Category: Gender

Over a decade ago Susan Patton, better known as the “Princeton Mom”, made the rounds promoting her book, Marry Smart: Advice for Finding THE ONE.  This book presented the 18th century view that a woman should focus primarily on quickly finding a husband as fertility diminishes with time.

Patton attracted more attention with her March 11, 2014 interview with the Daily Princetonian. In a letter to the editor written about a year before the interview, she wrote, “Please spare me your ‘blaming the victim’ outrage” and claimed that a woman who is drunk and provocatively dressed “must bear accountability for what may happen.” When asked why the woman is responsible in the case of rape or sexual assault, she had the following to say:

 

 The reason is, she is the one most likely to be harmed, so she is the one that needs to take control of the situation. She is that one that needs to take responsibility for herself and for her own safety, and simply not allow herself to come to a point where she is no longer capable of protecting her physical self. The analogy that I would give you is: If you cross the street without looking both ways and a car jumps the light or isn’t paying attention, and you get hit by a car — as a woman or as anybody — and you say, ‘Well I had a green light,’ well yes you did have a green light but that wasn’t enough. So in the same way, a woman who is going to say, ‘Well the man should have recognized that I was drunk and not pushed me beyond the level at which I was happy to engage with him,’ well, you didn’t look both ways. I mean yes, you’re right, a man should act better, men should be more respectful of women, but in the absence of that, and regardless of whether they are or are not, women must take care of themselves.

 

As might be imagined, this view generated some backlash from faculty at Princeton and other people. While this is all old news, the triumph of MAGA, the rise of misogynistic authoritarianism and the tradwife movement make reconsidering these claims relevant to today.

Patton’s first claim is that since the woman is most likely to be harmed, she needs to be responsible for her safety. There are at least two ways to view this claim. One is the reasonable claim a person has an obligation to herself to make sure she is not needlessly in danger. This view that self-preservation is rational and obligatory is ably defended by thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Another way to view the claim, which was taken by her critics, is that the burden falls completely on the woman. While this can be seen as a prudent view, it runs afoul of the notion that the wrongdoer should bear most of the responsibility for the harm inflicted (if not all of it).

Patton’s second claim is that a woman has an obligation to not allow herself to be incapable of self-defense. This might mean that a woman has an obligation to not become so drunk that she cannot defend herself from assault or rape. In defense of this claim, Patton offers her analogy: a woman who gets assaulted or raped when she is too drunk to defend herself is like someone who gets hit by a car because they did not look both ways before crossing the street—even though she had the right to cross.

The analogy has some merit—while drivers are obligated to take care not to hit people, a person should take care to avoid being hit and to do otherwise is foolish. As an experienced runner, I understand the value of defensive crossing and respond with horror when I see people starring at their phones as they blindly step into the crosswalk.

However, there is a distinction between what is prudent and what is morally obligatory. While a woman should not impair herself when she believes she will be at risk of assault or rape, this is different from her having a moral obligation to herself to avoid being vulnerable. There is also a third matter, namely who is responsible when a drunk woman is raped or assaulted.

About the second matter, this is a question of whether there is a moral obligation for self-defense. It is generally accepted that people have a moral right to self-defense and for the sake of the discussion that will be assumed (see John Locke for an argument). This right gives a person the liberty to protect herself. If it is only a liberty, then the person has the right to not act in self-defense and thus increase their risk of being a victim. However, if there is an obligation for self-defense, then failing to act on this would be a moral failing. challenge is to show that there is such an obligation.

On the face of it, it would seem self-defense is a liberty rather than an obligation. However, some consideration suggests this is not as obvious as it might seem.  In the Leviathan, Hobbes presents what the Law of Nature (lex naturalis): “a precept or general rule, found by reason, that forbids a man to do what is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving it and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.” Hobbes goes on to note that “right consists in liberty to do or to forbear” and “law determines and binds.” If Hobbes is correct, then people would have both a right to and an obligation for self-defense.

John Locke and Thomas Aquinas also contend that life is to be preserved and if they are right, then this would impose an obligation of self-defense. Of course, this notion could be countered by contending that all it requires is for a person to seek protection from possible threats and doing so could involve relying on the protection or restraint of others rather than oneself. However, there are arguments against this.

I will start with a practical argument. While the modern Western state projects its coercive force and spying eyes into society, the state’s agents cannot (yet) observe all that occurs nor can they always be close at hand in times of danger. This assumes, of course, that agents of the state want to protect citizens from harm.

As such, relying solely on the state would put a person at risk—after all, they would often be helpless in the face of danger. If a person relies on other individuals, then unless she is always guarded, then she also faces the risk of being a helpless victim. Relying on the state or others would, at the very least, seem imprudent.

This argument can be used as the basis for a moral argument. If a person is morally obligated to preserve life (including their own) and others cannot be reliably depended on, then they would have an obligation of self-defense and this would include not intentionally making themselves vulnerable to known threats. These threats would include those presented by bad men. As such, a woman would have a moral obligation to avoid being vulnerable. This seems reasonable.

The third matter is the question of moral responsibility when a drunk woman is assaulted or raped by a man who takes advantage of her vulnerability.  In the abstract, it could be argued that the woman does bear some responsibility—if a woman has an obligation to defend herself, she would have failed in her obligation by becoming vulnerable. As with the road analogy, someone who crosses the road without looking and gets hit has failed in a duty to herself. However, even if this point is granted, there is still the matter of who bears most of the moral responsibility.

On the face of it, it seems evident that the man who assaulted or raped the woman bears the overwhelming moral responsibility. After all, even if the woman should have avoided being vulnerable, the man has a far greater moral obligation to not harm her. There is also the matter of reasonable expectations. To be specific, while a person is obligated to protect herself, this does not obligate her to be hyper-vigilant against all possible dangers. If a woman does not buy body armor to wear on campus (after all, there are campus shooting) and she is shot by a gunman, it would be absurd to blame her for her injury or death. The blame rests on the shooter—his obligation to not shoot her outweighs the extent of her obligation to be prepared.

In the case of rape and sexual assault, while a woman should be prudent for the sake of self-protection, the overwhelming moral responsibility is on the man. That the woman makes herself vulnerable to rape or assault no more lessens the rapist’s responsibility than the fact that the woman was not wearing body armor lessens the responsibility of the shooter. The principle here is that vulnerability does not mitigate moral responsibility. This is intuitively plausible: just because a victimizer has an easier time with his victim, it hardly makes his misdeeds less bad.

Patton did acknowledge that men should act better, but she insisted that a woman must take care of herself. This could be seen as sensible advice: a woman should not count on the goodwill of others but be on guard against reasonably foreseeable harm. This advice is, of course, consistent with the view that the rapist is the one truly responsible for the rape.

Because of my work on metaphysical free will, it is hardly a shock that I am interested in whether sexual orientation is a choice. One problem with this issue is it seems impossible to prove (or disprove) the existence of free will in this, or any, context. As Kant argued, free will seems to lie beyond the reach of our knowledge. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that a person’s sexual orientation is a matter of choice. But this is nothing special: the same can be said about the person’s political party, religion, hobbies and so on.

Laying aside metaphysical speculation, it can be assumed (or pretended) that people do have a choice in some matters. Given this assumption, the question would seem to be whether sexual orientation is in the category of things that can be reasonably assumed to be matters of choice.

On the face of it, sexual orientation is within the domain of what a person finds sexually appealing and attractive. This falls within a larger set of what a person finds appealing and attractive in general.

Thanks to science, it seems reasonable to believe that some of what people find appealing and attractive has a foundation in our neural hardwiring rather than in choice. For example, humans find symmetrical faces more attractive than non-symmetrical faces and this does not seem to be a preference we choose. Folks who like the theory of evolution often claim that this preference exists because those with symmetrical faces are often healthier and hence better “choices” for reproductive activities.  

Food preferences also involve some hard wiring: humans like salty, fatty and sweet foods and the usual explanation also ties into evolution. For example, sweet foods are high calorie foods but are rare in nature, hence our ancestors who really liked sweets did better at surviving than those who did not really like sweets. Or some such story of survival of the sweetest.

Assuming such hardwired preferences, it makes sense that sexual preferences also involve at least some hardwiring. So, for example, a person might be hardwired to prefer light hair over dark hair.  Then again, the preference might be based on experience—the person might have had positive experiences with those with light hair and thus was conditioned to have that preference. The challenge is, of course, to sort out the causal role of hard wiring from the causal role of experience (including socialization). What is left over might be what could be described as choice.

In the case of sexual orientation, it seems reasonable to have some doubts about experience being the primary factor. After all, homosexual behavior has often been condemned, discouraged and punished. As such, it seems less likely that people would be socialized into being homosexual—especially in places where being homosexual is punishable by death. However, this is not impossible—perhaps people could be somehow socialized into being gay by all the social efforts to make them be straight.

Hardwiring for sexual orientation does seem plausible. This is mainly because there seems to be a lack of evidence that homosexuality is chosen. Assuming that the options are choice, nature or nurture, then eliminating choice and nurture would leave nature. But, of course, this could be a false trilemma as there might be other options.

It can be objected that people do choose homosexual behavior and thus being homosexual is a choice. While this does have some appeal, it is important to distinguish between a person’s orientation and what the person chooses to do. A person might be heterosexual and choose to engage in homosexual activity for practical reasons or curiosity. A homosexual might act like a heterosexual to avoid being killed. However, these choices would not change their orientation. As such, my view is that while behavior can be chosen, orientation is probably not.

When attacking DEI efforts, folks on the right usually make vague remarks about merit. While the right seems to have abandoned philosophy, let us imagine a good faith argument against DEI efforts based on an appeal to merit.

While the right is unclear what they mean by “merit”, the common usage is that a person receives something, such as a position, based on earning it through being worthy. For example, when people talk about meritocracy, they usually speak of people earning positions, jobs, scholarships or promotions based on their skills, abilities and effort. In contrast, receiving such things because of factors such as wealth, social class, or family connections would not be the result of merit. There are obvious philosophical questions about what factors should count as merit in terms of determining what people earn and what they merely receive. For example, a person who gets into college because of their academic ability might seem to have earned it by merit. But what if they have that ability because of the genetic lottery and years of expensive tutoring and schooling paid for by wealth inherited by their parents? They did not earn their genes, tutoring, and schooling and this would, it seems to diminish claims of merit. But let us return to constructing a merit argument against DEI efforts. I will then use that merit argument against inheritance.

To build a merit argument against DEI efforts, one must begin with the assumption that DEI is either not needed or unfair. For it not to be needed, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI do not face significant discrimination or unfair obstacles and have equal opportunity to succeed on their merits. For it to be unfair, it must be assumed that those who benefit from DEI gain an unfair, unmerited advantage over others.

While those who oppose DEI often seem to do so from racism, sexism and similar bigotry, one could take the view that women and minorities are just as capable as white men (and have equal opportunities) but that DEI efforts provide its beneficiaries unfair advantages over equally qualified white men. If it is also assumed that things such as jobs and scholarships should be earned by merit, then it would follow that DEI is bad. Obviously, I do not think that most folks on the right are advancing good faith arguments against DEI but let us take the merit argument seriously and hold them to their professed view that laws should be crafted to ensure that success is merit based and that unfair advantages are eliminated. This entails that the inheritance laws should be changed to eliminate the unfair, unearned advantages conferred by inherited wealth. If one is exceptionally devoted to merit, one could even push for laws aimed at creating equality of opportunity for everyone—but I will just focus on inheritance.

Inherited wealth, by definition, is unearned and thus anything it is used to acquire would be unmerited to the degree the wealth purchased it. Such wealth can confer significant advantages in terms of such things as influence, opportunities and resources. As a minor example, a family with sufficient inherited wealth can own property in the best school district, provide tutoring and other support for their children, enroll them in special programs and so on. If one is a stickler about merit, children obviously do not earn or merit such advantages even if their parents did not inherit their wealth and to the degree the children gain from them, they would not be earning whatever they receive from them. Ironically, the anti-DEI President Trump received millions from his father, and this provided him with a massive, unearned advantage over everyone who choose their parents less wisely. Family members can also inherit businesses and gain unearned ownership and positions in those businesses. And so on, for all that can be inherited and can yield unfair advantages. None of these are earned or merit based. So, those who reject DEI based on the merit argument must also oppose inheritance on the same basis. If laws should be passed to forbid DEI to ensure that success is based on merit, then laws should also be passed to eliminate or severely restrict inheritance to ensure that success is based on merit.

It might be objected that inherited wealth is not like DEI efforts, but the challenge is to show how they different in relevant ways. One could argue that there is an obvious difference: DEI is linked to such factors as gender, ethnicity and veteran status, whereas inheritance is usually just a matter of birth. But objections of this sort would be based on the idea that merit should apply to DEI factors but not otherwise, which would not be a merit-based argument. If merit is what matters and the law must ensure this, then merit is what matters and the law must ensure this.

While few, if any, on the right would accept the above reasoning and consistency arguments obviously have no effect on the right (or most people), we should always remember that their merit arguments against DEI are made in bad faith unless they also argue against inheritance. When they speak of merit, they should be asked about inheritance and other unfair advantages they favor.

As a follow up to the war on CRT (Critical Race Theory) and wokeness, the right has waged a largely successful war on DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusivity). While I take a favorable view of DEI, I recognize that DEI efforts sometimes suffered from corruption and inefficiency. I also acknowledge (and criticize) that some of it was purely performative. This is to say that the efforts of DEI were just like other human efforts, which gives us no special reason to criticize it in particular for these failings. But these are flaws that should be addressed, whether they be in DEI programs or the operations of the Pentagon. Despite these flaws, there are  good reasons in favor of DEI. And, of course, arguments against DEI.

One justification for DEI efforts is that they are supposed to offset past unfairness, discrimination, and injustice. That is, they are warranted on the moral grounds that they address past wrongs. A standard concern about this justification is that it can be seen as addressing past discrimination by engaging in present discrimination. As an illustrating anecdote, when I was applying for a job during my last year of grad school, I and my fellow white male philosophers were worried that our chances of getting a job would be lower because schools appeared to be addressing past discrimination in hiring by what seemed might be present discrimination in hiring. That is, that we white males of the (then) present would be sacrificed to atone for the sins of the white males of the past. While it is tempting to dismiss such concerns, there is a reasonable moral concern about fairness. I recall that there were serious suggestions that the old white guys should step down to open more jobs for women and minorities. After all, to the degree they “earned” their jobs because of past discrimination and exclusion, would it not be fair that they be the ones to pay the price demanded by justice? This approach and its consequences do raise moral concerns about individual justice and justice for groups. Being philosophers, we did consider that even if we, as individuals, were treated unfairly during the hiring process, this might still be morally justified. Those of us inclined to difficult self-reflection also considered that we might have been under the influence of racism and sexism when thinking that we might be treated unfairly simply in virtue of being white men. Because of my own experience, I can understand how people might feel about DEI. My considered view is that while there can be cases where white men are treated unfairly, concerns about addressing past wrongdoing are morally relevant on utilitarian grounds. Also, virtue theory supports this: it is better to err on the side of addressing a greater injustice rather than refusing to do so out of an exaggerated fear of the possibility of a lesser injustice.

A second reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can address existing unfairness and discrimination. For example, funding programs for minority owned businesses can be seen as helping to offset the discrimination against minorities in the realm of finance. As another example, a scholarship for female students in the sciences can be seen as offsetting the bias against women in the sciences.

Such efforts can, of course, be interpreted as unfair. For example, a white business owner might argue that funding only available to minorities is unfair to her. As another example, a male student could contend that it is unfair that he cannot get the scholarship that a woman can. While such arguments can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith by people who know that, for example, white business owners are more likely to get loans than minority business owners (even when they are financially equal)—so white business owners already have an unfair advantage. Good faith reasoning requires that we consider the full context and not just take each alleged unfairness in ahistorical isolation. For example, in isolation it might seem unfair if funding or a scholarship were not available to everyone. But if one group already enjoys an unfair advantage, attempting to offset that helps restore fairness. Unfortunately, many unfair advantages are hidden and exposing them often requires good faith analysis and interpretation. To illustrate, banks obviously do not advertise special white-only rates for home loans, but these exist in practice. As such, explicit efforts to provide fair loans to minority home buyers can appear unfair, since they explicitly exclude while the exclusions in practice are usually concealed.

A third reason in favor of DEI efforts is that they can aim at allowing fair consideration of and opportunities for people who would otherwise be excluded. Going back to my example of academic hiring, academic philosophy was (and is) a mostly white male field and it took intentional effort for highly qualified women and minorities to even be considered for professorships. In the case of competitions for such things as jobs or scholarships, this approach increases fairness by preventing people from being excluded simply because of their race, gender, age, etc.

The usual criticism of this is that DEI efforts are not really aimed at providing equal consideration and fairness, but are intended to provide an unearned advantage to some people based on their identity. While such criticisms can be made in good faith, they are often made in bad faith based on racism and sexism. I will discuss this in my next essay in this series as I look at how the American right works to erase and whitewash history as part of its attack on DEI efforts.

Back in 2015 Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, was the focus of national media because of her refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. In 2025 she appeared in the national news again because of her petition to revisit the same-sex ruling. The Supreme Court denied her petition. I wrote about Davis in 2015 and it seems reasonable to revisit the timeless issue of ad hominem attacks.

As should be expected, opponents of same-sex marriage focused on the claim that Davis’ religious liberty was being violated. As should also be expected, her critics sought and found evidence of what seemed to be her hypocrisy: Davis has been divorced three times and is on her fourth marriage. Some bloggers, eager to attack her, claimed that she was guilty of adultery. Such attacks can be relevant to certain issues, but they are also irrelevant for other issues. It is worth sorting between the relevant and the irrelevant.

If the issue at hand is whether Davis was consistent in her professed religious values, then her actions would be relevant. After all, if a person claims to have a set of values and acts in ways that violate those values, then this provides grounds for accusations of hypocrisy or even a lack of belief in the professed values. That said, there can be many reasons why a person acts in violation of her professed values. One obvious reason is moral weakness—most people, me included, fail to live up to their principles due to our flaws and frailties. As none of us is without sin, we should not be hasty in judging the failings of others.  However, it is reasonable to consider a person’s actions when assessing whether she is acting in a manner consistent with her professed values.

If Davis was, in fact, operating on the principle that marriage licenses should not be issued to people who have violated the rules of God (presumably as presented in the bible), then she would seem to have been required to accept that she should not have been issued a marriage license (after all, there is a wealth of scriptural condemnation of adultery and divorce). If she accepted that she should have been issued her license despite her violations of religious rules, then consistency would seem to require that the same treatment be afforded to everyone—including same-sex couples. After all, adultery makes God’s top ten list while homosexuality seems to be only mentioned in a single line (and one that also marks shellfish as an abomination). So, if adulterers can get licenses, it would be difficult to justify denying same-sex couples marriage licenses on the grounds of a Christian faith.

If the issue at hand is whether Davis was right in her professed view and her past refusal to grant licenses to same-sex couples, then references to her divorce and alleged adultery are logically irrelevant. If a person claimed that Davis was wrong in her view or acted wrongly in denying licenses because she has been divorced or has (allegedly) committed adultery, then this would be a personal attack ad hominem. A personal attack is committed when a person substitutes abusive remarks for evidence when attacking another person’s claim or claims. This line of “reasoning” is fallacious because the attack is directed at the person making the claim and not the claim itself. The truth value of a claim is independent of the person making the claim. After all, no matter how repugnant an individual might be, they can still make true claims.

If a critic of Davis asserts that her claim about same-sex marriage was in error because of her own alleged hypocrisy, then the critic would commit an ad hominem tu quoque.  This fallacy is committed when it is concluded that a person’s claim is false because 1) it is inconsistent with something else a person has said or 2) what a person says is inconsistent with her actions. The fact that a person makes inconsistent claims does not make any particular claim she makes false (although of any pair of inconsistent claims only one can be true—but both can be false). Also, the fact that a person’s claims are not consistent with her actions might indicate that the person is a hypocrite, but this does not prove her claims are false. As such, Davis’ behavior had no bearing on the truth of her claims or the rightness of her decision to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

Dan Savage and others  made the claim that Davis was motivated by her desire to profit from the fame she garnered from her actions. Savage asserts that “But no one is stating the obvious: this isn’t about Kim Davis standing up for her supposed principles—proof of that in a moment—it’s about Kim Davis cashing in.” Given, as Savage notes, the monetary windfall received by the pizza parlor owners who refused to cater a same-sex wedding, this has some plausibility.

If the issue at hand is Davis’ sincerity and the morality of her motivations, then whether or not she is motivated by hopes of profit or sincere belief does matter. If she is opposing same-sex marriage based on her informed conscience or, at the least, on a sincerely held principle, then that is a different matter than being motivated by a desire for fame and profit. A person motivated by principle to take a moral stand is at least attempting to act rightly—whether her principle is actually good or not. Claiming to be acting from principle while being motivated by fame and fortune would be to engage in deceit.

However, if the issue were whether Davis was right about her claim regarding same-sex marriage, then her motivations would not be relevant. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to yet another ad hominem, the circumstantial ad hominem. This is a fallacy in which one attempts to attack a claim by asserting that the person making the claim is making it simply out of self-interest. In some cases, this fallacy involves substituting an attack on a person’s circumstances (such as the person’s religion, political affiliation, ethnic background, etc.). This ad hominem is a fallacy because a person’s interests and circumstances have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the claim being made. While a person’s interests will provide them with motives to support certain claims, the claims stand or fall on their own. It is also the case that a person’s circumstances (religion, political affiliation, etc.) do not affect the truth or falsity of the claim. This is made clear by the following example: “Bill claims that 1+1 =2. But he is a Christian, so his claim is false.” Or, if someone claimed that Dan Savage was wrong simply because of his beliefs.

Thus, Davis’ behavior, beliefs, and motivations were relevant to certain issues. However, they are not relevant to the truth (or falsity) of her claims regarding same-sex marriage.

In the previous essay I discussed gender nominalism, the idea that gender is not a feature of reality, but a social (or individual) construct. As such, a person falling within a gender class is a matter of naming rather than a matter of having objective features. In this essay I will not argue for (or against) gender nominalism. Rather, I will be discussing gender nominalism within the context of competition.

Being a runner, I will start with competitive sports. As anyone who has run competitively knows, males and females usually compete within their own sexes. So, for example, a typical road race will often have awards for the top males and for the top females. While individual males and females vary greatly in their abilities, males have a general physical advantage over females when it comes to running: the best male runner is better than the best female runner and average male runners are also better than average female runners.  But good female runners are better than average male runners and the best female runners are better than good male runners.

Given that males generally have an advantage over females in running (and many other physical sports), it could be advantageous for a male runner if the division was based on gender and people could simply declare their genders. That is, a male could declare himself a woman and thus be more likely to do better relative to the competition. While there are those who do accept that people have the right to declare their gender and that others are obliged to accept this, it seems clear that this would not be morally acceptable in competitive sports.

The ethics based purpose of dividing athletes by sex is to allow for a fairer completion. This same principle, that of fairer competition, is also used to justify age groups. As older runner knows, few things slow you down like dragging years.  Because of this, a runner could, in general, gain an advantage by making a declaration of age identity (typically older). Perhaps the person could claim that he has always been old on the inside and that to refuse to accept his age identification would be oppression. However, this would be absurd: declaring an age does not change the person’s ability to compete and would thus grant an unfair advantage. Likewise, allowing a male to compete as a woman (or girl) in virtue of merely declared gender identification would be unfair. A declaration by itself would not, obviously, change the person’s anatomy and physiology.

There are, however, cases that are more complicated. These include cases in which a person has undergone a change in anatomy. While these cases are important, they go beyond the intended scope of this essay, which is gender nominalism.

Some competitions do not divide the competitors by sex. These are typically those where the statistical physical differences between males and females do not impact the outcome. Some examples include debate, chess, spelling bees and NASCAR. In these cases, males and females compete equally and hence the principle of fairness allows for the lack of sex divisions. Some of these competitions do have other divisions. For example, spelling bees do not normally pit elementary school students against high school students. In such competitions, gender identification would be irrelevant. As such, competitors should be free to gender identify as they wish within the context of such competitions.

Interestingly, there are competitions where there appear to be no sex-based advantages (in terms of physical abilities), yet there are gender divisions. There are competitions in literature, music, and acting that are divided by gender (and some are open only to one gender). There are also scholarships, fellowships and other academic awards that are open only to one gender.

Since being a biological male would seem to yield no advantage in such cases, the principle of fairness would not seem to apply. For example, the fact that males are generally larger and stronger would yield no advantage when it came to writing a novel, acting in a play, or playing a guitar. As such, if people should be able to set their own gender identity, they should be able to do so for such competitions, thus enabling them to compete where they wish.

It could be argued that the principle of fairness would still apply, that people born as males would still have an advantage even if they elected to identify as women for the competition. This advantage, it might be claimed, would be based in the socially constructed advantages that males possess. Naturally, it would need to be shown that a male that gender identifies as a woman for such competitions, such as getting a woman’s only scholarship, would still retain the alleged male advantage.

It could also be argued that these divisions are not based on a principle of fairness about advantages or disadvantages. Rather, the divisions are to give more people a chance of winning. This could be justified on the same grounds that justify having many categories. For example, there are awards for being the best actor in a supporting role, which exists to create another chance for an actor to win something. If a person could just gender declare and be eligible, then that would create an “imbalance”, much as allowing non-supporting actors to declare themselves supporting actors to get a shot at that award would be unfair.

Of course, this seems to assume that there is a justified distinction between the genders that would ground the claims of unfairness. That is, it would be as wrong for a male to win best actress as it would be for a female screenwriter who never acted to win best actress for her screenplay.  Or that it would be as bad for a male to get a scholarship intended for a woman as it would be for a football player who cannot do math to get a math scholarship. This approach, which would involve rejecting one form of gender nominalism (the version in which the individual gets to declare gender) is an option. This would not, however, require accepting that gender is not a social construct. One could still be a gender nominalist of the sort that believes that gender classification is both a matter of individual declaration and acceptance by the “relevant community.” As such, the relevant communities could police their competitions. For example, those who dole out scholarships for woman can define what it is to be a woman for the purpose of their scholarships, to prevent non-woman from getting them. This would, of course, seem to justify similar gender policing by society, which leads to some interesting problems about who gets to define gender identity. The usual answer people give is, of course, themselves.

 

 

After losing the battle over same-sex marriage, some on the right selected trans rights as their new battleground. A key front in this battle is that of sports, with the arguments centering around professed concerns about fairness. There is also a lot of implied metaphysics going on behind the scenes, so this essay will examine gender nominalism and competition. This will, however, require some metaphysical groundwork.

A classic philosophical problem is the problem of universals. Put roughly, the problem is determining in virtue of what (if anything) a particular a is of the type F. To use a concrete example, the question would be “in virtue of what is Morris a cat?” Philosophers often split into two camps when answering this question. The nominalists, shockingly enough, embrace nominalism. This is the view that what makes a particular a an F is that we name it an F. For example, what makes Morris a cat is that we call (or name) him a cat.

The other camp, the realists, take the view that there is a metaphysical reality underlying a being of the type F. Put another way, it is not just a matter of naming or calling something an F that makes it an F. In terms of what makes a of the type F, different realist philosophers give different answers. Plato famously claimed that it is the Form of F that makes individual F things F. For example, it is the Form of Beauty that makes all the beautiful things beautiful. And, presumably, the Form of ugly that makes the ugly things ugly. Others, such as myself, accept tropes (not to be confused with the tropes of film and literature) that serve a similar function.

While realists believe in the reality of some categories, they usually think some categories are not grounded in features of objective reality. As such, most realists agree that nominalists are right about some categories. To use an easy example, being a Democrat (or Republican) is not grounded in metaphysics, but is a social construct. A political party is made up by people and membership is a matter of social convention rather than metaphysical reality. There is presumably no Form of Democrat or Republican.

When it comes to sorting out sex and gender, things are complicated and involves at least four factors.  One is anatomy, which might (or might not) correspond to the second, which is genetic makeup (XX, XY, XYY, etc.). The third factor is the person’s own claimed gender identity which might (or might not) correspond to the fourth, which is the gender identity assigned by other people.

While anatomy and physiology are adjustable (via chemicals or surgery), they are objective features of reality. While a person can choose to alter their anatomy, merely changing how one designates one’s sex does not change the physical features. While a complete genetic conversion (XX to XY or vice versa) is (probably) not yet possible, it is just a matter of time before that can be done. However, even if genetics could be changed, a person’s genetic makeup is still an objective feature of reality and a person cannot change their genes merely by claiming a change in designation. But if genes define a person’s sex, then a genetic change would objectively change their sex.

Gender is, perhaps, another matter. Like most people, I often use the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably when speaking informally. Obviously, if gender is taken as the same as sex, then gender would seem to be an objective feature of reality. But if  gender and sex are taken as the same, then we would need a new term to take the place of “gender.”

However, gender has been largely or even entirely split from anatomy or genetics, at least by experts in the relevant fields. One version of this view can be called “gender nominalism.” On this view, gender is not an objective feature of reality, like anatomy, but a matter of naming, like being a Republican or Democrat. While some politicians have decreed that there are two genders, the fact that they think they need to do this just proves that they understand gender is a social construct. After all, politicians do not feel the need to decree that water is hydrogen and oxygen or that that triangles have three sides.

Some thinkers have cast gender as being constructed by society, while others contend that individuals have lesser or greater power to construct their own gender identities. People can place whatever gender label they wish upon themselves, but there is still the question of the role of others in that gender identity. The question is, then, to what degree can individuals construct their own gender identities? There is also the moral question about whether others should (morally) accept such gender self-identification. These matters are part of the broader challenge of identity in terms of who defines one’s identity (and what aspects) and to what degree are people morally obligated to accept these assignments (or declarations of identity).

My own view is to go with the obvious: people are free to self-declare whatever gender they wish, just as they are free to make any other claim of identity that is a social construct (which is a polite term for “made up”). So, a person could declare that he is a straight, Republican, Rotarian, fundamentalist, Christian, and a man. Another person could declare that she is a lesbian, Republican, Jewish woman, who belongs to the Elks. And so on. But, of course, there is the matter of getting others to recognize that identity. For example, if a person identifies as a Republican, yet believes in climate change, argues for abortion rights, endorses same-sex marriage, supports trans rights, favors tax increases, supports education spending, endorse the minimum wage, and is pro-environment, then other Republicans could rightly question the person’s Republican identity and claim that that person is a RINO (Republican in Name Only). As another example, a biological male could declare identity as a woman, yet still dress like a man, act like a man, date women, and exhibit no behavior that is associated with being a woman. In this case, other women might accuse her of being a WINO (Woman in Name Only).

In cases in which self-identification has no meaningful consequences for other people, it makes sense for people to freely self-identify. In such cases, claiming to be F makes the person F, and what other people believe should have no impact on that person being F. That said, people might still dispute a person’s claim. For example, if someone self-identifies as a Trekkie, yet knows little about Star Trek, others might point out that this self-identification is in error. However, since this has no meaningful consequences, the person has every right to insist on being a Trekkie, though doing so might suggest that he is about as smart as a tribble.

In cases in which self-identification does have meaningful consequences for others, then there would seem to be moral grounds (based on the principle of harm) to allow restrictions on such self-identification. For example, if a relatively fast male runner wanted to self-identify as a woman simply by claiming this identity so “she” could qualify for the Olympics, then it would be reasonable to prevent that from happening. After all, “she” would bump a qualified woman off the team, which would be wrong. Because of the potential for such harm, it would be absurd to accept that everyone is obligated to automatically accept the self-identification of others.

The flip side of this is that others should not have an automatic right to deny the self-identification of others. As a general rule, the principle of harm would apply here as well: others  have the right to impose in cases in which there is actual harm, and the person would have the right to refuse the forced identity of others when doing so would inflict wrongful harm. The practical challenge is, clearly enough, working out the ethics of specific cases.

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In my previous essay I set the stage for discussing the concern about people switching competition categories to gain something. It is to this matter that I now turn.

The Sickle Cell 5K in Tallahassee is known for its excellent master’s trophy for the overall male and female masters runners. It has consistently been bigger and better than the second and third overall awards. One year a master’s runner was third overall but wanted the male masters’ award instead. This created a problem. While there was no rule about this, there are established running norms: overall places take precedence over the masters category and the masters category takes precedence over age group placing.  So, a 40+ year old runner who placed first to third would get the corresponding overall award. The first 40+ runner outside the top three would get the masters award and the next runner in their age group would win that age group. As would be expected, some people got mad about this runner’s efforts to get the masters award since he was breaking the norms and traditions to get a better award.

His argument, which was not unreasonable, was that he was the first masters runner and hence earned that award. This meant that the 4th place runner would get third overall. This might sound odd, but (as noted above) the running norms already allow for a person who finishes second in their age group to place first if the person who would win that age group wins an overall or masters award (most races have a no-double-dip rule). While his request did break the norms, he was  in the masters category. One might say that he elected to identify as a masters runner for the purpose of the award. He got the award when the original masters winner did everyone a favor by giving it to him, allowing the awards to continue. But this episode is still spoken of today and switching categories to get a better award is usually seen as questionable. This episode can be used as an analogy.

Suppose that transgender athletes are like the masters athlete: they belong in their chosen category but they are changing from one category to another in order to get a better award (or win). The masters runner could have accepted the third-place award, a transgender runner who identifies as female could stick to competing as male. But by switching categories, the athletes could be seen as gaining an advantage and thus they have an incentive to do so. They also are both picking a category they really belong in, so they are not engaged in a cheat or deceit. But if their motive is to switch for a gain and and in doing so they do harm another athlete, then this would seem to be wrong. The masters runner took the better award from another runner and a transgender athlete who changes categories to win takes away a win from another female athlete. This can be used to ground a moral argument against allowing athletes to change categories to win. That said, there is an easy counter.

Imagine a runner attends a Division 1 school and finds that they are good enough for the division but not good enough to regularly win. They switch to a Division 2 school so they can win regularly. They have changed their category to improve their gains and have “harmed” other runners. They might displace a runner from the team and will take victories that would have gone to other athletes had they not changed their category. While this approach to sports might not seem morally ideal, the runner would not be acting wrongly. They would be Division 2 even if they could have stuck with Division 1. Likewise, for an athlete who switches their gender category by transitioning: one might take issue with someone doing this for an advantage, but this is morally acceptable. It must be noted that people do not transition just to get an advantage. Some readers probably doubt that an athlete can legitimately switch categories, so I now turn to this matter.

Let us go back to the masters award incident but change it slightly. Imagine that the third-place runner is 39 years and 10 months old but decides to identify as a masters runner to get the award. In this case, the issue is easily resolved: age is an objective matter, and they are not a masters runner. Hence, they do not get the award. Likewise, athletes who claim to be female but are not have no right to switch categories. While this might seem to settle the matter, there are at least two replies.

One reply is to go back to the masters case. Imagine that the runner is 39 years old based on his birthday, but he is a devote Catholic who sincerely believes that life begins at conception and sets his age accordingly at over 40. By his religious based standard of age, he is a masters runner. While the official age of runner for racing is based on their birthdate and not their moment of conception, the runner could make an argument based on freedom of religion: he is being discriminated against by the failure of the race officials to recognize that he is at least 40 because his life began at conception under his faith. Likewise, a runner who self-identifies as a female could argue that she is being discriminated against when she is not allowed to select her category based on her beliefs about what it is to be female. Both runners could agree that there is a fact of the matter about being a masters runner or a female runner, but they disagree with the standards being imposed upon them by those who they see as discriminating against them. As such, the debate becomes one of defining category membership.

In the case of age, the dispute would seem to be easy to settle: to avoid charges of attacking religious freedom, the rules about age could be put neutrally to specify that the time from birth is used to determine the competition age of a runner. The standard applies to everyone and intuitively seems fair. In the case of gender, the same approach should be taken: a fair set of standards to categorize people is needed. But gender is much more complicated than age.

If gender were only of concern in sports, then the matter would be easier to address. But gender impacts every aspect of a person’s life and is, of course, a key battleground in the culture wars. As such, even if one makes a good faith effort to develop gender standards for sports categories, this will be a daunting task.  Obviously,  many people think they have the right answer and think they could easily solve the problem by imposing their own views on everyone else.

There are, of course, some easy and obvious sufficient conditions for being admitted into the female category: people with XX chromosomes and female anatomy and physiology get an automatic admission (if they wish).  Beyond that, the debates begin.  Since this matter is complicated and not my area of expertise, I freely admit that I do not have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. I do not even have a well-considered set of general principles.

One obvious principle is that it would be morally wrong for a male athlete to lie about his identify to gain a competitive advantage. The moral problem is, of course, the intent to deceive to gain an advantage.

This is analogous to my view that it is wrong for person to lie about their religious views to gain something, such as a person who wants to use a religious excuse to get away with discrimination or to avoid paying taxes. My moral assessment would, of course, adjust in cases of sincere belief, even if the person’s belief turns out to be untrue. As with the religion case, there is the practical problem of sorting out when people are lying, though in the United States we generally do not put professed religious beliefs to a test.

While there is no crisis in sports involving male athletes switching categories in large numbers, allowing people to switch categories merely by saying they identify in that category does provide an opportunity for the unprincipled to exploit, just as allowing people to claim special treatment simply for asserting they have religious beliefs allows opportunities for the unprincipled. The moral and practical challenge is sorting out what tests should be used to protect against such unprincipled exploitation while avoiding discriminating against people. We do not make people prove that their religious beliefs are true before allowing them to gain the benefits of professing belief and we need to be consistent when it comes to professed gender identity. One approach, which is what we generally do for religion, is to take people at their word unless there is adequate evidence of an intent to deceive. For example, a male athlete who posted “LOL identifying as a girl just to win the 5K today, but fellas stay away I ain’t gay! After I win, I will be a boy again.” would be intending to deceive and should, one would infer, not be allowed to compete in the 5K as a female.  Likewise, if someone bringing a freedom of religion lawsuit so they can discriminate posted “LOL pretending to believe in God so I can hate on the gays!”, then they should probably not win that lawsuit. But in other cases, we should accept their profession as sincere. I do admit this does not settle the matter.

Upon taking office, Joe Biden signed an executive order requiring that schools receiving federal funding allow people who self-identify as females onto female sport’s teams. Pushback against it has ranged from thoughtful considerations of fairness to misogyny masquerading as morality. Exploiting the manufactured panic over transgender people, Trump signed an executive order banning transgender people from competing in women’s sports. While the narrative is that the anti-trans athlete folks are motivated by fairness, this is easily disproved by their lack of concern about fair treatment of women in sports in other areas, such as funding and facilities.

In addition to being complicated on its own, the fairness of transgender women competing with other women is linked to other complicated matters, such as general concerns about fairness in society and issues of gender identity. People arguing in good faith can make arguments in one area without realizing the implications of these arguments in other areas. To illustrate, consider the fictional character of Polly. Polly is a national level high school runner who holds to a principle of fairness. Polly’s brother, Paul, is faster than Polly but not a national level male runner. He jokingly suggests putting on a dress and beating Polly, which worries her. If a person could just self-identify as a female, Paul could do so and suddenly be a national level female high school runner. In a panic, Polly thinks up a nightmare scenario: the top male runners compete as boys, switch their gender identities, and win again as girls! Polly and her sister runners would be out of the competition, which would be unfair. In good faith, Polly can make a good moral argument against allowing this based on fairness. But her seemingly reasonable argument might justifying harming people in the broader context of fairness in society, something Polly would not want. As such, we should be careful to consider the implications of arguments about fairness in sports have in other areas.

People can also argue in bad faith, presenting an appealing fairness argument about sports while not caring about fairness. They might be using the sport argument as a Trojan horse to lure people into their ideological agenda or they might want to weaponize a seemingly reasonable argument. This is not to say that arguing in bad faith entails that a person must be making false claims or fallacious arguments. After all, one can use truth and good logic in bad faith. But we should be on guard against bad faith arguments. I will endeavor to follow my own advice and make good faith arguments while considering their implications.

From the standpoint of fairness, there are reasonable moral grounds to be concerned about allowing people to self-identify their category for competition. To focus the discussion, I will use my own sport of running and the specific context of road races—but the general points apply across all sports.

Road races have well-established categories that are based on a conception of fair competition. Almost all races have gender categories (male or female). Most races have age groups and some also include the master category (40+) and sometimes the grand master category (50+). A few races also add a weight category (Clydesdale or Athena). In addition to categories created for fairness, races sometimes have categories for other reasons. For example, the Bowlegs 5K in Tallahassee raises money for a college scholarship and has a special educator category. Since educators as a class have neither advantages nor disadvantages relative to other runners, this category is not based on fairness.

In most cases, these categories serve their intended purpose as they make competition fairer by sorting people into groups based on qualities that impact performance. In some cases, these categories can have the unintended effect of allowing a person in a generally advantaged category win in their category while losing to a runner in a disadvantaged category. For example, a 50-year-old runner might win nothing in his age group while also beating every runner in the younger age groups. He thus loses to inferior performances because of the age groups intended to allow older runners like him to fairly compete. While this can be annoying, these cases are rare, and the overall positive impact of age groups and gender divisions outweigh the negative aspects. This is a good general approach to setting policies. A good policy will never be perfect, but a good policy creates more overall good than bad. But there are people who do try to exploit categories to their advantage. I will turn to this in my next essay.