friend for the advantages they happen to provide and making use of them. But there is the question of how many athletes would not have transitioned but for thinking they would gain an advantage. If they transitioned and this was not a deciding factor, then they could not be justly accused of intending to “cheat.” The purest case would, of course, be someone who transitions with no interest or intent to gain an advantage and who is not good at sports. They could hardly be accused of cheating or intending to cheat.

In closing, the worry about trans athletes “cheating” is the result of the right’s culture war obsession with a vanishingly small number of trans athletes. And the number of trans athletes decrease as the performance requirements increase, since there are relatively few trans people and the number of athletes at each increasing tier of performance drops dramatically. There are, as noted in the previous essay, strict rules in place for trans athletes. It is most reasonable to see the worry as yet another culture war moral panic aimed at hurting people as part of a political game.

The culture war over trans athletes extended to the Paris Olympics when Imane Khelif was falsely claimed to be transgender. This claim arose because Khelif won her boxing match in 46 seconds by hitting her opponent so hard that she had to withdraw from the match. The claim might have been made as a cynical attack of opportunity to get the transgender culture war in the international spotlight. As there were no transgender athletes in the Paris Olympics, they had to be imagined. Or it might have been the result of the sexist view that an Olympic level woman athlete could not be strong enough to win a match in one punch. While sorting this out would be interesting, my philosophical concern is with two common factors that are used to fuel the trans culture war. These are the misconception that an athlete can simply declare their gender and a misconception or misunderstanding of the claim that men are stronger than women.

If it were true that a male athlete could simply declare themselves a female athlete, then this would be unfair. However, this is not true. Ben Shapiro wanted to make a documentary about having male basketball players declare themselves to be women so they could play against women’s teams, but he found out that this is not how it works. He ended up making the comedy Lady Ballers instead and reality undercuts its entire political premise. Sports governing bodies, such as the NCAA, have long had strict rules in place for transgender athletes and athletes cannot simply pick their gender and compete. But even if someone knows this, they might argue that allowing trans athletes to compete would be unfair because “men are stronger than women.”

The general claim that men are stronger than women is true, but it is commonly misunderstood. Some take it as meaning that almost any man will be stronger than almost any woman. For example, Lady Ballers is based on the idea that washed up former high school basketball players led by their former coach can easily beat world class women’s basketball teams.  This leads to the concern that trans athletes would unfairly steal places in competitions because men are stronger than women. For example, it might be worried that a trans athlete could unfairly win the mile and steal the win from the second-place runner. But is this something we should worry about? To answer this, we need to consider relative athletic performance. I will use the mile as an example.

Hobbs Kessler of Skyline Highschool ran a 3:57 mile, setting the high school record. The men’s record holder for the mile is Hicham El Guerrouj who ran 3:43 in 1999. The women’s record holder is Faith Kipyegon who ran a 4:07 in 2023. While this might be taken as showing that men are faster than women, we need to be more precise. These numbers show that elite male runners are faster than elite female runners. But it also shows just how good an elite female athlete can be: the overwhelming majority of men, even trained milers, cannot run a 4:07 mile. I was an All-Conference college cross country runner, and I could not run a 4:07 mile. This means that a trans athlete would need to be a very good athlete to compete against good non-trans female athletes, even if it was (contrary to fact) assumed that the transition to meet the requirements to compete would result in no loss of performance. As the number of trans athletes is incredibly low and the number of male athletes who would be good enough to beat top female athletes is relatively low, the odds of a really good male athlete deciding to transition to compete is extremely low. But it could be argued, the odds are not zero and this means that some woman could be “robbed” of a place.

Similar concerns have been expressed about women who perform exceptionally well in sports and have high testosterone levels, despite the link being disproven. The fact that male athletes are not subject to such “performance policing” suggests that sexism is at work here, that women who perform exceptionally well are looked at with suspicion of being men. This sexism also seems to play a role in the concerns expressed about trans athletes, that women athletes are weak and must be protected.

People also express concern that trans athletes might “steal” slots on teams. Many teams have limited numbers of athletes that are allowed, such as the number of runners who can compete as varsity in cross country. To “steal” a slot, a trans athlete would just need to be better than the worst athlete who would have made the team. This is a much lower bar than “stealing” places and it is more likely to occur. Of course, the worst athlete who would have made the team could also have been displaced if someone slightly better had showed up to try out, so the likelihood that a trans athlete will “steal” a spot is far less likely than the chance someone else could show up and “steal” that spot, perhaps deciding to try out on a whim, because they just moved to the area, or picked that college. As such, this fear of trans “theft” is overblown.

While most Americans are not hostile to transgender people and oppose discrimination against their fellow Americans, the Republican party has made them a major target in their endless culture war. While sports have become one of the newest battlefields in this fight, there is still a focus on the bathroom battles. While the legal issues will be addressed by judges, there are also the moral issues.

Utilitarianism provides one approach to the moral issue of whether transgender people should be able to choose which bathroom to use. This involves weighing the harms of denying this choice against the harms of granting it. In a democracy, this approach seems to be a reasonable one, at least if it is believed that a democratic state should aim at the general good of the people (and that America is a democracy).

A utilitarian assessment leads to an obvious conclusion: bathroom choice should be granted. The two main arguments against bathroom choice fail in the face of facts and logic. One argument is that allowing bathroom choice would put people in danger. Since some states have already allowed bathroom choice, there is data about the danger presented by such choice. Currently, the evidence shows that there is no meaningful danger. As some wits enjoy pointing out, more Republican lawmakers have been arrested for bathroom misconduct than transgender people. As such, Republicans worried about bathroom safety should focus on policing their own party.

The other argument is the privacy argument, which contends that allowing people in bathrooms based on their gender identification would violate the privacy of other people. While the focus is on women’s bathrooms, men’s bathrooms have the greater potential for privacy violations because of urinals. Sometimes there are not even dividers between them and someone could simply look down and across at another person engaged in urination. As women’s bathrooms lack urinals and have stalls, there is more privacy. However, someone could obviously peep under a stall. In this sense, bathrooms already lack some degree of privacy. But this could be addressed by enclosing urinals in stalls and making stalls peep proof in ways that would still allow ventilation and ease of cleaning. But making bathrooms peep proof has not been a focus of Republican law makers, so they are probably thinking of privacy in a different way. The most reasonable interpretation is privacy from members of the other sex, this could be called “gender privacy.”

Those favoring transgender rights would point out that allowing people to use facilities based on gender identity would not result in boys seeing girls or vice versa. It would just be the usual girls seeing girls in the girls bathroom and boys seeing boys in the boy’s bathroom. Since the main worry is transgender girls in girl’s bathrooms, I will focus on that. However, the same discussion could be made for transgender boys.

The obvious reply to this would be to assert that gender identification is not a real thing: a person’s gender is set by biological sex. So, a transgender girl would, in fact, be a boy and hence should not be allowed in the girls’ locker room. This is presumably, based on the assumption that a transgender girl is still sexually attracted to girls because they are still a boy. There seem to be three possibilities here.

The first is that transgender girls are straight boys and are sexually attracted to girls (that is, they are just faking) and this grounds the claim that a transgender girl would violate the privacy of other girls. This would entail that lesbian girls also violate the privacy of other girls and since about 10% of the population is gay, then any bathroom with ten or more girls probably has some privacy violation occurring. As such, those concerned with privacy would presumably need to address this as well. The worry that lesbians might be violating privacy could be addressed by making stalls peep proof, but then no transgender bans would be needed since privacy would be protected.  While this could prove expensive, if Republicans are truly dedicated to bathroom privacy, they could provide funding for this.

The second is that transgender girls are not automatically sexually attracted to other girls and hence do not violate their privacy: they are girls like other girls. It could be objected that what matters is the genetic makeup or gender past of the person: someone who was once a biological male seeing a girl in the locker room violates her privacy. Arguing for this requires showing how this matters in terms of privacy, that being seen by girls is not a privacy violation but being seen by a transgender girl who is just going about their business is a privacy violation. That is, if the person looking does not care about what is being seen, then how is it a privacy violation?

The third is that transgender girls are just girls. In which case, there is no privacy violation since it is just girls seeing girls.

While those advancing these arguments might honestly believe them, it might be suspected that the motivation for opposing bathroom choice is a dislike of transgender people. This is the “transgender people are icky and bad” argument. This “argument” has no merit on the face of it, which is why it usually is not advanced as a reason by opponents of bathroom choice. But now back to the utilitarian argument.

One stock problem with utilitarian arguments is that they can be used to justify violating rights. This problem typically arises in when the benefits received by a numerical majority come at the expense of harms done to a numerical minority. However, it can also arise in cases where the greater benefits to a numerical minority outweigh the lesser harms to a numerical majority. In the case at hand, those opposed to bathroom choice could argue that even if bathroom choice benefits transgender people far more than it hurts people who oppose bathroom choice, the rights of anti-choice people are being violated. This then makes the matter a question of competing rights.

In the case of public bathroom facilities, such as student bathrooms at schools, members of the public have the right to use them since that is the nature of public goods. There are, however, reasonable limits placed on access. For example, the bathrooms in public schools, courthouses and government buildings are generally not open to anyone to wander off the street to use. So, while there is a right to public bathrooms, like all rights, it does have its limits. It can thus be assumed that transgender people have bathroom rights just as people who oppose bathroom choice do. What is in dispute is whether the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to not be forced to use bathrooms with transgender people.

Disputes over competing rights are often settled by utilitarian considerations, but the utilitarian argument already favors bathroom choice. As such, another approach is needed, and a reasonable one is the consideration of which right has priority. This approach assumes that there is a hierarchy of rights, and that one right can take precedent over another. Fortunately, this is intuitively appealing. For example, while people have a right to free expression, the right to not be unjustly harmed trumps it. This is why libel and slander are not protected by this right.

So, the bathroom issue comes down to this: does the right of a transgender person to choose their bathroom have priority over the right of an anti-choice person to not encounter transgender people in the bathroom? My inclination is that the right of the transgender person has priority over the anti-choice person. To support this, I will use an analogy to race.

Not so long ago, there were separate bathrooms for black and white people. When the bathrooms were to be integrated, there were dire warnings that terrible things would occur if bathrooms were integrated. This is a stock conservative approach against expanding rights: if these people get this right, then terrible things will happen. This argument was made in defense of the anti-miscegenation laws, against desegregation of schools and the military, and against same-sex marriage. So far, the claims of harm have turned out to be wrong.

In the specific case of desegregation of bathrooms, these terrible things obviously did not take place. Whites also have argued that they had a right to not be in the same bathroom as blacks. However, the alleged white right to not be in a bathroom with blacks does not trump the right of blacks to use the public bathroom. Likewise, the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to exclude them.

It can be objected that if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then gender mixing will occur in the bathrooms. For example, one common sight at races (such as marathons) is long lines leading to the women’s bathrooms and short lines for the men’s bathrooms. Women runners might start going into the men’s room (they already sometimes do). Then terrible things might happen. Specifically, I might need to wait longer to pee before races. This is a case where my selfishness must outweigh my moral principles: though I have no moral objection to gender mixing of bathrooms, my selfish bladder says that I cannot give up my right to a shorter line. If men want to go to the women’s bathroom, my bladder approves since that means less wait for it.