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As noted in my previous essay, critics of capitalism are often accused of being envious or Marxists. As shown in that essay, even if a critic is envious, it is fallacious to conclude their criticism is therefore wrong. But it could be argued that a person’s envy can bias them and diminish their credibility. I will look at this and examine envy. I will then engage in some self-reflection on whether I am envious.

Since envy involves resentment, an envious person could have a bias and see who they envy in an unwarranted or negative manner. This might occur for a variety of reasons, such as a desire to explain away their own failures or feel better by attributing negative qualities to who they envy. For example, a person who envies the rich might explain their own lack of wealth in terms of the machinations of the wealthy and “the system” while seeing the rich as suffering from greed, dishonesty and corruption. Thus, it is an envious person could be biased against those they envy.  If such a bias exists, then the envious person’s credibility would be reduced in proportion to their bias. This is because they would be more inclined to accept negative claims about those they envy. So, it would be rational to consider the influence of bias when assessing claims.

But the mere possibility of bias is not proof of bias, there would need to be evidence the person 1) is envious and 2) is biased by this envy. If this evidence exists, then we should consider the impact of this bias on the person’s claims. This approach can have merit in the context of the Argument from Authority.

An Argument from Authority occurs when it is argued that a claim should be accepted because the person making it is an authority (expert) on the subject. It has this form:

 

Premise 1: Person A is an authority(expert) on subject S.

Premise 2: A says P about S.

Conclusion: P is true.

 

This inductive argument is assessed in terms of the quality of the expert, and this includes considering whether the expert is significantly biased. If an expert is biased to a degree that would render them untrustworthy, then accepting a biased claim from them would be an error of logic. If I were so envious of the rich that I was significantly biased against them, then unsupported claims I make about them should not be accepted as true based on my (alleged) expertise.

But even if someone is envious and extremely biased, this would not disprove their claims since claims stand or fall on their own. To think otherwise would be to fall into the Accusation of Envy fallacy discussed in the previous essay. The logical response to bias is not to reject the claims, but to subject them to scrutiny. Even if I was extremely envious of the rich, it would not follow that my claims about capitalism are false, and they would need to be assessed on their own merit.  But am I envious of the rich? To answer this, I need to consider the nature of envy.

At its core, envy involves wanting what someone else has. This can range from a possession (such as money) to a quality (such as being a fast runner). But merely wanting what someone else has is not the defining feature of envy. You might want to have artistic skills to match Rembrandt, but this need not make you envious. Envy includes a resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing and often includes a desire to take it. But even this does not properly capture envy. Suppose that you start a business with a trusted friend, but they betray you and flee the country with your money. You want the money, you resent that they have it, and you desire that it be taken away from them. But it would be incorrect to say that you are envious of them. More must be added to complete the recipe for envy.

One plausible addition is that resentment must be unwarranted, and the desire is improper in some relevant way. In the case of the hypothetical betrayer, your resentment is warranted and the desire for your money is proper. Establishing a claim of envy would thus require showing that a person wants what another has, that they unjustly resent that the other person has it, and that there is something improper about their desire for it. Envy also often involves an inability by the envious to get what they desire. If they could, they would not be envious.  The envious person thus suffers from a series of moral failings relative to their desire. While this is hardly a necessary and sufficient definition of “envy” it should suffice for sorting out whether I am envious of the rich.

To be envious of the rich, I would need to want to be rich.  I would also need an unjust resentment of the rich, an improper desire to be rich, and perhaps a desire that the rich no longer be rich and I would need to lack the ability to become rich. Let us walk through each of these in turn.  While I want to have some money (food and running shoes are not free), I do not desire to be rich. As for evidence, my life choices have not been aimed at becoming rich. For example, I earned my doctorate in philosophy and then became a professor. I could have picked a much more lucrative degree and profession.  While I write books, these are in philosophy and gaming rather than more profitable areas. If I wanted to be one of the rich, I would have been going about it in an ineffective way. But it could be contended that while I want to be rich, I lack the ability and have continuously been stuck in an “inferior” life.

The easy and obvious reply is that since I had the ability to complete a doctorate, I also had the ability to complete a far more lucrative advanced degree. Given that I was a college athlete and still train regularly despite numerous injuries, I can stick to challenging tasks and persist through difficulties. While it would be immodest to go through my strengths and accomplishments, suffice it to say that I could have certainly succeeded in a career far more profitable than being a professor if I desired to be rich. I am not saying that I would be rich; simply that if I wanted to be rich, I could have put myself on a path far more likely to achieve that result than a career in philosophy. If being rich was my goal, I would have tried. If I had turned out to be a bitter failure, then a charge of envy might have some merit. But to say that I am envious of what I never aimed for is a bizarre claim. One could claim some secret knowledge of my motives, but that would be unsupported speculation.

I do not unjustly resent the rich who have earned their wealth, such as by working hard in a demanding job. I do  have a negative view towards those who have acquired wealth unjustly, who use their wealth to the detriment of others, or who squandered the opportunities their wealth afforded them. I do believe that the current system is unfair, but I do not feel indignation that I have been treated unfairly. Rather I feel moral anger at the harmful aspects of the economic system we have created and perpetuate.

I do think that the rich should have less wealth, that they should contribute more and do better with their wealth. But I also think that everyone should use more of their resources to do good, me included. Like most people, I do not always live up to my moral ideals. But I do not want the rich to be stripped of their wealth and left poor. Being poor in America is a terrible thing, so I do not want anyone to be poor. 

As such, while I do have a negative view of some rich people and I have serious criticisms of the current economic system, I do not envy the rich. And even if I did, this would be irrelevant to any criticism I make.

 

I am, on occasion, critical of capitalism. I am, on occasion, accused of being critical because I am allegedly envious or a Marxist. If these were attacks aimed only at me, they would be of no general interest. However, accusing critics of capitalism of being motivated by envy or Marxism is a common tactic that warrants evaluation. I will begin with the accusation of envy.

While the accusation of envy is rarely presented as a developed argument, it aims to refute criticism of capitalism by attacking the critic’s motive.  The logic is that their criticism is wrong because they are envious of those who are winning capitalism. Obviously, this reasoning is fallacious and can be called the Accusation of Envy or Refutation by Envy. This fallacious argument has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Person P makes critical claim C about X.

Premise 2: P is accused of envy (typically relating to X).

Conclusion: Therefore, claim C is false.

 

This is a fallacy because whether a person is envious has no bearing on the truth of the claims they make. Even if a person is driven by envy, it does not follow that their claims are false. The following example illustrates this “reasoning” is flawed:

 

Sam: “When tyrants oppress their people and commit genocide, they are acting wrongly.”

Sally: “Why you are just envious of tyrants. So, you are wrong. They are acting justly and morally.”

 

Another absurd example, involves math:

 

Cool Joe: “2+2 = 7.”

Mathematician Mary: “That is wrong; 2+2=4.”

Cool Joe: “You are just envious of my being so cool. And rich. And handsome. So, you are wrong. 2+2 =7.”

Cool Cathy: “Oh, Joe, you are so right, and Mary is so wrong. Work through your envy and maybe you’ll get a man someday.”

 

Even if Mary was envious of Joe, it does not follow she is wrong when she claims 2+2 =4. The example is intended to be absurd, because its absurdity shows that this logic is fallacious.  If this logic was good, it would be easy to “disprove” anything, be it basic truths of math or criticisms of capitalism.

As such, accusing anyone of envy does not refute claims. Since this is a fallacy, it might be wondered why someone would use this tactic. One possibility is that the fallacious attack is the best the person has; they have no good refutation. A second possibility is that while fallacies are logically flawed, they can be very powerful persuasive tools. As a practical matter “winning” an argument has nothing to do with truth or the quality of the logic; it is about persuading the target audience to accept a claim whether it is true. Ad hominem style attacks are effective psychologically, so this tactic can be a winning one. In many cases the target audience wants to reject the criticism, hence they are happy to accept any “reason” to do so.

It might be wondered whether a person’s envy can be relevant to their claims. While it is, as shown above, irrelevant to the truth of their claims, it could be a relevant factor in assessing bias. But even if a person is biased, it does not follow that their claim must be false.  It is to the matter of envy and credibility that I will turn in the next essay.

Because the United Kingdom was suffering from a shortage of sperm donors it was been proposed that men be allowed to donate their sperm after they are dead. As with other post-death donations, the donated material would be extracted and used. This does raise some ethical issues.

It must be noted that the donation process is voluntary, and the sperm is not simply harvested without consent. As such, the main moral issue is whether such a donation is morally acceptable. The specific act of donating sperm post death falls under two broader moral areas. The first is the ethics of donating anything after death. If such donations were morally unacceptable, then it would follow that sperm donation after death would also be unacceptable. While the general ethics of post-death donations is beyond the scope of this work, the ethics of donating organs after death is well-established: it is not only acceptable, but laudable. But this does not establish that post-death sperm donation is acceptable.

The second is the ethics of sperm donation in general. If this is morally wrong, then post-death sperm donation would also be morally wrong. While some might take issue with sperm donation in generally, it does not seem morally problematic, but this is also matter is beyond the scope of this work

The distinction between post-death sperm donation and general post-death donation is that what is being donated is sperm, but the ethics of this falls under the more general ethical topic of sperm donation. Thus, the moral concern specific to post-death sperm donation is that it occurs post-death. As such, this is the one factor that would distinguish post-death sperm donation from normal sperm donation. So, the question is what, if any, moral difference is made by the donor being dead before their donation.

While there might be a bit of an “icky” factor to the post-death aspect, the “argument from icky” does not have much moral weight unless the “ick” can be spelled out in terms relevant to the moral status of the action. There are certainly numerous other considerations that are morally relevant, and I will focus on these.

One moral concern is the treatment of the dead. While the dead person is presumably beyond caring, there is a possible impact on family and friends when they learn of the procedure. There is also the concern about treating the dead with respect and one might argue that extracting sperm would be disrespectful. It could be argued that the procedure is no more (or less) disrespectful than those used to harvest donated organs. There is also the fact that the person consented to the procedure; if they were not deceived or misled about the procedure, the consent of an adult overrides the concerns of their family and addresses the issue of respect. If those doing the extraction are acting in accord with the donor’s consent and do not do anything beyond that consent, they would be acting in a respectful manner.

There is also a pragmatic concern: a donor might have died from a genetic condition. This can be addressed by providing prospective recipients with this information so they can make an informed choice. And any donated sperm would come with an unknown risk of possible genetic problems.

One objection is that children from donated sperm will have lost a parent before they are even conceived. They will never be able to meet their biological father. While this might seem an odd situation, this is like cases in which a father dies before their child is born. While this is not common, it does happen. Wars, for example, claim fathers before their children are born. In the case of the typical donor, there is likely to be far less emotional impact, since the donor would have no connection to the mother. There is also the fact that a living sperm donor could die before his children decide to seek him out and there is the possibility that neither children nor donor will ever want to meet. As such, there seems to be no special moral problem with post-death donation that makes it different from other cases in which a child never meets the man who donated the sperm that created them.

Another concern is that while a donated organ might grant life, donated sperm creates a new person. One worry is that the spouse or partner of the dead man might be harmed by this. While this is a matter of concern, the same problem arises with living sperm donors. Also, if the spouse or partner is worried about this, they need to address this with the man while he is still alive. But this is obviously not unique to post-death sperm donation; the man chooses to donate his sperm in both types of donations. So, the ethics of a married man deciding to donate sperm remains the same whether the donation occurs when he is alive or dead.

Based on the above, if the man consented, there is no specific moral problem with post-death sperm donation. So, if sperm donation and post-death body component donation are acceptable, post-death sperm donation is as well.

Thank you for being here. You all meant a lot to my dad, and he appreciated your presence in his life.

Waiting for a phone call that will never come is hard.

After his cancer diagnosis, my dad called my sister every day without fail. 7:00 am, except for holidays and weekends. Then 8:00 am. He wanted her to know that he was okay and not to worry. He was a very thoughtful and reliable man; you could count on him, and he loved his family.

For years, he would call me on Sundays. As men, we had mastered the manly art of saying a lot with few words. Hence, we just needed the one call a week.

When he was teaching college, we would talk about our classes and students.  We’d also commiserate about meetings and how they should have been emails. He was a great teacher. Whenever I went anywhere with him, we’d run into former students and their faces would light up, so I knew he had made their lives better.

One reason I became a teacher was because of him; like him I want to help make people’s lives better. He was good at math and even better at teaching it in ways students could understand. I could never do that, so I teach philosophy. Math is hard.

We would also talk about our dogs, sharing stories of the crazy things they had done that week. We both agreed we had the smartest, best dogs in the world. And we were right.

As I got older and started talking about “back in the day”, we’d reminisce about our adventures together. One of his favorite stories was about the insane number of fish we caught on an ice fishing trip; the flags were popping up like it was a parade and we went home with more fish than bait. Another was when we went smelting and I gave up on the net and jumped into the water and started grabbing them with my hands. It worked. Really.

My dad preferred  fishing with a pole, and had extensive fishing wisdom, such as his saying that you  “can’t catch fish if your fly is out of the water.”  He loved going to Tim Pond, and introduced my sister and her husband to the place. When they couldn’t catch anything while he was reeling in his limit, he shared another bit of fishing wisdom, saying, “that’s why they call it fishing and not catching.” 

As a boy he dreamed of owning a hunting camp in his hometown of Norway. That dream came true when he and his father built it. His best friend, Don Soler, helped him build an add on to it, and they spent many deer seasons hunting from there. My sister and I would sleep in the loft, with Beth asking him and our mom not to tell the bears they had children.

Beth survived the bears to work at L.L. Bean. Her most important job was advising him on which new Bean flannel shirts to buy, although his closet was already full of them. But you can never have too much flannel.

Before her passing, dad would tell me what his wife Carolyn was up to. This usually involved Roger’s Farm. A place she loved and where she practiced her role as a master gardener.

When Nancy Blanchard became part of his life, he’d tell me about their week together. Every Friday they went to Pepper’s Landing. Nancy always had the same thing, which is something I can relate to. Once you find something good, you stick with it.

Another bit of wisdom my dad liked to share is that “Every day is good, some are just better than others.” While today is a sad day, it is good that we are together and thinking of him.

I’ll end this as I did our phone calls: I love you dad.

Prior to Trump’s first victory mainstream Republicans attacked and criticized. His victory not only silenced almost all his conservative critics most became fawning Trump loyalists. Lindsey Graham provides an excellent example of Trump’s transformative power: he was polymorphed from a savage attacker to Trump’s attack dog. Few dared oppose him during his first term, such as John McCain and Mitt Romney. But the Republicans in congress now act in accord with his will and whims. There are a few surviving conservative critics of Trump, but they have proven politically irrelevant. This does make sense, as Trump is the logical result of decades of GOP strategies and efforts. If the Republican party were a Pokemon, Trump would be the final evolution of the party.

The surrender and assimilation of the Republican leadership was not surprising; the party focused on winning and holding power rather than developing and advancing meaningful policy goals. Whatever ideology once defined the party has become a devotion to power for the sake of power and profit. Under Trump, all talk of a balanced budget, all worries about deficits and have ceased.  What is more interesting is the impact Trump has had on his followers.

When Joe Walsh  made a futile effort to challenge Trump for the Republican nomination. During his effort, he asked Trump supporters if Trump has every lied. They said that he had not. Walsh brought up Trump’s criticism of Obama playing golf and Trump’s claim that he would be too busy as president to play golf. While most people did not care about, some insisted Trump had never played golf as president. His supporters also believed that hundreds of miles of the wall had been built and paid for by Mexico and that the Democrats in congress are treasonous liars.  Walsh closed by noting that he “…realized once and for all that nobody can beat Trump in a Republican primary. Not just because it’s become his party, but because it has become a cult, and he’s a cult leader. He doesn’t have supporters; he has followers. And in their eyes, he can do no wrong.” This raised some interesting philosophical concerns.

Some might respond by saying “what about the Democrats?” and accuse them of being a cult. While one could debate political cults, this “what about” would (as always) be irrelevant. Even if the Democrats were a cult, this would prove or disprove nothing about Republicans. My concern is with looking at the epistemology and thinking of the voters Walsh encountered.

One possible explanation is that Trump voters have normal epistemic abilities and hold to true beliefs but are lying in this case. They believe that Trump lies, that the wall was not paid for by Mexico and so on. People often lie in support of people they like, especially when they think those people are being attacked. This is a matter of ethics: believing that it is right to lie in defense of someone you support especially when speaking their opponent. While subject to moral assessment, this need not be cultish. After all, people will lie to defend their friends.

A second explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have always been defective and they are unusually bad at forming true beliefs and critically assessing claims. This could be due to various biases and the usual reasons people fall victim to fallacies and rhetoric. But this need not be cultish since believing false things because of epistemic defects or failures in critical thinking is a common occurrence. On this explanation, Trump supporters are wrong, but they are not wrong because of being cultists. Rather, they are following Trump because they are wrong.

A third explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have been corrupted by Trump’s influence. That is, they reject the rational methods of forming beliefs and critical thinking in favor of believing in Trump because Trump tells them to believe in him. They are wrong because they are following Trump. In this case, they might be cultists. They would be accepting a “Trump command theory” in what Trump says is true is true because Trump says so and what Trump says is false because Trump says so. If this explanation is correct, Trump is shaping the perceived reality of his followers. They are not lying to defend him or themselves, they are true believers in Trump’s false description of the world. That is, they are a cult with a charismatic leader.

James J. LaBossiere, born on December 19, 1939, in Norway, Maine, was the son of Alfred “Cooper” and Gladys Clement LaBossiere. He passed away peacefully on May 3, 2025, leaving behind an enduring legacy as a father and a teacher.

James, better known as Jim, graduated from Norway High School in 1958, where he excelled in football, basketball, and baseball, earning the title of the most athletic male of his class. He pursued higher education at the University of Maine, earning a degree in mathematics in 1962 and a Masters in Education in 1968.

Jim’s passion for teaching and coaching began at Higgins Classical Institute in Charleston, Maine, where he taught math and physics and served as the assistant football coach and baseball coach. He later dedicated 26 years to teaching mathematics at Old Town High School, where he also coached the baseball team to an undefeated season, winning the Penobscot Valley Conference. For his outstanding achievements, Jim was named Maine State Baseball Coach of the Year and John Bapst Quarterback Club Outstanding Baseball Coach in Eastern Maine.  After retiring from Old Town High School, he continued to teach as an adjunct professor at E.M.V.T.I. and University College in Bangor, eventually returning to full-time teaching at University College in 1993 until his retirement in 2013. A dedicated educator, it is difficult to go anywhere in Maine without encountering a former student who remembers him fondly.

An avid outdoorsman throughout his life, Jim’s love for the outdoors was evident from a young age. He learned to swim before he was seven so he could go fishing alone and enjoyed fishing throughout his life. He introduced his family to fly fishing at his favorite fishing camp, Tim Pond, and cherished his camp in Sodom, Maine. Jim was also an avid hunter and had a special bond with his dogs. His last dog was the miniature schnauzer, Sophie.

Jim’s kindness was evident in how he treated everyone, always offering a friendly hello and a smile.  He had a remarkable ability to remember people and their names, making each encounter feel personal and special.  Jim shared a lifelong friendship with Don Soler and they spent countless hours hunting and fishing together.

 Jim was a member of Holy Family Catholic Church in Old Town.

Jim was a devoted and loving father.  He is survived by his daughter Beth LaBossiere and her husband John Gerken of Yarmouth; his son Michael LaBossiere of Florida; grandchildren Frank Klingensmith and his wife Mariah, and Dale Klingensmith and his partner Santi; great granddaughter Eleanor Klingensmith; stepchildren Cheryl Thomas, Jason Thomas, Steven Thomas, , seven step grandchildren, and two step great- grandchildren.  He was predeceased by his wife, Carolyn, and is fondly remembered by his wonderful companion, Nancy Blanchard, who came into his life after Carolyn’s passing.

Jim’s life was filled with remarkable achievements and wonderful moments. He will be deeply missed by all who knew him.

Ever since Trump won his first term in office, I have wondered why people support him. I am not going make a straw man his supporters and say they are all stupid, racist, or opportunists. Rather, I want to consider reasons why people back Trump.

To start with the most obvious, some agree with his actions and policies, and it is rational that they support him. There is no mystery here other than why they agree with him.

There are some who are dismayed about what he says and wish he would show more restraint. While they dislike some of his word choices, they largely agree with his policies and actions. This is certainly rational. If their only concern about him is that he sometimes gets salty or a bit rough, it makes sense they support him.

There are even some supporters who worry about some of his policies and actions but go along with him anyway. In many cases, their motivations seem pragmatic: they get something from Trump or would pay a high price for not supporting him. For example, a Republican politician might get taken out in a primary if they earned Trump’s ire. As another example, a wealthy person might loath Trump yet like the tax breaks and de-regulation that increase their wealth. This involves setting aside certain values for others, but this can be rational. We all must make judgments in which values are in conflict, so a Trump supporter backing him despite their dislike makes sense. Trump supporters also try to convince others to support Trump.

When people criticize of Trump, his supporters often defend him by making economic arguments. For example, Trump supporters have told me that because of him the stock market does well, and this is good for my retirement income. So, I should stop criticizing Trump. When the stock market does badly, they place the blame elsewhere and say that Trump will fix it soon.  As another example, his supporters also respond to criticism about Trump’s racism with by arguing minorities ought to support Trump (or at least shut up) because under his leadership they will be better off . These arguments are based on the principle most eloquently put by  James Carville’s “the economy, stupid.” While Carville originally presented this to Clinton campaigners, it is now used broadly to claim that what matters the most is the economy.

From a factual standpoint, this claim has merit: people often say that they vote based on economic concerns. In the 2024 election, Trump supporters posted about inflation, egg prices and the cost of gas as reasons to support Trump. But is the argument that people should support Trump for economic reasons a good one?

From a factual standpoint, there are obvious problems with the premise of this argument. First, Trump (as predicted) failed to deliver on his promises about the cost of eggs and inflation. The stock market has also been a bit erratic.

 Second, the economy has been good for the wealthy and not so good for everyone else. While this gives billionaires an excellent reason to support Trump, it does not give the rest of us an economic reason to do so. Third, the influence of the president on the economy is often exaggerated. In good times, supporters of the president give him the credit, in bad time his opponents assign him the blame.  Trump failed to deliver on egg prices and inflation, but much of this is beyond Trump’s control. While his gets him off the hook to a degree, it also undercuts the argument that people should support Trump because of the economy.

Trump most devoted supporters will dispute these claims and assert that the economy is either great or will soon be great. Let these claims be granted for the sake of argument. The Trump supporter version of the argument would be:

 

Premise 1: The economy is great.

Premise 2: This is because of Trump.

Conclusion: You should support Trump (or at least stop criticizing him).

 

This argument is used to convince people who oppose to support or at least stop criticizing him. I oppose many of Trump’s policies and actions. These include his racist immigration policies, his approach to Ukraine, DOGE, his tax cuts, his putting incompetent grifters into positions of power and so on. While Trump’s supporters would dispute my views, their economic argument is that I should set aside my moral concerns because of his (alleged) success with the economy This argument is an old one and connects to America’s original sin.

Some of the slave-owning founders recognized that slavery was morally wrong or at least expressed this view in their more philosophical writings. Yet, they allowed it to continue for pragmatic reasons: profit and political support. Those who supported them but who also had moral concerns about slavery were swayed by similar reasons: slavery was crucial to the economy. People looked away, morally speaking, because they wanted to get paid. This approach has persisted: people who have moral qualms often set them aside for economic reasons and are often persuaded to do so.

I am not saying that supporting Trump is the moral equivalent of supporting slavery. Rather, my point is that an original sin of America is putting economics over ethics. What Trump supporters are now asking me to do is analogous, albeit not as bad: they want me to set aside my moral concerns about Trump because of his alleged economic success. That is, I should look away because I am getting paid. They are not amused when I ask if this means that they will turn against Trump when the economy goes bad.

One could try to make a utilitarian case by arguing that the harm he causes is outweighed by the good of the economic benefits of his presidency. But even if it is (wrongly) assumed that Trump is significantly responsible for the positive aspects of the economy it is not plausible to claim that most of his morally problematic actions and policies have anything to do with the economy. For example, his racist immigration policies will hurt the economy if fully acted upon. If Trump did have to do morally problematic things to make the economy better, then one could make the utilitarian argument to justify these actions. But the economy cannot justify evil actions and policies that do not impact the economy. Using an analogy, one could imagine a spouse who does questionable things to make money for their family. These could be, perhaps, justified on utilitarian grounds. But this would not justify wrongdoing on their part that had nothing to do with making money. So, if dad must do some shady business to pay for Timmy’s cancer treatment, then that could be justified. But the fact that he makes money would not, for example, justify dad committing adultery, beating Timmy, or vandalizing the local mosque and synagogue. Likewise, for Trump, whatever he might do to (allegedly) improve the economy might be justified on utilitarian grounds. But this does not warrant his other misdeeds. Those who believe he is a bad person doing bad things should not be swayed by an appeal to money; they should not look away just because they want to get paid.

As a political tool, members of congress threaten or engage in a government shutdown. When the government is shut down, federal workers can be furloughed and sent home without pay and forbidden from working. Others, like TSA agents, can be compelled to work without pay. As the government shutdown does not shut down bills and expenses, the unpaid workers will be harmed by their lack of income. While some federal workers are well paid, many live from paycheck to paycheck and have few financial reserves. Because of this, some federal workers have turned to food banks during past shutdowns. In addition to the impact on workers, there are indirect impacts on those providing goods and services. After all, people who are not getting paid will be spending less.

In addition to the financial impacts, there are other harms. One example is the national parks. There is also the harm suffered by those who need the federal services. There are also the long-term harms of the shutdown. While one could write almost endlessly of the harms of a shutdown, it suffices to say they are harmful and something that should be avoided.

Debating about who is to blame for any shutdown is often a fruitless endeavor because of the partisan divide. Minds will generally not be changed by evidence or reasons. That said, a shutdown requires both parties: if one party gives in to the other, then the shutdown will end. From a moral standpoint, both sides bear some blame. However, the blame need not be equal.

After all, refusing to give in to a threat to harm others can be morally acceptable. And it is usually the Republicans who make such threats.  From a utilitarian standpoint, giving in would be wrong if it created more harm than refusing to do so. This utilitarian calculation can consider more than just the immediate factors. For example, it should also include that yielding to such tactics encourages their future use.

The ethics of the shutdown comes down to two moral concerns. The first is whether it is morally acceptable to hurt innocent people to get what you want. The second is whether it is morally acceptable to refuse to give someone what they want when they threaten to harm the innocent.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the matter is settled by weighing the harm against benefit. The benefits can include preventing harm. So, a shutdown would be morally acceptable if doing so prevented greater harm, since shutdowns are always harmful. What must also be considered is whether there is an alternative to the shutdown. To use an analogy, if someone proposed a risky surgery, failing to consider alternatives would be morally irresponsible. In the case of the shutdown, there are alternatives. One is to use a less harmful process of negotiation and for each side to agree they will not use the shutdown as a political tool.

One practical problem is that the shutdown is perceived as a useful, albeit risky, political tool. The side pushing a shutdown will think that it will probably work; the other side thinks they can keep it from working. Both sides think they can score political points. Using a shutdown as a tool requires ignoring or even not caring about the harm being inflicted on the American people. After all, while politicians can lose political points or not get what they want, they are not harmed by their shutdown. This willingness to use people as pawns is morally problematic, assuming you agree with Locke that the purpose of the state is the good of the people.

That said, political, economic and military calculations always involve harming pawns—so the shutdown could be seen as just another move in the political game. This can be countered by arguing that there are better alternatives, and so causing harm is not necessary. As such, the shutdown would seem to be an unethical political tool. Unfortunately, just as it takes two to shut down the government, it also takes two to avoid it: both parties must agree to not shut it down. But as long as it is seen as a viable tool and if politicians are willing to hurt Americans to achieve their political goals, then we must expect future shutdowns.

The denotation of a word is what it literally means. The connotation is the emotional loading of the word, which can be negative or positive; this is how the word makes you feel. To illustrate, “swarm” and “infestation” have strong negative connotations. Whether the connotation is negative or positive depends on various factors, such as how the audience feels about the word. For example, the connotation of “socialism” is negative for most Americans but obviously positive to socialists. Two words can have the same denotation, but very different connotations. For example, the slang “pig” and the word “police” have the same denotation, but different connotations. As would be expected, rhetoric uses the influence of connotation to affect how people feel.

Words that have strong connotations can be powerful rhetorical tools. As with any powerful tool, people will want to use it, even if they must steal it. Hence, connotation theft.  A word can derive its connotation from a variety of factors, such as historical context, and this is how the connotation is earned. If the word is then knowingly used for that connotation in a manner inconsistent with those factors, then the connotation has been stolen. This can also involve intentionally ignoring a word’s denotation to use its connotation.  A person can also unintentionally steal connotation by being unaware that their use is inconsistent with the factors, such as the historical context or denotation, that give the word the connotation in question.

Put into a template, connotation theft looks like this:

 

  1. Word W has connotation C because of P,Q and R.
  2. Word W is used in situation S because it has connotation C.
  3. But S is inconsistent with P, Q, R.

 

A good example is the word “fascism.” The word has a strong negative connotation primarily because of the Nazis and their numerous crimes. To a lesser extent, fascist Italy and Spain also contributed to this negative connotation. Because of the strong negative connotation of “fascism” calling something “fascism” or associating it with fascism can be an effective rhetorical tactic. Doing this can generate negative feelings towards the thing in question and these can influence what people think. Because of this, it is not surprising that the term is often used in American politics. George W. Bush’s administration was called fascist. Bush in turn used the term “Islamofascism” (which is distinct from Islamic fascism) to create negative feelings. Obama was called a fascist and, of course, Trump is being called a fascist now. Interestingly, the left is now being called fascist and some claim that the Nazis were leftists (mainly because of the “socialism” in their name). One might thus agree with a quote attributed to George Orwell, that “[T]he word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.'” This, it could be argued, arose from connotation theft: using the word for its negative connotation while ignoring its denotation and historical context served to split them apart.

Orwell’s remark shows a problem with connotation theft: it can rob a word of its denotation and historical context, making it just a rhetorical tool. Another problem is that connotation theft is a deceit because the emotional power of the word is exploited by intentionally misapplying it. For example, some on the right assert that the left and the socialists are fascists. Since most people feel fascism is bad, this misuse of the term can make people feel the left is bad. But the claim that fascism is leftist is a lie. First, while the National Socialists used the word “socialist”, they were neither socialists nor leftists. Fascism is a reaction to and an opponent of the left. Second, the negative connotation of “fascism” did not arise from any socialist style programs or policies the Nazis or other fascists might have implemented. It arises from the fascism of the fascists and the Nazi’s multitude of crimes. As such, applying the term “fascist” to the left is an attempt at connotation theft (or, at best an act of ignorance). This is most certainly not to claim that the left is without sin, just that fascism is a sin of the right rather than the left.

The main defense against being deceived by connotation theft is being aware of what gives a term its emotional power, such as its correct denotation and historical context. For example, when someone is accused of being fascist, one should consider if the word applies or, as Orwell said, it is just signifying something the speaker finds undesirable and hopes you will too.

During Trump’s first term the United States assassinated Iran’s Qassem Soleimani which raised moral questions about targeted killings. As it seems likely Trump will order more assassinations, this is a topic worth revisiting.

While the definition of “assassination” can be debated, it is a targeted killing aimed to achieve a political, economic or ideological end. While one could quibble over the fine points of definitions, my concern is with the issue of whether assassination can be morally warranted.

It can be argued that I am misguided to even consider this issue. Some might point out that assassination is killing and killing is wrong, thus there is no need for a distinct discussion about assassination. But I will assume, perhaps incorrectly, that at least some killings are morally acceptable. If I am in error, then the issue would be settled: assassination would be wrong because all killing is wrong,

Others might take the stance that morality is irrelevant and embrace the pragmatic approach that a country should kill when doing so is advantageous. On this view, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. This is a viable approach but entails that if the United States is justified in killing on pragmatic grounds, then everyone else is also justified. The only unjustified killings would be those that were not advantageous, as defined by the killers. This seems problematic.

In discussing this matter “in the wild”, I have found that people can be confused about what counts as ethics. For example, during a Facebook discussion of assassination someone rejected the notion of applying ethics.  They did so for what they claimed were two non-moral reasons. The first was that the United States is justified in assassinating people based on self-defense. The second is that the United States is justified when it kills in retribution.  But self-defense and retribution justifications are moral justifications and are subject to evaluation.

During the discussion, the “anger justification” was also advanced, which is often used to try to justify violence. For example, people will often try to “defend” the death penalty by asking people how they would feel if someone they loved were the victim of a terrible crime. They are supposed to feel angry, and this is supposed to somehow justify the death penalty based on this anger.

 The gist of the argument about assassination was that I would be mad if someone I knew had been killed by a foreigner and I would want to kill them and this entail that killing them would be somehow justified. The gist of the “logic” seems to be

 

Premise 1: If B did X to you, then you would be angry enough to do Y to B.

Conclusion: Doing Y to B is morally justified. 

 

While there might be a macho appeal to this “reasoning”, whether I would be angry enough to kill someone is irrelevant to whether killing them is right. If this was good logic, it would entail that sufficient anger would justify any killing, which is absurd.  For example, it would justify someone killing you if they were enraged because they thought you cut them off in traffic.

This sort of reasoning seems to be fueled by the tendency people have to think that if they are angry, then they are justified in being angry.  But this does not follow; being angry just means you are angry. The anger you feel is irrelevant to truth and justification. Naturally, a person can be both justified and angry, so anger does not invalidate justification.

Getting back to the ethics of assassination, if the principle was adopted that anger justified killing, it would mean that people who killed Americans would also be justified if they were angry and that someone who was angry at you would be justified in killing you. This all seems absurd, so this “principle” is absurd. But perhaps a case can be made for ethical assassination.

A good historical example is Operation Vengeance. In WWII, American P-38 fighters intercepted and killed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. This had a significant impact in terms of morale and the elimination of an important leader.

The moral justification for this is clear: when one is engaged in war, then leaders are legitimate targets. In the broader moral perspective, the overall ethics of a killing would depend on whether the war was just or unjust.  In fact, one could argue that targeting leaders in a just war is morally superior to the killing of soldiers. In general, the soldiers are not involved in the decisions that started the war and would not be fighting without being sent by their leaders. In contrast, the leaders are making the decisions and are morally responsible for the wars they start. As such, if a soldier in a war is a morally legitimate target for violence, then the leaders who sent them to war are also morally legitimate targets. Or even more legitimate, since it is their war.

In the example of Soleimani, the United States and Iran were not at war, hence the ethics of war do not apply. However, one could appeal to the ethics of conflict between nations. In general, killing the citizens of other nations outside of war is wrong. But there can be exceptions if the person did things that morally warranted their death. But accepting this as a justification requires accepting the corresponding moral principle and we would need to accept that Americans could be justly killed by other nations if their evil deeds warranted their deaths. For example, there are those who would argue that the deaths caused by American politicians could warrant their assassination on moral grounds.  There is also the option of just insisting that it is acceptable for the United States to engage in assassination because it is “my country”, but the same sort of argument can be made by citizens of other countries. For example, Iranians can make an equally bad case that it is acceptable for Iran to engage in assassination because it is their country.