Category: Gender

Transgender people, especially transgender athletes are now among the favored targets of the right. Pretending to be concerned about fairness for women, Republican lawmakers have been busy passing laws banning transgender athletes from competition.

On the face of it, these laws seem aimed at saying to the Republican base “we hate and fear transgender people as much as we think you do so keep voting for us.” Obviously, proponents of these laws do not make this claim; they pretend they are very concerned about women and girls being treated fairly.

Republicans profess to be the party of small government, but these laws expand the involvement of the state and as could have agents of the state looking at genitals. This is the same party that raged against mask mandates as too invasive. But, as they have established, the Republican party has no respect for ethics, consistency or logic.

Like Republicans, I profess a belief in minimal government but differ in being consistent.  I have argued in other essays that the state should limit its use of law to cases in which a harm needs to be addressed by law and the good the law outweighs any harms of the law. Those who back the transathlete bans have been hard pressed to find meaningful harms. While inconsistent with their professed love of small government and freedom, these laws are consistent with their approach to voter rights in that they support imposing restrictions where no meaningful harm exists.  But perhaps they are motivated by their professed principle of fairness to women. Let us test this hypothesis.

If the Republicans believe laws should ensure women are treated fairly, then they should pass other laws aimed at addressing serious inequalities between men and women. One example is the persistent pay gap between men and women. In Florida, women make 85 cents for every dollar made by men. This is a harm being done to women and is unfair, yet while the Republican controlled government of Florida was busy with ant-transgender laws, they have been uninterested in this pay gap. One could counter that this is a concern for the private sector, but one can then point to the gender pay gap in Florida government: something the government could and should address. One could also run down a checklist of the areas where women are treated unfairly relative to men and look for evidence that the Republicans have addressed these cases of unfairness. As such, the claim that they are motivated by concerns about fair treatment of women and girls is just another lie. If they were truly motivated by this principle, they would be actively addressing the significant unfairness faced by women and girls and not just focused on ant-transgender laws wearing the mask of fairness.

As a practical response, whenever the Republicans make the fairness argument against transgender athletes, they should be immediately challenged about what else they are going to do to adress fairness. For example, if they are so concerned about fairness, they should ratify the ERA. 

“Bathroom bill” is the popular term for legislative efforts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on gender identity. These bills typically define who can and cannot access these facilities based on how the bill defines sex or Examples include defining sex by assigned sex at birth, sex listed on the person’s birth certificate, or sex based on gender identity. Some states have passed or are considering bathroom bills and this matter is part of the ongoing culture war against transpeople. As Trump himself noted, this front of the culture war is new. As to why it was opened up, the reasonable answer is that the right mostly lost the same-sex marriage culture war, and they needed a new victim to attack for political gain. Transgender people, unfortunately, were the chosen target.

People tend to take a stance on bathroom bills based on how they feel rather than based on a theory of law. This is usually because most people, even politicians, don’t have a theory of law. While my focus in this essay is on bathroom bills, I am using this context to develop my theory of law in more detail. I want to have a principled and consistent method of assessing laws and good faith argumentation involves making this methodology clear.

Good faith also requires me to note that I am operating within a framework of political philosophy based on Mill and Locke. I accept that people have rights, that the purpose of government is the good of the people, and that rights can only be infringed upon based on the principle of harm. I also favor small government: the laws and the state’s use of coercive force should be kept at a minimum. I have other assumptions but laying out my entire political philosophy would require at least one book. Good faith also requires that I make it clear that I generally oppose bathroom bills and my reasons will be advanced in this essay.

My first consideration in assessing a (potential) law is determining whether the subject is fit for law, and this requires determining whether the matter falls under the legitimate use of the power of the state. What counts as legitimate use is a matter of debate and people are rarely consistent beyond thinking that if the state is doing what they want, it is legitimate. Fortunately, the issue of legitimate use can be narrowed down. In the case of the bathroom bill, the issue is whether controlling who can access bathrooms is a legitimate use of the coercive power of the state. In the context of laws that restrict liberty and rights, I generally follow Mill’s approach: liberty can only be justly restricted to prevent harm to another. On this principle, proponents of a bathroom bill would need to identify the harm the bill is intended to prevent: if there is no harm, then there is no justification for restricting liberty. But even if a law is supposed to prevent harm, this does not settle the issue of whether it should be law.

A second consideration is the issue of whether the significance and nature of the alleged harm warrants expending public resources to pass and enforce a law. Harms vary in significance and even significant harm might not be the right sort of harm that justifies the use of the coercive power of the state. Consider, if you will, some harm that can occur in a bathroom.

Like many other men, I feel uncomfortable when other men try to engage me in conversation while I am urinating. I am also a bit offended when people try to make eye contact during these conversations. While I am experiencing some harm (discomfort and feeling offended) these harms are not significant enough to warrant a law against them. They are also not the right sort of harm: the state does not seem obliged to protect us from discomfort or offense. But a person could escalate matters in the bathroom: if the chatty urinator started making threats of violence or tried to touch someone, then the harm becomes both significant enough to and the right sort to warrant state intervention. That is, laws against threatening people and assault fall within the state’s legitimate use of coercive force.

While those advocating bathroom bills might feel uncomfortable around or offended by the people whose bathroom access they wish to control, they generally understand that these reasons do not warrant passing a law. As such, the bills are typically presented as intending to keep women and girls safe in the bathroom. Some proponents of these bills do admit that transgender people are rarely sexual predators. Instead, they express worry that non-transgender sexual predators will exploit laws allowing transgender access to bathrooms to attack women and girls. This does allege harm that would be both significant and the right sort. But is the allegation true? After all, if the harm is make-believe, it cannot justify a law.

Several states and large cities have allowed transgender people to access bathrooms based on their identity for years, thus providing a wealth of empirical data . The evidence is that this access is not exploited by predators. That is, allowing trans people access to bathrooms of their choice does not decrease the safety of women and girls in bathrooms. If it did, there would be evidence. This is not to deny that a sexual predator could dress up as a woman to get into a bathroom, just that it does not seem to be something that occurs with any statistical significance. There is also the obvious fact that  a predator could dress up as a women whether there are bathroom laws in place. A sexual predator could also disguise themselves as a trash can to launch an ambush in a bathroom, but we do not need a law to address this. It is not something that happens enough to warrant creating a law and mandating trash can inspections.

Somewhat ironically, bathroom bills require that transgender men use women’s bathrooms. As such, a sexual predator keen on exploiting the law could simply claim to be a transgender male and freely enter bathrooms. No need to wear a dress or makeup. As such, the fear argument is self-defeating: if a law is needed to keep transgender people out of bathrooms because male sexual predators will put on dresses to pretend to be transwomen, then the law would not work because sexual predators would simply claim to be transmen and have easy access to the bathrooms because the law defines them as women. This could be addressed by employing bathroom police and requiring people to present birth certificates before accessing bathrooms. But this would require a disproportionate expenditure of resources and impose inconveniences not warranted by the alleged harm. In response, one could contend that something must be done to address even the possibility of harm: theoretical transgender predators must be prevented from attacking women and girls in bathrooms no matter how unlikely this is to happen.

My third consideration is the issue of whether the harm is adequately addressed by existing laws or factors other than laws. If the harm is already addressed adequately, there is no need for a new law. Going back to my chatty urinator discussion, we do not need a law banning chatty people from bathrooms because someone might make verbal threats in the bathroom. We also do not need a law banning people who make eye contact in bathrooms because someone might touch someone else in the bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: making threats is illegal and assault is illegal. Likewise, while knowing a trans person is in the bathroom with them might make a person uncomfortable or feel offended, we do not need a law banning trans people because someone might assault or rape someone in a bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: assault and rape are illegal and allowing trans people to use bathrooms as they wish does not change that. As such, there is no need for bathroom bills and on their own grounds of justification they are unjustified.

A fundamental ethical concern in sports is creating fair categories of competition. Age is a non-controversial example of this: elementary school teams do not compete against high school teams. Size is also a relatively non-controversial example in boxing. A heavyweight fighter will generally have a significant advantage over a smaller fighter. But there is a challenge in developing principles of category fairness. After all, there are many factors that can provide one category of athletes an advantage over others that intuitively should not be the basis of categorizing athletes for fair competition.

As an obvious example, some have anatomies and physiologies that give them an advantage. To illustrate, a runner with an ideal body type for running and excellent genetics for speed and endurance will have an advantage over someone with a body that is biomechanically terrible for running and whose genes lack those advantages. One could also consider psychological factors (such as determination) and even economic factors (which can affect diet, coaching, and available training time). While trying to adjust for these factors would make competition fairer, it does lead to a reductio ad absurdum: the ultimate in fairness would be for each person to be in their own category, competing against only themselves. That is, there would be no competition.

The other extreme would be to have no categories: everyone competes with everyone regardless of such factors as age, gender, or weight. This could even be seen as fair: everyone is competing without distinction and the best will win. But this would also be absurd (and dangerous): imagine elementary school students playing tackle football against the Patriots. It can also be argued that this would be unfair: professional football players enjoy far too many advantages over elementary school football players. As Aristotle would say, the right approach lies in a mean between these two extremes: neither too many nor too few categories for fair competition.

One category that seems reasonable in most sports is sex. Males generally enjoy significant physical advantages relative to females and genderless competition would tend to result in males dominating sports. As an example, if the Olympic marathon had no gender categories, all the competing athletes would almost certainly be males. There would, of course, be exceptions at individual competitions as a female runner might beat all the males at a specific marathon. As such, a case can be made that gender categories in sports are fair. While this might seem like a simple matter, it is complicated.

There are world class women athletes, such as Caster Semenya, who have XY chromosomes. While there are many bad faith arguments made about this issue, one can have a good faith debate about the fairness of allowing women with XY chromosomes to compete with XX women since there are some reasons to think XY chromosomes can provide an advantage that XX women lack. It must be noted that the performance of elite XY women athletes does not match that of elite male athletes and XX women athletes can outperform XY women athletes in competition.

The easy and obvious reply to concerns about XY women is to point out that this seems to be almost the only case where people are worried about genetic advantages in sports. Athletes do not get tested to see if they have advantageous genes (or anatomy and physiology) to determine if they can compete. For example, very tall basketball players have an edge over shorter players, and this has a genetic component, but they do not get banned because of that genetic feature. In fact, elite athletes probably enjoy a range of genetic advantages over other athletes, but they do not get banned from the sport even when they greatly exceed even other athletes in their performance.

It can be countered that there are grounds for concern about allowing XY women to compete as women. We have accepted the categories of male and female in sports as a division needed to ensure fair competition. It can be argued that XY women should be excluded from the female category in sports on the grounds that they do not qualify for inclusion. This, one might argue, is based on fairness: XY males are excluded from competing against XX females based on fairness because they do not belong in the female category and would have an unfair advantage. This reasoning can also be backed up by an analogy.

Imagine that Sam has been adopted and is just young enough to be able to play one year of little league baseball before aging out. When he tries out for the little league team, he finds that his somewhat unusual size and strength give him an edge over the other kids and people notice that he seems to be the size of kids a year older. Now imagine that the parents of another child think that something is up, so they hire an investigator to check Sam’s background. The investigator finds out that there seems to have been a mistake in Sam’s records, and he might be a year older than what the official documents say. While Sam and his parents have done nothing wrong intentionally, it would be unfair for Sam to compete against kids a year younger than him. As such, Sam should not be allowed to finish the season because he exceeds the age limit. While this argument does have some appeal, it does raise important concerns.

While I do agree that dividing athletes into the male and female categories can be warranted on the grounds of fairness, to simply assume that XY women are not females would be unwarranted. What is needed is a well-developed and defended set of principles for sorting athletes into these categories. These principles would also need to be consistent and consistently applied.

Going back to the analogy with Sam, he appears to be a large person of his claimed age. But the parents of the other child believe the evidence provided by their investigator and by their standard, Sam is too old to compete in little league and must be excluded on the grounds of fairness. While age is clearly an objective matter, this lack of certainty is intentional to make the analogy fit: while some believe that XY women are not women, this is a matter of what standards one accepts. Just as one would need to argue for which documentation to accept about Sam’s age, one must argue for the standards used to exclude or include people in the male/female categories in sports.

If it is decided that the distinction is based on genetics (which it seems to be) and that XY women must be excluded from the female category because they have an unfair advantage, then consistency would seem to require doing a genetic analysis of all athletes to discern if there are genes that yield similar unfair advantages. If such genes do exist, then allowing people with them to compete with those without would be unfair. If we should exclude XY women based on their alleged advantage, then the same would apply to these other athletes and they would need to be excluded as well. If one says that this should be limited solely to XY and XX, then they would need to provide a principled argument for making this the only genetic distinction that matters. While one could make a practical appeal to the cost of testing; the same would also apply to the XY/XX cases as one must test a person to determine if a woman is XX or XY.  And if there is a need to test for that, then there would seem to be a need to test for other genetic advantages.

One can also argue that the genetic advantages of top athletes are too diverse to identify and categorize and the XX/XY distinction is a simple one that allows the preservation of existing sports competition categories. There would also be degrees of advantage and sorting this all out would be needlessly complicated. But one could reply that we could create broad genetic categories analogous to age groups in sports. This could be countered by arguing that the distinctions and advantages are fuzzy and unclear, so why not let people compete without genetic testing and categorization? This would, of course, seem to also apply to XY women and while they might have some possible advantage over some XX women in sports, this does not seem to warrant creating a special category that excludes them from competing against other women. This does require accepting that the sharp and absolute male/female distinction that some people crave does not exist, that the boundaries are fluid and fuzzy and this reflects reality. While some might want “pure” Platonic concepts of male and female, we do not find them instantiated perfectly in this world. As such, XY women should be permitted to compete as women.

Power holders in the United States tend to be white, male, straight, and (profess to be) Christian. Membership in these groups also seems to confer a degree of advantage relative to people outside of these groups. Yet, as been noted in the previous essays, some claim that the people in these groups are now the “real victims.” In this essay I will look at how a version of the fallacy of anecdotal evidence can be used to “argue” about who is “the real victim.”

The fallacy of anecdotal evidence is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a small number of cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. The fallacy is sometimes taken to be a version of the hasty generalization fallacy (drawing a conclusion from a sample that is too small to adequately support that conclusion). The main difference between hasty generalization and anecdotal evidence is that the fallacy anecdotal evidence involves using a story (anecdote) as the sample.

Here is the form of the anecdotal evidence fallacy often used to “argue” that an advantaged group is not advantaged:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B

Premise 2: A member of Group A was disadvantaged relative to a member of Group B.

Conclusion: Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B (or Group B is not disadvantaged relative to Group A).

 

 

To illustrate:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that white Americas are advantaged relative to black Americans.

Premise 2: Chad, a white American, was unable to get into his first choice of colleges because affirmative action allowed Anthony, a black American, to displace him.

Conclusion: White Americans are not advantaged relative to black Americans.

 

The problem with the logic is that an anecdote does not suffice to establish a general claim because an adequately large sample is needed to make a strong generalization. But one must also be on guard against another sort of fallacy:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B.

Premise 2: Member M of Group A is disadvantaged relative to Member N of Group B.

Conclusion: The disadvantage of M is morally acceptable, or M is not really disadvantaged.

 

To illustrate:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that men are advantaged relative to women.

Premise 2: Andy was disadvantaged relative to his boss Sally when she used her position to sexually harass him.

Conclusion: The disadvantage of Andy is morally acceptable, or Andy was not really disadvantaged.

 

 

While individual cases do not disprove a body of statistical evidence they should not be ignored. As in the illustration given above, while men generally have a workplace advantage over women, this does not entail that individual men are never at a disadvantage relative to individual women. It also does not entail that, for example, men cannot be the victims of sexual harassment by women.  As another illustration, while white men dominate academics, business, and politics, this does not entail that there are not injustices against specific white men in such things as admission, hiring and promotions. These sorts of situations can lead to moral debates about harm.

One excellent example is the debate over affirmative action. An oversimplified justification is that groups that have been historically disadvantaged are given a degree of preference in the selection process. For example, a minority woman might be given preference over a white woman in the case of college admission. The usual moral counter is that the white woman is wronged by this: if she is better qualified, then she should be admitted, even if this entails that the college population will remain almost entirely white.

The usual counter to this is that the white woman is likely to appear better qualified because she has enjoyed the advantages conferred from being white. For example, her ancestors might have built wealth by owning the ancestors of the black woman who was admitted over her and this inherited wealth meant that her family has been attending college for generations, that she was able to attend excellent schools, and that her family could pay for tutoring and test preparation.

This can be countered by other arguments, such as how the woman did not own slaves herself, so it is unfair for her to not be admitted on the “merit” arising from all these advantages arising from generational wealth. One can, of course, consider scenarios such as cases in which the black woman is from a wealthy family while the white woman is from a poor family. Such cases can, of course, be considered in terms of economic class and one could argue that class should also be a factor. This obviously all leads to the moral issue of whether it is acceptable to inflict some harm on specific members of advantaged groups to address systematic disadvantages, which goes way beyond the scope of this essay.

Fortunately, I do not need to settle this issue here. This is because even if such anecdotes are examples of morally wrong actions, they do not disprove the general statistical claims about relative advantages and disadvantages between groups. For example, even if a few white students are wronged by affirmative action when they cannot attend their first pick of schools, these anecdotes do not disprove the statistical evidence of the relative advantage conferred by being white in America. After all, the claim of advantage is not that each white person is always advantaged over everyone else on an individual-by-individual basis. Rather it is about the overall advantages that appear in statistics such as wealth and treatment by the police. As such, using anecdotes to “refute” statistical data is, as always, a fallacy. But what about cases in which members of an advantaged group do suffer a statistically meaningful disadvantage in one or more areas?

While falling victim to the fallacy of anecdotal evidence is bad logic, it is not an error to consider that members of an advantaged group might face a significant disadvantage (or harm) because of their membership in that advantaged group. As would be expected, any example used here will be controversial. I will use the Fathers’ Rights movement as the example. The central claim behind this movement is that fathers are systematically disadvantaged relative to mothers. While there are liberal and conservative versions, the general claim is that fathers and mothers should have parity in the legal system on this matter. Critics, as would be expected, claim that men tend to already enjoy a relative advantage here. But if the Fathers’ Rights movement is correct about fathers being systematically disadvantaged relative to mothers, then this would not be mere anecdotal reasoning. That is, it would not just be a few cases in which individual fathers were disadvantaged relative to a few individual mothers, it would be systematic injustice. But would this area of relative disadvantage disprove the claim of general advantage? Let us look at the reasoning:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B.

Premise 2: But Group A is disadvantaged relative to Group B in specific area C.

Conclusion: Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B.

 

As presented, this would be an error in reasoning because Group A being disadvantaged in one area would not prove that the group is not advantaged relative to Group B when all areas are considered. To use an analogy, the fact that Team B outscored Team A in the fifth inning of a baseball game does not entail that B is leading. It must be noted that a similar argument with multiple premises like Premise 2 could show that Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B. After all, establishing adequate statistical evidence would obviously be adequate. There are, of course, questions about how to determine relative advantage and these can be debated in good faith. One obvious point of dispute would be the matter of weighting. For example, if fathers are disadvantaged relative to mothers, how would this count relative to the pay gap between men and women? And so on for all areas of comparison. This does show the need to consider each area as well as a need for assessing value but this is not unique to the situation at hand and one could, as is often done, assign crude dollar values to do the math.

In closing, while individual wrongs and wrongs done to members of advantaged groups as members of that group can occur, they do not automatically disprove the statistical data. 

 

When it is claimed that the “real victims” are white, male, straight or Christian, there is the obvious problem of explaining how this occurs. It cannot be that white, male, straight and Christian people are systematically excluded from power in the United States. These are the people who currently dominate the White House, the Senate, the House, corporations, academia, and so on. But there is a feeling among some white, straight, male, and Christian people that they are suffering. But what is the explanation?

A “left wing” explanation would be that while being white, male, straight or Christian yields relative advantages, the greatest advantages are held by those who have the greatest wealth and power. That is, class is a dominant factor in the United States. Take, for example, the claim that migrants are stealing jobs. Put this way, white workers are claimed to be victims of minorities. While there are cases in which jobs are lost to migrants, the job woes of Americans are not caused by migrants stealing jobs. While the causes of job losses and underemployment are complicated, a major factor is that those with the power to make decisions choose to do things that hurt American workers. As a specific example, my hometown of Old Town used to have the paper mill as its primary employer. Migrants did not come to Old Town to steal the jobs, ownership of the mill changed and eventually those in charge decided to shut the mill down. This hurt my hometown in ways that it will probably never recover from. One could spend endless hours going through similar explanations of the real woes faced by white, male, straight, and Christian Americans. But this sort of explanation is obviously not going to be presented by those who hold power. But they still need to explain the suffering.

One “non-left” explanation is that the “real victims” are “losing” to the other groups because they are inferior. To use an analogy, back in the day my friends and I did well in the local road races; we were the ruling class of local running. This is no longer the case. The explanation is easy: we are now decades older and are inferior to the young athletes who now rule. One could argue that the same sort of thing is happening to the groups in question: they once ruled America but are now losing to superior groups because they are inferior. But this explanation would clearly be unacceptable to the conservatives who claim that white, straight, male, Christians are the real victims.

One reason for this is the conservative notion of merit and their claims about pulling oneself up by the bootstraps. If these groups are “losing” because they are inferior, then this would be acceptable under a professed principle of merit in conservative ideology. But conservatives do not say that it is morally fine that white, straight, Christian men are losing because they are inferior to their competition.

A second reason conservatives will not accept the inferiority explanation is that it would not be good propaganda or rhetoric. Telling these groups that they are losing because they are inferior will hardly yield the desired results. As such, an explanation is still wanting.

But conservatives do tend to present the “opponents” of these groups as being strong in some manner. This allows the “defeat” to be blamed on the strength of the opposing groups rather than on the weakness of the “real victims.” An obvious problem is that if these opposing groups are presented as strong, this entails their white, straight, male, Christian “victims” are weaker and thus, by conservative ideology, inferior. This creates a challenge for conservatives: the “real victims” must be victims, but they must also be mighty. That is, they must be mighty victims. The reasons given that the groups are mighty(yet victims) vary considerably and fall along a vast spectrum.

In the case of being white, the notion of whites being mighty can range from pride in being white to white supremacy. Moderate examples of this would be people to argue for the superiority of Western (white) culture and point to the accomplishments of white people. Approaching the extreme end would be assertions of fundamental white supremacy and the inferiority of all others. Nazis would be in this area. I must, of course, state the obvious to pre-empt a likely attack: being fine with being white is fine. I’m fine with looking white; but I do not think I am thus superior to others.

In the case of being male, the notion that men are superior to women can range from pride in being a male to complete misogyny. Moderate examples would be those who argue that men and women have different qualities, but men are generally better. Near the extreme end would be full misogyny, the idea that men are vastly superior to women and women are horrible and out to destroy men. One can be fine with being a man; that can be healthy. I am fine with being a man; but I do not think this makes me superior.

In the case of being straight, the notion that being straight is superior to having another sexuality can range from the idea that being straight is more natural to the notion that non-straight people are abominations that should be destroyed. Moderate examples would be those who say that being straight is generally better than not being straight and non-straight people probably have some minor mental illness. The extreme end would involve regarding those other than straight people as perverted abominations that should be cured, locked away or even killed. One can be fine with being straight. I am. But I do not think that other orientations must be perverted or inferior. I do, of course, recognize that there can be evil connected to one’s sexuality. After all, pedophiles and rapists are morally wicked.

In the case of Christianity, the idea that it is better than other religions can range from the notion that it is somewhat better to the view that other faiths are not only inferior but wicked. Moderate examples would be people who think their faith is better because of Christ, but who think that other monotheistic faiths are close to being right (if only they would accept Jesus). Extreme examples would include fanatical loathing and hatred of other faiths, regarding those people as not only wrong but monstrous in their beliefs. This is not to deny that some people are monstrous in their beliefs. Christians should obviously be fine with being Christian—I am fine with my Episcopalian background. But I do not think I am thus superior to others. Once it has been “argued” that these groups are superior, then an explanation must be given as to why they are the “real victims.”

As noted above, the opposing groups that make whites, men, straight people, and Christians into the “real victims” must be strong enough to “win” yet also somehow inferior. These requires that the opposing groups have the traits needed to “win” while also having traits that make them inferior. The “real victim” groups must have the traits needed to “lose” while also having the traits that make them superior. This seems to create the paradox of the mighty victims: the inferior victimizers must win consistently to explain why these superior groups are the “real victims”, but the “victory” must also be unearned.

One way to try to do this is by a sports analogy in which the allegedly best athletes are consistently bested by allegedly inferior athletes. Inferior athletes could win by cheating or through some conspiracy, thus the inferiors consistently and unfairly best their betters. This would, of course, require that the best athletes can never overcome cheating or do anything to prevent it. That is, they are powerless to be anything but mighty victims. But this would seem to require that although they are the best athletes, they are lacking in other ways that allow them to be so easily bested. For this analogy to work with the groups in question, it would need to be shown that these groups are cheating in some manner that cannot be addressed by the alleged superiority of the “real victims.” It is not clear how this would work: that the “real victims” would be superior yet still unable to overcome the cheating of their alleged inferiors.

A second way is to use the ally hypothesis. The allegedly inferior victimizing groups are aided and abetted by traitors in the victimized groups. On this narrative, the traitors can best their betrayed fellows because they are also among the superior groups and aid the allegedly inferior groups to best their own kind. For example, one might allege that there are white traitors helping to victimize their fellow whites. Ironically, this would require that the traitors be superior to the loyalists, otherwise the group loyalists should be able to “win.” So, if whites being the real victims is explained in terms of white traitors, the problem is that this would seem to entail that the “best” whites are the traitors since they are “beating” the “lesser” whites. So, the ally hypothesis falls apart under examination.

A third way is to use the numbers hypothesis; the allegedly inferior victimizing groups have superior numbers, so the mighty victims are “losing.” While it is true that numbers can offset ability, the “real victim” groups are generally not outnumbered. Men and women are roughly equal in numbers, straight people vastly outnumber other orientations, Christians dominate American religion, and white people still have a numerical advantage in America, though we might now be a majority minority (that is, not 50+% of the population but still more than any other group). As such, the numbers argument fails. But there is an explanation that does reconcile the fact that these groups are both “superior” and victims.

It is true that white people, men, straight people, and Christians are victims. But it is also true that people from these groups hold the overwhelming power in the United States. Thus, these groups both hold superior power and contain victims. The victims are, ironically, most often victims of their fellows who hold superior power. So how do the powerful few convince the many in these groups that they are the “real victims” of the out groups?

A main strategy seems to involve pointing to losses in relative advantages between groups and convincing people that these losses are both unfair and caused by the other group. For example, men have lost some of their relative advantages over women in both the law and social norms and nothing stings like losing an undeserved advantage. It seems natural to blame women for this, since they have gained from these changes.  As another example, whites have lost some relative advantages over the years. To use an extreme example, it is no longer legal to own a black person. It is natural to blame people who are not white for the changes. Straight people have also seen same-sex marriage legalized, which some people somehow see as a loss. It is natural to blame people with other orientations for this.  Christianity has had to share more space with other religions and this loss of advantage no doubt strikes some as being victimized. It is natural to blame people of other faiths for this, since they have gained something.

Another strategy involves getting people in these mighty victim groups to believe (or at least feel) that most of their woes are the fault of the other groups, even when there is no connection. For example, the poverty and underemployment that white, straight, Christian men face is blamed on minorities although the economic decisions in the United States are mostly made by a few white, straight, Christian men. Men who are concerned that men die disproportionately in dangerous jobs might blame the feminists but it is obviously not the feminist who exclude women from dangerous jobs, and it is certainly not the feminists who control working conditions or when we take military action. There are also cases in which the harms are entirely fictional, for example Fox’s eternal make-believe war on Christmas.

We thus have a working explanation of mighty victims. A tiny fraction of the members of the group are mighty in that they hold overwhelming power. The other members of these groups are victims, but they are mostly victimized by members of their own groups. Which makes sense: the idea that those with less power are somehow victimizing the powerful is as absurd as the idea that the poor are victimizing the rich.

In my last essay I noted that those who have power in the United States tend to be white, male, straight, and (profess to be) Christian. Given this fact, it might seem odd that some argue that these groups are the real victims in the United States.

Contrary to the evidence, it is now often claimed that white people are the real victims of racism. It is true that white Americans have lost certain advantages arising from being perceived as white. In 1865 slavery was abolished and in 1870 voting rights were no longer restricted by race. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also resulted in a relative loss of white advantage. As would be imagined, only racists point to these as examples of whites being the real victims of racism. But some whites believe they are now the real victims of racism.

When pressed for contemporary evidence of how whites are the real victims of racism, people typically point to things like affirmative action, Black Lives Matter, criticism of systematic racism, and the fact that Kamala Harris was the Democrat’s presidential candidate. I do not think that most of my fellow white folk are lying when they claim they believe they are the real victims of racism. But I think they are in error. The obvious reason is the overwhelming evidence of systematic racism in the United States is for racism whose targets are not white. I do get why white people can honestly believe they are the real victims. There are ongoing efforts to convince white people that criticism of systematic racism and efforts to offset the negative impact of centuries of racism are racist. There is also the “clever” tactic of accusing people of being racist when they acknowledge the role of the racist’s conception of race as a factor in addressing racism. To pre-empt a likely fallacious appeal to anecdotal evidence, I know individual white people can be victims of racial discrimination. In addition to condemning that as morally wrong I will also note that my concern here is at the group level rather than focusing on anecdotes. It is consistent with white folks like me generally having an advantage because we are perceived as white that some specific white people face real racial discrimination.  And discrimination of this sort is wrong.

Contrary to the evidence, it is also now claimed that men are the real victims of sexism. It is true that men have lost many advantages relative to women. In 1920 women got the right to vote in the United States. There have also been laws passed to protect women at work and at home. Divorce has changed over the years and men (have mostly) lost the “right” to rape their wives. As would be expected, few would point to these as examples of how men are the real victims of sexism. When pressed, common examples involve references to the Me Too movement, certain feminists bashing men, strong female characters in media, changing gender roles, the rights of fathers relative to those of mothers, the charge of toxic masculinity, and Kamala Harris.

It must be acknowledged that there are some real issues with sexism against men; a good example being concerns about fathers’ rights. Men can be victims because of their sex: men suffer the heaviest casualties in combat and far more men than women are killed or injured in workplace accidents. At this point, you might be thinking that I have refuted my own view because I just argued men can be more likely to be harmed because they are men.

I must acknowledge that men are victims of sexism, but they are not generally the victims of the sexism of women. that is, it is not women who are the main cause of the suffering and death of men because they are men. It is the sexism of other men. Men are more likely to die and be injured in certain jobs because there are more men working those traditional male jobs. As an example, more men die in commercial fishing accidents than women because more men work in that field. More men die in battle because other men tend to send them to die in battle.

Rather than engage in a debate over who is being harmed the most by sexism, I agree that men and women are brutalized by sexism and that these problems need to be addressed. As such, men and women are both the real victims here. But what about straight people? Are we the victims of oppression?

Contrary to evidence, it is often claimed that we straight people are the real victims of discrimination. It is true that same-sex couples gained the legal right to marry in 2015 and there are some protections in place against discrimination based on sexual orientation. There is still open opposition to these legal rights and protections and opposition is often cast in terms of how gay rights somehow hurt straight people. For example, one stock argument against same sex marriage was that allowing it would be harmful to different sex marriages; something that absolutely did not happen.

But there are cases in which people are discriminated against because they are straight, which raises real moral concerns about hiring ethics. I do acknowledge the obvious: individual straight people can suffer from discrimination. But this is consistent with the social and legal advantages that arise from being straight in the states. As such, while a straight person can be a victim of discrimination, we straight people as a class enjoy significant advantages. But what about we Christians? Are we being oppressed in America?

While Americans generally recognize that discrimination exists against religious minorities, about 50% of Americans believe that evangelical Christians face discrimination. While the United States freedom of religion and often practices the separation of church and state, Christianity is the dominant religion. As such, some effort is required to claim religious discrimination against Christians in general.

As evidence of discrimination against Christians, people often cite Fox News unrelenting absurd war on Christmas propaganda.  It is absurd that people even need to try to refute what is obviously untrue. After all, Christmas  effectively rules the United States from late October until early January. Most of the other “evidence” of discrimination involves cases in which the separation of church and state is enforced, cases in which religious employers are not allowed to discriminate against employees or customers, and similar cases in which Christians are not allowed an exception to the law. While these do show that the dominance of Christianity in government, society and business has declined, this is not evidence of discrimination.

As in the other cases, individual Christians can face religious discrimination. However, this is consistent with Christianity being the dominant religion in the United States. The same survey in which 50% of those surveyed claimed that evangelicals faced discrimination only 15% claimed that being an evangelical hurt a person’s chances of getting ahead, while 63% agreed that being a Muslim hurt a person’s chances of getting ahead (31% said it hurt chances a lot). I do agree that religious discrimination is real and oppose it but it is wrong to claim that as a group Christians are the victims here.

In closing, while a person from any group can be a victim, the groups discussed generally enjoy advantages and are not the “real” victims. But it is not a contest to be the real victim: we should be morally concerned with human suffering regardless of which group a person belongs to. But we should not be disingenuous when discussing which groups have advantages. You might be wondering why this series is entitled “Mighty Victims.” This will be answered in the next essay.

While it can be argued that “toxic masculinity” is useful, I still feel a bit uncomfortable about the phrase. While it would be natural to accuse me of fearing an attack on my maleness, my concern is a pragmatic one about the consequences of the term. Which, from a utilitarian standpoint, also makes it a moral one.

As a man, I am familiar with how some other men react to the phrase “toxic masculinity.” The reaction of toxic males is as one would expect, they are outraged that their misdeeds and moral flaws are being challenged. However, non-toxic males can also react negatively to the phrase, typically because they feel it is applied unfairly to all men. While some radicals think all men are evil), this is not how the term is commonly used. After all, if masculinity itself was seen as evil, it would be pointless to talk about toxic masculinity. Doing so would be analogous to speaking of toxic toxins. As such, defenders of the phrase “toxic masculinity” can say it is like saying “contaminated spinach” as this doesn’t claim that all spinach is contaminated. Likewise, saying “toxic masculinity” is not claiming that all masculinity is toxic, just the toxic variety.

This is appealing and when someone uses the phrase in this manner, one can sort out their intent. That said, the use of the phrase can still upset non-toxic men and getting into the nuances of intention often fails to persuade them. After all, when people feel attacked, they rarely pause for a philosophical analysis. As such, using the phrase can have the negative consequence of alienating and upsetting men who do think that men should behave virtuously. It can also cause some men to double down on their toxicity. As such, there is a pragmatic problem with the phrase.

One reply to this would be to argue that only snowflakes and bad men would be angered by it. The snowflakes should “man up” and it is fine that the bad men are angry. They are, after all, criticized for being evil and evil people hate that. While this does have some appeal, it is worth considering how non-toxic (or “curable”) men might feel about the phrase and whether another approach might be better.

Consider, if you will, if the term “toxic” was used to refer to various groups who have members who behave badly and have vices (which would be everybody). To illustrate, consider the phrases “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality”, “toxic transgenderism”, “toxic feminism” and so on. If someone did a YouTube video about “toxic blackness” or “toxic homosexuality” while insisting that they were only concerned about blacks or homosexuals who behaved badly and not in attacking blacks or homosexuals in general, they would be met with skepticism. Even if the person was completely sincere and carefully argued that their concern was with the toxic members of these groups, then they would probably still be doubted.

The obvious reply would be to argue that “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality” and such differ from “toxic masculinity.” While such a case can be made, it does seem reasonable to consider that just as many would find “toxic blackness” and “toxic homosexuality” offensive, many non-toxic men might think “toxic masculinity” is offensive.

From a pragmatic standpoint, the main concern is whether the phrase “toxic masculinity” creates more harm than good in terms of persuading men to behave better.  If it does create more harm, then another approach should be considered in its place.

While toxic masculinity faced some criticism, it seems to have emerged victorious. While the term is not used as often as it was, I am still somewhat uncomfortable with it. This discomfort is not because I am a man. Unlike more fragile “men”, I am not threatened by criticism. I can distinguish between criticisms of bad behavior by men and the rare attacks on men simply for being men. My slight discomfort arises two sources. The first is based in ethics and the second arises from pragmatic considerations. I will look at the first in this essay and the second in the following essay.

While this oversimplifies matters, my ethical view includes an acceptance of universal principles. One implication is that if something is wrong to do, then it is wrong for anyone to do. I am aware of the principle of relevant difference: that a difference in the application of ethics can be justified by a difference that warrants this.

For example, some argue that while it is wrong for members of one ethnicity to “put on the face” of another, there are exceptions. One illustration is that is seen as acceptable for Michael Che to “go undercover” as a white female liberal, but the idea of Colin Jost going undercover as a black girl is seen as utterly unacceptable. The moral justification for this rests on the relevant differences between a black man putting on “white face” and a white man putting on “black face.” These differences are connected to the history of racism and power differences. Naturally, people disagree about whether these differences are relevant. In such cases of relevant differences between ethnicities, it makes sense to reference ethnicity when discussing ethics. The same sort of reasoning applies to sex or gender issues.

For example, some argue that male comedians would be sexist if they used the same type of humor as female comedians who do routines about the failures and defects of men. In such cases, the ethics of a joke would thus depend on the gender or sex of the person telling it and the target of the joke. Using these examples, it would thus make sense to talk about toxic white comedy or toxic male comedy because the whiteness or maleness of the comic would be essential to the wrongness of the comedy. But what about toxic masculinity, considered in terms of moral misdeeds and moral vices?

For toxic masculinity what matters is the ethics of the behavior and its consequences rather than on whether the actions are done by men. To illustrate, the moral concern about sexual harassment is with its wrongness and not the gender or sex of the harasser. After all, while most sexual harassment is done by men, it is not restricted to us and its wrongness does not stem from the gender pf the perpetrator. It is equally wrong for a female to engage in sexual harassment. To focus on toxic masculinity would seem to imply that the vices and moral misdeeds are wrong because they are the misdeeds and vices of males, which would seem to be an error.

One reasonable counter is to argue that while the general misdeeds and vices that make up the evils of toxic masculinity are not limited to males, focusing on males make sense because males are the main offenders. Doing so, one might argue, does not exclude focusing on similar misdeeds by females.  It is just that there are less toxically masculine females to worry about.

Another reasonable counter is that the vices and misdeeds of males that are grouped under the label of “toxic masculinity” are male in character because of the masculinity part. That is, they are vices and misdeeds that arise from a concept of maleness, and it is appropriate to use the term. This has considerable appeal and could counter my initial concern. As such, my next essay will focus on pragmatic concerns.

Mark Zuckerberg’s recent crisis of masculinity reminded me of an earlier round in the endless culture war over gender roles.  In the not-so-distant past, the marketing departments of some major corporations decided that pretending to value positive masculinity would increase profits. Gillette attempted this with the Best Men Can Be themed advertisement. The name was based on Gillette’s classic advertising line, “the best a man can get.” This campaign did ignite a response, but not what the marketing department wanted. To be fair, the marketing department probably thought no decent person could get mad at a mild endorsement of minimal male decency. And they were right.  

As would be expected, people like Piers Morgan and James Wood responded harshly. In the case of Morgan, he accused Gillette of virtue signaling, fueling the “global assault on masculinity” and called for us to “let boys be damn boys” and to “let men be damn men.” Woods claimed Gillette was jumping on the “men are horrible” bandwagon and said he was done with buying Gillette products. Other men were not upset, noting  its message appeared to be “Don’t be a jerk. Don’t raise a jerk. Call out other men being for jerks.” And some pointed out Gillette was just trying to sell more razors. While I will not attempt to see it through the eyes of those who hate it, I will address the philosophical aspects of virtue based advertising.

While some loathed the content of the advertisement, it is advancing a set of values, advocating certain behavior and encouraging men to serve as role-models by acting on those values. It is, of course, doing this to sell razors and shaving cream. From a moral standpoint, this raises two questions. The first is whether the values are morally good. The second is whether motivation is relevant.

Since I generally follow Aristotle’s virtue theory, I think that people should be the best they can be. Intuitively, this is morally commendable. That men should be the best they can be seems to be morally obvious and the burden of proof would rest on those who would deny it. The real dispute is over what it means to be the best.

Each society and subgroup have its own notion of the best man, and the easy approach is to go with what they say. The obvious problem with is approach is that moral relativism collapses into subjectivism, and it then collapses into moral nihilism. So “morally best” would end up referring to nothing. This puts an end to moral discussion, so one must accept moral objectivity for the discussion to progress.

While the response to from Morgan and Woods would suggest the values it advances are wicked, this is not true. The values endorsed seem to be classic virtues, such as respect and courage. For example, one man rushes to stop a group of boys who are attacking another boy, which is a virtuous act. As another example, a man is shown talking another out of harassing a woman, which is also a virtuous act. To treat others with respect and to protect those who need protection certain is what good men should do, hence it is odd to condemn the ad. But perhaps the critics did not take issue with these values, but with another aspect of the ad.

While the ad ends with displays of virtuous behavior, it begins by showing men and boys behaving badly, such as talking over a woman at a business meeting and laughing at sexual harassment in a sitcom. It does make sense that the likes of Morgan and Woods would be angry at this. They see it as an attack on men aimed at showing that all men are terrible. The problem with this interpretation is the ad does not say that all men are horrible. As noted above, the second part of the ad presents men acting ethically. As such, the ad simply says the obvious: some men are awful, some are good. Its message is also quite benign: don’t be awful, be the best you can be. There seems to be nothing here to take issue with, unless one thinks that behavior such as bullying and sexual harassment are morally commendable. In that case, the problem lies with those who think this and not with the ad.

Some might object to being preached at by a company trying to sell goods or services by virtue signaling. This is a reasonable objection, and people are free to not watch the ads or complain about this technique. However, the motivation of the company is irrelevant to the correctness (or incorrectness) of the claims and values in the ad. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to an ad hominem, that the motivation of someone making a claim makes the claim false. Even if Gillette was cynically trying to sell more razors and shaving cream and did not give a damn about men being their best, the claims and values presented in the ad stand or fall on their own. Naturally, it is reasonable to condemn or praise the folks at Gillette based on their motives, but that is another ethical issue distinct from whether some men behave badly and whether being the best men means acting in the ways presented in the ad.  I agree that if Gillette or another corporation is cynically exploiting values it does not endorse, then that is morally dubious behavior—but, once again, this is not relevant to whether the claims and values expressed are right or not.

In a tragic aircraft accident, sixty-seven people died. In response to past tragedies, presidents ranging from Reagan to Obama have endeavored to unite and comfort the American people. Trump intentionally decided to take a different approach and used the tragedy as an opportunity to advance his anti-DEI agenda.

While Trump acknowledged that the cause of the crash was unknown, he quickly blamed DEI. When a reporter asked him how he knew this, he asserted it was because he has common sense. He also claimed that the crash was the fault of Biden and Obama and that it might have been caused by hiring people with disabilities.

In one sense, Trump is right to blame past administrations. The federal government has allowed the quality of air traffic safety to decline, and one might trace this back to at least Reagan who famously fired the striking air traffic controllers. As with many areas concerned with the safety of the American people, there is a shortage of staff, chronic underfunding and a problem with obsolete technology. Past administrations (including Trump’s) and congress bear responsibility for this. So, I agree with Trump that past leaders bear some of the blame for the tragedy. But I disagree with his false DEI claim.

As is always the case, rational people spend time and energy trying to debunk and refute Trump’s false claims. While this should be done, there is the question of whether this has any practical effect in terms of changing minds. At this point, it seems certain that America is firmly divided between those who reject Trump’s lies and those who accept them or do not care that he is lying. But I’m all about the desperate fight against impossible odds, so here we go.

Trump’s claim that the crash was caused by diversity hires of people with disabilities is easy to debunk. The FAA has strict requirements for air traffic controllers and someone who was incapable of doing the job would not be hired. After all, being an air traffic controller is not like being a member of Trump’s cabinet. As others will point out, this baseless attack on people with disabilities echoes the Nazis.  Trump supporters will presumably respond to this criticism by saying that “liberals” always compare Trump to the Nazis. While some comparisons are overblown, there is a reason why this occurs so often. And that is because Trump and his henchmen are often at least Nazi adjacent. Proud American Nazis know this is true and wish that their fellows had more courage. So, the questions “why do the libs always compare Trump and his henchmen to Nazis?” and “why do Nazis like Trump and his henchmen?” have the same answer. Meanwhile, the “normies” are baffled and the mainstream media generates think pieces debating the obvious. But what about Trump’s DEI claims?

One problem with engaging with these DEI claims is that the engagement provides them with a degree of legitimacy they do not deserve. Doing so can create the impression that there is a meaningful debate with two equally plausible sides. As many others have pointed out, when Trump and his ilk talk about DEI, this is just a dog whistle to the racists and sexists. These bigots know exactly what he means as do the anti-racists; but they disagree about whether bigotry is good. As to why Trump and his ilk bother with dog whistles, there seem to be two reasons.

One is that being openly racist or sexist is seen as crude and impolite. Polite bigots use dog whistles in public, reserving their open racism and sexism for private conversations. People can also convince themselves that they are good because they are not openly using racist or sexist terms.

The other is that there are non-bigots who cannot hear the dog whistle and believe, in good faith ignorance, that DEI might be the cause of these problems. If pressed, they will deny being racist or sexist and will claim that DEI might arise from good intentions but is bad because it puts incompetent people into jobs that are not qualified for. And hence things go wrong. If they are asked about why these people are assumed to be incompetent and whether women, minorities, old people, and people with disabilities can be competent, they will usually grow uncomfortable and want to change to topic. These people are still in play. While the bigots want to recruit them using dog whistles to onboard them into bigotry, they will settle for them remaining cooperatively neutral. If a “normie” expresses doubt about charges of racism or sexism or defends attacks on DEI, this provides cover and support for the bigots, and they are happy to exploit this cover. But “normies” are potential recruits to the side of good, since they have a mild dislike of racism and sexism that can be appealed to. One challenge is convincing them to hear the dog whistles for what they are. This is difficult, since it requires acknowledging their own past complicity in racism and sexism while also facing uncomfortable truths about politicians and pundits they might like and support.

The danger in trying to win over the “normies” is that one must engage with the DEI claims made by Trump and his fellows, which (as mentioned above) runs the risk of lending them legitimacy by creating the appearance that there is something to debate. But it seems that the only way to reveal the truth is to engage with the lies, as risky as that might be.

As a philosopher, my preference is to use good logic and plausible claims when arguing. After all, the goal is truth, and this is the correct approach. However, logic is awful as a means of persuasion and engaging people with facts is challenging because for every fact there seems to be a thousand appealing lies. But there might be some people who can be persuaded by the fact that DEI is not to blame for the crash nor is it to blame for the other things, such as wildfires, that the right likes to blame on it. That said, the core of the fight is one of values.

For someone to believe that DEI results in the hiring of incompetent people, they must believe that white, straight men have a monopoly on competence and that everyone else is inferior to a degree that they are unsuitable for many jobs. So, one way to engage with a possible “normie” about DEI is to ask them what they have in their hearts: do they feel that only straight, white men are truly competent and that everyone else is inferior and suitable only for race and gender “appropriate” roles? If they do not find this bigotry in their hearts, there is hope for them.