Feminists tend to criticize the portrayal of female superheroes in comics.  This criticism is usually body types of female heroes, the poses, and skimpy. One response is the Hawkeye Initiative in which Hawkeye (or another male superhero) is drawn in the same pose and costume type as a female superhero. As would be imagined, the male hero looks absurd when so posed and costumed, which is the point of the criticism.

While the presentation of female superheroes in comics is a first world problem, it does raise important concerns about potential harms, such as perceptions of body image.  But my interest here is in superhero costumes from a practical standpoint. While I am no expert on fashion, I draw on my experiences as an athlete, martial artist and gamer to guide the discussion.

In the realm of fiction, being a superhero generally means being very physically active and engaging in combat. This means that a sensible superhero would have a costume designed to take these into account.

While I am not a superhero, decades of competitive running give me some insight into what to wear when engaged in physical activity. One important factor is mobility, as you need to be able to move properly in athletic clothing. One approach is loose fitting clothing that allows a lot of motion (such as running shorts) while another is the tight-fitting spandex (such as running tights) that also allow free motion. The idea of heroes wearing tights makes sense for the same reason it makes sense for runners to wear them. Another important factor is temperature management. Most heroes will generate body heat and sweat when they are active. So, they will need to be able to stay cool while active but also remain warm when they are just patrolling or engaging in dramatic dialogue.

As a runner, I wear as little as possible when I am running in warm weather. These are just shorts, socks and shoes.  Many other runners are similar, with women generally adding the legally necessary coverage. Presumably a superhero that runs about would want to wear as little as possible. As such, in warm weather superheroes dressed in super versions of running clothes would make sense and they would have lots of skin exposed.  This assumes that the superheroes need to stay cool when being active. A superhero that had no need to sweat could wear whatever they wished—the concerns of mere sweaty mortals would not matter to them.

Considering this, it would make sense for female superheroes to wear the same amount of clothing as competitive runners: not much. However, the same would also apply to male superheroes.

While wearing minimal clothing is a good idea when active under warm conditions, like runners facing cooler weather, superheroes would alsoneed to cover up more to remain comfortable and perhaps avoid hypothermia. Practical and sensible superheroes should also consider following a standard practice of runners: wearing more clothing to warm up or when waiting to compete, then shedding clothing when it is time to get down to business. Since hanging out all day in sweat-soaked clothes is uncomfortable, sensible heroes would also change costumes when they can. And shower.

Unlike runners, superheroes engage in combat, and this imposes another set of practical considerations. Since superheroes tend to fight hand to hand, it would be unwise to have costumes that provide a foe with easy handholds. As such, tight costumes without extraneous material would be the best choice. Capes would, as always, be a poor choice.

When engaging in combat, it has always been a good idea to have protective gear. Some of this protection is intended to deal with the incidentals of combat, such as ending up in contact with rough surfaces (like being knocked down in the street) but most of it is supposed to provide protection against attacks. This protection usually takes the form of armor, ranging from ballistic clothing to powered armor (like Iron Man wears).

Armor does have the usual trade-offs: it tends to restrict movement, tire out the wearer quicker, and create overheating problems. As such, heroes that rely on speed and freedom of movement might be inclined to avoid armor or at least keep it to a minimum. The classic Batman, for example, did not wear any armor. However, as anyone who plays games like D&Ds or faces combat in the real world knows, armor is usually a good idea when other people are trying to kill you.

To be effective armor must at least cover the important parts (usually the head and torso) and that means exposing a lot of skin is a bad idea. As such, the “classic” fantasy drawings of heroines in armor are absurd. Or, as a veteran D&D player put it, “if the enemy can see your cleavage, they can cut your boobs.” And no one wants their boobs cut.

Superheroes who have powers that make them invulnerable or otherwise grant great defensive powers do not need to rely on armor and they can safely wear whatever they like; such as Power Girl’s famous cleavage window costume. While the classic Wonder Woman relied on her magical bracelets, the updated version seems to be close to Superman in her ability to withstand damage. As such, she would not need to rely on armor for protection. Superman, of course, does not need armor since his skin is almost certainly stronger than almost anything he could find on earth. As such, a superhero who still had to deal with the sweating problem but did not need armor would want to wear as little as possible, be they male or female. Perhaps this explains why Wonder Woman still dresses the way she does.

 

While homophobia can still be exploited for political advantage, it is not as effective as it used to be. In response to its diminished political value, the American right embraced transphobia. Before this, most Americans gave little thought to such matters as transpeople competing in sports and bathroom bills. Now that Trump has reclaimed the Whitehouse, it is certain that transphobia will continue to be pushed onto the American people and exploited for political advantage. This will give rise to various moral questions, centered around sports and bathrooms. The right seems extremely interested in bathrooms and who is using them. While one could simply assume that their views are, at best, based on ill-founded but sincere fears, there is the moral question of whether transpeople should be allowed to choose their bathrooms.

One way to approach this moral issue is to consider the matter in utilitarian terms. This requires weighing the likely harms and benefits of allowing or denying this choice. If our overall goal in politics is to serve the good of the people, this is a reasonable approach. It also does not beg any questions as it requires an honest evaluation of the harms and benefits to everyone.

A utilitarian assessment would favor bathroom choice. This is because the two most used arguments against bathroom choice are defeated by the facts. One argument is that allowing bathroom choice would put people in danger. This argument has considerable rhetorical power that derives from fear. After all, the idea that women and girls will be attacked in bathrooms is frightening. But does it have any logical force? Because some states allow bathroom choice, we have data about the danger. Currently, the evidence shows that there is no meaningful danger. As some wits enjoy pointing out, more Republican lawmakers have been arrested for bathroom misconduct than transgender people. As such, those worried about misdeeds in bathrooms should be focusing on the threat presented by Republican lawmakers. The other argument is the privacy argument, which falls apart under analysis.

While some might advance these arguments in good faith, there are those who oppose bathroom choice because they dislike of transgender people and make the “transgender people are icky argument.” This “argument” has no merit on the face of it, which is why it is not advanced as a reason by opponents of bathroom choice. Instead, as noted above, politicians and pundits rely on false claims about danger, using the psychological force of these lies in place of the logical force of evidence. But can a good argument be made for restricting bathroom choice?

A stock problem with utilitarian arguments is they can be used to justify violating rights. This occurs in cases where the benefits received by a numerical majority come at the expense of harm done to a numerical minority. However, it can also arise in cases where the greater benefits to a numerical minority outweigh the lesser harms to a numerical majority. In the case at hand, those opposed to bathroom choice could argue that even if bathroom choice benefits transgender people far more than it harms people who oppose it, the rights of anti-choice people are being violated. This then makes the matter one of competing rights.

In the case of public bathroom facilities, such as student bathrooms at schools, members of the public have the right to use them; that is the nature of public goods. There are, however, reasonable limits placed on access. For example, the public is not allowed to go into a school during normal hours to use the bathrooms. Similarly, the bathrooms in courthouses and government buildings are often not open to anyone to wander off the street and use. So, like all rights, the right to public bathrooms does have limits. It can thus be assumed that transgender people have bathroom rights as do people who oppose bathroom choice. What is in dispute is whether the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to not be forced to share bathrooms with transgender people. Or whether the right of anti-choice people to force transgender people to use specific bathrooms overrides the right of transgender people.

Disputes over competing rights are often settled by utilitarian considerations, but the utilitarian argument already favors bathroom choice. As such, another approach is needed, and a reasonable one is the consideration of which right has priority. This approach assumes that there is a hierarchy of rights, and that one right can take precedent over another. Fortunately, this is intuitively appealing. For example, while people have a right to free expression, the right to not be unjustly harmed trumps it. This is a reason why libel and slander are not protected by this right.

So, the bathroom issue comes down to this: does the right of a transgender person to choose their bathroom have priority over the right of an anti-choice person to not encounter transgender people in the bathroom? My inclination is that the right of the transgender person has priority over the anti-choice person. To support this, I will use an analogy to race.

Not so long ago, there were separate bathrooms for black and white people. When the end of race segregated bathrooms was proposed, there were dire warnings that terrible things would occur if bathrooms were integrated. Obviously enough, these terrible things did not take place. Whites could have argued that they had a right to not be in the same bathroom as blacks. However, the alleged white right to not be in a bathroom with blacks does not seem to trump the right of blacks to use the bathroom. Likewise, the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom would seem to trump the right of anti-choice people to exclude them.

It can be objected (using a slippery slope approach) that if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then bathrooms should be gender neutral. While many will have an emotional reaction to the idea, there is the historical question of why bathrooms were segregated to begin with.  While people might think this has always been the case, the first regulation requiring separate facilities for men and women was not passed in the United States until 1887. The ideological rational behind the separation was the view that women are weaker and needed protection in public spaces. But this separation was not limited to bathrooms as women had their own reading room in public libraries and even their own train cars. But these other gender segregated areas eventually vanished in most of the United States. We do not, for example, have women only seating sections on planes. As such, while it might seem odd to accept gender neutral bathrooms, it was once odd to suggest integrated libraries and transportation, which are now accepted without a thought in most of the United States. One can, of course, raise the danger and privacy arguments against allowing gender neutral bathrooms, but attacking people and harassing them are both already crimes, whether they occur in bathrooms or not. Bathrooms can also be designed to allow privacy (enclosing or replacing urinals and making stalls peep proof). To be fair, it can be argued that a person using the bathroom is more vulnerable to attack and that bathrooms usually only have one exit, making escape more difficult. Given the number of men who seem onboard with “your body, my choice”, women are now even more justified in being wary of men and hence a case can be made to keep bathrooms separate to keep men out.

But making this argument in good faith would require considering all areas where men are likely to harm women and establishing gender segregation in these areas. This would be most, if not all, areas in the United States showing that it is not bathrooms that are the danger, but bad men.

While the anti-abortion movement claimed a great victory when the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, the Republican Party has learned that this victory proved deeply unpopular with the American people. While Democrats favor abortion rights more than Republicans, 64% of surveyed voters say abortion should be always or mostly legal. While some Republican controlled state legislatures have imposed extreme restrictions on abortion rights, abortion rights supporters have won in several state ballots. As this is being written several more states (including my adopted state of Florida) have abortion rights measures on the ballot. Given that the anti-abortion view is held by a minority of voters, it is likely that these measures will pass in many states.

Because the anti-abortion position of the Republican party has proven unpopular and has imposed a political cost, the party’s rhetoric has shifted. The current rhetorical spin is that the Republican party is not against abortion rights. Rather, the party is for states’ rights.  Those critical of this rhetoric like to point out that appeals to states’ rights was also a tactic employed by the southern states to defend slavery. While the analogy is imperfect, the comparison does have some merit.

The states’ rights argument for slavery amounts to contending that the states should have the freedom to decide whether they will allow slavery, and this is usually phrased in terms of an appeal to democracy. That is, the citizens of the state should vote to decide whether some people can be denied freedom and be owned. An obvious defect with this reasoning is that it rests on the assumption that it is a matter of freedom of choice to take away freedom of choice.

A similar defect arises with the states’ rights rhetoric in the abortion debate. If it is accepted that the citizens of the state have the right to decide the issue of abortion because they should be free of federal law, then it is problematic to argue that the state has the right to take away the freedom of women to decide whether they get an abortion. If choice is important, then having legal abortion allows women to choose: a woman is not mandated to have an abortion nor forbidden, so she can make the choice. Hence, this rhetorical move entails that abortion should be legal nationwide.

Someone might counter this by taking the anti-abortion stance that women should not be allowed that choice, perhaps by drawing an analogy with murder. After all, they might argue, we would not want people free to chose murder. But the problem with that reply is that by using the states’ rights rhetoric, the Republican party has acknowledged that the legality of abortion should be a matter of choice, and this makes it difficult to argue that abortion should not be a choice for individual women.

While intended to address the backlash from the unpopularity of the success of the anti-abortion movement, this rhetoric has caused backlash from that movement. Some anti-abortion activists have urged their followers to withdraw their support of Trump. There is the question of how much impact this will have on the election, given that anti-abortion voters will almost certainly not vote for Harris. But it might cause a few single-issue voters to stay home on election day or not vote for Trump.

Pro-abortion rights people are almost certainly not going to be fooled by this rhetoric, since they know this is a rhetorical shift and not a change in policy or goals. While it might win over a few of the undecided voters, it seems to have two effects. The first is that it gives Republicans an established rhetorical talking point to use whenever they are asked about abortion. The second is that it provides those who want to vote for anti-abortion Republicans but who are not anti-abortion themselves a way to rationalize their vote. They can insist the Republican party is “pro-choice” because their new rhetorical position is that the states should chose. But not that women should chose.

The states’ rights rhetorical move could be an effective strategy. While the anti-abortion movement would prefer a federal abortion ban, having the states decide is better for them than having abortion legal nationwide. After all, some states have put abortion bans in place and these have been wins for the movement. But the obvious downside for this movement is that some states have put in place protections for abortion rights, despite the anti-abortion movement’s desire to make the choice for everyone.

In closing, the states’ rights argument is a position that cannot be effectively defended, because its foundation is the principle of choice, and this entails that it is the women who should make the choice for themselves.

 

In discussing the ethics of trans athletes competing, some people have made the claim that trans athletes would be cheating if they competed against non-trans women. This requires sorting out the notion of cheating. One obvious approach is to a make a moral comparison between transition and obvious forms of cheating, such as using banned performance enhancing drugs.

Cheating, of the sort that can morally be condemned, requires an intention to cheat and action taken to that end. As such, for a trans athlete to be condemned as a cheater simply by transitioning and competing, it would need to be shown that they did so with the intention of gaining an unfair advantage. Whether they gain an advantage or not would be relevant to the effectiveness of the alleged cheating, but morally the intent to cheat and taking the action to cheat should be condemned whether successful or not. It seems unlikely that trans athletes are intending to cheat and the idea that they gain an unfair advantage can be questioned.

One reason is that if their motivation to transition is solely to gain an unfair advantage, there are easier ways to cheat, such as with performance enhancing drugs. It would be odd for a person to go through the process of transitioning when they could gain an advantage by much simpler means. After all, as noted in the previous essay, an athlete who would be a top competitor as a trans athlete would already need to be a very good athlete and performance enhancing methods might suffice. It could be argued that the advantage gained by transitioning would be greater, but this runs into problems.

There is also the obvious fact that the relative gain weighed against the cost shows that people would be unlikely to “cheat” by transitioning. Transitioning comes with a very high cost when considered solely as a method of “cheating” and sexism towards women’s sports means that the relative gain would be low. Women’s sports tend to have less prestige and less financial reward (although this is changing to some degree). To have a rational incentive to “cheat” by transitioning, a male athlete would need to be good enough to beat top female athletes to get the rewards they desire, but not good enough to get similar (or better) rewards by using some other means. For example, there is often a significant pay gap between men’s and women’s teams that has made being on a losing men’s team more profitable than being on a winning women’s team. To be fair, as women’s sports gain more equality in compensation and prestige, then the incentive to transition to “cheat” would increase; but this would still undergo radically altering one’s entire life to do this, including facing prejudice and abuse for doing so.  An athlete would also have to plan out this “cheating” well in advance, while also knowing that they will be a good enough athlete. As such, it seems unlikely that an athlete would decide to undergo transition solely to gain an advantage in sports, even if they were able to plan it all out. While athletes do sacrifice for their sport, the cost imposed on trans people by others seems far too high for someone to do this just to gain that alleged advantage. As such, it is unlikely that trans athletes are engaged in cheating.

It might be argued that even if someone is sincere in their transition, they could still be “cheating” if the advantage they are alleged to gain is a factor or if they are willing use that alleged advantage. This could be seen as like being sincerely someone’s friend, but also being their friend for the advantages they happen to provide and making use of them. But there is the question of how many athletes would not have transitioned but for thinking they would gain an advantage. If they transitioned and this was not a deciding factor, then they could not be justly accused of intending to “cheat.” The purest case would, of course, be someone who transitions with no interest or intent to gain an advantage and who is not good at sports. They could hardly be accused of cheating or intending to cheat.

In closing, the worry about trans athletes “cheating” is the result of the right’s culture war obsession with a vanishingly small number of trans athletes. And the number of trans athletes decrease as the performance requirements increase, since there are relatively few trans people and the number of athletes at each increasing tier of performance drops dramatically. There are, as noted in the previous essay, strict rules in place for trans athletes. It is most reasonable to see the worry as yet another culture war moral panic aimed at hurting people as part of a political game.

The culture war over trans athletes extended to the Paris Olympics when Imane Khelif was falsely claimed to be transgender. This claim arose because Khelif won her boxing match in 46 seconds by hitting her opponent so hard that she had to withdraw from the match. The claim might have been made as a cynical attack of opportunity to get the transgender culture war in the international spotlight. As there were no transgender athletes in the Paris Olympics, they had to be imagined. Or it might have been the result of the sexist view that an Olympic level woman athlete could not be strong enough to win a match in one punch. While sorting this out would be interesting, my philosophical concern is with two common factors that are used to fuel the trans culture war. These are the misconception that an athlete can simply declare their gender and a misconception or misunderstanding of the claim that men are stronger than women.

If it were true that a male athlete could simply declare themselves a female athlete, then this would be unfair. However, this is not true. Ben Shapiro wanted to make a documentary about having male basketball players declare themselves to be women so they could play against women’s teams, but he found out that this is not how it works. He ended up making the comedy Lady Ballers instead and reality undercuts its entire political premise. Sports governing bodies, such as the NCAA, have long had strict rules in place for transgender athletes and athletes cannot simply pick their gender and compete. But even if someone knows this, they might argue that allowing trans athletes to compete would be unfair because “men are stronger than women.”

The general claim that men are stronger than women is true, but it is commonly misunderstood. Some take it as meaning that almost any man will be stronger than almost any woman. For example, Lady Ballers is based on the idea that washed up former high school basketball players led by their former coach can easily beat world class women’s basketball teams.  This leads to the concern that trans athletes would unfairly steal places in competitions because men are stronger than women. For example, it might be worried that a trans athlete could unfairly win the mile and steal the win from the second-place runner. But is this something we should worry about? To answer this, we need to consider relative athletic performance. I will use the mile as an example.

Hobbs Kessler of Skyline Highschool ran a 3:57 mile, setting the high school record. The men’s record holder for the mile is Hicham El Guerrouj who ran 3:43 in 1999. The women’s record holder is Faith Kipyegon who ran a 4:07 in 2023. While this might be taken as showing that men are faster than women, we need to be more precise. These numbers show that elite male runners are faster than elite female runners. But it also shows just how good an elite female athlete can be: the overwhelming majority of men, even trained milers, cannot run a 4:07 mile. I was an All-Conference college cross country runner, and I could not run a 4:07 mile. This means that a trans athlete would need to be a very good athlete to compete against good non-trans female athletes, even if it was (contrary to fact) assumed that the transition to meet the requirements to compete would result in no loss of performance. As the number of trans athletes is incredibly low and the number of male athletes who would be good enough to beat top female athletes is relatively low, the odds of a really good male athlete deciding to transition to compete is extremely low. But it could be argued, the odds are not zero and this means that some woman could be “robbed” of a place.

Similar concerns have been expressed about women who perform exceptionally well in sports and have high testosterone levels, despite the link being disproven. The fact that male athletes are not subject to such “performance policing” suggests that sexism is at work here, that women who perform exceptionally well are looked at with suspicion of being men. This sexism also seems to play a role in the concerns expressed about trans athletes, that women athletes are weak and must be protected.

People also express concern that trans athletes might “steal” slots on teams. Many teams have limited numbers of athletes that are allowed, such as the number of runners who can compete as varsity in cross country. To “steal” a slot, a trans athlete would just need to be better than the worst athlete who would have made the team. This is a much lower bar than “stealing” places and it is more likely to occur. Of course, the worst athlete who would have made the team could also have been displaced if someone slightly better had showed up to try out, so the likelihood that a trans athlete will “steal” a spot is far less likely than the chance someone else could show up and “steal” that spot, perhaps deciding to try out on a whim, because they just moved to the area, or picked that college. As such, this fear of trans “theft” is overblown.

While most Americans are not hostile to transgender people and oppose discrimination against their fellow Americans, the Republican party has made them a major target in their endless culture war. While sports have become one of the newest battlefields in this fight, there is still a focus on the bathroom battles. While the legal issues will be addressed by judges, there are also the moral issues.

Utilitarianism provides one approach to the moral issue of whether transgender people should be able to choose which bathroom to use. This involves weighing the harms of denying this choice against the harms of granting it. In a democracy, this approach seems to be a reasonable one, at least if it is believed that a democratic state should aim at the general good of the people (and that America is a democracy).

A utilitarian assessment leads to an obvious conclusion: bathroom choice should be granted. The two main arguments against bathroom choice fail in the face of facts and logic. One argument is that allowing bathroom choice would put people in danger. Since some states have already allowed bathroom choice, there is data about the danger presented by such choice. Currently, the evidence shows that there is no meaningful danger. As some wits enjoy pointing out, more Republican lawmakers have been arrested for bathroom misconduct than transgender people. As such, Republicans worried about bathroom safety should focus on policing their own party.

The other argument is the privacy argument, which contends that allowing people in bathrooms based on their gender identification would violate the privacy of other people. While the focus is on women’s bathrooms, men’s bathrooms have the greater potential for privacy violations because of urinals. Sometimes there are not even dividers between them and someone could simply look down and across at another person engaged in urination. As women’s bathrooms lack urinals and have stalls, there is more privacy. However, someone could obviously peep under a stall. In this sense, bathrooms already lack some degree of privacy. But this could be addressed by enclosing urinals in stalls and making stalls peep proof in ways that would still allow ventilation and ease of cleaning. But making bathrooms peep proof has not been a focus of Republican law makers, so they are probably thinking of privacy in a different way. The most reasonable interpretation is privacy from members of the other sex, this could be called “gender privacy.”

Those favoring transgender rights would point out that allowing people to use facilities based on gender identity would not result in boys seeing girls or vice versa. It would just be the usual girls seeing girls in the girls bathroom and boys seeing boys in the boy’s bathroom. Since the main worry is transgender girls in girl’s bathrooms, I will focus on that. However, the same discussion could be made for transgender boys.

The obvious reply to this would be to assert that gender identification is not a real thing: a person’s gender is set by biological sex. So, a transgender girl would, in fact, be a boy and hence should not be allowed in the girls’ locker room. This is presumably, based on the assumption that a transgender girl is still sexually attracted to girls because they are still a boy. There seem to be three possibilities here.

The first is that transgender girls are straight boys and are sexually attracted to girls (that is, they are just faking) and this grounds the claim that a transgender girl would violate the privacy of other girls. This would entail that lesbian girls also violate the privacy of other girls and since about 10% of the population is gay, then any bathroom with ten or more girls probably has some privacy violation occurring. As such, those concerned with privacy would presumably need to address this as well. The worry that lesbians might be violating privacy could be addressed by making stalls peep proof, but then no transgender bans would be needed since privacy would be protected.  While this could prove expensive, if Republicans are truly dedicated to bathroom privacy, they could provide funding for this.

The second is that transgender girls are not automatically sexually attracted to other girls and hence do not violate their privacy: they are girls like other girls. It could be objected that what matters is the genetic makeup or gender past of the person: someone who was once a biological male seeing a girl in the locker room violates her privacy. Arguing for this requires showing how this matters in terms of privacy, that being seen by girls is not a privacy violation but being seen by a transgender girl who is just going about their business is a privacy violation. That is, if the person looking does not care about what is being seen, then how is it a privacy violation?

The third is that transgender girls are just girls. In which case, there is no privacy violation since it is just girls seeing girls.

While those advancing these arguments might honestly believe them, it might be suspected that the motivation for opposing bathroom choice is a dislike of transgender people. This is the “transgender people are icky and bad” argument. This “argument” has no merit on the face of it, which is why it usually is not advanced as a reason by opponents of bathroom choice. But now back to the utilitarian argument.

One stock problem with utilitarian arguments is that they can be used to justify violating rights. This problem typically arises in when the benefits received by a numerical majority come at the expense of harms done to a numerical minority. However, it can also arise in cases where the greater benefits to a numerical minority outweigh the lesser harms to a numerical majority. In the case at hand, those opposed to bathroom choice could argue that even if bathroom choice benefits transgender people far more than it hurts people who oppose bathroom choice, the rights of anti-choice people are being violated. This then makes the matter a question of competing rights.

In the case of public bathroom facilities, such as student bathrooms at schools, members of the public have the right to use them since that is the nature of public goods. There are, however, reasonable limits placed on access. For example, the bathrooms in public schools, courthouses and government buildings are generally not open to anyone to wander off the street to use. So, while there is a right to public bathrooms, like all rights, it does have its limits. It can thus be assumed that transgender people have bathroom rights just as people who oppose bathroom choice do. What is in dispute is whether the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to not be forced to use bathrooms with transgender people.

Disputes over competing rights are often settled by utilitarian considerations, but the utilitarian argument already favors bathroom choice. As such, another approach is needed, and a reasonable one is the consideration of which right has priority. This approach assumes that there is a hierarchy of rights, and that one right can take precedent over another. Fortunately, this is intuitively appealing. For example, while people have a right to free expression, the right to not be unjustly harmed trumps it. This is why libel and slander are not protected by this right.

So, the bathroom issue comes down to this: does the right of a transgender person to choose their bathroom have priority over the right of an anti-choice person to not encounter transgender people in the bathroom? My inclination is that the right of the transgender person has priority over the anti-choice person. To support this, I will use an analogy to race.

Not so long ago, there were separate bathrooms for black and white people. When the bathrooms were to be integrated, there were dire warnings that terrible things would occur if bathrooms were integrated. This is a stock conservative approach against expanding rights: if these people get this right, then terrible things will happen. This argument was made in defense of the anti-miscegenation laws, against desegregation of schools and the military, and against same-sex marriage. So far, the claims of harm have turned out to be wrong.

In the specific case of desegregation of bathrooms, these terrible things obviously did not take place. Whites also have argued that they had a right to not be in the same bathroom as blacks. However, the alleged white right to not be in a bathroom with blacks does not trump the right of blacks to use the public bathroom. Likewise, the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to exclude them.

It can be objected that if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then gender mixing will occur in the bathrooms. For example, one common sight at races (such as marathons) is long lines leading to the women’s bathrooms and short lines for the men’s bathrooms. Women runners might start going into the men’s room (they already sometimes do). Then terrible things might happen. Specifically, I might need to wait longer to pee before races. This is a case where my selfishness must outweigh my moral principles: though I have no moral objection to gender mixing of bathrooms, my selfish bladder says that I cannot give up my right to a shorter line. If men want to go to the women’s bathroom, my bladder approves since that means less wait for it.

Two ways I track the culture war are my Facebook feed and memos about changes to higher education. One recent conflict was the Great Light Beer Battle of 2023. For those unfamiliar with this significant and world changing battle, TikToker Dylan Mulvaney received a custom can of Bud Light featuring her face and did a short promo spot. Since Mulvaney is a trans person, there was a reaction from many on the right.  Kid Rock added to the discussion of corporate marketing tactics by purchasing boxes of Bud Light and shooting them with a submachinegun. For those unfamiliar with gun laws, it is legal to own automatic weapons—you just need to navigate your way through the legal maze and pay the appropriate fee. Others limited their rage to words rather than bullets. This is but one example of some on the right being outraged by “woke” companies. As with all other battle, we will move on as memory fades, and they find something new.

Those who know me know I have long argued in favor of a broad and deep conception of free speech, largely stolen from J.S. Mill. People have the right to freedom of expression, through this is limited by the principle of harm. While there are gray areas of harm that can be debated, following Aristotle’s guidance about virtues, I prefer to err on the side of freedom. As such, I hold that harm needs to be meaningful and significant to justify restricting expression. Offending someone, even deeply, is not a significant harm—although the line between offense and harm can be fuzzy. This view entails that people have the right to condemn companies they disagree with, including posting videos of the execution of offending products with a submachine gun. From a practical standpoint, I do think that buying a product to destroy it in protest seems unwise—the company is profiting from the protest, and it can make a person appear the  fool. Perhaps such a gesture can be effective by showing that the person is so committed to the protest that they will, in effect, burn their own money to make a point.  In the case of Bud Light, the rage is directed at the brewer for being “woke.” In this case the “wokeness” is being willing to have a trans person do a promotional spot for them.

On the face of it, few (if any) American corporations are woke (in the non-pejorative sense). That is, they are not committed to social and economic justice. Their primary function is making money. This is not to deny that people, even those in high positions, might hold socially liberal views. When a company takes a stance on a social issue, this is almost always done when the stance enjoys popular acceptance. At the very least, they calculate that taking this stance will generate more revenue than not doing so. They can miscalculate and suffer a loss—as can happen with any marketing strategy or product change. In the case of Bud Light giving Mulvany the custom beer can, they made what probably seemed like a sensible marketing move: Overall, a 64% majority of Americans favor policies that protect transgender individuals from discrimination in jobs, housing and public spaces such as restaurants and stores, including 37% who strongly favor them. A much smaller share (10%) oppose or strongly oppose these policies, while 25% neither favor nor oppose them. While Americans are more divided over matters such as bathroom bills and transgender athletes in sports, hostility towards trans people is limited to a minority of Americans. As such, Bud Light made what appeared to be a smart play: for a small cost, they signal that they “believe” what most American consumers believe. This play did end in a fumble, as Bud Light sales are down, according to a detailed analysis of the Harvard Business Review.  But the parent company has not gone broke and it is worth considering that the causal factors include more than just the culture war factors.

While people enraged by such “woke” behavior have a moral right to express their rage, their reaction is not morally commendable. In general, the culture war rage at companies tends to focus on expressions of a pro-inclusion stance. In the case of the Bud Light episode, the company signaled a trans tolerant viewpoint, recognizing that trans people buy beer and gambling that since most Americans are at least tolerant of trans Americans this would be a smart marketing move. Before that, many companies (including other beer companies) have expressed other types of tolerance, such as towards gay people, women, and people of color. These were also met with rage. The anger usually seems focused on an expression of tolerance, perhaps because when capitalist corporations use tolerance signaling in their marketing, it marks that conservatives have lost that fight and will need to move on to hating someone or something else. This signals the right that they need to get back into that fight to signal that sort of tolerance will not be tolerated.

A good example is the reaction to Cracker Barrel recognizing there is a profitable market for plant-based meats. When Cracker Barrel added Impossible Sausage (a plant-based sausage) they were met with rage from the right and accusations of being woke. That was all nonsense, Cracker Barrel wants to make money selling people what they want to stuff into their sausage port. While the meat folks had every moral right to rage against this decision, their anger revealed their values.

A degree of anger could have been warranted if Cracker Barrel had decided to replace its meat-based sausage with plant-based sausage. I, too, have been mildly annoyed when a business has replaced a product, I like with one I don’t. But Cracker Barrel did not take anything away, it added an option. The meat-lovers could still get their meat, while people who wanted a meatless option could have that. So, the rage at Cracker Barrel was for giving people more choices, not less. As such, a reasonable explanation for the rage would be a dislike of people who prefer to eat plants (at least some of the time). This, one assumes, is due to prejudices against and stereotypes of vegans and vegetarians. Plant-based meats are also seen as connected to concern about climate change and animal cruelty and some on the right dislike the (alleged) politics behind it. But adding plant-based sausage to the menu does the meat eaters no harm since they can still have their meat, so their anger seems unwarranted. They seem to think they have the right to deny other people their choice of sausages simply because they dislike that choice. The same would seem to hold true in the rage at Bud Light: while trans people cause them no harm, they seem mad that they exist and that most people at least chose to be tolerant and wish them no harm.

Those who dislike trans people can, of course, make the usual argument that trans people are a threat. Hence, they can claim they are right to be mad at Bud Light because they are expressing tolerance of allegedly dangerous people. However, as many have pointed out, trans people are far more likely to be victims than perpetrators. This is not to deny that people can feel threatened by the notion of transgender people, but this is rather different from trans people being a threat as trans people—as opposed to the true claim that any type of person could also do harm. In closing, while people like Kid Rock have the moral right to express their rage at companies engaged in marketing by appealing to broadly accepted values, the rage against inclusion is to be condemned.

While the title of this essay could mean that Boebert and Greene’s culture war against “the progressives” and “the woke” got them into congress, it is not what I mean. What I mean is that progressive feminists fought for the rights of women to vote and hold office and without them, Boebert and Greene would be unable to do either.

The right in the United States tends to be ahistorical or mythological in their approach to the past and hence rarely talk about how many conservatives of today accept progressive views that their predecessors savagely opposed. An excellent illustration of this is women’s rights. Women were granted the right to vote in 1920 by the ratification of the 19th Amendment. While this might seem like a long time ago, there are people still alive that were born before then. Interestingly, the first woman served in congress in 1917, even before women had the Constitutional right to vote.

As would be expected, the battle over women’s right to vote and hold office  followed the template of conservative arguments for exclusion. One anti-suffrage argument was that women did not want the vote because they took care of the home and children and hence did not have the time to vote or stay informed about politics. Interestingly, this argument was advanced by the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage which was founded in 1911 by Josephine Dodge. Dodge had also led a movement to establish day care centers for working mothers and was apparently did not find her own arguments against political involvement by women to be convincing.

The other argument, a stock argument for exclusion in general, is that women are defective  relative to men. It was (and sometimes still is) claimed that they lack the mental capacity to engage in politics or are too emotional. A “nicer” version of the argument is based on the belief that men and women are fundamentally different and  women would be sullied by politics. There were also racist and class arguments against extending the vote: allowing all women the right to vote would allow, well, all women the right to vote and this would ibnclude minorities and those in the lower economic classes. 

There was also a “practical” argument that allowing women to vote would increase the cost of elections by doubling the number of voters. Some often unspoken “practical” arguments were concerns that women would act from maternal concern and vote for prohibiting alcohol consumption (which did happen with Prohibition) and vote for safer working conditions and limits on working hours.

While progressives and radicals (including some anarchists) backed women’s suffrage, one argument in favor of it rests on the stereotype of women as maternal and purer than men: the argument was that women voters would clean up politics and government. As noted above, these alleged qualities of women were also used to argue against allowin women to vote.  There were also more liberal arguments based on natural rights (citizens have a moral right to have a say in the government) and, of course, the classic “no taxation without representation” argument. Despite the stereotype argument, the movement for women’s suffrage  is best categorized as a leftist, progressive, and even radical movement opposed to some traditional family values. It is true that the Republican party of the time did support women’s suffrage, but the Republican party of the past is fundamentally different from the Republican party of today (and likewise for the Democrats). But, the Republicans  of today can claim that a party with the same name did fight for women’s rights.  But what does this mean for today?

Given that women’s right to vote and right to hold office are progressive and even radical views, the fact that the American right (mostly) accepts women like Boebert, Greene, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, and Nikki Haley in positions of power suggests three possibilities.

The first is that the right is more progressive than it believes and is willing to quietly embrace some progressive values, such as allowing women to vote and hold office. This seems unlikely, but the idea of closet progressives ruling the party does make a narrative that would appeal to conspiracy theorists.

The second is the “Queen Victoria” approach: while these women think they should be in office (and have equal rights), this is not a commitment to the general principle that women should have the right to hold office (and have equal rights). While possible, there is not much evidence either way—although Boebert recently claimed that women are weaker vessels and because of their frailty need men. I am inclined to think that these conservative women who hold positions of power think that the same right should extend to other women, but I could be wrong about this.

 The third is that while these were once progressive and radical ideas, they are now old enough and established enough that most do not see them as progressive or radical. If so, this indicates that traditional and conservative values can shift over time, albeit at a slower progression than for the progressives. On this view, the distinction between progressives and conservatives must include the factor of time: conservatives eventually embrace some progressive views but it takes them longer. This seems plausible, since if anyone were to suggest to Boebert and her fellows that they are embracing progressive views by holding office, they would probably deny it and then tear into the “woke” and “progressives” for wanting to do for others what the progressives once did for women. 

This gradual increase in inclusion relative to who gets excluded by the right suggests that in 100 years there might be a transgender conservative in office raging (and voting) against rights for (to use a sci-fi example) synthetic people. This is not intended to be against transgender people; the point is that members of any excluded group are people, and a person can be an exclusionary bigot even if they are a member of a group that is or was excluded because of bigotry. The American right demonstrates this every day. For example, not long ago Italian Americans were not considered white and were subject to discrimination and racism. But now Ron DeSantis, whose family immigrated relatively recently, is infamous for his anti-migrant policies and cruelty to migrants.

While I do not expect such people to experience a revelation about the inconsistency of their views this  undercuts the right’s professed world view. Far from holding fast to traditional values, the American right (slowly) shifts and progresses in terms of who is excluded and who is the target of bigotry. True, they do hold to the traditional values of exclusion and prejudice, but the tent really does get bigger. The right has already accepted, with some limitations, women, minorities, and homosexuals—groups they once violently excluded. As noted above, the scope of “whiteness” has expanded, allowing for a much more inclusive form of white supremacy than in the past.

This does lead to an interesting question about what will happen if the tent keeps getting bigger. Will the right need to stop expanding the tent or will they eventually need to kick some people back out into the rain? Or could progress eventually put an end to exclusion when there is no one left to exclude? As I suggested above, this might be where technology can save the right for a while: once all humans are included, they can briefly exclude synthetic people. But eventually there might be a right-wing AI member of congress raging against the people of Alpha Centauri and so on as long as they can find some outsider to exclude. So, the right had better get busy backing AI and warp drive research if they can’t keep enough people out of their tent.

The United States faces many problems, such as collapsing banks, closing hospitals, and radioactive waste contaminating elementary schools. While there are people trying to solve these problems, many politicians and pundits are focused on culture war battles over what often seem to be imaginary problems. While it is easy to lose track of the current battles of the culture war, I think there is still a war on woke and pugilism against pronouns.

While a rational person might respond to this with outrage that so much effort is being wasted when so many real problems exist, it is rational for the right to focus on these fights rather than on solving actual problems. Solving real problems is usually hard and fighting made up fights is easy. Also, seriously addressing the real problems most American face would risk the ire of their financial backers, rejection by their base, and put them at odds with their professed ideology.

While I thought that the right had largely moved on from the fight over pronouns, it turns out that I was wrong. On April 9, 2024 the governor of Idaho signed a law forbidding teachers from referring to a student by a name or pronoun that doesn’t align with their birth sex, unless the parents consent. So, the pronoun war continues, at least until the right needs to rebrand the fight.

While the pronoun war is largely a conflict manufactured by the right using a straw man and nut picking (treating the most extreme or unusual members of a group as representative of the group), there is a tiny bit of truth buried deep under all the hyperbole. There are some cases in which people do appear to be acting in extreme ways about pronoun usage and these can be weaponized to “argue” that the left is looney about pronouns. But, of course, this is fallacious reasoning. At best, it establishes that a few people exist who appear to be acting in extreme ways about pronoun usage. Pronouns are, of course, also linked to the culture war over gender.

To be fair, some people can seem to be engaged in pompous virtue signaling about pronouns and this can be annoying. This is analogous to the stereotype of vegans or people who do cross-fit annoyingly telling everyone. Posturing is annoying. But tolerating annoying behavior by having a proportional response is part of being an adult. As such, the right thing to do is politely tolerate such mild virtue signaling. But what about cases in which a person is serious (and not just virtue signaling) about their pronouns? My view of this is shaped by the “Mikey Likes It” commercial for Life cereal.

While my name is “Michael” I usually go by “Mike.” But, as you have probably guessed, people have called me “Mikey.” I do not like that. This is because when people use “Mikey” they have usually been trying to insult or provoke me. I respond by politely saying that I do not go by “Mikey. If they keep pushing it, it just becomes ever more evident they are doing it to provoke me. People have said they do not understand why I am taking offense at being called “Mikey” and even say that they can call me whatever they want. The pronoun wars reminded me of how much I disliked being called “Mikey” by people trying to mess with me when I was younger.

Looked at philosophically, my view is that my name is my name and I have the right to decide what name I will respond to. It is not up to other people to decide. This is especially true when they are misnaming me with malicious intent and are trying to insult or provoke me. While I don’t think this is a serious offense, it is still a hostile action, motivated by malice or cruelty.

When people insist that they be called by their chosen pronouns, I get it—I think of people trying to insult or provoke me by calling me “Mikey.” Their pronouns belong to them and thus they have the right to refuse to respond to pronouns they do not accept. People attempting to impose pronouns on them are most likely trying to insult them, be cruel, or provoke them—and hence are to be condemned in their misdeeds. But wait, someone might say, isn’t forcing people to accept your pronouns forcing them to accept your values?

When made in good faith, there is an interesting issue here of whether accepting a person’s pronouns entails accepting a specific value system about identity. To use an analogy, if I accept that King Charles should be called “King Charles”, would I thus be embracing the values system behind the British monarchy? On the face of it, I would just be accepting that that is what the British call him rather than accepting a political theory. But it could be argued that using the word “king” entails accepting that he really is a king and perhaps even that his kingship is legitimate.

On the one hand, it can be argued that expecting people to use one’s preferred pronouns is like me expecting people to call me “Mike” rather than “Mikey.” I am not forcing people who believe that “Mikey” is correct to adopt my world view about my name; I just expect them to respect my name when they talk to me. If this is too much for them, they can just call me “Michael.” Likewise, if a person has “they” as their pronoun, no one is forced to accept whatever world view might lie behind that choice—the other person can either use “they” or avoid pronouns if they have a sincere commitment against using pronouns in ways they do not want to use them.

On the other hand, one could argue that using a person’s preferred pronouns is to endorse or at least tolerate certain values. For example, a person might use “she/her” and someone talking to them might have a conceptual scheme in which that person is a “he/him.” As such, if they use “she/her”, then they would be respecting the other person’s pronoun choice at the expense of their own professed belief. Likewise, if a person had a sincere belief that “Mikey” is the correct short form of “Michael” then they would be respecting my choice at the expense of their own professed belief. Going back to the king example, it could be argued that referring to Charles as King Charles is to accept that he is a legitimate king and perhaps to endorse monarchy.

As another example, imagine that Sally is divorced and changed her name from Mrs. Sally Jones back to Ms. Sally Smith. Now, suppose Sally is talking to Ted at the DMV.  Ted sincerely does not believe in divorce, he believes a married woman must go by “Mrs.”, and that a woman must take her husband’s name. Sally is trying to get a new driver’s license as Ms. Sally Smith. Because of Ted’s beliefs about marriage, he refuses to refer to her as “Ms. Sally Smith” and refuses to issue her a new driver’s license.

His belief is profound and sincere (and based on his religion, if you’d like to add that), but it would be absurd to say that he has the right to refuse to accept her choice because he has a different conception of marriage. Likewise, one could say it would be absurd for someone to just impose pronouns on people based on their conception of proper pronoun use. Even if this is based on sincere beliefs. After all, it is not Ted’s beliefs that should decide how Sally refers to herself.

A person could be both respectful of the other person and act in accord with their beliefs by not using pronouns. If the person asked to use pronouns they disagree with sees it as an imposition, then they would need to accept that applying pronouns to a person who disagrees with them would also be an imposition. Consistency would require that they do not impose on others if they would not wish to be imposed upon themselves.

In closing, I obviously don’t think that people should be able to use the right to choose their pronouns and name to engage in identity theft. I also do not think that people would identify themselves as attack helicopters or whatever—I say this to show that I am familiar with the rhetoric used in bad faith “debate” over this issue. It does no more harm to use the pronouns that people wish to use than it does to use the name they prefer. If it is asking too much to do this, then the easy fix is to simply not use pronouns.

MEWF BarbieIn my last essay I discussed TERFs (Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists), with a focus on the seemingly odd alliance between TERFs (or “gender critical” feminists) and the far right. J.K. Rowling is, sadly, the most famous example of what her critics see as a TERF allied with the far right. While a TERF need not be a racist, there is a category of feminism that often is, the MEWF (Minority Excluding White Feminist). While a TERF (Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist) excludes trans-women because they claim they are not women, a MEWF does not claim that minority women are not women. As such, their exclusion is not based on gender but on race. In some cases, this exclusion arises from ignorance rather than malice.

While we Americans like to claim that “all men are equal”, the United States is deeply segregated by race and economic class. For those who might doubt this, it is easy to acquire what is admittedly anecdotal evidence: walk around your neighborhood and see who lives around you. Then consider the diversity (or lack thereof) of your friends. If you have kids in school (or are a kid in school), look at their classmates. While you might be an interesting exception, you will most likely find that your neighbors and friends are similar in race and economic class. If you have kids, they probably attend a school where most other students are the same race and economic class as you.

This segregation entails that people will often be ignorant about people outside of their race and class. Thus, a typical white feminist (especially if they are in the upper class) will know little about the challenges faced by women of color (and women of lower economic classes). It is easy for such white feminists to be MEWFs out of innocent ignorance—they are simply unaware of problems that women of color might face as people of color. An obvious example is racism—while a white feminist has heard about racism, it is not something they experience in the way they experience sexism. One can criticize white feminists for such ignorance and argue that they have a moral obligation to correct their ignorance, but one should be sympathetic when it comes to the ignorance of others, since we are all ignorant in many ways. This is, of course, not to forgive willful ignorance. But there are other factors than ignorance that can make a person a MEWF, such as a difference in priorities.

A white feminist can be aware of the circumstances faced by women of color but be focused on their own concerns, making them a priority. It can be argued that it is rational for people to give priority to their problems, given the limited resources most of us have. As an analogy, if someone can barely afford to buy food, it would be unreasonable to criticize them for not feeding others.  One might also look at in terms of an airplane analogy: you should get your own mask on before helping others. This would certainly apply in analogous emergency situations in which not helping yourself first would make you unable to help others. An analogy could also be drawn to specialists—an oncologist should not be condemned for not being a general practitioner. After all, the oncologist is kept quite busy with cancer cases.

As such, perhaps it makes sense for white feminists to focus on matters that impact (or interest) them and ignore those that do not. This can easily result in their excluding women of color and of different economic classes. A feminist executive, such as Sheryl Sandberg, would tend to prioritize the problems of female executives and be less concerned with those faced by the women who work in the companies run by these executives. But there might be grounds for condemning such exclusion as selfish or too self-focused.

Rachel Cargle offers an interesting criticism of toxic white feminism, focusing on what she dubs “white supremacy in heels.” Cargle notes that white feminists can often be guilty of tone policing, spiritual bypassing (the notion that racism can be eradicated by “love and light”), the white savior complex, and centering (making it all about them). Other authors, such as Rafia Zakaria and Kyla Schuller, are also critical of white feminism. It must be noted that these criticisms are not attacks on white feminists for being white, but a criticism of the ideology of white feminism. This sort of distinction is often willfully ignored by those who make bad faith arguments that critics of racism are racists. This is on par with saying that a critic of corruption must be corrupt because they are criticizing corruption. Despite this discussion, some might find the idea of white supremacist MEWFs to be absurd. After all, feminism is often cast as “woke” and white supremacy is usually seen as inextricably linked to misogyny. But a look at American history shows how well white supremacy and white feminism can mix.

One often unknown fact of the women’s suffrage movement in the United States is that some of its members were members of Women of the Ku Klux Klan (WKKK). While pushing for the right of women to vote, their push was for white women and they wished to exclude Black women. A reason for this was that the votes of white women could be used to counter the votes of Black men. As might be guessed, the KKK tended to be in favor of this—resulting in unexpected consequences.

The women in the suffrage movement, including the white supremacists, developed political skills and networks that could be employed for other purposes—be they for progressive causes or to advance racism. Interestingly, a split developed between the male KKK and the female WKK: while both held anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and racist views, the WKKK embraced the idea of women’s rights and argued for what would seem to be some progressive positions, such as pay for housewives. But these rights and entitlements would only be for white, native-born Protestant women. One could say they have a good claim to being the original MEWFs. While this might all be dismissed as “ancient” history (the early 1900s), this form of MEWF is alive and well. As an illustration, consider Lauren Boebert and Marjorie Taylor Greene.

While it might sound odd, Boebert and Greene should be considered feminists (there are many versions of feminism). They both obviously believe that women have the right to vote, serve in political offices, and hold power. Boebert also believes in the right of a woman to divorce her husband. They also clearly think that women have the right to harshly criticize powerful men (such as Joe Biden), as opposed to being demure and polite ladies who defer to the patriarchy. Not long ago, these views and their behavior would have been seen as shockingly radical by the right—they would have been savagely condemned and criticized. Now they are mainstream feminists about these views, but feminists, nonetheless. After all, Boebert and Greene obviously disagree with most of the misogynistic views expressed by the right—they are not going to go back to the kitchen to make sandwiches for men. But their behavior and words make it clear that they are MEWFs. Greene seems to embrace white nationalism and Boebert seems to have a bond with white supremacy. Thus, the tradition started by the WKKK continues to this day. Rush Limbo, with his talk of Feminazis, was almost not wrong.