Category: Ethics

There are two issues here.  The first is determining what is the worst thing that a person should express. The second is the issue of determining the worst thing that a person should be allowed to express. While these might seem to be the same issue, they are not. There is a distinction between what a person should do and what is morally permissible to prevent a person from doing. The focus will be on using the coercive power of the state in this role.

As an illustration of the distinction, consider the example of a person lying to her boyfriend about playing video games when she was supposed to be doing yard work. She should not lie to him (although there are exceptions). However, the police should not be sent to coerce her into telling the truth about this. So, she should not lie about playing video games, but the state should allow her to do this.

This view can be disputed and there are those who argue in favor of complete freedom from the state (such as anarchists) and those who argue that the state should control almost every aspect of life (totalitarians). However, the idea that there are some matters that are not the business of the state is an intuitively plausible position. What follows will rest on this assumption and the challenge will be to sort out these two issues.

A plausible and appealing approach is to take a utilitarian stance and use Mill’s principle of harm to determine the worst thing a person should express and should be allowed to express. The right of free expression is limited by the right of others not to be harmed in their life, liberty and property without adequate justification.

In the case of the worst thing that a person should express, I am speaking in the context of morality. There are, of course, non-moral meanings of “should.” To use the most obvious example, there is the pragmatic “should”: what a person should do in serving their practical self-interest. For example, a person should not tell her boss what she really thinks of him if doing so would cost her a job she desperately needs. To use another example, there is also the “should” of etiquette: what a person should do or not do to follow the social norms. For example, a person should not go without pants at a formal wedding, even to express his opposition to the tyranny of pants.

Returning to morality, it is reasonable to weigh the harm the expression generates against the right of free expression. Obviously enough, there is not an exact formula for calculating the worst thing a person should express, and this will vary according to the circumstances. For example, the worst thing one should express to a young child is different from the worst thing one should express to a jaded adult. In terms of the harms, these would include such harm as offending the person, scaring them, insulting them, and so on for harm that can be inflicted by mere expression.

While people do not have a right not to be offended, people do have a right not to be unjustly harmed by other people. To use an obvious example, men should not catcall women who do not want to be subject to this verbal harassment. This sort of behavior certainly offends, upsets and even scares many women and the right to free expression does not give men a moral pass that exempts them from what they should or should not do.

To use another example, people should not intentionally and willfully insult deeply held beliefs simply for the sake of insulting or provoking the person. While the person does have the right to mock the belief of another, the right of expression is not a moral free pass to be abusive.

As a final example, people should not engage in trolling. While a person does have the right to express his views to troll others, this is wrong. Trolling is, by definition, done with malice and contributes nothing of value to the conversation. As such, it should not be done.

While I have claimed that people should not unjustly harm others by expressing themselves, I have not made any claims about whether people should be allowed to express themselves in these ways. It is to this that I now turn.

If the principle of harm is a reasonable principle (which can be debated), then a plausible approach would be to use it to sketch out some boundaries. The first rough boundary was just discussed: this is the boundary between what people should express and what people should (morally) not. The second rough boundary begins at the point where other people should be allowed to prevent a person from expressing themselves and ends just before the point at which the state has the moral right to use its coercive power to prevent such expression.

This area is the domain of interactions between people that does not fall under the authority of the state yet still allows for preventing people from expressing their views. For example, people can be justly prevented from expressing their views in the workplace without the state being involved. To use a specific example, the administrators of my university have the right to prevent me from expressing certain things in my classes, although the specific restrictions can be debated. To use another example, a group of friends would have the right, among themselves, to ban someone from their group for saying racist, mean and spiteful things. As a final example, a blog administrator would have the right to ban a troll from her site.

The third boundary is the point at which the state can justly use its coercive power to prevent a person from engaging in expression. As with the other boundaries, this should be set (roughly) by the degree of harm that the expression would cause others. There are many easy and obvious examples where the state would be right to limit expression: threats of murder, damaging slander, incitements to violence against the innocent, and similar such unquestionably harmful expressions.

Matters do, of course, can get complicated quickly. Consider, for example, a person who does not call for the murder of Democrats but tweets his approval when they are assassinated. While this seems to be something a person should not do, it is not clear that it crosses the boundary that would allow the state to justly prevent the person from expressing this view. If the approval does not create sufficient harm, then it would seem to not warrant coercive action by the state.

As another example, consider the expression of racist views via social media. While people should not say such things, as long as they do not engage in actual threats, then it would seem that the state does not have the right to silence the person. This is because the expression of racist views (without threats) would not seem to generate enough harm to warrant state coercion. Naturally, it could justify action on the part of the person’s employer, friends and associates: they might be fired and shunned. Or might have been in the before time.

As a third example, consider a person who mocks the dominant or even official religion of a state. While the rulers of such states usually think they have the right to silence such an infidel, it is not clear that this would create enough unjust harm to warrant silencing the person. Being an American, I think that it would not, but I believe in both freedom of religion and the freedom to mock religion.  There is, of course, the matter of the concern that such mockery could provoke others to harm the mocker, thus warranting the state to stop the person for their own protection. However, the fact that people will act wrongly in response to expressions would not seem to warrant coercing the person into silence.

In general, I favor erring on the side of freedom: unless the state can show that silencing expression is needed to prevent real and unjust harm, the state does not have the moral right to silence expression.

I have merely sketched out a general outline of this matter and have presented three rough boundaries about what people should say and what they should be allowed to say. Much more work would be needed to develop a full and proper account.

Photo by Céréales Killer

While the murders of twelve people at Charlie Hebdo were morally unjustifiable, one of the killers did attempt, in advance, to justify the attack. The  justification offered was that the attack was in accord with Islamic law. Since I am not a scholar of Islam, I will not address the issue of whether this is true or not. As an ethicist, I will address the matter of moral justification for the killings.

From the standpoint of the killers, the attack on Charlie Hebdo was presumably punishment. In general, punishment is aimed at retaliation for wrongs done, to redeem the wrongdoer or  for deterrence (this is the RRD model of punishment). Presumably the killers were aiming at both retaliation and deterrence and not redemption. From a moral standpoint, both retaliation and deterrence are supposed to be limited by a principle of proportionality.

In the case of retaliation, the punishment should correspond to the alleged crime. The reason for this is that disproportionate retaliation would not “balance the books” but instead create another wrong that would justify retaliation in response. This, of course, assumes that retaliation is justifiable in general, which can  be questioned.

In the case of deterrence, there is also a presumption in favor of proportionality. The main reason is the same as for retaliation: excessive punishment would, by definition, create another wrong. A standard counter to this is to argue that excessive punishment is acceptable on the grounds of its deterrence value on the view that the greater the punishment, the greater the deterrence.

While this does have a certain appeal, it also runs counter to common moral intuitions. For example, blowing up a student’s car for parking in a faculty parking space at university would deter students, but would be excessive. As another example, having the police execute people for speeding would tend to deter speeding, but this certainly seems unacceptable.

There is also the standard utilitarian argument that excessive punishment used for deterrence would create more harm than good. For example, allowing police to summarily execute anyone who resisted arrest would deter resistance, but the harm to citizens and society would outweigh the benefits. As such, it seems reasonable to accept that punishment for the purpose of deterrence should be proportional to the offense. There is, of course, still concern about the deterrence factor. A good guiding principle is that the punishment that aims at deterrence should be sufficient to deter, yet proportional to the offense. Deterring the misdeed should not be worse than the misdeed.

In the case of the people at Charlie Hebdo, their alleged offense was their satire of Mohammad and Islam via cartoons. On the face of it, death is a disproportionate punishment. After all, killing someone is vastly more harmful than insulting or offending someone.

A proportional response would have been something along the lines of creating a satirical cartoon of the staff, publishing an article critical of their cartoons or protesting these cartoons. That is, a proportional response to the non-violent expression of a view would be the non-violent expression of an opposing view.  Murder is obviously a vastly disproportionate response.

It could be replied that the punishment was proportional because of the severity of the offense. The challenge is, obviously enough, arguing that the offense was severe enough to warrant death.  On the face of it, no cartoon would seem to merit death. After all, no matter how bad a cartoon might be, the worst it can do is offend a person and this would not warrant death. However, it could be argued that the offense is not against just anyone but against God. That is, the crime is blasphemy or something similar. This would provide a potential avenue for justifying a penalty of death. It is to this that I now turn.

Religious thinkers who believe in Hell face the challenge of justifying eternal damnation. As David Hume noted, an infinite punishment for what must be finite offenses is contrary to our principles of justice. That is, even if a person sinned for every second of their life, they could not do enough evil to warrant an infinitely bad, infinitely long punishment. However, there is a clever reply to this claim.

In his classic sermon “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God”, Jonathan Edwards says of sinners that “justice calls aloud for an infinite punishment of their sins.” He justifies the infinite punishment of sin on the grounds that since God is infinitely good, any sin against God is infinitely bad. As such, the punishment is proportional to the offense: infinite punishment for an infinitely bad crime.

It could be contended that creating cartoons mocking Mohammed and Islam are sins against an infinitely good God, thus warranting an infinite punishment and presumably justifying killing (which is much less than infinite punishment). Interestingly, the infinite punishment for sins would render punishing of sinners here on earth pointless for two reasons. First, if the sinner will be punished infinitely, then punishing him here would not increase his punishment. So, there is no point to it.  Second, if the sinner is going to be punished divinely, then punishment here would also be pointless. To use an analogy, imagine if someone proposed having a pre-legal system in which alleged criminals would be tried and, if found guilty, be given pointless sentences (such as being mildly scolded). The alleged criminals would then go on to the real legal system for their real punishment. This pre-legal system would be a pointless waste of time and resources. Likewise, if there is divine justice for sins, then punishing them here would be a pointless waste of time.

This, obviously enough, assumes that God is real, that He punishes and that He would punish people for something as minor as a cartoon. Attributing this to God would present him as a petty and insecure God who is overly concerned about snarky cartoons. People are most likely to react violently to mere mockery when they are strong enough to punish, but weak enough to be insecure. God should not be enraged by cartoons. But I could be wrong. If am, God will take care of matters in the afterlife and there is thus no reason to kill cartoonists.

If God does not exist, then the cartoons obviously cannot have offended God. In this case, the offense would be against people who believe in fiction. While they might be angry at being mocked, killing the cartoonists would be like enraged Harry Potter fans killing a cartoonist for mocking Daniel Radcliffe with a snarky cartoon. While they might be devoted to the world of Harry Potter and be very protective of Daniel Radcliffe, offensive cartoons mocking a real person and a fictional world would not warrant killing a cartoonist.

As such, if God is real, then He will deal with any offense against Him. As such, there is no justification for people seeking revenge in His name. If He is not real, then the offense is against the make-believe, and this does not warrant killing. Either way, such killings would be completely unjustified.

Photo by Céréales Killer

After the 2015 Charlie Hedbo murders in France, the discussion of group responsibility heated up.  Some contend that all Muslims were responsible for the actions the killers. Most people did not claim that all Muslims supported the killings, but there was a tendency to put a special burden of responsibility upon Muslims as a group. Some people did claim that the murders were evidence that Islam itself is radical and violent. This sort of “reasoning” is, obviously enough, the same sort used to condemn all Christians or Republicans based on the actions of a few.

To infer an entire group has a certain characteristic (such as being violent or prone to terrorism) based on the actions of a few involves committing the fallacy of hasty generalization. This “reasoning” also often includes the fallacy of suppressed evidence in that evidence contrary to the claim is ignored. For example, to condemn Islam as violent based on the actions of terrorists would be to ignore the fact that most Muslims are as peaceful as people of other faiths, such as Christians and Jews.

It might be objected that a group can be held accountable for the misdeeds of its members even when those misdeeds are committed by a few and even when these misdeeds are supposed to not match the beliefs of the group. For example, if I were to engage in sexual harassment while on the job, Florida A&M University can be held accountable for my actions. Thus, it could be argued, all Muslims are accountable for the killings in France and these killings provide just more evidence that Islam itself is a violent and murderous religion.

In reply, Islam (like Christianity) is not a monolithic faith with a single hierarchy over all Muslims. After all, there are diverse sects of Islam and many Muslim hierarchies. For example, the Muslims of Saudi Arabia do not fall under the hierarchy of the Muslims of Iran. 

As such, treating all of Islam as an organization with a chain of command and a chain of responsibility that extends throughout the entire faith would be absurd. To use an analogy, sports fans sometimes go on violent rampages after events. While the actions of violent fans should be condemned, the peaceful fans are not accountable for those actions. After all, while the fans are connected by their being fans of a specific team this is not enough to create accountability. As such, to condemn all of Islam based on what happened in France would be both unfair and unreasonable.

This, of course, raises the question of the extent to which even an organized group is accountable for its members. One intuitive guide is that the accountability of the group is proportional to the authority the group has over the individuals. For example, while I am a philosopher and belong to the American Philosophical Association, other philosophers have no authority over me. As such, they have no accountability for my actions. In contrast, my university has authority over my work life as a professional philosopher and hence can be held accountable should I, for example, sexually harass a student or co-worker.

The same principle should be applied to Islam (and any faith). Being a Muslim is analogous to being a philosopher in that there is a recognizable group. As with being a philosopher, merely being a Muslim does not make a person accountable for all other Muslims any more than being a Christian makes one accountable for the actions of every other Christian across time and space.

But just as I am employed by a university, a Muslim can belong to an analogous organization, such as a mosque or ISIS. To the degree that the group has authority over the individual, the group is accountable. So, if the killers in France were acting as members of ISIS or Al-Qaeda, then the group would be accountable. However, while groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda might delude themselves into thinking they have legitimate authority over all Muslims, they obviously do not. After all, they are opposed by most Muslims.

 So, with a religion as vast and varied as Islam, it cannot be reasonably be claimed that there is a central earthly authority over its members and this would serve to limit the collective responsibility of the faith. Naturally, the same would apply to other groups with a similar lack of overall authority, such as Christians, conservatives, liberals, Buddhists, Jews, philosophers, runners, and satirists.

When people disagree on controversial issues it is not uncommon for one person to accuse another of lying. In some cases, this accusation is warranted and in others it is not. There is also some confusion about what should count as a lie.

While this might seem mere semantics, the distinction between what is a lie and what is not a lie matters. The main reason for this is that to accuse a person of lying is to make a moral charge against them. It is not merely to claim that the person is in error but to claim that they are doing something morally wrong. While some people do use “lie” interchangeably with “untruth”, there is a difference. To use an easy and obvious example, imagine a student who is asked which year the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The student thinks it was in 1944 and writes that down. She has made an untrue claim, but it would be unfair to accuse her of lying.

Now, imagine that one student, Sally, is asking another student, Jane, about when the United States bombed Hiroshima. Jane does not like Sally and wants her to fail, so she tells her 1944, though she knows it was 1945. If Sally tells another student that it was 1944 and puts that down on her test, Sally could not fairly be accused of lying. Jane, however, lied. While Sally is saying and writing something untrue, she believes the claim and is not acting with malicious intent. In contrast, Jane believes she is saying something untrue and is acting from malice. This suggests some important distinctions between lying and making untrue claims.

One obvious distinction is that a lie requires that the person believes they are making an untrue claim. Naturally, there is the practical problem of determining whether a person really believes what they are claiming, but this is not relevant to the abstract distinction: if the person believes the claim, then they would not be lying when they make that claim.

It can be argued that a person can lie even when they believe a claim, that what matters is whether the claim is true. The obvious problem is that the accusation of lying is not just a claim the person is wrong; it is also a moral condemnation of wrongdoing. While “lie” could be taken to apply to any untrue claim, there would be a need for a new word to convey not just a statement of error but also one of condemnation. Going back to the test example, it would be odd to say that a wrong answer on a test is thus a lie.

It can also be argued that a person can lie by telling the truth, but by doing so in such a way as to mislead a person into believing something untrue. This does have a certain appeal in that it includes the intent to deceive but differs from the “standard” lie in that the claim is true (or at least believed to be true).

A second obvious distinction is that the person must have malicious intent. This distinguishes untruths of movies, stories and shows from lies. When the actor playing Darth Vader says to Luke “No. I am your father.”, he is saying something untrue, yet it would be unfair to say that the actor is thus a liar. Likewise, the references to dragons, hobbits and elves in the Hobbit are all untrue, yet one should not brand Tolkien a liar for these words.

The obvious reply to this is that there is a category of lies that lack a malicious intent. These lies are often told with good intentions, such as a compliment about a person’s appearance or when parents speak of Santa Claus. As such, there are lies that are not malicious and often called “white lies.” If intent matters, then this sort of lie is much less bad than the malicious lie. They do meet a general definition of “lie” which involves making an untrue claim with the intent to deceive but the deceit is supposed to be benign. Naturally, there are those who would argue that such deceits are still wrong, even with good intentions. The matter is also complicated by the fact that there seem to be untrue claims aimed at deceit that intuitively seem morally acceptable. The classic case is, of course, misleading a person who is trying to murder someone.

In some cases, one person will accuse another of lying because the person disagrees with a claim made by the other person. For example, a person might claim that Trump wants to help average Americans and be accused of lying about this by a person who hates Trump.

 In this context, the accusation that the person is lying seems to rest on three points. The first is that the accuser thinks the person does not actually believe their claim and is engaged in an intentional deceit. The accuser also thinks that the claim is not true. The second is that the accuser believes that the accused intends to deceive and expects people to believe them. The third is that the accuser thinks the accused has malicious intent. This might be merely limited to the intent to deceive, but it typically goes beyond this. For example, Trump supporter might be suspected of employing their alleged deceit to encourage cruelty and fascism. Or maybe the person is trolling.

So, to be justified in accusing a person of lying, it needs to be shown that the person does not really believe their claim, that they intend to deceive and that there is malicious intent. Arguing against the claim can show that it is untrue, but this would not be sufficient to show that the person is lying, unless one takes a lie to merely be a claim that is not true. On this view, if someone made a mistake in a math problem and got the wrong answer, they would be a liar. What would be needed would be adequate evidence that the person is insincere in his claim (that is, they believe they are saying the untrue), that they intend to deceive and that there is some malicious intent.

Naturally, effective criticism of a claim does not require showing that the person making the claim is a liar. In fact, the truth or falsity of a claim has no connection to the intent of the person making the claim or what they believe about it. An accusation of lying moves from the issue of whether the claim is true to a moral dispute about the character of the person making the claim. It can, of course, be a useful persuasive device to call someone a liar, but by itself it does nothing to prove or disprove the claim under dispute.

Plato, through the character of Socrates, advances a classic argument against democracy. When something requires knowledge and skill, such as a medical issue, it would be foolish to decide by having the ignorant vote. The wise turn to those who have the knowledge and skill needed to make a good decision.

Political matters, such as deciding what policies to adopt for immigration, require knowledge and skill. As such, it would be foolish to make decisions by having the ignorant and unskilled vote on such matters. Picking a competent leader also requires knowledge and skill and thus it would be foolish to leave it to those lacking these attributes.

In the abstract, this argument is compelling: as with all tasks that require competence, it would be best to have the competent make decisions. There are, however, various counters to this argument.

One appealing argument assumes people have a moral right to a role in decisions that impact them, even if they are not likely to make the best (or even good) choices.  Consider, for example, something as simple as choosing a meal. Most people will not select the most nutritious or even the most delicious option, thus making a bad choice. However, compelling people against their will to eat a meal, even if it is the best for them, is morally problematic. At least when it comes to adults. Naturally, an argument can be made that people who routinely make poor health choices would be better off being compelled to eat healthy foods, which is the heart of this dispute between democracy and being ruled by those with the knowledge and skills to make better decisions.

Another approach is to use the context of the state of nature. This is a philosophical device developed by thinkers like Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau in which one is asked to imagine a world without a political system in place which is a world in which everyone is equal in social status. In this world, there are no kings, presidents, lawyers, police or other such socially constructed positions of hierarchy. It is also assumed there is nothing supernatural conferring a right to rule (such as the make-believe divine right of kings). In such a context, the obvious question is that of what would give a person the right to rule over others.

As a practical matter, the strongest would probably coerce others into submission, but the question is one of the right to rule and not a question of what people would do. Given these assumptions, it would seem that no one has the right to be the boss over anyone else, since everyone is equal in status. What would be required, and what has often been argued for, is that the consent of the governed would be needed to provide the ruler with the right to rule. This is, of course, the professed justification for political legitimacy in the United States and other democratic countries.

If it is accepted that political legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed, the usual method of determining this consent is by voting. For a country to continue as one country it must also be accepted that the numerical minority will go along with the vote of the numerical majority. Otherwise, as Locke noted, the country would be torn asunder. This is, as has been shown in the United States, consistent with having certain things (such as rights) that are protected from the tyranny of the majority.

If voting is accepted in this role, then maintaining political legitimacy would seem to require two things. The first is that there must be reliable means of assuring that fraud does not occur in elections. The United States has done an excellent job at this. While there are some issues with the accuracy of voter lists (people who move or die often remain on lists for years), voter fraud is almost non-existent, despite unsupported assertions to the contrary by Republicans.

The second is that every citizen who wishes to vote must have equal and easy access to the voting process. To the degree that citizens are denied this equal and easy access, political legitimacy is decreased. This is because those who are deterred or prevented from voting are denied the opportunity to provide their consent. This excludes them from falling under the legitimate authority of the government. It also reduces the legitimacy of the government in general. Since accepting a democratic system means accepting majority rule, excluding voters impacts this. After all, one does not know how the excluded voters would have voted, thus calling into question whether the majority is ruling or not.

Because of this, the usual attempts to deter voter participation are a direct attack on political legitimacy in the United States. These include such things as voter ID laws, restrictions on early voting, gerrymandering, unreasonable limits on polling hours, cutting back on polling places and so on.

In contrast, efforts to make voting easier and more accessible (consistent with maintaining the integrity of the vote) increase political legitimacy. These include such things as early voting, expanded voting hours, providing free transportation to polling stations, mail in voting, online voter registration and so on. One particularly interesting idea is automatic voter registration.

It could be argued that citizens have an obligation to overcome inconveniences and even major obstacles to vote; otherwise, they are lazy and unworthy. While it is reasonable to expect citizens to put in some effort, the burden of access rests on the government. While it is the duty of a citizen to vote, it is the duty of the government to allow citizens to exercise this fundamental political right without undue effort. That is, the government needs to make it as easy and convenient as possible. This can be seen as somewhat analogous to the burden of proof: it is not the obligation of the citizen to overcome burdens placed by the state; it is the obligation of the state to not impose needless burdens.

It could be objected that I only favor easy and equal access to the voting process because I am registered as a Democrat and Democrats are more likely to win when voter turnout is higher. If the opposite were true, then I would surely change my view. The easy and obvious reply to this objection is that it is irrelevant to the merit of the arguments advanced above. Another reply is that I do accept majority rule and even if Democrats were less likely to win with greater voter turnout, I would still support easy and equal access. And would do so for the reasons given above. That is, I believe in democracy even when doing so does not enrich my bank account or get me what I want.

One long standing Christmas tradition at Fox news is perpetuating their imaginary war on Christmas. While it is not a self-evident truth that Christmas is safe in the United States, the idea that there is such a war is as absurd as the claim that there is a war on pizza. Like Christmas, pizza is liked (if not loved) by nearly everyone. While Christmas is not here year-round, during the Christmas season (which seems to be October to January) the trapping of Christmas are as ubiquitous as pizza.

A long-standing Fox tactic has been to scour the United States for the few incidents that can be cast as attacks on Christmas and then elevate them into a war. This same approach could be used to “prove” that there is a war on pizza. There are, no doubt, a few incidents that can be presented as attacks on the truth and goodness of pizza. The problem is, obviously enough, that a few isolated incidents do not constitute a war, especially when the incidents are presented in an exaggerated manner. What is ironic about Fox pushing the idea of this war is Christmas is supposed to be a time for peace on earth and goodwill towards all. As such, Fox seems to have its own perpetual war on the spirit of Christmas.

A classic example is when Breitbart and Fox  suggested that a Jewish family was responsible for the cancellation of A Christmas Carol, which was supposed to be put on as a play by students in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. While it is true the family wanted their child excused from the play, the play was cancelled for other reasons. One reason was that changes in the education requirements set by the state made it difficult for classroom time to be used to prepare for the play. This does point to a problem in public education but does not constitute a war on Christmas.

The second reason the play was cancelled was to be respectful of the cultural and religious diversity of the students. While some might be tempted to see this as a war on Christmas, being respectful of religious diversity in public schools does not constitute an attack on Christmas. One way to look at this situation in a different light is to imagine that a public school was putting on a play with religious content that you strongly disagree with. If, for example, you are not a fan of Islam, imagine that the school was putting on a play about Ramadan. Or, as another example, that the play brought back that old-time religion and glorified Saturnalia. If either of these plays were performed at a public school, Fox and Breitbart would most likely cast these incidents as evidence of the war on Christianity.

An incident in which one’s faith fails to dominate is not evidence of a war on that faith or its holiday. Rather, it just shows tolerance and respect for others. Going back to the pizza analogy, to decide to not have a strict pizza only policy for school lunches is not a war on pizza. While most people like pizza, making everyone eat it all the time is neither fair or tolerant.

Since I grew up “acting” in school Christmas plays and watching them, I do have sympathy for the view that something valuable would be lost if schools cancel their Christmas plays. One solution is to have generic holiday plays. Another is to have a diversity of plays around the holidays to expose children to diverse religious views and holidays. These options do have problems but are perhaps better than cancelling a school Christmas play. Or perhaps not.

The untruths presented by Fox and Breitbart are morally problematic, but this is compounded by the fact that it was suggested that a Jewish family was responsible for the cancellation. As would be expected, there were the usual responses to this story from the internet: calls to identify the “responsible” family and to act. As many other incidents have shown, these sorts of online attacks can quickly escalate into unrelenting harassment and worse.

This ties into a classic anti-Semitic narrative and is consistent with the safe space that Trump had created for bigotry in his first term. While people who are not Jewish or have little knowledge of history might be inclined to dismiss worries about the anti-Semitism inherent in such suggestions, this was a real problem. While it would be a slippery slope fallacy to say that this story (or other incidents) will inevitably lead to something terrible, it would also be a mistake not to be concerned about where this path leads. After all, this sort of thing has played out many times and in places and it is best to address such things when they are small. After all, it is easier to extinguish a match than a forest fire. 

It must be noted that Slate and other news sites claimed that a Jewish family fled the country out of fear they would be harmed. While the family did express concern, it is now claimed that they left for vacation. While some might be tempted to accuse Slate and others of running fake news because of their mistake, there are two easy and obvious replies. The first is that there seems to be no intent to deceive people with a claim that was known to be untrue as Slate and others presented the information available at the time. The second is that Slate and others updated the report to reflect the new and presumably correct information. Correcting errors is not something that is done in fake news.

If the error by Slate and the others was due to failing to properly investigate the claims, then they can be justly criticized for not being properly diligent. However, if the error was not due to negligence then this should be regarded as a mere mistake and one that was corrected. Slate could also be criticized for going with the original dramatic headline about the Jewish family fleeing the country; but the main criticism should still be on the error. This one error does not, obviously enough, invalidate the rest of the reporting the other claims stand or fall on their own.

While Fox News’ war on Christmas and Christianity mythology has merely been annoying and stupid in the past, but they have the potential to cause real problems in the year to come, especially with the current administration.

The American anarchist Henry David Thoreau presented what has become a popular conservative view of the effect of government on business: “Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way…Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India-rubber, would never manage to bounce over obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way…” While this view of the role of the state in business is often taken as gospel by conservatives, there is the question of whether Thoreau is right. While I find his anarchism appealing, there are some problems with his view.

Thoreau is right that the government can be employed to thwart and impede enterprises. To illustrate, this can be done by granting special advantages and subsidies to certain companies or industries, thus impeding their competitors. However, he is mistaken in his claim that the government has never “furthered any enterprise.” I will begin with an easy and obvious reply to this claim.

Modern business could not exist without the physical and social infrastructure provided by the state. In terms of the physical infrastructure, businesses need the transportation infrastructure provided by the taxpayers. The most obvious aspect of this infrastructure is the system of roads that is paid for by the citizens and maintained by the government (citizens acting collectively). Without roads, most businesses could not operate as products could not be moved effectively, and customers would be hard pressed to reach the businesses.

Perhaps even more critical than the physical infrastructure is the social infrastructure created by the people acting collectively and through officials. The social infrastructure includes the legal system, laws, police services, military services, diplomatic services and so on for the structures that compose the governmental aspects of society.

For example, companies in the intellectual property business (which ranges from those dealing in the arts to pharmaceutical companies) require the legal system and law enforcement. For example, if the state did not enforce drug patents, the business model of the major pharmaceutical companies would be destroyed. As another example, if the state did not protect Disney’s intellectual property, their profits would suffer.

As a further illustration, companies that do business internationally require the government’s military and diplomatic services to enable their business activities. In some cases, this involves the use of the military to serve the interest of business. In other cases, it is the less bloody hand of diplomacy that advances American business around the world.

All businesses rely on the currency system made possible by the state and they are all protected by the police. While there are non-state currencies (such as bitcoin) and companies can hire mercenaries, these options are not viable for most businesses.  All of this shows the state plays a critical role in allowing business to even exist. This can, however, be countered.

It could be argued that while the state is necessary for business (after all, there is little business in the state of nature), it does nothing beyond that and should just get out of the way to avoid impeding business. To use an analogy, someone must build the stadium for the football game, but they need to get out of the way when it is time for the players to take the field. The obvious reply is to show how the state has played a very positive role in the development of business.

The United States has made a practice of subsidizing and supporting what the ruling class sees as key businesses. In the 1800s, the railroads were developed with the assistance of the state. The development of the oil industry depended on the state, as did the development of modern agriculture. It could, of course, be objected that this subsidizing and support are bad things. But they are certainly not bad for the businesses that benefit. Elon Musk, for example, profits greatly from taxpayer money. Presumably he was so focused on cutting support for others so even more of this public money could end up in his accounts.

Another area where the state has helped advance business is in funding and engaging in research. This is often research that would be too expensive for private industry and research that requires a long time to yield benefits. One example of this is the development of space technology that made satellites possible. Another example is the development of the internet, which is the nervous system of the modern economy. The BBC’s “50 Things that Made the Modern Economy” does an excellent analysis of the role of governments in developing the technology that made the iPhone possible (and all smart phones).  Unfortunately for business, the Trump administration is (from malice or ignorance) cutting support for research.

One reason the United States has been so successful in the modern economy has been the past commitment of public money to basic research. While not all research leads to successful commercial applications (such as computers), the ability of the collective (us acting as the state) to support long term and expensive research has been critical to the advancement of technology and civilization.

This is not to take away from private sector research, but much of it is built upon public sector foundations. As is expected, private sector research now tends to focus on short-term profits rather than long term research. Unfortunately, this view has infected the public sector as well. As public money for research is reduced, public institutions seek private money, and this money often comes with strings and the risk of corruption. For example, “research” might be funded to “prove” that a product is safe or effective. While this does yield short-term gains, it will lead to a long-term disaster.

The state also helps further enterprise through laws regulating business. While this might seem like a paradox, it is easily shown by using an analogy to the role of the state in regulating the behavior of citizens.

Allowing businesses to operate with no regulation is like allowing anyone to operate without regulations. While the idea of an unregulated life might seem appealing, individuals need protection from others who might threaten their life, liberty and property. To this end, laws are created and enforced to protect people. The same applies to protecting businesses from other businesses (and businesses from people and people from businesses). This is, of course, the stock argument for having government rather than the unregulated state of nature. As Hobbes noted, a lack of government can become a war of all against all and this ends badly for everyone. The freer the market gets, the closer it gets to this state of nature  and this is well worth remembering. The ruling class controlling business does want the citizens to be in the state of nature relative to them but they want to be protected from each other and the citizens by the coercive power of the state.

It might be assumed that I foolishly think that all government involvement in business is good and that all regulations are desirable. This is not the case. Governments can wreck their own economies through corruption, bad regulations and other failures. This has happened in the past and is probably happening now.

Regulations are like any law as they can be good or bad, depending on what they achieve. Some regulations, such as those that encourage fair competition in business, are good. Others, such as those that grant certain companies unfair legal and financial advantages (such as Monsanto here), are not.

While rhetorical bumper stickers about government, business and regulation are appealing in a simplistic way, the reality of the situation requires more thought and due consideration of the positive role the state can play, with due vigilance against the harms that it can do.

Anyone who has played RTS games such as Blizzard’s Starcraft knows the basics of swarm warfare: you build a swarm of cheap units and hurl them against the enemy’s smaller force of more expensive units. The plan is that although the swarm will be decimated, the enemy will be exterminated. The same tactic is also used in the classic tabletop game Ogre. It pitted a lone intelligent super tank against a large force of human infantry and armor. And, of course, the real world has many examples of swarm warfare with some successful for those using the swarm tactic (ants taking out a larger foe) and some proving disastrous (massed infantry attacks on machineguns in WWI).

A modern approach to swarm tactics is to build a swarm of drones and deploy them against the enemy. While such drones will tend to be airborne units, they could also be ground or sea machines. In terms of their attacks, there are many options. The drones could be large enough to be equipped with weapons, such as small caliber guns, that would allow them to engage and return to reload for future battles. Some might be equipped with melee weapons, poisons, or biological weapons. The drones could also be suicide machines, small missiles intended to damage the enemy by destroying themselves.

While the development of military drone swarms in the United States will fall within the usual high cost of developing new weapon technology, the drones themselves can be cheap. After all, they will tend to be much smaller and simpler than crewed weapons such as aircraft, ships and ground vehicles. The main cost will most likely be in developing the software to make the drones operate effectively in a swarm; but after that it will be just a matter of mass producing the hardware.

If effective software and cost-effective hardware can be developed, one of the main advantages of the battle swarm will be its low cost. While such low-cost warfare might be problematic for defense contractors who have grown accustomed to profitable contracts, it is appealing to those concerned about costs and reducing government spending. After all, if low-cost drones could replace expensive units, defenses expenses could be significantly reduced. The savings could be used for social programs or, more likely, more tax cuts for the wealthy.

Low-cost units, if effective, can confer an attrition advantage. If, for example, it costs you $12,000 in drones to take down the enemy’s $12,000,000 fighter jet, then you stand a decent chance of winning. If hundreds of dollars of drones can take down millions of dollars of aircraft, then the situation is even better for the side with the drones. Likewise for naval vessels, land vehicles and structures.

The low cost does raise some concerns, though. Once the drone controlling software makes its way out into the world (via the inevitable hack, theft, or sale), then everyone could use swarms. This will recreate the IED and suicide bomber situation, only at an exponential increase. Instead of IEDs in the road, they will be flying around cities, looking for targets. Instead of a few suicide bombers with vests, there will be swarms of drones loaded with explosives. Since Uber comparisons are now mandatory, the swarm will be the Uber of death.

This does raise moral concerns about the development of drone software and technology; but the easy and obvious reply is that there is nothing new about this situation: every weapon ever developed eventually gets around. As such, the usual ethics of weapon development applies here, with due emphasis on the possibility of providing another cheap and effective way to destroy and kill.

One short term advantage of the first swarms is that they will be facing weapons designed primarily to engage small numbers of high value targets. For example, air defense systems now consist mostly of expensive missiles designed to destroy very expensive aircraft. Firing a standard anti-aircraft missile into a swarm will destroy some of the drones (assuming the missile detonates), but enough of the swarm will probably survive the attack for it to remain effective. It is also likely that the weapons used to defend against the drones will cost more than the drones, which ties back into the cost advantage.

This advantage of the drones would be quickly lost if effective anti-swarm weapons were developed. Not surprisingly, gamers have already worked out effective responses to swarms. In D&D and Pathfinder players generally loath swarms for the same reason that ill-prepared militaries will loath drone swarms: while individual swarm members are easy to kill, it is difficult to kill enough of them with standard weapons. In games, players respond to swarms with area of effect attacks, such as fireballs (or running away). These sorts of attacks can consume the entire swarm and either eliminate it or reduce its numbers, so it is no longer a threat. While the real world has an unfortunate lack of wizards, the same idea will work against drone swarms: cheap weapons that do moderate damage over a large area. One possible weapon is a battery of large, automatic shotguns that fill the sky with pellets or flechettes. Missiles could also be designed that act like claymore mines in the sky, spraying ball bearings in almost all directions.  And, obviously enough, swarms will be countered by swarms.

The drones would also be subject to electronic warfare. If they are being remotely controlled, this connection could be disrupted. Autonomous drones would be  less vulnerable, but they would still need to coordinate with each other to remain a swarm, and this coordination could be targeted.

The practical challenge would be to make the defenses cheap enough to make them cost effective. Then again, countries whose ruling class is happy to burn money for expensive weapon systems would not need to worry about the costs. In fact, defense contractors will presumably be lobbying for expensive swarm and anti-swarm systems.

The swarms also inherit  existing moral concerns about non-swarm drones, be they controlled by humans or deployed as autonomous killing machines. The ethical problems of swarms controlled by a human operator would be the same as the ethical problems of a single drone controlled by a human, the difference in numbers does not make a moral difference. For example, if drone assassination with a single drone is wrong (or right), then drone assassination with a swarm would also be wrong (or right).

Likewise, an autonomous swarm is not morally different from a single autonomous unit in terms of the ethics of the situation.  For example, if deploying a single autonomous killbot is wrong (or right), then deploying an autonomous killbot swarm is wrong (or right).  That said, perhaps there is a greater chance that an autonomous killbot swarm will develop a rogue hive mind and turn against us. Or perhaps not. In any case, Will Rodgers will be proven right once again: “You can’t say that civilization don’t advance, however, for in every war they kill you in a new way.”

While many supporters of Trump insist he is not a racist, white nationalists have once again rejoiced in his victory. Regardless of what Trump believes, his rhetoric has created a safe space for the alt-right. While this term is broad and, perhaps, misused, it bundles groups that are perceived as racist and even neo-Nazi in character. I will not endeavor to break down the fine distinctions between these various groups but will focus on white nationalists. As the name indicates, they have an ideological commitment to creating a nation consisting solely of whites.

Since Nazis and other hate groups have advocated the same goal, it seems reasonable to consider that white nationalists are racists and a hate group. Not surprisingly, they often claim they are not racists and are not a hate group. They even advance some arguments in support of these claims. In this essay, I will consider the family argument.

While the family argument is presented in various ways, the gist is that it is natural for people to prefer the company of their family members and that it is right to give precedence to one’s family. In their family analogy, they take whites to be a family. This, as they see it, warrants having a white nation or, failing that, giving precedence to whites. Some white nationalists extend the family argument to other races, arguing that each race should act in the same way and each race should have its own nation. This helps explain the apparently inconsistent claims about Jews by some white nationalists: they want the Jews to leave America, but they support Israel becoming a pure Jewish state.

The family analogy gains much of its appeal from human psychology: as a matter of fact, humans do generally prefer and give precedence to their own family members over others. This approach is also commonly used in solving ethical problems, such as who to save and how to distribute resources. For example, if a mother is given the choice between saving a stranger or her daughter from drowning, the intuitively right choice is her daughter. While the family approach has considerable appeal, there are some obvious concerns. One is whether whites constitute a family. Another is the extent to which being family morally warrants preference and precedence.

In the biological sense, a human family is made up of humans who are closely genetically related to each other. This is something that can be objectively tested, such as with a paternity test. In this regard, family identity is a matter of the genetic similarity (and origin) of the members. There is also the matter of distinguishing the family members from outsiders. This is done by focusing on the differences between the family members and others.

To argue that whites are a biological family requires establishing that whites are genetically related to each other. This is easy enough to do; all humans are genetically related because they are humans. But the white nationalist wants whites to be an exclusive family. One obvious problem with this, especially in the United States, is that most whites are closely related to non-whites. To use one well-known example, Thomas Jefferson has many descendants, and they thus constitute a family. However, many of them are descended from him and Sally Hemings and thus would presumably not be regarded as white by white nationalists. While one might quibble about whether Heming and Jefferson had children, it is well-established that the genetic background of most “white” Americans will not be “pure white.” There is also the fact that the genetic background of many “non-white” Americans will include white ancestors. This will mean that the “white family” will include people who the white nationalists would regard as non-white. For example, Dick Cheney and Barack Obama are related and are thus family. As such, the biological family analogy breaks down immediately in terms of the white nationalists’ approach.

A possible counter to this is to focus on specific “white” genes and argue that these are what define being white. One obvious point of focus is skin color; white skin is apparently the result of a single letter DNA mutation in the 3.1 billion letters in the human genome. As such, white nationalists could rally around this one letter and use that to define what it is to be white. This would certainly seem like an absurd foundation for preference and precedence; but perhaps the absurd would suffice for the white nationalists.

While families are often defined biologically, there are also family members that are adopted and, of course, people marry into families they are (hopefully not) closely related to. As such, a family need not be genetically defined. This provides an alternative way to try to make whites into a family.

White nationalists could argue that the white family is not defined by white genes, but by a set of values or interests that constitute being white. That is, being white is a social construct analogous to a political party, religion, or club. While there is the obvious challenge of working out what would be the values and interests one must have to be part of the white club, this could in theory be worked out. After all, the white nationalists have set up their own little white club and they presumably have ways of deciding who gets to join. The obvious problem with this approach is that it does not seem to capture what the white nationalists want in terms of being white. After all, anyone could have those values and interests and thus be white by that definition. Also, there are many people who have white skin who do not share the interests or values of the white nationalists and would thus not be white on this approach. I, for one, do not want to be in their little club.

The white nationalists could always go with the traditional approach of regarding as white anyone who looks white. Potential whites would presumably need to provide some proof that they do not have any non-whiteness in their background. There is, after all, a long history of people passing as whites in the United States. Since white nationalists tend to regard Jews as non-white, they would also need to sort that out in some way; after all, Jews can have very white skin. Presumably they can look to the Nazis for how to work this all out. There is also concern about using technology to allow people to appear white, such as genetic modification. One could even imagine a sci-fi scenario in which people could switch genes as they wished, thus creating a bit of a problem for racists who base their racism in genetics. Presumably white nationalists would really need to worry about such things. After all, they would not want non-whites in their white paradise.

One obvious problem with this approach is that it is like accepting as family anyone who looks like you in some specified way. For example, embracing someone as a relative because they have a similar nose. This seems an odd way to set a foundation for preference and precedence, but white nationalists presumably think in odd ways.

Given the above discussion, there seems to be no foundation for regarding whites as a family. As such, the white nationalist family analogy fails.

The authors of the United States Constitution were aware of the dangers of state infringement on religious liberty. The First Amendment provides two key protections for citizens. The first is the prohibition against making “law respecting the establishment of religion.” This protects citizens from the tyrannical imposition of a state-backed religion. The second is that congress is forbidden from making any law that prohibits the free exercise of religion. This protects citizens from the tyrannical forbiddance of religion by the state.

I support both prohibitions. While many believe it would be great if their religion was established and imposed by the coercive power of the state, they would not want someone else’s religion imposed upon them. For example, Americans who want their interpretation of Christianity as foundation for laws express horror at the prospect of Sharia law being imposed on them. As always, it is wise to consider the actions of the state in accord with the spirit of the Golden Rule: impose laws on others as you would have them impose laws on you. So, just as I would not want to have Sharia law imposed on me, I should not impose my faith-based law on others.

While I am not very active in my exercise of religion (although I am religious in my exercise), I also support the freedom to exercise religion. On the extreme side, impositions on religious liberties are often the starting point of efforts to oppress religious minorities. This can, and has, lead to attempts at extermination. As such, it is wise to make it difficult to get the ball of hate rolling. On the less extreme side, the free exercise of religion is part of the broader moral rights of liberty of conscience, freedom of expression and freedom of belief (which I also support). The American experience has shown that the acceptance of religious freedom, as imperfect as it may be, has helped maintain the stability of the United States. While we have many sects and religions, we generally do not have significant sectarian or religious violence (although the past is a different story). While there are, of course, other contributing factors, the freedom of religion has contributed significantly.

In recent years, there have been claims that religious liberty is under attack in the United States. As a holiday tradition, Fox News runs its absurd stories about their fictional war on Christmas. While rampant, soulless consumerism has all but defeated religious Christmas, there is obviously no war against it. There are also claims that Christians are persecuted in the United States. To support this, people point to the legality of abortion (in some stateas), the legalization of same-sex marriage, and laws protecting LGBT people from discrimination. These are taken by some as attacks on religious liberty. In response, several states have endeavored to roll back these alleged intrusions on liberty, although public support varies even when there are well-funded efforts to manufacture it.

To appeal to certain evangelical voters (who are not a monolithic bloc) Trump claimed that he would act in accord with their view of religious liberty. As they see it, Trump will enforce the second prohibition and protect citizens in their free exercise of the religion by ensuring that their freedom is prioritized over the rights of other Americans. However, critics argue that this would violate the first prohibition by imposing religion on others via the law. I hold the supporters of religious liberty to their rhetoric about freedom. To be specific, let it be assumed that religious freedom is something they think should be protected by the state, even when doing so can impose harms on others. To illustrate the harms, consider the impact of not protecting LGBT people from discrimination based on faith as well as the impact of the anti-abortion efforts on women’s health and freedom of choice.

While Trump made a great rhetorical effort to win evangelical voters, he also engaged in sustained attacks on Muslims. He once proposed a complete ban on allowing Muslims into the United States, he called for a registry of Muslims, and has used anti-Muslim rhetoric. While the ban and registry can be taken to violate the prohibition against interfering with the free exercise of religion, this can be countered. It could be argued that banning Muslims from the United States would not prevent them from freely exercising their religion in the United States, they would simply be excluded from coming here because of their religion. It could also be argued that a registry would  not violate this prohibition. While some Muslims might elect to keep their faith private to avoid being put on that list, the registry itself would not forbid the free exercise of religion. Those willing to identify themselves to the government and have their information in a database conveniently available for hate-groups would be free to exercise their religion.

Not surprisingly, some Christians dedicated to their own religious liberty supported the registry and ban. However, they should have considered the matter not just in terms of their own perceived self-interest, but in terms of their professed support for religious liberty as a principle. They should consider reversing the situation: what would be their view of a country that banned Christians and had a registry of Christians? They would be critical of that country and would consider those acts persecution. This reflection should help suggest what is wrong with the ban and registry. But consistency does not seem to matter, and one suspects that the principle they embrace is not freedom of religion but their right to impose their religion on others.

The principle of religious liberty would seem to prohibit the registry and ban as they seem to be clear impositions on the freedom of religion, broadly construed. This can be countered by defining religious freedom more narrowly limiting it to, for example, the freedom to worship within a religious edifice. This narrow interpretation would, however, preclude using the religious liberty argument in regard to such matters as abortion, contraception and LGBT rights.

Another possible counter is based on the fact that rights do have limits. One basis for limiting rights is the principle of harm: liberty can be restricted to protect others from harm. Using the overused example, the freedom of expression does not grant the moral right to yell “fire” in a crowded theater when there is no fire. In the case of the Muslim registry and ban, it can be argued that the religious liberty of Muslims can be limited to protect others from harm. This would presumably be developed in terms of terrorism. However, if possible harms to others were used to warrant the Muslim ban and registry, then the same argument would apply to the religious liberty arguments about abortion, contraception, and LGBT rights based on the harms they will impose on others. This then becomes a matter of weighing the harm imposed by restricting or allowing religious liberties. Regardless of the specific evaluation, this involves recognizing that the ban and registry violate religious liberty and that religious liberty can be constrained on the grounds of harm.