Category: Politics

 

I am, on occasion, critical of capitalism. I am, on occasion, accused of being critical because I am allegedly envious or a Marxist. If these were attacks aimed only at me, they would be of no general interest. However, accusing critics of capitalism of being motivated by envy or Marxism is a common tactic that warrants evaluation. I will begin with the accusation of envy.

While the accusation of envy is rarely presented as a developed argument, it aims to refute criticism of capitalism by attacking the critic’s motive.  The logic is that their criticism is wrong because they are envious of those who are winning capitalism. Obviously, this reasoning is fallacious and can be called the Accusation of Envy or Refutation by Envy. This fallacious argument has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Person P makes critical claim C about X.

Premise 2: P is accused of envy (typically relating to X).

Conclusion: Therefore, claim C is false.

 

This is a fallacy because whether a person is envious has no bearing on the truth of the claims they make. Even if a person is driven by envy, it does not follow that their claims are false. The following example illustrates this “reasoning” is flawed:

 

Sam: “When tyrants oppress their people and commit genocide, they are acting wrongly.”

Sally: “Why you are just envious of tyrants. So, you are wrong. They are acting justly and morally.”

 

Another absurd example, involves math:

 

Cool Joe: “2+2 = 7.”

Mathematician Mary: “That is wrong; 2+2=4.”

Cool Joe: “You are just envious of my being so cool. And rich. And handsome. So, you are wrong. 2+2 =7.”

Cool Cathy: “Oh, Joe, you are so right, and Mary is so wrong. Work through your envy and maybe you’ll get a man someday.”

 

Even if Mary was envious of Joe, it does not follow she is wrong when she claims 2+2 =4. The example is intended to be absurd, because its absurdity shows that this logic is fallacious.  If this logic was good, it would be easy to “disprove” anything, be it basic truths of math or criticisms of capitalism.

As such, accusing anyone of envy does not refute claims. Since this is a fallacy, it might be wondered why someone would use this tactic. One possibility is that the fallacious attack is the best the person has; they have no good refutation. A second possibility is that while fallacies are logically flawed, they can be very powerful persuasive tools. As a practical matter “winning” an argument has nothing to do with truth or the quality of the logic; it is about persuading the target audience to accept a claim whether it is true. Ad hominem style attacks are effective psychologically, so this tactic can be a winning one. In many cases the target audience wants to reject the criticism, hence they are happy to accept any “reason” to do so.

It might be wondered whether a person’s envy can be relevant to their claims. While it is, as shown above, irrelevant to the truth of their claims, it could be a relevant factor in assessing bias. But even if a person is biased, it does not follow that their claim must be false.  It is to the matter of envy and credibility that I will turn in the next essay.

Prior to Trump’s first victory mainstream Republicans attacked and criticized. His victory not only silenced almost all his conservative critics most became fawning Trump loyalists. Lindsey Graham provides an excellent example of Trump’s transformative power: he was polymorphed from a savage attacker to Trump’s attack dog. Few dared oppose him during his first term, such as John McCain and Mitt Romney. But the Republicans in congress now act in accord with his will and whims. There are a few surviving conservative critics of Trump, but they have proven politically irrelevant. This does make sense, as Trump is the logical result of decades of GOP strategies and efforts. If the Republican party were a Pokemon, Trump would be the final evolution of the party.

The surrender and assimilation of the Republican leadership was not surprising; the party focused on winning and holding power rather than developing and advancing meaningful policy goals. Whatever ideology once defined the party has become a devotion to power for the sake of power and profit. Under Trump, all talk of a balanced budget, all worries about deficits and have ceased.  What is more interesting is the impact Trump has had on his followers.

When Joe Walsh  made a futile effort to challenge Trump for the Republican nomination. During his effort, he asked Trump supporters if Trump has every lied. They said that he had not. Walsh brought up Trump’s criticism of Obama playing golf and Trump’s claim that he would be too busy as president to play golf. While most people did not care about, some insisted Trump had never played golf as president. His supporters also believed that hundreds of miles of the wall had been built and paid for by Mexico and that the Democrats in congress are treasonous liars.  Walsh closed by noting that he “…realized once and for all that nobody can beat Trump in a Republican primary. Not just because it’s become his party, but because it has become a cult, and he’s a cult leader. He doesn’t have supporters; he has followers. And in their eyes, he can do no wrong.” This raised some interesting philosophical concerns.

Some might respond by saying “what about the Democrats?” and accuse them of being a cult. While one could debate political cults, this “what about” would (as always) be irrelevant. Even if the Democrats were a cult, this would prove or disprove nothing about Republicans. My concern is with looking at the epistemology and thinking of the voters Walsh encountered.

One possible explanation is that Trump voters have normal epistemic abilities and hold to true beliefs but are lying in this case. They believe that Trump lies, that the wall was not paid for by Mexico and so on. People often lie in support of people they like, especially when they think those people are being attacked. This is a matter of ethics: believing that it is right to lie in defense of someone you support especially when speaking their opponent. While subject to moral assessment, this need not be cultish. After all, people will lie to defend their friends.

A second explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have always been defective and they are unusually bad at forming true beliefs and critically assessing claims. This could be due to various biases and the usual reasons people fall victim to fallacies and rhetoric. But this need not be cultish since believing false things because of epistemic defects or failures in critical thinking is a common occurrence. On this explanation, Trump supporters are wrong, but they are not wrong because of being cultists. Rather, they are following Trump because they are wrong.

A third explanation is that these voters’ epistemic abilities and critical thinking skills have been corrupted by Trump’s influence. That is, they reject the rational methods of forming beliefs and critical thinking in favor of believing in Trump because Trump tells them to believe in him. They are wrong because they are following Trump. In this case, they might be cultists. They would be accepting a “Trump command theory” in what Trump says is true is true because Trump says so and what Trump says is false because Trump says so. If this explanation is correct, Trump is shaping the perceived reality of his followers. They are not lying to defend him or themselves, they are true believers in Trump’s false description of the world. That is, they are a cult with a charismatic leader.

Ever since Trump won his first term in office, I have wondered why people support him. I am not going make a straw man his supporters and say they are all stupid, racist, or opportunists. Rather, I want to consider reasons why people back Trump.

To start with the most obvious, some agree with his actions and policies, and it is rational that they support him. There is no mystery here other than why they agree with him.

There are some who are dismayed about what he says and wish he would show more restraint. While they dislike some of his word choices, they largely agree with his policies and actions. This is certainly rational. If their only concern about him is that he sometimes gets salty or a bit rough, it makes sense they support him.

There are even some supporters who worry about some of his policies and actions but go along with him anyway. In many cases, their motivations seem pragmatic: they get something from Trump or would pay a high price for not supporting him. For example, a Republican politician might get taken out in a primary if they earned Trump’s ire. As another example, a wealthy person might loath Trump yet like the tax breaks and de-regulation that increase their wealth. This involves setting aside certain values for others, but this can be rational. We all must make judgments in which values are in conflict, so a Trump supporter backing him despite their dislike makes sense. Trump supporters also try to convince others to support Trump.

When people criticize of Trump, his supporters often defend him by making economic arguments. For example, Trump supporters have told me that because of him the stock market does well, and this is good for my retirement income. So, I should stop criticizing Trump. When the stock market does badly, they place the blame elsewhere and say that Trump will fix it soon.  As another example, his supporters also respond to criticism about Trump’s racism with by arguing minorities ought to support Trump (or at least shut up) because under his leadership they will be better off . These arguments are based on the principle most eloquently put by  James Carville’s “the economy, stupid.” While Carville originally presented this to Clinton campaigners, it is now used broadly to claim that what matters the most is the economy.

From a factual standpoint, this claim has merit: people often say that they vote based on economic concerns. In the 2024 election, Trump supporters posted about inflation, egg prices and the cost of gas as reasons to support Trump. But is the argument that people should support Trump for economic reasons a good one?

From a factual standpoint, there are obvious problems with the premise of this argument. First, Trump (as predicted) failed to deliver on his promises about the cost of eggs and inflation. The stock market has also been a bit erratic.

 Second, the economy has been good for the wealthy and not so good for everyone else. While this gives billionaires an excellent reason to support Trump, it does not give the rest of us an economic reason to do so. Third, the influence of the president on the economy is often exaggerated. In good times, supporters of the president give him the credit, in bad time his opponents assign him the blame.  Trump failed to deliver on egg prices and inflation, but much of this is beyond Trump’s control. While his gets him off the hook to a degree, it also undercuts the argument that people should support Trump because of the economy.

Trump most devoted supporters will dispute these claims and assert that the economy is either great or will soon be great. Let these claims be granted for the sake of argument. The Trump supporter version of the argument would be:

 

Premise 1: The economy is great.

Premise 2: This is because of Trump.

Conclusion: You should support Trump (or at least stop criticizing him).

 

This argument is used to convince people who oppose to support or at least stop criticizing him. I oppose many of Trump’s policies and actions. These include his racist immigration policies, his approach to Ukraine, DOGE, his tax cuts, his putting incompetent grifters into positions of power and so on. While Trump’s supporters would dispute my views, their economic argument is that I should set aside my moral concerns because of his (alleged) success with the economy This argument is an old one and connects to America’s original sin.

Some of the slave-owning founders recognized that slavery was morally wrong or at least expressed this view in their more philosophical writings. Yet, they allowed it to continue for pragmatic reasons: profit and political support. Those who supported them but who also had moral concerns about slavery were swayed by similar reasons: slavery was crucial to the economy. People looked away, morally speaking, because they wanted to get paid. This approach has persisted: people who have moral qualms often set them aside for economic reasons and are often persuaded to do so.

I am not saying that supporting Trump is the moral equivalent of supporting slavery. Rather, my point is that an original sin of America is putting economics over ethics. What Trump supporters are now asking me to do is analogous, albeit not as bad: they want me to set aside my moral concerns about Trump because of his alleged economic success. That is, I should look away because I am getting paid. They are not amused when I ask if this means that they will turn against Trump when the economy goes bad.

One could try to make a utilitarian case by arguing that the harm he causes is outweighed by the good of the economic benefits of his presidency. But even if it is (wrongly) assumed that Trump is significantly responsible for the positive aspects of the economy it is not plausible to claim that most of his morally problematic actions and policies have anything to do with the economy. For example, his racist immigration policies will hurt the economy if fully acted upon. If Trump did have to do morally problematic things to make the economy better, then one could make the utilitarian argument to justify these actions. But the economy cannot justify evil actions and policies that do not impact the economy. Using an analogy, one could imagine a spouse who does questionable things to make money for their family. These could be, perhaps, justified on utilitarian grounds. But this would not justify wrongdoing on their part that had nothing to do with making money. So, if dad must do some shady business to pay for Timmy’s cancer treatment, then that could be justified. But the fact that he makes money would not, for example, justify dad committing adultery, beating Timmy, or vandalizing the local mosque and synagogue. Likewise, for Trump, whatever he might do to (allegedly) improve the economy might be justified on utilitarian grounds. But this does not warrant his other misdeeds. Those who believe he is a bad person doing bad things should not be swayed by an appeal to money; they should not look away just because they want to get paid.

As a political tool, members of congress threaten or engage in a government shutdown. When the government is shut down, federal workers can be furloughed and sent home without pay and forbidden from working. Others, like TSA agents, can be compelled to work without pay. As the government shutdown does not shut down bills and expenses, the unpaid workers will be harmed by their lack of income. While some federal workers are well paid, many live from paycheck to paycheck and have few financial reserves. Because of this, some federal workers have turned to food banks during past shutdowns. In addition to the impact on workers, there are indirect impacts on those providing goods and services. After all, people who are not getting paid will be spending less.

In addition to the financial impacts, there are other harms. One example is the national parks. There is also the harm suffered by those who need the federal services. There are also the long-term harms of the shutdown. While one could write almost endlessly of the harms of a shutdown, it suffices to say they are harmful and something that should be avoided.

Debating about who is to blame for any shutdown is often a fruitless endeavor because of the partisan divide. Minds will generally not be changed by evidence or reasons. That said, a shutdown requires both parties: if one party gives in to the other, then the shutdown will end. From a moral standpoint, both sides bear some blame. However, the blame need not be equal.

After all, refusing to give in to a threat to harm others can be morally acceptable. And it is usually the Republicans who make such threats.  From a utilitarian standpoint, giving in would be wrong if it created more harm than refusing to do so. This utilitarian calculation can consider more than just the immediate factors. For example, it should also include that yielding to such tactics encourages their future use.

The ethics of the shutdown comes down to two moral concerns. The first is whether it is morally acceptable to hurt innocent people to get what you want. The second is whether it is morally acceptable to refuse to give someone what they want when they threaten to harm the innocent.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the matter is settled by weighing the harm against benefit. The benefits can include preventing harm. So, a shutdown would be morally acceptable if doing so prevented greater harm, since shutdowns are always harmful. What must also be considered is whether there is an alternative to the shutdown. To use an analogy, if someone proposed a risky surgery, failing to consider alternatives would be morally irresponsible. In the case of the shutdown, there are alternatives. One is to use a less harmful process of negotiation and for each side to agree they will not use the shutdown as a political tool.

One practical problem is that the shutdown is perceived as a useful, albeit risky, political tool. The side pushing a shutdown will think that it will probably work; the other side thinks they can keep it from working. Both sides think they can score political points. Using a shutdown as a tool requires ignoring or even not caring about the harm being inflicted on the American people. After all, while politicians can lose political points or not get what they want, they are not harmed by their shutdown. This willingness to use people as pawns is morally problematic, assuming you agree with Locke that the purpose of the state is the good of the people.

That said, political, economic and military calculations always involve harming pawns—so the shutdown could be seen as just another move in the political game. This can be countered by arguing that there are better alternatives, and so causing harm is not necessary. As such, the shutdown would seem to be an unethical political tool. Unfortunately, just as it takes two to shut down the government, it also takes two to avoid it: both parties must agree to not shut it down. But as long as it is seen as a viable tool and if politicians are willing to hurt Americans to achieve their political goals, then we must expect future shutdowns.

The denotation of a word is what it literally means. The connotation is the emotional loading of the word, which can be negative or positive; this is how the word makes you feel. To illustrate, “swarm” and “infestation” have strong negative connotations. Whether the connotation is negative or positive depends on various factors, such as how the audience feels about the word. For example, the connotation of “socialism” is negative for most Americans but obviously positive to socialists. Two words can have the same denotation, but very different connotations. For example, the slang “pig” and the word “police” have the same denotation, but different connotations. As would be expected, rhetoric uses the influence of connotation to affect how people feel.

Words that have strong connotations can be powerful rhetorical tools. As with any powerful tool, people will want to use it, even if they must steal it. Hence, connotation theft.  A word can derive its connotation from a variety of factors, such as historical context, and this is how the connotation is earned. If the word is then knowingly used for that connotation in a manner inconsistent with those factors, then the connotation has been stolen. This can also involve intentionally ignoring a word’s denotation to use its connotation.  A person can also unintentionally steal connotation by being unaware that their use is inconsistent with the factors, such as the historical context or denotation, that give the word the connotation in question.

Put into a template, connotation theft looks like this:

 

  1. Word W has connotation C because of P,Q and R.
  2. Word W is used in situation S because it has connotation C.
  3. But S is inconsistent with P, Q, R.

 

A good example is the word “fascism.” The word has a strong negative connotation primarily because of the Nazis and their numerous crimes. To a lesser extent, fascist Italy and Spain also contributed to this negative connotation. Because of the strong negative connotation of “fascism” calling something “fascism” or associating it with fascism can be an effective rhetorical tactic. Doing this can generate negative feelings towards the thing in question and these can influence what people think. Because of this, it is not surprising that the term is often used in American politics. George W. Bush’s administration was called fascist. Bush in turn used the term “Islamofascism” (which is distinct from Islamic fascism) to create negative feelings. Obama was called a fascist and, of course, Trump is being called a fascist now. Interestingly, the left is now being called fascist and some claim that the Nazis were leftists (mainly because of the “socialism” in their name). One might thus agree with a quote attributed to George Orwell, that “[T]he word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.'” This, it could be argued, arose from connotation theft: using the word for its negative connotation while ignoring its denotation and historical context served to split them apart.

Orwell’s remark shows a problem with connotation theft: it can rob a word of its denotation and historical context, making it just a rhetorical tool. Another problem is that connotation theft is a deceit because the emotional power of the word is exploited by intentionally misapplying it. For example, some on the right assert that the left and the socialists are fascists. Since most people feel fascism is bad, this misuse of the term can make people feel the left is bad. But the claim that fascism is leftist is a lie. First, while the National Socialists used the word “socialist”, they were neither socialists nor leftists. Fascism is a reaction to and an opponent of the left. Second, the negative connotation of “fascism” did not arise from any socialist style programs or policies the Nazis or other fascists might have implemented. It arises from the fascism of the fascists and the Nazi’s multitude of crimes. As such, applying the term “fascist” to the left is an attempt at connotation theft (or, at best an act of ignorance). This is most certainly not to claim that the left is without sin, just that fascism is a sin of the right rather than the left.

The main defense against being deceived by connotation theft is being aware of what gives a term its emotional power, such as its correct denotation and historical context. For example, when someone is accused of being fascist, one should consider if the word applies or, as Orwell said, it is just signifying something the speaker finds undesirable and hopes you will too.

During Trump’s first term the United States assassinated Iran’s Qassem Soleimani which raised moral questions about targeted killings. As it seems likely Trump will order more assassinations, this is a topic worth revisiting.

While the definition of “assassination” can be debated, it is a targeted killing aimed to achieve a political, economic or ideological end. While one could quibble over the fine points of definitions, my concern is with the issue of whether assassination can be morally warranted.

It can be argued that I am misguided to even consider this issue. Some might point out that assassination is killing and killing is wrong, thus there is no need for a distinct discussion about assassination. But I will assume, perhaps incorrectly, that at least some killings are morally acceptable. If I am in error, then the issue would be settled: assassination would be wrong because all killing is wrong,

Others might take the stance that morality is irrelevant and embrace the pragmatic approach that a country should kill when doing so is advantageous. On this view, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. This is a viable approach but entails that if the United States is justified in killing on pragmatic grounds, then everyone else is also justified. The only unjustified killings would be those that were not advantageous, as defined by the killers. This seems problematic.

In discussing this matter “in the wild”, I have found that people can be confused about what counts as ethics. For example, during a Facebook discussion of assassination someone rejected the notion of applying ethics.  They did so for what they claimed were two non-moral reasons. The first was that the United States is justified in assassinating people based on self-defense. The second is that the United States is justified when it kills in retribution.  But self-defense and retribution justifications are moral justifications and are subject to evaluation.

During the discussion, the “anger justification” was also advanced, which is often used to try to justify violence. For example, people will often try to “defend” the death penalty by asking people how they would feel if someone they loved were the victim of a terrible crime. They are supposed to feel angry, and this is supposed to somehow justify the death penalty based on this anger.

 The gist of the argument about assassination was that I would be mad if someone I knew had been killed by a foreigner and I would want to kill them and this entail that killing them would be somehow justified. The gist of the “logic” seems to be

 

Premise 1: If B did X to you, then you would be angry enough to do Y to B.

Conclusion: Doing Y to B is morally justified. 

 

While there might be a macho appeal to this “reasoning”, whether I would be angry enough to kill someone is irrelevant to whether killing them is right. If this was good logic, it would entail that sufficient anger would justify any killing, which is absurd.  For example, it would justify someone killing you if they were enraged because they thought you cut them off in traffic.

This sort of reasoning seems to be fueled by the tendency people have to think that if they are angry, then they are justified in being angry.  But this does not follow; being angry just means you are angry. The anger you feel is irrelevant to truth and justification. Naturally, a person can be both justified and angry, so anger does not invalidate justification.

Getting back to the ethics of assassination, if the principle was adopted that anger justified killing, it would mean that people who killed Americans would also be justified if they were angry and that someone who was angry at you would be justified in killing you. This all seems absurd, so this “principle” is absurd. But perhaps a case can be made for ethical assassination.

A good historical example is Operation Vengeance. In WWII, American P-38 fighters intercepted and killed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. This had a significant impact in terms of morale and the elimination of an important leader.

The moral justification for this is clear: when one is engaged in war, then leaders are legitimate targets. In the broader moral perspective, the overall ethics of a killing would depend on whether the war was just or unjust.  In fact, one could argue that targeting leaders in a just war is morally superior to the killing of soldiers. In general, the soldiers are not involved in the decisions that started the war and would not be fighting without being sent by their leaders. In contrast, the leaders are making the decisions and are morally responsible for the wars they start. As such, if a soldier in a war is a morally legitimate target for violence, then the leaders who sent them to war are also morally legitimate targets. Or even more legitimate, since it is their war.

In the example of Soleimani, the United States and Iran were not at war, hence the ethics of war do not apply. However, one could appeal to the ethics of conflict between nations. In general, killing the citizens of other nations outside of war is wrong. But there can be exceptions if the person did things that morally warranted their death. But accepting this as a justification requires accepting the corresponding moral principle and we would need to accept that Americans could be justly killed by other nations if their evil deeds warranted their deaths. For example, there are those who would argue that the deaths caused by American politicians could warrant their assassination on moral grounds.  There is also the option of just insisting that it is acceptable for the United States to engage in assassination because it is “my country”, but the same sort of argument can be made by citizens of other countries. For example, Iranians can make an equally bad case that it is acceptable for Iran to engage in assassination because it is their country.

 

 

While the term “fascism” has been around since before WWII, its use has surged in recent years and is used across the American political spectrum. Both Bush and Obama were called fascists. Trump’s detractors and supporters regularly use the term on each other. But what is fascism?

One obvious problem, as noted by John Locke, is that “people can apply sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as they please.” This can lead to unintentional confusion and intentional misuses. Locke’s solution was practical: when making inquiries “we must determine what we mean and thus determine when it is and is not the same.” Those acting in good faith try to agree on the meanings of terms or at least establish the boundaries of the discussion while those acting in bad faith have excellent reasons to shift meanings as needed. As such, those interested in an honest consideration of fascism can disagree but will try to be consistent and clear when using the term.

A stop sign analogy also serves well here. While the American stop sign is a red octagon with “stop” in white letters, this could be changed to a purple square with the symbol of a hand in the center. Or an orange circle. Or almost anything. But we need to agree on what the sign will be, otherwise there will be crashes. The same holds for defining terms. We can define them anyway we wish, but if we are not consistent, then there will be language crashes.

An obvious place to seek the meaning of “fascism” is to look at what paradigm fascists and fascist thinkers say. As such, Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile provide a good starting point since they are the Original Fascists.  One aspect of classic fascism is the rejection of peace. As the classic fascist sees it, perpetual peace is impossible. Even if it were possible, it would be undesirable. War is seen as good because it energizes the population and provides the opportunity for nobility and heroism.

While some claim fascism is a leftist ideology and link it to socialism, there are two problems with this view. One is that fascism is a political rather than economic system. For example, while the Nazi state provided German companies with slave labor, these corporations remained owned by individuals (like Porsche) rather than by the state. And state ownership of the means of production is a hallmark of socialism. The second is that the fascist ideology directly opposes the basic tenets of socialism, especially the Marxist variants. In the case of Marxism, fascism explicitly rejects economic determinism. In the case of socialism in general, fascism rejects the notion of class conflict. The focus of the modern fascist is on race rather than economic class.

Fascism also opposes liberal democracy on two grounds. As fascism regards the state as supreme, the notion of majority rule by voting is anathema to their ideology. Instead, they embrace authoritarianism. Fascism also associates the concept of equality with democracy and rejects equality on two grounds. First, fascism sees inequality as immutable. Second, the fascist sees inequality as good, thus rejecting the notion of progress.

One plausible reason for confusing socialism and fascism is that the fascist state is seen as absolute and everything else exists to serve it. Under classic socialism, the state owns the means of production. But these are not the same. A fascist state, such as Nazi Germany, can have a capitalist economy that exists to serve the state, and this allows for individuals to own companies (such as Porsche) and profit handsomely under fascism.

A socialist economy could exist in a direct democracy in which the state exists to benefit the individual. One could, of course, have a fascist state that also owns all the means of production, but fascism is not socialism.

The fascists also have a negative view of liberty as the state is to decide what freedoms people have, depriving them of what the rulers regard as useless and possibly harmful liberties. Fascists also reify the state, regarding it as having “a will and a personality.” From a rational standpoint, this is nonsense. While Hobbes liked to cast the state as a leviathan composed of the people, the state is just a collection of people with various social constructs forming the costume of the state. To use an analogy, the state is a giant pantomime horse or an elaborate dragon dance.

The fascist view of the state also puts them at odds with the Marxist. According to Marxism, the state will no longer exist under communism because it will no longer be needed. As such there can be no communist state in the strict sense, though this term is used to describe countries that profess a form of Marxism that never gets around to getting rid of the state that is run by the ruling class. 

Fascism also embraces the idea of empire and imperialism and use this to justify discipline, duty and sacrifice—as well as “the necessarily severe measures that must be taken against those who would oppose” the state. So, these are the basics of fascism, as per Mussolini and Gentile.

As with any complicated and controversial concept, there are many other views of fascism. Some are compatible with the account given above.  There are also some fascists that attempt to recast fascism to, ironically, attack those who oppose fascism.

While I do not claim that this account is the definitive account, it does provide some basic and key qualities of fascism and deviations from them need be justified.

 

 

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Since most Americans find overt racism unpalatable, racist politicians and pragmatic exploiters of racism need to avoid it. However, they want to recruit and advance their agenda, so they need to express their racism while maintaining plausible deniability.  The example I will focus on involves racism and migration.

If a politician said, “I will build a wall to protect the purity of the white race from becoming mongrelized by the brown rapists swarming across our border” they would normally not last very long in office. If a recruiter for the alt right said to “normies” that “the inferior non-white races are defiling our women and robbing us our blood and soil…let me also warn you of the covetous Jew…” they would not be very effective at turning normal folks into racists. But racists need a way to get the message out in public while also denying they are racists. This is where dog whistles, coded language and chocolate chipping (see my essay on this) come in. The basic idea is presenting racism in a way that does not seem racist.

When it comes to migration, open racism is not always effective in the public arena. Fortunately for the racist, centuries of American racism against migrants provide tools to lure in non-racists and allow plausible deniability. These tools are effective because they involve presenting concerns that can also be rational and non-racist.

One approach is presenting migrants as criminals who are coming here to commit crimes. It is rational to be concerned about crime and being worried about crime does not make a person a racist. As such, casting migrants as criminals allows a racist to appeal to non-racists and if pressed, they can say they are not racists. They are just worried about crime.

Another tactic is to associate migrants with disease, the claim is they are bringing diseases that will infect us. As with crime, it is rational to be concerned about disease and this does not make a person a racist. This also allows racists to appeal to non-racists and gives them cover in the form of a professed concern about health.

A third tactic is to assert that migrants are causing economic harm by stealing American jobs and exploiting social services like schools, food stamps and welfare. It is sensible to be worried about economic harms and such worries do not make one a racist. Once again, this tactic provides a cloak for the racist, they can deny their racism and assert they are just looking out for American jobs and protecting the taxpayer.

Since it is rational to be concerned about crime, disease and economic harms, how can one discern a non-racist from a racist? While this method is not foolproof, the logical way is to use the facts.

While migrants do commit crimes, they commit crimes at a rate lower than native born Americans. While having more migrants does entail more crime, so does having more babies since more people results in more crime. As such, reducing migration to reduce crime makes as much sense as lowering birth rates to fight crime. That is, not much sense. If one has doubts about migrants and crime, one can examine the police data to see the truth.

While migrants do get sick, they do not present a significant health risk when one considers that Americans are already infecting each other. It is, of course, rational to be concerned that war-torn countries and failing countries might be suffering from a decline in vaccination. But Americans are also falling behind in their vaccination rates, so this is not a threat unique to migrants. As this is being written, Americans are far more at risk to get Measles from Texans and Floridians than migrants.  In any case, worries about vaccinations and disease are better addressed by health care solutions rather than broad migration policies. Examination of health data will show that migrants are not a special health threat. That said, pandemics and epidemics can create special situations that justify restricting travel.

While it is true that illegal migrants can lower wages because businesses engage in illegal hiring practices and can exploit undocumented workers, illegal migrants are not stealing jobs. Rather, they are given jobs illegally. Migrants that are here legally are also not stealing jobs; they are being hired.

The main reasons Americans lose jobs is not because migrants take them. Rather the causes tend to be technological change (such as automation), economic factors (such as natural gas being cheaper than coal), and decisions by business leaders (such as sending jobs overseas). As far as checking on whether migrants have stolen jobs, think about this: how many legally run American businesses have fired American workers and replaced them with migrants here in America? Is there, for example, a big GM plant being operated entirely by Mexicans? There are, of course, American owned plants in Mexico and other countries, but that is because of decisions made by the companies and not due to migrants dragging plants across the border.

If someone endorses harsh migration policies and professes it is because of their concerns about crime, disease and economic harms, the method to test them is to present the facts of the matter. If the person is not a racist, they will be willing to reconsider their position. After all, if they favor harsh migration polices because they believe that they would meaningfully reduce crime and they learn that they will not, they should change their position. If the facts have no impact on their position, then that serves as evidence that just rejects facts or are a racist.

It might be objected that someone could argue migrants are disease carrying criminals who come here to steal jobs and exploit the social system without being racists. While this is possible, they would need to prove their claims and thus overturn all evidence to the contrary. It is also worth noting that the notion that migrants are disease carrying criminals is a an old one. If your family is not pure WASP, it is likely the same was said about your family. So, which is more likely: that past and present migrants were or are disease carrying criminals coming here to steal jobs or that these assertions are just tired racism hidden under a badly worn and threadbare cloak of deceit?

 

Some claim that “wokeness” (formerly “political correctness) has gone too far so that “you can’t say anything anymore.” As evidence people often offer examples of celebrities who faced some consequences for saying things that seem racist, homophobic or sexist. They also point to trigger warnings, safe spaces and when right wing speakers have been harassed or silenced.

While the moral right of free expression and the legal right of the First Amendment should be protected vigorously, there is the question of whether it is true that one can’t say anything anymore. By this people do not mean that they cannot say what they want; their worry is there could be consequences for what they say.

My view on free expression is unoriginal as it is based on Mill’s principle of harm: a person is free to say what they wish and the only thing that warrants limiting this liberty is to protect others from harm. As I have argued in past essays, merely offensive speech is not harmful in a way that warrants restricting it. But there is a large grey area between expression that should obviously be restricted (such as the infamous yelling of “fire”) and expressions that should not. I am happy to debate about what should be moved one direction or the other, but I adopt a principle of erring on the side of freedom and place the burden of proof on those who would restrict freedom of expression. We should assume that a person has a right to say what they wish unless there is a logically compelling reason why they do not. In fact, I encourage people to express whatever hateful views they might have, that way we know what sort of person they are. That said, I am aware of an obvious problem with my view.

The problem is sorting out whether the harm generated by expression warrants restricting it. As noted above, I hold to a high bar. What is merely offensive, insulting, enraging and so on should not be restricted. My view here is analogous to my view on same sex marriage: some people claim it is deeply offensive to their beliefs but allowing it does them no meaningful harm. It is ironic that the principle I use to defend same sex marriage I also use to defend the expression of people who oppose it on the grounds they find it offensive.

While people should be free to say almost anything, I also agree with another of Mill’s views: he made it clear that while people should be free to do as they wished if they did no harm to others, people should not expect their free expression to be free of all consequences. While racism, sexism, xenophobia and bigotry are popular in the United States, expressing these views can come with a social cost and consequences. People have been fired for such expressions, which is sometimes a disproportionate punishment. The consequences should be proportional to the offense, which is a basic principle of punishment I stole from John Locke.

While it is just and right to be upset in cases in which the punishment exceeds the misdeed, there is far too much hand wringing and complaining that people face any consequences for expressing racist, sexist, xenophobic or other bigoted views. Expression has always come with consequences; the current anger seems to be mostly because members of advantaged groups sometimes pay a price for saying what they previously were able to get away with. I do agree that the consequences should be proportional. For example, someone who made one racist tweet years ago should not be punished today if they have done nothing similar recently. But for someone to be outraged they cannot say racist, sexist, or other bigoted things with no consequences is unreasonable. It is like being angry they “can’t say anything” because they are not free to shout obscenities in school, church or at work without suffering some consequences. So, one is free to say anything, but not free of the possible consequences. Just as it has always been.

When billionaires are criticized for their excess wealth, their defenders often point out that they are philanthropists. Bill Gates is famous for his foundation, Jeff Bezos has given millions to his charities, and the Koch brothers have spent lavishly on higher education and medical research.

One counter to this defense is that this philanthropy yields advantages ranging from tax breaks to buying influence. To use an Aristotelian criticism, if the billionaires are engaging in philanthropy to advance their own interests rather than being generous for generosity’s sake, then they are not acting from virtue and should not be praised. To use a non-billionaire example, if I volunteer with an environmental group because I want to impress the liberals, then I am not being virtuous. If I volunteer because I want to do good, then I would be virtuous. But not everyone embraces virtue ethics.

A utilitarian would not be concerned with the motives and character of billionaires and would focus on the consequences of their actions. So, if Bezos donates money to get a tax break or offset his negative image, that does not matter to the utilitarian. What matters is the effect of the donation in terms of generating happiness and unhappiness. As such, even if a billionaire should not be praised for their motives or character, they should be lauded if their donation does more good than the alternatives. While the motives and character of billionaires and the utilitarian value of philanthropy can be debated at length, I turn now to the claim that the rich give the most to charity.

When people say the rich give more to charity than the non-rich, this seems to be an obviously true claim. After all, the rich have more resources and can give more in total and as a percentage of their wealth than the poor without making a significant sacrifice. To use an analogy, suppose Sally Bigbucks, you, and I are at lunch. Poor Pete asks us for $10 so he can buy food for his family. I have $10, you have $20 in your pocket, and Sally has $10,000. If lunch is $10, I’d have to forgo lunch to help Pete, which would be a real sacrifice. You could give 50% of what you have and still buy lunch, which would also be a meaningful sacrifice. Sally could generously give Pete $100, but this would only be 1% of what she has on hand and would not be a sacrifice. If she only gave him $10, that would be 0.1% of what she has on hand. The same sort of calculation should be made when the rich give what seem like large amounts of money to charity. To put these donations in perspective, you should determine what percentage the donation would be in terms of their yearly income or total wealth. So, while a wealthy person might publicly and loudly donate thousands of dollars to a charity, it might be comparable to you or I donating tens of dollars. This is not to attack the rich for donating to charity; it is better that they do this than, for example, buying a $900,000 watch. But we should keep the extent of their generosity in perspective: they can give more because they have far more than the rest of us.

Another point is that the rich can only be charitable because other people are in need. On the one hand, this can be dismissed as a an obvious “duh”: charity is only needed because there are poor people in need. If everyone was well off, there would be no need for charity.  On the other hand, this is an important and we need to understand why the rich are so rich and others are so poor they need charity. With the vast wealth of the United States, why do so many people need the largess of the wealthy and the support of taxpayers just to survive?

The American right tends to explain this by claiming the rich earn their wealth and those in need of charity are defective or have been the victim of a disaster.  For example, the poor are lazy or less intelligent. Racism often factors in here as well. As such, the rich are generously giving what they have rightfully earned to the unworthy or incapable. Using a Thanksgiving analogy, Grandma Sally bought a turkey feast that she graciously shares with others, despite the fact they contributed little or nothing. Perhaps because they were victims of a disaster or perhaps because they are too lazy or stupid to afford their own feast.

The left often claims the rich get their wealth by using unfair advantages and exploiting others. On this view, there are many people who need charity because the rich have taken most of the wealth. As such, when the rich engage in charity they give back to the poor some of what they took away. To use a Thanksgiving analogy, Grandma Sally has a great feast in which everyone works hard to make the feast, but Grandma doles out a few tiny bits of food to the folks at the little table.

While the left and right will endlessly debate this, charity is needed because there are people who cannot meet their needs by their own efforts, usually because of low wages and high costs. This is the system that exists, and it creates both those in need of charity and those who have so much that they can engage in philanthropy and remain extremely wealthy. As such, while philanthropy is better than nothing, it is the result of an evil system, one so imbalanced that some people require charity despite working hard.

Naturally one could advance the usual counter that those who get charity are somehow defective, such as lazy and unwilling to find good jobs. But this goes against the facts: people need charity because we have created and tolerate a system that takes so much from so many that some depend on the wealthy giving a tiny back from what they have taken. This is not worthy of praise.