Author: Michael LaBossiere

While conservatives are usually not overly concerned with racism and have been willing to tolerate the racism of their fellows, they delight in accusing Democrats of racism. If this Democrat is a woman and Muslim, so much the better.

This sort of allegation is probably satisfying. First, there is the value in scoring political points against Democrats. Second, it is no doubt pleasant to turn the tables on Democrats. Third, such attacks provide cover for the racism of certain conservatives: how dare the Democrats attack, for example, Trump for being a racist when they have racists among them? While it is ironic to attack Democrats for alleged racism to protect racists, it seems a popular strategy on the right. This is not to say that racist Democrats should get a pass, but this tactic is based on a fallacy.

A favorite target of conservatives is  Democrat Ilhan Omar. Omar has been critical of Israel and its influence over American politics. Unfortunately for the Democrats, but fortunately for the Republicans, she has used terms like “hypnotize” and “allegiance” that can be interpreted as linking to anti-Semitic tropes. Her words were not overtly anti-Semitic as one must interpret them through the lens of these tropes. If she had said the same words about another country, they would seem innocuous. For example, her use of “allegiance” was taken as referring to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. However, if she had accused Trump of having an allegiance to Russia, this would obviously not appear anti-Semitic to anyone.

An obvious concern, which has been raised by others, is that criticism of Israel can easily be cast as anti-Semitism by analyzing every word of the criticism to find some connection to anti-Semitism. Even if a critic is scrupulous in their word choices, it would be easy to make an accusation of anti-Semitism. For example, any criticism of the influence of Israel lobbying congress using money can easily be cast as an anti-Semitic attack based on antisemitic stereotypes of Jews, money and conspiracies.

Interestingly, critics of Israel find themselves in a situation that conservatives often claim to face, that their non-racist words and actions are wrongly interpreted as racist. More generally, this is the complaint about political correctness and not being able to “say things” anymore. Oddly enough, conservatives did not rush to defend Omar from political correctness. As an example, when a conservative makes a monkey reference involving a black person, their defenders will profess ignorance of the racist monkey trope and assert that the person was using the reference in a perfectly non-racist manner.

While the lamentations of conservatives about political correctness are often veiled defenses of racism and sexism, their concerns do contain some merit. A person’s words can be wrongly taken as racist, especially when people are hypersensitive and are actively trying to interpret the words as racist. And almost any criticism can be seen as racist. For example, criticism of Obama was sometimes cast as racist, even when it seemed to be limited to his policies and actions. As such, there is a real problem here: if criticizing a black person must be racist and criticizing Israel must be anti-Semitic, then there would be no way to offer legitimate criticism of a black President or Israel. It is obviously absurd to think that Obama or Israel should be exempt from criticism because such criticism must be racist or anti-Semitic. There are many legitimate criticisms of both that have nothing to do with racism. As such, it would be absurd to dismiss such criticism as automatically racist. So, criticizing Israel is no more automatically anti-Semitic than criticizing Obama is automatically racist or criticizing Elizabeth Warren is sexist.

There is, however, the problem of the opposite extreme: that having grounds for legitimate criticism entails that the criticism is not racist. For example, while there are legitimate grounds to criticize Israeli influence over congress, couching this criticism in terms of an international Jewish conspiracy and remarking that Jews are the secret bankers controlling America would be antisemitic. As such, while criticizing Israel can be antisemitic it need not be.

The question “why lie if the truth would suffice” can be interpreted in at least three ways. One is as an inquiry about the motivation and asks for an explanation. A second is as an inquiry about weighing the advantages and disadvantages of lying. The third way is as a rhetorical question that states, under the guise of inquiry, that one should not lie if the truth would suffice.

Since a general discussion of this question would be rather abstract, I will focus on a specific example and use it as the basis for the discussion. Readers should, of course, construct their own examples using their favorite lie from those they disagree with. I will use Trump’s response to the Democrats’ Green New Deal as my example. While this is something of a flashback to his first term, Trump recently signed an executive order targeting the old Green New Deal.

In 2019 the Democrats proposed a Green New Deal aimed at addressing climate change and economic issues. As with any proposal, rational criticisms can be raised against it. In his first term, Trump claimed the Democrats intend “to permanently eliminate all Planes, Cars, Cows, Oil, Gas & the Military – even if no other country would do the same.”  While there are some Democrats who would do these things, the Democratic Party favors none of that. Looked at rationally, it seems to make no sense to lie about the Green New Deal. If it is bad enough to reject on its own defects, lies would not be needed. If one must lie to attack it, this suggests a lack of arguments against it. To use an analogy, if a prosecutor lies to convict a person, this suggests they have no case—otherwise they would rely on evidence. So, why would Trump lie if the truth would suffice to show the Green New Deal is a terrible plan?

The question of why Trump (or anyone else) lies when the truth would suffice is a matter for psychology, not philosophy. So, I will leave that question to others. This leaves me with the question about the advantages and disadvantages of lying along with the rhetorical question.

The lie about the Green New Deal is a good example of hyperbole and a straw man. Trump himself claims to use the tactic of “truthful hyperbole”. Hyperbole is a rhetorical device in which one makes use of extravagant overstatement, such as claiming that the Democrats plan to eliminate cows. The reason hyperbole is not just called lying is because it is a specific type of untruth and must have a foundation in truth. Hyperbole involves inflating or exaggerating something true rather than a complete fiction. The Green New Deal is aimed at making America carbon neutral and this would impact cars, cows, planes, oil, gas and the military. The extravagant exaggeration is that the proposal would eliminate all of them permanently. This would be as if someone proposed cutting back on dessert at family dinners and they were accused of wanting to eliminate meals permanently. Since hyperbole is rhetoric without logic, it has no logical force and does not prove (or disprove) anything. But it can have considerable psychological force in influencing people to believe a claim.

Hyperbole is often used in conjunction with the Straw Man fallacy. This fallacy is committed when a person’s actual position is ignored and a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version of that position is criticized in its place. This sort of “reasoning” has the following pattern:

 

Premise 1: Person A has position X.

Premise 2: Person B presents position Y (a distorted version of X).

Premise 3: Person B attacks position Y.

Conclusion: Therefore, X is false or bad.

 

This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because attacking a distorted version of a position is not a criticism of the actual position. One might as well expect an attack on a poor drawing of a person to hurt the person.

Like hyperbole, the Straw Man fallacy is not based on a simple lie: it involves an exaggeration or distortion of something true. In the case of Trump and the Green New Deal, his “reasoning” is that the Green New Deal should be rejected because his hyperbolic straw man version of it is terrible. Since this is a fallacy, his “reasons” do not support his claim. It is, as always, important to note that Trump could be right about the Green New Deal being a bad idea, but not for the “reasons” he gives. To infer that a fallacy must have a false conclusion is itself a fallacy (the fallacy fallacy).

While hyperbole has no logical force and a straw man is a fallacy, there are advantages to using them. One advantage is that they are much easier than coming up with good reasons. Criticizing the Green New Deal for what it is requires knowing what it is and considering possible defects which take time and effort. Tweeting out a straw man takes seconds.

The second advantage is that hyperbole and straw men often work, often much better than the truth. In the case of complex matters, people rarely do their homework and do not know that a straw man is a straw man. I have interacted with people who honestly think Democrats plan to eliminate planes and cars. Since this is a bad idea, they reject it, not realizing that is not the Green New Deal. An obvious defense against hyperbole and straw man is to know the truth. While this can take time and effort, someone who has the time to post on Facebook or Twitter, has the time to do basic fact checking. If not, their ignorance should command them to remain silent, though they have the right to express their unsupported views.

As far as working better than the truth, hyperbole or straw man appeals to the target’s fears, anger or hope. They are thus motivated to believe in ways that truth cannot match. People generally find rational argumentation dull and unmoving, especially about complicated issues.  If Trump honestly presented real problems with the Green New Deal, complete with supporting data and graphs, he would bore most and lose his audience. By using a straw man, he better achieves his goal. This does allow for a pragmatic argument for lying because the truth will not suffice.

If telling the truth would not suffice to convince people, then there is the pragmatic argument that if lying would do the job, then it should be used. For example, if going into an honest assessment of the  Green New Deal would bore people and lying would get the job done, then Trump should lie if he wants to achieve his goal. This does, however, raise  moral concerns.

If the reason the truth would not suffice is because it does not logically support the claim, then it would be immoral to lie. To use a non-political example, if you would not invest in my new fake company iScam if you knew it was a scam, getting you to invest in it by lying would be wrong. So, if the New Green Deal would not be refuted by the truth, Trump’s lies about it would be immoral.

But, what about cases in which the truth would logically support a claim, but the truth would not persuade people to accept that claim? Going back to the Green New Deal example, suppose it is terrible but explaining its defects would bore people and they would remain unpersuaded. But a straw man version of the Green New Deal would persuade many people to reject this hypothetically terrible plan? From a utilitarian standpoint, the lie could be morally justified; if the good of lying outweighed the harm, then it would be the right thing to do. To use an analogy, suppose you were trying to convince a friend to not start a dangerous diet. You have scientific data and good arguments, but you know your friend is bored by data and is largely immune to logic. So, telling them the truth would mean that they would go on the diet and harm themself. But, if you exaggerate the harm dramatically, your friend will abandon the diet. In such a case, the straw man argument would seem to be morally justified as you are using it to protect your friend.

While this might seem to justify the general use of hyperbole and the straw man, it only justifies their use when the truth does suffice logically but does not suffice in terms of persuasive power. That is, the fallacy is only justified as a persuasive device when there are non-fallacious arguments that would properly establish the same conclusion.

Several years ago, Singer R. Kelly was jailed and accused of sexually abusing teenagers and attempting to force his hairdresser into performing oral sex. His lawyer, Steve Greenberg, employed the “rock star rape defense”: “He did not force anyone to have sex. He’s a rock star. He doesn’t have to.” This tactic has been employed by others and is worth examining.

Presented more formally, the Rock Star Defense has the following form:

 

Premise 1: If someone is a “rock star”, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not force anyone to have sex.

 

On the face of it, this might seem to be a good argument.  This is because it looks like modus ponens, a valid deductive argument better known as affirming the antecedent. However, it only resembles this argument. To be  modus ponens, it would need to look like this:

 

Premise 1: If someone is a rock star, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not have to force anyone to have sex.

 

The problem is that even if it were true that “rock stars” do not have to force anyone to have sex it does not follow that a “rockstar” did not force someone to have sex. After all, people do things they do not have to do. To use a non-criminal example, a person who owns a working vehicle does not have to walk, but they can choose to do so.  But the “rockstar” defense could be developed as an extended argument:

 

Argument 1

Premise 1: If someone is a rock star, they do not have to force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2: X is a rock star.

Conclusion: Therefore, X does not have to force anyone to have sex.

 

Argument 2

Premise 1: If someone does not have to force anyone to have sex, then they will not force anyone to have sex.

Premise 2 (conclusion of Argument 1): X does not have to force anyone to have sex.

Conclusion: Therefore, X did not force anyone to have sex.

 

Since both arguments are example of modus ponens, they are valid deductive arguments and the logic is unassailable. However, there is the question of whether the premises are true. While it could be debated whether a person is a “rockstar”, the general issues are whether rock stars do not have to force anyone to have sex and whether not having to force anyone to have sex entails that one would not force anyone to have sex.

The claim that rock stars do not have to force anyone to have sex is probably based on the assumption that anyone would willingly have sex with them because of their fame or fortune. As such, they would not need to force anyone to have sex because they would do so willingly.

While it is true that a rock star can probably find someone willing to have sex with them because they are a rockstar, it is not true that anyone (in the sense of everyone) would be willing to have sex with them. Even people who are fans of a celebrity might not want to have sex with them. As such, while a rock star can find at least one person to have sex with them willingly and thus do not need to use force to have sex, it does not follow that everyone they had sex with did so willingly.

The rockstar rape defense can also be undercut by comparing it to a rockstar shoplifting defense. A celebrity accused of shoplifting could argue that they did not steal because they are celebrities and do not need to shoplift. However, celebrities obviously do shoplift—the fact they do not need to shoplift does not entail that they did not shoplift . Likewise, even if a celebrity could have consensual sex with somebody, it does not follow that they did not assault or rape somebody else.

In light of the above, the rock star defense has no merit. This does not, of course, entail that someone is guilty because they use the defense. However, any jury should dismiss the rock star defense as absurd.

 

While the United States is experiencing a backlash from when Black Lives Mattered, there are still social expectations that set the allowed forms of racism. While racism is the foundation of United States immigration policy, blatantly attacking migrants for their color is considered impolite, at least for now. While there are various rhetorical approaches to attacking migrants, the focus of this essay is on the well-worn claim that migration needs to be restricted because migrants bring disease.

Ironically, migrants to the United States make up 16% of healthcare workers, including 29% of physicians and 24% of dentists.  It is more likely that a migrant will prevent or treat a disease than cause one. If the goal is to improve health outcomes, restrictions on migration would have a negative effect. While some might worry about migration and disease in sincere ignorance, it is primarily a tool of fear and racism. But is it true that migrants present no health risks?

If the standard is that migrants must present zero health risk, then this cannot be met: there is a non-zero chance a migrant pass on an illness to an American. And it is true that migration increases the number of cases of illness: more than zero Americans will catch some illness from migrants. However, this does not warrant regarding migrants as health threat. After all, there are non-zero cases in which a migrant saves a life or does something else heroic. But it would be odd to speak of the great promise of a wave of migrant heroism—except in the economic sense. Likewise, speaking of the threat of a wave of migrant disease would is unfounded. It is also worth noting that Americans having more babies or travelling between states also increase the spreading of disease, but this is not seen as a good reason to prevent people from reproducing or travelling.

When I point out that migrants do not present a  meaningful health threat, a common response is that must mean I support  open borders  and allowing people to  flood the United States without regulation and without any concerns about their health. My reply is that this entails nothing about my view of immigration policy, except that I do not think that fears of diseased migrants should shape border policy. While I am not terrified of diseased hordes invading America, I do still have health concerns about the movement of people.

The fear that migrants can bring devastating diseases to the Americas is based on historical fact. When Europeans arrived in what they called the New World they brought with them Old World diseases that proved devastating to the native populations. Smallpox decimated the native people, thus greatly European conquest of these lands. If the natives had been able to enforce strong borders and keep the Europeans out, history would be radically different. As would be suspected, modern opponents of migration to the United States do not use this example when making their disease argument. In part this is because it would make clear that most Americans are migrants or descendants of recent migrants. There is also the fact that the situation now is different.

Back in the 1500s the native people had little or no resistance to European diseases and there was no modern medicine. The situation is different today. Migrants coming to the United States will generally not be bringing in unknown diseases that will be devastating because there is no health care. That said, we should very worried about the impact of the Trump administration on America’s fragile and overpriced health care system.

While we will be having another pandemic soon, it is unlikely to arise from migrants coming into the United States. As such, legitimate worries about pandemics do not warrant restricting general migration. After all, what generally occurs is vaccinated people migrating from countries with health care systems to the United States.

A legitimate concern is that other countries might suffer from health care failures.  For example, Venezuela’s health care system was undercut due to the corruption and mismanagement of its government. One consequence was an outbreak of measles. Health care professionals have left Venezuela and its citizens have also attempted to flee. As such, we might see people fleeing a failing country with a broken health care system, thus making the spread of disease a real concern.

Normally, this sort of thing would not be a serious problem. In the case of measles, vaccination is safe and effective. It was also widespread. However, some Americans have decided to forgo vaccinating their children. America has thus intentionally made itself vulnerable to measles. While measles and other diseases will spread internally, we also need to worry about other countries failing at public health and allowing these diseases to spread. As this occurs, we might see a return to diseases spreading among unprotected populations. However, this time the lack of protection will be intentional as people will have chosen to condemn their children to illness, perhaps with the best intentions.

While proponents of the disease argument against migration will want to take advantage of these self-inflicted failures, even this scenario does not warrant the migration restrictions they favor. After all, measles is already here and does not need to be brought across the border. Rather than showing that the United States needs to tighten up the borders, this situation shows that the United States must tighten up the vaccination requirements for citizens to ensure that they are protected from diseases that are already here. Vaccines and health care, not a wall, will keep us safe from disease. While it might seem odd for the same people to push an anti-vax and “immigrants cause disease” view, this does make sense. They are both ideological movements built on fear and ignorance seemingly designed to maximize harm.

A few years ago, Gucci created controversy with its black balaclava jumper. The jumper could be pulled up to cover a person’s mouth and featured big red lips that echoed blackface. The designer refuted this, claiming he was inspired by the works of a performance artist Leigh Bowery. Katy Perry, no stranger to accusations of cultural appropriation, was also accused of having blackface shoes in her line of shoes. Her defenders noted that these shoes come in many colors and all have the same face. Unlike cases when a person wears blackface, cases such as the Gucci and Perry incidents admit of ambiguity  and allow room for plausible denial. While the United States had a brief phase in which Black Lives Mattered, the pushback efforts have yielded fruit, and it seems reasonable to re-consider topics such as black face.

One approach to determining whether an object, like a shoe, is a form of black face is to consider the creator’s likely intentions. If a designer did not intend to create a blackface object, then it would seem reasonable to infer that the object is not a work of blackface. This is because being a blackface object is more than how an object looks; it must be created (or used) for that purpose.

In support of this view, it can be argued that since an object of blackface is racist, it requires racist intent to create it. A person who creates an object that looks like a blackface object without racist intent cannot be justly accused of racism. To use an analogy, suppose a designer created something in which some see pornographic images.  If the designer did not intend this, they should not be considered pornographers, and the work should not be considered pornography.

As a practical matter, the challenge is determining intent. While this can be difficult, the sensible approach is to consider the person’s history and their explanation of their inspiration and goals. If they have no history of racism and deny that they intended to create a blackface object, then it would be reasonable to believe them.

It could be objected that the creators cannot plead ignorance. While they might not have intended the works to be blackface objects, they should have realized how they would be seen. After all, anyone familiar with American culture and history should recognize such objects and they should be aware of the consequences of selling them. To use an analogy, a designer who unintentionally creates a work that would obviously be seen as pornographic, should be aware of this. If they put it on sale while denying awareness, then they would be selling pornographic images.

It could be replied that a creator might be unaware of the history of blackface or that they do not see the objects as blackface objects. Using the pornography example, a designer might be unable to see what other people think they see. If a designer has no knowledge of the history of blackface or cannot see that their work would be seen as blackface, then they could be excused. Some might insist that they should be aware of history and that they cannot honestly say that they did not see a problem before it was pointed out by others. But perhaps an object being blackface is not a matter of what is in the mind of the creator, but what is in the eye of the beholder.

Behind the saying “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is the aesthetic theory that beauty is a subjective quality dependent on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver. This saying could be modified for perceptions of racism: “blackface is in the eye of the beholder.” The underlying principle would be that whether an object is blackface depends on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver.

If blackface is in the eye of the beholder, then it is up to the beholder to determine whether an object is blackface. This could also apply to racism or sexism in general. This might be a matter of judgment or a matter of feeling, depending on the broader aesthetic theory in play. One possible problem with this principle is that whether an object is blackface would seem to be subjective. As such, those who do not see an object as blackface would be as right (or wrong) as those who see it as blackface. However, there is a way to grant some people a privileged right to judge (or feel).

A way to argue for this is to draw an analogy to insult. Whether something is an insult, it could be argued, depends on the target. If the target does not judge or feel that the alleged insult is an insult, then it is not. If the target judges or feels the alleged insult is an insult, then it is. In the case of objects alleged to be blackface, there is the question of who has a privileged position of judgment.

The easy and obvious answer is that target of any potential blackface object would be black people. As such, whether an object is a blackface object would be decided by the judgment or feeling of black people. While one could get bogged down in the problem of group consensus, there are two approaches here. One is to accept the majority opinion. The other would be to judge at the individual level so an object could be blackface for one person but not another. While messy and inexact, this does seem to reflect the messy and inexact reality of such judgments (or feelings). Thus, an object would be blackface if most black people judged (or felt) that it was. Alternatively, it could be done at an individual level: an object would be blackface for an individual if they judged (or felt) it was blackface.

It could be objected that by this definition, anything could be blackface and anything could be racism. Alternatively, one could argue that if blackface or racism is subjective, then this could be used to avoid accusations of racism. That is, any accusation could be met with “that is just how you feel.”

The solution is a messy one: as with disputes over beauty or insults, there would need to be philosophical arguments and the better arguments should settle things. Even if blackface is in the eye of the beholder, better and worse cases can be made that a judgment is reasonable. That no perfect resolution is possible should be expected.

But some might object that being accused of racism has consequences. A person’s career could be ended and their life ruined and surely this should not be left up to subjective judgments or feelings. Turning back to the analogy of insults, there is the question of whether the person making the alleged insult intended to be insulting or not. This can be investigated by considering their history, character and the context of the situation. Likewise, if a work is judged (or felt) to be a blackface object, there is still the question of the intent of the creator. While one cannot know the true heart and mind of another, the creator’s history and character as well as the context can be assessed to reach a plausible conclusion. As such, a person could create a blackface object without intent and without being a racist, just as a person could insult another without intending it. In such cases, the object should be condemned but the creator should be held innocent. Naturally, if the creator’s history and character and the context provide evidence of racism, then that is another matter.

According to the FDA, it “is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.” Given this mission, the FDA should put the interest of public health ahead of other concerns, such as the profits of a pharmaceutical company. While many at the FDA are dedicated to this mission, federal agencies are routinely captured by industry. So, it is not surprising that the FDA has benefited companies at the expense of public health. Charles Seife wrote an article that appeared in the February 2018 issue of Scientific American. While there are legal issues here, my concern is with ethics

On the face of it, the moral problem is easy to solve. As the FDA is tasked with protecting public health, its moral duty is to do that. Putting public health at risk to benefit a company or individual would be wrong. Part of the problem, as noted by Seife, is that the FDA is secretive, which makes it difficult for the public to know about the FDA and the products it approves. Another part of the problem, also noted by Seife, is that the FDA seems willing to allow research misconduct to remain unreported. Under the current administration, it seems likely that things will only get worse.

While it is tempting to see evidence of misdeed when drugs are recalled or given new warnings, it must be noted that this should be expected even when products are properly evaluated. This is because of how inductive reasoning used in product trials works. While inductive logic is essential, it has a fundamental problem that is called, shockingly enough, the problem of induction. Since an inductive argument’s conclusion always “leaps” beyond its premises, the conclusion of such an argument can always be false, even when all the premises are true. Since the controlled experiments of the trials are inductive, they can be properly conducted  and still yield a false conclusion. These trials are then generalized to the entire population, which is another inductive argument and another chance for things to go wrong.

For example, even a large sample will not contain every genetic or physiological variation relevant to drug interactions. As such, a drug that was safe in the trials might have unexpected results out in the wild. So, one should not rush to judgment if an approved drug needs a warning label revision or has unexpected effects on some people. That said, the concern about how the FDA operates remains, as Seife’s research indicates.  As such, the FDA seems to have acted wrongly by putting corporate interests ahead of public health. It remains to be seen what the future will bring, but even under traditional administrations, the FDA has engaged in bad behavior. If even this modest oversight is stripped away, things will become much worse.

An obvious solution is to make the FDA’s process and data available to the public. Under this solution, the public would have access to everything that occurs within the FDA as well as all the information provided to the FDA by the companies whose products are being evaluated. While this would solve the problems noted above, there are reasonable concerns about such complete transparency.

Allowing full public access to the FDA’s information would also allow the same access to competing pharmaceutical companies (and others with a financial interest in the data). Such transparency would allow access to a company’s trade secrets, commercial and financial information.  This could cause “substantial competitive injury” and would be like playing poker while being forced to let everyone see your cards. Because of the potential harm, such full transparency would seem to be wrong.

It could be countered that all companies would be on equal footing, and no one would have an advantage. Going back to the poker analogy, if everyone must show their cards, no one has an advantage. The obvious problem is that foreign companies that do not undergo FDA approval would have access to the data and this could give them an edge against companies that sought FDA approval.

Another counter is to argue on utilitarian grounds: even if transparency harmed companies, the advantage to public health would outweigh this. But this could be countered by arguing the reverse. As these concerns are reasonable, complete transparency is morally problematic under the current economic system. As such, what would seem to be needed is an approach that protects the public while also protecting the legitimate interests of companies.

As Seife noted in his article, the information the FDA has kept from the public includes data about harmful side-effects and concerns about the efficacy of products. This information has been redacted or withheld based on the harm that would be done to the company if the truth were known. While it is true that releasing such information could harm a company’s profit, this is not a morally acceptable reason. After all, the mission of the FDA is to protect public health; protecting private profit at the expense of public health is a violation of this mission.

While a company or individual does have a right to keep certain information private, this right does not extend to concealing danger to others. To use an analogy, while I do have the right to keep my medical records private, I do not have the right to keep it a secret if I were infected with Ebola. To use another analogy, while a company would have a right to keep its manufacturing process for snacks secret, it has no right to keep secret the fact that the main ingredient is rats. The public does not have a right to know their trade secrets; but they do have a right to know if the snacks contain rats. Likewise, while the public does not have a right to know the legitimate trade secrets of a drug company, they do have the right to know the side-effects and efficacy of the drugs they take. As such, the FDA can fulfil its proper mission of protecting public health while also protecting legitimate trade secrets. Companies that want to profit on concealing data from the public with FDA collusion might be dismayed by this, but they have no moral right to expect this—especially when they can still make massive profits by making safe and efficacious drugs.

Considering the actions of the current administration, it is terrifying to consider how much worse things could become. Information about side-effects and ineffective drugs have been concealed in the past, but Trump and Musk are dedicated to dismantling the federal government, including the FDA. In the best of times, it did not protect us very well and it is reasonable to think it will become much worse. While it is always wise to be cautious about drugs and procedures, it would be prudent to be extremely cautious about forthcoming FDA approvals.

Joyce Short, a victim of deception, has argued that rape by fraud should be a crime. Pragmatically, the legal issues are the most important; but its moral aspects are philosophically important.

To set the context for the discussion and avoid straw person attacks, those arguing that rape by fraud should be a crime are focusing on significant fraud rather than absurd cases. To illustrate, a person who engages in hyperbole about their wealth or engages in bragging about their awesomeness would not be targets of these proposed laws. Rather, the arguments for the proposals are based on cases such as Short’s in which someone engages in significant and sustained deception to gain sexual access. Another example is the case of Abigail Finney. One of her boyfriend’s friends had sex with her by pretending to be him. While the man was chided by the court, he was not convicted of any crime. From a legal standpoint, rape and assault are currently narrowly defined and using fraud, rather than force, is (usually) not a crime. From a moral standpoint, this seems incorrect.

One argument for why the use of fraud to gain assent is wrong is that fraud is wrong. While the goal of the fraud does matter, fraud itself is immoral and using it to trick a person into assenting to sex would thus be immoral.

Another argument for this type of fraud being morally wrong and one that ties into the legal argument, is to draw an analogy between crimes of fraud and using fraud to trick a person into assenting to sex.

While specific laws about fraud vary, the general idea is that the perpetrator intentionally deceives the victim with the intent of persuading the victim to part with property. A key aspect of fraud is that without the deceit, the person would not have parted with their property.  For example, if someone calls a victim and pretends to be an IRS agent to trick them into providing an Apple gift card number, then they are attempting fraud. After all, the person would not give Apple gift card numbers to strangers who call asking for them.

While it might seem odd to see a person’s body as their property, Locke argues for this in his discussion of property rights. He argues that a person’s right to property, such as a house, arises from their ownership of their body.  So, it could be argued a person who uses deceit to acquire sex is morally (and legally) like someone who uses deceit to steal any property. Or, perhaps a better analogy would be stealing access to property, such as using fraud to get a hotel room or a rental car. If it is immoral and illegal to use deceit to steal property or access to it, then the same should apply to using deceit to steal access to a person’s body.

It could also be argued that using deceit to acquire sex is analogous to a theft of services. If someone uses deceit to steal the services of a business, then that would be a crime (and probably wrong). The same should apply to stealing sex by using deceit. One concern is that characterizing sex as a service would seem to imply that people engage in a prostitution when they engage in sex. While this might seem unappealing, it can be argued that consensual sex is an exchange. Naturally, one could note that under capitalism, everything is a good or a service, so seeing acquiring sex by deceit as a theft of service makes sense in our economic system.

While fraud might not seem as bad as the use of force, it is recognized as an immoral and criminal tool and to not apply the same principle to sex would be inconsistent and unprincipled. This would be on par with making violent theft a crime but allowing people to freely engage in theft by deceit.

One counter argument is to contend that a person who assents to sex with a deceiver is still (probably) consenting to have sex with them. To illustrate, imagine a man who creates the false appearance of wealth and success intending to use it to get women to have sex with him. While his targets could say that they would not have had sex with him if they had known he was not rich, it would seem odd to conclude that he should be charged with a crime despite his immoral behavior.

As another example, imagine a woman who uses plastic surgery, makeup and padded clothing to improve her attractiveness. Imagine that a man would not have had sex with her if he knew how she really looked (they have sex in the dark). While she did deceive him and this would be immoral, it would be odd to say that it should be considered a crime.

One final objection is to argue that personal relations should not be regulated by the state. To use an analogy, imagine that Sam pretends to have the same hobbies and interests as Dan so that he can become his friend. Sam does not really care about Dan, but Dan has an awesome boat, a beach house and goes on amazing trips around the world. By pretending to be Dan’s friend, Sam gets to ride in the boat with Sam, stay in the beach house with Sam and go on trips with Sam. Even if Dan forms a one-way emotional bond with Sam and is deeply attached to him, Sam does not seem to be engaged in criminal activity (although he would be a morally awful person) if he simply plays the role of a fake friend. Obviously, if he used deceit to steal the boat, house or money from Dan, that would be different. By analogy, one could argue, using deceit to get assent to sex in similar sorts of circumstances would be immoral but should not be considered a crime.

The easy and obvious counter to such concerns is to note that morality and the law distinguish between degrees of severity regarding immorality and crimes. As such, while these specific examples show immoral behavior in the form of intentional deception, they do not seem to rise to the level of crimes. But there can be cases in which the nature of the fraud should make the act criminal. This shows the legal and moral importance of crafting laws that make such distinctions. While some might object that this would be too hard, the law and ethics already address equally complex matters successfully.

 

For those not familiar with blackface, it originated as makeup for portraying caricatures of black people. In the United States, it is generally considered unambiguously racist. While the use of blackface in the arts has largely ceased (though there is still controversy about white actors taking non-white roles) it has persisted in popular culture. It is most likely to be seen at costume parties, such as on Halloween. As might be suspected, the revelation that a public figure appeared in blackface can be a career ender. A few years ago, Mile Ertel resigned as the Secretary of State of my adopted state of Florida when photos of him in blackface surface.  He dressed up as a black Katrina victim two months after the storm and his defenders argued that this past behavior should not have been held against him.  While Ertel is a Republican, blackface is bipartisan.

The release of a photo from his 1984 medical school yearbook (showing one person in blackface and another in Ku Klux Klan gear) has created a bit of a problem for the former governor of Virgina, the Democrat Ralph Northam. Since the incident occurred in 1984, his defenders argued that he should not suffer the consequences of this past action.

One time-based defense for someone who used blackface is to argue they were not aware of its history and implications and did not have racist intention. People do dress up in non-racist costumes that are odd and problematic that they think are just fine, especially when alcohol is involved.

This defense is not entirely absurd. Everyone has done stupid things from ignorance rather than malice. Also, everyone has done wrong because of lapses in judgment or due influences like alcohol or peer pressure. While it would be a fallacy to argue that something is acceptable because it is commonly done, it is reasonable to argue that judgments of behavior should consider the realities of human behavior: we consistently do dumb things for dumb reasons.

While blackface is racist, if a person used it in sincere ignorance and apologize when informed of the truth, then they should be forgiven. The problem is that the history of blackface is well known in the United States. While a very young child could reasonably claim ignorance, others would be hard-pressed to claim ignorance. They could, however, use the aberration defense: that although they did not act in ignorance, they are not racist.

While it might seem absurd to say that a person could do something racist without being racist, there is an analogy to lying. While a person who lies is a liar when they lie, it would be absurd to label a person who is usually honest a liar because they have lied. Likewise, a person who is generally not racist, but has engaged in some out of character racist behavior, should not be labeled as a racist. Naturally, there would be exceptions. The key question is whether the incident is an aberration or arising from their established character. This is where time becomes a critical factor.

To steal from Aristotle, assessing a person’s actions requires considering whether they are acting from a fixed and permanent disposition. If a person has the vice of racism, they would be consistent in their racism, and it would not be an irregular or aberrant behavior on their part. Someone who is not a racist might have done some racist acts in their past, but if these acts are few and relatively minor, then they should not be considered a racist. To use an analogy, a person who has told a few lies in the past but is generally honest should not be condemned as a liar. The same works for virtues: someone who acted bravely once but is otherwise consistently cowardly would not be a brave person.

As such, while appearing in blackface would be racist, the person should be judged not by a single racist or ignorant action. The person’s reasons for the action must be considered and, importantly, their general character must be assessed. As such, while Ertel and Northam should not have put on blackface, the act itself does not suffice to determine whether they are racists who engaged in habitual racism or non-racists who did something racist. Their complete character and history must be considered.

It could be objected that the principle of judging people based on their character and broad history of behavior rather than on a single incident is unacceptable. In the case of blackface, it could be argued that the offense is so serious that it forever marks a person, rendering them eternally unfit for public office. But the idea of eternal offenses is problematic as it makes redemption impossible.  

While the United States has the best health care money can buy, many Americans cannot afford it. Many Americans are underinsured or not insured and even the insured might face denial of coverage. Americans, as their response to the execution of a health care CEO, are aware of this. Most politicians, with the exception of people like Bernie Sanders, have put their faith in the fact that people forget quickly and have done nothing to address this problem.

A lack of insurance puts the health of the uninsured at risk and health care institutions suffer financially. Medical bankruptcy also occurs at an alarming rate.  Because of these problems, there have been proposals to extend Medicare to all Americans.

On the positive side, this would provide everyone with health insurance. This would benefit those without insurance and would also help the finances of healthcare institutions. As the system already exists, it would mostly be a matter of scale. This would come with serious challenges, but they are obviously not insurmountable. While there are clear advantages to expanding Medicare, a rational assessment requires looking beyond the positive aspects and, as much as possible, without the filters of ideology.

An obvious concern is the cost of such an expansion. Those who already pay for insurance would not suffer any financial impact from the switch, unless the cost of Medicare was significantly higher than what they are paying now.  As the cost could have negative impacts on the economy and individuals, it needs to be assessed rationally.

A second concern is the impact on the health insurance industry. While some might be tempted to think that only the CEOs would suffer, the insurance industry is made up of a range of people who depend on their jobs to survive. Switching to Medicare for all would eliminate the private health insurance industry and put people out of work directly and indirectly. Somewhat ironically, those on the right who oppose Medicare expansion usually see firing workers as a positive thing while those on the left express concern for workers. One possibility is that former insurance workers could be retrained and hired to work for Medicare, assuming that it is not swept away in the current zeal to destroy government agencies and programs that protect and benefit non-billionaires.

 It is also worth considering other economic aspects. While it should not be assumed that this cost will be too high relative to the benefits, this cost needs to be considered. Again, while it is appealing to think that eliminating private insurance would only harm evil CEOs, the effects on others should be considered. But given the tremendous harm Americans suffer from the current system; its replacement would certainly do more good than harm.

A third concern is fraud. While fraud does occur with private health insurance, Medicare is sometimes a cash cow for fraudsters. In 2014 about 10% of Medicare’s total budget was lost to fraud. Expanding Medicare to everyone would turn the cash cow into a cash herd. Fraud could and should be addressed even if Medicare is not expanded, but the cost of fraud must be included in the calculations used to assess the merits of expanding Medicare. While the right advances the narrative that it is poor people who defraud the government, the evidence is that it is the wealthy. This does make intuitive sense: if the poor were as good at committing fraud as the right claims, they would no longer be poor. But even with the inevitable fraud, an expansion of Medicare would be superior to the existing system, which siphons money from Americans into the accounts of CEOs.

A fourth concern is usually advanced by conservatives, namely that the elimination of the for-profit motivation will ruin the quality of health care with socialism. One reply is to note that health care will remain for-profit: Medicare for all does not nationalize health care institutions, just the insurance industry. And the motivation provided by the for-profit approach is to profit more, and that typically involves worse rather than better medical care.

That said, it could be argued that with one entity paying all the bills costs will increase and quality will decrease—but what is needed is evidence for these claims. If they are true, then this would be a problem that could be addressed. The rest of the world

Early immigration laws, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1924, were intended to “to preserve the ideal of U.S. homogeneity.” That is, they were openly racist and aimed at limiting the immigration of non-whites. Immigration was revised in 1952 and then again in 1965. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changed the quota system and removed many of the racial barriers that had marked immigration since the 1920s.

As social norms changed after the 1960s, open racism became largely unacceptable, and most racists switched to coded language and dog whistles. Openly justifying immigration policy based on race became and remains problematic. As such, the narrative changed from preserving the homogeneity of the United States against the threat of non-whites to the narrative of protecting American jobs and protecting Americans from crimes. After 9/11 a new narrative was added, that of protecting Americans from terrorists.

The election and re-election of Donald Trump saw a return of the classic racist narrative. While the mainstream narrative is still focused on crime and economics, white nationalists openly express their fears they will be replaced by non-whites. Sometimes this is dressed up as concerns about culture, but often the white nationalists are honest in their racism. Mainstream politicians, at least for now, still use coded language and dog whistles. Although the code is much more open and the dog whistles much louder. While those ignorant of history might mistake this as something new in American politics, it is a return to its roots. Some would even argue that the core of these polices has always been racist, but the racism has been obscured.

It could be objected that while racism might have been a factor in the past, it does not influence current immigration and border policy. After all, some might contend, those pushing for stronger border control and tighter restrictions on immigration claim their goals are to reduce crime and to protect the American economy. Put simply, the argument is that they are not racists.  They are trying to address crime and the economic threat of migrants. It is just a coincidence that these policies target people who are not white. For this to be true, there would either need to be real problems that would be best addressed by these policies or those supporting the policies would at least need to believe this. As it is difficult to determine what people believe, I will focus on what is real.

While the narrative of the criminal migrant is an American myth, it does not match reality. Migrants are less likely to commit crimes and more likely to be victims of crimes relative to people born in the United States. But migrants do commit some crimes. As such, it can be argued that reducing the number of migrants would reduce the number of crimes and thus these policies are warranted. This would be an odd approach since it would also justify any way of reducing the size of the population based on reducing the number of crimes. Interestingly, this principle would justify public policies supporting birth control and abortion as having fewer people would entail fewer crimes. It could also justify population control in the form of legal restrictions on the number of children: if people have fewer children, then there will be less crime. My point is, obviously, not to argue for population control but to contend that restricting migration to reduce crime makes no more sense than imposing family size limits to reduce crime. While both approaches would reduce crime, they are not an effective or sensible way to address crime. It would be more effective to use social resources to directly address the causes of crimes.

The idea that migrants will steal jobs is a classic myth, but also generally unfounded. Overall, migrants are beneficial to the economy. It is true that migration is not entirely beneficial and there are negative economic consequences. However, the biggest threat American workers face is obviously not being replaced by migrants. It is far more likely that their jobs will be lost to automation, offshoring or changes in the economy. For example, coal workers have suffered not because of migrants taking their jobs, but because natural gas and renewable sources of energy are making coal increasingly obsolete. Ironically, efforts made to help the economy by restricting migration would be more likely to cause economic harm.

Given that the crime and economic arguments used to justify migration and border policy fail, there are few explanations left. One is that those making these arguments believe them, which entails they either have secret information or refusing to accept reality. A second explanation is that these arguments are covers for their real reasons. While speculating about motivations is problematic, the most plausible explanation is that they desire to continue the old racist policies. After all, if they had a good alternative argument backed by facts, then they would simply use that and there would be no need to lie.