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I have seen the cost of a university education explode since I was a student, even adjusting for inflation. As a professor, I can assure you that faculty salaries have not increased proportionally nor are we to blame for the increase in the cost.

Professor salaries, especially at state school, are often compressed. For those of us who have been around a while, the compression can be extreme. For example, a full professor who was hired in the early 1990s might have a salary on par with a brand-new hire. This is one reason why star faculty move around in search of ever larger salaries. Universities also rely heavily on underpaid adjuncts. While the rates vary, an adjunct might make $24,000 over nine months for teaching eight classes. As adjuncts usually receive no benefits, they are cheap labor for higher education. As adjuncts often have advanced degrees, they are perhaps the worst paid of the best educated.

To be fair and balanced there are star faculty who command large salaries and perks. They are celebrities of academics who use their status and connections to slide from one well-paying job to an even better paying job. Such stars sometimes enjoy exemptions from the mundane duties of faculty, such as teaching. As with any profession, stars are relatively rare and are usually not a significant factor in the increased cost of education. As such, blaming the faculty for the higher cost is not, in general, a legitimate complaint.

But complaining about the cost of education is legitimate: costs have increased significantly while there are increasing doubts about the quality and value of education. The rise of AI is also raising significant doubts, although AI is likely to be yet another bubble. However, we should put the cost of education into perspective. Being a professor, I will focus on the educational aspects.

At a state school like my own Florida A&M University, a student will most often take a class from a person with a terminal degree, usually a doctorate. A standard class is three credit hours, which means that a student is supposed to be in class two and a half hours per week. In my college four classes per semester is common and we are required to hold two hours of office hours per class. We also have various research and administrative duties. For example, I am the unit facilitator for Philosophy & Religion and seem to have a lifetime sentence to be the chair of two university committees. Thanks to email, students can contact us around the clock—and most faculty, including myself, respond to emails outside of normal hours and on the weekends. I’m writing this on a Sunday and just completed an email exchange with a student.  We also typically do work for the classes, such as grading, preparing lessons and so on throughout the week and during vacations. Even the unpaid three months that 9-month faculty get in the summer.

While the exact hours will vary, a student at a school like FAMU will have access to a professional with an advanced degree for 2.5 hours in the classroom, have access to 8 hours of office hours, and typically have unlimited email access. Most faculty are also willing to engage with students in their off time—for example, I have stopped while grocery shopping to explain a paper to a student who also happened to be in Publix at that time. This is in return for the cost of tuition, only a small fraction of which goes to the professor.

Now, compare this to the cost per hour for other professionals. For example, a psychiatrist might charge between $125-$285 per hour. As another example, a plumber might charge $9-150 an hour. As a third example, a consultant might charge anywhere from $30 to thousands of dollars an hour. As a fourth example, an attorney might charge hundreds of dollars per hour or more.

 Imagine what it would cost to have a plumber, medical doctor, or attorney spend 2.5 hours a week with you for 16 weeks (divided by the other people, of course), be available an additional eight hours a week, do work for you outside of those hours, respond personally to your emails and so on.  If professors billed like plumbers, lawyers or medical doctors, the cost of school would be insanely high.

It might be replied that plumbers, lawyers and medical doctors perform services that are more valuable than professors. After all, a plumber can fix your pipes, a lawyer could get you a nice settlement and a medical doctor might re-attach your quadriceps tendon. A professor merely teaches and surely that has far less value. The obvious practical reply is that people with college degrees make, on average, more than those without—this would suggest that teaching does provide some value. There is also the fact that plumbers, medical doctors and lawyers need education to do what they do—thus showing that education does provide something of value (although plumbers typically do not go to college to become plumbers).

As such, while education is too expensive, the actual cost of paying professors is ridiculously cheap relative to what other comparable professionals cost. You might suspect that I implying the blame lies elsewhere, and you would be right.

 

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One of my lasting lessons from political science is that every major society has a pyramid structure of wealth and power. The United States is no exception. However, the United States is also supposed to be a democratic society—which seems inconsistent with the pyramid.

While the United States has the mechanisms of democracy, such as voting, it might be wondered whether it is democratic or oligarchic (or plutocratic) in nature. While people might consider how they feel about this, feelings and anecdotes are not proof. So, for example, a leftist who thinks the rich rule the country and who feels oppressed by the plutocracy does not prove their belief by appealing to their feelings or anecdotes about the rich. Likewise, a conservative who thinks that America is a great democracy and feels good about the rich does not prove their belief by appealing to their feelings or anecdotes about the rich.

What is needed is a study to determine how the system works. One obvious way to determine the degree of democracy is to compare the expressed preferences of citizens with the political results. If the political results generally correspond to the preferences of the majority, then this is a reasonable (but not infallible) indicator the system is democratic. If the political results generally favor the rich and powerful while going against the preferences of the less wealthy majority, then this would be a reasonable (but not infallible) indicator that the system is oligarchic (or plutocratic). After all, to the degree that a system is democratic, the majority should have their preferences enacted into law and policy—even when this goes against the wishes of the rich. To the degree that the system is oligarchic, then the minority of elites should get their way—even when this goes against the preferences of the majority.

Some years ago, researchers at Princeton and Northwestern conducted just such a study: “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”  using data gathered from 1981 to 2002. The researchers examined about 1,800 polices from that time and matched them against the preferences expressed by three classes: the average American (50th income percentile), the affluent American (the 90th percentile of income) and the large special interest groups.

The results were not surprising: “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”

As noted above, a democratic system should result in the preferences of the majority being expressed in policies and laws more often than not. However, “When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites and/or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the US political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.” As such, this study provided evidence that the United States was already an oligarchy before Trump, rather than a democratic state.

It might be contended that this system is fine since, to use a misquote, what is the preference for General Motors is the preference for Americans. That is, it could be claimed that the elites and most Americans have the same or similar preferences.  However, the study found that the interests of the wealthy are not substantially correlated with the preferences of average citizens. The preferences of most Americans do not match the interests of the wealthy, but the wealthy generally get what they want.

One objection is that the preferences of the majority are mistaken—that is, the majority wants things that are not in their best interest and what the elites want is what is best. For example, while most Americans might prefer stronger consumer protection laws, it could be claimed that they are in error because what is good for GM is good for the country, even if the many think otherwise. What is in their best interest is less consumer protection, which is what the financial elites want.

The obvious reply is that even if the majority is mistaken and the oligarchs know best, this would be arguing that oligarchy is better than democracy, not that America is not an oligarchy.

Another objection is that the system is democratic in that people vote for elected officials who then pass laws and enact policies. As citizens can vote them out of office, they must be expressing the preferences of the citizens—even though policy and law consistently goes against the expressed preferences of the majority. This is to say that we have democratically created an oligarchy, so it is still a democracy (or at least a republic).

This objection is interesting and raises a question about why people consistently re-elect those who consistently act contrary to their expressed preferences. One possibility is that the choices are very limited—you can vote for anyone you want, but a Democrat or Republican will almost certainly be elected. As such, the voters get to vote, but do not get real choices.

Another possibility is ignorance—people might not realize that what they get does not match what they claim to want. Such ignorance would put the moral blame partially on the citizens—they should be better informed.  Then again, given the abysmal approval rating for congress and President Trump, it seems that people do realize this. This creates an odd scenario: people really dislike them yet re-elect them. 

A third possibility is the power of propaganda engines devoted to convincing people that the laws and policies are good. So, while people prefer one thing, they are persuaded to believe that what is in the interest of the oligarchy is what they should like. People might also be distracted by other matters—for example, people who have been convinced they should fear transgender people and hate DEI will support politicians who appeal to their hate and fear, even if the politician also supports policies contrary to most other things the voter wants. In this case, the moral failing is on the part of the deceivers—they are tricking citizens and corrupting democracy.

Another approach to objecting to the study is to raise questions about the methodology. One question would be whether the 1,800 policies are properly representative of the political system. After all, if the researchers picked ones that favored the wealthy and ignored others that matched public preferences, then the study would be biased. As such, a key question is whether the sample used in the study is large enough and representative enough to adequately support the conclusion. Another question would be whether the study had the preferences of the people correct. After all, to properly claim that the laws and policies do not generally match the preferences of the majority, the claimed preferences would need to be the actual preferences of the majority. These concerns can be addressed by examining the study carefully and objectively, rather than merely dismissing or accepting it based on how one feels about the matter.

Looking back on the study from the perspective of 2026, it is evident that Trump and Congress are simply openly engaging in an oligarchy that has long existed in the United States.

 

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Some years ago, my running friend Nancy arranged a trash pickup after the Palace Saloon 5K. This involved spending about an hour and a half picking up trash in the hot Florida sun.  We runners created a pile of overstuffed trash bags full of a diversity of discarded debris.

On my training runs, I routinely pick up litter in San Luis Park. This ranges from the expected (discarded cans) to the unusual (a stereo system). These adventures in litter caused me to think about issues related to litter and especially the cost of litter.

One obvious cost of litter is the aesthetic damage. Litter is ugly and makes an area look, well, trashy. One of the many reasons I pick up litter is that I prefer not to run through trashy places.

Another obvious cost of litter is the environmental damage. Some of this is obvious, such as oil or paint leaking from discarded cans. Other damage is less obvious, such as erosion and flooding that can be caused by litter clogging storm drains.  There is also the harm done to animals directly, such as sea life killed when their stomachs fill with plastic debris. As with the aesthetic damage, the cost of the litter is largely paid by those who did not litter—such as the turtles and seabirds harmed by discarded items.

A less obvious cost is that paid by people who pick up the litter. For example, I take a few minutes out of almost every run to dispose of trash discarded by others. There are also walkers in my neighborhood who pick up trash during their entire walk—I will see them carrying full bags of cans, bottles and other debris that have been thrown onto the streets, sidewalks and lawns. Unlike my home state of Maine, Florida does not have a deposit on bottle and cans so there is no financial incentive to pick them up.

Those of us who clean up after the litterbugs pay with our time and effort. This is doubly annoying because the effort we need to expend to pick up the debris and dispose of it properly is more than the litterbug would spend to dispose of it. Litter is often scattered about, in pieces or tossed into the woods—thus making it a chore to pick up and carry. Also, carrying trash while running is more inconvenient than transporting it in a vehicle—and much of the trash beside the road is hurled from vehicles.

Some states, such as my home state of Maine, do shift some of the cost of litter to the litterer. To be specific, these states have a deposit on bottles and cans. When someone discards a can or bottle, they are throwing away the deposit—thus incurring a small cost for littering. When someone picks up the bottle or can, they can redeem it for the deposit—thus offsetting the cost of their effort. While this approach does not cover all forms of litter, it impacts the litter problem by providing people with an incentive to not litter or to pick up the litter thrown away by others.

This model of imposing a cost on littering and providing a reward for cleaning up litter is ethical. In terms of fairness, it seems right that the person littering should pay a price for the damage done and the cost imposed on others. It is also right that people who make the effort to clean up messes caused by others should receive compensation. The obvious challenge is making the model work on a broader scale beyond bottles and cans. I do, of course, think this should extend beyond mere personal littering, which is trivial when compared to the massive, organized littering of businesses.

 

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While there are various ways to define what it is for a pet to be exotic, I will focus on non-domesticated animals. Naturally, some of these pets do not involve much moral controversy. For example, keeping a tank of small fish seems morally acceptable—provided the fish are properly cared for. I am, for this short essay, mainly concerned with animals such as lions, tigers, bears, wolves, kangaroos, pythons, chimpanzees and other such animals. That is, animals that are wild and can present a danger to human beings. Also of concern are exotic pets that might pose no meaningful direct danger to humans but could be a danger to small animals or the local environment.

One obvious moral argument against allowing people to own dangerous exotic pets is that they are dangerous. Bears and tigers can easily kill humans. There is also the harm caused to ecosystems by escaped pets, such as the constrictors infesting my adopted state of Florida. This can be cast as utilitarian argument in terms of the harms outweighing the alleged benefits of having such exotic pets.

The obvious response to this argument is that non-exotic pets, such as dogs and horses, injure and even kill people. As such, the harm argument would also hold against having any pet that is a potential danger to a human. This response could be taken to entail at least two things. One is that all pet ownership of potentially dangerous animals should not be allowed. This would not appeal to most people, given the popularity of dogs. The other is that people should be allowed to have potentially dangerous pets, be the pet a dog or a bear. While this view has some appeal, the easy and obvious counter is that there are clear relevant differences between pets like dogs and pets like lions, tigers and bears.

While a domesticated animal like a dog or horse can seriously injure or kill a human, they are generally less dangerous and far less likely to attack than a wild species like a bear or tiger. After all, domestic animals have been (mostly) selected to not be aggressive towards humans and for other appropriate (from our perspective) behavior. So, while my dogs were good at biting, they were not as dangerous as a bear and never attacked a human, even when provoked. This is not to say that it is impossible for a well-behaved dog to turn violent. This is just to say that a well-trained dog is radically different from a well-trained bear or tiger.

While injuries caused by dogs are common, this is because there are so many dogs kept as pets. As such, even a tiny percentage of aggressive dogs will cause a relatively high number of incidents. There is also a reasonable concern about dogs that have been bred and trained to be aggressive. Such dogs present a threat to people and arguments can be made about restricting ownership of dog breeds that are alleged to be prone to violence.

Another obvious moral argument is based on the harms done to the exotic animals. While domesticated animals can do well living with humans (for example, my dogs have been happy living in my house—provided they got their runs and outdoor adventures), wild animals often do not do very well. Many who own exotic pets cannot provide the environment a wild species needs to be happy and healthy. There are also the concerns about medical care, proper exercise, diet and so on. As such, allowing people to own such exotic pets would often have negative consequences for the animals. Once again, the moral case against owning such pets can be made on utilitarian grounds.

An obvious reply is that domestic animals also have needs. As such, it could be contended that if the keeping of domestic animals is acceptable if they are properly cared for, then the same should hold for the exotic animals. This reply does have considerable appeal. After all, if an animal is properly cared for and is healthy and happy, then there would seem to be no moral grounds for forbidding a person from having such a pet.

The practical problem is that caring properly for such exotic animals is more challenging and more expensive than care for a domesticated animal. As I mentioned, my dogs have been happy living in my house and going on runs and expeditions with me. While medical care and food was not cheap, taking care of them was something I could easily afford. Exotic pets often present more serious challenges in terms of cost. For example, a tiger is very expensive to feed and one should not take a tiger out for an adventure to local dog park. However, with proper resources these challenges could be addressed.

As a final moral argument, there is the concern that it is simply wrong to keep an exotic animal as a pet. To steal from Aristotle, it is not the function (or nature) of wild animals to exist as pets for humans. While people and animals might form bonds, the wild animals are such that being made into a pet is a distortion or even violation of what they are, which would be wrong. This, of course, would seem to suggest that we have distorted animals and perhaps wronged them by domesticating them—which might be true.

This line of reasoning can be countered in various ways, ranging from arguing against there being such natures to religious appeals to the claim that humans were given dominion over the animals and thus we can do what we wish with them.

My own view is somewhat mixed. Since I have shared my home with many dogs and cats, it should be no surprise that I am morally fine with having a pet (provided they are well cared for). However, I think keeping exotic animals as pets is morally problematic. That said, some people do truly love their exotic pets and take excellent care of them. In the case of endangered species, there is also the added moral argument about the preservation of such species as pets—which does have some appeal when the alternative is extinction. This does, however, raise the moral issue of whether existing as pets (or domesticated animals) is morally better than being extinct.

In closing, I would certainly not have a lion, tiger or bear as a pet. A dire husky…well, sure.

Way back on 4/9/2014 NPR did a report on why there are fewer women than men in business. While the gap has narrowed as of 2026, it persists (especially at the senior level). The difference begins in business school and continues forward. The report presented an interesting hypothesis: men and women differ in their ethics.

While people usually claim lying is immoral, men and woman are more likely to lie to a woman when negotiating. The report also mentioned a test with an ethical issue: the seller of a house does not want it sold to someone who will turn it into a condo, but a potential buyer wants to do just that. Men were more likely than women to lie to sell the house.

It was also found that men tend towards egocentric ethical reasoning in that if the man will be harmed by something, then it is regarded as unethical. If the man benefits, he is more likely to see it as morally grey. So, in the case of the house scenario, a man representing the buyer would tend to see lying to the seller as acceptable because he would make a sale. However, a man representing the seller would be more likely to see being lied to as unethical.

In another test of ethics, people were asked about their willingness to include an inferior ingredient in a product that would hurt people but would generate more profit. Men were more willing than the women to see this as acceptable. In fact, women tended to see this as outrageous.

These results provide two reasons why women would be less likely to be in business than men. The first is that men are less troubled by unethical, but more profitable, decisions.  The idea that having “moral flexibility” provides an advantage,  as Glaucon  argued in Plato’s Republic. If a morally flexible person needs to lie to gain an advantage, he can lie. If a bribe would serve his purpose, he can bribe. If a bribe would not suffice and someone needs to have a tragic “accident”, then he can arrange an accident. A morally flexible person is like a craftsperson that has a broader range of tools, so they are more likely to have the right tool for every occasion. Just as the better equipped craftsperson has an advantage, the morally flexible person has an advantage over those more constrained by ethics. If women are, in general, more constrained by ethics, then they would probably be less likely to remain in business because they would be at a competitive disadvantage. The ethical difference might also explain why women are less likely to go into business—it is a common stereotype that unethical activity is part of doing business. If women are more ethical than men, then they would be more inclined to avoid business.

It could be countered that Glaucon is wrong and that being unethical (while getting away with it) does not provide advantages. Obviously, getting caught and punished for unethical behavior is not advantageous—but it is not the unethical behavior that causes the problem. Rather, it is getting caught and punished. Glaucon is clear that being unjust is only advantageous when one can get away with it. Socrates argues that being ethical is superior to being unethical, but he does not do so by arguing that the ethical person will have greater material success. That is conceded to Glaucon.

It must be noted that a person could be ethical and have material success while a morally flexible person could be a complete failure. The claim is that ethical flexibility provides a distinct advantage in material success in the context of capitalism.

One could, and should, point out that there are unethical women and ethical men. The obvious reply is that this claim is true—it has not been asserted that all men are unethical or that all women are ethical. Rather, women seem to be generally more ethical than men.

It might be countered that the ethical view assumed in this essay is flawed. For example, it could be countered that what matters is profit and the means to this end are thus justified. As such, using inferior ingredients to make a profit would not be unethical, but laudable. After all, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. As such, women might be avoiding business because they are unethical on this view of ethics.

The second reason is that women are more likely to be lied to in negotiations. If true, this would put women at a disadvantage relative to men. This, of course, assumes that such deceit would be advantageous in negotiations. While there surely are cases in which deceit would be disadvantageous, at deceit can be a very useful technique. While President Trump is but one example, his regime does provide an excellent example of the power of moral flexibility in material success.

If it is believed that having more women in business is desirable (which would not be accepted by everyone), then there seem to be two main options. The first is for women to become more unethical so they can compete with men. The second would be to endeavor to make business more ethical. This would also help address the matter of lying to women.

 

 

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While same sex couples currently have the right to marry, it would be unwise to think that this right is permanent. As such, I find it wise to continue to discuss the various arguments used against it. Fortunately, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to recycle old arguments rather than advance something new. As a philosopher, I’ll focus on the moral arguments against same-sex marriage.

If something is morally wrong, then it should be possible to present non-fallacious and reasonable arguments to show it is wrong.  There should also be true claims in any arguments. I do not claim that the arguments must be decisive, that is a rare occurrence in ethics. While people continue to argue against same sex marriage, the arguments are often the old mix of fallacies and poor reasoning. There is also the usual employment of untrue “facts.”

Appeal to tradition and appeal to common practice are two fallacies that are often used to argue against same-sex marriage.  This might be done by arguing that defining marriage as being between a man and a woman is correct because it is “age-old and still predominant.” Appeal to tradition is the fallacy that something is good or true just because it has been believed or practiced for a long time. While people do refer to a test of time, the mere fact that something has endured as a tradition is not evidence it is true or good. If it is, in fact, true or good, then reasons beyond an appeal to tradition should exist. Common practice is the fallacy that a practice is good just because it is common. But just because many people do something does not entail it is good. Also, if something is good, then there should be other reasons as to why it is good beyond the claim that it is commonly done. As same-sex marriage has now been around for a while, the appeal to tradition and common practice arguments can be countered on their own fallacious terms by pointing out that same-sex marriage is now both a tradition and a common practice.

Another standard argument against same-sex marriage is the procreation gambit, sometimes with an added bit about the state’s interest. One example is the argument made by the state of Utah during the last fight over the issue:  “Same-sex couples, who cannot procreate, do not promote the state’s interests in responsible procreation (regardless of whether they harm it).” There is also the boilerplate argument about “responsible procreation” and “optimal mode of child rearing.” Expect to see these arguments more if the push back against same-sex marriage gets more momentum.

In these arguments, same-sex marriage is criticized on two grounds in the context of “responsible procreation.” The first is the claim that same-sex couples cannot procreate naturally. The second is that same-sex couples fail to provide an “optimal mode of child rearing.” To argue same-sex couples the right to marry because of these criticisms would require accepting two general principles: 1) marriage is to be denied to those who do cannot or do not procreate and 2) people who are not capable of the “optimal mode of child rearing” should not be allowed to marry.

The first principle entails that different sex couples who do not want or cannot have children must also be denied marriage. After all, if an inability (or unwillingness) to have kids warrants denying same-sex couples the right to marry, the same would also apply to different-sex couples.

This principle would also seem to imply that couples who use artificial means to reproduce (such as in vitro fertilization or a surrogate) must also be denied marriage. After all, same-sex couples can use these methods to procreate. Alternatively, if different-sex couples can use these methods and be allowed to marry, then same-sex couples who procreate would thus also seem to be entitled to marriage.

The principle would also seem to entail that all married couples would be required to have at least one child, presumably within a specific time frame to ensure that the couple is not just faking their desire (or ability) to have children to get married. This would certainly seem to be a violation of the rights of the parents and an egregious intrusion by the state.

The second principle entails that straight couples who are not optimal parents must be denied marriage.  This would seem to require that the state monitor all marriages to determine that the parents are providing an optimal mode of child rearing and that it be empowered to revoke marriage licenses (as the state can revoke a driver’s license for driving violations) for non-optimal parents. Different-sex parents can obviously provide non-optimal modes. After all, child abuse and neglect are committed by different-sex couples.

While I agree irresponsible people should not have children and the state has an obligation to protect children, it is absurd to deny such people the right to marry. After all, not allowing them to marry (or dissolving the marriage when they proved irresponsible) would not make them more responsible or benefit the children. Now to the state’s interest.

For the sake of the argument, I will grant that the state (that is, the people making up a political entity we call the state) has an interest in having people reproduce. After all, the state is just a collection of people, so if there are no new people, the state will cease to exist. Of course, this also gives the state an interest in immigration—it would also replace lost people.

This interest in procreation does not, however, entail that the state thus has an interest in preventing same sex-marriage. Allowing same-sex marriage does not reduce the number of different-sex marriages—that is, there is not a limited supply of marriages that same-sex couples could “use up.” Also, even if there were a limited number of allowed marriages, same-sex couples would only be a small percentage of the marriages and, obviously enough, marriage is not a necessary condition for procreation nor responsible procreation. That is, people can impregnate or be impregnated without being married. People can also be good parents without being married. And they can be terrible parents when married.

Considering these arguments, the procreation argument against same-sex marriage remains absurd. If those opposing same-sex marriage had better arguments, they would surely use them. But they simply repeat the old, failed arguments and fallacies. But, to be fair and balanced, this is not a fight that is won or lost by logic but by politics and that battle might be refought soon.

As a young political science and philosophy major I learned about types of governments. Among these is the plutocracy—rule by the wealthy. I recall thinking, in my young anarchist days, that all governments were, are and will be plutocracies. After all, the rich always have influence proportional to their wealth and society tends to head in the direction desired by the wealthy. I was aware, of course, that there can be momentary disruptions of the plutocracy. For example, a rebellion or revolution might result in the old rich being killed, exiled or stripped of their wealth. However, history shows that a new rich always emerges (or the old rich return). Even in the allegedly communist states, a wealthy class has always appeared. “Communist” China, after all, has billionaires. The plutocratic system seems eternal.

As might be imagined, my cynical view was countered by some of my friends—they insisted that America was a democracy and not a plutocracy. After all, they argued, the rich do not always get their way in everything and money did not always decide elections. In fact, they pointed out that there were strict restrictions on political spending. A plutocracy would not have such limits.  As such, some might conclude that my younger anarchist self was mistaken. But I think, here in 2026, that my young self has been tragically proven right.

Years ago, the infamous Supreme Court ruling allowed unlimited campaign spending by corporations on the grounds that corporations are people, spending is speech and people have a right to free speech. The idea that corporations are people can be easily disproven by a simple reduction ad absurdum: If corporations have the right to free speech because they are people, then they cannot be owned. After all, the Constitution expressly forbids slavery (that is, the ownership of people). To contend that corporations can be owned yet are people who have freedom of speech is to either accept slavery or to fail to grasp the logical notion of consistency. So, a corporation can have freedom of speech, provided it is set free from being owned. Since it is obvious that corporations are things that can be justly owned, it should be obvious that they are not people. As such, they do not get freedom of speech. Naturally, the actual people associated with corporations have their right to freedom of speech. What remains is, of course, the matter of whether spending is speech or not.

On 4/2/2014 the Supreme Court struck down the aggregate campaign contribution limits. This was based, not surprisingly, on the Citizens United ruling in 2010.  That ruling included the absurd claim that the influence and access offered unlimited spending is not a concern in regard to corruption. The years since then have proven the obvious: unlimited spending invites corruption.

The case was brought by Shaun McCutcheon—a very wealthy Republican donor. The impact of his victory is that a single donor, such as McCutcheon, can contribute millions to parties, candidates and PACs. The ruling did leave some limits in place: an individual can give:  $2,600 per candidate, per election; $32,400 to political party committees per year; and $5,000 per PAC, per year. The main change was there is no longer an overall cap to the total donations. Previously, a donor could not give more than $123,200 to all political committees, with limits of $48,600 to candidates and $74,600 to political parties and PACs.

McCutcheon claimed, in error or falsely, that this was a grassroots victory against the status quo:  “With the ruling, we continue to chip away at the long entrenched status quo from the grassroots—a status quo that has kept challengers, better ideas, and new entrants to the political arena mostly locked out. Ensuring that citizens are able to contribute to multiple candidates or causes who share their views only provides further support to a system in which ‘We the People’ hold the ultimate reins of power.”

This was an odd claim in 2014, given that it benefits most those wealthy enough to make such donations as opposed to the average citizen who lacks the funds to take advantage of this ruling. As I predicted in 2014, this ruling weakened what little grasp the people still have on the reins of power and strengthened the grip of the wealth. As I predicted, this ruling was a boon for the Republican party and billionaires as was evident by the billionaires attemnding Trump’s last inauguration. While it is true that the Democrats also have their wealthy supporters, the Democrats rely more heavily on large numbers of small donations.

Back in 2014 I was concerned the ruling would lead to increased corruption and increased influence on politics by the wealthy. On the face of it, these seem to be the obvious consequences of lifting such restrictions and allowing the money to flow more freely into politics. After all, the original purpose of the restrictions was to address problems with corruption and influence buying. It was an easy prediction to get right.

While those who supported it insisted that corruption and influence buying would not increase, they also appealed to the principle of freedom. As Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner said at the time, “What I think this means is freedom of speech is being upheld. Donors ought to have the freedom to give what they want to give.”

The basic issue, then, was and still is whether such spending is speech.  That spending is free speech, seemed a dubious claim then and appears even more dubious now But let us reason through this. Suppose that spending money for political purposes should be considered speech. Now, it is acceptable to try to persuade a politician by speaking to them. If spending is speech, then I should be able to try to persuade politicians by speaking to them with money. However, this is bribery. But, if spending is a form of free speech, bribery should be acceptable as a form of free speech. This seems absurd, to say the least.

It might be countered that such contributions cannot be direct bribes in that there can be no direct giving of money in return for specific actions or promises to act. However, it would be foolish to believe campaign financing is not intended to influence behavior by providing money and support. After all, it would be ludicrous to imagine that millionaires and billionaires would donate millions of dollars and expect nothing in return. While this is not logically impossible, it is exceptionally unlikely. What has happened since 2014 has confirmed this repeatedly and the Trump regime has abandoned all pretense of not being a plutocracy. Although, to be fair and balanced, Trump’s approach is best seen as a griftocracy.

However, suppose  spending is a form of speech and tprotected by the right of free expression. It does not, of course, follow that such speech should be free of limits. After all, limits are justly placed on speech. The example everyone uses is yelling of “fire” in a crowded theater in which there is no fire. In the case of allowing this sort of spending, it would do serious harm to the political process by increasing the influence of an individual based on his wealth and thus proportionally decreasing the influence of those who are less wealthy. To use an analogy, it is on par with having a public discussion in which the wealthy are allowed to blast their speech from concert grade loudspeakers up on a stage while the rest of us are expected to try to shout out our views from the crowd.

To counter arguments like this, Roberts made an analogy to newspaper endorsements. As he said, there is no limit to the number of candidates a newspaper can endorse. As such, by analogy, it should follow that there should be no limit on the number of candidates a person can donate money to. There are two easy and obvious replies I made back in 2014. The first is to go back to the original argument that spending is not speech. While a newspaper endorsement is speech (it is the expression of ideas and views) handing people money does not seem to qualify as an expression of ideas and views. When I buy a pair of running shoes or pay my entry to a road race, I am not engaged in expression—I am trading money for goods and services. Likewise, when a person donates to a political cause, they are trading money for goods and services. But, even if it is accepted that spending is speech, there is still a significant difference. A newspaper endorsement works by persuasion—one is either swayed by it or not. In contrast, large sums of money have far more impact: money allows people to become viable candidates, and it allows them to run campaigns. As such, the influence of money is much more significant than the influence of a newspaper endorsement and this increases the likelihood of corruption.

This returns to the corruption issue. My contention, back in 2014, was that such a flow of money would lead to corruption and grant the wealthy even more influence, while reducing the political influence of the less wealthy. The competing claim is that allowing this sort of spending will not have any negative impact. Given the usual effect of large sums of money, I would claim that increased corruption seems to be the likely outcome. Looking back twelve years after that 2014 decision, my predictions were proven correct; although that was one of the easiest predictions I ever made.

 People want to gain as much as they can for as little effort as possible. For example, people seem to buy exercise equipment thinking it will make exercise easier. They usually find out that is not the case—thus the trade in barely used exercise equipment that spent its time buried under clothes. Years ago, brain training games were all the rage. The appeal was, of course, that the games were supposed to fun rather than burdensome, unliked education. The question was whether such games worked.

The idea that playing brain games can have positive effects makes sense. After all, exercising the body improves it. By analogy, the same should hold for the brain. The obvious concern is that not everything that people think is exercise improves the body. Likewise, some brain games might be like useless exercises for the body: you are doing something, but it is having no significant effect. To address this matter, the thing to do is to turn to science.

As it stands, the research showed that the commercial brain training games had no meaningful impact. While people do get better at the games, this is most likely due to familiarity. For example, I used to play World of Warcraft and I “got good” at boss fights by doing them repeatedly until I was familiar with the mechanisms. While there is some skill transference between fights, I found I had to learn each boss to “get good.” The same generally holds for brain games and getting better at such a game does not entail that one is smarter or more mentally capable.

Fortunately for me, video games of the more “traditional” sort can improve memory and mental skills. This is not surprising as they typically present challenges analogous to those in the real world. As such, rather than simply focusing on a simple game that is narrowly focused, the gamer is forced to fully engage the general challenge and develop a broader set of capabilities. As such, video games of this sort probably help improve mental abilities in a way analogous to how reality does: you improve skills that have a general application. In the case of video games, the challenges will tend to be more challenging and more frequent than what a person would generally encounter in the real world. For example, participating in a World of Warcraft dungeon or raid involves tracking abilities, maintaining situational awareness, following (or giving) orders, using strategy and so on. That is, it provides a mental workout. So, a person looking for games to make her smarter would be better off getting a gaming console or PC and selecting challenging games. They will probably be much more fun than most brain games and apparently more effective.

That said, there are certain brain games that do seem to have a positive benefit. One promising example is a speed training game that seems to help reduce the risk of developing Alzheimer’s and other types of dementia.

I would also like to put in a plug for traditional tabletop games as well—be they games like Risk or role-playing games like D&D. They can provide enjoyable challenges that seem to have a positive impact on cognitive abilities. Plus, they are social activities—and that is better for a person than playing solo brain games.

When a well-connected author publishes a new book, they make the rounds of various shows. Such authors also enjoy mentions in the media, as befitting their fame and connections. For example, favored authors will often be interviewed and reviewed on NPR. Authors who have their own shows plug their own books. Elite authors are also supported by other cultural elites. These are the people, such as Oprah, who tell the rest of us what is good.

There is considerable advantage to being blessed by the curators of culture. First, there is the boon of exposure. Being a gamer, I will present this in gaming terms. One way to look at this is that a certain percentage of people will buy a book if they hear about it. Alternatively, this can be thought of in terms of a percent chance that a person who hears of the book will buy it. So, for example, a book with a 5% purchase rating would be bought by 5% of those who hear about it. Or each person who hears about it has a 5% chance of buying it. While this is an abstract, game style simplification, it shows that the more people who hear about a book, the more copies of a book will be sold. This is true even for books that are not good. This is the principle that spam works on: if enough people hear about something money can still be made even if the response or purchase rate is low. Obviously when an author gets on a significant show to talk about her book, her sales will increase. Likewise for other forms of exposure for the author and the book. Equally obvious is that access to the curators of culture is limited and carefully controlled—an author must be properly connected to make it into the brightest circle of media light. This connection might even be luck: the book just happens to catch the attention of the right person, and the author is invited, perhaps briefly, into the circle.

Second, there is the gift of endorsement. If a book is endorsed or praised by the right people, this can boost to sales over and above the boon granted by exposure. While endorsement does provide exposure, exposure does not always entail endorsement. After all, the curators of culture do sometimes speak of books they dislike. While condemnation of a work might impair its sales, the exposure can increase sales. And being condemned by the right sort of people can boost sales. In the case of ideological works, for example, being condemned by an ideological foe could boost sales among ideological friends.

As discussed in an early essay on luck, the quality of a work has little connection to its success. Luck is a major factor. Exposure and endorsement add to this, and either might be acquired by luck). In an ideal aesthetic world, works would receive exposure and endorsement proportionate to their merit. In the actual world, there is often little correlation. The best books need not be the most exposed or most endorsed. Mediocre (or worse) books might garner great attention and receive unwarranted praise from the curators of culture.

This is not to say that merit never achieves success, just that merit seems a small factor in successful sales. Sometimes, just sometimes, a meritorious work does achieve success against long odds because of its merit—but this is notable in its rarity.

Over a decade ago Susan Patton, better known as the “Princeton Mom”, made the rounds promoting her book, Marry Smart: Advice for Finding THE ONE.  This book presented the 18th century view that a woman should focus primarily on quickly finding a husband as fertility diminishes with time.

Patton attracted more attention with her March 11, 2014 interview with the Daily Princetonian. In a letter to the editor written about a year before the interview, she wrote, “Please spare me your ‘blaming the victim’ outrage” and claimed that a woman who is drunk and provocatively dressed “must bear accountability for what may happen.” When asked why the woman is responsible in the case of rape or sexual assault, she had the following to say:

 

 The reason is, she is the one most likely to be harmed, so she is the one that needs to take control of the situation. She is that one that needs to take responsibility for herself and for her own safety, and simply not allow herself to come to a point where she is no longer capable of protecting her physical self. The analogy that I would give you is: If you cross the street without looking both ways and a car jumps the light or isn’t paying attention, and you get hit by a car — as a woman or as anybody — and you say, ‘Well I had a green light,’ well yes you did have a green light but that wasn’t enough. So in the same way, a woman who is going to say, ‘Well the man should have recognized that I was drunk and not pushed me beyond the level at which I was happy to engage with him,’ well, you didn’t look both ways. I mean yes, you’re right, a man should act better, men should be more respectful of women, but in the absence of that, and regardless of whether they are or are not, women must take care of themselves.

 

As might be imagined, this view generated some backlash from faculty at Princeton and other people. While this is all old news, the triumph of MAGA, the rise of misogynistic authoritarianism and the tradwife movement make reconsidering these claims relevant to today.

Patton’s first claim is that since the woman is most likely to be harmed, she needs to be responsible for her safety. There are at least two ways to view this claim. One is the reasonable claim a person has an obligation to herself to make sure she is not needlessly in danger. This view that self-preservation is rational and obligatory is ably defended by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Another way to view the claim, which was taken by her critics, is that the burden falls completely on the woman. While this can be seen as a prudent view, it runs afoul of the notion that the wrongdoer should bear most of the responsibility for the harm inflicted (if not all of it).

Patton’s second claim is that a woman has an obligation to not allow herself to be incapable of self-defense. This might mean that a woman has an obligation to not become so drunk that she cannot defend herself from assault or rape. In defense of this claim, Patton offers her analogy: a woman who gets assaulted or raped when she is too drunk to defend herself is like someone who gets hit by a car because they did not look both ways before crossing the street—even though she had the right to cross.

The analogy has some merit—while drivers are obligated to take care not to hit people, a person should take care to avoid being hit and to do otherwise is foolish. As an experienced runner, I understand the value of defensive crossing and respond with horror when I see people starring at their phones as they blindly step into the crosswalk.

However, there is a distinction between what is prudent and what is morally obligatory. While a woman should not impair herself when she believes she will be at risk of assault or rape, this is different from her having a moral obligation to herself to avoid being vulnerable. There is also a third matter, namely who is responsible when a drunk woman is raped or assaulted.

About the second matter, this is a question of whether there is a moral obligation for self-defense. It is generally accepted that people have a moral right to self-defense and for the sake of the discussion that will be assumed (see John Locke for an argument). This right gives a person the liberty to protect herself. If it is only a liberty, then the person has the right to not act in self-defense and thus increase their risk of being a victim. However, if there is an obligation for self-defense, then failing to act on this would be a moral failing. challenge is to show that there is such an obligation.

On the face of it, it would seem self-defense is a liberty rather than an obligation. However, some consideration suggests this is not as obvious as it might seem.  In the Leviathan, Hobbes presents what the Law of Nature (lex naturalis): “a precept or general rule, found by reason, that forbids a man to do what is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving it and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.” Hobbes goes on to note that “right consists in liberty to do or to forbear” and “law determines and binds.” If Hobbes is correct, then people would have both a right to and an obligation for self-defense.

John Locke and Thomas Aquinas also contend that life is to be preserved and if they are right, then this would impose an obligation of self-defense. Of course, this notion could be countered by contending that all it requires is for a person to seek protection from possible threats and doing so could involve relying on the protection or restraint of others rather than oneself. However, there are arguments against this.

I will start with a practical argument. While the modern Western state projects its coercive force and spying eyes into society, the state’s agents cannot (yet) observe all that occurs nor can they always be close at hand in times of danger. This assumes, of course, that agents of the state want to protect citizens from harm.

As such, relying solely on the state would put a person at risk—after all, they would often be helpless in the face of danger. If a person relies on other individuals, then unless she is always guarded, then she also faces the risk of being a helpless victim. Relying on the state or others would, at the very least, seem imprudent.

This argument can be used as the basis for a moral argument. If a person is morally obligated to preserve life (including their own) and others cannot be reliably depended on, then they would have an obligation of self-defense and this would include not intentionally making themselves vulnerable to known threats. These threats would include those presented by bad men. As such, a woman would have a moral obligation to avoid being vulnerable. This seems reasonable.

The third matter is the question of moral responsibility when a drunk woman is assaulted or raped by a man who takes advantage of her vulnerability.  In the abstract, it could be argued that the woman does bear some responsibility—if a woman has an obligation to defend herself, she would have failed in her obligation by becoming vulnerable. As with the road analogy, someone who crosses the road without looking and gets hit has failed in a duty to herself. However, even if this point is granted, there is still the matter of who bears most of the moral responsibility.

On the face of it, it seems evident that the man who assaulted or raped the woman bears the overwhelming moral responsibility. After all, even if the woman should have avoided being vulnerable, the man has a far greater moral obligation to not harm her. There is also the matter of reasonable expectations. To be specific, while a person is obligated to protect herself, this does not obligate her to be hyper-vigilant against all possible dangers. If a woman does not buy body armor to wear on campus (after all, there are campus shooting) and she is shot by a gunman, it would be absurd to blame her for her injury or death. The blame rests on the shooter—his obligation to not shoot her outweighs the extent of her obligation to be prepared.

In the case of rape and sexual assault, while a woman should be prudent for the sake of self-protection, the overwhelming moral responsibility is on the man. That the woman makes herself vulnerable to rape or assault no more lessens the rapist’s responsibility than the fact that the woman was not wearing body armor lessens the responsibility of the shooter. The principle here is that vulnerability does not mitigate moral responsibility. This is intuitively plausible: just because a victimizer has an easier time with his victim, it hardly makes his misdeeds less bad.

Patton did acknowledge that men should act better, but she insisted that a woman must take care of herself. This could be seen as sensible advice: a woman should not count on the goodwill of others but be on guard against reasonably foreseeable harm. This advice is, of course, consistent with the view that the rapist is the one truly responsible for the rape.