Author: Michael LaBossiere

The question of whether some philosophical ideas are too harmful to even be proposed was raised in a philosophy teaching group on Facebook. The essay that follows is a quick ramble rather than a complete theory of harmful ideas.

When addressing this question, a good starting place is determining who would be harmed and the nature of the harm. From the perspective of those who perceive themselves as harmed, the answer is likely to be “yes.” But this leads to the matter of whether a perceived harm warrants not proposing an idea.

An easy and obvious way to approach this moral issue is utilitarianism: if proposing a philosophical idea would generate more harm (negative value) than benefit (positive value) for the morally relevant beings, then it would be too harmful to propose. Ideas would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis using a plausible account of value, a plausible system of weighing these values, and a plausible account of who is morally relevant. As would be expected, people can come up with different assessments in good faith. The obvious counters to this utilitarian approach would be arguments in favor of other moral systems, such as a deontological theory of ethics.

 The discussion of harmful ideas would also require setting some guidelines about the sort of ideas and harms that should be given serious consideration. For example, it is easy to make up a horror story of a philosophical idea such that understanding the idea would lead to madness, catatonia or even death. Fortunately, these fictional cases are easy to address: these ideas would  be too harmful to propose. The moral justification would be analogous to arguments one might use to show that handing out poisoned food to people would be wrong. While such ideas might be possible, this seems to be a purely theoretical concern: fun for horror stories but as worrisome as the possibility of being mauled by werewolves. That said,  there is the science-fiction case of Roko’s basilisk that some might use as an example of an idea too harmful to propose. But there seems to be no evidence for any meaningful harm caused by this idea. As such, it is best to focus on ideas that could cause actual harm.

Real philosophical ideas do cause harm. Obvious examples range from ideas that create mild discomfort in students to philosophical ideas that have been used to justify brutally oppressive governments. These ideas are already out in the wild but can be used as the starting point for discussions about general categories of new ideas. We should, of course, not make public an example of an idea we suspect might be too harmful to propose.

One general category of ideas would be those that would cause psychological distress in people, perhaps because these ideas are about those people. To use a real example, a philosophical idea that gender is set by Platonic universals and is thus an objective feature of reality could cause some dismay and distress, especially people for those whom a choice of gender is important. To use another real example, the philosophical ideas used to argue for atheism (such as the problem of evil) can be distressing to people of faith. These sorts of situations fall under existing concerns about ideas that cause similar distress, especially in the classroom. That is, these new ideas could be assessed in the context of how we already handle existing ideas.

Another general category of ideas is those that could cause social, economic, or political harm if proposed and acted upon. As a real example, the philosophical underpinnings of fascism and racism (such as they are) have a role in the harms done by these views. As another real example, those who possess great wealth and power would contend they could be harmed by the philosophical ideas underlying socialism, social justice, anarchism, and other views inimical to concentrated wealth and power.

These ideas should be assessed in a way like how one should assess new technology: what harm could it generate directly and what are likely scenarios in which it can be misused? While people often overestimate and underestimate harms and benefits, engaging in an assessment is still preferable to letting it loose in the wild and hoping for the best. We would also need to keep in mind the obvious: what is harmful to some can be beneficial to others. To illustrate with a sci-fi example, if a philosopher has an idea that would effectively undermine capitalism and create a Star Trek style world, then this would be perceived as extremely harmful to the ruling classes yet would be objectively beneficial to humanity. The rulers would, one assumes, would see this idea as too harmful to propose.

In closing, there can be ideas too harmful to propose but we lack a well-developed account of such ideas. At least for now.

Back when Black Lives Mattered, there was talk about defunding the police. While nothing significant seems to have come of this, it did create controversy at the time.  Some took issue with the choice of the word “defund” since  it allowed the right to easily create a straw person to attack. A straw person is a fallacy in which a distorted or exaggerated version is put in place of the actual claim, argument, or position. The straw version is attacked, thus “refuting” the real version. The most common straw person was that “defunding the police” meant the complete abolition of law enforcement. This was not true. While there was disagreement, the general view is that the police should have their funding reduced to fund chronically underfunded community services, such as mental health care. Some people did (and do) think that the current system of policing should be abolished in favor of a better system.

The straw person often guided the right into a slippery slope fallacy. This is a fallacy in which it is claimed that something (usually terrible) will inevitably follow from something else. The fallacy occurs when the connection between the two is not adequately supported. Slippery slope fallacies often involve hyperbole in the form of an extravagant exaggeration of the alleged consequences. In the case of defunding the police, the straw person slippery slope used by some on the right is that defunding the police would lead to utter chaos.

This also involved the use of scare tactics, a fallacy in which the “support” offered for the claim is something intended to frighten the target. As would also be expected, there are often racist dog-whistles (or open racism) employed to craft these nightmare scenarios.

It can be argued that that there are radical anarchists who want to get rid of the state and there are people who want a world free of police so they can commit violence, assault and theft. But taking these people to define what it means to defund the police is like using the Westboro Baptist Church to define all Christians. Using the most extreme members of the group to define the entire group, be they on the left or the right, is the fallacy of nut picking.  While there are many excellent moral arguments for defunding the police, I will focus on a very practical moral argument involving effective use of community resources. As “defunding the police” seems forever tainted, I prefer the phrase “rethinking the police.”

For a variety of reasons, the United States saw a marked militarization of the police. Police training has also shifted, with a very lucrative industry arising that trains police to be warriors. This would make sense if there had been a significant rise in violent crime and criminals were regularly using military weapons. However, violent crime has been consistently decreasing over time. While criminals do use assault rifles and some have used body armor, most crimes are not committed with guns and the most common guns used in crimes are handguns. While there is value in having superior firepower, the militarization of the police vastly exceeds the threat to a degree that is almost ludicrous. Also, SWAT teams exist for a reason, which is to handle the rare cases in which they are needed. But it doesn’t make sense to have most police armed to SWAT levels.

One problem with the combination of militarization and warrior training is a bias towards the use of force. One aspect of rethinking the police involves demilitarizing to make them less threatening to the public and, some hope, reducing the bias towards violence. There is also an image problem: militarized police marching the streets of America, violently attacking protestors makes us look like a repressive authoritarian state. To be fair, and balanced, this might soon be an accurate image.  Another problem with a militarized warrior police is that they are equipped and trained for violence but dealing with violent crime is a small fraction of their job.

While cities vary in the time officers spend on activities, addressing violent crime takes up about 4% of a typical shift. Over 30% of an officer’s time is spent responding to non-criminal calls. The rest of the time is spent on traffic, other crimes, property crimes and proactive activity. Between 6 and 9% are medical calls. Even it is incorrectly assumed that violent crimes always call for a militarized warrior response, that means that only 4% of police activity is responsible for the cost of militarizing the police and maintaining a warrior force. As numerous incidents involving people with mental health issues, autism, and other medical issues have shown, warrior police are  poorly equipped and trained to address these situations, even if they have the best intentions.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the right thing to do is to use the community resources to produce the best results. From a practical standpoint, the right thing to do is to use  community resources in a way that matches the needs of the community and to use the most effective methods, equipment, and training to meet these needs. Since violent crime makes up such a tiny fraction of police work, it makes moral and practical sense to shift funding and change the way policing works in the United States to make it both more ethical and more rational in terms of resource use.

While this might seem like a crazy notion or a utopian dream, some American communities have implemented these changes. An excellent example is the CAHOOTS program in Eugene, Oregon.  The gist of this program is that medics and mental health counselors are sent to respond to appropriate 911 calls. Because the United States has an ever-growing problem with homelessness, drug addiction and mental illness there is a corresponding need for professional response. Starting with Reagan, the United States decided to dump many social and health issues onto the police, and this has worked out as expected. Programs like CAHOOTS aim at reversing this. This program has proven successful and other cities are adopting similar programs. Rethinking the police has been going on for 30 years in Oregon and was spreading. This was a good thing.

While having medical professionals respond to relevant calls would be a major improvement, this does not address the underlying problems. In many ways, it is rather like policing: controlling the symptoms of social ills while leaving the causes in place. Ethically and effectively rethinking the police would require using resources to fix the social ills that require policing in all its forms. It would also, obviously, require meaningful political and economic changes to address poverty, homelessness, and such ills as the opioid epidemic inflicted by the pharmaceutical companies.  Rethinking the police in an ethical and rational manner would make for a better America for most people and is the right thing to do.

Suppose you saw a headline saying, “President admits activity was criminal in nature.” If you loath the president, you might infer he did something criminal and rush to post the article on Facebook or tweet it. If you support the president, you will probably interpret it in a way favorable to the president. You might assume the activity was by some enemy of the president or perhaps someone in the administration who betrayed the president with their misdeeds. You might even conclude that it is fake news. But if you are a critical thinker, you would read the article and assess its credibility before drawing an inference about the activity. This headline is an example of a misleading headline, because very different articles could have the same headline.

Saying “the president admits” would tend to lead people to think the president is involved in the activity; either that he committed the act, or someone connected to him did. But the article could be different from what it seems to imply. For example, the article might state that the president is agreeing that an act of violence done by one of his supporters was a crime. As another example, the headline could be extremely misleading, and the president might have made a quick remark about something completely unrelated to him that he agreed is a crime.

For the sake of this essay, I will adopt the general term of “headlining” to cover three aspects of misleading headlines.  The first is the intentional creation of a misleading headline as a rhetorical technique. A misleading headline is not a complete fabrication as that would simply be lying. A misleading headline has some connection to the truth but it is such that it is aimed to deceive the audience. This can be done in a variety of ways, such as using hyperbole (extravagant exaggeration), downplaying (casting it as less serious or less important), using vague or ambiguous wording, or by other rhetorical techniques.

There are, many reasons to create misleading headlines and more than one can apply. One common reason is to create a clickbait headline to generate ad revenue; the idea is that an honest headline would not be as interesting. I am not saying that headlines should be written in a dull manner and a headline that might seem misleading could be defended if it was intended to be interesting rather than to mislead. While there will be unclear cases, we can sort out the intentionally misleading headlines from those with the honest intent to be interesting. It is also worth noting that writers can create misleading headlines unintentionally due to failure of skill rather than a failure of honesty.

Another reason for a misleading headline is as a tool to influence the audience without using outright falsehood. Many biased sites and organizations have two seemingly conflicting goals. The first is to push a narrative and shape beliefs. The second is to retain some credibility as source of information.  Misleading headlines sitting atop factually correct stories allow a site to achieve both goals: the headlines allow them to mislead while the stories allow them to claim they are doing truthful reporting. The writers and editors might even have moral qualms about lying outright but be willing to mislead without technically lying.

The second aspect of headlining is when a reader is influenced to believe what the misleading headline is intended to imply. That is, they have been tricked into believing an untrue interpretation. For example, a person seeing the headline “President admits activity was criminal in nature” used by a site hostile to the president might interpret it as “president admits he committed a crime” and rush to Facebook to post about it. In truth, the president might have just agreed when asked if some crime done by a foreign leader was a crime. In this case the person is a victim of deceit: they believed the news source but have been misled by the headline. This is different from believing an outright lie as a misleading headline is not a complete fabrication and it often sits atop content that is not entirely untrue.

In such a case, the person is making three mistakes. The first is interpreting the headline in a misleading way without considering other plausible interpretations. The second is not reading the article. The third is not being critical of the claim and assessing it. The defense against falling for misleading headlines involves avoiding these three errors.

The third aspect of headlining is intentional misuse of misleading headlines. This occurs when the person is aware that the headline is misleading, but they use of it for their own purposes, often by posting the article on social media with their preferred interpretation of the headline. For example, a person who loathes the president might know that the “President admits activity was criminal in nature” headline is about the president agreeing that a foreign leader committed a crime. But they might post a link to the article while making some claim about the president’s guilt in the hope that others will be misled.

A person might even go so far as to create an entire YouTube video based on intentionally misinterpreting headlines. Such people might be called out for this by someone else on YouTube. People can, of course, also just lie about the content of an article and use that to make their straw man argument.

A defense against this tactic has three parts. The first is questioning the interpretation and considering other plausible interpretations. The second is to read the actual article to see the content. The third is being critical of the claims made and applying the rational methods of claim assessment. So, always go beyond the headlines.

Back in my high school and college track and cross-country days I was accustomed to unflattering comparisons between runners and football players. Runners were mocked as weak and unmanly, while football is a sport for manly men. When Trump’s followers praise his strength, this reminds me of those days and leads me consider the concept of strength.

My conception of strength was influenced by one of my fellow college runners. After he was jokingly mocked by football players, he replied that anyone could hurt somebody else, but it took a real athlete to hurt themselves. To be fair to football players, they do endure being hurt by others and when doing serious training they hurt themselves. But this remark provides a good starting point for a discussion of strength in the context of Trump.

As a runner, I think of strength in terms of the ability to overcome pain, fear and vices to achieve excellence. As an example, getting up at 5:00 am to do a 12-mile training run in the freezing rain is an example of strength. Completing a marathon despite the pain and exhaustion is also an example of strength. While running provides a serious test of strength, there are far greater tests. A good example is the case of someone Trump loathed, Senator John McCain.

While I disagreed with McCain on many political issues, I respect the moral courage and strength he showed during the Viet Nam war. As is well known, McCain was shot down and captured. Severely injured, he endured torture and survived as a prisoner of war. When his captors offered to release him as a sign of preferential treatment, he refused in accord with the military Code of Conduct.  McCain showed incredible strength, endured pain and fear and resisted efforts to corrupt him. One can find other accounts of the strength of American soldiers who endured fear, pain and danger. Strength, obviously, is not limited to the military. The parent who endures the burden of working multiple jobs to provide for their children while also caring for their own parents shows great strength. Those who face adversity, pain and fear with courage show their strength, even if they are broken or killed in their acts of strength. Even the strongest have limits, and there is merit and honor even in defeat.

Trump has a different view of such people. I selected McCain as an example because Trump’s view of McCain is well known. Trump said of John McCain that “He’s not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.” I also used the example of American soldiers because Trump has allegedly called Americans who have died in war “losers” and “suckers.” Trump’s followers see him as strong, but given his utter contempt for McCain and America’s war dead, one must wonder about their conception of strength.

While McCain endured great adversity, Trump has not. He was given millions and has enjoyed a life in which others do his work for him (such as writing “his” book) and clean up his messes. Aside from his repeated bankruptcies and failures, he has been able to escape the consequences of his actions.  But Trump does face some challenges, and these allow us to see his alleged strength.

A good place to look for Trump’s alleged strength is how he handles even mild criticism and challenges presented by people in the media. One can also look at the harsher criticisms advanced by journalists and authors such as Bob Woodward.

Trump’s response is to throw tantrums and lie when faced with even mild criticism. He , accoridng to Tom Nichols, “…is a vain, cowardly, lying, vulgar, jabbering blowhard.” He is also a blamer who refuses to accept responsibility and turns against his people, throwing them under the bus rather than showing strength of characters and accepting responsibility and exhibiting loyalty. He is weakness personified, unable to endure even the mildest criticism without cracking. So where is his strength?

Going back to the remarks by my running friend, Trump’s “strength” seems to lie in his willingness to hurt others; he is “strong” enough to act in ways counter to empathy, compassion and moral decency. This is the sort of strength praised by Himmler in his Posen speeches: “Most of you here know what it means when 100 corpses lie next to each other, when there are 500 or when there are 1,000. To have endured this and at the same time to have remained a decent person — with exceptions due to human weaknesses — has made us tough, and is a glorious chapter that has not and will not be spoken of.” Himmler also expressed his view of strength when he said ,“Thus I have basically given the order to also kill the wives and children of these partisans, and commissars. I would be a weakling and a criminal to our descendants if I allowed the hate-filled sons of the sub-humans we have liquidated in this struggle of humanity against subhumanity to grow up.”

While people often roll their eyes at Nazi comparisons, this view that strength is a matter of overcoming kindness and moral principles in order to do “what must be done” is one explicitly endorsed by modern  thinkers of the right. Ben Shapiro, for example, has come out against empathy. Elon Musk has also come out against empathy, seeing it as a threat to Western civilization. It must be noted that there are critics of empathy who are not on the right; but these criticisms are not that empathy must be overcome by strength so that we might do the “hard things that must be done.” Rather, these tend to be criticisms of tribal empathy, which is only feeling empathy for your side. There have also been criticisms of how empathy can lead to bad policy, not because caring precludes good policy. The concern is that identifying with a very specific person in very specific circumstances can result in badly crafted laws. Those critical of this aspect of empathy do not advocate being uncaring, but advocate compassion over empathy. The right advocates cruelty.

It could be objected that strength is required to overcome empathy, compassion, and moral qualms to do the things that must be done. Going back to my example of McCain and the dead soldiers, they were in combat and usually willing to harm others in battle. Their strength was that they could do the hard things that must be done in war. While this sort of objection does have some appeal, there is an important moral distinction between the strength required to be a combatant and the strength required to be murderous and cruel. Himmler claims that those who engaged in the murders he described retained their decency and were acting from strength; but that is not true. They were engaged in genocide and thus they lost all claim to being decent people.

In the case of Trump, his “strength” is not the sort of strength that enables a person to do something difficult that must be done and can be morally justified, like fighting in a just war. Rather, his cruelty is mistaken for strength. That he readily does cruel and terrible things without any expression of regret, remorse or compassion shows the weakness of his character.  He cannot even be given some credit for contending against those as strong or stronger than him for he is the President and even before then he made a point of going after those with far less power. As such, his followers are making the classic error of confusing cruel emptiness with strength.

Some years ago The Atlantic published a piece claiming that Trump described Americans killed in war as ‘losers’ and ‘suckers.’ Trump has denied these claims and his supporters  rushed to defend him. As would be expected, people tend to believe or reject the claims based on their ideology rather than on considerations of the evidence. I will endeavor to assess the claims philosophically.

In support of the claims is the fact that the Atlantic is a credible source that engages in careful fact checking.  The story has also been corroborated by other news outlets. Trump and his supporters denied the claims. From a critical thinking standpoint, this dispute comes down to an assessment of relative credibility of the Atlantic and Trump. Looked at objectively, Trump lies regularly and the Atlantic carefully fact checks its claims. As such, this is a major plus in favor of the Atlantic. Trump’s supporters assert, without evidence, that the Atlantic is fake news but the burden of proof was  on them to respond to the evidence in favor of the Atlantic’s credibility. If the Atlantic is fake news, they should be able to present evidence establishing this. An obvious problem is that Trump’s supporters tend to reject any claims unfavorable to Trump as false while those who loath Trump tend to accept such claims because of their dislike of Trump. For those between these extremes, the Atlantic would presumably win the credibility battle.

Counting against the Atlantic is the fact that it has a known center-left bias. As such, the Atlantic does have a motivation to be critical of Trump and this lowers its credibility. Trump and his supporters are, obviously, biased in Trump’s favor which lowers their credibility. As such, it comes down to assessing the relative bias and its impact on the credibility of each source. Once again, Trump’s supporters will tend to see the Atlantic as utterly biased against Trump and those who loath Trump will take him as utterly biased. Those in the middle would seem likely to favor the Atlantic here.

Also counting against the Atlantic is the fact that the sources are anonymous. As such, we must rely on a double argument from authority: the claims are supported by the claimed expertise of the author in assessing the anonymous sources and the expertise (broadly speaking) of the anonymous sources. Since we do not know the identity of the sources, we cannot assess their credibility ourselves and must rely on the credibility of the author. While some might be tempted to reject anonymous sources out of hand, this would be an error since anonymous sources have a legitimate role in reporting in cases in which the sources could be harmed if they were identified. Trump would have taken action against anyone who revealed these negative facts. While the use of anonymous sources does not count against the credibility of the claims, their identification and confirmation would greatly increase credibility. And, of course, their identification and disconfirmation would reduce the credibility of the claims. Having a recording of what Trump said would also have a large impact on the credibility of the claims, although one should consider the possibility of technological trickery.

Counting in favor of the claims is Trump’s confirmed negative statements about veterans and, most especially prisoners of war. Trump famously attacked  former POW John McCain, asserting that he likes people that were not captured. Trump also has an established history of disrespecting veterans, soldiers and the military. Trump’s seemingly complete focus on defining all interactions as transactional  is consistent with the claims attributed to him, as is his well known cruelty and lack of empathy. The claims attributed to Trump are completely consistent with Trump’s character and his past claims, which increases the credibility of these claims about him. As such, it is reasonable to believe that the article is accurate.

While Trump and his supporters are very pro-military, Trump has made it clear that he is anti-veteran. The Musk-Trump regime’s cuts have caused significant and ongoing harm to veterans, and Trump expressed no concern for this harm. As such, his current actions lend credence to this past claim.

Back in 2020, Kyle Rittenhouse became famous for shooting three people in Kenosha, Wisconsin. This took place during protests of the killing of Jacob Blake by police. While he was charged, he was found not guilty and even got to meet with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 2021.

My adopted city of Tallahassee also saw an armed response to protestors. Fortunately, the incident ended quickly without injury or death. The episode seems to have begun with a confrontation between the protestors and the armed person which escalated into shoving. The armed person then drew his weapon to deter the protestors and quickly surrendered to the police.  He was seen as acting in legitimate self-defense: he felt threatened and drew his weapon to deter possible attackers. He might even be credited with showing restraint as Florida has a controversial stand your ground law that might have allowed him to legally shoot the protestors.

These two examples raise the issue of whether it is ethical to go armed to confront protestors. Since my expertise is not law, I will leave it to the lawyers, legislators, and judges to sort out the legal aspects and will focus on the moral issue.

To pre-empt likely straw person attacks, I will begin with the obvious: if protestors unjustly attack someone, they have the right to self-defense. For example, if Sally is standing in front of her store and protestors start throwing bricks at her, she has the right of self-defense. She has done nothing to warrant their attack, and they are acting wrongly to harm her.

As another example, if Bill engages protestors in a debate and the protestors start punching him, then he would have the moral right of self-defense. He has the moral right to be in public spaces and to express his views. As such, he would have done nothing that would warrant the attack and can rightfully defend himself.

At the other extreme there are cases in which it would be absurd to claim the right of self-defense. For example, if a person watches too much Fox News and is terrified of protestors and opens fire on a group of peaceful protestors walking past his property, he cannot claim the moral right of self-defense. Merely being afraid does not suffice to warrant self-defense; there must be a level of threat that a reasonable person would recognize. As another example, if a protestor was spray-painting protest slogans on the wall of a business, this would not morally warrant the owner shooting them as the offense does not merit the punishment of death. As with most moral issues, it is the land between the extremes where the meaningful debate usually takes place.

While many would see the Rittenhouse case as open and shut, it does raise a general point worth considering. Rather than focus on the specific case, this incident raises the moral question of whether a person has the moral right to intentionally travel to a place to defend the property or lives of others knowing that confrontation is likely. This is, of course, a case of an intentional, traveling vigilante. Since I have written vigilantism before, I will take my usual approach of using John Locke’s theory of self-defense.

Locke argues that when we are in the state of civil society, we still retain the right of self-defense and the right to protect others. But it must be “activated” before it can justly be used. What must occur is that a person must be temporarily removed from the state of civil society by an action that wrongly threatens life, liberty, or property. For this to occur, there must be no viable civil authority able or willing to intervene on the person’s behalf. If there is a viable and willing civil authority that can act effectively, the person remains in the state of civil society and does not have the right to use violence. To use an obvious example, if I am in a confrontation and someone punches me and a police officer immediately pins them to the ground, I do not have the right to attack them because the civil authority was present and acted effectively. But if the officer is fifty feet away while the person is trying to hit me, I have the moral right to engage them. But if the officer subdues them, I do not have the right to keep hitting them as civil society has been restored.

On the face of it, a travelling vigilante would be hard-pressed to invoke the right of self-defense: they must travel to a place to intentionally put themselves in danger when they could just stay home and remain safe. This is like running across a room to get in front of a punch aimed at someone else just so one can claim self-defense. That would be absurd. So, a travelling vigilante cannot justly claim self-defense: they could have defended themselves by staying away from the danger. 

But Locke also allows, in the state of nature, people to rightfully defend others. So, if civil society has failed in a location, then people would have a moral right to go to that place to defend lives and property that are being wrongfully threatened. Specific cases would require sorting out whether the alleged threats were real and morally wrong. But if civil society has not failed in that location, then such an action would not be warranted: protecting life, liberty and property is the obligation of the state and vigilantes would not be warranted in using violence. As such, a travelling vigilante could be justified in cases in which civil authority has failed.

The other general sort of case involves a person going to a protest while armed, knowing that their planned actions or presence is likely to provoke a response. There are two main types of situations here. One is that the person is aware that their presence and actions might provoke a response, but they do not intend to instigate violence. If the person has a morally acceptable reason to go, even if it is just to exercise their right to be in a public space, then their going would seem to be acceptable. That said, a person should still consider the consequences of their actions: while they do have the right to be there, if they go knowing they will trigger a conflict, then they bear some responsibility if something happens. After all, they could avoid the conflict by not going. To use an analogy, if Sam’s ex is going to be at a party and Sam knows there will be an incident if he goes, while he still has the right to attend the party, he does have some responsibility for deciding to attend. But, of course, if he does not want an incident and his ex is the instigator, then the ex bears most of the responsibility.

The second is that the person intends to provoke a response so that they can engage in violence while claiming they are acting in self-defense. This is morally complicated. On the one hand, claiming self-defense after intentionally provoking the response would be morally problematic. To use an ex analogy, if Sam knows that his ex will create an incident and ruin the party if he shows up and provokes her and shows up intending to provoke her and ruin the party, then he bears some of the blame.

On the other hand, it can be argued that even if the person intends to provoke an incident, they can still claim self-defense if those provoked act wrongly. Using the ex-example, if Sam knows what his ex will do and goes with the intent of provoking her, if his provocation does not morally justify her response, he can still rightfully claim that she bears most of the responsibility. He can, rightfully, claim that she has no right to respond in that manner even though he knows what will happen when he goes and provokes her. So, if Joe attends a protest of Trump and Musk supporters and shouts “black lives matter” and “go home Elon” intending to provoke a violent response, then he would bear some responsibility if violence ensued. After all, but for his presence and actions, it would not have occurred.  But he can also claim self-defense: the violent response was not warranted by his provocation. This does, of course, raise complicated moral questions about what sort of provocation warrants a violent response.

Since I teach philosophy, I am sometimes asked how to win an argument. Being a philosopher, I disappoint those asking with philosophical discussion rather than providing tips on how to destroy an opponent with “facts” and “logic.”

In philosophy, an argument is a set of claims. There are two types of claims in an argument: one conclusion and one or more premises.  The conclusion is the claim that is supposed to be supported by the premises. A premise is a claim given as evidence or a reason for accepting the conclusion.  As such, making an argument requires making a point (conclusion) and backing it up with evidence or reasons (premises).

When assessing an argument there are two main factors to consider: the quality of the premises and the quality of the reasoning. When assessing the quality of reasoning, the question is: Do the premises logically support the conclusion? If the premises do not logically support the conclusion, then the argument is flawed, and the conclusion should not be accepted based on the premises provided. The conclusion may be true, but a flawed argument gives you no logical reason to believe the conclusion because of that argument. If the premises do logically support the conclusion, then you would have a good reason to accept the conclusion, on the assumption that the premises are true or at least plausible.

When assessing the quality of the premises, the question to ask is: are the premises true (or at least plausible)?  While the testing of premises can be a rather extensive matter, it is reasonable to accept a premise as plausible if it meets three conditions. First, the premise is consistent with your own observations. Second, the premise is consistent with your background beliefs and experience. Third, the premise is consistent with credible sources, such as experts, standard references, and textbooks.

In terms of winning, the constructing of a philosophical argument in isolation is like playing solitaire: winning is not beating someone else. A solitaire win would be constructing a good argument with plausible premises. But this is certainly not the sort of winning that people are interested in. What they want is the victory conditions for an argument against someone else.

In the case of arguing philosophically, the contest would be settled in favor of the best argument(s).  As such, winning is a matter of having better logic and more plausible premises than the opposition. In the ideal, the result would be to find something (likely to be) true. Such contests must also be conducted in good faith and in accord with the philosophical principle of charity. This does not mean that the two sides cannot be engaged in an intense dispute in which claims and logic are called into question. To use an analogy, competing in such an argument is analogous to competing in good faith in an athletic event: one abides by the agreed upon rules and does not cheat. And of course, victory goes to the one who earns it by making the better arguments. Obviously enough, this is not the sort of winning people tend to have in mind when they think of winning an argument.  What people tend to think of is something Ben Shapiro is famous for: his guide to winning arguments against leftists. The underlying view of winning is not unique to Ben Shapiro and one can easily trace this notion back to the Sophists of ancient Greece and no doubt even further into the shadows of time. 

In this context you win if the audience believes you and rejects your opponent, whether what you are claiming is true or whether your logic is good. While philosophical arguments can be used to persuade people, they tend (as Aristotle noted) to be the weakest means of persuasion. As such, if you want to win an argument, then good logic is usually your worst tool. Fallacies (errors in reasoning) are far more effective than good arguments as tools of persuasion. Rhetorical devices, which rely on emotive force, are also effective at persuading people and thus are better weapons than good arguments. While a fallacy can have a true conclusion and rhetoric can be used to dress up the truth, these tools do not reliably lead to the truth. Used well, however, they can reliably persuade.

Philosophers are often critical of this concept of winning in the same way honest athletes are critical of cheating. To use an analogy, consider winning a marathon. One way to win the marathon is to train hard, complete the race fairly, and earn the win. But there are other ways to win the prize. One option is to compete unfairly by using pharmaceuticals or blood doping. One could also cut the course or bribe officials. There are many ways to “win” and get the prize without competing in good faith. Likewise, an argument can be “won” using fallacies, rhetoric and lies. That is, one can be crowned the winner in the same way as the marathon cheat steals their laurels.

It could be countered that in argumentation what really matters is winning. So, if a politician or YouTuber can profit by persuading people to accept their views through fallacies, rhetoric and lies then they have beaten their opponents even (or especially) if their opponents are making true claims. The obvious counter is to draw the analogy to sports: winning matters but winning must be earned through an honest path to victory. Otherwise, one is stealing the laurels. Having the trophy does not make one the best and “winning” does not make one right.

Back during the ideological battle over masks in the last pandemic, I used arguments by analogy to defend governmental mask requirements. My silly comparison was to laws against public nudity. My serious comparisons were to such things as automobile safety laws and regulations for food handling. During discussions, I often encountered the fallacy of perfect analogy, which is the subject of this essay.

Informally speaking, an argument by analogy is an argument in which it is concluded that because two things are alike in certain ways, they are alike in some other way. More formally, the argument looks like this:

 

           Premise 1: X and Y have properties P, Q, R.

           Premise 2: X has property Z.

           Conclusion: Y has property Z.

 

X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as mask ordinances and automobile safety regulations. P, Q, R, and are also variables, but they stand for properties or features that X and Y are known to possess, such as protecting people from danger. Z is also a variable, and it stands for the property or feature that X is known to possess, such as being an acceptable imposition by the government. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of the illustration—the things being compared might have many more properties in common.

An argument by analogy is an inductive argument. This means that it is supposed to be such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is probably true. Like other inductive arguments, the argument by analogy is assessed by applying standards to determine the quality of the logic. Like all arguments, there is also the question of whether the premises are true.

The strength of an analogical argument’s logic depends on three factors. To the degree an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument. To the degree that it fails, it is weak. If the argument is weak enough it can be considered a fallacy (an error in logic). In this case, it would be a false or weak analogy.

The first standard is that the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. This standard is based on the commonsense notion that the more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. It should be noted that even if the two things are very much alike in many respects, there is still the possibility that they are not alike regarding Z. This is one reason why analogical arguments are inductive.

The second is the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present. It should be kept in mind that it is possible for X and Y to share relevant properties while Y does not actually have property Z. Again, this is part of the reason why analogical arguments are inductive.

The third is that it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

These can be simplified to a basic standard: the more like the two things are in relevant ways, the stronger the argument. And the more the two things are different in relevant ways, the weaker the argument. To focus the discussion, I will make use of two analogies to mask regulations. I do not want to get bogged down in the distinctions between ordinances, laws, and such, so I am using the vague term “regulations.” Any substantial battles over the exact terminology can be addressed in the context of law.

When arguing about masks, my concern was with the ethics of such regulations, and I left the legal wrangling to the legal experts. There are two main strategies when using an argument by analogy to argue that something is morally acceptable (or unacceptable). The first is to find something the target audience believes is morally acceptable (or unacceptable) and argue that it is like what you are trying to prove to be morally acceptable (or unacceptable). For example, most people think that laws against public nudity are morally acceptable and hence drawing an analogy between them and mask regulations would be a plausible approach. This differs from an appeal to belief fallacy in that the point is not that something is good (or bad) because people believe it. Rather, it is an appeal to consistency: if a someone accepts public nudity laws as ethical and mask regulations are like these nudity laws, then they should accept the mask regulations are ethical as well.

The second is to find something for which there are already strong arguments for being morally acceptable (or unacceptable) and show how the thing in question is like that thing. This is analogous to how lawyers make use of precedent: if a type of case is already well argued, then a successful analogy to that case allows one to apply the same arguments. As an example, the regulations governing automobile safety (like requiring working brakes) have good arguments supporting them. If it can be shown that mask regulations are like these regulations, then these arguments would also apply to mask regulations, thus providing support for them. While these uses of the argument are reasonable, they can also be reasonably challenged. But the challenges can also be fallacious. It is to the challenges that I now turn.

As noted above, the premises of any argument can be challenged. In the case of an argument by analogy, once counter involves arguing that either (or both) X or Y lack the attributed properties. Another counter is to argue that X lacks Z—this approach can be used against both approaches.

If the argument is a targeted analogy, a person who does not accept that X has Z can reject the analogy. For example, a person who is morally fine with public nudity can reject the analogical argument which assumes laws against public nudity are morally acceptable. If the argument is aimed at making an analogy with something that has established moral arguments, then arguing against these arguments would undercut the analogy. For example, an anarchist could make use of the usual arguments against all the laws of the state to undercut my analogy between masks and automobile safety laws. The arguments that refute the claim that requiring brakes by law is morally acceptable would, by analogy, also refute the claim that mandating mask usage is morally acceptable. This, of course, cannot merely be asserted, it still needs to be argued.

Even if a critic accepts the truth of the premises, they can still reject the argument in a principled manner by arguing that the analogy is weak: that it fails to meet the three standards adequately. If the analogy is bad enough, it could even be the fallacy of false or weak analogy. But the critic must also be on guard against committing fallacies.

One error a critic can make is simply asserting that the three standards are not met and therefore the conclusion of the argument is false. The most common version of this is to assert, without adequate support, that a difference is both relevant and significant enough to refute the analogy.  This can be pushed to the point where it becomes the perfect analogy fallacy. It is often combined with the fallacy fallacy: concluding that an argument must have a false conclusion because the reasoning is (or is alleged to be) fallacious.

The perfect analogy fallacy has this form:

 

Argument 1

Premise 1: An argument by analogy concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: D is a difference between X and Y.

Conclusion: The argument by analogy is a false or weak analogy.

 

One could also combine the perfect analogy fallacy with the fallacy fallacy in an extended argument:

 

Argument 2

Premise 1: An argument by analogy A concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: Argument by analogy A is a false or weak analogy, as per Argument 1.

Conclusion: Y does not have Z.

 

Or just smash them together:

 

Argument 3

Premise 1: An argument by analogy A concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: D is a difference between X and Y.

Conclusion: Y does not have Z.

 

Argument 2 and 3 would always be fallacies because inferring that the conclusion of a fallacy must be false because it is a fallacy is always a mistake. After all, even an invalid deductive argument can have a true conclusion. For example, consider this invalid argument with all true premises and a true conclusion:

 

Premise 1: If Tallahassee is the capital of Florida, then it is in Florida.

Premise 2: Tallahassee is in Florida.

Conclusion: Tallahassee is the capital of Florida.

 

Argument 1 could, however, be modified to make a good argument. What is wanting is a premise that establishes D as a relevant difference between X and Y that would suffice to show that the argument by analogy is weak. This cannot simply be asserted and it would need to be shown to be plausible using an argument.

The reason I call this fallacy the perfect analogy fallacy is that the use of argument 1 would be part of a strategy to reject an argument by analogy in an unprincipled manner. This would involve either refusing to accept the similarities as adequate or simply asserting that almost any difference is relevant and sufficient to undercut the analogy. That is, the critic is requiring a perfect analogy, which is an impossible standard to meet.

For example, a critic might respond to my nudity law analogy by asserting that the mask covers the mouth while other clothes do not. While this is true, they would need to do more than just point to this difference and they would need to show how this undercuts the analogy. One way to do this is to note that while clothing does not impede breathing, a mask over the mouth can, which could be developed into a relevant difference that undercuts my analogy.

As another example, a critic might respond to my brake analogy by asserting that brakes are not worn but masks are. While this is true, it would need to be shown that this is a relevant and significant difference that breaks the analogy. The main challenge would be showing that while the state can compel people to have safe vehicles, they cannot compel people to wear safety devices, such as seat belts and masks. This could be done but requires more than asserting that people do not wear brakes.

Before accusing a critic of committing this fallacy it is important to determine if this charge has a foundation. After all, good faith criticisms of an argument by analogy involve questioning the similarity between the two things and raising questions about relevant differences. If the critic brings up a difference without support for their claim that it is relevant and significant enough to undercut the analogy, then this would be grounds for suspicion. If they keep repeating the difference without supporting their claim or keep shifting to new, unsupported differences to reject the argument, then it would be reasonable to suspect they are engaged in this fallacy. Their strategy would seem to be to require that X and Y be identical before they accept that X having Z supports Y having Z, which is an impossible standard.

When trying to sort out good faith criticism from bad faith perfect analogy attacks there are two main things to look for. The first is, obviously enough, at least an attempt to argue that the claimed difference is relevant and significant. The second is to look for a willingness on the part of the critic to identify what similarities they would accept as relevant. If they refuse or it plausibly seems that they require an unreasonable (or even impossible) level of similarity, then they are likely to be using the perfect analogy fallacy. It should also be noted that people can fall into this fallacy unwittingly. They are not consciously using a bad faith strategy; they simply believe that asserting a difference exists suffices to undercut the analogy. They would be reasoning in error, but not in bad faith. Such an error can often be corrected, since a person arguing in good faith seeks the truth. I am expecting similar perfect analogy fallacies in the next pandemic, assuming that the government even attempts to take action to protect the people.

https://www.dukeupress.edu/fugitive-modernities

Jessica Krug, a former history professor at George Washington University, admitted to misrepresenting her race and ethnicity. In her confession, she accepted responsibility for her deception while making note of her mental health issues.  This incident was a gift to the right: when it occurred, I learned about it from a Facebook post contending this was proof that there is no such thing as white privilege. While the post asserted this claim without any argument, it did raise an interesting issue.

One could argue that if there is an advantage to a white person masquerading as black, then white privilege must not be real. After all, if a rational person were seeking an advantage by masquerading as another ethnicity, they would take on the most advantageous role. Since the white Krug masqueraded as black and she is clearly intelligent, then it follows that being white is not more advantageous than being black. Therefore, one might conclude that white privilege is not real.

While Krug does refer to mental health issues, she does not claim she took on the black identity because of mental illness. So, it would be a mistake to try to counter the above argument by contending she was crazy and thus gave up her real white privilege. In fact, while her choice was morally wrong, it can be seen as a clever choice in her situation and a case can be made that her masquerade was advantageous while also arguing that this is consistent with white privilege.

The statistical evidence for white privilege is overwhelming. The idea of white privilege is not that white people have it easy or get everything for nothing. In the United States, life for everyone who is not in the upper classes is difficult and often precarious. But being white makes it a bit less bad.  An average white person will enjoy statistically significant advantages over a black person because they are white. Or, rather, other people give white people an advantage in many circumstances. But this does not entail that there are no circumstances in which appearing black can yield an advantage.

As an analogy, matching the current conception of physical beauty yields many advantages and beautiful people are perceived as being better in many non-beauty related ways. But there can be specific and limited circumstances in which not being seen as conventionally beautiful can be advantageous. For example, a company might be looking for models who do not match that conception of beauty for a an ad campaign. As another example, there are some professional contexts in which matching that conception of beauty could be a disadvantage. But these limited cases do not prove that there is no general beauty advantage.

While the academy still favors white people (and more so every day now), there can be specific jobs, awards, fellowships, scholarships, and other opportunities in which being (or appearing) black can be an advantage (or a necessity). For example, when I was at Ohio State a fellow grad student applied for an African-American scholarship. He had dual American and African citizenship and thus seemed to qualify. But he did not because he was a white African-American and not black. There are also certain academic fields where having a specific identity provides more perceived credibility. A humorous example of this is the Black Jeopardy skit on Saturday Night Live featuring Lewis C.K. as a professor of African American Studies at Brigham Young University. It was funny, obviously, because Lewis C.K. is white. In such cases, appearing black can provide a specific advantage that can outweigh the general advantages of being white. While Krug would probably have been successful if she had been honest, this was a very narrow and  unusual case in which appearing black was probably more advantageous. As such, her case does not disprove white privilege; at best it shows that there are very limited and rare circumstances in which appearing black can provide a very specific advantage.

Some on the right might be pleased I have agreed that there can be cases in which a black person can  gain an advantage because they are black. But they should not be that pleased: all I have argued for is that there are very limited cases in which being (or appearing) black can yield a limited and specific contextual advantage. This does not show that whites are at a general disadvantage in the academy. And it certainly does not disprove white privilege. Going back to the beauty analogy, it would be like claiming that one model who succeeded because she was not seen as beautiful proves that there is no advantage to being seen as beautiful.

As noted in the previous essay, the use of false equivalence is a common tactic in politics. This essay will illustrate some of the ways it can be used to influence voters, and I will provide some methods of defense. While this method can be employed across the political spectrum, in the United States it is favored by the right.

One use of the false equivalence is to make voters feel better voting for a politician who has serious flaws. Such voters would not vote for the other politician, but their enthusiasm could be damped by their negative view of their own politician. This might even cause them to skip voting, if obstacles such as bad weather, long lines or a pandemic interfere. The use of a false equivalence can make such voters feel that since the other candidate is just as bad in the specified ways, they should not feel any concern about supporting their politician. While this is inferior to making the voters feel that their politician is great, it can be effective in getting people to vote.

A second use of the false equivalence is to win over voters who are concerned about the serious flaws of a candidate but would vote for them if these worries were assuaged. But the opposing politician is less flawed and might be able to win over these voters. The tactic here is to draw a false equivalence between the two candidates to convince the voters that both candidates are equally bad. This would allow the deceived voters to feel better about voting for the flawed candidate. They can tell themselves that both are equally bad, so they should vote for the one they prefer for some other reasons. This method can be effective and has the advantage of gaining a vote while taking a vote from the opponent.

A third use is against voters who are unlikely to vote for one politician but might vote for another politician if they were to cast a vote. The goal of the false equivalence in such cases is to demotivate the voter by getting them to believe that all politicians are the same, that is, they are all equally bad. The hope is that this will cause the voter to not vote. While this is not as good as winning over a voter, it is likely to cost their opponent a vote and thus increase their chances of not losing. While this is a sensible method for a bad politician who is going up against a better politician, it does run the risk if adopted by an entire party because they might demotivate their own voters. To avoid this, the false equivalence needs to be designed so that it demotivates the target voters while having less or no impact on the other voters.

One way to do this is by focusing on qualities that would demotivate those inclined to vote for the other party while having less negative impact on the voters of one’s party. Fortunately for politicians, there are things that would upset voters for the other party that their own voters are fine with. For example, the Republicans tried to cast Joe Biden as a racist and someone who gropes women. Since Democrats are much more upset about racism and groping, casting Joe Biden in this way can demotivate Democratic voters while not demotivating Republican voters. After all, most Republicans tolerate or approve of Trump’s racism and history of groping.

Crafting a false equivalence often involves making use of other fallacies and rhetorical devices to power the fallacy. One common method is to use down players to make one politician seem less bad and employ hyperbole to make the other worse. People also sometimes lie or use untruths they uncritically accept. These tactics are typically used in two ways. One is to exaggerate or downplay the number of negative factors. The other is to exaggerate or downplay the degree of the negative factors. The defense against all of these is to be critical and seek the truth. Be wary of claims that you really like (which can be negative claims about someone you do not like) and do not simply accept them without adequate evidence from credible sources.

When trying to exaggerate the number of negative factors, a common tactic is repetition: bringing up the same negative factor repeatedly and from different sources. This can make a single or small number seem much larger psychologically. Repetition will feel like there are many negative factors because one hears about them so often. When trying to create the illusion of a large number, a common approach is to use different headlines for stories and social media posts with the same content as people tend not to read the details and will often be deceived.  The main defense here is noting that it is simply the same thing being repeated to create the appearance of a larger number. Also, always consider that claims can be false.

When it comes to intensity, a commonly employed fallacy is the straw man: presenting a distorted or exaggerated version of the truth. In many cases this involves a claim that a person knows an unknown fact about the target. That, for example, although there is no positive evidence that a person said, did or believes something awful, the person making the straw man somehow knows this alleged secret truth.

As with most fallacies, there are two primary defenses against the false equivalence. The first is knowing that the fallacy is a fallacy. The second is being a critical thinker about claims and being careful to believe only in proportion to the evidence.