Due to the execution of a health insurance CEO, public attention is focused on health care. The United States has expensive health care, and this is working as intended to generate profits. Many Americans are uninsured or underinsured and even those who have insurance can find that their care is not covered. As has been repeatedly pointed out in the wake of the execution, there is a health care crisis in the United States and it is one that has been intentionally created.

Americans are a creative and generous people, which explains why people have turned to GoFundMe to get money for medical expenses. Medical bills can be ruinous and lead to bankruptcy for hundreds of thousands of Americans each year. A GoFundMe campaign can help a person pay their bills, get the care they need and avoid financial ruin. Friends of mine have been forced to undertake such campaigns and I have donated to them, as have many other people. In my own case, I am lucky and have a job that offers insurance coverage at a price I can afford, and my modest salary allows me to meet the medical expenses for a very healthy person with no pre-existing conditions. However, I know that like most of us,  I am one medical disaster away from financial ruin. As such, I have followed the use of GoFundMe for medical expenses with some practical interest. I have also given it some thought from a philosophical perspective.

On the one hand, the success of certain GoFundMe campaigns to cover such expenses suggests that people are morally decent and are willing to expend their own resources to help others. While GoFundMe does profit from these donations, their take is modest. They are not engaged in gouging people in need and exploiting medical necessities for absurdly high profits. That is the job of the health insurance industry.

On the other hand, there is the moral concern that in a wealthy country replete with billionaires and millionaires, many people must beg for money to meet their medical expenses. This spotlights the excessive cost of healthcare, the relatively low earnings of many Americans, and the weakness of the nation’s safety net. While those who donate out of generosity and compassion merit moral praise, the need for such donations merits moral condemnation. People should not need to beg for money to pay for their medical care. 

To anticipate an objection, I am aware that people do use GoFundMe for frivolous things and there are scammers, but my concern is with the fact that some people do need to turn to crowdfunding to pay their bills.

While donating is morally laudable, there are concerns about this method of funding. One practical problem is that it depends on the generosity of others. It is not a systematic and dependable method of funding. As such, it is a gamble to rely on it.

A second problem is that it depends on running an effective social media campaign. Like any other crowdfunding, success depends on getting attention and persuading people to donate. Those who have the time, resources and skills to run effective social media campaigns (or who have help) are more likely to succeed. This is concerning because people facing serious medical expenses are often in no condition to undertake the challenges of running a social media campaign. This is not to criticize or condemn people who can do this or recruit others. My point is that this method is no substitute for a systematic and consistent approach to funding health care.

A third problem is that success depends on the appeal of the medical condition and the person with that condition. While a rational approach to funding would be based on merit and need, there are clearly conditions and people that are more appealing in terms of attracting donors. For example, certain diseases and conditions can be “in” and generate sympathy, while others are not as appealing. In the case of people, we are not all equal in how appealing we are to others. As with the other problems, I do not condemn or criticize people for having conditions that are “in” or being appealing. Rather, my concern is that this method rests so heavily on these factors rather than medical and financial need. Once again, this serves to illustrate how the current system has been willfully broken and does not serve the needs of most Americans. While those who have succeeded in their GoFundMe campaigns should be lauded for their effort and ingenuity, those who run the health care system in which people have to run social media campaigns to afford their health care should be condemned.   

 

While teen pregnancy has declined in the United States, Texas has had the slowest rate of decline. In a typical year, 35,000 Texan teenagers and women under 20 get pregnant. While some states have addressed the problem of unplanned teen pregnancies by education and social services support, Texas has taken a different approach. Most Texas schools offer either no sex education or abstinence only sex education. While many states offer contraception counselling to teen mothers, Texas generally does not. Texas also has restrictive policies regarding contraception for teenagers, although the evidence shows access to contraception reduces unplanned pregnancies (and also abortions). Despite the evidence linking Texas’ approach with teen pregnancy, the view of many social conservatives is that abstinence only education is the best approach. But is it?

Looked at in the context of reducing unplanned teen pregnancies, Texas’ abstinence only (or no sex education at all) approach is not the best. To use the obvious analogy, it is as if Texas was trying to reduce automobile accidents, injuries and fatalities involving teenagers by offering them either no driver education or driver education that says not to drive or get in cars. Texas is also doing the equivalent of trying to ensure teens who do get in cars do so without access to seat belts, air bags and other safety equipment. This all assumes that the best approach is defined in terms of reducing unplanned teen pregnancies just as the best approach to automobile accidents would be defined in terms of preventing them. But there are other ways to assess what is best.

One alternative is to pick the morally best. Some conservatives claim premarital sex is morally wrong. On this view, Texas is taking the right approach because unmarried teenagers should be practicing abstinence and enabling them to understand and access birth control would contribute to their immoral deeds. To use an analogy, consider murder. Since murder is wrong, schools should teach an abstinence only approach to murder and not enable people easy access to implements of murder. Except, obviously, guns.

One reply to this approach that the moral righteousness of those who deny teenagers proper sex education and access to contraceptives comes at the cost of harming the teenagers and society. Allowing this harm to occur to others so one can impose their own values is morally unacceptable on utilitarian grounds.  There is also moral concern about the rights of teenagers to make their own informed choices about consensual sexual behavior. The imposition of the values of the social conservatives denies them this right and infringes on their freedom. Naturally, those who value abstinence and oppose contraception are free to act on this view themselves. They have the right to not engage in sex or to not use contraception. They do not have the right to cause harm to others because of their views of sex as there seems to be no foundation for such a right. There is not a right to keep people in a state of harmful ignorance nor a right to deny people contraception.

But the Texas approach can be seen as the best approach by considering an alternative set of goals. As noted above, if the goal is reducing unwanted teen pregnancies, then the Texas approach is failing. However, it could be succeeding at other goals. One possible goal is to ensure the poor and uneducated remain that way. After all, unplanned pregnancies are most likely to occur among the poor and uneducated and they make it harder for people to rise out of poverty and achieve educational goals. Maintaining a poor and uneducated population confers significant benefits to the upper classes and meshes with some morally repugnant ideological views. Another possible goal is rooted in misogyny in that it is aimed at making it more likely that girls will get pregnant. This is a variant of the goal of maintaining an underclass; in this case the specific targets are girls and young women.

While a utilitarian case could, perhaps, be made for using these policies to help maintain the underclasses, the harms caused by them outweigh the alleged advantages. As such, policies aimed at maintaining the underclasses would seem morally wrong.

Given the above discussion, Texas’ approach to teenage pregnancy is either ineffective or immoral (or both). As such, the policies in Texas should be replaced by those that have proven effective elsewhere.

 

Trump picking anti-vaccine Robert F. Kennedy to serve as the secretary of Health and Human Services has shone a spotlight on the anti-vax movement. This movement has been growing, leading to a decrease in vaccinations. One impact of this has been an increase is measles cases in the United States.

Critics of the anti-vaccination movement point to such cases as proof the movement is misinformed and dangerous.  Critics of the anti-vaxxers often deride them and see them as stupid because there is no evidence that vaccines cause the harms anti-vaxxers claims they do. For example, it is often claimed that vaccines cause autism, but this is clearly untrue. Vaccinations have also been conclusively shown to prevent diseases and reduce the severity of illnesses and this is evident to anyone who has a basic knowledge of the history of disease.  

It is tempting for critics to dismiss anti-vaxxers as stupid people who are too dumb to understand basic science. This, however, is a mistake.  One reason is purely pragmatic: those who are pro-vaccination want the anti-vaccination people to change their minds and calling them stupid, mocking and insulting them will cause them to entrench and double down on their view. Another reason is that the anti-vaccination people are not, in general, stupid. Interestingly there are grounds for both skepticism and concern about health and science. To show this, I will present some points of concern.

One point of rational concern is that scientific research has been plagued with corruption, fraud and errors. For example, the percentage of scientific articles retracted for fraud is ten times what it was in 1975. Once lauded studies and theories, such as those driving the pushing of antioxidants and omega-3, were riddled with inaccuracies. So, it is not stupid to worry that scientific research might not be accurate. Ironically, the study that started the belief that vaccines cause autism is a paradigm of bad science. So, it is not stupid to consider that studies that show vaccines are safe might also have flaws. That said, the fact that some research is flawed does not prove that any specific research is flawed. After all, the fact that some people are guilty of crimes does not therefore prove that you are guilty of a crime.

Another matter of concern is the influence of corporate lobbyists on health issue. For example, the dietary guidelines and recommendations set forth by the United States Government should be set based on the best science. However, these recommendations are influenced by industry lobbyists, such as the dairy industry. Given the influence of corporate lobbyists, it is not stupid to worry the recommendations and guidelines given by the state might not be the best but instead are aimed to increase profits for certain industries.

A third point of concern is that dietary and health guidelines and recommendations undergo what seems to be relentless and unwarranted change. For example, the government has warned us of the dangers of cholesterol for decades, but this recommendation has changed. It would, of course, be one thing if the changes were the result of steady improvements in knowledge. However, the recommendations often seem to lack a proper foundation. John P.A. Ioannidis, a professor of medicine and statistics at Stanford, has noted “Almost every single nutrient imaginable has peer reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome. In this literature of epidemic proportions, how many results are correct?” Given such criticism from experts in the field, it hardly seems stupid of people to have doubts and concerns.

There is also the fact that people do suffer adverse drug reactions that can lead to serious medical issues and even death. While the reported numbers vary (one FDA page puts the number of deaths at 100,000 per year) this is certainly a matter of concern.  Everyone who has seen drug ads is familiar with the warnings. For example, consider Januvia, a diabetes drug. As required by law, the ads mention all the side effects of the drug and these include serious consequences including death. Given that the FDA has approved drugs with dangerous side effects, it is hardly stupid to be concerned about the potential side effects from any medicine or vaccine.

Given the above points, it is not stupid to be concerned about vaccines or any medication. At this point, the reader might suspect that I will defend an anti-vaccine position, bust despite all the points I raised I am pro-vaccination. This might seem surprising given the points made above, but my pro-vax position is consistent with my concerns.

The above points show there are rational grounds for a critical and skeptical approach to matters of health, medicine and science. However, this skepticism needs to be rational. That is, it should not be a rejection of science but the adoption of a critical approach in which one considers the best available evidence, assesses experts by the proper standards (those of a good argument from authority), and so on. Also, it is important to note that the general skepticism does not justify accepting or rejecting a specific claim. For example, the fact that there have been flawed studies does not prove that a specific study about vaccines is flawed. As another example, the fact that lobbyists influence government does not prove that all vaccines are harmful drugs pushed on Americans by greedy corporations. As a final example, the fact that some medicines have serious and dangerous side effects does not prove that the measles vaccine is dangerous or causes autism. Just as one should be rationally skeptical about pro-vaccination claims one should also be rationally skeptical about anti-vaccination claims.

To use an analogy, it is rational to have a general skepticism about the honesty and goodness of people. After all, people do lie and there are bad people. However, this general skepticism does not automatically prove that you are dishonest or evil—that is a matter that must be addressed on the individual level.

To use another analogy, it is rational to have a general concern about engineering. After all, there have been many engineering disasters. However, this general concern does not warrant believing that a specific engineering project is defective or that engineering itself is defective. The specific project would need to be examined, and engineering is, in general, the most rational approach to building stuff.

So, the people who are anti-vaccine are not, in general, stupid. However, they are not rationally assessing the specific vaccines and the evidence for their safety and efficacy. It is rational to be concerned about medicine in general, just as it is rational to be concerned about the honesty of people in general. However, just as one should not infer that a friend is a liar because there are people who lie, one should not infer that a vaccine must be bad because there is bad science and bad medicine.

Convincing anti-vaccination people to accept vaccination is challenging. One reason is that the issue is politicized and is a battle of values and identity. This is partially since the anti-vaccine people have been mocked and attacked, thus leading them to entrench and double down. Another reason is that, as argued above, they do have well-founded concerns about the trustworthiness of government, the accuracy of scientific studies, and the goodness of corporations. A third reason is that people tend to give more weight to the negative and tend to weigh potential loss more than potential gain. As such, people give more weight to negative reasons against vaccines and fear the alleged dangers of vaccines more than they value their benefits.

Given the importance of vaccinations, it is critical that the anti-vaccination movement be addressed rather than attacked. Calling people stupid, mocking them and attacking them are not effective ways of convincing people that vaccines are generally safe and effective. A more rational and more effective approach is to address their legitimate concerns and consider their fears. After all, the goal should be the health of people and not scoring points in a political battle

 

Asking “when was the last battle of the Civil War fought?” is a trick question; the last battle has yet to be fought. One example of a minor skirmish is when New Orleans began its removal of Confederate monuments. The removal of the first monument looked like a covert operation. Using equipment with hidden company names, the removal crews wore masks and body armor while operating under the cover of darkness and police sniper protection. These precautions were deemed necessary because of threats. In addition to being controversial, the removal of such monuments is philosophically interesting.

One argument commonly used to defend Confederate monuments is the historical argument: the monuments express and are part of history and their removal is claimed to be like tearing pages from the history books. This argument does have some appeal, at least for objects marking an historical event and presenting facts. However, monuments tend to be erected to bestow honors, and this goes beyond marking an historical event and presenting history.

One example is the Battle of Liberty Place Monument. It was erected in New Orleans in 1891 to honor the 1874 battle between the Crescent City White League and the racially integrated New Orleans Metropolitan police and state militia. The monument was modified by the city in 1932 with a plaque expressing support for white supremacy. The monument was modified again in 1993 when a new plaque was placed over the 1932 plaque, commemorating all those who died in the battle.

From a moral perspective, the problem with this sort of monument is that it is not an objective historical marker, but and endorsement of white supremacy and racism. As such, to keep such a memorial in place would be to say the city at least tolerates white supremacy and racism. If these values are still endorsed by the city, then the monument should remain as a warning label. That way people will know to expect white supremacy and racism.

 However, if the values are no longer endorsed by the city, then such a monument should be removed.  This would express the current views of the people of the city. It could be objected that such removal would be on par with purging historical records. Obviously, the records of the event should not be purged. Historical records should aim at recording the facts without praising (or condemning) what has occurred. In contrast, to erect and preserve an honoring monument is to take a stance on the matter; to praise or condemn it.

It could be argued that the 1993 change to the monument “redeems” it from its white supremacist and racist origins and it and similar monuments should remain in place. This does have some appeal, part of which is that the monument expresses the history of the (allegedly) changed values. To use an analogy, a building that once served an evil purpose can be refurbished and redeemed to serve a good purpose. This, it could be argued, sends a more powerful statement than simply razing the building.

However, the monument was originally created to honor white supremacy, and the recent modification could be justly seen as an effort to conceal this fact. Since the monument does have historical significance, it would be reasonable to preserve it. After all, historical artifacts can be kept without endorsing values associated with the artifact. For example, keeping artifacts that belonged to Stalin as historically significant items is not to endorse Stalinism. Keeping a monument in a place of honor, is an endorsement.

The matter can become more complicated in cases involving statues of individuals such as General Robert E. Lee, Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General P.G.T. Beauregard. These men did shape the history of the United States. It also cannot be denied they possessed some personal virtues. Lee is often presented as a man of considerable virtue. P.G.T. Beauregard went on to advocate for civil rights and voting rights for blacks (though some might say this was due to political expediency).

Given their historical importance and roles, it can be argued that they were worthy of statues and that these statues should remain to honor them. The easy and obvious counter is that they engaged in treason against the United States and backed slavery. Whatever personal virtues they might have possessed, they should not be honored for their role in the Confederacy. Statues that honor people who were Confederates but who did laudable things after the Civil War should, of course, be evaluated based on the merits of those individuals. But to honor the Confederacy and its support of slavery would be a moral error.

It could also be argued that even though the Confederate cause of fighting for the right of some people to own other people is wicked, people like Lee and Beauregard earned their statues and their honor. As such, it would be unjust to remove their statues because of the political sensibilities of today. After all, as it should be pointed out, there are statues that honor the slave owners Washington and Jefferson for their laudable deeds within the context of the dishonor of slavery. If the principle of removing monuments that honored those who supported a rebellion aimed at creating an independent slave-owning nation was strictly followed, then there would need to be a rather extensive purge of American monuments. If honoring supporters of slavery and slave owners is acceptable, then perhaps the removal of the statues of the heroes of the Confederacy could be justified on the grounds of their rebellion against the United States. This would allow for a principled distinction to be made: statues of slavery supporters and slave owners can be acceptable, as long as they were not rebels against the United States. Alternative, the principle could be that statues of victorious rebel slavery supporters are acceptable, but those of losing rebel slavery supporters are not. Winning, it could be said, makes all the difference.

 

The idea that government should be more like a business is appealing to those whose education, experience and values are in the business world. People do see the world through the lens of their experiences and want to apply the methods they are most familiar with to as many areas as possible. For example, I am a philosophy professor and tend to see the world through the philosophical lens and want to apply critical thinking, logic and ethical reasoning whenever I can. Likewise, those who are educated and experienced in business see the world through a business lens and wish to broadly apply their business skills and methods.

A reasonable case can be made as to why a business focused approach has merit. One can point out that many skills developed in the context of business can be used in government. For example, negotiating and deal making skills can be applied to politics. As another example, business leadership and management skills can also be applied in government. It would be a mistake to claim that government is nothing like a business, but it can also be argued that it is mistaken to try to transform government into a business.

One mistake is to think that just because there are positive qualities of business that overlap with those of government, making government more like a business will thus make government better. Making one thing more like another only adds positive qualities if they are made alike in positive ways. Making them alike in other ways does not do this. For example, dressing like a runner makes one like a runner, but this does not confer the health benefits of running.

 There is also the fact that although things with similar positive qualities are similar, it does not follow they are otherwise alike in relevant ways. For example, efficiency is a positive quality of business and government, but merely making government like business does not necessarily make it more efficient. There are businesses that are very inefficient.

Also, the fact that efficiency can be a positive quality of both business and government does not mean they are alike in other ways or that the way business is made more efficient is the way to make government more efficient. To illustrate, a business might be very efficient at exploiting customers and workers while enriching the stockholders, but that is presumably not the sort of efficiency one should aim for in government.

Avoiding this mistake involves resisting the mythology and fetishizing of making things like businesses and giving due consideration to which skills, methods and approaches transfer well from business to government and which do not.

A second basic mistake is like that made by Ion in Plato’s dialogue Ion. The rhapsode Ion believes, at the start of the dialogue, that poets have knowledge and mastery about almost everything. His reasoning is that because poets write about, for example, military matters, they thus are experts in military matters. As such, poets should be able to teach people about everything and serve as leaders in all these areas.

Socrates shows that the poets (as poets) do not have such knowledge. The gist of his argument is that each area is mastered by mastering the subject of that area and all these areas “belong” to others and not to the poets. For example, knowledge of waging war belongs to soldiers. The poets touch but lightly on these other areas and understand only the appearances and not the depth. Socrates does note that a person can have multiple domains of mastery, so a medical doctor could, for example, also be skilled at mathematics or art history.

The error in the case of business is to think that because there are many types of business and almost everything has some connection to business, then an alleged mastery of business confers mastery over all these things. However, business skills are distinct from skills specific to types of businesses. To illustrate, while a manager might believe that their management skills are universal, managing a software company does not confer software skills nor does managing a hospital confer medical skills. One might pick up skills and knowledge, but this would not be as a businessperson. After all, while a businessperson might be a runner, that does not make running a business. The fact that there are businesses associated with running, such as Nike, does not entail that skill in business thus confers skill in running. As such, for someone to think that business skills thus confer mastery over government would be a mistake. They might believe that they have such mastery because government interacts with business and some businesses do things like what government does, but they would be as mistaken as someone who thinks that because they manage a Nike outlet, they are thus an athlete.

 

A way to argue the United States is obligated to provide health care is by contending it is analogous to its obligation to defend citizens from “enemies foreign and domestic.” While there is disagreement about the obligations of a country, most thinkers believe the state is required to provide a military defense against foreign threats and deploy the police against domestic threats. So, just as the United States is obligated to defend its citizens from foreign terrorists and domestic criminals, it is obligated to defend them against cancer.

Another approach is to forgo the analogy and argue the basis of the obligation to provide military defense and police services also extends to providing health care. The general principle is that the state is obligated to protect its citizens. Since anthrax and heart failure can kill a person just as dead as a bullet or a bomb, then the state is also obligated to provide medical protection. Otherwise, the citizens are left unguarded, and the state would fail in its duty as a protector. While these lines of reasoning are appealing, they can certainly be countered. This could be done by arguing that there are relevant differences between providing health care and providing armed defenses.

One way is to argue that the state is only obligated to protect its citizens from threats presented by humans and not from other threats, such as disease or accidents. So, the state is under no obligation to protect citizens from the ravages of natura disease. But, the state is obligated to protect citizens from foes using disease as a weapon.

This seems odd. From the standpoint of the victim, it does not matter whether their disease is natural or inflicted, since the effect on them is the same. What matters is the harm being inflicted on the citizen. To use an analogy, it would be like the police being willing to stop a human from trying to kill another human but shrugging and walking away if they see a wild animal tearing apart a human. As such, it does not matter whether the harm is caused by a human or, for example, a virus—the state’s obligation to protect citizens would still apply.

Another counter to my view is to argue that while the state is obligated to protect its citizens, it is only obligated to provide a certain type of defense. The psychology behind this approach can be made clear by the rhetoric of those supporting generous state funding of the military and police while being against state funding for medical care. The military is spoken of in terms of its importance in “degrading and destroying” the enemy and the police are spoken of in terms of their role in imposing “law and order.” These are very aggressive roles. One can appear tough while speaking about funding submarines, torpedoes, bullets and missiles.

In contrast, the rhetoric against state funding of health care speaks of “the nanny state” and how providing such support will make people “weak” and “dependent.” This is caring rather than clubbing, curing rather than killing. One does not look manly or tough when speaking about funding preventative care and wellness initiatives.

What lies behind this psychology and rhetoric is the principle that the state’s role in protecting its citizens is one of force and violence, not one of caring and curing. This does provide a potentially relevant difference; but the challenge is showing that this difference warrants providing armed defense while precluding providing medical care.

One way to argue against it is to use an analogy to a family. Family members are generally obligated to protect one another, but if it were claimed that this obligation was limited only to using force and not caring for family members, then this would be rightfully regarded as absurd. Imagine, for example, a parent who was willing to kill to protect their child, but unwilling to take care of their illnesses and injuries. They would be rightfully condemned as a bad parent.

An interesting rhetorical approach is to embrace the military and police metaphors. Just as the state should thrust its force against enemies within and without, it should use its medical might to crush foes that are literally within—within the citizens. So, the state could wage war on viruses, disease and such and thus make it more manly and less nanny. This should have some rhetorical appeal to those who love military and police spending but are loath to fund healthcare.

As far as the argument that health care should not be provided by the state because it will make people dependent and weak, the obvious reply is that providing military and police protection shoulf have the same impact. As such, if the dependency argument works against health care, it would also work against having state military and police. If people should go it on their own regarding health care, then they should do the same when it comes to their armed defense. If private health coverage would suffice, then citizens should just arm themselves and provide their own defense and policing. This, obviously enough, would be a return to the anarchy of the state of nature and that would be bad. If accepting military and police protection from the state does not make citizens weak and dependent, then the same should also hold true for accepting health care from the state.

As a final point, an easy way to counter the obligation argument for state health care is to argue that the state is not obligated to provide military and police protection to the citizens. Rather, the military and the military, it could be argued, exists to protect and advance the interests of the elites. Since the elites have excellent health care thanks to their wealth and power, there is no need for the state to provide it to them. Other than the elites in government, like the Republicans in congress, who get their health care from the state.  On this view, support for using public money for the military and police and not health care makes perfect sense.

 

While the right to free speech is fundamental to classical liberalism, contemporary liberals are often accused of being its enemy. Two examples include incidents at Berkeley and Middlebury. As always, the matter of free speech is philosophically interesting, especially when it involves higher education.

One important distinction in the context of rights is that of the negative versus the positive. A negative right is not an evil right; rather it is a freedom such that the possessor is not entitled to be provided with the means to exercise the right. It is a right to not be interfered with.

A positive right is an entitlement to the means needed to exercise the right. For example, the United States currently grants citizens a right to public K-12 education. In addition to having the liberty to seek this education, it is also provided (by the taxpayers). In contrast, college education is usually a negative right: students have the liberty to attend college but are (generally) not provided with free education.

The right to free speech is a negative right; it is intended as a protection from impediment rather than an entitlement to the means of expression. To use an obvious example, while I have the right to express my views no one is obligated to provide me with free radio or TV time in which to do so.

While university personnel have no right to unjustly interfere with free speech, they are usually under no moral obligation to provide people with speaking opportunities on campus. For example, while I might be invited to speak at Harvard, Harvard has no obligation to provide me with a room just because I might want to talk about philosophy.

Decisions about who to invite and who to allow to speak in official venues are often made on pragmatic grounds, such as which speakers will boost the reputation of the school or who happens to be friends with top administrators. There are also practical concerns about the cost of the speaker, the likelihood of trouble arising, and the extent of the interest in the speaker. While these practical concerns are important, decisions about who to invite (and who to exclude) should also be made on principled grounds.

One reasonable principle is that decisions should be made based on the educational value of the speaker campus, broadly understood. Since universities are supposed to educate students, it makes sense for them to operate on this principle. Speakers who offer little or nothing in the way of educational value could be justly denied invitations. Of course, education is not the only concern of a university in terms of what it offers to the students and the community. Speakers who offer things of artistic value or even mere entertainment value should also be given due consideration.

One concern about decisions based on these factors is that there can be good faith debate about which speakers have the merit to warrant their invitation. For example, the incident at Middlebury arose because some see Charles Murray’s co-authored controversial book The Bell Curve as  based on pseudoscience and bad methodology. While these matters can be clouded with ideology, there are established standards regarding educational merit regarding such things as methodology and legitimacy. The main problem lies in their application, but this is not a problem unique to picking speaker as it extends across the academy. Fortunately, the basic principle of merit is reasonable clear but the real fights take place over the particulars.

Another seemingly sensible principle is a moral one; that those invited should reflect the values of the institution and perhaps the broader society. At the very least, those invited should not be evil and should not be espousing evil.

This principle does have some problems. One is deciding what conflicts with the values of the institution. Another is that it is difficult to speak of the values of the broader society, given the considerable diversity of opinions on moral issues. When people use this approach, they usually refer to their own values and fall prey to the cognitive bias that leads them to assume their values are shared by society. There is the enduring problem in ethics of sorting out good and evil. There is also the concern about whether academic or artistic merit can offset moral concerns. For example, a Catholic university might see a pro-choice philosopher as endorsing a morally wrong position, yet think that having this philosopher engage a pro-life philosopher in a campus debate to have educational merit. As another example, a liberal institution might regard an extreme libertarian as having morally problematic views yet see educational merit in having them present their arguments as part of a series on American political philosophy.  As with the matter of merit, there are rational and principled ways to approach ethical concerns but this is even more fraught with controversy than questions of assessing educational merit.

While I agree that speech can cause harm, I hold to a presumption in favor of free expression. As a principle, this means that if there is reasonable doubt as to whether the merit of a speech outweighs moral concerns about the speaker or content, then the decision should favor free expression. This is based on the view that it is better to run the risk of tolerating possible evil than to risk silencing someone who has something worth saying. As such, I generally favor a liberal (in the classic sense) approach to inviting speakers to universities.

Americans tend to favor free expression for those they agree with and oppose it for those they dislike. When campuses attempted to exclude right wing speakers, the right expressed its devotion to free expression, speaking of the free market of ideas. As was expected, when college students and faculty recently protested the treatment of the Palestinians by Israel, the right supported a crack down on free expression and on some campuses riot police were turned lose on students and faculty. The right has also worked hard to restrict the content of college classes, enacting laws imposing what they call “reforms.” For example, my adopted state of Florida professes to be all about freedom, but this is only for the freedom to express views that accord with the ideology of the right. It could be countered that “the left” takes a similar approach when it is in power, allowing free speech it approves of. While such finger pointing might feel good, it also shows that Americans are not as committed to free speech as we claim.

 

While simple and ideologically appealing explanations for Harris’ loss are tempting, the truth is that the reasons are many and often complicated. While it is inarguably true that racism and sexism (two staples of American politics) were factors, the relationships between the two parties and the truth were also factors.

While politics often involves people in a dubious relation with the truth, Trump seems to have locked the Republican party into strategic deceit. The prime example is, of course, what was dubbed the “Big Lie” about Trump being robbed of his rightful victory in 2020. As would be expected, talk of issues with the election has ceased with Trump’s victory. While the Republican party has engaged in strategic lying broadly, I will focus on economic lies.

To be fair and balanced, both the Republicans and the Democrats are right when they claim that many Americans are suffering economically. Inflation, stagnating wages, the high cost of health care and the absurd price of housing have been hurting Americans. Even those who are relatively well off also seem to have felt that the economy was not working for them as it should. As such, both sides agreed on and were correct about the general claim that most Americans are facing economic woes. But they obviously differed in their explanations and proposed solutions. I will focus on the explanations.

While the Republican populist rhetoric did lay some of the blame on corporations, there was an emphasis on lying about the impact of migrants. In addition to the old lies that migrants are stealing jobs, spreading disease, committing crimes and sponging off the system, J.D. Vance also offered the false claim that migrants were responsible for the high cost of housing. While migrants do occupy housing, it is obviously not true that undocumented migrants are buying houses in the United States. In addition to the barrier of the high cost, there is also the fact that legally buying a house is a process that an undocumented person would not be able to complete. Trump and Vance ran hard on the migration issue, linking it to the economy and using racism and xenophobia to add rhetorical fuel to their false claims. The economic link is a smart rhetorical play for two reasons. First, it provides cover for people who are motivated by racism and xenophobia but who do not want to be seen for what they are. Second, it onboards people who are not racist or xenophobic but who are rightfully worried about their economic woes. In terms of how this can work, I need to present an analogy to tech support.

While I am a philosopher, I am also the guy that family, friends, and co-workers turn to when they have tech issues. While I do not work in IT, I was the editor of a Mac ezine in the 1990s, wrote shareware programs, and still build my own PCs. I also have those philosophical critical thinking skills that translate well into fixing tech problems.

When I first started helping people, I made some mistakes that were soon corrected by experience. These were not technical mistakes but psychological. The first was that I would try to explain the nature and the cause of the problem accurately and in some detail. I learned that no one cared much about a detailed explanation, even if they could understand it. The second was that when I tried to show them how to fix the problem as I fixed it, they did not want to know the details, nor did they care much about what I was doing as long as I solved their problem. As one friend put it, they didn’t need to know how to fix problems since they had me. Since learning that people only want their problems solved without caring much about the complicated why or how, since then I have fixed problems quietly. While I was initially annoyed by this and wondered how they could not love knowing about technology as I did, I realized that this was a biased view on my part. While I am interested in technology and solving problems and willing to expend my resources on this knowledge and skill, other people are not interested and prefer to expend their mental resources on other things. This is rational since a person has only so many resources to spend and it makes sense to rely on other people who have the needed knowledge and skill. This holds even when the problem is important and affecting a person.

While I am also interested in politics and economics, it makes sense that (just as with technology) most people are not. They do recognize when they feel things are not going as they would like, and they want someone else to offer them a simple explanation and be told that the problem will be fixed for them.

While we talk about “the economy”, it is obviously an incredibly complicated network of people, resources, made-up laws, made-up traditions, practices, relationships, and so on. As such, there are usually no simple explanations or fixes for economic problems (and one person’s problem is another person’s profit). But just as people notice when their PC is crashing, people notice when their grocery bills are higher, and their rent eats up an ever-larger chunk of their paycheck. Not being experts in the economy (and who really is?) they do not really know why this is happening and have no idea what complicated solutions are needed. Instead, just as my friends and relatives turn to me to fix their technology woes, voters look to politicians to offer simple explanations and easy to understand fixes. But there are obvious differences in that I am honest about technology problems, and I know how to fix them (only one partial failure in over thirty years). When it comes to the economy, as noted above, the Republicans have embraced strategic lying.

They offer simplistic and untrue explanations, such as blaming migrants. But this appeals to people since they are offering an explanation they can understand without being experts in economics: migrants are hurting the economy and hence hurting them. They can then offer a simple, easy to grasp solution (that will make things worse): the Republicans will round up and deport the migrants. This solution will not work for obvious reasons and will most likely make things work because a cornerstone of American food production and construction is cheap migrant labor. This means that the Republicans might suffer some loses when the economy does not improve (or gets worse) but perhaps they can use strategic lying to avoid blame for that. Given that the Republicans have adopted strategic lying, one might think that the Democrats could have won by telling the truth about the cause of Americans’ economic woes and offering real solutions. But Democrats will (mostly) not tell the truth about the economy.

While the Republican rhetoric accuses the Democrats of being socialists and communists, this is also part of strategic lying. While it is true that there are Democrats who have views that are left of the current center, the mainstream Democrats are committed to (or bought by) the same capitalist system (and capitalists) that the Republicans work hard to serve. There is, however, a meaningful difference in that the Democrats push back against some of the worst excesses and favor relatively timid and mild regulations and protections for the lower classes and the environment. In contrast, the Republican party seems to favor allowing the elites to do as they wish without regulation (as long as they do not wish to appear “woke” for marketing purposes, as Disney found out). While some Democrats might have laudable motives, there is also a practical reason to keep the excesses of capitalism in some degree of check, since failure to do so could result in social upheaval and revolt. But getting back to Democrats not telling the truth.

Harris decided to run from the center, making a show of embracing rebel Republicans such as Liz Cheney and “good” billionaires. Despite the claims that the Democrats lost because they were too “woke” or too into identity politics, Harris and her fellow Democrats steered away from “wokeness” and generally avoided identity politics. They even took harder lines on immigration and crime. While acknowledging the economic woes of the lower classes, the Democrats generally did not tell the truth about the cause of those woes nor did they offer any meaningful solutions. This is because telling the truth about these woes would reveal that they are the result of the actions of the elite classes and that significantly improving the conditions for the lower classes would require meaningful changes to the status quo and not just band aids. One of the many reasons that the Democrats cannot do this is that they are, like the Republicans, reliant on the economic elites for their re-election funding. There are also the financial rewards politicians receive for serving these interests, be they Democrats or Republicans. Congress has, to no one’s surprise, an abundance of millionaires. Democrats, I suppose, deserve some faint praise for not engaging in scapegoating migrants or the poor for the economic woes most Americans face. But they deserve criticism for not telling the truth.

While it can be pointed out the Republicans’ strategic lie beat the Democrats’ strategic silence, it can be argued that the Democrats could have won if they had adopted views like those of Bernie Sanders. While some pundits and liberal elites are quick to claim that people who voted for Trump did so because they are dumb racist misogynists, I recommend that people think about my tale about fixing technology: people rationally want someone who can explain complicated problems in simple terms and offer a promise that they will fix the problems. The Republicans did offer explanations, although they were mostly lies. They also offered simple solutions (albeit ones that will just make things work). The next election cycle the Democrats should heed my advice and take my approach: offer a simple but honest explanation and offer a simple explanation of the complicated fix that is needed. Then fix the problem and remember that people will forget you fixed it until they have another problem.

 

110 Fallacies

Description:

Like the general Appeal to Silence fallacy, the Gish Gallop and Fire Hose of Falsehoods are tactics that involve taking a failure to respond as evidence for a claim.

As a rhetorical tool, the Gish Gallop is an attempt to overwhelm an opponent by presenting many arguments and claims with no concern for their quality or accuracy. The Gish Gallop was named in 1994 by anthropologist Eugenie Scott who claimed that Duane Gish used this tactic when arguing against evolution.

The Gish Gallop is somewhat like the debating tactic of spreading which involves making arguments as rapidly as possible in the hopes that the opponent will not be able to respond to all of them. The main distinction is that the Gish Gallop is an inherently bad faith technique that relies on rapidly presenting weak arguments, fallacies, partial truths, Straw Men, and lies in the hopes that the opponent will not be able to refute them all. The Gish Gallop can be seen as a metaphorical cluster bomb of fallacies and untruths.

While this technique lacks logical force, it can have considerable psychological force. The Gish Gallop relies on Brandolini’s Law, which is the idea that it takes more time and effort to refute a fallacy or false claim than it takes to make them. Effective use of a Gish Gallop will yield many unrefuted fallacies and false claims, and this can create the impression in the audience that the Gish Galloper has “won” the debate. The Gish Gallop can be combined with Moving the Goal Posts to create the illusion that at least some of the refutations have been addressed.

Psychologically, the side that seems to have made the most unrefuted arguments and claims might appear to be correct, especially if the Gish Galloper uses the Gish Gallop fallacy, which has the following general form:

 

Premise 1: Person A presented N arguments for claim C.

Premise 2: Person B, the opponent, refuted X of A’s arguments.

Premise 3: N is greater than X.

Conclusion: C is true.

 

This is fallacious reasoning because it is not the number of arguments that proves a claim, but the quality of the arguments. As an illustration, consider this silly example:

 

Premise 1: During a debate, Bob presented 123 arguments that 2+2=6.

Premise 2: Bob’s opponent Sally only refuted 2 of Bob’s arguments before time ran out.

Premise 3: 123 is greater than 2.

Conclusion: Therefore, 2+2=6

 

While the error in reasoning is obvious in such absurd cases, people can easily fall victim to this reasoning in more complicated or controversial cases, especially if the audience does not know the subject well.

One reason why this fallacy might be appealing is that it seems analogous to methods that do work. For example, a swarm of relatively weak ants can overwhelm a strong spider in virtue of their numbers, even though the spider might kill many of them. But argumentation usually does not work like that; weak arguments generally do not add together to overcome a single strong argument. So, the analogy is not a swarm of ants beating a spider, but a spider fighting weak ants one at a time.

Another reason the fallacy might seem appealing is that making claims or arguments that are not refuted could seem analogous to one team not being able to block every shot taken by their opponent. But the Gish Gallop would be best compared to a basketball team rapidly taking wild shots all over the place, not caring whether they are even made in the direction on the basket. The opposing team does not need to block those wild shots; they are not going to score any points. In the case of arguments, not refuting a bad argument does not prove that the argument is good. Not refuting a claim does not prove the claim is true. See Burden of Proof for a discussion of this.

While the Gish Gallop technique involves presenting at least some arguments, a related technique is to blast an opponent with a Fire Hose of Falsehoods. In this context, the Fire Hose of Falsehood is a rhetorical technique in which many falsehoods are quickly presented. The technique can also employ the rhetorical technique of repetition. As a matter of psychological force, the more times a person hears a claim, the more likely they are to believe it. But the number of times a claim is repeated is irrelevant to its truth. This method also often involves using multiple channels to distribute the falsehoods. For example, real users or bots on various social media platforms could be employed to spread the falsehood. This can have considerable psychological force since people are also inclined to believe a claim that (appears to) come from multiple sources. But the mere number of sources making a claim is irrelevant to the truth of that claim.

This technique can be used to achieve various ends, such as serving as a Red Herring to distract people from an issue or, in its classic role, as a propaganda technique. On a small scale, such as in a debate, it can be used to overwhelm an opponent because a person can usually tell a lie much faster than someone else can refute it. This technique can be used with Moving the Goal Post to exhaust an opponent and run out the clock.

It can also be employed as a variant of the Appeal to Silence. As a fallacy, the reasoning is that unless all the falsehoods made by someone are refuted, then their unrefuted falsehoods are true. As a fallacy, it has this generally form:

 

Premise 1: Person A makes N falsehoods.

Premise 2: Person B, the opponent, refuted X of A’s falsehoods.

Premise 3: N is greater than X.

Conclusion: The unrefuted falsehoods are true.

 

Laid bare like this, the bad logic is evident. Not refuting a falsehood does not make the falsehood true. When someone uses this fallacy, they will attempt to conceal the logical structure of this reasoning. They might, for example, simply say that their opponent has not refuted their claims and so their opponent must agree with them.

While this is a fallacy, it can be effective psychologically. If a person seems confident in their falsehoods and overwhelms their opponent with the sheer number of their lies, they might appear to have “won” the debate.  

 

Defense: To avoid being taken in by the Gish Gallop, the key is remembering that the support premises provide to a conclusion is based on the quality of the argument. The quantity of (unrefuted) arguments for a claim, by itself, does not serve as evidence for a claim. In the case of claims, a failure to refute all the claims made a person does not prove that the unrefuted claims are true; this applies to both the Gish Gallop and the Fire Hose of Falsehood.

If a Gish Gallop or Fire Hose of Falsehood is being used against you in a debate, you will almost certainly not be able to respond to all the arguments and claims. From a logical standpoint, one good option is to briefly point out your opponent’s technique and why it is defective. If you are arguing for a position, focus on your positive arguments and, if time permits, respond to the most serious objections. If you are arguing against a position, focus on your arguments against that position and, if possible, try to pre-empt the arguments your opponent is likely to use in their Gish Gallop. You can also sometimes group arguments and claims together and refute them in groups. For example, if an opponent uses multiple Straw Men, you can respond to all of these by pointing this out.

 

Example#1

Gus: “So, my opponent is a climate change scientist. That means she hates capitalism, so she is wrong. Also, these so-called climate change scientists say that humans are the only things that affect the climate, that is totally wrong. You remember Al Gore, right? Remember how silly that guy is? Plus, he lost the election! To George Bush! Lots of smart people don’t believe in climate change and how can the climate change if the earth is flat? Remember how they used to call it global warming? Now these scientists say that some places will get cooler! Also, remember that it snowed in Texas. So much for global warming! And we still had winter; it was cold some days. And everyone knows that we had ice ages in the past. But we don’t have an ice age now. So, climate changes without us; so much for the idea that humans are causing it.”

Moderator: “Time. Your turn Dr. Jones. You have two minutes.”

Dr. Jones: “So where to begin…”

Gus, two minutes later: “See, “Dr.” Jones did not refute all my arguments. So, climate change is all a hoax, as I said.

 

Statistics show that violent and property crimes have plunged since the 1990s and although some types of crime have increased, overall crime is down. However, most Americans erroneously believe that crime has increased in general. Interestingly, while Americans tend to think that crime is up nationally and locally, they believe the increase is less where they live. This all can easily be explained using some basic ideas from critical thinking.

When people repeatedly hear stories about crime, even the same incident over and over, they tend to conclude that the amount of crime must correspond with how often they hear about it. Since many politicians and news companies frequently talk about crime, people will think it must be high or increasing; this is mistaking the frequency of hearing about it with the frequency of crime. This is the availability heuristic cognitive bias at work. This can also feed into the fallacy of hasty generalization in which an inference is drawn from a sample that is too small to warrant such a conclusion. For example, a person might hear about a few crimes on the news and then infer from this small sample that crime is more widespread than it really is.

 There is also a tendency to infer from hearing vivid or dramatic accounts of crime that crime must be high. This mistakes the vividness of crimes for statistical likelihood. In philosophy, this is known as the misleading vividness fallacy. It occurs when a small number of dramatic events are taken to outweigh significant statistical evidence. Somewhat more formally, this fallacy is committed when an estimation of the probability of an occurrence is based on the vividness of the occurrence and not on statistical evidence of how often it occurs.  It is fallacious because the vividness of an event does not make it more likely to occur, especially in the face of significant statistical evidence.

This fallacy gets its psychological force from the fact that dramatic or vivid cases tend to make a strong impression. In the case of crime, people can feel that they are in danger, and this intensifies the vividness. For example, when a politician or a news show focuses on a brutal murder and provides dramatic details of the crime, this can make people feel threatened and that such a crime is likely to occur even when it is very unlikely. The way people respond to shark attacks provides another good example of this fallacy: the odds of being killed or injured by a shark are extremely low; yet shark attacks make the news and make people feel that they are likely to be in danger.

Politicians and news companies also tell their audiences that crime is high, often explicitly using various logical fallacies and rhetorical techniques to persuade people to accept this disinformation. One common fallacy used here is anecdotal evidence. This fallacy is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a very small number of cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. Politicians, pundits and the media will often have a go-to story of a crime (which is also usually vivid and dramatic) and repeatedly present that to their audience. If the audience falls for the anecdotal evidence, they will feel that crime is high, even though crime has been steadily decreasing (with a few exceptions).

Politicians and news companies also often enhance their anecdotes and crime stories by appealing to people’s biases, fears and prejudices. For example, a politician might focus on migrant crime and present minorities as criminals, thus tapping into racism and fear of migrants. Those who fear or dislike migrants and minorities will respond with fear or anger and feel that crime is occurring more than it really is.

The disparity between what people think about local and national crime can be explained by the fact that the local experience of people and whatever accurate local information might be available will tend to match reality better. People also tend to think better of their local area than they do of other places (although there are exceptions). And there is evidence that people are good at estimating crime in their own area and as crime is down, a more accurate estimate will reflect this.

The obvious defense against poor reasoning about crime is to know the facts: while America is a dangerous and violent country, crime has been decreasing and is much lower than it was in the 1990s. But it is fair to say that Americans are right to be concerned about crime, although we tend to be wrong about the crime facts. For example, if you work for wages, you should be worried about wage theft and the fact that the criminals usually get away with it.