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Teenagers are stereotyped as poor decision makers who engage in risky behavior. These stereotypes are often explained in terms of the teenage brain (or mind) being immature and lacking the reasoning abilities of adults. Obviously, adults often engage in poor decision-making and risky behavior.

But research shows that teenagers use basically the same reasoning as adults and they even overestimate risks. So, if the youth use the same reasoning as adults and overestimate risk, then what needs to be determined is the way teenage thinking differs from that of adults.

A plausible hypothesis is that teenagers differ from adults in terms of how they evaluate the value of a reward. The difference is that teenagers place higher value on certain rewards than adults. If this is correct, it makes sense that teenagers are more willing than adults to engage in risk taking. After all, the rationality of taking a risk can be seen as a matter of weighing the (perceived) risk against the (perceived) value of the potential reward. So, a teenager who places higher value on a reward than an adult would be acting rationally (to a degree) if they were willing to take more risks to achieve that reward.

Obviously, adults also vary in their willingness to take risks and some of this is, presumably, a matter of the value adults place on the rewards relative to the risks. So, for example, if Sam values sex more than Sally does, then Sam will (somewhat) rationally accept more risks than Sally. If teenagers generally value rewards more than adults do, then the greater risk-taking behavior of teens relative to adults makes considerable sense.

It might be wondered why teenagers place more value on rewards relative to adults. One theory is based in the workings of the brain. On this view, the sensitivity of the human brain to dopamine and oxytocin peaks during the teenage years. Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that is supposed to trigger the “reward” mechanisms of the brain. Oxytocin is another neurotransmitter, one that is also linked with the “reward” mechanisms as well as social activity. If the teenage brain is more sensitive to these chemicals, then it makes sense that teenagers would place more value on rewards. This is because they do, in fact, get a greater reward than adults.  Or, more accurately, they feel more rewarded. This, of course, might be one and the same thing as perhaps the value of a reward is a matter of how rewarded a person feels. This does raise an interesting subject, namely whether the value of a reward is subjective or objective.

Adults are often critical of what they see as irrationally risky behavior by teens. While my teen years are well behind me, I have looked back on some of my decisions that seemed like good ideas at the time, yet my adult assessment is that they were not. However, I am weighing these decisions in terms of my adult perspective and in terms of the consequences of these actions (or potential consequences I could have faced). I also must consider that the rewards that I felt in the past are now nothing but faded memories. It is a bit like eating a lot of cake. At the time, that sugar rush and taste are rewarding, and it might seem like a good idea at the time. But once the sugar rush gives way to the sugar crash and the cake, as my mother would say, “went right to the hips”, then the assessment might be different. The food analogy is especially apt: as you might well recall from your own youth, candy and other junk food tasted so good then. Now it imostly just tastes like junk. This also raises an interesting subject worthy of additional exploration, namely the assessment of value over time.

Going back to the cake, eating the whole thing was enjoyable and seemed like a great idea at the time. Yes, I have eaten an entire cake. With ice cream.  But, in my defense, I used to run 95-100 miles per week. Looking back from the perspective of my older self, that seems to have been a bad idea, and I certainly would not do that (or enjoy it) today. But does this change of perspective show that it was a poor choice at the time? I am tempted to think that, at the time, it was a good choice for the kid I was. But my adult self now judges my kid self harshly and perhaps unfairly. After all, there does seem to be relativity to value and it seems mere prejudice to say that my current evaluation should be taken as being better than the evaluations of my past self. That is, what would be a bad decision today might have been a good one then. Using the cake example, cake tasted so good back in the day. Now, thanks to the cruel hand of time, cake does not taste nearly as good.

 

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Like most people, I have eaten bugs. Also, like most Americans, this has been unintentional and often done in ignorance. I’ve accidentally inhaled a few bugs while running but mostly I’ve consumed bug bits in foods—the FDA allows a certain percentage of “debris” and some of that is composed of bugs.

While Americans typically do not willingly and knowingly eat insects, about 2 billion people do and there are about 2,000 species that are known to be edible. As might be guessed, many who eat insects live in developing countries. As countries develop, people tend to switch away from eating insects. This is hardly surprising—eating meat is seen as a sign of status while eating insects typically is not. However, there are excellent reasons to use insects as a food source for humans and animals. Some of these reasons are practical while others are ethical. Unfortunately, using insects as food is now a battle in the culture war, with a conspiracy theory that the global elites want to make us eat (more) bugs. After all, we already get bugs in our food.

One practical reason to use insects as a food source is efficiency. 10 pounds of feed will yield 4.8 pounds of cricket protein, 4.5 pounds of salmon, 2.2 pounds of chicken, 1.1 pounds of pork, and .4 pounds of beef.  With a growing human population and the degradation of the environment, increased efficiency will be vital to providing people with enough food.

A second practical reason is they require less land to produce protein. For example, it takes 269 square feet to produce a pound of pork protein while it requires only 88 square feet to generate one pound of mealworm protein.  Given an expanding population and a decrease in available land, this is a good reason to use insect farming as a food source. It is also morally relevant, at least for those who are concerned about the environmental impact of food production. If we can produce more food on less land we could, in theory, allow some currently used land to return to the wild.

A third reason, which would be rejected by those who deny climate change, is that producing insect protein generates less greenhouse gas. A pound of pork generates 38 pounds of CO2 while a pound of mealworms produces only 14. For those who believe that CO2 production is a problem, this is both a moral and practical reason in favor of using insects for food. For those who think that CO2 has no impact or does not matter, this would be no advantage.

A fourth practical reason is that while many food animals are fed using food that humans could also eat (like grain and corn based feed), many insects  consume organic waste unfit for human consumption. As such, insects can transform low-value feed material (such as garbage) into higher value feed or food. This would also provide a moral reason, at least for those who favor reducing waste that ends up in landfills. This could provide some interesting business opportunities and combinations—imagine a waste processing business that “processes” organic waste with insects and then converts the insects to feed, food or for use in other products (such as medicine, lipstick and alcoholic beverages).

A potentially powerful moral argument in favor of choosing insect protein over protein from animals such as chicken, pigs and cows is based on the assumption that insects have a lower moral status than such animals (or at least would suffer less).

In terms of the lower status approach, the argument would be a variation on one commonly used to support vegetarianism over eating meat: plants have a lower moral status than animals; therefore, it is preferable to eat plants rather than animals. If insects have a lower moral status than chickens, pigs, cows, etc., then using insects for food would be morally preferable. This, of course, also rests on the assumption that it is preferable to do wrong (in this case kill and eat) to beings with a lesser moral status than to those with a higher status.

In terms of the suffering argument, this would be a standard utilitarian argument. The usual calculation involves weighing the harm (in this case, the suffering) against the benefits. Insects are, on the face of it, less able to suffer (and less able to understand their own suffering) than animals like pigs and cows. Also, insects would seem to suffer less under the conditions in which they would be raised. While chickens might be factory farmed with their beaks clipped and confined to tiny cages, mealworms would be pretty much doing what they would do in the “wild” when being raised as food. While the insect would still be killed, the overall suffering generated by using insects as food would be far less than that created by using animals like pigs and cows as food. This would seem to be a morally compelling argument.

The most obvious problem with using insects as food is the “yuck factor.” Bugs are generally seen as dirty and gross. They are things that you usually do not want to find in your food. Some of the “yuck” is visual, such as seeing the insect as you eat it. One obvious solution is to process insects into forms that look like “normal” foods, such as powders, pastes, and the classic “mystery meat patty.”  People can also learn to overcome the distaste, much as some people must overcome their initial rejection of foods like lobster and crab. Also, to be a bit crude, most people eat flesh cut from the corpses of dead animals so we should be able to tolerate the alleged grossness of eating bugs.

Another concern is that insects might bear the stigma of being a food suitable for “primitive” cultures and not suitable for “civilized” people. Insect based food products might be seen as lacking in status, especially in contrast with traditional meats. These are, of course, all matters of social perception. Just as they are created, they can be altered. As such, these problems could be overcome.

Since I grew up eating lobsters and crabs (I’m from Maine), I am already fine with eating “bug-like” creatures. So, I would not have any problem with eating actual bugs, if they are safe to eat. I will admit that I probably will not be serving up plates of fried beetles to my friends, but I would have no problem serving up food containing properly processed insects. And not just because it would be, at least initially, funny.

 

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As science and philosophy explained the natural world in the Modern Era, the philosophical idea of strict determinism was embraced by thinkers like Thomas Hobbes. Strict determinism, as often presented, includes both metaphysical and epistemic aspects. In the context of metaphysics, it is the view that each event follows from previous events by necessity. In negative terms, it is a denial of both chance and free will. A variant of this is predestination, which is the notion that all events are planned and set by a supernatural agency (typically God).  The epistemic aspect is grounded in metaphysics: if each event follows from other events by necessity, if someone knew all the relevant facts about the state of a system at a time and had enough intellectual capacity (or processing power), they could correctly predict the future of that system. Philosophers and scientists who are metaphysical determinists typically claim that the world seems undetermined to us because of our epistemic failings. In short, we believe in choice or chance because we are unable to always predict what will occur. But, for the determinist, this is a matter of ignorance and not metaphysics. For those who believe in choice or chance, our inability to predict is taken as the result of a universe in which choice or chance is real. That is, we cannot always predict because the metaphysical nature of the universe makes (at least some of) it unpredictable. Because of choice or chance, what follows from one event is not (always) a matter of necessity.

An obvious problem for choosing between determinism and its alternatives is given our limited epistemic abilities, a deterministic universe seems the same to us as a non-deterministic universe. If the universe is deterministic, our limited epistemic abilities mean that we often make predictions that turn out to be wrong (and we are determined to do so). If the universe is not deterministic, our limited epistemic abilities and the non-deterministic nature of the universe mean that we often make errors in our predictions. As such, the fact that we make errors is consistent with both deterministic and non-deterministic universes.

It can be argued that as we get better at predicting we will have an improved understanding of the nature of the universe. However, until we reach omniscience, we will not know whether our errors are purely epistemic (events are unpredictable because we are not perfect predictors) or are the result of metaphysics (events are unpredictable because of choice or chance).

Interestingly, one feature of reality that often leads thinkers to reject strict determinism is chaos. For example, consider the motion of the planets in our solar system.  In the past, the motion of the planets was presented as a sign of the order of the universe—a clockwork solar system in God’s clockwork universe. While the planets might seem to move like clockwork, Newton realized the gravity of the planets affected each other but also realized that calculating the interactions was beyond his ability.  In the face of problems in his physics, Newton used God to fill in the gaps. With the development of computers, scientists modeled planetary motion and the generally accepted view is that they are not part of deterministic divine clock. To be less poetical, the view is that chaos seems to be a factor. For example, some scientists believe that the gas giant Jupiter’s gravity might change Mercury’s gravity enough that it collides with Venus or Earth. This suggests the solar system is not an orderly clockwork machine of perfect order. Because of this sort of thing (which occurs at all levels in the world) some thinkers take the universe to include chaos and infer from the lack of perfect order that strict determinism is false. While this is certainly tempting, the inference is not as solid as some might think.

It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the universe lacks a strict and eternal order from such things as the chaotic behavior of the planets. However, strict determinism is not the same thing as strict order. Strict order is a metaphysical notion that a system will work in the same way, without any variation or change, for as long as it exists. The idea of an eternally ordered clockwork universe is an excellent example of this sort of system: it works like a perfect clock, each part relentlessly following its path without deviation. While a deterministic system would certainly be consistent with such an orderly system, determinism is not the same thing as strict order. After all, to accept determinism is to accept that each event follows by necessity from previous events. This is consistent with a system that deterministically changes over time and changes in ways that seem chaotic.

Returning to the example of the solar system, suppose that Jupiter’s gravity will cause Mercury’s orbit to change enough so that it hits the earth. This is consistent with that event being necessarily determined by past events such that things could not have been different. To use an analogy, it is like a clockwork machine built with a defect that will inevitably break the machine. Things cannot be otherwise, yet to those ignorant of the defect, the machine will seem to fall into chaos. However, if one knew the defect and had the capacity to process the data, then this breakdown would be predictable. To use another analogy, it is like scripted performance of madness by an actor: it might seem chaotic, but the script determines it. That is, it merely seems chaotic because of our ignorance. As such, the appearance of chaos does not disprove strict determinism because determinism is not the same thing as unchanging.

 

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Back in 2014 Kaci Hickox, a nurse from my home state of Maine, returned to the United States after serving as a health care worker in an Ebola outbreak. Rather than being greeted as a hero, she was confined to an unheated tent with a box for a toilet and no shower. She did not have any symptoms and tested negative for Ebola. After threatening a lawsuit, she was released and allowed to return to Maine. After arriving home, she refused to be quarantined again. She did, however, state that she would be following the CDC protocols. Her situation put a face on a general moral concern, namely the ethics of balancing rights with safety. As Ebola has once again made it into the American news cycle, it is worth revisiting this situation.

While past outbreaks of Ebola in Africa were met largely with indifference from the West (aside from those who went to help), the 2014 outbreak infected the United States with a severe case of fear. Some in the media fed the fear, presumably in the hopes of increasing views. Politicians also contributed to the fear. Some tried to make Ebola into a political game piece to bash their opponents and score points by appeasing fears they helped create. Because of this fear, most Americans supported a travel ban for Ebola infected countries and some states imposed mandatory quarantines. While politicians will exploit the fears of the public, the ethics of the matter should be considered rationally. My view has not changed much from 2014 but is worth reconsidering.

While Ebola and other deadly diseases are scary, I address them with the same approach I use for all situations in which rights (or liberties) conflict with safety.  The first step is sorting out the level of risk. This includes determining the probability that the harm will occur as well as the severity of the harm (in quantity and quality). In the case of Ebola, the probability that someone will be infected in the United States is low. As experts have pointed out, infection requires direct contact with bodily fluids while a person is infectious. Even then, the infection rate has seemed relatively low, at least for past cases in the United States. In terms of the harm, Ebola can be fatal. However, timely treatment in a well-equipped facility can be effective. In terms of the things that are likely to harm or kill someone in the United States, Ebola is near the bottom of the list. As such, a rational assessment of the threat is that it is usually a small one in the United States. Naturally, if the chances of infection increased, then a reassessment of the threat would be in order. While overreacting from fear is bad, not responding to a disease can be worse.

The second step is determining key facts about safety proposals. One obvious concern is the effectiveness of the proposed method. As an example, the 21-day mandatory quarantine would be effective at containing Ebola. If someone shows no symptoms during that time, then she is almost certainly Ebola free and can be released. If a person shows symptoms, then she can be treated immediately.  An alternative, namely tracking and monitoring people rather than locking them up would also be effective—at least it has worked in the past. However, this method could fail—bureaucratic failures might happen or people might refuse to cooperate. A second concern is the cost of the method. In the case of the 21-day quarantine, there are the obvious economic and psychological costs to the person being quarantined. After all, some people will not be able to work from quarantine, and the person will be isolated from others. There is also the cost of the quarantine itself. In terms of other consequences, it was argued that imposing this quarantine would discourage volunteers from going to help and this will be worse for the United States. This is because it is best for the rest of the world if Ebola is stopped before it spreads and this will require volunteers from around the world. In the case of the tracking and monitoring approach, there would be a cost—but less than a mandatory quarantine.

From a practical standpoint, assessing a proposal is a utilitarian calculation: does the risk warrant the cost? To use some non-Ebola examples, every aircraft could be made as safe as Air-Force One, every car could be made as safe as a NASCAR vehicle, and all guns could be taken away to prevent gun accidents and homicides. However, we have decided that the cost of such safety is too high and hence we are willing to allow people to die. In the case of Ebola, the calculation is a question of considering the risk against the effectiveness and cost of the proposed method. Since I am not a medical expert, I  will defer to the medical experts who claimed that the quarantine approach was not warranted for people who lack symptoms and test negative.

The third concern is the moral concern. Sorting out the moral aspect involves weighing the practical concerns (risk, effectiveness and cost) against the right (or liberty) in question. Some also include the legal aspects of the matter here as well, although law and morality are distinct (except for those who are legalists and see the law as determining morality). Since I am not a lawyer, I will leave the legal aspects to others and focus on the ethics.

When working through the moral aspect, the challenge is determining whether the practical concerns morally justify restricting or even eliminating rights (or liberties) in the name of safety. This should be based on consistent principles in when balancing safety and rights. Unfortunately, people tend to be wildly inconsistent. In the case of Ebola, some people expressed the “better safe than sorry” view and imposed or supported mandatory quarantines at the expense of the rights and liberties of those  quarantined. In the case of gun rights, these are often taken as trumping concerns about safety. The same holds true of the “right” or liberty to operate automobiles: tens of thousands of people die each year on the roads, yet any proposal to deny people this right would be rejected.  In general, people assess based on feelings, prejudices, biases, ideology and other non-rational factors, which helps explain the lack of consistency. So, people are willing to impose on basic rights for little or no gain to safety, while also being content to refuse even modest infringements in matters that result in great harm (as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated). However, there are also legitimate grounds for differences: people can, after due consideration, assess the weight of rights against safety differently.

Turning back to Ebola, the main moral question is whether the safety gained by imposing a quarantine (or travel ban) would justify denying people their rights. In the case of someone who is infectious, the answer would seem to be “yes.” After all, the harm done to the person (being quarantined) is greatly exceeded by the harm that would be inflicted on others by his putting them at risk of infection. In the case of people who are showing no symptoms, who test negative and who are relatively low risk (no known specific exposure to infection), then a mandatory quarantine would not be justified. Naturally, some would argue that “it is better to be safe than sorry” and hence the mandatory quarantine should be imposed. However, if it was justified in the case of Ebola, it would also be justified in other cases in which imposing on rights has even a slight chance of preventing harm. This would seem to justify taking away private vehicles and guns: these kill more people in the United States than Ebola. It might also justify imposing mandatory diets and exercise on people to protect them from harm.  After all, poor health habits are major causes of health issues and premature deaths. To be consistent, if imposing a mandatory quarantine is warranted on the grounds that rights can be set aside even when the risk is incredibly slight, then this same principle must be applied across the board. This seems rather unreasonable and hence the mandatory quarantine of people who are not infectious would also be unreasonable and not morally acceptable. 

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In general, humans often join factions and then see their own factions as right, good and truthful while viewing opposing factions as wrong, evil and deceitful. While the best-known factions tend to be political or religious, people can form factions around almost anything, ranging from sports teams to video game consoles.

While there are rational reasons to form and support a faction, factionalism tends to be fed by cognitive biases and fallacies. A core cognitive bias of factionalism is in group bias. This is the psychology tendency to easily form negative views of those outside of their group. For example, Democrats often see Republicans negatively, casting them as uncaring, sexist, racist and fixated on money. In turn, Republicans typically look back at Democrats negatively and see them as woke, obsessed with race and gender, and wanting to punish success. This occurs outside of politics, with competing religious groups seeing each other as heretics or infidels. It even extends to games and sports, as the battles of #gamergate illustrated.

The other side of this bias is that members of a faction see themselves in a positive light and are inclined to attribute positive qualities. For example, Democrats see themselves as caring about the environment and being concerned about social good. As another example, MAGA folks cast themselves as true Americans who just want to make America great again.

This bias is often expressed in terms of and fueled by stereotypes. For example, critics of the sexist aspects of gaming might the worst stereotypes of male gamers (dateless, pale misogynists who spew their rage with a mouth full of Cheetos). As another example, Democrats will sometimes cast the rich as being uncaring and out of touch plutocrats. These stereotypes are sometimes taken the extreme of demonizing: presenting the other faction members as not merely wrong but as evil.

Such stereotypes are easy to accept and many are based on another bias, the fundamental attribution error. This is a psychological tendency to fail to realize that the behavior of other people is as much limited by circumstances as our behavior would be if we were in their circumstances. For example, a person who was born into a wealthy family and enjoyed many advantages might not understand the challenges faced by people who were not so lucky in choosing their parents. Because of this, she might demonize those who are unsuccessful and attribute their failure to laziness and other defects without considering their circumstances.

Factionalism is also strengthened by various fallacies. The most obvious is the appeal to group identity. This fallacy occurs when a person accepts her pride in being in a group as evidence that a claim is true. Roughly put, a person believes a claim because her faction accepts it as true. The claim might even be true, but the mistake is that the basis of the belief is not rational. For example, a devoted environmentalist might believe in climate change because of her membership in that faction rather than because of evidence (which shows climate change is occurring). This method of belief “protects” group members from evidence and arguments because such beliefs are based on group identity and not proof. While a person can overcome this fallacy, faction-based beliefs tend to only change when the faction changes or if the person leaves the faction.

The above-mentioned biases also tend to incline people towards fallacious reasoning. The negative biases tend to motivate people to accept straw man reasoning, which is when someone ignores a person’s actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version. Politicians routinely make straw men out of the views they oppose, and their faction members typically embrace these. The negative biases also make ad hominem fallacies common. An ad hominem is a category of fallacies in which a claim or argument is rejected based on some irrelevant fact about the person presenting the claim or argument. Typically, this fallacy involves two steps. First, an attack is made against the character of the person making the claim or her circumstances, or her actions. Second, this attack is taken as evidence against the claim. For example, opponents of a feminist critic of sexism in gaming might reject her view by claiming that she is only trying to become famous and make money. While it might be true that she is doing that, this would not disprove her claims. The guilt by association fallacy, in which a person rejects a claim simply because it is pointed out that people she dislikes accept the claim, both arises from and contributes to factionalism.

The negative views and stereotypes are also often fed by fallacies that involve poor generalizations. One is misleading vividness, a fallacy in which a very small number of dramatic events are taken to outweigh statistical evidence. For example, a person in a faction holding that migrants are violent criminals would focus on the few examples they can find. Misleading vividness is closely related to hasty generalization, a fallacy in which a person draws a conclusion about a population based on a sample that is not large enough to justify that conclusion. For example, a Democrat might believe that all corporations are bad based just on the behavior of Amazon. Biased generalizations also occur, which is a fallacy committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on a sample that is biased or prejudiced in some manner. This is often fed by the confirmation bias—the tendency people have to seek and accept evidence for their view while avoiding or ignoring evidence against their view. For example, a person might form their views from watching biased media such as Fox News.

The positive biases also contribute to fallacious reasoning, often taking the form of a positive ad hominem. A positive ad hominem occurs when a claim is accepted based on irrelevant facts about a person making a claim or argument. Typically, this fallacy involves two steps. First, something positive (but irrelevant) about the character of person making the claim, her circumstances, or her actions is presented. Second, this is taken as evidence for their claim. For example, a MAGA Republican might accept what Trump says as true, just because he likes Trump.

Nor surprisingly, factionalism is also supported by variations of appeals to belief (it is true/right because my faction believes it is so), appeal to common practice (it is right because my faction does it), and appeal to tradition (it is right because my faction has “always done this”).

Factionalism is both fed by and contributes to such biases and poor reasoning. This is not to say that group membership is a bad thing, just that it is wise to be on guard against the corrupting influence of factionalism.

 

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Having written on the ethics of asteroid mining, I thought I would return to this subject and address an additional moral concern, namely the potential dangers of asteroid (and comet) mining. My concern here is not with the dangers to the miners but with dangers to our home world and the rest of us.

While mining of asteroids and comets is currently science fiction, it is possible and might prove to be economically viable. One relevant factor is the high cost of getting material into space. Given this cost, space construction using material mined in space might be cost effective. Satellites might be built in space from material harvested from asteroids. It is also worth considering that the cost of mining materials in space and shipping them to earth might also be low enough that space mining would be viable. If such material is more expensive to mine or has limited availability on earth, then space mining could be viable or even necessary.

If material mined in space is to be used on earth, an obvious problem is how to get the material to the surface safely and as cheaply as possible. One approach is to move an asteroid close to the earth to facilitate mining and transportation—it might be more efficient to move the asteroid rather than send mining vessels back and forth. One obvious moral concern about moving an asteroid close to earth is that something could go wrong and the asteroid could strike the earth, perhaps in a populated area. Another obvious concern is that the asteroid could be intentionally used as a weapon—perhaps by a state or by non-state actors. An asteroid could do incredible damage and would provide a “clean kill” without radioactive fallout or chemical or biological residue.  An asteroid might even “accidentally on purpose” be dropped on a target, thus allowing the attacker to claim that it was an accident (something harder to do when using actual weapons).

Given the dangers posed by moving asteroids into earth orbit, this is something that should be carefully regulated. That said, accidents and intentional misuse are guaranteed.

Another concern is the transport of material from space to earth. The obvious approach is to ship material to the surface using a vehicle, perhaps constructed in orbit from materials mined in space. Such a vehicle could be simple as it would not need a crew and would just have to ensure that the cargo landed in roughly the right area. Another approach would be to drop material from orbit—perhaps by surrounding valuable materials with materials intended to ablate during the landing and with a parachute system for some braking.

An obvious concern is the danger posed by such transport methods. While vehicles or rock-drops would not do the sort of damage that an asteroid would, if one crashed into a densely populated area (intentionally or accidentally) it could do significant harm. While such crashes will almost certainly occur, there is a moral obligation to try to minimize the chances they will happen. The obvious problem is that increasing safety usually increases cost and decreases convenience. For example, having the landing zones in unpopulated areas would reduce the risk of a crash into an urban area, but would  require transporting materials to places where it can be processed (unless the processing plants are built in the drop zone).  As another example, payload sizes might be limited to reduce the damage done by crashes. As a final example, the vessels or drop-rocks might be required to have safety systems, such as backup parachutes. Given that people will cut costs and corners and suffer lapses of attention, accidents are inevitable. We can also expect the Republican party to work hard to ensure that space mining is not well regulated and that it is used to hurt people.  Also of concern is the fact that the vessels and drop-rocks could be used as weapons (as a rule, any technology that can be used to kill people will be used to kill people). As such, there will need for safeguards. It would, for example, be bad if terrorists were able to get control of a system and start dropping vessels or rocks onto a city.

Despite the risks, if there is profit to be made in mining space and new chances to make people suffer, it will almost certainly be done. Given that the resources on earth are limited, access to the bounty of the solar system could be good for (almost) everyone. It could also be another step for humanity towards the stars. Or it could play out in a corporate dystopia.

 

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My experiences as a gamer have taught me lessons applicable to the real world (assuming it exists). One key skill for dealing with reality is the ability to model it. Roughly put, this is the ability to grasp how things work and make reasonably accurate predictions. This ability is useful: grasping how things work is a big step on the road to success.

Many games, such as Call of Cthulhu, D&D, Pathfinder and Star Fleet Battles use dice to model the vagaries of reality. For example, if your Call of Cthulhu character is trying to avoid being spotted by the cultists of Hastur as she spies on them, you would need to roll under your Sneak skill on percentile dice. As another example, if your D-7 battle cruiser were firing phasers and disruptors at a Kzinti strike cruiser, you would roll dice and consult various charts to see what happened in a game of Star Fleet Battles. Video games also include the digital equivalent of dice. For example, if you are playing World of Warcraft, the damage done by a spell or a weapon will be random(ish).

Being a gamer, it is natural for me to look at reality as also being random—after all, if a random model (gaming system) fits aspects of reality, that suggests the model has some things right. As such, I tend to think of this as being a random universe in which God (or whatever) plays dice with us.

Naturally, I do not know if the universe is random (contains elements of chance). After all, we tend to attribute chance to the unpredictable, but this unpredictability might be a matter of ignorance rather than chance. The fact that we do not know what will happen does not entail that it is a matter of chance.

People also seem to believe in chance because they think things could have been differently: the roll might have been a 1 rather than a 20 or Sam might have won the lottery. However, even if things could have been different it does not follow that chance is real. After all, chance is not the only thing that could make a difference. Also, there is the question of proving that things could have been different.  This would seem to be impossible: while it might be believed that conditions could be recreated perfectly, one factor that can never be duplicated is time. Recreating an event will always be a recreation. If the die comes up 20 on the first roll and 1 on the second, this does not show that it could have been a 1 the first time. It shiows that it was 20 the first time and 1 the second.

If someone had a TARDIS and could pop back in time to witness the roll again and if the time traveler saw a different outcome this time, then this might be evidence of chance. Or evidence that the time traveler changed the event.

Even traveling to a possible or parallel world would not be of help. If our TARDIS malfunctions and pops us into a world like our own right before the parallel me rolled the die and we see it come up 1 rather than 20, this just shows that he rolled a 1. It tells us nothing about whether my roll of 20 could have been a 1.

Of course, the other side of the coin is that I can never know that the world is non-random: aside from some sort of special knowledge about the working of the universe, a random universe and a non-random universe would seem the same. Whether my die roll is random or not, all I get is the result—I do not perceive either chance or determinism. However, I go with a random universe because, to be honest, I am a gamer who is hooked on dice.

If the universe is deterministic, then I am determined to do what I do. If the universe is random, then chance is a factor. However, a purely random universe would not permit actual decision-making: it would be determined by chance. In games, there is apparently the added element of choice—I chose for my character to try to attack the dragon and then roll dice to determine the result. As such, I also add choice to my random universe. I admit I have no idea what choice might be or how it works.

Obviously, there is no way to prove that choice occurs—as with chance versus determinism, without knowing the brute fact about choice there is no way to know whether the universe allows for choice. I go with a choice universe for the following reason: If there is no choice, then I go with choice because I have no choice. So, I am determined (or chanced) to be wrong. I could not choose otherwise. If there is choice, then I am right. So, choosing choice seems the best choice. So, I believe in a random universe with choice—mainly because of gaming. So, what about the lessons from this?

One important lesson is that decisions are made in uncertainty: because of chance, the results of any choice cannot be known with certainty. In a game, I do not know if the sword strike will finish the dragon. In life, I do not know if an investment will pay off. In general, this uncertainty can be reduced, and this shows the importance of knowing odds and consequences: such knowledge is critical to making good decisions in a game and in life. So, know as much as you can for a better tomorrow.

Another important lesson is that things can always go wrong. Or well. In a game, there might be a 1 in 100 chance that a character will be spotted by cultists. But it could happen. In life, there might be a 1 in a 1,000 chance of a doctor taking precautions catching Ebola from a patient. But it could happen. Because of this, the possibility of failure must always be considered, and it is wise to take steps to minimize the chances of failure and the consequences.

Keeping in mind the role of chance also helps a person be more understanding, sympathetic and forgiving. After all, if things can fail or go wrong because of chance, then it makes sense to be more forgiving and understanding of failure—at least when the failure can be attributed in part to chance. It also helps when it comes to praising success: knowing that chance plays a role in success is also important. For example, people often assume that the success of those they like is deserved because it must be the result of hard work, virtue and so on. However, if chance plays a significant role in success, then that should be considered when praising people, condemning them, and making decisions. Naturally, the role of chance in success and failure should be considered when planning and creating policies. Unfortunately, people often take the view that both success and failure are mainly a matter of choice—for example, that the rich must deserve their riches, and the poor must deserve their poverty. However, an understanding of chance would help our understanding of success and failure and would, hopefully, influence the decisions we make.  There is an old saying “there, but for the grace of God, go I.” One could also say “there, but for the luck of the die, go I.”

 

 

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In science fiction automated medical services are common. One example is the autodoc—an autonomous robotic pod that treats the patient within its confines. Medbots, as distinct from the autodoc, are robots that do not enclose the patient, but do their work in a way like a traditional doctor or medic.  There are also non-robotic options using remote-controlled machines—this would be an advanced form of telemedicine in which the patient can be treated remotely. Naturally, robots can be built that can be switched from robotic (autonomous) to remote controlled mode. For example, a medbot might gather data about the patient and then a human doctor might take control to diagnose and treat the patient.

One of the main and morally commendable reasons to create medical robots and telemedicine capabilities is to treat people in areas without enough human medical professionals. For example, a medical specialist who lives in New York City could diagnose and treat patients in such desolate areas as New Jersey or Ohio. With such machines, a patient could (in theory) have access to any also radically change health care—after all, a medical robot would never get tired and such robots could, in theory, be sent all over the world, even Florida, to provide medical care. There is, of course, the usual concern about the impact of technology on jobs—if robots can replace medical personnel and increase profits for corporations, that will certainly happen. While robots would excel at programmable surgery and similar tasks, it will probably be some time before robots are advanced enough to replace human medical professionals on a large scale

Another excellent reason to create medical robots and telemedicine capabilities has been made clear by the latest Ebola outbreak: medical personnel are at risk for infection. While protective gear and protocols do exist, the gear is cumbersome, flawed and hot and people often fail to follow protocols.  While many people are moral heroes and put themselves at risk to treat the ill and bury the dead, there are no doubt people who are deterred by the very real possibility of a horrible death. Medical robots and telemedicine seem ideal for handling such cases and the more utopian use of robots is to save lives (rather than just take jobs).

First, human diseases cannot infect machines: a robot cannot get Ebola. So, a doctor using telemedicine to treat Ebola patients would be at not risk. This would presumably increase the number of people willing to treat such diseases and lower the impact of such diseases on medical professionals. That is, far fewer would get sick or die trying to treat people.

 Second, while a machine can be contaminated, decontaminating a medical robot or telemedicine machine would be easier than disinfecting a human. After all, a sealed machine could be completely hosed down by another machine without concerns about it being poisoned by disinfectants, etc. While patients might be exposed to a contaminated machine, machines do not go home—so a contaminated machine would not spread a disease like an infected or contaminated human would.

Third, medical machines could be sent, even air-dropped, into remote and isolated areas that lack doctors yet are often the starting points of diseases. This would allow a rapid response that would help the people there and help stop a disease before it makes its way into heavily populated areas. While some doctors and medical professionals are willing to be dropped into isolated areas, there are no doubt many more who would be willing to remotely operate a medical machine that has been dropped into a remote area suffering from a deadly disease.

There are, of course, some concerns about the medical machines, be they medbots, autodocs or telemedicine devices.

One is that these medical machines might be so expensive that it would be cost prohibitive to use them in situations in which they would be ideal (namely in isolated or impoverished areas). While politicians and pundits often blather about human life being priceless, actual practice shows they do not act on this. So, the challenge would be to develop medical machines that are effective yet inexpensive enough that they would be deployed where they would be needed.

Another concern is the possibility of a psychological impact on the patient. When patients who have been treated by medical personal in hazard suits speak about their experiences, they often remark on the lack of human contact. If a machine is treating the patient, even one remotely operated by a human, there will be a lack of human contact. But the psychological harm done to the patient would be outweighed by the vastly lowered risk of a disease spreading. Also, machines could be designed to provide more in the way of human interaction—for example, a telemedicine machine could have a screen that allows the patient to see the doctor’s face and talk to her.

A third concern is that such machines could malfunction or be intentionally interfered with. For example, someone might “hack” into a telemedicine device as an act of terrorism. While it might be wondered why someone would do this, it seems to be a general rule that if someone can do something evil, then someone will do something evil. As such, these devices would need to be safeguarded. While no device will be perfect, it would certainly be wise to consider possible problems ahead of time—although the usual process is to have something horrible occur and then fix it. Or at least talk about fixing it.

In sum, the latest Ebola outbreak has (once again) shown the importance of developing effective medical machines that can enable treatment while taking medical and other personnel out of harm’s way.

 

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The right to vote is part of the foundation of democracy and this includes the right to have one’s vote count. One part of protecting this right is preventing voter fraud. Fraud can rob legitimate voters of their right to decide the election. Another part is preventing voter suppression because it can rob people of their votes.

Republicans profess to be very worried about voter and election fraud (by Democrats) and have enacted laws aimed they claim will reducing such fraud. In response, Democrats claim these laws are aimed at voter suppression. Each side accuses the other of having wicked political motives. Many Democrats see Republicans as trying to disenfranchise voters who tend to vote for Democrats. The Republicans counter, without evidence, that Democrats support fraud because it is in their favor. While these beliefs might be sincere, sincerity is irrelevant to truth. What matters are the reasons and evidence that support the belief. As such, I will look at the available evidence and endeavor to sort out the matter.

One point of contention is the extent of voter fraud. One longstanding Republican talking point is that voter fraud is widespread.  For example, on April 7, 2014 Dick Morris claimed that over 1 million people voted twice in 2012. If this was true, then it would be a very serious matter: widespread voter fraud could change the results of elections and rob voters of their right to decide. Democrats admit fraud does occur but at such a miniscule level that it has no effect on election outcomes and does not warrant the measures favored by the Republicans.

Settling this matter requires looking at the available facts.  Dick Morris’ claim (which made the rounds as a conservative talking point), is false. But the fact that Morris was astoundingly wrong does not prove that voter fraud is not widespread. However, the facts do. Despite years of searching for fraud, the Republicans have not found any evidence (other their own efforts to overturn the 2020 election).

Republicans argue for voter ID laws by claiming they will prevent fraud. However, past investigations of voter fraud has shown only 31 credible cases out of one billion ballots. As such, this sort of fraud does occur—but only at an incredibly low rate.

In general, significant (let alone widespread) voter fraud does not occur although the myth is widespread. Republican claims about voter fraud are based on a myth and shows the lack of foundation for their claims and proposals regarding the matter. And yet they persist in their fairy tales of fraud.

It might be argued that while voter fraud is insignificant, it still must be countered by laws and policy changes, such as requiring voter IDs and eliminating early voting.  This has some appeal. To use an analogy, even if only a fraction of 1% of students cheated, then professors should still take some effort to prevent that cheating for the sake of academic integrity. Unless, of course, the measures used to counter that cheating did more harm than the cheating. The same would seem to apply to measures to counter voter fraud.

A key moral issue here is whether it is more important to prevent fraud or to prevent disenfranchisement. This is analogous to the moral concern about guilt in the legal system. In the United States, there is (supposed to be) a presumption of innocence on the moral grounds that it is better that a guilty person goes free than an innocent person be unjustly punished. In the case of voting, should it be accepted that it is better that a legitimate voter be denied her vote rather than an illegitimate voter be allowed to get away with fraud? Or is it better that an illegitimate voter gets away with fraud then to deny a legitimate voter her right to vote?

My moral conviction is that it is more important to prevent disenfranchisement and this should be given greater weight than fraud prevention. To avoid a straw man attack, I must say I am against fraud and favor rational safeguards against it. However, given the minuscule rates of fraud if attempts to reduce it result in disenfranchisement, then I would oppose such attempts on moral grounds. Naturally, others take a different view and believe it is worth disenfranchising voters in an (alleged) attempt to reduce the minuscule rates of fraud to even more miniscule levels.

Returning to the matter of facts, one  important concern is whether the laws and policies in question result in voter suppression. If they do not, even if they do nothing to counter voter fraud, then they might be tolerable (assuming they do not come with other costs).

But the evidence shows the laws allegedly aimed at preventing voter fraud serve as voter suppression measures, mostly aimed at minority voters. Keith Bentele and Erin E. O’Brien published a study entitled “Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies.” Based on their analysis of the data, they concluded “the Republican Party has engaged in strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting electoral fortunes, and an internal rightward ideological drift among the party faithful.” The full study, from the journal Perspectives on Politics, is available here. Since this is a factual matter, those who disagree with these findings can counter this by providing an analysis of equal or greater credibility based on supported facts. Since the 2013 study, Republicans have increased their efforts to fight “fraud” and Trump has made it clear he wants Republicans to do anything they can to ensure Republican victories through such means as redistricting and various strategies that are obviously aimed at voter suppression.

It is a talking point among Republicans that most professors are tools of the Democrats and academic experts should not be trusted. While this has been an effective ad homimen, what is needed is evidence and arguments countering the claims.  If professors are tools of the Democrats and academic experts are not to be trusted, then it should be easy to provide credible, objective evidence and analysis showing that they are in error.

One of the best-known methods proposed to counter voter fraud is the voter ID law. While, as shown above, the sort of fraud that would be prevented by these laws almost never occurs, it serves to disenfranchise voters. As would be suspected, Hispanic and African-American voters are more likely than white Americans to lack the ID required by these laws.

Another approach is to make it harder for citizens to register. One example is restrictions on voter registration drives—Hispanics and African-Americans register to vote at twice the rate of whites via drives. It is not clear how these methods would reduce fraud. The restrictions mostly do not seem to be aimed at making it harder for people to register fraudulently—just to make it more inconvenient to register at all.

A third tactic is to reduce the available early voting times and eliminate weekend and evening voting. This would seem to have no effect on fraud but seems aimed at minority voting patterns. In 2008 70% of African-American voters in North Carolina cast their ballots early.  Minority voters are more likely than white voters to vote on weekends and in the evening. For example, 56% of the 2008 weekend voters in Cuyahoga County in Ohio were black.

A fourth tactic is to make it harder for people with past convictions to regain their voting rights. This impacts African Americans the most. This tactic does not prevent fraud—it merely denies people the right to vote.

The laws and policies allegedly aimed at voter fraud would not reduce the existing fraud (which is already miniscule) and the only effect would be to suppress voting. As such, these laws and proposals fail to protect the rights of voters and instead are a violation of that basic right. In short, they are either a misguided and failed effort to prevent fraud or a wicked and potentially successful effort to suppress voters in favor of Republican victories. Either way, these laws and policies are a violation of a fundamental right of American democracy.

 

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 While most Americans do not vote, there is still in question of how a voter should vote. While I have opinions about the candidates and issues in the upcoming election in my adopted state of Florida, this essay is not aimed at convincing you to vote as I will. Rather, my goal is to discuss how you should vote in general.

The answer to the question of how you should vote is easy: if you are rational, then you should vote in your rational self-interest. In the case of a candidate, you should vote for the candidate you believe will act in your self-interest. In the case of such things as ballot measures, you should vote for or against based on how you believe it will impact your self-interest. So, roughly put, you should vote for what you think is best for you.

While this is obvious advice, it does bring up two often overlooked concerns. The first is the determining what is actually in your self-interest. The second is determining whether your decision is in your self-interest. In the case of a candidate, the concern is whether the candidate will act in your self-interest. In the case of things like ballot measures, the question is whether the measure will be advantageous to your interests or not.

It might be thought that a person knows what is in her self-interest. Unfortunately, people can be wrong about this. In most cases people assume that if they want or like something, then it is in their self-interest. But what a person likes or wants might not be what is best for them. For example, a person might like the idea of cutting school funding without considering how it will impact her family and community. In contrast, what people do not want, or dislike is often assumed to be against their self-interest. But what a person dislikes or does not want might not be bad for her. For example, a person might dislike the idea of an increased minimum wage and vote against it without considering whether it would be in their self-interest or not. The take-away is that a person needs to look beyond what they like or dislike, want or do not want to determine their actual self-interest.

It is natural to think that of what is in a person’s self interest in selfish terms. That is, in terms of what seems to benefit only the person without considering its effect on others. While this is one way to look at self-interest, it is worth considering what might seem to be in a person’s selfish interest could be against her self-interest. For example, a business owner might see paying taxes to fund public education as being against her self-interest because it seems to have no direct, selfish benefit to her. However, having educated fellow citizens would seem to be in her self-interest and even in her selfish interest. Having the state pay for the education of her workers is advantageous to her—even if she has to contribute a little through her taxes. As another example, a person might see paying taxes for public health programs and medical aid to foreign countries as against her self-interest because she has her own medical coverage and does not travel to those countries. However, as has been shown with Ebola, public and world health is in her interest—unless she lives in total isolation. As such, even the selfish should consider whether their selfishness in a matter is actually in their self-interest.

It is also worth considering a view of self-interest that is more altruistic. That is, that a person’s interest is not just in her individual advantages but also in the general good. For this sort of person, providing for the common defense and securing the general welfare would be in her self-interest because her self-interest goes beyond just herself.

So, a person should sort out her self-interest and consider that it might not just be a matter of what she likes, wants or sees as in her selfish advantage. The next step is to determine which candidate is most likely to act in her self-interest and which vote on a ballot measure is most likely to serve her self-interest.

Political candidates, obviously enough, try to convince their target voters that they will act in their interest. Those backing ballot measures also do their best to convince voters that voting a certain way is in their self-interest. However, the evidence shows that most politicians do not act in the interest of the majority of those who voted for them. Researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted a study, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, to determine whether politicians acted based on the preferences of the majority. The researchers examined about 1,800 policies and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups.

The results are hardly surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.” This suggests that voters are bad at selecting candidates who will act in their interest. Or, to be fair and balanced, perhaps there are few  candidates who will do so.

It can be countered that the study just shows that politicians generally act contrary to the preferences of the majority but not that they act contrary to their self-interest. After all, I made the point that what people want (prefer) might not be what is in their self-interest. But, on the face of it, unless what is in the interest of the majority is that the affluent get their way, then it seems that the politicians voters choose generally do not act in the best interest of the voters. This would suggest that voters should pick different candidates and that better people should run for office.

 

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