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Before getting into the discussion, I am not a medical professional and what follows should be met with due criticism and you should consult an expert before embarking on changes to your exercise or nutrition practices. Or you might die. Probably not. But maybe.

As any philosopher will tell you, while the math used in science is deductive (the premises are supposed to guarantee the conclusion with certainty) scientific reasoning is inductive (the premises provide some degree of support for the conclusion that is less than complete). Because of this, science suffers from what philosophers call the problem of induction. In practical terms, this means that no matter how careful the reasoning and no matter how good the evidence, the inference can still be false. The basis is that inductive reasoning involves a “leap” from the premises/evidence (what has been observed) to the conclusion (what has not been observed). Put bluntly, inductive reasoning always has a chance to lead to a false conclusion. But this appears unavoidable as life seems inductive.

Scientists and philosophers have tried to make science entirely deductive. For example, Descartes believed he could find truths that he could not doubt and then use valid deductive reasoning to generate a true conclusion with absolute certainty. Unfortunately, this science of certainty is the science of the future and (probably) always will be. So, we are stuck with induction.

The problem of induction applies to the sciences that study nutrition, exercise and weight loss and the conclusions made in these sciences can always be wrong. This helps explain why recommendations change relentlessly.

While there are philosophers of science who would disagree, science is a matter of trying to figure things out by doing the best we can do at this time. This is limited by the available resources (such as technology) and human epistemic capabilities. As such, whatever science is presenting now is almost certainly at least partially wrong; but the wrongs often get reduced over time. But sometimes they increase. This is true of all the sciences. Consider, for example, the changes in physics since Thales got it started. This also helps explain why recommendations about diet and exercise change often.

While science is sometimes idealized as a field of pure reason outside of social influences, science is also a social activity. Because of this, science is influenced by social factors and human flaws. For example, scientists need money to fund their research and can be vulnerable to corporations looking to “prove” claims that are in their interest. As another example, scientific subjects can become issues of political controversy, such as race, evolution and climate change. This politicization tends to be bad for science and anyone who does not profit from manufacturing controversy. As a final example, scientists can be motivated by pride and ambition to fake or modify their findings. Because of these factors, the sciences dealing with nutrition and exercise are, to a meaningful degree, corrupted and this makes it difficult to make a rational judgment about which claims are true. One excellent example is how the sugar industry paid scientists at Harvard to downplay the health risks presented by sugar and play up those presented by fat. Another illustration is the fact that the food pyramid endorsed by the US government has been shaped by the food industries rather than being based entirely on good science.

Given these problems it might be tempting to abandon mainstream science and go with whatever food or exercise ideology one finds appealing. That would be a bad idea. While science suffers from these problems, mainstream science is better than the nonscientific alternatives. They tend to have all the problems of science without any of its strengths. So, what should one do? The rational approach is to accept the majority opinion of qualified and credible experts. One should also keep in mind the above problems and approach the science with due skepticism.

So, what does the best science of today say about weight loss? First, humans evolved as hunter-gatherers and getting enough calories was a challenge. Humans tend to be very good at storing energy in the form of fat which is one reason the calorie rich environment of modern society contributes to obesity. Crudely put, it is in our nature to overeat because that once meant the difference between life and death.

Second, while exercise does burn calories, it burns far less than many imagine. For most people, most of the calorie burning is a result of the body staying alive. As such, while exercising more could help a person lose weight, the calorie impact of exercise is surprisingly low. That said, you should exercise (if you can) if only for the health benefits.

Third, hunger is a function of the brain, and the brain responds differently to different foods. Foods high in protein and fiber create a feeling of fullness that tends to turn off the hunger signal. Foods with a high glycemic index (like cake) tend to stimulate the brain to cause people to consume more calories. As such, manipulating your brain is an effective way to increase the chance of losing weight. Interestingly, as Aristotle argued, habituation to foods can train the brain to prefer foods that are healthier. You can train yourself to prefer things like nuts, broccoli and oatmeal over cookies, cake, and soda. This takes time and effort but can be done.

Fourth, weight loss has diminishing returns: as one loses weight, one’s metabolism slows, and less energy is needed. As such, losing weight makes it harder to lose weight, which is something to keep in mind.  Naturally, all these claims could be disproven tomorrow, but they seem reasonable now.

 

Central to our American mythology is the belief a person can rise to the pinnacle of success from the depths of poverty. While this does happen, poverty presents an undeniable obstacle to success. Tales within this myth of success present an inconsistent view of poverty:  the hero is praised for overcoming the incredible obstacle of poverty while it is also claimed that anyone with gumption should be able to succeed. The achievement is thus claimed to be heroic yet easy and expected.

Outside of myths, poverty is difficult to overcome. There are the obvious challenges of poverty. For example, a person born into poverty will not have the same educational opportunities as the affluent. As another example, they will have less access to technology such as computers and high-speed internet. As a third example, there are the impacts of diet and health care. These necessities are expensive, and the poor have less access to good food and good care. There is also research by scientists such as Kimberly G. Noble  that suggests a link between poverty and brain development.

While the most direct way to study the impact of poverty and the brain is by imagining the brain, this is expensive. However, research shows a correlation between family income and the size of some surface areas of the cortex. For children whose families make under $50,000 per year, there is a strong correlation between income and the surface area of the cortex. While greater income is correlated with greater cortical surface area, the apparent impact is reduced once the income exceeds $50,000 a year. This suggests, but does not prove, that poverty has a negative impact on the development of the cortex and this impact is proportional to the degree of poverty.

Because of the cost of direct research on the brain, most research focuses on cognitive tests that indirectly test the brain. Children from lower income families perform worse than their more affluent peers in their language skills, memory, self-control and focus. This performance disparity cuts across ethnicity and gender.

As would be expected, there are individuals who do not conform to this general correlation and there are children from disadvantaged families who perform well on the tests and children from advantaged families who do poorly. Knowing the economic class of a child does not automatically reveal what their individual capabilities are. However, there is a correlation in terms of populations rather than individuals. This needs to be remembered when assessing anecdotes of successful rising from poverty. As with all appeals to anecdotal evidence, they do not outweigh statistical evidence.

To use an analogy, boys tend to be stronger than girls but knowing that Sally is a girl does not mean that Sally is certainly weaker than Bob the boy. An anecdote about how Sally is stronger than Bob also does not show that girls are stronger than boys; it just shows that Sally is unusual in her strength. Likewise, if Sally lives in poverty but does exceptionally well on the cognitive tests and has a normal cortex, this does not prove that poverty does not have a negative impact on the brain. This leads to the question as to whether poverty is a causal factor in brain development.

As the saying goes, correlation is not causation. To infer that because there is a correlation between poverty and cognitive abilities then there must be a causal connection would be to fall victim to a causal fallacy. One possibility is that the correlation is a mere coincidence and there is no causal connection. Another possibility is that there is a third factor that is causing both and poverty and the cognitive abilities are both effects.

There is also the possibility that the causal connection has been reversed. That is, it is not poverty that increases the chances a person has less cortical surface (and corresponding capabilities). Rather, it is having less cortical surface area that is a causal factor in poverty.

This view does have some appeal. As noted above, children in poverty tend to do worse on tests for language skills, memory, self-control and focus. These are the capabilities that are useful for success, and people who are less capable will tend to be less successful. Unless, of course, they are simply born into “success.” To use an analogy, there is a correlation between running speed and success in track races. It is not losing races that makes a person slow. It is being slow that causes a person to lose races.

Despite the appeal of this interpretation, to rush to the conclusion that it is cognitive abilities that cause poverty would be as much a fallacy as just rushing to the conclusion that poverty must influence brain development. Both views appear plausible, and it is possible that causation is going in both directions. The challenge is to sort the causation. The obvious approach is to conduct the controlled experiment suggested by Noble: providing an experimental group of low-income families with an income supplement and providing the control group with a relatively tiny supplement. If the experiment is conducted properly and the sample size is large enough, the results would be statistically significant and provide an answer to the question of the causal connection.

Intuitively, it makes sense that an adequate family income would have a positive impact on the development of children. After all, adequate income would allow access to adequate food, care and education. It would also tend to have a positive impact on family conditions, such as emotional stress. This is not to say that just “throwing money at poverty” is a cure all; but reducing poverty is a worthwhile goal regardless of its connection to brain development. If it does turn out that poverty does have a negative impact on development, then those who claim to be concerned with the well-being of children should be motivated to combat poverty. It would also serve to undercut another American myth, that the poor are stuck in poverty simply because they are lazy. If poverty has the damaging impact on the brain it seems to have, then this would help explain why poverty is such a trap.

 

While there are many moral theories, two of the best known are utilitarianism and deontology. John Stuart Mill presents the paradigm of utilitarian ethics: the morality of an action is dependent on the happiness and unhappiness it creates for the morally relevant beings. Moral status, for this sort of utilitarian, is defined in terms of the being’s capacity to experience happiness and unhappiness. Beings count to the degree they can experience these states. A being that could not experience either would not count, except to the degree that what happened to it affected beings that could experience happiness and unhappiness. Of course, even a being that has moral status merely gets included in the utilitarian calculation. As such, all beings are means to the ends of maximizing happiness and minimizing unhappiness.

Kant, the paradigm deontologist, rejects the utilitarian approach.  Instead, he contends that ethics is a matter of following the correct moral rules. He also contends that rational beings are ends and are not to be treated merely as means to ends. For Kant, the possible moral statuses of a being are binary: rational beings have status as ends, non-rational beings are mere objects and are thus means. As would be expected, these moral theories present two different approaches to the ethics of slavery.

For the classic utilitarian, the ethics of slavery would be assessed in terms of the happiness and unhappiness generated by the activities of slavery. On the face of it, an assessment of slavery would seem to result in the conclusion that slavery is morally wrong. After all, slavery typically generates unhappiness on the part of the enslaved. This unhappiness is not only a matter of the usual abuse and exploitation a slave suffers, but also the general damage to happiness that arises from being regarded as property rather than a person. While the slave owners are clearly better off than the slaves, the practice of slavery is often harmful to the happiness of the slave owners as well; one might argue they deserve such suffering and could avoid it by not being slave owners. As such, the harms of slavery would seem to make it immoral on utilitarian grounds.

For the utilitarian the immorality of slavery is contingent on its consequences: if enslaving people creates more unhappiness than happiness, then it is wrong. However, if enslaving people were to create more happiness than unhappiness, then it would be morally acceptable. A reply to this is to argue that slavery, by its very nature, would always create more unhappiness than happiness. As such, while the evil of slavery is contingent, it would always turn out to be wrong.

An interesting counter is to put the burden of proof on those who claim that such slavery would be wrong. That is, they would need to show that a system of slavery that maximized happiness was morally wrong. On the face of it, showing that something that created more good than bad is still bad would be challenging. However, there are numerous appeal to intuition arguments that aim to do just that. The usual approach is to present a scenario that generates more happiness than unhappiness, but intuitively seems to be wrong or at least makes one feel morally uncomfortable. Ursula K. Le Guin’s classic short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” is often used in this role, for it asks us to imagine a utopia that exists at the cost of the suffering of one person.  There are also other options, such as arguing within the context of another moral theory. For example, a natural rights theory that included a right to liberty could be used to argue that slavery is wrong because it violates rights, even if happened to be a happiness maximizing slavery.

A utilitarian can also “bite the bullet” and argue that even if such slavery might seem intuitively wrong, this is a mere prejudice on our part, most likely fueled by examples the unhappy slaveries that pervade history. While utilitarian moral theory can obviously be applied to the ethics of slavery, it is not the only word on the matter. As such, I now turn to the Kantian approach.

As noted above, Kant divides reality into two distinct classes of beings. Rational beings exist as ends and to use them solely as means would be, for Kant, morally wrong. Non-rational beings, which includes non-human animals, are mere objects. Interestingly, as I have noted in other essays and books, Kant argues that animals should be treated well because treating them badly can incline humans to treat other humans badly. This, I have argued elsewhere, gives animals an ersatz moral status.

On the face of it, under Kant’s theory the very nature of slavery would make it immoral. If persons are rational beings and slavery treats people as objects, then slavery would be wrong. First, it would involve treating a rational being solely as a means. After all, it is difficult to imagine that enslaving a person is consistent with treating them as an end rather than just as a means. Second, it would also seem to involve a willful category error by treating a rational being (which is not an object) as an object. Slavery would thus be fundamentally incoherent because it purports that non-objects (people) are objects.

Since Kantian ethics do not focus on happiness and unhappiness, even a deliriously happy system of slavery would still be wrong for Kant. Kant does, of course, get criticized because his system relegates non-rational beings into the realm of objects, thus lumping together squirrels and stones, apes and asphalt, tapirs and twigs and so on. As such, if non-rational beings could be enslaved, then this would not matter morally (unless doing so impacted rational beings in negative ways). The easy and obvious reply to this concern is to argue that non-rational beings could not be enslaved because slavery is when people are taken to be property and non-rational beings are not people on Kant’s view. Non-rational animals can be mistreated and harmed, but they cannot be enslaved.

It is, of course, possible to have an account of what it is to be a person that extends personhood beyond rational beings. For example, opponents of abortion often contend the zygote is a person despite its obvious lack of rationality. Fortunately, it would be easy enough to create a modification of Kant’s theory in which what matters is being a person (however defined) rather than being a rational being.

Thus, utilitarian ethical theories leave open the possibility that slavery could be morally acceptable while under a Kantian account slavery would always be morally wrong.

 

While slavery is still practiced around the world, it is now broadly seen as evil. While apologists for slavery are relatively few, there remains the question as to why slavery is evil.

It is tempting to define the wrongness of slavery in terms of exploitation and abuse. While such abuse and exploitation are wrong, they are not adequate in explaining the wrongness of slavery itself. This is because abuse and exploitation can exist apart from slavery, thus showing that these are not sufficient conditions for slavery. Being abused and exploited does not entail that one is a slave. Examples of such abuse and exploitation are, unfortunately, abundant. If you work for a living, you are most likely exploited but you are almost certainly not a slave. Countless people suffer abuse in relationships from the very people who should be kind to them.

Abuse and exploitation are also not necessary conditions of slavery. That is, a person can be enslaved without being abused or exploited. As noted in an earlier essay, there have been slaves who have enjoyed considerable power and status. Despite their status and power, such slavery is still wrong. As such, it is not the abuse or exploitation that makes slavery wrong.

This is not to say that abuse and exploitation do not matter. When present, they compound the basic evil of slavery and make the bad even worse. Slavery is also strongly connected to abuse and exploitation. The belief that enslaved people are property makes it easy for others to justify and get away with abuse and exploitation. While free people are abused or exploited, they usually have more legal protection than the enslaved. So, while the abuse and exploitation matter, slavery serves as an enabler of mistreatment, and this contribute to the wrongness of slavery. 

What makes slavery morally wrong, then, is that it is perceived as transforming people into objects that can be owned. The claim of ownership over another person is the denial of their personhood and all that goes with it. For those with liberal Lockean inclinations, this denial of personhood is a denial of the basic rights to life, liberty and property. Since a slave is supposed to be property, their life supposedly belongs to the owner. Hence, slaveowners usually see themselves as having the right to kill or harm their slaves. I do not deny that slaves are sometimes protected by laws and slavery does come in degrees. But every form of slavery must assume that the owner has ownership over the life of the slave and can use compulsion to maintain slavery.

Slavery, by its very nature, is a violation of a person’s liberty. They are denied freedom of choice and denied agency. As the owner sees it, they have the right to make decisions for their property such as what work they do, who they have sex with, and what faith they might follow. This is not to say that slaves do not have some freedom or that free people are completely free. It is to say that the freedoms of slaves are limited and often restricted to minor decisions. As noted above, slavery does admit of degrees and in the past some favored or high-status slaves might enjoy considerable liberty. For example, a Mamluk ruler might enjoy greater liberty than a non-slave in their empire. It can be objected that such a slave would be a slave in name only. After all, a person of such status and power would be far better off than most despite being a slave. The challenge to those who argue that slavery is inherently wrong is to show that such an exalted slave is still wronged by their slavery. One approach is to appeal to the intuition that however exalted, the slave is still a slave. That is, regarded as property rather than a free person and this is inherently wrong.

Being regarded as property, slaves often cannot own property of their own. After all, being owned entails that their owner owns what they own. There are, of course, exceptions to this and sometimes slaves are paid for their work and can even eventually buy themselves out of slavery. While this does show, once again, that there are diverse types of slavery, the idea that a person should need to buy themselves seems absurd on the face of it.

Thus, while slavery does enable a multitude of evils, the core evil of slavery is the belief that a person can be owned as an object.

 

The term “robot” and the idea of a robot rebellion were introduced by Karel Capek in Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti. “Robot” is derived from the Czech term for “forced labor” which was itself based on a term for slavery. Robots and slavery are thus linked in science-fiction. This leads to a philosophical question: can a machine be a slave? Sorting this matter out requires an adequate definition of slavery followed by determining whether the definition can fit a machine.

In simple terms, slavery is the ownership of a person by another person. While slavery is often seen in absolute terms (one is either enslaved or not), there are degrees of slavery in that the extent of ownership can vary. For example, a slave owner might grant their slaves some free time or allow them some limited autonomy. This is analogous to being ruled under a political authority in that there are degrees of being ruled and degrees of freedom under that rule.

Slavery is also often characterized in terms of forcing a person to engage in uncompensated labor. While this account does have some appeal, it is flawed. After all, it could be claimed that slaves are compensated by being provided with food, shelter and clothing. Slaves are sometimes even paid wages and there are cases in which slaves have purchased their own freedom using these wages. The Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire were slaves yet were paid and enjoyed a socioeconomic status above many of the free subjects of the empire.  As such, compelled unpaid labor is not the defining quality of slavery. However, it is intuitively plausible to regard compelled unpaid labor as a form of slavery in that the compeller purports to own the laborer’s time without consent or compensation.

Slaves are also often presented as powerless and abused, but this is not always the case. For example, the slave soldier Mamluks were treated as property that could be purchased, yet  enjoyed considerable status and power. The Janissaries, as noted above, also enjoyed considerable influence and power. There are free people who are powerless and routinely abused. Thus, being powerless and abused is neither necessary nor sufficient for slavery. As such, the defining characteristic of slavery is the claiming of ownership; that the slave is property.

Obviously, not all forms of ownership are slavery. My running shoes are not enslaved by me, nor is my smartphone. This is because shoes and smartphones lack the moral status required to be considered enslaved. The matter becomes more controversial when it comes to animals.

Most people accept that humans have the right to own animals. For example, a human who has a dog or cat is referred to as the pet’s owner. But there are people who take issue with the ownership of animals. While some philosophers, such as Kant and Descartes, regard animals as objects, other philosophers argue they have moral status. For example, some utilitarians accept that the capacity of animals to feel pleasure and pain grants them moral status. This is typically taken as a status that requires their suffering be considered rather than one that morally forbids their being owned. That is, it is seen as morally acceptable to own animals if they are treated well. There are even people who consider any ownership of animals to be wrong but their use of the term “slavery” for the ownership of animals seems more metaphorical than a considered philosophical position.

While I think that treating animals as property is morally wrong, I would not characterize the ownership of most animals as slavery. This is because most animals lack the status required to be enslaved. To use an analogy, denying animals religious freedom, the freedom of expression, the right to vote and so on does not oppress animals because they are not the sort of beings that can exercise these rights. This is not to say that animals cannot be wronged, just that their capabilities limit the wrongs that can be done to them. So, while an animal can be wronged by being cruelly confined, it cannot be wronged by denying it freedom of religion.

People, because of their capabilities, can be enslaved. This is because the claim of ownership over them is a denial of their rightful status. The problem is working out exactly what it is to be a person and this is something that philosophers have struggled with since the origin of the idea of persons. Fortunately, I do not need to provide such a definition when considering whether machines can be enslaved and can rely on an analogy to make my case.

While I believe that other humans are (usually) people, thanks to the problem of other minds I do not know that they are really people. Since I have no epistemic access to their (alleged) thoughts and feelings, I do not know if they have the qualities needed to be people or if they are just mindless automatons exhibiting an illusion of the personhood that I possess. Because of this, I must use an argument by analogy: these other beings act like I do, I am a person, so they are also people. To be consistent, I need to extend the same reasoning to beings that are not humans, which would include machines. After all, without cutting open the apparent humans I meet, I have no idea whether they are organic beings or machines. So, the mere appearance of being organic or mechanical is not relevant, I must judge by how the entity functions. For all I know, you are a machine. For all you know, I am a machine. Yet it seems reasonable to regard both of us as people.

While machines can engage in some person-like behavior now, they cannot yet pass this analogy test. That is, they cannot consistently exhibit the capacities exhibited by a known person, namely me. However, this does not mean that machines could never pass this test. That is, behave in ways that would be sufficient to be accepted as a person if it that behavior was done by an organic human.

A machine that could pass this test would merit being regarded as a person in the same way that humans passing this test merit this status. As such, if a human person can be enslaved, then a robot person could also be enslaved.

It is, of course, tempting to ask if a robot with such behavior would really be a person. The same question can be asked about humans, thanks to that problem of other minds.

 

A common theme of dystopian science fiction is the enslavement of humanity by machines. Emma Goldman, an anarchist philosopher, also feared human servitude to the machines. In one of her essays on anarchism, she asserted that:

Strange to say, there are people who extol this deadening method of centralized production as the proudest achievement of our age. They fail utterly to realize that if we are to continue in machine subserviency, our slavery is more complete than was our bondage to the King. They do not want to know that centralization is not only the death-knell of liberty, but also of health and beauty, of art and science, all these being impossible in a clock-like, mechanical atmosphere.

When Goldman was writing in the 1900s, the world had just entered the industrial age, and the technology of today was but a dream of visionary writers. The slavery she envisioned was not of robot masters ruling over humanity, but humans compelled to work long hours in factories, serving the machines to serve the human owners of these machines. That this is still applicable today needs no argument.

The labor movements of the 1900s helped reduce the extent of this servitude, at least in Western countries. As the rest of the world industrialized the story of servitude to the machine played out over and over. While the point of factory machines was to automate work so few could do the work of many, it is only recently that “true” automation has taken place, which is having machines doing the work instead of humans. For example, robots that assemble cars do what humans used to do. As another example, computers instead of human operators now handle phone calls.

In the eyes of utopians, this progress was supposed to free humans from tedious and dangerous work, allowing them freedom to engage in creative and rewarding labor. The reality is a dystopia. While automation has replaced humans in some tedious, low paying and dangerous jobs, automation has also replaced humans in what were once considered good jobs. Humans also continue to work in tedious, low paying and dangerous jobs because human labor is still cheaper or more effective than automation. For example, fast food chains do not use robots to prepare food. This is because cheap human labor is readily available. The dream that automation would free humanity remains a dream. Machines have mostly pushed humans out of jobs into other jobs, sometimes ones more suited for machines. If human well-being were considered important, this would not be happening.

Humans still work jobs like those condemned by Goldman. But, thanks to technology, humans are even more closely supervised and regulated by machines. For example, there is software designed to monitor employee productivity. As another example, some businesses use workplace cameras to watch employees. Obviously enough, these can be dismissed as not being enslaved by the machines and defenders would say it is good human resource management ensuring that human workers are operating efficiently. At the command of other humans, of course.

One technology that looks like servitude to the machine is warehouse picking, such as that done by Amazon. Employees. Amazon and other companies have automated some of the picking process, making use of robots in various tasks. But, while a robot might bring shelves to human workers, the humans are the ones picking the products for shipping. Since humans tend to have poor memories and get bored with picking, human pickers have been automated. They are told by computers what to do, then they tell the computers what they have done. That is, the machines are the masters, and humans are doing their bidding.

It is easy enough to argue that this sort of thing is not enslavement by machines. First, the computers controlling the humans are operating at the behest of the owners of Amazon who are (presumably) humans. Second, humans are paid for their labors and are not owned by the machines (or Amazon). As such, any enslavement of humans by machines is metaphorical.

Interestingly, the best case for human enslavement by machines can be made outside of the workplace. Many humans are now ruled by their smartphones and tablets, responding to every beep and buzz of their masters, ignoring those around them to attend to the demands of the device, and living lives revolving around the machine.

This can be easily dismissed as a metaphor. While humans are said to be addicted to their devices, they do not meet the definition of “slaves.” They willingly “obey” their devices and could turn them off. They are free to do as they want, they just do not want to disobey their devices. Humans are also not owned by their devices, rather they own their devices. But it is reasonable to consider that humans are in a form of bondage their devices have, by the design of other humans, seduced people into making them the focus of their attention and thus have become the masters.

 

110 Fallacies on Amazon

Also Known as: Appeal to Anecdote

Description:

This fallacy is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a very small number of cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. The fallacy is often considered a variation of Hasty Generalization. It has the following forms:

 

Form One

Premise 1:  Anecdote A is told about a member M (or small number of members) of Population P.

Premise 2: Anecdote A says that M is (or is not) C.

Conclusion: Therefore, C is (or is not) true of Population P.

 

Form Two

Premise 1: Reasonable statistical evidence S exists for general claim C.

Premise 2:  Anecdote A is presented that is an exception to or goes against general claim C.

Conclusion: General claim C is false

 

This fallacy is like Hasty Generalization in that a similar error is committed, namely drawing an inference based on a sample that is inadequate in size. One difference between Hasty Generalization and Anecdotal Evidence is that the fallacy of Anecdotal Evidence involves using a story (anecdote) as the sample. The more definitive distinction is that the second form of Anecdotal Evidence involves a rejection of statistical evidence for a general claim.

People often fall victim to this fallacy because stories and anecdotes usually have more psychological influence than statistical data. This persuasive force can cause people to infer that what is true in an anecdote must be true of the whole population or that an anecdote justifies rejecting statistical evidence. People often accept this fallacy because they would prefer that what is true in the anecdote be true for the whole population (a form of Wishful Thinking). For example, a person who smokes might try to convince herself that smoking will not hurt her because her Aunt Jane smoked 52 cigars a day and lived, cancer free, until she was 95.

People also fall for this fallacy when the anecdote matches their biases (positive or negative) or prejudices. For example, a person who fears and dislikes immigrants might believe that immigrants are likely to commit crimes because of an anecdote they hear about an immigrant who committed a crime. A person who has a very favorable view of immigrants might be swayed by an anecdote about an exceptional immigrant and infer that most immigrants will be exceptional.

As the example suggests, this sort of poor reasoning can be used in the context of causal reasoning. In addition to cases involving individual causation (such as Jane not getting cancer) this poor reasoning is commonly applied to causal claims about populations. What typically occurs is that a person rejects a general causal claim such as smoking causes cancer in favor of an anecdote in which a person smoked but did not get cancer. While this anecdote does show that not everyone who smokes gets cancer, it does not prove that smoking does not cause cancer.

This is because establishing that C is a causal factor for effect E in population P is a matter of showing that there would be more cases of E if all members of P were exposed to C than if none were. Showing that there are some anecdotal cases in which members of P were exposed to C but did not show effect E does not show that C does not cause E. In fact, that is what you should expect to see in most cases.

That said, the exceptions given in the anecdotes can provide a reason to be suspicious of a claimed causal connection, but this suspicion must be proportional to the evidence provided by the anecdote. For example, the fact that Alan Magee survived a fall of 20,000 feet from his B-17 bomber in WWII does show that a human can survive such a fall. However, it does not serve to disprove the general claim that falls from such great heights are usually fatal.

 Anecdotes can also provide the basis for additional research. For example, the fact that some people can be exposed to certain pathogens without getting sick suggests that they would be worth examining to see how their immunity works and whether this could benefit the general population. As another example, the fact that people do sometimes survive falls from aircraft does provide a reason for investigating how this works and how this information might be useful.

 

Defense: The defense against the first version of this fallacy is to keep in mind that an anecdote does not prove or disprove a general claim. It is especially important to be on guard against anecdotes that have strong persuasive force, such as one that are very vivid or nicely line up with biases.

For the second version, the person committing it will ironically raise the red flag for this fallacy. They will admit that they are rejecting statistical evidence in favor of an anecdote. In effect, they are telling you to believe the one piece of evidence they like in favor of the weight of evidence they dislike. To avoid inflicting this fallacy on yourself, be on guard against the tendency to confuse the psychological force of an anecdote with its logical force.

 

Example #1

Jane: “Uncle Bill smoked a pack a day since he was 11 and he lived to be 90. So, all that science and medical talk about smoking being bad is just a bunch of garbage.”

Example #2

John: “Oh no! That woman is bringing pit bull into the dog park! Everyone get their dogs and run away!”

Sally: “Oh, don’t worry. I know that people think that pit bulls are aggressive and that there are all these statistics about them being dangerous dogs.”

John: “Yeah, that is why I’m leaving before your monster kills my dog.”

Sally: “But look at how sweet my pit bull Lady Buttercup is—she has never hurt anyone. So, all that bull about pit bulls being aggressive is just that: bull.”

Example #3

Bill: “Hey Sally, you look a bit under the weather.”

Sally: “Yeah, I think I’m getting a cold. In the summer. In Florida. This sucks.”

Bill: “My dad and I almost never get colds. You should do what we do.”

Sally: “What is that?”

Bill: “Drink red wine with every meal. My dad said that is the secret to avoiding colds. When I got old enough to buy wine, I started doing it.”

Sally: “Every meal? Even breakfast?”

Bill: “Yes.”

Sally: “Red wine goes with donuts?”

Bill: “It pairs perfectly.”

Ted: “That is baloney. I know a guy who did that and he had colds all the time. Now, this other guy told me that having a slice of cheese with every meal keeps the colds away. I never saw him so much as sniffle.”

Sally: “Why not just have wine and cheese every meal?”

Example #4

Fred: “You are wasting time studying.”

George: “What? Why aren’t you studying? The test is going to be hard.”

Fred: “No need.”

George: “You’re not going to cheat, are you?”

Fred: “No, of course not! But I heard about this woman, Keisha. She aced the last test. She went to the movies and forgot to study. So, I’m going with the Keisha Method—I just need to pick a movie and my A is assured.”

Example #5

Tucker: “Did you hear that story about the immigrant who killed that student?”

Sally: “I did. Terrible.”

Tucker: “So, I bet you’ll change your stance on immigration. After all, they are coming here to commit crimes and endangering Americans.”

Sally: “The statistics show otherwise.”

Tucker: “That is your opinion. That murder shows otherwise.”

Example #5

Sally: “Did you hear that story about the immigrant who saved ten Americans and is now attending medical school and law school at the same time?”

Tucker: “I did. Impressive.”

Sally: “So, I bet you’ll change your stance on immigration. After all, they are amazing people who will do great things.”

 

This is the last of the virtual cheating series and the focus is on virtual people. The virtual aspect is easy enough to define; these are entities that exist entirely within the realm of computer memory and do not exist as physical beings in that they lack bodies of the traditional sort. They are, of course, physical beings in the broad sense, existing as data within physical memory systems.

An example of such a virtual being is a non-player character (NPC) in a video game. These coded entities range from enemies that fight the player to characters that engage in the illusion of conversation. As it now stands, these NPCs are simple beings, though players can have very strong emotional responses and even (one-sided) relationships with them. Bioware and Larian Studios excel at creating NPCs that players get very involved in and their games often feature elaborate relationship and romance systems.

While these coded entities are usually designed to look like and imitate the behavior of people, they are not people. They are, at best, the illusion of people. As such, while humans could become emotionally attached to these virtual entities (just as humans can become attached to objects), the idea of cheating with an NPC is on par with the idea of cheating with your phone.

As technology improves, virtual people will become more and more person-like. As with the robots discussed in the previous essay, if a virtual person were a person, then cheating would seem possible. Also, as with the discussion of robots, there could be degrees of virtual personhood, thus allowing for degrees of cheating. Since virtual people are essentially robots in the virtual world, the discussion of robots in that essay applies analogously to the virtual robots of the virtual world. There is, however, one obvious break in the analogy: unlike robots, virtual people lack physical bodies. This leads to the question of whether a human can virtually cheat with a virtual person or if cheating requires a physical sexual component that a virtual being cannot possess.

While, as discussed in a previous essay, there is a form of virtual sex that involves physical devices that stimulate the sexual organs, this is not “pure” virtual sex. After all, the user is using a VR headset to “look” at the partner, but the stimulation is all done mechanically. Pure virtual sex would require the sci-fi sort of virtual reality of cyberpunk: a person fully “jacked in” to the virtual reality so all the inputs and outputs are directly to and from the brain. The person would have a virtual body in the virtual reality that mediates their interaction with that world, rather than having crude devices stimulating their physical body.

Assuming the technology is good enough, a person could have virtual sex with a virtual person (or another person who is also jacked into the virtual world). On the one hand, this would obviously not be sex in the usual sense as those involved would have no physical contact. This would avoid many of the usual harms of traditional cheating as STDs and pregnancies would be impossible (although sexual malware and virtual babies might be possible). This does leave open the door for concerns about emotional infidelity.

If the virtual experience is indistinguishable from the experience of physical sex, then it could be argued that the lack of physical contact is irrelevant. At this point, the classic problem of the external world becomes relevant. The gist of this problem is that because I cannot get outside of my experiences to “see” that they are really being caused by external things that seem to be causing them, I can never know if there is really an external world. For all I know, I am dreaming right now or already in a virtual world. While this is usually seen as the nightmare scenario in epistemology, George Berkeley embraced this view in his idealism. He argued that there is no metaphysical matter and that “to be is to be perceived.” On his view, all that exists are minds and within them are ideas. Crudely put, Berkeley’s reality is virtual and God is the server. Berkely stresses that he does not, for example, deny that apples or rocks exist. They do and can be experienced, they are just not made out of metaphysical matter but are composed of ideas.

So, if cheating is defined in a way that requires physical sexual activity, knowing whether a person is cheating or not requires solving the problem of the external world. There is the philosophical possibility that there never has been any cheating since there might be no physical world. If sexual activity is instead defined in terms of behavior and sensations without references to a need for physical systems, then virtual cheating would be possible, assuming the technology can reach the required level.  

While this discussion of virtual cheating is currently theoretical, it does provide an interesting way to explore what it is about cheating (if anything) that is wrong. As noted at the start of the series, many of the main concerns about cheating are physical concerns about STDs and pregnancy. These concerns are avoided by virtual cheating. What remains are the emotions of those involved and the agreements between them. As a practical matter, the future is likely to see people working out the specifics of their relationships in terms of what sort of virtual and robotic activities are allowed and which are forbidden. While people can simply agree to anything, there is the deeper question of the rational foundation of relationship boundaries. For example, whether it is reasonable to consider interaction with a sexbot cheating or elaborate masturbation. A brave new world awaits and perhaps what happens in VR will stay in VR.

 

While science fiction has speculated about robot-human sex and romance, current technology offers little more than sex dolls. In terms of the physical aspects of sexual activity, the development of more “active” sexbots is an engineering problem; getting the machinery to perform properly and in ways that are safe for the user (or unsafe, if that is what one wants). Regarding cheating, while a suitably advanced sexbot could actively engage in sexual activity with a human, the sexbot would not be a person and hence the standard definition of cheating (as discussed in the previous essays) would not be met. This is because sexual activity with such a sexbot would be analogous to using any other sex toy (such as a simple “blow up doll” or vibrator). Since a person cannot cheat with an object, such activity would not be cheating. Some people might take issue with their partner sexing it up with a sexbot and forbid such activity. While a person who broke such an agreement about robot sex would be acting wrongly, they would not be cheating. Unless, of course, the sexbot was enough like a person for cheating to occur.

There are already efforts to make sexbots more like people in terms of their “mental” functions. For example, being able to create the illusion of conversation via AI. As such efforts progress and sexbots act more and more like people, the philosophical question of whether they really are people will become increasingly important to address. While the main moral concerns would be about the ethics of how sexbots are treated, there is also the matter of cheating.

If a sexbot were a person, then it would be possible to cheat with them; just as one could cheat with an organic person. The fact that a sexbot might be purely mechanical would not be relevant to the ethics of the cheating, what would matter would be that a person was engaging in sexual activity with another person when their relationship with another person forbids such behavior.

It could be objected that the mechanical nature of the sexbot would matter because sex requires organic parts of the right sort and thus a human cannot really have sex with a sexbot, no matter how the parts of the robot are shaped.

One counter to this is to use a functional argument. To draw an analogy to the philosophy of mind known as functionalism, it could be argued that the composition of the relevant parts does not matter, what matters is their functional role. A such, a human could have sex with a sexbot that had parts that functioned in the right way.

Another counter is to argue that the composition of the parts does not matter, rather it is the sexual activity with a person that matters. To use an analogy, a human could cheat on another human even if their only sexual contact with the other human involved sex toys. In this case, what matters is that the activity is sexual and involves people, not that objects rather than body parts are used. As such, sex with a sexbot person could be cheating if the human was breaking their commitment.

While knowing whether a sexbot is a person would (mostly) settle the cheating issue, there remains the epistemic problem of other minds. In this case, the problem is determining whether a sexbot has a mind that qualifies them as a person. There can, of course, be varying degrees of confidence in the determination and there could also be degrees of personness. Or, rather, degrees of how person-like a sexbot might be.

Thanks to Descartes and Turing, there is a language test for having a mind. If a sexbot can engage in conversation that is indistinguishable from conversation with a human, then it would be reasonable to regard the sexbot as a person. That said, there might be good reasons for having a more extensive testing system for personhood which might include testing for emotions and self-awareness. But, from a practical standpoint, if a sexbot can engage in a level of behavior that would qualify them for person status if they were a human capable of that behavior, then it would be just as reasonable to accept the sexbot as a person. To do otherwise would seem to be mere prejudice. As such, a human person could cheat with a sexbot that could pass this test. At least it would be cheating as far as we knew.

Since it will be a long time (if ever) before a sexbot person is constructed, what is of immediate concern are sexbots that are person-like. That is, they do not meet the standards that would qualify a human as a person, yet have behavior that is sophisticated enough that they seem to be more than objects. One might consider an analogy here to animals: they do not qualify as human-level people, but their behavior does qualify them for a moral status above that of objects (at least for most moral philosophers and all decent people). In this case, the question about cheating becomes a question of whether the sexbot is person-like enough to enable cheating to take place.

One approach is to consider the matter from the perspective of the human. If the human engaged in sexual activity with the sexbot regards them as being person-like enough, then the activity can be seen as cheating because they would believe they are cheating.  An objection to this is that it does not matter what the human thinks about the sexbot, what matters is its actual status. After all, if a human regards a human they are cheating with as an object, this does not mean they are not cheating. Likewise, if a human feels like they are cheating, it does not mean they really are.

This can be countered by arguing that how the human feels does matter. After all, if the human thinks they are cheating and they are engaging in the behavior, they are still acting wrongly. To use an analogy, if a person thinks they are stealing something and takes it anyway, they  have acted wrongly even if it turns out that they were not stealing. The obvious objection to this line of reasoning is that while a person who thinks they are stealing did act wrongly by engaging in what they thought was theft, they did not actually commit a theft. Likewise, a person who thinks they are engaging in cheating, but are not, would be acting wrongly in that they are doing something they think is wrong, but not cheating.

Another approach is to consider the matter objectively so that the degree of cheating would be proportional to the degree that the sexbot is person-like. On this view, cheating with a person-like sexbot would not be as bad as cheating with a full person. The obvious objection is that one is either cheating or not; there are no degrees of cheating. The obvious counter is to try to appeal to the intuition that there could be degrees of cheating in this manner. To use an analogy, just as there can be degrees of cheating in terms of the sexual activity engaged in, there can also be degrees of cheating in terms of how person-like the sexbot is.

While person-like sexbots are still the stuff of science fiction, I suspect the future will see some interesting divorce cases in which this matter is debated in court.

 

As discussed in the previous essays, classic cheating involves sexual activity with a person while one is in a committed relationship that is supposed to exclude such activity. Visual VR can allow interaction with another person, but while such activity might have sexual content (such as nakedness) it would not be sexual activity in the sense that requires physical contact. Such behavior, as argued in the previous essay, might constitute a form of emotional infidelity but not physical infidelity.

One of the iron laws of technology is that any technology that can be used for sex will be used for sex. Virtual reality (VR), in its various forms, is no exception. For the most part, VR is limited to sight and sound. That is, virtual reality is mostly just virtual visual reality (VVR). However, researchers are hard at work developing tactile devices for the erogenous zones, thus allowing people to interact sexually across the internet. This is the start of what could be called “robust” VR that involves more than just sight and sound. This sort of technology might make virtual cheating suitably analogous to real cheating.

Most current research is focused on developing devices for men to use to have “virtual sex.” By the standards of traditional cheating, this sort of activity would not count as cheating. This is because the sexual interaction is not with another person, but with devices. The obvious analogy here is to with less-sophisticated sex toys. If, for example, using a vibrator or blow-up-doll does not count as cheating because the device is not a person, then the same should apply to more complicated devices, such as VR sex suits that can be used with VR sex programs. There is also the question of whether such activity counts as sex. On the one hand, it is some sort of sexual activity. On the other hand, using such a device would not end a person’s tenure as a virgin.

It is worth considering that a user could develop an emotional relationship with their virtual sex “partner” and thus engage in a form of emotional infidelity. An objection is that this virtual sex partner is not a person and thus cheating would not be possible since one cannot cheat on a person with an object.

This can be countered by considering the classic problem of other minds. Because all we have access to is external behavior, one never knows if what seem to be people really are people; that is, they think and feel in the right ways (or at all). Since I do not know if anyone else has a mind as I do, I could have emotional attachments to entities that are not really people at all and never know. So, I could never know if I was cheating in the traditional sense if I had to know that I was interacting with another person. As might be suspected, this sort of epistemic excuse (“baby, I did not know she was a person because of the problem of other minds”) is unlikely to be accepted by anyone (even epistemologists). What would seem to matter is not knowing that the other entity is a person but having the right (or rather wrong) sort of emotional involvement. So, if a person could have feelings towards the virtual sexual partner that they “interact with”, then this sort of behavior could count as virtual cheating because of the one-way emotions.

There are also devices that allow people to interact sexually across the internet; with each partner having a device that communicates with their partner’s corresponding device. Put roughly, this is remote control sex. This sort of activity does avoid many of the possible harms of traditional cheating: there is no risk of pregnancy nor risk of STDs (assuming the equipment is clean). While these considerations do impact utilitarian calculations, the question remains as to whether this would count as cheating or not.

On the one hand, the argument could be made that this is not direct sexual contact as each person is only directly “engaged” with their device. To use an analogy, imagine that someone has (unknown to you) connected your computer to a “stimulation device” so that every time you use your mouse or keyboard, someone is “stimulated.” In such cases, it would be odd to say that you were having sex with that person. As such, this sort of thing would not be cheating.

On the other hand, there is the matter of intent. In the case of the mouse example, the user has no idea what they are doing and it is that, rather than the remote-controlled nature of the activity, that matters. In the case of remote-control interaction, the users are intentionally engaging in the activity and know what they are doing. The fact that is happening via the internet does not matter. The moral status is the same if they were in the same room, using the devices “manually” on each other. As such, while there is not actual bodily contact, the activity is sexual and controlled by those involved. As such, it would morally count as cheating. There can, of course, be a debate about the degrees of cheating. One might argue that cheating using sex toys is not as bad as cheating using body parts. I will, however, leave that to others to discuss.

In the next essay I will discuss cheating in the context sex with robots and person-like VR beings.