Category: Economics

Opportunity hoarding, a concept developed by Richard Reeves,  occurs when parents give their children advantages in ways harmful to other children. In the previous essay I examined income mobility in the context of opportunity hoarding and I now turn to the ethics of competition.

Before getting into this, I will try to pre-empt likely strawman attacks. I will not argue that parents should be forbidden from doing the best they can for their children. As a specific example, I will not be arguing for things like a ban on parents helping their children with homework. I will also not argue that the state should use its compulsive power to force, Harrison Bergeron style,  the equality of children. Nor will I argue for the elimination of competition. Now, on to the discussion, one that will afford plenty of opportunity for criticism.

Opportunity hoarding raises two important moral concerns. The first is the moral issue of what opportunities should be competitive. The second is the issue of what means are morally acceptable in competitions. This essay focuses on the first issue.

While some might argue there should be no competition for opportunities, this position suffers from two obvious defects. The first, and most obvious, is that opportunity is always limited. As such, if there are more people than opportunities, there must be competition of some kind. These limits need not arise from any evil intent. For example, many runners will want to be trained by a legendary running coach, but she cannot coach everyone. As another example, many people might wish to take a writing class with a legendary professor, but they can only grade so many papers. While there obviously are other coaches and other professors, there will always be those who prefer one over the others—even if they are equally good. There is, of course, the legitimate moral concern that opportunities are limited for unethical reasons. I am not suggesting that all limits on opportunity are warranted just because there will always be some unavoidable limits. To illustrate, it is morally fine for a coach to limit the number of people she coaches because she can only do a good job with a limited number of athletes. It would not be morally fine for a coach to refuse runners because they were, for example, Christian or Moslem.

The second defect is that competition for limited opportunities is morally right. The easy and obvious argument is that if opportunities are limited (and the limit is ethical), then they should be distributed on a competitive basis. As is often argued, opportunity should be earned. The obvious analogy is to sports: the awards in a 5K should be earned by those who run the fastest. To hand out the awards randomly or based on some standard other than performance would be unfair and wrong.

Even if the notion of competition for opportunity is accepted, there arises the moral and practical problem of deciding how the competition will be resolved. In some cases, this will be obvious. For example, it makes sense that the best athletes be the ones who are on an Olympics team. In other cases, deciding who wins is more complicated, such as determining who should be admitted to a university. As would be expected, volumes can be written about the ethics of resolving competitions.

While there is debate about resolving competitions ethically, there is the question of what opportunities should be competitive. While there are always finite opportunities, there is also always a finite number of people seeking opportunities. In many cases we can decide how many people can have these opportunities by deciding how we allocate resources. For example, Americans could decide that we want all our public schools to be well-funded so all children can attend a good school. This would not eliminate competition for schools. Even if all schools were well funded and supported, there would still be better schools. But people would not need to compete to buy houses in wealthy neighborhoods to get their children into good schools, they could live anywhere and still get into a good school. This would come at a cost as the well-off parents would need to contribute to the general education of children rather than just supporting only their children’s schools. But if we value equality of opportunity for all children, then this would be a price worth paying.

This essay cannot, obviously, provide details about each opportunity. A reasonable starting point for broad moral choices is, of course, the utilitarian approach: looking at the cost and benefits for all, what would generate the most good and the least evil? This series continues in the next essay.

Way back during the college admissions scandal of 2019 the media briefly focused on how the wealthy can secure admission to the best schools. The discussion included talking about opportunity hoarding, a concept developed by Richard Reeves in his Dream Hoarders. Opportunity hoarding occurs when parents seek advantages for their children in ways harmful to others. One example is parents disparaging the children of other people who are competing with their own for school admission. The practice of opportunity hoarding raises moral issues I will address in a short series of essays. I will begin by discussing economic mobility.

Americans want to believe in economic mobility, that by hard work, people will be better off than their parents. While people just talk about economic mobility, it is important to distinguish between two types: relative mobility and absolute mobility. In both, mobility is moving up or down relative to one’s parents. Relative mobility is measured by comparing the economic ranking of current adults relative to their parents’ ranking. This can be illustrated by an analogy to racing 5Ks. When comparing two 5Ks, your relative performance is a measure of your place in the second race relative to how you placed in the first race. If you placed better in the second race than in the first one, then your relative performance was upward. If you placed worse, then your relative performance would be downward. In this analogy, the race is a generation: the first race would correspond to the economic ranking of the parents and the second would be analogous to the current adult’s ranking.

Absolute mobility is a measure of whether the current adults have a higher adjusted (for inflation, etc.) income at the same age as their parents. Going back to the running analogy, your absolute performance would be a measure of whether you were faster in the second race relative to the first race. As before, the first race is analogous to the parents’ income and the second is analogous to the current adults’ income. While both measure improvement (or decline) there are important differences.

A critical difference is that relative mobility is a zero-sum game: if someone moves up, someone else must move down. To illustrate, the top 1% can only be 1% of the population. If Sally moves into the 1%, then she pushes someone else down. The analogy to the race illustrates this as well: if you move into first place, then you push someone else into second place. In contrast, absolute mobility need not be zero-sum: you having more income does not entail that other people get less. Going back to the running analogy, if you get faster between races, it does not make anyone else slower, and everyone could get faster. Because of this, a country could have little or no relative mobility, but great absolute mobility.  Using the running analogy, the same people could place in the top 10 in race after race while everyone is also getting faster. Because of this, distinguishing between the two types of mobility is critical, especially when it comes to opportunity hoarding.

If relative mobility is low, then children usually stay in the same economic class as their parents. For example, if Sally is born to parents in the top 20%, then she will probably stay there. If relatively mobility is high, then people are likely to move up (or down) relative to their parents. While it is tempting to think that low relative mobility would always be bad, this is where absolute mobility is important. If relative mobility is low but absolute mobility is high and widely distributed, then most people will be better off than their parents, though they will still be in the same relative place. Going back to the running analogy, everybody is running faster, but people keep getting the same places in the races. One could imagine a desirable society that has very low relative mobility but exceptional absolute mobility. Imagine, if you will, a nation in which Bartholomew Billionaire’s family has always been in the top 1% and owns dozens of houses, several yachts, three private jets and 100 luxury cars. Living in the same country is Paula Poor whose family has always been in the lowest 1% of income earners. But her family now owns a modest house, her children are attending state college, and she and her husband can easily afford health insurance, good food and the occasional vacation.

 This seems to be better than a society with high relative mobility but poor absolute mobility. People readily moving up (and down) from generation to generation might seem good, but if income does not improve (or worsens) from generation to generation, then moving around more freely would be worse than being “stuck” in a good situation. Going back to the running analogy, this would be like races in which people did not get better (or got worse), but different people made it into the top 10 each race.

A society in which both types of mobility are low would be bad: those stuck in the lower income classes would not move up relatively or absolutely. While those in the upper classes would be secure, their lot would also not improve much relative to their parents. This would be a rather stagnant society. But what about real countries, such as the United States?

Currently, the United States has low relative mobility: contrary to American mythology, people usually  stay within the class they were born into. Absolute mobility used to be good, but income has stagnated and now the United States has lower absolute mobility. As such, many Americans are worse off than their parents and are also stuck in their economic class. In this situation, we are experiencing downward mobility.

Those in the upper classes (the top 20%) are aware of what downward mobility entails and they try to prevent this by giving their children advantages over other children. While doing the best one can for their children is usually the right thing to do, it can become morally problematic when this harms the opportunities of others, perhaps by locking them out of moving upward. Richard Reeves and Kimberly Howard have discussed the phenomena of the glass floor—a metaphor for the various factors that keep the children of the well off from sinking into the lower classes. This floor is a ceiling for others. Even if there is no malicious intent, to the degree that it keeps the children of the upper classes from descending it also keeps the children of the lower classes from ascending. This is for the obvious reason that relative mobility, like the places in a race, is zero-sum. My victory is your loss, and your victory is my loss. But it should not be simply assumed that this is immoral, hence the need for additional essays on this subject.

Because of income inequality and a lack of compassionate leaders, America has a serious homeless problem. One growing segment consists of people who live in their cars and many of them  are homeless despite being employed. They are usually not homeless not by choice, but because they cannot afford housing near their work.

Such people lack political power and are often the subject of negative stereotypes, it is not surprising that municipalities have tried to “solve” the problem by laws that crack down on living in cars. As would be expected, these laws have not been effective. Churches, charity groups and some communities have attempted to address the problem in a more positive way by establishing safe parking areas for the homeless. In some cases, there is access to showers and bathrooms. This situation raises moral concerns about what, if anything, should be done to help the homeless. This is, obviously enough, part of the broader moral question of what we owe other people.

One approach, as noted above, is to try to solve the problem by banning people from sleeping in their vehicles in public areas. This gives people the choice between trouble with the law or leaving. If these laws are widespread, then leaving becomes a problem, as there will be fewer places to go. Also, those with employment are tied to their jobs and moving would only make things worse. If they stay, they can end up losing their car to fines and impoundment, which will leave them without shelter and transportation. This solution is also cruel as it punishes people for being poor and unable to find affordable housing. It could be objected that these people could easily drive somewhere, find a new job and get affordable housing. However, if it were so easy for them to do this, then they would have done so already.

Another approach, as mentioned above, is for charity, churches and communities to create safe parking for the homeless. While this is preferable to using the police against the poor and the powerless, it does have some problems. One concern is the cost of the lots and resources used to pay for them could pay for housing. Another concern is that the lots used by the homeless are not usable by others, reducing available parking. But this could be addressed by improving public transportation, which we should be doing anyway.

 Perhaps the greatest concern is that while the homeless need not fear the police and have some safety, they are still living in their cars in a parking lot, which is stressful, unpleasant and difficult. The fact that they do not have a permanent residence also creates other problems, such as where the children can attend school. As such, while such safe lots are a step up from parking illegally or “in the wild”, they are hardly ideal and do not address the underlying problems.

Obviously enough, the main reason that the working homeless live in their cars is that they cannot afford housing. This can be explained in terms of either their pay being too low or the cost of housing being too high. As such, the underlying problem is financial, and this suggests two obvious solutions.

The first is to increase wages so that the working homeless can afford at least basic, safe housing. The obvious problem is determining how this should be done. While some employers do provide sufficient wages, it would be foolish to think that most will willingly pay a living wage. Another option is to use the coercive power of the state, not against the homeless, but to compel employers to pay more. This raises the usual objections about the state interfering with the “free” market.

The second solution is to provide more affordable housing. As with better pay, this could be done by the private sector (landlords voluntarily making less money) or by the state (compelling more affordable housing). As always, this raises the usual objections about the state interfering with the “free” market.

As noted above, one could argue that the working homeless should find better jobs or move someplace with lower housing costs. While this has some appeal, the working homeless driving away would be a problem for the welathy: if the people who clean their houses, make them lattes, teach their kids, put out their fires, police their streets, and work in their startups are forced to move too far away, then the rich will be left without these services. Perhaps this is why Silicon Valley is working so hard on robots. As such, even the rich have a reason to support better pay, affordable housing, or better public transportation (until the robots arrive). However, expecting rational self-interest or moral concerns about the well-being of others to solve the problem within the private sector is irrational. Also, solving social problems is not really the job of the private sector. Dealing with social issues is one reason we have governments. So, if the problem is to be addressed effectively, then the power of the state would be needed.

As noted above, using the coercive power of the state against the homeless is not an effective solution and is not ethical. As such, the state should use our resources to address wages or housing costs. As noted above, many would object to the state interfering in the market (except, obviously, when the state’s interference is to their advantage) by compelling change in wages or the cost of housing. However, the Lockean view of the state is that it exists for the good of the people and using it to slightly reduce the wealth of the wealthy so the less well-off do not have to live in their cars is morally justified. At least for those who subscribe to the Lockean view of the state. But not everyone subscribes to this view of the purpose of the state and even Lockeans might see this as unjustified.

Another option that does not involve increasing wages or increasing affordable housing is for the state (and perhaps some in the private sector) to invest in affordable, reliable and fast public transportation that would allow workers to live where housing is affordable and commute into the upper-class zones for work. This approach would have the negative effect of enhancing the growing division between the classes in America: the rich will dwell within their enclaves, while those who teach their children, make their lattes, clean their houses, fight their fires, and police their streets will be transported in to do their work, then shipped out when they are done. But at least they won’t be living in their cars. Life in America is a choice between dystopias, at least under the current system.

The fact that college admission is for sale is an open secret. As with other forms of institutionalized unfairness, there are norms and laws governing the legal and acceptable ways of buying admission. For example, donating large sums of money or funding a building to buy admission are within the norms and laws. But there was admission scandal in which celebrities and other elites broke the rules to get their children into elite colleges. On the face of it, there is no need to argue that what they did was morally wrong. What is more interesting is considering the matter in the context of fairness.

On the surface, the actions of the accused are clearly unfair. While the tactics varied, they included altering admission test results, bribing coaches to accept non-athletes as recruited athletes, and the classic direct bribe. Interestingly, most comments on these misdeeds noted the elites could have used traditional legal and accepted methods of purchasing admission. These methods are unfair because admission was not based on the students’ merits, thus they might have unjustly taken the places of students who merited admission. While the parents did act unfairly, it is worth considering this unfairness within the broader context of our society.

As many others have pointed out over the years, even the normal admission system is unfair. Poor children will almost always attend inferior schools and have far less opportunity to engage in the application enhancing activities available to the well-off. Poor children will also usually not be able to afford tutors, test preparation training, personal statement coaches and so on. They will also usually lack connections that influence admission. In contrast, wealthy children will enjoy a cornucopia of admission advantages. While there were programs and other efforts to provide some microscopic mitigation of disparity, the Trump administration is intent on defunding and dismantling most of these. As such, the disparities in admissions will grow.

It might be countered that some people rose from poverty to attend elite institutions and go on to great success, while some born into wealth have been failures. The obvious reply is that while these stories are interesting, they are just anecdotes and what matters is the general statistics. While some people succeed despite incredible odds, these few examples only show getting out of poverty and into an elite school is extremely unlikely. If people regularly arose from poverty, such success stories would be unremarkable.

In general, college admissions are like a race in which some people must run on foot, some get bikes, some get cars, and some get rocket ships. While one can talk about the merits of people in this race, the competition is fundamentally unfair in intentional ways. I do, obviously, recognize that people vary greatly in abilities. My point is, to stick to the analogy, that even the most talented runner is not going to win against someone who gets to race with a car.

While the elites cheated, they cheated in an already unfair race. To continue the analogy, their children were already driving fast cars in competition with people forced to run. These parents did things analogous to cutting the course and using illegal modifications on their cars. While this certainly matters, it does not matter that much from the perspective of those who were already competing by running. Again, I am not denying that people do vary in ability or that no one ever wins this race on foot or that no one crashes their metaphorical car. My point is that if fairness truly matters, then we should not just be outraged when the elites cheat in an already unfair system, we should be outraged by the unfair system.

In the previous essay I proposed adding inheritance rules to the standard Monopoly game. The aim was to provide a context for discussing the tension between inheritance and fairness by using the classic board game. Out of curiosity, I also posted my proposed rules on Facebook. Not surprisingly, people got the point of the rules and there were criticisms of my analogy. One reasonable criticism was that while Monopoly is a zero-sum game, the economy is not. This does raise the question of the impact of making a non-zero-sum version of monopoly with the inheritance rules in play.

One response to the zero-sum criticism is to note that Monopoly does reflect zero-sum aspects of the real economy. The classic game is about owning properties and major business and these are zero-sum in the actual world. If, for example, I own a vast tract of land, that means less land for other people. While we can make more usable land by draining swamps and building islands, there is a finite amount of land on earth. The same generally holds true of businesses. There is a finite limit to the number of viable businesses and the success of a business in an area limits the success of others. As such, for the zero-sum parts of the economy, Monopoly is not a terrible model.

The easy and obvious counter to this is to argue that there is no zero-sum economy or that there is a significant non-zero-sum part of the economy that negates the unfairness of the inheritance system. My Monopoly analogy, the criticism would go, fails and inheritance is fair. But what if Monopoly could be made into a non-zero-sum game?

In the real economy, the idea is that the sum grows over time. The same can be applied to monopoly. A way to simulate this is to add in the Board Expansion rule variant to the inheritance rules (unlimited money, houses, and hotels can also be added by printing them as needed). To play this variant, you will need several Monopoly sets.

 

Board Expansion Rules for Monopoly Inheritance!

 

Rule 1: Prior to the start of the next game in the series of games, place another Monopoly board with its Go square adjacent to the Just Visiting square of the prior board. Repeat until the players decide to stop playing. Play begins in the Go square on the board from the first game.

 

Rule 2: Once a player’s piece has completed moving completely around a board (from Go back to Go), they must exit the board and move to the next board. A board is exited via the Just Visiting square and entered via the Go square. Once a piece has completely moved around the final board in the set, the piece must be moved back to the prior board and so on until the original board is reached. The process begins anew and continues into the game ends. The board a piece is on is treated as the game board for that piece.

 

Alternative Rule: Instead of being forced to leave a board after moving completely around it (from Go to go), a player can elect to stay on a board if they wish. This rule allows players a chance to escape the original game’s board.

 

This variant allows for a non-zero-sum game, limited only by the number of Monopoly boards on hand. While this allows the players who do not have the luck of inheritance a better chance, the player who gets the inheritance still has a massive advantage. While there will be a new board with property available to all players each game, the player who has inherited from the previous game will be in a much better position than the other players to acquire the new property. The main effect of the expanding game would seem to be that the heir player will have ever more property at the end of each game and thus the next heir will have an even greater advantage over the non-heirs. While the game is not zero-sum, those that lack inheritance will almost certainly still lose.

 

The estate tax in the United States allows a person to gift or donate up to $13.9 million tax free (be sure to check the latest tax law). The catch is, of course, that they must die. The Republicans have long called the estate tax the “death tax” and argue against it. But they also pitch the narrative of a free market, and most Americans praise fair competition and equality of opportunity. So, Americans like inheritance and fair competition. But these are at odds with each other: allowing significant inheritance conflicts with fair competition and equality of opportunity. While it is easy enough to argue for this point, it makes more sense to make people feel the unfairness inherent to inheritance. This can be done by playing my special version of Monopoly.

Almost everyone is familiar with Monopoly. For those who are not, the rules can be found here. The gist of the game is that you win by driving all the other players into bankruptcy. In normal play, the outcome of one game does not affect the next: the game has an equal opportunity start, since everyone begins with the same resources, in the same place and with a chance to win based entirely on ability and luck. My proposed variation adds in inheritance rules to make it more like the real world. This variation requires playing multiple games of Monopoly.

 

Monopoly Inheritance!

 

Rule 1:  The first game in the series is played normally using the standard rules.

 

Rule 2: Upon the conclusion of a game in the series, the winning player records what they possess at the end. This includes money, property, houses, and hotels.

 

Rule Three: At the start of the second and later games in the series, one player is randomly selected to receive the game possessions of the winning player from the previous game. The receiving player is the heir, and the possessions make up their inheritance. The other players start normally. The game is otherwise played using the normal rules, with the exceptions noted in these rules. The series ends when no one wants to play it anymore.

 

Inheritance Variations

Players can experiment with these variations to make the game more “realistic” or “fairer.” The rules need to be set prior to play.

 

Fractional Inheritance: The heir receives a percentage of the possessions of the previous winner (75%, 50% or 25% are suggested). Property is selected by drawing the property cards randomly. Round up fractions up.

 

Multiple Heirs: If there are at least three players, then two players are randomly selected to be heirs, dividing the possessions of the winner between them. This can be a 50-50 split or a 75-25 split at the discretion of all the players.

 

While a player who is not the heir could win the game, the heir has an incredible advantage. Anyone playing by these rules who is not the heir will see how unfair the game is. This should help people feel how inheritance of significant wealth is inconsistent with having a fair and competitive economic system.

From a philosophical standpoint, the first game could be considered a state-of-nature game (of the sort envisioned by Locke) in which everything is initially available to all, and property has yet to be divided up.

The players in the second (and subsequent) game take on the role of the next generation. Since birth is random and inheritance is not merited by effort, the heir is selected at random rather than being the previous winner.

As with any analogy that compares something simple to something vastly more complicated, this analogy will break down quickly. To illustrate, the real-world features multiple heirs, there is no equal start for everyone else, there is not just one game with one winner and so on through all the millions of differences. My point is, of course, not that this game variant is a perfect model of inheritance in the United States. Rather, my goal is to get people who are fine with the inheritance system as it stands to play this variant and see if they still feel that inheritance is a fair addition to the game. And then to think about whether it is fair in the real economy. The question that I want to pose is this: would you play Monopoly by these rules? Why or why not?

As always, I am open to arguments against my view. Perhaps allowing and encouraging massive disparities in inheritance is fair and makes for competitive economic system that improves the general welfare.

Republicans have long raged against what they call the “death tax” and while they have not eliminated the estate tax, they succeeded in changing it. In 2017 the estate tax applied only to individuals with total assets exceeding $5.49 million (double for a married couple). After the Republican tax bill passed, the number was increases to $11.8 million (double for a married couple).  For 2025, it is $13.9 million. Given the exceptional wealth inequality in the United States, the change impacted very few but was advantageous to the wealthy.

Trump justified the change based on his claim that it is unfair that people pay taxes twice: once when they earn the money, once more when their assets are inherited. This ignores the fact that those inheriting the assets did not pay the first taxes on it, so they are not paying the tax twice. But if Trump is right, then sales taxes should also be eliminated. You (probably) pay taxes on your income, then you pay sales tax when you make a taxable purchase with that income. But my focus is not on the fairness of taxes but about inheritance.

While inheritance is seen by some as an ancient tradition and a right, there are rational arguments against allowing it at all. Also, as with any tradition and common practice, it would be a fallacy to infer its traditional nature and common practice justify it. After all, people have been commonly doing bad and stupid things for a long time.

A way to argue against inherited wealth is to contend it has negative consequences that make it immoral. Mary Wollstonecraft argued that hereditary wealth is morally wrong because it produces idleness and impedes people from developing their virtues. While complicated to sort out, this does present an empirical claim: one could do a statistical analysis of the impact of hereditary wealth on idleness and virtue.

Interestingly, while conservatives aggressively oppose estate and inheritance taxes, they also use an argument against welfare that would also apply to eliminating inheritance.

A common argument against welfare echoes Wollstonecraft’s argument against hereditary wealth: it makes people idle and prevents them from developing virtues, therefore it should be restricted (or eliminated). Rod Blum, a Republican representative from Iowa, said “Sometimes we need to force people to go to work. There will be no excuses for anyone who can work to sit at home and not work.” Donald Trump, whose fortune was built on inheritance, has said that “The person who is not working at all and has no intention of working at all is making more money and doing better than the person that’s working his and her ass off.” While this might sound like Trump is describing himself, it seems to be his criticism of welfare.

If this criticism of welfare is correct, then it also applies to inheritance. After all, people do not earn their inheritance. As such, if Republicans are sincere in their arguments against welfare, then they must apply the same reasoning to inheritance and oppose it for the same reasons they oppose welfare. Obviously enough, they do not take this position. They advance one set of arguments against welfare and give another set in favor of protecting inheritance and see to it that the two do not meet.

While it is tempting to dismiss this as just another example of Republican inconsistency and hypocrisy, it could be argued that there are relevant differences between inheritance and welfare that break the analogy.

One argument can be built on the fact that inheritance is passed on voluntarily to the recipient, while welfare involves taking tax money from some people who do not want their money used for welfare . A similar argument can be made by pointing out that inheritance usually goes to relatives while state welfare does not. While these are differences, they would not seem to be relevant to the argument that welfare is bad because it makes people lazy. After all, it is getting money that one has not earned that is the problem, not whether it was giving willingly or who it comes from. Unless one wants to make the implausible claim that money given willingly by relatives is special and will not make people lazy.

Another argument can be made arguing that inherited wealth is earned while welfare is not. While this might appeal to some, even a cursory consideration dismantles this view. First, some do earn their welfare by paying for it when they are working. For example, if Sally works for ten years paying taxes and gets fired when her company moves overseas, then she is getting back money from a system she contributed to. Second, if a person did work for their inheritance, it is not actually an inheritance, but something earned. If, for example, someone worked in the family business for pay, then they have earned their pay. But merely working for a business does not entitle a person to own the business after the death of the current owner. So, this sort of argument fails.

If the Republicans are right that welfare is bad because it makes people idle and impedes their virtue, then the same would apply to inheritance, especially large inheritances. As such, if they are opposed to the harm of welfare and must combat them, then they must also oppose the harm of inheritance with an equal or greater intensity. If they don’t, one might think that they simply dislike poor people and their argument against welfare is made in bad faith.

It might be pointed out that if someone opposes inheritance, then they must oppose welfare. One reply is to accept this. If welfare makes people idle and inflicts moral harm, then it would seem right to oppose it. A second reply is to argue that welfare helps people in need and is analogous to family helping family in times of trouble rather than being analogous to inheritance, in which one simply receives wealth regardless of need or merit.

Lest anyone start mass-producing straw men, my concern here is with large inheritances; I obviously have no objection to the sort of inheritance most of us will receive and I certainly have no issue with, for example, someone inheriting grandad’s Hummel collection or grandma’s collection of assault rifles.

In closing, whenever a politician makes the “lazy” argument against welfare, they should be asked if they apply that argument to inherited wealth.

The intense politicalization of ecological issues makes it difficult to have a rational discussion of environmental regulation. When the left wants regulation, the right can claim they want to destroy jobs because of a deranged preference for tiny fish over humans. When the right opposes regulation, they can be presented as willing to destroy the environment because they value profits over other people and the planet. This conflict leads to the seesaw of regulations as each party takes and loses power. While there is no single solution to this problem, a rational approach would be to try to develop solutions that benefit corporations and the inhabitants of the ecosystem, such as us humans. As an example, I will use the seabirds.

While sea food is delicious and nutritious, modern fishing techniques kill hundreds of thousands of seabirds each year. For example, albatrosses are sometimes killed by longline fishing. As another example, penguins can get caught in gill nets and drown. These dead birds have no value to business and they are an unfortunately bycatch whose carcasses are garbage rather than profitable.

Fortunately for the birds, there are ways to reduce their death toll. For example, long line fishing can be made safer for birds by using streamers to deter them or by weighting the lines so they sink out of reach of diving birds. These methods of protecting birds do cost money and can make things more difficult for the fishing crews. As such, regulations requiring that fishing vessels use these devices and measures impose costs which can impact the pay of the fishing crews and the cost of seafood. Because of this, it would be rational of industry to oppose such regulations to avoid these costs.

While some might be tempted to dismiss this as an obsession with profit, attacking the industry means it will double down on its opposition and lobby against regulations. This will make it even harder for environmentalists to get regulations in place. Aggressive opposition by industry will motivate environmentalists, making it harder for industry to get what they want. In such conflicts, the lobbyists are always victorious.  It would be preferable for everyone (other than the lobbyists) if there was a way to protect birds while also benefiting the fishing industry.

It seems difficult to imagine that protecting birds would benefit the seafood industry in any significant way. After all, they would need to purchase equipment and adopt methods to protect birds. There seems to be no profit in this. But perhaps there is the potential for gain.

Protecting birds could pay off in public relations. A company can advertise it is bird safe and perhaps offset the cost through improved sales and by increasing prices. However, it would be even better if protecting birds was also profitable or at least cost neutral. One example of this is longline fishing.

An estimated 160,000 albatrosses and petrels are killed each year when they get hooked on longlines. While this is obviously bad for the birds, it is also costly to the industry. First, they must waste time removing dead birds from their lines. Second, and more importantly for them, each hooked bird could have been a profitable fish. Keeping birds off their lines means that they can catch more fish. As such, regulations that protect birds can be a win for the birds and the industry.  But this does lead to an obvious objection.

Opponents of environmental regulation can content that if protecting birds is advantageous to the industry, there is no reason to impose regulations. Out of rational self-interest, industry will act without being coerced. So, there is no need to impose regulations.

As I favor minimal state intrusion, I find this appealing: why use the power of the state to compel people to do what they would do without coercion? Especially when an imposition might cause opposition. To use an analogy, think of seat belt laws. Wearing a seat belt is a good idea and people should do so, but some people refuse to wear them because it is required by law. It could be argued that it makes more sense to inform people of the benefits of seat belts and let rational self-interest motivate them.

The obvious counter is that people generally do not operate from rational self-interest. If they did, everyone would be eating the healthiest meals they could get and exercising as often as they could. As such, to follow Aristotle, people must often be compelled to do what is best for them. So, while protecting seabirds would be in the interest of industry, they are unlikely to do so just because it is in their interest. So, regulation is needed to compel them to act in their own interest. To use another analogy, while it is rational for people to learn how to drive properly before taking to the road, the state needs to compel people to do this.

While I favor freedom, freedom can be justly limited on moral grounds when liberty creates significant harm. So, for example, while people should be free to have pets, there should be regulations forbidding people from taking their pet tiger for a walk in the local park. The challenge, as always, is balancing liberty against harm.

By Government of Florida –

DeSantis, the governor of my adopted state of Florida, is plagiarizing Elon Musk’s DOGE. Like Musk, DeSantis claims that his DOGE will eliminate “waste, fraud and abuse.” As with Musk and DOGE, DeSantis already knows what he wants to cut: 70 state boards and commissions and 900 jobs. He also wants to force universities to undergo reviews and audits, and the state will “look into” local government expenditures. As I am not an expert on government finances I will, unlike Musk, leave the merit of any cuts to the experts. Instead, I will discuss the concepts of fraud and waste.

There is an obvious rhetorical advantage to claiming that DOGE is targeting fraud and waste. After all, everyone agrees that fraud and waste are bad. Unless, of course, one is benefiting from either. Fraud, as a concept, is easy to define. It is intentional deception aimed at acquiring an unfair or unlawful gain. While it might seem that fraud would be easy to determine, what counts as fraud will always be a matter of which interpretation of the law is being used. J.D. Vance’s discussion of paroles and Temporary Protected Status provides a good illustration of this. While the Biden administration followed (their interpretation of) the law, J.D. Vance claimed that they had acted illegally, making the migrants in question illegal. The same would also apply to claims about fraud. While, for example, a contract was (interpreted as) legal and not fraudulent when it was made during the Biden administration, under Musk’s interpretation it could now be fraud. While there can be good faith disagreement about the law and fraud, Musk could easily claim that something is fraud simply because he does not like it. Given the lack of oversight of DOGE, fraud could be whatever Musk calls “fraud.” That said, as “fraud” is usually defined in laws, there would be at least some grounds for judging whether something is fraud. The concept of waste is much more problematic.

Wasteful spending is expending resources, especially money, in ways that are either unnecessary or inefficient. While we agree that waste is bad, this is like saying that we also agree that bad is bad. But people obviously disagree about what is wasteful and what is bad. It might seem that inefficiency is an objective matter and in some cases it is. For example, if the government had a contract with one of Musk’s companies that cost taxpayers more than what a competitor would charge for the same product, then that would be inefficient and hence waste. But there can be cases where spending seems inefficient, but it is not. After all efficiency is not just a matter of paying a higher price but involves getting the same or less by paying more. If, for example, Musk’s product was superior to the competition, then the extra cost could be worth it. It is also worth considering the obvious: someone could just lie about efficiency when they want to cut spending. While inefficiency does allow some degree of objectivity, whether spending is unnecessary seems entirely a matter of a person’s values. This applies to everyday spending and government spending.

As an example, consider going out for dinner and buying drinks. Whether that is wasteful depends on your values. While it could be argued that it would be more efficient to cook dinner at home and buy alcohol at the store as the cost would be much lower, some people believe that going out is not a waste of their money. This is because of the return they get from the experience. In terms of who is right, this is a debate of which values are correct and is not something that can be resolved by an Excel spreadsheet. Likewise for government spending.

What is unnecessary is in the eye of the beholder. People who do not like SNAP or Medicaid will see these as unnecessary. People who do not like subsidies for the wealthy will see those as unnecessary. So, when Musk claims to be cutting waste he could be telling the truth: he could be cutting spending that he, as the world’s richest person, thinks is unnecessary. While he sees his lucrative contracts as necessary, he obviously does not need SNAP, Medicaid, or farm subsidies and these no doubt seem unnecessary to him. From a rhetorical standpoint, claiming to be cutting waste sounds much better than cutting programs one does not like, hence that is what Musk says his DOGE is doing.

But has DOGE been a success? Even a cursory review of DOGE’s own “receipts” and claims reveals many untruths and errors. For example, the claims about Social Security fraud and $8 billion in savings in a Department of Homeland Security contract were debunked, with the $8 billion turning out to be $8 million. As of this writing, Musk has made at least 28 false claims, such as the lie about $50 million for condoms in Gaza and the claim that congress gave itself a 40% tax increase. In terms of finding waste, fraud and abuse DOGE has been a failure.

As to why DOGE has done such a poor job, one possible explanation is incompetence: Musk cares about waste and fraud, but he and his DOGE are not very good at their jobs. A second explanation is that Musk does not care about waste and fraud and DOGE has other goals. Going with the reasonable idea that the purpose of a thing is what it does, we should look at what DOGE is doing to see its actual goals. It has succeeded in demoralizing federal employees, it has targeted agencies that protect the American people from fraud and financial exploitation, and it has gone after agencies that regulate and investigate Musk’s businesses. In these areas DOGE has been a success. While DeSantis has yet to announce a billionaire to head up his DOGE, it is reasonable to infer it will serve a similar function in Florida. With the obvious exception of the more Musk focused goals of DOGE. It is reasonable to infer that DOGE is using the rhetorical cover of going after fraud and waste to poorly conceal its real goals. We should expect the same with Florida DOGE.

Imagine I am the CEO of a corporation whose factory farming practices drew the attention of the Humane Society and legislation has now been proposed to reign in my cruel excesses. If I appeared in a video complaining about the Humane Society forcing me to be less cruel and this would have a tiny impact on my vast wealth, few people would be sympathetic. If I was smart and evil, I would use astroturfing instead of honesty. Astroturfing involves concealing those behind a message or organization to make it seem that it arose and is funded by grassroot participants. In this imaginary scenario, I could hire a company to lay down some AstroTurf for me.

 While astroturfing can be a complicated, it usually involves three basic techniques. The first is using positive names for the shell organization(s). For example, my Astroturf organization might be called “Friends of Friendly Farming”, which is much more appealing than “Cow Cruelty Crusaders.”

A second technique is using commercials depicting the “common folk” who just happen to be extremely concerned about the issue. For example, my commercial might feature a mother venting her rage that meat would be unaffordable for her family if the wicked Humane Society had its way.

The third and key part of astroturfing is that those behind it remain anonymous. After all, if people knew that I was behind Friends of Friendly Farming, they would find it less appealing. Since astroturfing is inherently deceitful, it would seem to be immoral. But what, if anything should be done about it?

The use of deceptive names is unethical because of their rhetorical influence over people who might not otherwise support the group if its name matched its purpose. Going back to my example, most would find “Friends of Friendly Farming” appealing. But most would not be won over by “Make Sure Mike Keeps Making Money by Being Mean to Animals.” This technique is like advertising and labelling unhealthy junk food made in China as patriotic, healthy, “Yankee Snacks”. That is, it is deceit. However, just because something is unethical does not entail that it should be illegal.

While the First Amendment does not explicitly protect the right to deceptive speech, laws aimed at requiring honest naming for groups would seem unlikely to withstand scrutiny. There are also practical concerns about enforcement and the potential for abuse of such laws. For example, Republicans would presumably use such laws to insist that all liberal and moderate groups label themselves as “Woke Marxist Transgender Anti-American Vermin.”

 There is also the problem of sorting out whether terms, especially value terms, are being applied correctly. Value terms are especially challenging, given the extent to which even good faith disagreement about them exists. For example, determining whether a group called “Righteous Americans for Righteous Justice” is righteous and for righteous justice would be difficult. As such, while the use of intentionally deceptive names is unethical, it should not be illegal.

The use of dishonest and deceptive commercials is also unethical. They are like listing false ingredients on a food label to get people to buy it. It is also like catfishing. This is when a person pretends, online, to be someone desirable as part of an intentional deception. As with deceptive names, the use of actors portraying “common folk” with strong views on the issue is probably protected by the right to free expression.  There is also the fact that politicians favor allowing considerable leeway in certain deceptive practices, usually determined by which industry is bankrolling their re-election.  

As noted above, the essential quality of astroturfing is that the real parties remain anonymous, hidden behind an appealing shell. In addition to being unethical, this anonymity makes it difficult to assess the case made by those speaking for the anonymous entity. This is because the identity of the source of a claim is necessary to assess the credibility and possible bias of that source. While claims obviously stand or fall on their own, the identity of the source is critical to the practical matter of judging claims.

While there might be a right to deceptive (or persuasive, if one prefers) speech, there is not a right to anonymous speech. Requiring those funding groups and ads to identify themselves does not limit their right of free expression and it serves, as noted above, to protect the right of the listeners to properly assess the claims intended to influence them. Naturally, there are cases in which anonymous speech is morally acceptable—such as in oppressive regimes.

Those who engage in astroturfing might claim they would be harmed if their identities were known. After all, they want to be anonymous because they believe that if people knew their identities, then their efforts at persuasion would be less effective. As such, not being allowed to remain anonymous would harm them.

The easy and obvious response to this is that people do not have a moral right to remain anonymous simply because people would be less likely to be persuaded if they knew their identity. Using an analogy, a company wanting to sell dog meat could not justly claim it would be harmed if it was not allowed to hide the identity of the meat. In such cases, the right to know trumps the right of free expression. As such, it would be reasonable to have laws that forbid such anonymous funding. Naturally, moral exceptions can be made in oppressive countries that engage in unjust persecution.