In the face of a crisis politicians often have an incentive to conceal, lie and spread disinformation. There seems to be a natural impulse to do these things to avoid blame or perhaps from wishful thinking. A politician might have good reasons to conceal and deceive, such as to not seem weak to other nations or to avoid panicking the population. But concealing facts is likely to make things worse, while disinformation will make it even worse than that.

A lesson that should have been learned from the 1918 influenza pandemic is that honesty and accurate information are critical to fighting a pandemic. The threat of the flu was initially downplayed, allowing it to spread. Officials also failed to inform the public of the true danger. One example is the infamous Philadelphia parade which allowed the flu to spread like wildfire.  This resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 people and over 200,000 were infected. While this disaster should have provided a  lesson, the denial, downplaying and deceit continued. The inaction extended to the top, with President Woodrow Wilson (a Democrat) remaining silent about the flu. While there is no way to calculate  how many people would have not died if accurate information had been provided, it is reasonable to infer that many lives could have been saved.  Given this historical lesson, we should have been ready to face COVID-19 with honest, accurate information. But this was not the case. As an American, I will focus on my government, though examining other nations would also be useful.

When COVID-19 was first identified in January, former Trump officials  (Bossert and Gottlieb) started sounding a warning about the virus, drawing the obvious and tragic lessons from the 1918 pandemic. The initial response from Fox News was to cast the virus as a hoax intended to harm TrumpAccording to Snopes, Trump did not directly claim the virus was a hoax but instead accused the Democrats of creating a new hoax—the target of the alleged hoax being his inept and dangerous handling of the virus.   This evolved into downplaying the severity of the threat, with Trump making dangerously false claims about the spread of the virus and other critical matters. While the White House and Fox news eventually seemed to take the threat seriously, dangerous disinformation was still being spread. One example of moral irresponsibility was the claim that test kits were readily available so that the federal government would be able to provide them to the states. This was not true and the lie costs states time they could have used to create and distribute their own test kits. It was as if your home was on fire and the fire department said that they were just about there with their great new firetrucks. But they were lying, they were not on their way and only had some garden hoses.

Because of the downplaying and deceit, there were deaths that could have been prevented by the truth. If Trump and Fox News had told the truth from day one, people would still have gotten sick, but we would have been better prepared and could have mitigated the harm. Instead, Trump and Fox News (and others) aided and abetted the viral enemy with disinformation and some deaths are partially their fault. 

The lessons from COVID-19 are a repeat of those of the 1918 pandemic: those in power need to provide honest and accurate information in response to public health threats. Such honesty can cost a politician, especially if they are ill equipped to handle the crisis. But the cost of silence and disinformation is always higher when it is paid by the public. But a leader’s concern should be the good of the people, not their own private good.

It could be objected that there have been cases in which silence and disinformation were beneficia. That is, the leaders’ concealment or lying caused a better outcome than the truth. While this might have some merit in some cases, the 1918 and 2019 pandemics shows this is a poor response to pandemics.  To claim there might be unknown cases in which silence or deception were the best choices would be to use an appeal to ignorance fallacy. Claiming silence or deceit is good because there might be unknown cases in which they worked is terrible logic. While the above focuses on politicians and leaders, it is also worth considering the threat of disinformation from members of the public.

As would be expected, citizens also spread misinformation. In some cases, this is the result of ignorance. People might act from benevolent motives, but they are doing harm by spreading untrue claims. For example, a person might believe that drinking bleach can cure COVID-19 and they share because they care. While benevolent motives cannot be faulted, people have an obligation to critically assess claims before they share them A quick test of a claim is to check it against one’s own observations, against one’s background information and against credible claims. Using the bleach example, bleach bottles have prominent warnings about the dangers of bleach (observation) and most people should have in their background information that bleach is a poison.  If a claim matches up with all three, then it is reasonable to accept it as likely be true. If it does not, then it is often reasonable to doubt the claim or at least suspend judgment. People also need to critically assess the sources of claims. If no source is provided, then one must go with the above methods of testing a claim. If a source is provided, the source must be confirmed and assessed. The credibility of source depends primarily on the knowledge of the source (how likely they are to be right) and their lack of bias (a biased source is less credible, since they have a reason to lie). In general, knowledgeable and unbiased sources are good sources; biased or ignorant sources are not. When in doubt it is wisest to suspend judgment.

There are also those who knowingly spread misinformation. This might be to make money, such as Televangelist Jim Bakker’s efforts to sell a fake corona virus cure or for political advantages, such as Russia’s efforts to worsen the pandemic by spreading disinformation in the West. There are also trolls who spread disinformation because it is amusing or because they want to hurt people. There is  no reasonable way to argue that it is morally acceptable for people to lie in health crisis to make money or because a troll likes engaging in harmful trolling. But perhaps a case can be made justifying nations weaponizing misinformation. After all, if using war or otherwise hurting and killing people are morally acceptable, then hurting people through misinformation would also seem acceptable. That is, if we accept killing people with bullets and bombs, then it is hard to balk at killing with lies.

One possible response is to argue that a pandemic is a war with two sides: humans and the pathogen. As such, when a country uses disinformation in a pandemic, they are aiding the enemy of all humanity and are committing treason in a time of war. A less dramatic and more pragmatic response is to point out that misinformation, like a virus, tends to spread, so a country that weaponizes misinformation runs the risk of it infecting their own population. Social media is, of course, the vessel of choice for distributing most disinformation and misinformation.

While there can be sensible debate about what sort of political speech social media should restrict, if any, there seems to be no good arguments that social media companies should allow and enable the spread of misinformation and disinformation about a pandemic. Returning to the virus analogy, this would be like Uber having a policy of allowing drivers to knowingly drive  people infected with dangerous diseases around to interact with healthy people just because they can make some money. There is also the war analogy. If social media does not fight misinformation and disinformation in a pandemic, they are aiding and abetting the enemy in a time of war.

In closing, the lessons here are clear: leaders need to immediately provide accurate information about pandemics, citizens need to be critical in their acceptance of information, and intentional spreading of disinformation should be regarded as moral crime against humanity in a time of war.

When everyone is in danger from a disease, it seems irrational for a political party to politicize the threat. But this happened during COVID-19.  One reason is that while Americans seem extremely polarized; this is  more appearance than reality. While Americans do disagree strongly on some issues, there is considerable consensus about many issues. Because of this, political parties need to manufacture a conflict in which they can score points. Since a threat generates strong emotions, it can be ideal for politization as a party can tap into the emotions and manipulate them to its advantage. Taking a threat seriously can also be contrary to the interests of some and they will try to prevent this by politicizing the threat. If they succeed, they can recruit voters and get them to support policies that endanger these voters. Thus, a political party can have two excellent reasons to politicize a universal threat: to score political points and serve the interests of those who benefit from allowing the threat to remain unaddressed.

Politicization can be effective at engaging emotions and disengaging reasoning. There are many fallacies (such as group think) and cognitive biases (such as in group bias) that feed and are fed by ideology. If you are liberal, then you probably just thought of the Republican politicization of climate change. If you are a conservative, you might have been thinking about the sins of the Democrats. If so, then you can see how conflict can easily be created along party lines.

The COVID-19 virus presents a threat to everyone, but it was politicized. Initially the Trump administration downplayed the virus and accused the Democrats of using it to attack Trump and the idea that is a hoax aimed at hurting Trump persists. There were short-term advantages to politicizing the virus, such as keeping the markets calm through ignorance, to allow business to continue as usual and to hope that the virus would not arrive until after the 2020 election. Political points were also scored against the Democrats by accusing them of making up a virus threat to hurt Trump.

From the Republican perspective, the Democrats were the villains, doing terrible things to harm Trump and impede his efforts. On their view, it was the Democrats who were manufacturing the conflict; first by creating a virus hoax and then by interfering with Trump’s efforts to address the virus.  How one sees this matter will, obviously, tend to shake out along ideological lines, thus politicizing the issue of politicization.

While, as noted above, political points can be scored by politicizing an objective threat, this does have negative consequences. The most obvious is that time and resources are spent fighting manufactured political battles rather than uniting against a threat to everyone. Another consequence is that manufacturing a conflict requires that misinformation, thus misleading people and this can have enduring consequences. In the case of the virus, while Fox News and the White House did shift their position to match reality, the groundwork they laid still serves as a foundation for the enduring view that the virus is either a hoax or not very serious.

Some Republicans will want to blame the Democrats; a common narrative is that their impeachment efforts are partially to blame for the virus crisis. As would be expected, one’s ideological lens determines how one sees this matter: Trump and Fox News as the villains who politicized the virus or the Democrats as the villains who distracted Trump from the virus.

There are three solutions to the needless harm caused by this sort of politicization. The first is that politicians need to exercise judgment and restraint before engaging in politization of a crisis. The problem is that it is seen as a useful political tool. As such, getting politicians to use good judgment and exercise restraint is challenging. The second solution is that voters can support candidates who are more likely to exercise judgment and restraint. Third, voters also decide how they respond. If they resisted efforts to politicize a crisis that should be non-partisan, then the efforts of politicians would be far less likely to succeed.

One concern is the charge of politization can be used, ironically, to politicize an issue and silence legitimate criticism. For example, the facts show that Trump’s initial handling of the crisis was terrible and that he made untrue claims about the virus and the situation. As such, legitimate criticisms of these failures could be non-political. But if critics are Democrats or liberals, they could be accused of politicizing. To address this problem, critics should focus on the facts and steer clear of what might appear overtly political. This will be challenging, since the other party is unlikely to accept legitimate and fair criticism and will claim it is unfair politicization. As such, the manufactured polarization in the United States that has served the parties has done massive damage to America. As should be expected. Unless we address this, new crises will  repeat the harmful politicalization of the  COVID-19 crisis.

In the United States, health care is often seen as a private good. The benefit of a private good belongs primarily (or even exclusively) to the individual. But a private good could have some broader benefit as well. A private good is usually seen as being the responsibility of the beneficiary. Put roughly, you should pay for your private good, not the rest of us. There are many things that are clearly private goods.

For example, my running shoes are a private good because they benefit me, and I should be the one to buy them.  In terms of broader benefits, my health means that I do not miss work, and this benefits my employer and students. But this is not enough to make them a public good.  .

Obviously. a public good is supposed to benefit the public and is often seen as being the responsibility of society. Put roughly, it is a good for us and we should pay for it collectively. A public good need not benefit everyone directly. For example, public transport does not directly benefit someone who never uses it and only gets around by walking or biking.  There is considerable debate over what goods (if any) should be public. Public versus private health care is a matter of debate in the United States.

Apart from the United States, most wealthy countries have chosen public health care. The United States offers some public health care in the form of Medicare and Medicaid but people need to qualify for both and the Trump administration and Musk are doing what they can to cut into these programs.

Most working people rely on private health care. One reason is the rhetorical narrative that health care is a private goo or at least better as a private good. In terms of being a private good, the idea is that each of us is responsible for our own health care in that we must earn the money to pay for insurance and treatment. With the exceptions of Medicare and Medicaid, we are on our own. The idea is that my health is good for me, but not for you, hence I should bear the cost.

There are also arguments that private health care is better than public health care. This can be countered by the fact that people go bankrupt due to medical expenses, people cannot afford and hence do not get basic care, and people  turn to GoFundMe to pay their medical bills. It is true that we have the best health care money can buy, if you have the money to buy it. I will set aside this debate to focus on the main issue: whether health care is best seen as public or private good. One way to approach this matter is to consider paradigm cases of public goods.

Consider, if you will, an alternative America in which defense, police, fire and the legal system are private goods analogous to how health care is a private good in the real America. In this alternative America, citizens need to purchase military, police and legal insurance or face high costs for purchasing military, police, fire and legal services. In the case of military and police coverage, a citizen would be provided with various degrees of military protection for their person and property. Without such coverage, a citizen would need to pay high costs to secure such services as defense against foreign enemies and police investigations into crimes committed against them. Those who could not pay might be able to qualify for some basic services through government programs such as Militaryaid and Policecare. Those unable to qualify for these programs and unable to afford the services would be on their own. They would need to rely on self-defense, a garden hose and vigilante justice to address threats and crimes against them. This would be fair and just—after all, having the military protect me does not benefit you, nor does having the police investigate theft of my truck benefit you. Only having the military protect you benefits you. Only having the police investigate the theft of your truck benefits you. So, by the logic of health care as a private good, police and military services are also private goods. The same would also apply to aspects of the legal system. Being able to defend my property or other rights in a legal system does not benefit you, it just benefits me.

There would be, of course, certain police, military and legal activities that would occur because they would be good for these institutions and the state. The police would certainly enforce laws that generated revenue for them and the state; but if the law served only your private good, then you would need to pay for its enforcement. Such institutions would be lean and efficient, operating in accord with strict market forces as God intended. Unless, of course, they grew bloated and inefficient.

In this world, the results would be like health care in the real world. People would be locked into jobs to keep their police, military, fire and legal benefits. People in need would turn to GoFundMe to pay to have their spouses’ murder   investigation or keeping Canadians off their land. Many people would be victimized, injured or killed because they lacked basic coverage. But defenders of the system would praise it for all it alleged virtues and mock other countries for their public police, military, fire and legal services.

Things like police, military, legal and fire services are seen as public goods because they meet a state’s minimal obligation of protecting its citizens. Such goods require large expenditures, thus requiring collective funding and this can be seen as justifying providing a collective good. The same can be applied to health care; just as the state should protect its citizens from ISIS, fire and crime, it should also protect its citizens from COVID-19 and cancer. After all, you are dead whether you are killed by an ISIS bomb, a criminal’s bullet or COVID-19.

Police, military and other such services are also seen as public goods because they do (mostly) benefit everyone—even though the specific applications benefit specific people. The same also applies to much of health care. For example, infectious illnesses spread and containing them is a public good. As another pragmatic example, sick and injured people contribute less to the economy, so treating them benefits the public by getting them back into serving their core functions in capitalism: working and spending. As such, health care should be seen as analogous to the public goods of the military, police, fire, and legal system. There are, of course, obvious exceptions in which medical procedures are entirely private goods (like face lifts) but these exceptions do not disprove the general principle.

When the COVID-19 virus invaded the United States, it found an ill-prepared and complacent foe. As such, the impact proved devastating. One clear lesson is that the aggressively for-profit health care system is a weak point in our national defense against disease. I will make my case with the obvious analogy between health care and military defense.

Imagine, if you will, that the United States military operated like our health care system. Our current health care system is analogous to relying on mercenaries, albeit with a professional code of ethics and some loyalty to the nation. During normal times, the health care system is almost entirely mercenary: it fights battles to make a profit. This is not to disparage medical professionals, but the profit model chosen by those who control health care. Because the goal is profit, the health care system is operated to minimize costs and maximize income. This means operating like a mercenary force: employing minimal personnel to do the job, maintaining only necessary resources for normal operations, focusing on the highest paying customers, and only taking on profitable contracts. This is a rational way to operate a mercenary unit. But is it a good way for a national military to run? That is, would it make sense for the United States to switch from a public military to a mercenary military?

Laying aside the usual problems of loyalty and dependability, relying on a mercenary (for-profit) military model would be a problem for the United States. One obvious problem is the United States needs a large force that ready to engage in prolonged conflicts that we do not always get to pick. After all, national security need not match up with what would be the most profitable military operations and requires keeping resources available, such as the reserves, that no purely for-profit military would sensibly maintain. If the United States relied on a mercenary military for its defense, it would face many challenges in times of crisis: rapidly ramping up to meet the challenge, making the operations profitable enough to motivate mercenary forces (such as paying them enough to protect everybody). These are, in fact, all the reasons why a country should have a public, national military rather than relying on mercenaries. After all, the United States needs a military that is ready to face whatever threat arises and not a force limited by the need to make a profit. It is thus no surprise that our mercenary healthcare system runs into analogous problems.

Being focused on profits, the health care system operates with minimum resources and personnel. Maintaining a reserve of medical professionals and the resources needed for a crisis would cut deeply into profits. The government, it should be noted, does keep some medical resources in reserve, but this is obviously the public sector in operation. Because of this razor thin operation that maximizes profits, the health care system is like a mercenary unit: ill-prepared when the battle turns into a full-scale war requiring large reserves and resources. The health care system normally deals with the problem of resources by allocating them based on profit; like a smart mercenary commander who accepts the lucrative contract to fight easier opponents. In the case of health care, the wealthy get the best health care money can buy, while the poor get whatever is left over. But in the case of a national crisis, the response must be large scale: it is an invasion and not just the usual battles. People face the same problem, be it in a battle fought by mercenaries or health care provided by mercenaries: they need to be able to pay in order to get protection.

One principled reason we have a national public military rather than using mercenary forces is that we accept that the military should protect all citizens and not just those who can afford to hire their own mercenary forces. The same principle should apply to health care: having a mercenary medical system means that a citizen’s survival depends on what they can pay, and this is not acceptable. If we believe that the state should protect all citizens equally from ISIS and North Korea, then we should accept that the state should protect all citizens equally from COVID-19 and H1N1.

It could be sensibly argued that the military model fits in the case of pandemics and while health care should be modified to address the threat of pandemics, the for-profit model should remain for everyday medical matters. So, for example, everyone should have access to testing and treatment for COVID-19, but we should still be on our own when it comes to the flu, hepatitis or automobile accidents.

One reply is to argue that the state has obligations in the everyday medical care of the citizens. To use another analogy, if handling pandemics is like fighting a war, lesser threats are analogous to small-scale conflicts or police operations. We do not, for example, expect Americans to pay to get police services to address crimes against them, just because the crime is against them and not a pandemic of crime.

This is not to say that the state must pay for everything. No doubt someone is thinking about the state  paying for breast implants or face lifts. But expecting the state to pay for these would be like expecting the state to pay the bill because a citizen wanted to see a military parade on their street. As such, only the medically necessary should be covered. Just as we limit the obligations of the national military and local police, the obligations of health care can also be limited. This can lead to debates about what is necessary, but these disputes can be addressed in good faith.

It could be objected that people bring on their own health problems by bad choices and this should not be the responsibility of the state. But the same argument would apply to the police and military. For example, if the police thought that you did not take enough precautions to protect your car, they could refuse to do anything about it being stolen. Or, as another example, if you get attacked and injured, they could refuse to help you because you failed to take enough karate.

If we continue to rely on mercenary health care as part of our national defense, we can expect things to play out in a manner analogous to relying on mercenary forces for our national defense: no matter how brave or dedicated the individual soldiers are, a mercenary system is simply not up to facing the challenge.

As noted in previous essays, a tactic used by critics of capitalism is to accuse them of envy. As an argument, the Accusation of Envy is a fallacy. However, as was noted in the previous essay, a person’s envy could bias them and impact their credibility. Even when envy is relevant to credibility, proof of envy has no relevance to the truth of the person’s claims or the quality of their arguments. But from a rhetorical standpoint, such attacks can be effective: if someone is convinced another person is envious, they will often dismiss claims and arguments for psychological rather than logical reasons. Some people also enjoy attacking those they disagree with and casting them as being corrupted by vices. So, how would one tell if another person is envious?

My rough account of envy is that it involves an improper desire for what someone else has and the feeling includes an unwarranted resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing.  It often includes the desire to unjustly take it from the other person. An envious person would tend to be unable to get what they desire. If they could, they would presumably cease their envy (though they might become jealous). Determining if a person is envious would require assessing a person in terms of these factors in a fair and objective way.

A central part of the assessment is determining if the person has an improper desire for what someone else has. If a person shows no interest in the alleged object of desire, the accusation of envy would seem unwarranted. Even if a person is interested, it must be shown there is a defect in their desire and that unwarranted resentment is present.  As an illustration, consider the difference between training to be as good a basketball player as Jordan because he is an athlete you respect and bitterly begrudging his ability because you wish you had his talent.

 Discerning the presence of unwarranted resentment involves assessing the person’s words and deeds relative to the target of the alleged envy. Due caution must be taken to distinguish criticism and even anger from unwarranted resentment. Consider the difference between being justly angry at someone who harmed you and being unjustly resentful of someone who has done well in an area where you have failed. If a fair and objective assessment shows that the person is suffering from envy, then it would be reasonable to make that claim. But this would still be irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

In some cases, people will make their envy clear: they will express bitter, yet unwarranted, resentment and have a record of failed attempts to acquire what they desire. They might even admit their envy. In other cases, it will be harder to determine if a person is envious. After all, strong criticism can resemble unwarranted resentment, and justified anger can arise from a string of unfair failures. For example, a person who tries to start a small business and is repeatedly driven out of business by corporations exploiting their unfair advantages could be seen as having righteous anger at an unfair system or cast as a failure who is envious. If a person does not show clear signs of envy or denies that they are envious, one evil rhetorical tactic that can be used is Secret Motive.

Secret Motive (or Real Motive) is a rhetorical technique in which a person is accused of having a secret, typically bad, motive for their claims, arguments or actions. That is, they are being accused of having a real motive that is wicked. This is often a set up for an ad hominem attack based on the alleged secret motive. For example, consider a critic of capitalism who denies they are envious of the rich and there is no good evidence to the contrary. An evil “solution” is to insist their real motivation is envy, despite the lack of evidence. The accuser often claims a special insight or understanding into the psychology of the accused and this is why they somehow know the person’s secret motive despite being able to provide evidence for their claim. While primarily a rhetorical device (and hence not an argument) it can also be cast as a fallacy:

 

Premise 1: Person A asserts that person B has a secret (or real) motive.

Conclusion: B has a secret motive.

 

The error occurs when A fails to provide adequate evidence for their conclusion. This is not to say that “evidence” will never be provided; but what is offered fails to support their claim. For example, the “evidence” of envy might be that the person has been critical of the rich, though they have never expressed resentment at wealth earned fairly and have never exhibited interest in becoming rich. But the accuser somehow “knows” the accused is secretly envious, apparently through some exceptional epistemic abilities. Aside from dishonesty, one possible motivation is that the accuser honestly cannot conceive of anyone being critical of capitalism for a good reason. Hence, they infer there must be a secret wicked motive. But it is more likely the accuser knows there are good criticism of capitalism and to not accuse the critic of wicked motives would be to acknowledge this.

The defense against this technique is objectively assessing whether adequate evidence exists for the accusation of the secret motive. If not, the claim should not be accepted. It must also be remembered that even if a person has a bad (secret or not) motive, this is irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

 

I am, on occasion, critical of capitalism. I am, on occasion, accused of being critical because I am allegedly envious or a Marxist. If these were attacks aimed only at me, they would be of no general interest. However, accusing critics of capitalism of being motivated by envy or Marxism is a common tactic that warrants evaluation. I will begin with the accusation of envy.

While the accusation of envy is rarely presented as a developed argument, it aims to refute criticism of capitalism by attacking the critic’s motive.  The logic is that their criticism is wrong because they are envious of those who are winning capitalism. Obviously, this reasoning is fallacious and can be called the Accusation of Envy or Refutation by Envy. This fallacious argument has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Person P makes critical claim C about X.

Premise 2: P is accused of envy (typically relating to X).

Conclusion: Therefore, claim C is false.

 

This is a fallacy because whether a person is envious has no bearing on the truth of the claims they make. Even if a person is driven by envy, it does not follow that their claims are false. The following example illustrates this “reasoning” is flawed:

 

Sam: “When tyrants oppress their people and commit genocide, they are acting wrongly.”

Sally: “Why you are just envious of tyrants. So, you are wrong. They are acting justly and morally.”

 

Another absurd example, involves math:

 

Cool Joe: “2+2 = 7.”

Mathematician Mary: “That is wrong; 2+2=4.”

Cool Joe: “You are just envious of my being so cool. And rich. And handsome. So, you are wrong. 2+2 =7.”

Cool Cathy: “Oh, Joe, you are so right, and Mary is so wrong. Work through your envy and maybe you’ll get a man someday.”

 

Even if Mary was envious of Joe, it does not follow she is wrong when she claims 2+2 =4. The example is intended to be absurd, because its absurdity shows that this logic is fallacious.  If this logic was good, it would be easy to “disprove” anything, be it basic truths of math or criticisms of capitalism.

As such, accusing anyone of envy does not refute claims. Since this is a fallacy, it might be wondered why someone would use this tactic. One possibility is that the fallacious attack is the best the person has; they have no good refutation. A second possibility is that while fallacies are logically flawed, they can be very powerful persuasive tools. As a practical matter “winning” an argument has nothing to do with truth or the quality of the logic; it is about persuading the target audience to accept a claim whether it is true. Ad hominem style attacks are effective psychologically, so this tactic can be a winning one. In many cases the target audience wants to reject the criticism, hence they are happy to accept any “reason” to do so.

It might be wondered whether a person’s envy can be relevant to their claims. While it is, as shown above, irrelevant to the truth of their claims, it could be a relevant factor in assessing bias. But even if a person is biased, it does not follow that their claim must be false.  It is to the matter of envy and credibility that I will turn in the next essay.

Prior to Trump’s first victory mainstream Republicans attacked and criticized. His victory not only silenced almost all his conservative critics most became fawning Trump loyalists. Lindsey Graham provides an excellent example of Trump’s transformative power: he was polymorphed from a savage attacker to Trump’s attack dog. Few dared oppose him during his first term, such as John McCain and Mitt Romney. But the Republicans in congress now act in accord with his will and whims. There are a few surviving conservative critics of Trump, but they have proven politically irrelevant. This does make sense, as Trump is the logical result of decades of GOP strategies and efforts. If the Republican party were a Pokemon, Trump would be the final evolution of the party.

The surrender and assimilation of the Republican leadership was not surprising; the party focused on winning and holding power rather than developing and advancing meaningful policy goals. Whatever ideology once defined the party has become a devotion to power for the sake of power and profit. Under Trump, all talk of a balanced budget, all worries about deficits and have ceased.  What is more interesting is the impact Trump has had on his followers.

When Joe Walsh  made a futile effort to challenge Trump for the Republican nomination. During his effort, he asked Trump supporters if Trump has every lied. They said that he had not. Walsh brought up Trump’s criticism of Obama playing golf and Trump’s claim that he would be too busy as president to play golf. While most people did not care about, some insisted Trump had never played golf as president. His supporters also believed that hundreds of miles of the wall had been built and paid for by Mexico and that the Democrats in congress are treasonous liars.  Walsh closed by noting that he “…realized once and for all that nobody can beat Trump in a Republican primary. Not just because it’s become his party, but because it has become a cult, and he’s a cult leader. He doesn’t have supporters; he has followers. And in their eyes, he can do no wrong.” This raised some interesting philosophical concerns.

Some might respond by saying “what about the Democrats?” and accuse them of being a cult. While one could debate political cults, this “what about” would (as always) be irrelevant. Even if the Democrats were a cult, this would prove or disprove nothing about Republicans. My concern is with looking at the epistemology and thinking of the voters Walsh encountered.

One possible explanation is that Trump voters have normal epistemic abilities and hold to true beliefs but are lying in this case. They believe that Trump lies, that the wall was not paid for by Mexico and so on. People often lie in support of people they like, especially when they think those people are being attacked. This is a matter of ethics: believing that it is right to lie in defense of someone you support especially when speaking their opponent. While subject to moral assessment, this need not be cultish. After all, people will lie to defend their friends.

A second explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have always been defective and they are unusually bad at forming true beliefs and critically assessing claims. This could be due to various biases and the usual reasons people fall victim to fallacies and rhetoric. But this need not be cultish since believing false things because of epistemic defects or failures in critical thinking is a common occurrence. On this explanation, Trump supporters are wrong, but they are not wrong because of being cultists. Rather, they are following Trump because they are wrong.

A third explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have been corrupted by Trump’s influence. That is, they reject the rational methods of forming beliefs and critical thinking in favor of believing in Trump because Trump tells them to believe in him. They are wrong because they are following Trump. In this case, they might be cultists. They would be accepting a “Trump command theory” in what Trump says is true is true because Trump says so and what Trump says is false because Trump says so. If this explanation is correct, Trump is shaping the perceived reality of his followers. They are not lying to defend him or themselves, they are true believers in Trump’s false description of the world. That is, they are a cult with a charismatic leader.

Ever since Trump won his first term in office, I have wondered why people support him. I am not going make a straw man his supporters and say they are all stupid, racist, or opportunists. Rather, I want to consider reasons why people back Trump.

To start with the most obvious, some agree with his actions and policies, and it is rational that they support him. There is no mystery here other than why they agree with him.

There are some who are dismayed about what he says and wish he would show more restraint. While they dislike some of his word choices, they largely agree with his policies and actions. This is certainly rational. If their only concern about him is that he sometimes gets salty or a bit rough, it makes sense they support him.

There are even some supporters who worry about some of his policies and actions but go along with him anyway. In many cases, their motivations seem pragmatic: they get something from Trump or would pay a high price for not supporting him. For example, a Republican politician might get taken out in a primary if they earned Trump’s ire. As another example, a wealthy person might loath Trump yet like the tax breaks and de-regulation that increase their wealth. This involves setting aside certain values for others, but this can be rational. We all must make judgments in which values are in conflict, so a Trump supporter backing him despite their dislike makes sense. Trump supporters also try to convince others to support Trump.

When people criticize of Trump, his supporters often defend him by making economic arguments. For example, Trump supporters have told me that because of him the stock market does well, and this is good for my retirement income. So, I should stop criticizing Trump. When the stock market does badly, they place the blame elsewhere and say that Trump will fix it soon.  As another example, his supporters also respond to criticism about Trump’s racism with by arguing minorities ought to support Trump (or at least shut up) because under his leadership they will be better off . These arguments are based on the principle most eloquently put by  James Carville’s “the economy, stupid.” While Carville originally presented this to Clinton campaigners, it is now used broadly to claim that what matters the most is the economy.

From a factual standpoint, this claim has merit: people often say that they vote based on economic concerns. In the 2024 election, Trump supporters posted about inflation, egg prices and the cost of gas as reasons to support Trump. But is the argument that people should support Trump for economic reasons a good one?

From a factual standpoint, there are obvious problems with the premise of this argument. First, Trump (as predicted) failed to deliver on his promises about the cost of eggs and inflation. The stock market has also been a bit erratic.

 Second, the economy has been good for the wealthy and not so good for everyone else. While this gives billionaires an excellent reason to support Trump, it does not give the rest of us an economic reason to do so. Third, the influence of the president on the economy is often exaggerated. In good times, supporters of the president give him the credit, in bad time his opponents assign him the blame.  Trump failed to deliver on egg prices and inflation, but much of this is beyond Trump’s control. While his gets him off the hook to a degree, it also undercuts the argument that people should support Trump because of the economy.

Trump most devoted supporters will dispute these claims and assert that the economy is either great or will soon be great. Let these claims be granted for the sake of argument. The Trump supporter version of the argument would be:

 

Premise 1: The economy is great.

Premise 2: This is because of Trump.

Conclusion: You should support Trump (or at least stop criticizing him).

 

This argument is used to convince people who oppose to support or at least stop criticizing him. I oppose many of Trump’s policies and actions. These include his racist immigration policies, his approach to Ukraine, DOGE, his tax cuts, his putting incompetent grifters into positions of power and so on. While Trump’s supporters would dispute my views, their economic argument is that I should set aside my moral concerns because of his (alleged) success with the economy This argument is an old one and connects to America’s original sin.

Some of the slave-owning founders recognized that slavery was morally wrong or at least expressed this view in their more philosophical writings. Yet, they allowed it to continue for pragmatic reasons: profit and political support. Those who supported them but who also had moral concerns about slavery were swayed by similar reasons: slavery was crucial to the economy. People looked away, morally speaking, because they wanted to get paid. This approach has persisted: people who have moral qualms often set them aside for economic reasons and are often persuaded to do so.

I am not saying that supporting Trump is the moral equivalent of supporting slavery. Rather, my point is that an original sin of America is putting economics over ethics. What Trump supporters are now asking me to do is analogous, albeit not as bad: they want me to set aside my moral concerns about Trump because of his alleged economic success. That is, I should look away because I am getting paid. They are not amused when I ask if this means that they will turn against Trump when the economy goes bad.

One could try to make a utilitarian case by arguing that the harm he causes is outweighed by the good of the economic benefits of his presidency. But even if it is (wrongly) assumed that Trump is significantly responsible for the positive aspects of the economy it is not plausible to claim that most of his morally problematic actions and policies have anything to do with the economy. For example, his racist immigration policies will hurt the economy if fully acted upon. If Trump did have to do morally problematic things to make the economy better, then one could make the utilitarian argument to justify these actions. But the economy cannot justify evil actions and policies that do not impact the economy. Using an analogy, one could imagine a spouse who does questionable things to make money for their family. These could be, perhaps, justified on utilitarian grounds. But this would not justify wrongdoing on their part that had nothing to do with making money. So, if dad must do some shady business to pay for Timmy’s cancer treatment, then that could be justified. But the fact that he makes money would not, for example, justify dad committing adultery, beating Timmy, or vandalizing the local mosque and synagogue. Likewise, for Trump, whatever he might do to (allegedly) improve the economy might be justified on utilitarian grounds. But this does not warrant his other misdeeds. Those who believe he is a bad person doing bad things should not be swayed by an appeal to money; they should not look away just because they want to get paid.

As a political tool, members of congress threaten or engage in a government shutdown. When the government is shut down, federal workers can be furloughed and sent home without pay and forbidden from working. Others, like TSA agents, can be compelled to work without pay. As the government shutdown does not shut down bills and expenses, the unpaid workers will be harmed by their lack of income. While some federal workers are well paid, many live from paycheck to paycheck and have few financial reserves. Because of this, some federal workers have turned to food banks during past shutdowns. In addition to the impact on workers, there are indirect impacts on those providing goods and services. After all, people who are not getting paid will be spending less.

In addition to the financial impacts, there are other harms. One example is the national parks. There is also the harm suffered by those who need the federal services. There are also the long-term harms of the shutdown. While one could write almost endlessly of the harms of a shutdown, it suffices to say they are harmful and something that should be avoided.

Debating about who is to blame for any shutdown is often a fruitless endeavor because of the partisan divide. Minds will generally not be changed by evidence or reasons. That said, a shutdown requires both parties: if one party gives in to the other, then the shutdown will end. From a moral standpoint, both sides bear some blame. However, the blame need not be equal.

After all, refusing to give in to a threat to harm others can be morally acceptable. And it is usually the Republicans who make such threats.  From a utilitarian standpoint, giving in would be wrong if it created more harm than refusing to do so. This utilitarian calculation can consider more than just the immediate factors. For example, it should also include that yielding to such tactics encourages their future use.

The ethics of the shutdown comes down to two moral concerns. The first is whether it is morally acceptable to hurt innocent people to get what you want. The second is whether it is morally acceptable to refuse to give someone what they want when they threaten to harm the innocent.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the matter is settled by weighing the harm against benefit. The benefits can include preventing harm. So, a shutdown would be morally acceptable if doing so prevented greater harm, since shutdowns are always harmful. What must also be considered is whether there is an alternative to the shutdown. To use an analogy, if someone proposed a risky surgery, failing to consider alternatives would be morally irresponsible. In the case of the shutdown, there are alternatives. One is to use a less harmful process of negotiation and for each side to agree they will not use the shutdown as a political tool.

One practical problem is that the shutdown is perceived as a useful, albeit risky, political tool. The side pushing a shutdown will think that it will probably work; the other side thinks they can keep it from working. Both sides think they can score political points. Using a shutdown as a tool requires ignoring or even not caring about the harm being inflicted on the American people. After all, while politicians can lose political points or not get what they want, they are not harmed by their shutdown. This willingness to use people as pawns is morally problematic, assuming you agree with Locke that the purpose of the state is the good of the people.

That said, political, economic and military calculations always involve harming pawns—so the shutdown could be seen as just another move in the political game. This can be countered by arguing that there are better alternatives, and so causing harm is not necessary. As such, the shutdown would seem to be an unethical political tool. Unfortunately, just as it takes two to shut down the government, it also takes two to avoid it: both parties must agree to not shut it down. But as long as it is seen as a viable tool and if politicians are willing to hurt Americans to achieve their political goals, then we must expect future shutdowns.

The denotation of a word is what it literally means. The connotation is the emotional loading of the word, which can be negative or positive; this is how the word makes you feel. To illustrate, “swarm” and “infestation” have strong negative connotations. Whether the connotation is negative or positive depends on various factors, such as how the audience feels about the word. For example, the connotation of “socialism” is negative for most Americans but obviously positive to socialists. Two words can have the same denotation, but very different connotations. For example, the slang “pig” and the word “police” have the same denotation, but different connotations. As would be expected, rhetoric uses the influence of connotation to affect how people feel.

Words that have strong connotations can be powerful rhetorical tools. As with any powerful tool, people will want to use it, even if they must steal it. Hence, connotation theft.  A word can derive its connotation from a variety of factors, such as historical context, and this is how the connotation is earned. If the word is then knowingly used for that connotation in a manner inconsistent with those factors, then the connotation has been stolen. This can also involve intentionally ignoring a word’s denotation to use its connotation.  A person can also unintentionally steal connotation by being unaware that their use is inconsistent with the factors, such as the historical context or denotation, that give the word the connotation in question.

Put into a template, connotation theft looks like this:

 

  1. Word W has connotation C because of P,Q and R.
  2. Word W is used in situation S because it has connotation C.
  3. But S is inconsistent with P, Q, R.

 

A good example is the word “fascism.” The word has a strong negative connotation primarily because of the Nazis and their numerous crimes. To a lesser extent, fascist Italy and Spain also contributed to this negative connotation. Because of the strong negative connotation of “fascism” calling something “fascism” or associating it with fascism can be an effective rhetorical tactic. Doing this can generate negative feelings towards the thing in question and these can influence what people think. Because of this, it is not surprising that the term is often used in American politics. George W. Bush’s administration was called fascist. Bush in turn used the term “Islamofascism” (which is distinct from Islamic fascism) to create negative feelings. Obama was called a fascist and, of course, Trump is being called a fascist now. Interestingly, the left is now being called fascist and some claim that the Nazis were leftists (mainly because of the “socialism” in their name). One might thus agree with a quote attributed to George Orwell, that “[T]he word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.'” This, it could be argued, arose from connotation theft: using the word for its negative connotation while ignoring its denotation and historical context served to split them apart.

Orwell’s remark shows a problem with connotation theft: it can rob a word of its denotation and historical context, making it just a rhetorical tool. Another problem is that connotation theft is a deceit because the emotional power of the word is exploited by intentionally misapplying it. For example, some on the right assert that the left and the socialists are fascists. Since most people feel fascism is bad, this misuse of the term can make people feel the left is bad. But the claim that fascism is leftist is a lie. First, while the National Socialists used the word “socialist”, they were neither socialists nor leftists. Fascism is a reaction to and an opponent of the left. Second, the negative connotation of “fascism” did not arise from any socialist style programs or policies the Nazis or other fascists might have implemented. It arises from the fascism of the fascists and the Nazi’s multitude of crimes. As such, applying the term “fascist” to the left is an attempt at connotation theft (or, at best an act of ignorance). This is most certainly not to claim that the left is without sin, just that fascism is a sin of the right rather than the left.

The main defense against being deceived by connotation theft is being aware of what gives a term its emotional power, such as its correct denotation and historical context. For example, when someone is accused of being fascist, one should consider if the word applies or, as Orwell said, it is just signifying something the speaker finds undesirable and hopes you will too.