Category: Education

Higher education in the United States has largely embraced the business model. One highly visible example of this is the brand merchandizing of schools. Schools have licensed their names and logos for billions of dollars. Inspired by these brand-based profits, schools trademarked their slogans. Impressively, there are over 10,000 trademarked slogans.

Trademarked school slogans include “project safety” (University of Texas), “ready to be heard” (Chatham University), “power” (University of North Dakota), “rise above” (University of the Rockies), “students with diabetes” (University of South Florida), “student life” (Washington University in St. Louis) and “resolve” (Lehigh University). Those not familiar with trademark law might be surprised by some of these examples. After all, “student life” seems such a common phrase on campuses that it would be insane for a school to be allowed to trademark it. But one should never let sanity or logic be one’s guide when considering how the law works.

While the trademarking undertaken by schools might seem odd but harmless, the main purpose of a trademark is so that the owner enjoys an exclusive right and can sue others for using it. This is, of course, limited to certain contexts. So, for example, if I write about student life at Florida A&M University in a blog, Washington University would (I hope) not be able to sue me. However, in circumstances in which the trademark protection applies, then lawsuits are possible (and likely). For example, Eastern Carolina University sued Cisco Systems because of Cisco’s use of the phrase “tomorrow begins here.”

One practical and moral concern about universities’ enthusiasm for trademarking is that it has pushed higher education deeper into the realm of business. One might think universities should be focused on education rather than business—after all, an institution that does not focus on its core mission tends to do worse at that mission. This would also be morally problematic, if schools should (morally) focus on education.

An easy and obvious reply is that a university can wear many hats: educator, business, “professional in all but name” sport franchise and so on provided that each function is run properly and not operated at the expense of the core mission. Naturally, it could be added that the core mission of the modern university is not education, but business—branding, marketing and making money.

Another reply is that trademarks protect the university brand and allow them to make money by merchandizing their slogans and suing people for trademark violations. This money could then be used to support the core mission of the school.

There is, naturally enough, the worry that universities should not be focusing on branding and suing. While this can make them money, it is not what a university should be doing—which takes the conversation back to the questions of the core mission of universities as well as the question about whether schools can wear many hats without losing focus.

A second legal and moral concern is the impact trademarks have on free speech. On the one hand, United States law is clear about trademarks and the 1st Amendment.  The gist is that noncommercial usage is protected by the 1st Amendment and this allows such things as using trademarked material in protests or criticism. So, for example, the 1st Amendment allows me to include the above slogans in this essay. Not surprisingly, commercial usage is subject to trademark law. So, for example, I could not use the phrase “the power of independent thinking” as a slogan for my blog since that belongs to Wilkes University. In general, this seems reasonable. After all, if I created and trademarked a branding slogan for my blog, then I would certainly not want other people using my trademarked slogan. But, of course, I would be fine with people using the slogan when criticizing my blog—that would be acceptable use under freedom of expression.

On the other hand, trademark holders do sometimes try to exploit their trademarks and people’s ignorance of the law to their advantage. For example, threats made involving claims of alleged trademark violations are sometimes used as a means of censorship and silencing critics.

An obvious reply is that this is not a problem with trademarks as such. It is, rather, a problem with people misusing the law. There is, of course, the legitimate concern that the interpretation of the law will change and that trademark protection will be allowed to encroach on freedom of expression.

What might be a somewhat abstract point of concern is the idea that what seem to be stock phrases such as “the first year experience” (owned by University of South Carolina) can be trademarked and owned. This diminishes the public property that is language and privatizes it in favor of those with the resources to take over tracts of linguistic space. While the law currently still allows non-commercial use, this also limits the language other schools and businesses can legally use. It also requires that they research all the trademarks before using common phrases if they wish to avoid a lawsuit from a trademark holder. It has also long struck me as bizarre that someone can claim ownership of words and sentences, they did not create. But, of course, people also claim ownership of land and resources they obviously did not create. Ownership is weird.

The obvious counter, which I mentioned above, is that trademarks have a legitimate function. The obvious response is that there is still a reasonable concern about allowing private ownership of language and restricting freedom of expression. There is a need to balance whatever legitimate need there is to own branding slogans with the legitimate need to allow the use of stock and common phrases in commercial situations.  The challenge is to determine the boundary between the two and where a specific phrase or slogan falls. Or we could also consider that the approach of owing and exploiting common goods for profit is a bad idea and maybe we should do that less. Or not at all.

 

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It can be argued that providing college education to prisoners yields practical benefits and that there are ethical reasons for doing so.  If a function of the prison system is to reform prisoners so that they do not return to crime after they are released, then there is very good reason to support programs, such as that offered by Bard college, that provide college education to prisoners.

Since 2001 over a thousand prisoners have received college degrees from Bard. Of those released from prison, between 2.5 and 5% have been arrested again. In contrast, 75% of state prison inmates are arrested and incarcerated again within five years of their release. Prisoners who participate in education programs are also less likely to return to prison than former prisoners who did not participate in such programs.

Given the very high cost of incarceration (about $60,000 per year), reducing the number of people returning to prison would save the state and taxpayers money. There is also the cost of crime, both to the victims and society in general.

Of course, there is the (evil) practical concern that the prison-industrial complex in the United States is a job and profit creator (mostly transferring public money to the private sector) and having fewer people in prison would be a practical loss, economically speaking, for those who profit from the for-profit prison system. Also, scare tactics involving crime are a basic tool of politicians and pundits and addressing crime would be detrimental to them. Although, to be fair and balanced, they could just lie more about the crime statistics.

In moral terms, a utilitarian argument can be given in favor of such programs. Using the stock utilitarian moral argument, if the benefits generated by the education programs outweighed the harm, this would make them morally correct. There is, of course, also the moral value in having people not committing crimes and being, instead, positive members of the community.

One practical objection is that the cost of such programs might exceed the benefits. This is partially a factual matter, namely weighing the economic cost of crime and imprisonment against the cost of providing such programs in terms of dollars. The positive economic value of such programs should be considered as well. The cost to the state can, obviously, be offset if the programs are supported by others (such as donors and private universities). Given the cost of incarceration, practical considerations seem to favor the programs. However, this can be debated.

Another practical objection is that the benefits being discussed arise only when a released prisoner does not return to prison because of the education program. If a prisoner is serving a sentence that will keep them in prison for life, then there would seem to be no practical benefit. The counter to this is that most prisoners are not in prison for life, so this would apply in only a very few cases that would be offset by the cases in which people do leave prison.

It could also be claimed that the education programs are not the cause of the former prisoners remaining out of prison. After all, this could be a case of a common cause (that is, what seems to be a cause and an effect are really both effects of an underlying cause): the qualities that would cause a prisoner to participate in such an education program are likely to be the same ones that would make it less likely that the former prisoner would return. If this is the case, then it could be argued that such programs are not needed since they are not actually the causal factor.

While it is always wise to consider the possibility of a common cause, it does make sense that an education program would have causal role to play in a former prisoner not returning to prison. At the very least, education would increase the chances of the person getting a job and this would have an impact on the likelihood that they would return to crime. Most people, even President Trump, do not do crimes for no reason. Most people will also pick not doing crimes over doing crimes if they can get what they want or need.

It can also be argued that even if the former prisoners who would have been in the program would not have returned to prison anyway, the value of the education itself would justify the programs. I do believe that education has intrinsic value. However, this is not a view that is shared by everyone, and it can obviously be argued against, usually on economic grounds.

In general, though, the education programs seem worthwhile, if only on practical grounds. In cases in which education programs are being privately funded, there seems to be no practical reason to oppose them, especially if they have the claimed benefits regarding recidivism. Unless, of course, one considers the desires of those who profit from the for-profit prison system and those who desire that other people suffer.

One moral objection that can be raised against these programs is that resources are being expended on prisoners that could be used to help non-prisoners who cannot afford an education. One might also add that prisons (are alleged to) exist to punish people for their crimes and not to reward them. As such, prisoners should not receive such education. Instead, any resources that might have been spent on educating prisoners should be spent on assisting non-prisoners who cannot afford college. Of course, there are those who would not want to assist even non-prisoners who cannot afford college.

This moral objection does have some bite. After all, a person in need who has not committed crimes seems more deserving of assistance than someone who has committed crimes. If it did, in fact, come down to a choice between helping a non-criminal or a criminal, then it would seem preferable to assist the non-criminal—just as it would be preferable to spend money on education and infrastructure rather than on enriching the rich. It would also be preferable to spend money on addressing the causes of crime rather than creating a prison-industrial complex.

A reply to this objection is based on the fact that it is very expensive to imprison a person. While it would be preferable to avoid having to imprison people, once they are in prison it would seem desirable to invest a little more to keep them from returning to prison. Calculating this would involve using the cost of the education, the cost of keeping the prisoner in prison, the likely chance of returning to prison and for how long. To use a made-up example, if it cost $31,000 for a prisoner to get her degree and $31,000 a year to keep her locked up, then if there is a good chance that her degree would keep her out of prison for another four-year sentence, then it would seem to be worthwhile even as a gamble. After all, spending $31,000 is likely to save much more money. If the fact that she is likely to be a contributing member of society is factored in, the deal is even better. So, the gist of the reply is that spending the money education does make sense, if it has a good chance of saving money and doing some social good. If the money is not spent on education, then it seems likely that even more will be spent on dealing with recidivism. Either way society pays, the question is not whether one should spend more or less but whether one should pay for something positive (education) or negative (locking someone up). So, it is not a matter of spending money that could be spent to assist non-criminals, it is a matter of how to spend the money that will be spent either way.

I understand how someone struggling to pay for college would be outraged if prisoners  were getting an education for free and this is something that evil (or ignorant) politicians exploit. However, my reply to this is that paying for the education of a prisoner, assuming it reduces recidivism, is cheaper than paying to keep locking the prisoner up. Also, it is unlikely that the money spent on educating prisoners would be redirected to pay for the education of non-prisoners.

It might be objected that the problem should be addressed before people go to prison, that there should be education programs designed to assist people who are at risk for prison, but are also likely to be able to complete college and avoid prison.

In reply, I agree completely. It is better that a person never goes to prison in the first place and education is a much better investment than prison (except for those who profit from the for-profit prison system). There are, of course, those who would disagree and argue that it is better to let people end up in prison than to spend public money on college education. Others could argue that while such plans might be good intentioned, they would not work—the money would be spent, and the result would merely be educated criminals. These objections are worth considering, but I would still contend that spending on education to keep people out of prison is preferable to spending money to keep people in prison. But I don’t own a prison, and I am not driven by a desire to make people suffer.

 

 

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As a college student and professor, I am familiar with the unfortunate pattern of the Greek system on American campuses. Something awful will happen involving a fraternity or sorority, such as sexual assault, racist stuff, or a hazing death. Then there will be a backlash and calls for banning fraternities (and sometimes sororities). Administrative action will follow, such as hiring well-paid consultants to solve the image problem and creating some new bureaucracy on campus. Academics like me will write think pieces about the Greek system. The media will cover the event, squeezing out the blood and pain as long as they can.  Finally, things return to normal in time for the next terrible incident that grabs the attention of the media. Because of this, people regularly argue for getting rid of fraternities. I will, of course, focus on the moral arguments.

The main moral argument for banning fraternities is utilitarian: fraternities create more harm than good, thus making their removal morally correct. In terms of the harm, the catalog is unsurprising and certainly matches the usual intuitions about campus life in general and fraternities in particular.

First, while college students are often heavy drinkers, fraternity members  are more likely to engage in heavy and binge drinking (75%) than the general college population of men (49%). This heavier drinking means fraternity members suffer more from the negative effects of heavy drinking (such as injuries and academic problems). In addition to alcohol, fraternity members also abuse drugs (prescription and otherwise) at higher rates than non-fraternity members. Sorority members are also more likely to engage in heavy and binge drinking than their non-Greek counterparts.

Second, fraternity members are much more likely than non-fraternity members to commit sexual assault. It must, however, be noted that most fraternity men never commit sexual assault. While there is some disagreement about the causes, this is typically linked to the greater abuse of alcohol, group psychology and fraternity culture. Sorority members are more likely to be sexually assaulted than their non-Greek counterparts. This is also linked to alcohol abuse and cultural factors.

Third, there is hazing. On average, about one person is killed per year due to a hazing incident. Others are injured or otherwise harmed. Most fraternities officially ban hazing, but it persists. Obviously, hazing is not confined to fraternities—my own Florida A&M University lost a student, Robert Champion, to band hazing in 2011. While sororities also engage in hazing, fraternities are the ones that make the news the most often.

These harms fuel the utilitarian argument for banning fraternities (and sororities) as eliminating them will reduce the harm. To be specific, if fraternities cause their members to abuse alcohol, commit sexual assault and haze more than they would otherwise, then getting rid of them would reduce (but obviously not eliminate) these problems.

One response is to argue that banning fraternities would not have the desired effect. It can be claimed that fraternities merely group people who would behave badly on their own and a ban would not have a significant impact. This does have some appeal in that non-fraternity members do binge drink, do commit sexual assault and do engage in hazing.

This response can be countered by arguing that a fraternity does not just collect people who would behave badly on their own, but the social dynamics and culture of the fraternity play a causal role in this bad behavior. The group dynamics change individual behavior and a man who is in a fraternity is more likely to behave badly because of that membership. Given the studies of group dynamics, this is appealing: people do behave differently in groups and humans are often easily swayed by cultural factors and peer pressure.

Another response to the argument for banning fraternities is to admit that fraternities do cause some problems, but to counter by arguing that the good they create outweighs the harm. In defense of fraternities, people typically point to some of the following benefits.

First, fraternities often engage in charity work and community service—they do good things for the campus and general community. While I was not in a fraternity in college, many of my friends were and they did many good things and are still good men today. As a faculty member and a member of the community, I also see the good work done by fraternity members.

Second, fraternities provide opportunities for leadership, brotherhood and the forging of social connections that often prove very useful later in life. Fraternities have a well-established history of producing leaders in various fields, such as business and politics. 

These benefits are appealing and some fraternities include upstanding and outstanding men who do good on campus and go on to do good after they graduate. These positive factors should not be simply ignored or dismissed.

That said, as with any utilitarian calculation, the positive must be weighed against the negative. In this case, the question is whether the benefits of fraternities outweigh the harms. There is also the related question of whether banning them would create more good than harm.

This is partially a matter of facts—the statistics about drinking, sexual assault and so on are factual and should be addressed by the usual rational means of assessment. However, it is also a matter of value in terms of how much weight is placed on each positive and each negative factor. To use a dramatic example, this would involve questions about how many sexual assaults are offset by fraternity contributions to networking, leadership development and campus service. While some would be inclined to take the view that the number should be zero, it must be noted that we routinely tolerate horrible consequences in return for positive consequences. For example, tens of thousands of people die each year due to automobile accidents, yet we still tolerate driving. So, weighing the awful against the positive is, sadly, how we do things as a species. And, for utilitarian calculations, how they should be done. The obvious practical problem is that people disagree about these evaluations, and such disagreements need to be settled in order to make a decision. Obviously enough, defenders of the fraternity system would contend the positives outweigh the negative. Detractors would claim the reverse.

Naturally, there are alternative moral approaches to utilitarianism. For example, one might take the view that to weigh the benefits of fraternities against the fact that fraternity men are significantly more likely to engage in sexual assault is a moral travesty. The fraternities should be shut down, it might be argued, because sexual assault is to be prevented. While this does have some appeal, the same reasoning could be pushed to the entire university system: since sexual assault occurs on campus and eliminating campuses would eliminate sexual assault on campus, campuses should be eliminated.

My own view is mixed. Given the harms associated with fraternities, there is a moral case for eliminating them. That said, there are some positive aspects to the fraternity system that can support a moral case for preserving them, presumably with some reforms. And thus concludes this think piece; simply refer back to it the next time something awful happens involving a fraternity (or sorority).

 

 

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While I like being a professor, with each passing year I am less likely to recommend this career path. This is not because I fear competition (I am a tenured full professor). It is not because I have turned against my profession to embrace anti-intellectualism or some delusional ideology about “woke” professors. It is not even due to disillusionment. I still believe in education and the value of educators. My real reason is altruism and honesty: I want potential professors to know the truth. I now turn to some reasons why you might not want to become a professor.

First, there is the cost. To be a professor, you will almost always need a terminal degree in the field—typically a Ph.D. You need to start with a bachelor’s degree and college in the United States is more expensive each year. Student debt is at a record high. While a bachelor’s degree is, in general, a great investment, you will need to go on to graduate school.

While graduate school is expensive, many students work as teaching or research assistants. These positions typically for tuition and provide a very modest paycheck.  Since the pay is low and the workload is high, you will at best be in a financial holding pattern for the duration of grad school. After 3-7+ years, you will (if you are persistent and lucky) have that terminal degree.

If you are paying for graduate school, it will be expensive and will add to your debt. You might be able to work a decent job at the same time, but that will probably drag out graduate school.

Regardless of whether you had to pay or not, you will be attempting to start a career after about a decade (or more) in college—so be sure to consider this.

Second, the chances of getting a job are usually not great. While conditions vary, the general trend has been reduced budgets for faculty and increased spending on facilities and administrators. As such, if you are looking for a job in academics, it might be smarter to become an administrator rather than a professor. The salary for administrators is generally better than that of professors, although elite coaches of the prestige sports have the very best salaries.

When I went on the job market in 1993, it was terrible. When I applied for a job, I would get a form letter saying hundreds of people applied and how sorry the search committee was about my not getting an interview. I got my job by chance by being in the right place at the right time. It is thus wise to consider the odds of even getting a job.

Third, universities now often hire people into low-paying adjunct positions which lack benefits and job security.  The average adjunct salary is about $26,500. Starting salaries for professors varies, but are in the $50,000-$77,00 range. This is good, but not as good as what a person with an advanced degree can make outside of academics. Also, it is worth noting that the average salary for someone with just a B.A. is $81,000. By the numbers, if you go for a professorship, the odds are that you will be worse off financially than if you just stuck with a B.A. and went to work. That said, most of us do not become professors for money.

Fourth, the workload of professors is higher than most people think. While administrative, teaching and research loads vary, professors work about 61 hours per week and work on weekends (typically grading, class prep and research).  Thanks to budget cuts and increased enrollment, class sizes have tended to increase or remain high. For example, I typically have 35+ students per classes, with most of my classes being “writing intensive.”

People still tell me that they are envious that professors like me get summers off; the envy deceases when I tell them that this is unpaid “vacation.”. During this off time, a professor is still doing research and class preparation. And administrators seem to struggle with the idea that off-contract faculty are not getting paid, so I and others are still called to do unpaid work in the summer. For example, I am on an AI committee this summer along with other unpaid faculty.

Fifth, the trend at universities is that faculty are expected to do uncompensated administrative work on top of their academic duties (research, teaching, advising, etc.). As one extreme example, one semester I was teaching four classes, advising, writing a book, directing the seven-year program review, completing all the assessment tasks, serving as the philosophy & religion facilitator and serving on nine committees. 

Sixth, while professors were once well-respected, that respect has faded. Some of this is due to politicization of education. Those seeking to cut budgets to lower taxes, to transform education into a for-profit industry, and to break education unions have done an able job demonizing the profession and academics. To be fair and balanced, we professors have dropped the ball by failing to  make the case for our profession in the public arena.

Seventh, while every generation claims that the newer generations are worse, many students now see education as a means to the end of getting a job. Given the economy that our political and financial elites have crafted, this is a sensible and pragmatic approach. However, it has also translated into less student interest. The new model of education, crafted by state legislators, administrators and the business folks is to train the job fillers for the job creators. The current phrase is to make the students “workforce ready” and many universities are going all in on AI.

Finally, the general trend in politics has been one of increased hostility to education, with it being seen as a political battleground and another area for the rich to make profits. It seems likely that higher education will get worse.

But to be fair and balanced, a career as a professor can be a better choice than the alternatives, depending on what you value and what you expect from life. Even today, when people ask me if I would become a professor, I still say “yes.”

 

 

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Having been in academics for quite some time, I have seen fads come, go and stick. Way back in 2004 I witnessed the arrival of assessment at my university. While I initially thought it might be a passing fad, almost a quarter century later I am still serving (in perpetuity) on the General Education Assessment committee and completing yearly assessment plans and reports for Philosophy & Religion. As with all such things, assessment arrived with acronyms and buzz words. Those more cynical than I would say that all acronyms of administrative origin (AAO) amount to B.S. But I would not say such a thing. While I diligently engage in assessment, I am still aware of reasonable concerns about it.

One concern was succinctly put by a fellow philosopher: “you don’t fatten the pig by weighing it.” The criticism behind this homespun remark is that time spent on assessment is time taken from the core function of education, namely education. At the K-12 level, the burden of assessment and evaluation has become quite onerous in many places. At the higher education level, the burden is not as great—but we spend considerable time on it.

A sensible reply is that assessment is both valuable and necessary: if the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of education is not assessed, then there would be no way of knowing what is working and what is not. A counter is that educators assessed their efforts before the rise of modern assessment and there is the question as to whether these new efforts have improved education.

Another concern is that in addition to the time spent by faculty on assessment, a bureaucracy of assessment was created. Some schools have entire offices devoted to assessment complete with staff and administrators. With higher education facing financial woes and students confronting ever increasing tuition rates, it could be argued that assessment should be cut in favor of better serving the core mission of the university. A reply is to argue that funding an assessment office is more important to serving the core mission of the university than more faculty or lower tuition would be.

Another common concern is that assessment is part of the micromanagement of public education imposed by state legislatures. These are, unsurprisingly, usually the same legislators who speak loudly about getting government off peoples’ backs and cutting regulations (for business). This, some critics contend, is part of a campaign to discredit and damage public education.

One reply is that a state legislature has the right to insist that public schools provide evidence that the (ever-decreasing) public money is being well spent. If the legislatures showed real concern for the quality of education and were committed to public education, this reply would have considerable merit.

A final concern is that the results of the previous assessment must be applied to improve each academic program, and this seems to rest on an assumption of perpetual improvement. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts and administrative policies, faculty rarely get raises and salary compresence is a serious problem.  So faculty are supposed to better each year, but get paid less because inflation and the rising cost of living reduces the value of the salary each year. As such, the system demands perpetual improvement of faculty and schools, but there are usually no incentives or rewards—other than not getting fired or not being punished. Interestingly, the folks imposing this system claim that taxation and government impositions hurt business. That is, they seem to think it is bad for businesses to have less money and be regulated too much by the state, then it will be bad. This view does not extend to education. But there might be an ironic source of hope as education is being “businessified” and perhaps once the transformation is complete, the universities will get the love showered on corporations.

 

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The United States persists in waging and endless war on drugs and faces ever increasing and problems with higher education. I will reconsider an immodest proposal I made years ago intended to address both problems.

In the case of higher education, one problem is that the cost of education exceeds the resources of many Americans. One reason is that America’s political and economic elites repeatedly blow up the economy and have been engaged in an unrelenting extermination of the middle class. Another reason is the view that higher education has been cast as a private (rather than public) good and is seen by the elites as just another area to exploit for profit. Because of this, funding to public schools has been reduced and funding has been diverted from public schools to costly and ineffective for-profit schools. Yet another reason is that public universities have an ever-expanding administrative burden. Even the darling of academics, STEM, has seen significant cuts in support and public funding.

Through their war on drugs, the rulers have imposed a massive cost on the United States. First, there is the cost of the resources devoted to policing citizens, trying them and incarcerating them for drug crimes. Second, there is the cost of the social and personal damage done to individuals and communities. From the perspective of most citizens, the war on drugs has been a losing fight—mainly because “we have met the enemy and he is us.”

Fortunately, I have a solution to both problems. Years ago, I spoke with an engineering student about Florida State’s various programs aimed at creating businesses and heard a piece on NPR about the financial woes of schools and how faculty and staff were being pushed to be fund-raisers for schools. Unsurprisingly, things are even worse now.

This got me thinking about how universities could generate funding and I remembered a running joke from long ago. Back when universities started to commit to  “businessification, I joked with a running friend (hence a running joke) that we faculty members should become drug lords to fund our research and classes. While I do not think that I should become a drug lord, I would propose that public universities get into the drug business.

States should begin by legalizing marijuana and pass a general law allowing recreational drugs that can be shown to be as safe as tobacco and alcohol (that sets the bar very low).  The main restriction will be that the drugs can only be produced and sold by public universities. All the profits will go directly to the universities, to be used as decided by boards composed of students and faculty. To be realistic, the ruling elites would need to get a cut of this, but I’ll leave the corruption aspects to others.

To implement this plan, faculty and students should be actively involved. Business faculty and students would develop the models, plans and proposals. Design and marketing students and faculty will handle those aspects. Faculty and students in chemistry, biology and medicine will develop the drugs and endeavor to make them safer. Faculty and students in agriculture will see to the growing of the crops, starting with marijuana. Engineering students and faculty will develop hydroponics and other technology.

Once the marijuana and other drugs are available, the universities will sell the products to the public with all profits being used to fund the educational and research aspects of the universities. Since the schools are public universities, the drugs will be tax-free—there is no sense in incurring the extra cost of collecting taxes when the money is going to the schools already. Since schools already have brand marketing, this can be easily tied in. For example, Florida State can sell Seminole Gold and Seminole Garnet marijuana, while my own Florida A&M University can have Rattler Green and Rattler Orange.

One practical objection is that the operation might not be profitable. While this is obviously a reasonable concern, the drug trade can be very profitable. Also, by making such drugs legal, the cost of the war on drugs would drop, thus potentially freeing up resources for education and reducing the harms done to individuals and the community.  So, I am not too worried about this.

One reasonable objection is that drugs are unhealthy. The easy reply is that while this is true, we already tolerate unhealthy products such as tobacco, alcohol, cars and firearms. If these are tolerable, then the drugs sold by the schools (which must be at least as safe as tobacco and alcohol) would also be tolerable. The war on drugs is also very unhealthy—so scaling back the war would be good for public health.

One moral objection is that drugs are immoral. There are three easy replies. The first is that the drugs in question are no more immoral than alcohol and tobacco. If these can be morally tolerated, then so can the university drugs. Second, there is the consequentialist argument: if drugs are going to be used anyway by Americans, it is better that the money go to education rather than ending up in the coffers of criminals, gangs, terrorists and the prison-industrial complex. Third, there is also the consequentialist argument that university produced drugs will be safer and of higher quality than drugs produced by drug lords, gangs, terrorists and criminal dealers. Given the good consequences of legalizing university-manufactured drugs, this plan is clearly morally commendable.

Given the above arguments, having universities as legal drug sellers would clearly help solve two of America’s serious problems: the high cost of education and the higher cost of the ineffective and destructive war on drugs. As my contribution to the brand, I offer the slogan “get high for higher ed.” As you would suspect, I am not good at marketing.

 

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As Stephen Colbert’s current show winds down after being terminated, seemingly at the command of the Trump regime, I thought I’d look back at an episode of the Colbert Report.

Campbell Brown appeared on the July 31, 2014 episode of the Colbert Report to promote her Partnership for Educational Justice filing a legal complaint in Albany aimed at eliminating New York’s teacher tenure laws.  In my previous essay, I discussed the main topic, namely that of the points made in the legal complaint. In this essay, I will discuss some interesting points from Brown’s appearance on the Colbert Report. While a 2014 event might seem like ancient history, her appearance raises some issues that are still relevant today.

When Brown went to the show, she encountered protestors outside the building. Interestingly, she described them as trying to silence her and was critical of their presence. Colbert responded by noting that the protestors were exercising their First Amendment rights.

On the face of it, Brown used a common tactic—accusing critics of wanting to silence those expressing opposing viewpoints and using this as grounds for rejecting, dismissing or ignoring the criticisms. To be fair, some critics do say their opponent should be silenced. Because I accept the right to freedom of expression, I am against the silencing of critics. And, because I am consistent, I also oppose the demands of critics to silence those they criticize. I will admit there are exceptions, but these are just that—the exceptions.

However, it is important to distinguish between protests or criticism and attempts to silence. To protest someone or something is to express a negative view, and this is different from endeavoring to silence someone. For example, someone might have protested Brown’s lawsuit by making a sign and standing by the entrance to the building. This would express a stance against Brown, but unless the person told Brown to stop expressing her views or tried to shout her down, the person was not trying to silence Brown. It must be noted that even if a person would be happy if the target of their criticism did shut up, this is different from trying to silence someone.

To criticize something is to assess and evaluate it, which is different from trying to silence a person. I was myself critical of Brown, but I did not endeavor to silence her.  She had every right to make her claims and express her views, just as I had the right to express my own—even when my claims were critical of her claims. To assess is to not to silence. Even to claim someone is wrong is not to silence them. Saying “you are mistaken” is not the same as saying “shut up.”

That said, the tactic of accusing protestors or critics of trying to silence one does have some rhetorical value. First, it allows a person to dismiss or reject protestors/critics with a lazy ad homimen: “they are just trying to silence me, so their claims have no merit.” Second, it has an emotional appeal in that it casts the protestors or critics as being opposed to freedom of speech. The irony, of course, is that this is an attempt to silence the critics.

Another interesting aspect of the discussion was when Colbert asked Brown about who was funding her group and lawsuit. As Colbert, who once owned his own super PAC noted, it is legal to keep the names of those funding such an organization secret—even when they are actively involved in politics. When pressed a bit, Brown used another common tactic—she claimed that anonymity protects the donors from being harassed. This ties into the previously discussed tactic in which protestors and critics are cast as villains who are trying to silence a person. In this case, the opponents of her views are presumably being presented as the sort of people who would cruelly harass those they disagree with. This would, of course, have cast Brown as a brave hero—she was facing harassment, so the anonymous donors did not have to.

As Colbert noted, not revealing her donors is her legal right. However, the claim that she is keeping them anonymous to protect them from harassment was dubious. While Brown was subject to criticism and was protested, she did not seem to have been subjected to onerous abuse. The anonymous donors would presumably also not be cruelly abused—though they might be criticized.

Those more cynical than I might claim that the donors were concealed for nefarious reasons and there was speculation about who is the money behind the mouth. Those on the left, naturally enough, suspected a right-wing cabal aimed at destroying unions and privatizing education. Those of more moderate views might suspect a bi-partisan group that was aimed at privatizing education for the profit of themselves and their cronies. Some might even take Brown at face value: they backers are sincerely concerned with education reform. But, for some reason, they did not want anyone else to know.

Given her commitment to secrecy, it is ironic that in 2013 Brown created the Parents’ Transparency Project which was claimed to be aimed at bringing transparency to the negotiation process involving teachers’ unions.

This situation did raise the larger issue of secret funding. On the one hand, it could be argued that people have a right to privacy when it comes to their legal, financial and political machinations. On the other hand, secret money has at least two negative impacts. The first is that it has a corrosive effect on the openness that is supposed to the hallmark of democratic systems. The second is that it keeps the public in ignorance—knowing who is backing which candidates, causes and lawsuits seems is important for making informed decisions. Of course, it can be countered that the public does not need to know this, that it should not matter who is really funding something as they hide behind patriotic or positive sounding fronts.

Back in 2014, I was for transparency in such funding. First, I thought that such secret money is contrary to the openness that is critical to a democratic system.  I still think that. I thought that secret money deals were appropriate for oligarchies and corrupt states, but hardly suitable for what is supposed to be an open democracy. Now, in 2026, I can see that the United States has become an open oligarchy, with open corruption. While there anonymous funding is still a thing, it seems less important now given this open corruption.

Second, I believe that people should take responsibility for their beliefs and actions—being able to influence without accountability is morally unacceptable. I still believe this, although the open and unpunished corruption of today shows that some can engage in open corruption with no accountability.

Third, there is the matter of courage—only a coward hides behind anonymity when there is no real danger beyond people knowing what a person is backing. I still think this, but now some feel safe engaging in open corruption.

 

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The Republican dominated state legislature in my adopted state of Florida has been passing anti-union laws, the latest targeting public unions. The law excludes police and firefighter unions, with some noting that the difference is that these unions tend to support Republicans. As of this writing, I am a member of the United Faculty of Florida, which is a union for faculty. But my chapter of the union might cease to exist under the new law. But this war on educational unions is not new and I am taking this opportunity to look back to 2014 for an earlier battle in this war.

Back in July, 2014 Campbell Brown announced her Partnership for Educational Justice filed a legal complaint in Albany. This complaint aimed at eliminating New York’s teacher tenure laws. It was claimed that the tenure laws interfere with the right of children to a sound education.

This was not Brown’s first rodeo. In 2013 Brown asserted that her Parents’ Transparency Project was aimed at bringing transparency to the negotiation process involving teachers’ unions. During this campaign Brown asserted that the union is “…a system that protects teachers who engage in sexual misconduct.” Brown ran into some conflict of interest issues in regards to this group and there were concerns about the anonymous funding behind it: as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, PTP can legally keep its donors secret and engage in political spending. As should be no surprise, critics saw it as an attempt at union busting. To promote the lawsuit, Brown appeared on the July 31, 2014 episode of the Colbert Report—having faced protestors outside the show.

I did agree with some of Brown’s claims. First, I agree that children are entitled to a sound basic education. Her critics contend that her actual interest was in busting the unions at the behest of those bankrolling her efforts. While Brown’s actual motives are a point of interest, they are logically irrelevant to the merit of her claims and arguments. However, Colbert did raise a relevant criticism: if Brown was concerned that children receive a sound education and for educational equality, then her goals would have been better served by focusing on educational inequality, such as the extreme disparity in education funding. To be fair to Brown, it can be reasonable to focus on one issue and leave other issues to others. For example, it would be unreasonable to attack a person who is focused on fighting lung cancer for not dedicating their time to also fighting breast cancer. That said, this can also be used in bad faith as rhetorical cover. For example, a person who claims to be policing library book “for the children” might deflect a question about why they do not support school lunch programs by saying that their focus in on books. They could, obviously, also speak briefly in favor for school lunch programs even if they are focused on other matters.

Second, I did agree with her view of seniority. Schools sometimes follow a “first in, last out” policy. The problem is that merely being at a school a long time does not mean a person is a good teacher. I believe that employment should be, in general, based on competence and seniority is not a mark of competence, I favor a different approach. That said, experience can improve a teacher’s abilities, and I am a much better professor than I was I was fresh out of graduate school). However, improved abilities should be discernible in job performance and not just by looking at the calendar. Naturally, a rational case can be made for seniority—but I believe that all such cases must rest on the connection between experience and ability.

Third, I had some sympathy for her view that three years is not enough time to earn tenure After all, tenure at the university level requires six years (and, at my university, involves a yearlong review process starting in the department and ending with the university President). The easy and obvious counter is that teaching at a university requires an advanced degree (which requires 5+ years beyond the bachelor’s degree required to teach K-12), so having a shorter tenure period at K-12 schools is reasonable. So, my view is that this can be debated—but this should be done in good faith.

Fourth, I agreed with her view that tenure laws should not make it nearly impossible to fire ineffective or dangerous teachers. Tenure, as I see it, is supposed to ensure that teachers or professors can only be fired for cause and through due process. It is not so that teachers or professors can never be fired. At the college level, this is obviously connected to defending academic freedom. At the K-12 level, academic freedom might not be seen as being as great a concern. But there is a reasonable concern about protecting teachers from the vagaries of ideology, politics and such. To illustrate, tenure can be useful for protecting biology teachers from being fired because some people disbelieve in evolution or believe that vaccines cause autism. In the light of events during the second Trump regime, the need to protect teachers is even more obvious. Being consistent, I also hold that tenured conservative teachers should be protected, should “the left” undertake efforts for ideological purging. But I must note that what counts as ideological purging can be contentious. For example, a biology teacher who taught students that dinosaur bones are fake and that transgender people are possessed by demons would seem to be someone who shouldn’t be teaching. But some might argue that firing them would be a woke purge.

Brown’s view did get some psychological support from the common misconception that tenure means a teacher cannot be fired. However, tenure does not make one immune to being fired, just that due process must be used. It would be hard to defend the view that it is fine for schools to fire a teacher for any reason without any due process. After all, such firings would be (by definition) unjustified. It is, however, easy to defend the view that even a tenured teacher should be fired for being ineffective and certainly for being dangerous.

The problem is not with the general principle of tenure. If there is a problem, it would seem to lie in the process that is used and perhaps any rules that would keep the ineffective or dangerous in their jobs. The fix to this would not be the elimination of tenure, but a change in the process so that teachers are protected from unjustified dismissal and students are protected from ineffective or dangerous teachers. The system will never be perfect—but that is an unreasonable standard.

Academic freedom is usually taken as being more than merely the right to freely make specific claims in that it is supposed to provide broad protection in such matters as selecting books, developing curriculum and so on. It is also supposed to protect professors (tenured professors at least) from being unjustly fired or punished for expressing their views. It is, of course, not a license to act without consequences.

While defending academic freedom is often seen as leftist, conservatives have accused the left of restricting the academic freedom of conservative thinkers. While this claim is often hyperbole, there have been past incidents of faculty being punished for holding views that are regarded as politically incorrect. For example, Mike Adams was apparently once denied promotion to full professor based on his political engagement rather than a lack of qualifications. There were past proposals to replace academic freedom with academic justice.  While justice sounds good, the proposal was to substitute an ideological test in place of the general right. In short, academics could research what they wished, if it was consistent with the definition of “justice” in use. There were also proposals for trigger warnings, which also raised concerns about academic freedom. The right, in general, criticized such things and professed to favor freedom. As such, one might think that when they came into power, they would push for freedom.

One specific problem of academic freedom arises for state colleges and universities. While even for-profit schools receive money from the government, state schools receive funding as decided by the state legislature. While academic institutes, they are subject to the control of the state government.

Given that the state government is (in theory) acting in accord with the “will of the people” and that the schools are funded with state money, it is not unreasonable to believe that the state has the right to impose a degree of control over the schools. An important question is the extent to which the state should impose on academic freedom. As might be guessed, people answer this question based largely on their ideology.

As noted above, some of the loudest voices crying out for academic freedom were once on the right. Or rather, those crying out for freedom for certain views. When Republicans have power, they tend to pass laws that restrict freedom. For example, Florida’s state legislature has been busy reshaping the general education of the state schools. The law includes a ban on teaching “identity politics”, it forbids teaching that “systemic racism, sexism, oppression, and privilege are inherent in the institutions of the United States” but requires that humanities courses must include selections from the Western canon (even, for example, a GENED class on Japanese literature). And, of course, the Trump regime, which professes to love freedom, has been very busy intimidating universities to push them to conform to his will.

This view of freedom is not surprising. As Mill noted in his classic work on liberty, people rarely make decisions on liberty based on a consistent principle about what should be allowed and what should be restricted. Instead, people decide based on what they like and dislike. As such, it is hardly a shock that folks on the left and right praise freedom when it is protecting something they like while they are happy to restrict freedom when it involves something they dislike.

While the law is whatever those in power say it is, there is still the question of whether the state has the right to make such impositions. As noted above, one way to argue is that since the state funds them and they are public institutions, then the state government has the right to dictate to the universities in such matters as the content of their courses.

If this line of reasoning is good, then this would be a general principle and not one just limited to the Republicans wanting to purge “woke” content and DEI. So, if a state legislature passed laws forbidding teaching business courses or courses in religion, then that would be acceptable under this principle. It would also be acceptable for a law to be passed banning the teaching of Western history, Western values, anything that is seen as endorsing the patriarchy, and anything that is positive about white males and so on. That is, this principle would allow any state to impose any ideology onto the state schools.

Republicans would, one can infer, adamantly oppose to the ideology of their opposition setting the content for public schools. As such, it is probably fair to say that they do not have a general principle about the degree of state control over state schools but rather think that the schools should teach what Republicans like and not teach what they do not like—which is hardly a principle. In my own case, I follow a consistent principle of academic freedom and hence just as I oppose Florida mandating that GENED classes must not teach that “systemic racism, sexism, oppression, and privilege are inherent in the institutions of the United States”, I would also oppose a law that required GENED classes to teach this.

 

 

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A longtime issue in college athletics has been whether college athletes should be paid. I heard debates over this when I was a college athlete and, decades later, I still hear them. One addition to the debate has been over branding deals, such as the use of likenesses in video games.

One classic argument is that in the big money sports (football and basketball) the athletes already receive compensation in the form of scholarships, coaching, medical care, etc. Given the cost of higher education, a full scholarship can be worth $27,000 a year or more.

Even athletes in the other sports (such as track, cross country, field hockey and volleyball) can receive compensation in the form of scholarships, coaching, and medical care—although they usually get much less than the star athletes in the big money sports.

Following this reasoning, it can be claimed that college athletes have always been paid—in that they receive valuable compensation for their contributions. In fact, college athletes have been recognized as being employees with the right to unionize. As such, the dispute is over the amount and nature of the desired compensation, which is a classic employee-employer dispute.

Obviously enough, the NCAA and colleges want to keep player compensation as low as possible, since the less the athletes are paid, the more everyone else gets to keep. However, the fact that they would rather not provide better compensation is not proof that athletes should not receive more. 

While the NCAA and colleges have been on board with specific sorts of compensation (such as scholarships), they have often been very draconian about college athletes receiving other benefits. Based on my own experience at road races, college athletes were forbidden from accepting gift certificates they won. While the NCAA and the college can license the likeness of a player for use in a video game, athletes were not allowed to share in the profits.  Because of these practices, most of the money made in college sports flowed to the NCAA and the colleges, rather than the athletes.

On the face of it, athletes should receive compensation commensurate with their contribution. For example, if a player’s likeness is licensed for use in a video game, they should receive a suitable percentage of that deal. As another example, if selling the TV rights to football games brings in millions of dollars, the players who appear on TV should get a proportional cut. Obviously, the value of what the players receive in terms of other compensation must be factored in as well as part of their pay.

In some cases, the athletes might have been receiving fair compensation. However, the star athletes in the big money sports were probably being exploited.  

Over the years, the main argument advanced by the NCAA and colleges for not providing commensurate compensation is based on the view that a college athlete should be an amateur who competes “for the love of the sport.”

This has some appeal. When I was a college athlete, I competed for that reason—I loved to race. I still do, although I am much slower.  In terms of compensation, I did get some shoe money and boxed lunches when we traveled. I understand the idea of the amateur athlete who is not sullied by crass commerce nor driven by greed.

Of course, the true amateur athlete who is unsullied by greed must also be in an amateur environment driven by the love of the sport. When I was a college athlete, I was in that situation. I competed in cross country and track, both of which are not big money sports. I also went to a division III school—so there were no athletic scholarships. The coaches at the college generally followed the same model that is usually seen at public high schools—they had a primary job at the school and coaching was secondary. For example, my first cross-country coach was also an exercise physiology professor. The football coach also taught classes. So, we were all amateurs competing for the love of the sport—although we did get those boxed lunches and the coaches got some pay.

When everyone is an amateur and the compensation is modest it makes sense to not pay athletes and to hold them to the standards of being an amateur athlete (versus being a paid professional). However, this is not the case with the big money sports at the big schools.

First, the top coaches enjoy truly impressive salaries. The top coaches can make millions each year.  Interestingly, the highest paid public employee in some states is a college football or basketball coach.

Second, college football is a multi-billion-dollar industry and college basketball brings in millions for the colleges and NCAA. While the players did get some of this in the form of scholarships and other compensation, the bulk of it goes to others. A cynical person might note that this is a good lesson for the student athletes: the workers do the work and others reap the profits.

Given the money involved, these college sports are not amateur in any meaningful sense and it is not defined by a love of the game. Rather, this is a big money industry in which those doing most of the work receive very little while very few benefit greatly from their efforts. In short, college sports mirror the larger society. The lie that was long used to avoid justly compensating athletes was that they are amateurs who are supposed to play for the love of the game. Thus, there has been an inconsistency between the reality of the situation and what is expected of the athletes.

There is the option to make the ideal a reality and recreate college sports as amateur sports played for the love of sport. This would require following the model of amateur athletics I mentioned above: minimal compensation for everyone, coaches who are professors (or staff) first, athletes who are students first, no big money deals, and so on. Some schools already follow this ideal, such as the school I attended.

There is also the option to accept that big money sports are professional sports, and they should follow that model: the big money remains, but the athletes are recognized for what they really are—professional athletes.

 

 

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