Category: Race

 

By Modern-Day Debate, CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=151424337

American racists are a diverse group of people who are divided by their views on racism. One area of division is the sincerity of a person’s professed racism. Some racists are no doubt opportunists who do not sincerely and deeply believe in racism, they merely take advantage of it. Other racists are true believers. While racists do question the sincerity of other racists, much of the analysis of sincerity comes from outside these circles. For example, commentators in the media often seemed to agonize over the issue of whether Donald Trump is a racist or merely an opportunist. One the one hand, this can be seen as unimportant. After all, from the standpoint of those harmed by racism it hardly matters whether the racist is a true believer or an opportunist. To use an analogy, if someone robbed you, you would presumably not agonize over or even care whether the thief held a deep and sincere belief in being a thief. What matters is the harm they did to you. On the other hand, the sincerity of a racist is relevant in assessing them morally and can have some practical consequences. In terms of moral assessment, a case can be made that the opportunist is worse, since they are adding dishonesty to their moral crimes. In practical terms, an opportunist would abandon their professed racism when it was no longer advantageous. A second realm of division among American racists is the degree of racism they embrace.

While it is often claimed that everyone is a little bit racist, there is significant diversity in the degrees of racism people embrace. A very mild racist might feel superior to others while professing to be appalled at even the suggestion that people should be harmed solely because of their race. At the other extreme are those who engage in genocide and ethnic cleansing. The United States has a history of ethnic cleansing and it is not unreasonable to consider that the current administration’s immigration practices are aimed at this goal. However, there is disagreement on the right as to what degree of racism is acceptable.

The murder of Charlie Kirk created an influence vacuum that Nick Fuentes seems to be endeavoring to fill. In the process, Fuentes has set off what some commentators are calling a civil war of the right. This dispute centers over the next two areas of division. One is the extent to which the right should be openly racist. The historical shift from open racism to dog whistles and code words is often described as the Southern Strategy. The essentials of this strategy are best presented in the words of Lee Atwater:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

While open racism obviously never went away, modern mainstream racists embraced this approach, using dog whistles and code words. Trump’s election and especially his re-election helped rewind the Southern Strategy as people shifted back from dog whistles and code to being more open about their racism. Fuentes, who has been moving into the mainstream, is noteworthy for expressing his views directly, without euphemisms or employing dog whistles.

The other dispute is over who should be considered White. Nick Fuentes is Mexican American and he seems to regard himself as White, though others on the right might take issue with his view. There is also conflict over whether Indian Americans (with connections to India) count and Fuentes has attacked JD Vance because he is married to Usha, whose parents are Indian immigrants.  But a big fight that seems to be dividing American racists is the question of whether Jews should be considered White.  Tucker Carlson is credited with bringing this division into the national spotlight by interviewing Fuentes.

As Nick Fuentes has openly expressed his antisemitic views, he would presumably regard someone like Stephen Miller as not being White. After all, Stephen Miller is from a Jewish family that emigrated from Eastern Europe.  Others on the right profess to reject antisemitism or at least express support for Israel.

As a relevant aside, antisemites can support Israel for a variety of reasons, though this might strike some as bizarre. One reason can be that they favor ethno-states and endorse Jewish people leaving the United States and going to Israel. Another is for religious reasons, because they see Israel as playing an important role in the end times. There can also be purely pragmatic reasons involving Israel’s strategic importance as an American ally. But back to the main topic.

This fight on the right shines a light on the historical fact that being White is a matter of convention rather than a metaphysical reality. To illustrate, consider how the Irish and the Italians became White after being subject to virulent racism from Whites in America. It might strike some as odd that Irish and Italians would be considered non-White and subject to attacks from White racists. After all, one might say, the Irish and Italians look white in those old photos from back when they were not White. But as history shows, being White is not a matter of looking white but being accepted as White by those who are already accepted as being White. This acceptance is, obviously, not a matter of a vote and not all the established Whites accept new whites as White at the same time (or even ever). For the Irish and Italians, it was a gradual and uneven process, and some prejudices and derogatory terms persist.  

The history of Whiteness in America also shows that the right is inclusive and progressive, albeit at a slower rate and with a different style than the American left. In general, the American left has professed to embrace inclusion not by expanding who they accept as acceptable by allowing more people to be White. Rather, they profess to accept people as people. In contrast, the right tends to accept a broader definition of what it is to be White, thus becoming more inclusive. To be fair and balanced, there are those on the right who profess to embrace inclusivity and reject racism, although this seems to often be limited to non-Whites who happen to be in the upper economic classes or share their right-wing ideology. As an extreme example, Nick Fuentes claims to be good friends with Kanye West and they have appeared together with Kanye sporting a giant swastika on a chain.  As a less extreme example, Clarence Thomas has long been accepted by the mainstream right. The fight, then, is over how inclusive the right should be in terms of accepting people as White and which individuals should be accepted even if they are not White. The current main fight, as noted above, is over antisemitism and this is dividing the right. Because antisemitism has historically been embraced by the right and remains strong in the United States, it remains to be seen whether the right will embrace inclusivity or whether the traditional racists will win this fight.

In my previous essay I introduced the notion of using the notion of essential properties to address the question of whether James Bond must be a white man. I ran through this rather quickly and want to expand on it here.

As noted, an essential property (to steal from Aristotle) is a property that an entity must have. In contrast an accidental property is one that it does have but could lack. As I tell my students, accidental properties are not just properties from accidents, like the dent in a fender.

One way to look at essential properties is that if a being loses an essential property, it ceases to be. In effect, the change of property destroys it, although a new entity can arise. To use a simple example, it is essential to a triangle that it be three-sided. If another side is added, the triangle is no more. But the new entity could be a square. Of course, one could deny that the triangle is destroyed and instead take it as changing into a square. It all depends on how the identity of a being is determined.

Continuing the triangle example, the size and color of a triangle are accidental properties.  A red triangle that is painted blue remains a triangle, although it is now blue. But one could look at the object in terms of being a red object. In that case, changing the color would mean that it was no longer a red object, but a blue object. Turning back to James Bond and his color, he has always been a white man.

Making Bond a black man would change many of his established properties and one can obviously say that he would no longer be white Bond. But this could be seen as analogous to changing the color of a triangle: just as a red triangle painted blue is still a triangle, changing Bond from a white to a black man by a change of actors does not entail that is no longer Bond. Likewise, one might claim, for changing Bond to a woman via a change of actor.

As noted in the previous essay, the actors who have played Bond have been different in many ways, yet they are all accepted as Bond. As such, there are clearly many properties that Bond has accidentally. They can change with the actors while the character is still Bond. One advantage of a fictional character is, of course, that the author can simply decide on the essential properties when they create the metaphysics for their fictional world. For example, in fantasy settings an author might decide that a being is its soul and thus can undergo any number of bodily alterations (such as through being reincarnated or polymorphed) and still be the same being. If Bond was in such a world, all a being would need to be Bond would be to be the Bond soul. This soul could inhabit a black male body or even a dragon and still be Bond. Dragon Bond could make a great anime.

But, of course, the creator of Bond did not specify the metaphysics of his world, so we would need to speculate using various metaphysical theories about our world.  The question is: would a person changing their race or gender result in the person ceasing to be that person, just as changing the sides of a triangle would make it cease to be a triangle? Since Bond is a fictional character, there is the option to abandon metaphysics and make use of other domains to settle the matter of Bond identity. One easy solution is to go with the legal option.

Bond is an intellectual property, and this means that you and I cannot create and sell Bond books or films. As such, there is a legal definition of what counts as James Bond, and this can be tested by trying to see what will get you sued by the owner of James Bond. Closely related to this the Bond brand; this can change considerably and still be the Bond brand. Of course, these legal and branding matters are not very interesting from a philosophical perspective, and they are best suited for the courts and marketing departments. So I will now turn to aesthetics.

One easy solution is that Bond is whoever the creator says Bond is; but since the creator is dead, we cannot determine what he would think about re-writing Bond as someone other than a white man. One could, of course, go back to the legal argument and assert that whoever owns Bond has the right to decide who Bond is.

Another approach is to use the social conception: a character’s identity is based on the acceptance of the fans. As such, if the fans accept Bond as being someone other than a white man, then that is Bond. After all, Bond is a fictional character who exists in the minds of his creator and his audience. Since his creator is dead, Bond now exists in the minds of the audience; so perhaps it is a case of majority acceptance, a sort of aesthetic democracy. Bond is whom most fans say is Bond. Or one could take the approach that Bond is whoever the individual audience member accepts as Bond; a case of Bond subjectivity. Since Bond is fictional, this is appealing. As such, it would be up to you whether your Bond can be anyone other than a white man. A person’s decision would say quite a bit about them. While some might be tempted to assume that anyone who believes that Bond must be a white man is thus a racist or sexist, that would be a mistake. There can be non-sexist and non-racist reasons to believe this. There are, of course, also sexist and racist reasons to believe this.  As a metaphysician and a gamer, I am onboard with Bond variants that are still Bond. But I can understand why those who have different metaphysics (or none at all) would have differing views.  

Since his creation, James Bond has been a white man. Much to the delight of some and to the horror of others, there were serious plans to have a black actor play James Bond. There has even been some talk about having a female James Bond. While racist and sexist reasons abound to oppose such changes, are there good reasons for James Bond to always be a white man? Before getting into this discussion, I will first look at the matter of the 007.

While James Bond has been known as 007, this is his agent designation and there are other 00 agents.  This is like the number used by an athlete on a team. As such, while James Bond has been 007, another person could replace him and get that number, just the person who was 23 on a baseball team could retire and someone else could get that number (although teams do retire numbers). Within the James Bond universe, it would make sense for someone who is not a white man to get the 007. This could occur for any number of in universe reasons, most obviously that James Bond is not immortal and would eventually be too old or dead to remain 007. From an aesthetic standpoint, it would be interesting to see a Bond timeline in which time mattered, a Bond world in which he grew old, and a new agent took his place. This would have the benefit of keeping Bond relevant to today while also maintaining (in universe) the old Bond. There is, of course, the obvious financial risk: having a new 007 who is not James Bond can be seen as analogous to replacing a star athlete with a new person who gets their number. There is the risk of losing the drawing power. But my concern is with the more interesting matter of whether James Bond must be a white man, so I will leave the money worries to the branding gurus.

One obvious fact about the Bond of the movies is that different actors have played the character. While there are strong opinions about the best Bond, there was little debate about whether a new white man should take the role when the previous Bond aged out of the role or left for other reasons. The actors who played Bond were (in general) accepted as at least adequate for the role and there was no debate about whether the character was James Bond despite the change in actors. That is, there is no general issue with a new actor playing the role. There was also, obviously enough, no effort to explain in the Bond universe the change in Bond’s appearance. I mention this because of another famous character from United Kingdom fiction, Dr. Who. When Dr. Who began, the actor playing the doctor was already old and they ran into the problem of age. They hit on a brilliant solution: Dr. Who regenerates and radically changes appearance, though remaining the same person. This gives the show an interesting feature: continuity of character through changes of actors with an in-universe explanation.

While Bond movies do feature gadgets and plots that border or even cross into science fiction (consider Moonraker), it is unlikely that the Bond cinematic universe would allow for such science fiction devices as alternative realities, such as in Marvel’s What If…? As such, the various Bonds are not explained in terms of being alternative or variant Bonds; they are all the James Bond. Now, if Bond can remain Bond despite the changes of actors, then it would seem that he would remain Bond even if he were played by a non-white actor. After all, if switching from Sean Connery did not mean that Bond was no longer Bond, then changing his race should not do that either. After all, the actors that played Bond are different people, with significant differences in appearance, mannerisms, and voice. Having a black actor, for example, would just be another change of appearance.  It would also seem to follow that having a female actor play Bond would also make as much sense; it would just be another change in appearance. But one could attempt to argue that it is essential to Bond that he be a white man. This, of course, gets us into the notion of essential properties.

In philosophy, an essential property (to steal from Aristotle) is a property that an entity must have or cease to be that thing. In contrast an accidental property is one that it does have but could lack and still remain that thing. To use a simple example, it is essential to a triangle that it be three-sided. It must have three sides to be a triangle. But the size and color of a triangle are accidental properties; they can change, and it will still remain a triangle. So, the relevant issue here is whether being a white man is essential to being James Bond or merely accidental. Given all the changes in actors over the years, there are clearly many properties that Bond has accidentally as they can change with the actors while the character is still Bond. One advantage of a fictional character is, of course, that the author can simply decide on the essential properties when they create the metaphysics for their fictional world. But, of course, the creator of Bond did not do that, so we need to speculate using various metaphysical theories about our world. That is, would a person changing their race or gender result in the person ceasing to be, just as changing the sides of a triangle would make it cease to be a triangle? On the face of it, while such changes would clearly alter the person, they would seem to retain their personal identity. If this is true, then James Bond need not be a white man. But more will be said in the next essay.

While this will not surprise anyone familiar with the state of police accountability in the United States, a  study reports that more than half of killings by police have been mislabeled over the past 40 years. As also would be expected by anyone familiar with American policing, black men are killed and their deaths mislabeled at disproportionally high rates. One objection to the claims made in the study is to point out the federal government lacks a comprehensive system of tracking police caused deaths and use of force. As such, no one can claim to know the actual numbers.

On the one hand, that is a reasonable criticism. While journalists and academics have been tracking police deaths and use of force, this is a piecemeal effort that depends on the ability of individual journalists and researchers to gather and confirm information. While the National-Use-of-Force Data Collection launched in 2019, most police departments decline to provide data.  As such, we do not know the exact number of police caused deaths nor the  exact percentage that have been mislabeled. We cannot also claim to know the exact number of police uses of force and what percentage of these were not justified.

 That said, the authors of the study are using the best available data from the National Vital Statistics System, Fatal Encounters, Mapping Police Violence, and the Guardian’s The Counted. This data, while incomplete, does provide a foundation for a reasonable inductive generalization. Naturally, we need to keep in mind the usual concerns about sample size and the possibility of a biased sample. But one cannot simply reject the claims by asserting the sample must be too small or biased; one would need to support these claims.

On the other hand, this criticism (perhaps ironically) points to a huge problem: we do not have accurate and complete data on police killings and use of force. While one could claim that the missing data could show that there is no problem, one would think that if this were true, then the police would support making that data available. After all, it would help address criticism of the police and serve to improve their reputation.

Requiring the police to provide this data would seem to be something that the left and right can agree on. The left, obviously, want that data. The right is constantly speaking of the dangers of government overreach, warning against tyrannical abuses of power, and demanding accountability. Since they were outraged by the cruel tyranny of the mask and vaccines, then their rage should be incandescent about the lack of police accountability. After all, a mask is at worst a slight discomfort while the police seem to be using the power of the state to get away with murder. I am, of course, not serious about this. I know that the right, in general, is onboard with the police using violence—if they are using it against people the right does not like. They do, of course, have a very different view when the police oppose them. But this does provide a way of using the bad faith rhetoric of the right against them. While this is not effective, it is at least a bit amusing. What is not funny is how police caused deaths are so often mislabeled.

While mislabeling can occur from error, an ongoing problem is that coroners and medical examiners can be too closely linked to law enforcement and in some cases a coroner can be a law enforcement official, such as a sheriff. There is a reasonable concern that a forensic examination conducted by someone associated with law enforcement or who is otherwise biased will not be accurate. The George Floyd case provides an example of how this can occur. As I argued in an earlier essay, this link needs to be broken to ensure that deaths caused by police are properly labeled. Other improvements would also need to be made, since there is a serious problem and it involves, of course, racism.

Black Americans are about 3.5 times more likely than whites to be killed by the police. Latinos and Native Americans are also more likely than whites to be killed. Looked at as a public health hazard, a person is more likely to be killed by the police than be killed while riding a bike—and bicycling is dangerous in the United States. Given the disproportionate killing of black Americans, it is not surprising that the study showed that 60% of their deaths were misclassified.  States vary considerably in the accuracy of their reporting. Based on the study, Maryland does the best with only 16% of killings misclassified. Oklahoma does the worst, with 83%.

The available data shows that the police are engaging in disproportionate killing and that most of their killings are being misclassified. While some of the misclassification might be due to errors, this would only explain some cases. If it is claimed that most of the misclassifications are due to errors, this would be to claim that the system is plagued with gross incompetence and thus would still need a radical overhaul to correct this problem. One could, of course, also claim that researchers and journalists are lying about the misclassification. Supporting this claim would require competing data and evidence. This, as noted above, would be quite a challenge: the police generally do not provide this data. As such, a person claiming that the study is in error would need their own credible source of information. Obviously, simply launching ad hominem attacks on journalists and researchers would not refute their claims.  

In closing, those who claim that the police are not engaged in disproportionate and unnecessary killing and that deaths are not being misclassified should support mandatory reporting by the police and overhauling who does the classification and how it is done. After all, if they are right, then accurate data would prove them right. Those that simply deny there is a problem while opposing efforts to gather accurate information might be engaged in wishful thinking or they might be aware of the problem but think that it is not a problem at all, that is, they are fine with what is happening and want it to keep happening.

 

It might seem like woke madness to claim that medical devices can be biased. Are there white supremacist stethoscopes? Misogynistic MRI machines? Extremely racist X-Ray machines? Obviously not, medical devices do not have beliefs or ideologies (yet). But they can still be biased in their accuracy and effectiveness.

One example of a biased device is the pulse oximeter. This device measures blood oxygen by using light. You have probably had one clipped on your finger during a visit to your doctor. Or you might even own one. The bias in this device is that it is three times more likely to not reveal low oxygen levels in dark skinned patients than light skinned patients.  As would be expected, there are other devices that have problems with accuracy when used on people who have darker skins. These are essential sensor biases (or defects). In most cases, these can be addressed by improving the sensors or developing alternative devices. The problem is, to exaggerate a bit, is that most medical technology is made by white men for white men. This is not to claim such biased devices are all cases of intentional racism and misogyny. There is not, one assumes, a conspiracy against women and people of color in this area but there is a bias problem.  In addition to biased hardware, there is also biased software.

Many medical devices use software, and it is often used in medical diagnosis. People are often inclined to think software is unbiased, perhaps because of science fiction tropes about objective and unfeeling machines. While it is true that our current software does not feel or think, bias can make its way into the code. For example, software used to analyze chest x-rays would work less well on women than men if the software was “trained” only on X-rays of men. The movie Prometheus has an excellent fictional example of a gender-biased auto-doc that lacks the software to treat female patients.

These software issues can be addressed by using diverse training groups for software and taking steps to test software for bias by using a diverse testing group. Also, having a more diverse set of people working on such technology would probably also help.

Another factor is analogous to user error, which is user bias. People, unlike devices, do have biases and these can and do impact how they use medical devices and their data. Bias in healthcare is well documented. While overt and conscious racism and sexism are rare, sexism and subtle racism are still problems. Addressing this widespread problem is more challenging than addressing biases in hardware and software. But if we want fair and unbiased healthcare, it is a problem that must be addressed.

As to why these biases should be addressed, this is a matter of ethics. To allow bias to harm patients goes against the fundamental purpose of medicine, which is to heal people. From a utilitarian standpoint, addressing this bias would be the right thing to do: it would create more positive value than negative value. This is because there would be more accurate medical data and better treatment of patients.

In terms of a counterargument, one could contend that addressing bias would increase costs and thus should not be done. There are several easy and obvious replies. One is that the cost increase would be, at worst, minor. For example, testing devices on a more diverse population would not seem meaningfully more expensive than not doing that. Another is that patients and society pay a far greater price in terms of illness and its effects than it would cost to address medical bias. For those focused on the bottom line, workers who are not properly treated can cost corporations some of their profit and ongoing health issues can cost taxpayer money.

One can, of course, advance racist and sexist arguments by professing outrage at “wokeness” attempting to “ruin” medicine by “ramming diversity down throats” or however Fox news would put it. Such “arguments” would be aimed at preserving the harm done to women and people of color, which is an evil thing to do. One might hope that these folks would be hard pressed to turn, for example, pulse oximeters into a battlefront of the culture war. But these are the same folks who professed to lose their minds over Mr. Potato Head and went on a bizarre rampage against a grad school level theory that has been around since the 1970s. They are also the same folks who have gone anti-vax in during a pandemic, encouraging people to buy tickets in the death lottery. But the right thing to do is to choose life.

A few years ago, PragerU tried to push back on Twitter (now X) against arguments by young Americans about racism. In general, getting involved in social media battles is a bad idea. To use an AD&D analogy, these fights are like punching green slime: the more you attack, the more you hurt yourself. And you end up covered in slime. It is usually best to avoid rather than engage. 

In the case of PragerU, they fired off what they presumed would be a sick burn of the youth: “Young people are enamored with ‘anti-racist’ rhetoric because they think they are fighting racist systems in America.  The TRUTH is they are fighting America itself and the very values the country was founded on.” Ironically, PragerU could have used some schooling in clear writing.

Their intended meaning, given the ideology evident in their videos, is that the youth think they are fighting racism, but they are wrong about this. Instead, they are fighting America and its founding values. Which are supposedly not racist. However, the tweet as written states that the youth think they are fighting racist systems in America, but they do not realize that the racist systems are America itself and its founding values. That is, PragerU seems have tweeted openly what they were supposed to keep quiet: they believe that America was founded on racism and that the racist systems are America. Sometimes they are willing to acknowledge that there were a few racist things in America’s past, but quickly rush to explain that they were not so bad and, of course, have no meaningful consequences for the present day.

 These are the same people who defend “Civil War” statues on the grounds that history must be preserved. This is a bad faith argument for obvious reasons. While a statue can be an historical artifact, a statue is not history. As comedians have noted, we do not have statues of Bin Laden in New York City, even though he is historically significant to the city. We do not do this because such statues are political statements. There is also the obvious problem that the history presented by PragerU and its ilk generally try to whitewash the past and ignore the truth. Attacking Critical Race Theory has become a key part of this strategic attack on history and facts. This is a fight that the right is currently winning, a backlash from a time when Black Lives Mattered.

 Ironically, PragerU (and those who share their ideology) agree with key factual claims accepted by most Critical Race Theorists about racism. These include the fact that the United States political, economic, and social systems have been dominated by white Americans to their advantage.  The difference is that Critical Race Theorists generally see the racism (systematic and otherwise) as morally wrong and something that needs to be addressed. PragerU and their fellows see these systems as generally good, although they were reluctant to openly assert this claim. Instead, they have engaged in revisionist history and take great effort to block criticism of the existing system.

PragerU is (as is usually the case) is mistaken in its key claims. While the United States founding values include racist values (they are explicitly laid out in the Constitution, political philosophy, and laws) there are other professed values that are not racist and some are even anti-racist. As Dr. King noted, the Declaration of Independence makes promises to all Americans, whether those promises were sincere or not. While America is racist, it is also anti-racist as America is not monolithic, and we have a complicated moral history. There are those, like PragerU, who fight for racist elements of the system and those, like the young Americans they tried to attack, who are fighting racism. In the face of the backlash, anti-racism is fighting a defensive battle with open racism in the ascendence. But as the racism becomes more open and extreme, America will probably push back towards the center. Probably.

PragerU, like many other right-wing propaganda engines, is engaged in a project worthy of a comic book villain, but all too real. While they do admit America had some racism in the past, they contend that it was not that bad. They take special pains to present slavery in a positive light and present many Confederates as heroic figures. They refuse to accept that past racism has had any significant systematic effect on the present. While sometimes willing to admit that there might a racist bad apple or two, they refuse to accept that racism exists in a significant and systematic form. They do all this while defending and enhancing racism, even “cleverly” accusing those critical of racism of being “the real racists.” As always, I am unsure if ordinary citizens who profess to believe these things are unwitting victims or accomplices who know the lies are lies but pretend to believe. One must thus either think them ignorant or dishonest; neither of which is a pleasant. I prefer to think that many believe out of ignorance, if only because ignorance is easier to overcome than dishonesty.

In the context of the war on “cancel culture” Republicans professes devotion to the First Amendment, freedom of expression and the marketplace of ideas. As noted in earlier essays, they generally frame such battles in disingenuous ways or lie. For example, Republicans raged against the alleged cancellation of Dr. Seuss, but the truth is Dr. Seuss’ estate decided to stop selling six books. As another example, Republicans went into a frenzy when Hasbro renamed their Mr. Potato Head product line to “Potato Head” while keeping Mr. and Mrs. Potato Head. In these cases, the companies were not forced to do anything, and these seemed to be marketing decisions based on changing consumer tastes and values.

While I oppose these made-up battles over free expression, I agree with the Republicans professed principles about free expression and the First Amendment. I believe in a presumption in favor of free expression and hence the burden of proof rests on those who would limit this liberty. I go beyond most Republicans and hold that this liberty should also protect employees from their employers. While the Republicans, as I have argued elsewhere, have advanced bad faith arguments about tech companies and free expression, I think the power of corporations and the wealthy to control and dominate expression needs to be countered by the state. I favor free expression even when I disagree with the expression. That is, obviously, what it means to be for freedom of expression. In contrast, Republicans do not seem to believe in free expression (though there are some individual exceptions). Some clear evidence is that Republicans have been busy passing  laws banning teaching critical race theory in public schools and imposing their ideology on higher education using the coercive power of the state to destroy the free market of ideas.

Critical race theory arose in United States law schools in the 1970s and gradually expanded. It is the view that laws, regulations, and values should be critically examined to determine if they have different impacts on different racial groups. Given the truism that people in different groups will often be impacted in different ways by the same thing, this theory seems reasonable. Since it is a broad academic theory, people do disagree about the particulars. Academics is, after all, a place for debate and rational disagreement. Or for ideological conformity, depending on what one thinks of academic freedom.

Critical race theory also contributed to the development of diversity training and has implications across academic disciplines. Being exposed to critical race theory can incline a person towards being critical about matters of race, such as considering how a law might impact people differently depending on their skin color. It can also influence people to be critical about American history and make them less inclined to believe the often-dubious historical narrative advanced by the right. As such, it is hardly surprising that Republicans  worked at “cancelling” critical race theory.

On the one hand, one could make a liberty-based argument in favor of these efforts. Students should have the freedom to choose their own values, so schools forcing students to “affirm, adopt or adhere” to an academic theory would be morally wrong. An obvious reply is that professors are already not supposed to do this to students and a student can justly complain if they are compelled to affirm, adopt, or adhere to the tenets of a theory.  For example, if I started compelling my students to affirm trope theory, then the administration would put a stop to my metaphysical misdeeds. Thus, this sort of law can be seen as another example of Republicans addressing problems that either do not exist or are already adequately handled by existing mechanisms.

On the other hand, there is a reasonable concern that such laws are aimed at banning teaching this theory. This directly conflicts with the Republican’s alleged devotion to free expression, the First Amendment, and the marketplace of ideas. But their actions show they do not subscribe to these principles. Rather they subscribe to the principle that people should be able to express views Republicans at least tolerate and should be prevented from expressing views Republicans do not like. As noted above, the past “cancel culture” examples presented by Republicans are cases where companies made marketing decisions, and no one passed a law to compel them to make these changes. In the case of critical race theory, Republicans use the compulsive power of the state to forbid the expression of specific types of ideas, which seems to be a violation of the First Amendment. Their base generally either does not recognize the inconsistency or does not care. As such, it is a clever move on their part: they can praise free expression out of one corner of their mouth while calling for censorship out of the other corner.

In terms of cancelling mandatory diversity training, it can be argued that this does not interfere with freedom of expression: such training can be offered, but people can opt out.  Having been compelled to take a such training over the years, I am sympathetic to the liberty to refuse training. However, there are obvious problems with allowing people to avoid training. One is that people who need the training might skip it, to the detriment of the school and it is reasonable to expect people to be competent at their jobs and learn the values of the institution. As such, it is not a matter of freedom from mandatory training in general or even mandatory values training, but a very specific sort of mandatory value training, values that Republicans dislike. Arguments can certainly be made against specific types of mandatory value training on moral grounds. For example, if a school mandated that students be trained in fascist values or Western supremacy, then a solid moral case can be made against that. In the case of diversity training, the challenge is to show how teaching people to be tolerant of those they must work, learn, or live with is morally wrong.

In closing, Republicans obviously do not subscribe to their professed principles of free expression, their claimed love of the First Amendment, and their alleged devotion to the marketplace of ideas. If they did, they would not be doing what they do. They would, rather, let the marketplace of ideas sort out the good and bad ideas, something that they always say when they defend ideas of the extreme right. But they are operating in bad faith and disregard their professed principles when it suits them.

In epistemology, the problem of other minds is the challenge of proving that other beings have thoughts and feelings analogous to my own. A practical version of the problem is how to tell when someone is honest: how do I know their words match what they believe? But the version I am concerned with here is the problem of racist minds. That is, how do I know when someone is a racist? Racism, like dishonesty, comes in degrees. Just as everyone is a bit dishonest, everyone is a bit racist. But a person should not be labeled a liar unless they are significantly dishonest. The same applies to being a racist and a person should not be labeled as a racist unless their racism is significant. There is, of course, no exact boundary line defining when a person should be considered a liar or a racist. Fortunately, we can get by with imprecise standards and accept the existence of grey areas. To demand a precise line would, of course, fall for the line drawing fallacy.

It is important to distinguish racists from people who seem racist. One reason is that an accusation of racism can have serious consequences, and such claims should not be made lightly. Another reason is that racists should be exposed for what they are. What is needed are reliable tests for sorting out racists from non-racists.

The need for a test also arises in the classic problem of other minds. Descartes proposed a language-based test to solve the problem in the context of animals. Roughly put, if something uses true language, then it has a mind and thinks. Turing created his own variation on this test, one that is more famous than Descartes’ test. In the case of testing for racism, it is assumed that people have minds and that problem is bypassed (or ignored) for practical reasons.

It might be wondered why tests are needed. After all, many assume the only true racists are the blatant racists: they burn crosses, have Swastika tattoos, and openly use racist language. While these racists are easy to spot, there are more subtle racists who work at avoiding detection. In fact, coded racism has been a strategy in the United States for decades, most famously explained by Lee Atwater:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

This illustrates the challenge of determining whether a person is racist: there are coded words and phrases used by racists that are not openly racist in their normal meaning, and they have many uses. First, they allow a racist plausible deniability: they can claim to be using the word or phrase in a non-racist manner. Second, it allows racists to recruit non-racists. People who are, for example, concerned about welfare fraud can be drawn into racism through that gateway. Third, it allows racists to signal each other while making the “normies” think critics are crazy. As an illustration, when I have tried to explain various code phrases used by racists to “normies” they often think I am either making it up or I accept a wacky woke conspiracy theory. So how does one pierce the veil and solve the problem of racist minds? Here are two useful guides.

As noted above, there code words and phrases used by racists that have non-racist surface meanings. One example is the use of “China virus” by Trump and his fellows during the last pandemic. On the face of it, this seems non-racist: they are referencing where the virus comes from. As I have argued in earlier essays, this use of “China virus” is racist. It makes use of the well-worn racist trope of foreigners bringing disease and Trump’s followers got the message: anti-Asian violence increased dramatically. But one might say, surely there are many people who use such words and phrases without racist intent. That is true and is what gives the racists cover and an opportunity for plausible denial. If only racists used a phrase or word, it would be dead giveaway.

So how does one know when a person is using such words and phrases in a racist manner and when they are not? One easy test is to see how they react to being informed of the racist connotation of the word or phrase. For example, if someone uses “China virus”, then one can inform them it has racist implications and is used by racists. If the person persists in using it despite being aware of its implications, then it is reasonable to conclude they are being racist. It might be objected that a non-racist might want to persist in using the term to “own the libs” or because they refuse to be “politically correct.” While this has some appeal, it can also be a strategy for concealing racism. It is, after all, reasonable to infer that a person who is dedicated to “owning the libs” in this manner is a racist.

To use an analogy, imagine someone who likes setting off fireworks in their backyard. They learn their neighbor has PTSD because they lost an arm, an eye, and friends to IEDs in Iraq and the fireworks really bother her. If they persist in setting of the fireworks despite this knowledge, it would be reasonable to believe they are an ass. After all, a decent person would not do that, even if they believed they had the right to do so. Likewise, a person who persists in using words and phrases that are racist code in contexts where the code is racist would provide evidence they are a racist. Or an ass.

 As the Atwater quote also notes, racism is often coded into policies and their justifications.  Migration provides a good example of this sort of coding. Only the most blatant racists would openly say that they want to keep non-whites out of the United States because of white supremacy. As such, racists have adopted the approach of arguing for restrictions that focus on non-whites using justifications that are not openly racist. The stock reasons given are that migrants are coming here to commit crimes, steal jobs, steal social services and that migrants are bringing diseases.

On the face of it, these are not racist reasons: the arguments for restricting immigration use economic and safety concerns. It just happens that these restrictions target non-white migrants. So how does one distinguish between racists and non-racists who advance such arguments? After all, racists have worked hard to recruit non-racists into using their arguments and they can have considerable appeal. A sensible person would, after all, be concerned if migrants were committing crimes, stealing jobs, and spreading disease.

In most cases where the racists advance coded arguments, they are also making untrue or misleading claims.  This allows for an effective test. Using the migration example, the claims that migrants are stealing jobs, committing crimes and so on are either false or presented in a misleading manner.

If a person is a non-racist and supports, for example, restrictions on migration because they believe these claims, then proving that these claims are false would change their mind. So, if Sally supports restrictions on migration because of her concerns that migrants are doing all those terrible things she is told they do but she learns that these claims are not true or greatly exaggerated, then her position should change. If Sally is a racist, then these are not her real reasons—so she will not change her mind and will persist in lying and exaggerating. As such, a good general test is to find cases where a person claims to believe something that is coded racism and not supported by evidence. If the person is not a racist, they should be amendable to changing their views when the reasons they profess for accepting their views are disproven.

It can be countered that people can become very invested in beliefs and double-down in the face of disproof. Might there not be cases in which a non-racist simply refuses to accept disproof about, for example, claims about migrants? This is certainly possible, but one must wonder why they would be so committed to holding to a disproven view. It makes sense for a racist to do this since their belief is based on racism. But a non-racist would be irrational to do this; although it must be admitted that people are often irrational. As such, the test would not be able to reliably distinguish between racists and people with an irrational commitment to such views.

But, going back to the fireworks analogy, this would seem to be like a person who insists they are not an ass, they just refuse to believe that their neighbor is bothered by the fireworks despite all the overwhelming evidence. This is logically possible, but the better explanation would be that they are, in fact, an ass.

Transgender people, especially transgender athletes are now among the favored targets of the right. Pretending to be concerned about fairness for women, Republican lawmakers have been busy passing laws banning transgender athletes from competition.

On the face of it, these laws seem aimed at saying to the Republican base “we hate and fear transgender people as much as we think you do so keep voting for us.” Obviously, proponents of these laws do not make this claim; they pretend they are very concerned about women and girls being treated fairly.

Republicans profess to be the party of small government, but these laws expand the involvement of the state and as could have agents of the state looking at genitals. This is the same party that raged against mask mandates as too invasive. But, as they have established, the Republican party has no respect for ethics, consistency or logic.

Like Republicans, I profess a belief in minimal government but differ in being consistent.  I have argued in other essays that the state should limit its use of law to cases in which a harm needs to be addressed by law and the good the law outweighs any harms of the law. Those who back the transathlete bans have been hard pressed to find meaningful harms. While inconsistent with their professed love of small government and freedom, these laws are consistent with their approach to voter rights in that they support imposing restrictions where no meaningful harm exists.  But perhaps they are motivated by their professed principle of fairness to women. Let us test this hypothesis.

If the Republicans believe laws should ensure women are treated fairly, then they should pass other laws aimed at addressing serious inequalities between men and women. One example is the persistent pay gap between men and women. In Florida, women make 85 cents for every dollar made by men. This is a harm being done to women and is unfair, yet while the Republican controlled government of Florida was busy with ant-transgender laws, they have been uninterested in this pay gap. One could counter that this is a concern for the private sector, but one can then point to the gender pay gap in Florida government: something the government could and should address. One could also run down a checklist of the areas where women are treated unfairly relative to men and look for evidence that the Republicans have addressed these cases of unfairness. As such, the claim that they are motivated by concerns about fair treatment of women and girls is just another lie. If they were truly motivated by this principle, they would be actively addressing the significant unfairness faced by women and girls and not just focused on ant-transgender laws wearing the mask of fairness.

As a practical response, whenever the Republicans make the fairness argument against transgender athletes, they should be immediately challenged about what else they are going to do to adress fairness. For example, if they are so concerned about fairness, they should ratify the ERA. 

A few years ago, the estate of Dr. Seuss decided to pull six books from publication because the works include illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” This was taken by some on the right as an example of “cancel culture” and it became a battleground in the culture war designed to distract from real problems. There was speculation on the motives of the decision makers. They might have been motivated by sincere moral concerns, they might have been motivated by woke marketing (sales did increase after the announcement), or they might have (as the right suggests) yielded to the threat of “cancel culture.” While questions of motives are interesting, my main concern is with the philosophical matter of re-assessing works of the past in the context of current values.

This is not a new problem in philosophy and David Hume addressed the matter long ago. As Hume sees it, we can and should make allowances for some differences between current and past customs. He says, “The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because of their ruffs and fardingales?” Hume is right to note that elements of past art will be out of tune with our time and that some of these differences should be tolerated as being the natural and blameless result of shifting customs. Such works can and should still be enjoyed.

As an example, movies made and set in the 1960s will feature different styles of clothing, different lingo, different styles of filming, and so on. But it would be unreasonable to look down on or reject a work simply because of these differences. Hume does, however, note that a work can cross over from having blameless differences in customs to being morally problematic:

 

But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blamable.

 

Hume thus provides a rough guide to the moral assessment of past works: when a work’s content violates contemporary ethics, this is a significant flaw in the work. Hume does note that such works can still have artistic merit, and one can understand that the artist was operating within the context of the values of their time but these flaws are blameworthy and diminish our ability to enjoy the work. Put in marketing terms, the work loses its appeal to the audience. Hume’s view can easily be applied to the Dr. Seuss situation.

When Dr. Seuss created these works, the general customs, and ethics of America (and the world) were different. While there were people who held moral views that condemned racist stereotypes in art, there was a general acceptance of such things. In fact, many people would not even recognize them as being racist at the time they were created. Since I hold to an objective view of morality, I think that racist images have always been wrong, but I do recognize the impact of culture on moral assessment. There are, of course, ethical relativists who hold that morality depends on the culture: so, what was right in the earlier culture that accepted racism would be wrong now in a culture that is more critical of racism.

There are also theories that consider the role of cultural context in terms of what can be reasonably expected of people and that shapes how people and works are assessed. That is, that while morality is not relative, it can be harder or easier to be good in different times and places. So, a person trying to be a decent human being in the 1930s faced different challenges than a person trying to be a decent person in 2025. Harms also need to be taken in context: while racist stereotypes in drawings are seen as very harmful today, in the context of the racism of the past, these drawings would pale in comparison to the harms caused by racist violence and laws. This is not to deny the existence of racist violence today; it is just to put matters in context: things are bad, but not as bad as the past (though the future might be worse).

Whether we think that morality has changed or that more people are moral, these racist stereotypes are now broadly rejected by people who are not racists. As such, it made both moral and practical sense for the estate to take these books out of print. From a practical standpoint, racism can taint a business’ reputation and unless one focuses on marketing to racists (which could be a profitable option) purging racist content makes sense. In terms of ethics, racist images are wrong. One could advance a utilitarian argument here about harm, a Kantian argument about treating people as ends and not means, or many other sorts of arguments depending on what ethical theory you favor. As such, removing the products from sale makes sense, especially since they are books for children. We generally accept that children need more protection than adults. While adults can (sometimes) make informed decision about possible harms from content, children generally have not learned how to do this. So just as we would not allow children access to firearms, alcohol, or pornography, it is ethical for a company to decide to protect them from racism.

While it is tempting to see children’s books as just amusements, children can be profoundly shaped by the content of such works. This is, perhaps, why many parents and groups have been instrumental in making Captain Underpants the most banned (cancelled?) book in America. Just as they are shaped by all their experiences. Children will generally pick up on racist stereotypes and can internalize them. Even if they do not become overt racists, these stereotypes will impact how they think and act throughout their life. As Plato argued, “true education is being trained from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things.” Our good dead friend Aristotle developed this notion in his Nicomachean Ethics and he makes an excellent case for how people become habituated. Assuming Aristotle got it right, the estate made the right choice in discontinuing these works.

In closing, it is worth wondering why the right was so concerned about these works. If they were consistent defenders of freedom of expression and freedom of choice, then they could argue that they are merely applying their principles of freedom. However, they are not consistent defenders of these freedoms and one must suspect that they are fighting for racism rather than freedom.