Category: Politics

In the previous essay I drew an analogy between the ethics of abortion and the ethics of migration. In this essay, I will develop the analogy more and do so with a focus on the logic of the analogy. Because everyone loves logic.

Strictly presented, an analogical argument will have three premises and a conclusion. The first two premises (attempt to) establish the analogy by showing that the things in question are similar in certain respects.  The third premise establishes the additional fact known about one thing and the conclusion asserts that because the two things are alike in other respects, they are alike in this additional respect. Here is the form of the argument:

 

Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.

Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.

Premise 3: X has property Z as well.

Conclusion: Y has property Z

 

X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as rats and humans or Hitler and that politician you hate. P, Q, R, and Z are also variables, but they stand for properties or qualities, such as having a heart. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of the illustration as the things being compared might have more properties in common.

It is easy to make a moral argument using an argument from analogy. To argue that Y is morally wrong, find an X that is already accepted as being wrong and show how Y is like X. To argue that Y is morally good, find an X that is already accepted as morally good and show how Y is like X. To be a bit more formal, here is how the argument would look:

 

Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.

                    Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.

                    Premise 3: X is morally good (or morally wrong).

                    Conclusion: Y is morally good (or morally wrong).

 

The strength of an analogical argument depends on three factors. To the degree that an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument. If it fails to meet these standards, then it is weak. If it is weak enough, then it would be fallacious. There is no exact point at which an analogical argument becomes fallacious, however the standards do provide an objective basis for making this assessment.

First, the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. This standard is based on the commonsense notion that the more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. It should be noted that even if the two things are very much alike in many respects, there is still the possibility that they are not alike regarding Z.

Second, the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present.

Third, it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

In the case of drawing a moral analogy between the ethics of abortion and migration, the challenges are to determine the properties that make them alike and to establish the relevant moral status of abortion.

Since my goal is to show that those who already think abortion is morally wrong should also think expelling migrant children is wrong, I can assume (for the sake of the argument) that abortion is wrong. The next step is showing that abortion and expelling migrant children are alike enough to create a strong analogy.

Opponents of abortion tend to argue that human life has intrinsic worth and often speak in terms of a life being precious and a sacred gift from God. Since they tend to believe that a child exists at or soon after conception, it follows that the wrongness of abortion stems from the harm done to that precious life and sacred gift. While some opponents of abortion do allow exceptions for incest and rape, some do not and  reject abortion even if the pregnancy occurs against the mother’s will. Obviously enough, all opponents of abortion agree that in most cases the mother should be compelled to bear the child, even if they do not want to and even when doing so would cause them some harm. One way to see this is that the child has a right to remain where it is, even when it got there without the consent of the owner of the womb (the mother) and when she does not want it to remain.  What, then, are the similarities between abortion and expelling child migrants?

While this makes for a very problematic analogy, one could note that a child who is brought into the United States illegally would be like a child implanted in a woman (or girl) by rape. That is, their presence is the result of an illegal act and is against the will of the host. While expelling a fetus would certainly (given current technology) result in death, expelling a migrant child generally results in harm and can result, indirectly, in death. As such, if abortion is wrong for the above reasons, then expelling migrant children would be wrong, even if they were brought into the United States illegally.

There are a few obvious ways to counter this reasoning. One is to focus on the distinction between expelling a fetus and expelling a migrant child. As noted above, the fetus will certainly die during an abortion, but expelling a migrant child back into danger does cause certain death. This requires taking the moral position that only certain death matters. Interestingly, if artificial wombs became available, then abortion opponents who take the only death matters view would have to accept that a woman would have every right to expel a fetus into an artificial  womb, if death was not certain. That is, if the odds of the fetus would be comparable to the odds of a child being expelled back into a dangerous region.

A second difference is that migrant children are already born, so they are not unborn children. Those who are anti-abortion are often unconcerned about what happens to born children and mothers (anti-abortion states tend to have the highest infant mortality rates), so it would be “consistent” for them to not be concerned about the fate of migrant children. This requires accepting the moral view that what matters is preventing abortion and that once birth occurs, moral concern ends. While not an impossible view, it does seem rather difficult to defend in a consistent manner. As such, those who oppose abortion in all cases would need to accept that expelling migrant children into danger would be morally wrong and they should oppose this with the same vehemence with which they oppose abortion. But what about anti-abortion folks who allow abortion in the case of rape and incest?

Those who oppose abortion but make exceptions for cases of rape and incest would seem to be able to consistently advocate expelling migrant children, even when doing so would put them in danger. This is because they hold to what seems to be a consistent principle: if a child is present against the will of the property owner and as the result of a crime, then the child can be expelled even if this results in death whether this is an abortion or expelling a child who is an illegal migrant. But if the child is present due to consensual activity, then it would be wrong to expel the child.

While sexual consent can be a thorny issue, migration consent is even more problematic. After all, there is the question about what counts as consensual migration. On the face of it, one could simply go with the legal view: those who cross the border illegally are here without consent and can be expelled. But there is the fact that American business and others actively invite migrants to cross the border and want them here, thus seeming to grant a form of consent. Also, people can (or could) legally cross the border to seek asylum, thus there is legal consent for such people, which includes migrant children. So, the matter is less clear cut. But even if we stick with strict legality, then asylum seekers are still here with consent and hence expelling their children is morally like abortion: children are being harmed by being expelled. As such, those who hold an anti-abortion position are obligated to also oppose expelling migrant children if they arrived seeking asylum.

It is worth noting that if the analogy holds, it will also seem to hold in reverse. That is, a person who is opposed to expelling migrant children because of the harm it would do to them would seem to also need to oppose abortion. Pro-choice pro-migrant folks do have a way to get out of this. They can argue that while migrant children are clearly people and hence have that moral status, a developing fetus does not have that moral status and hence the choice of the woman trumps the rights (if any) of the fetus. This is a consistent position since the pro-choice pro-migrant person holds that people have rights, but that the fetus is not a person. In contrast, the anti-abortion anti-migrant person is in something of a bind; they need to argue that unborn fetuses have a greater moral status than already born migrant children.  But they are usually comfortable with claiming that an unborn fetus has the same or more rights than the mother, so this is probably not a problem for them.

As J.S. Mill pointed out in his writing on liberty, people usually do not follow consistent principles. Instead, they act based on likes and dislikes, which often arise from misinformation and disinformation. Comparing the view of many Republicans on abortion to their view of on immigration illustrates this clearly.

To use a concrete example, Alabama passed a very restrictive anti-abortion law that even forbids abortion in the case of rape. Proponents of the law, such as Alabama governor Kay Ivey, claimed the motivation behind the law is to protect life. As the governor said, “to the bill’s many supporters, this legislation stands as a powerful testament to Alabamians’ deeply held belief that every life is precious and that every life is a sacred gift from God.”

On the face of it, the principle is that because each life is precious and a sacred gift, if a man impregnates a woman (or girl), then she is obligated to host the zygote until birth. The expenses and risks of doing so fall on the woman (or girl). The United States government does little to assist pregnant women. Looked at in the abstract, the principle is that if a child manages to get inside a certain area, then there is an obligation on the part of the owner of that area to care for that child until the child can safely exit the area. If removing the child would kill or harm the child, then the child cannot be removed, perhaps regardless of how the child got there.

This principle would seem to also apply to migrant children who enter the United States, even if they are brought here illegally and against the will of the United States. Once they get within the United States, if expelling them would lead to harm, then the United States is obligated to care for them until they can safely exit the United States. After all, if the principle permits compelling women to bear a child from rape, then it surely permits compelling the United States to care for migrant children who are here illegally. At least until the children can safely leave the country.

It could be objected that abortion always kills a child while expelling a migrant child from the United States will probably not kill them. Hence the analogy fails. One reply is to argue that if every life is precious and a sacred gift, then even harming a precious, sacred gift would be wrong. That is, the principle isn’t “killing them would be wrong, but anything else is okay” but that each precious life must be treated as a sacred gift and one does not throw a sacred gift out.

 But making the strongest analogy requires considering only cases in which expulsion would result in death. There are migrant children (and adults) who are likely to be killed if they are sent back. It could be countered that, unlike abortion, they do have a chance of surviving. If so, the principle would have to be “each life is precious and a sacred gift, but this only entails that children should not be exposed to certain death. Likely death or great harm is morally okay.” While this is certainly a principle that one could hold, it is not commendable.

 As such, there would seem to be two options for anti-abortion folks who also want to be anti-migrant. The first is to consistently apply their avowed principle and accept immigrants when their expulsion would be likely to result in their harm. Or, if they want to be extremely strict, their deaths. The second option would be to abandon or modify their principle so that it applies only to abortion but not to migrants. The challenge is doing so in a manner that is not ad hoc or begs the question. For example, just saying that the principle only applies to the bodies of women but not to the United States would be ad hoc, as would saying that only zygotes deserve to be protected. It is worth noting that those who are pro-choice and pro-migrant would also need to consider the possible conflict between their principles as well.

One might also suspect that some anti-abortion folks are not motivated by a desire to protect “sacred, precious life” but have other, less laudable, motivations. Such people could easily reconcile being anti-abortion with being anti-migrant, perhaps by holding the principle that the state’s power should be used to harm people they dislike.

 

 

The first Trump administration made it clear that they saw creating fear as a legitimate tool to deter migration. During his campaign, Trump promised mass deportation and there is no reason to think that a kinder, gentler approach will be adopted in his second term in office. But is using fear to deter migration ethical?

It can be argued that it is. Obviously, deterring people by using laws and policies aimed at creating fear is a how society attempts to deter people from committing crimes. If it is morally acceptable to do this to deter potential jay walkers and murderers, then it is acceptable to do this to deter migrants. While some ethicists oppose the use of coercion by fear, the strategy of deterring bad behavior through fear has the approval of Aristotle.  This is like the use of force: not all uses of force are to be condemned, just immoral ones. So, the key question is whether using fear to deter migrants is morally acceptable.

In the past, the Trump administration adopted a strategy of creating fear by doing evil. First, the administration aggressively followed a policy of separating children and parents and officials were clear that this was intended to deter migration by creating fear that America would do evil to migrants. It is no accident that in fiction a quick way to show a group is evil is for it to take children from their parents. Second, the Trump administration treated detained children badly. Caging children and denying them necessities is also a stock behavior of evil characters in fiction. This is for good reason since mistreating children is evil. The purpose of this was to deter migrants through fear that if they try to come here, America will put their children into dirty cages without soap or toothbrushes.

Proponents of this policy argued that people choose to come here illegally knowing what will happen, then what is done to them is justified. On the one hand, this has some appeal. If I tell someone that a pot is hot and they grab it anyway, they only have themselves to blame.  On the other hand, if people are being pushed into a situation, such tactics mean people will be harmed rather than deterred. Going back to the stove, if I keep a hot pot to deter starving people from taking the food, I will just end up burning hungry people. Saying that they knew they would be burned is not an adequate defense. In the case of migration, many people are fleeing problems the United States helped. People are being pushed by things worse than what the Trump administration tried to do to scare them away.

There is also the fact that, as Locke argued, there are moral limits to how even a criminal can be treated. One of these is proportionality. Separating families and imprisoning children without necessities is a punishment that goes beyond the alleged crime. This is especially important in the case of children; they cannot rightly be considered guilty of a crime and hence punishing them is unwarranted. As such, using these methods is wrong.

As a final point, even if using such wicked means to deter people could be justified on utilitarian grounds, this would require showing that they are effective. However, they clearly did not work, and we were burning the hungry because the pain of the burn is less than the pain of the hunger. The Trump administration was fine with this. While they had hoped these evils would deter people, they had no qualms about doing wrong even when it does not achieve their stated goal. It became evil for evil’s sake, and we should expect more of the same.

One of the founding myths of the United States is that religious liberty is enshrined because people fled to the colonies to escape religious persecution and the strong connections between the church and state in Europe. Whatever the truth of the matter, these are two excellent reasons to legally protect religious liberty. After all, persecuting people based on their faith (or lack thereof) seems wrong. Concentrating secular and theological power has often proven dangerous, although the church and the state can be quite harmful operating on their own. See, for example, Pol Pot or the scandals of the Catholic Church. As such, freedom of religion seems generally good, albeit within limits.

It might strike some as odd that religious liberty should be limited, but it is the nature of freedoms that they require limitations to exist. To say that freedom requires limiting freedom might seem paradoxical or Orwellian, but it is neither. Consider, for example, the freedom to own property. As Hobbes argued in his Leviathan, if everyone has the right to everything, then this amounts to a right to nothing. As Hobbes and others have noted, meaningful property rights require limiting property rights. To illustrate, for you to own your phone or house, it follows that my liberty to own or use them must be limited. The same applies to other freedoms and rights. For example, your right to life puts limits on the freedoms of others; they are not free to murder you. The same applies to religious liberty: for you to have freedom of religion, others must be restricted in their ability to compel you to practice a different faith or to forbid you from practicing your faith. As such, to accept religious liberty in a meaningful sense is to accept that it has limits. The practical challenge is sorting out these limits, which is a matter of grave concern in the areas of religion, law and ethics.

One sensible approach to freedom is that of John Stuart Mill. Mill argues that freedom should be set on utilitarian grounds using a principle of harm. The gist of his approach is that if what you are doing does not harm anyone else, then you should be free to act (or think) in that way. If your action harms others, then this provides a reason to limit your freedom. As would be expected, this approach is often applied to religious freedom. To illustrate, it is unreasonable to tolerate human sacrifice on the grounds of religious liberty.  This can also be seen as an evaluation of which right trumps the other. In the case of human sacrifice, it can be argued that the right to life takes precedence over the right to practice one’s religion. As a practical matter, as Mill noted, people tend to take the view that what they like should be allowed and what they dislike should be forbidden, without any general principle in operation beyond liking and disliking.

Some would argue that religious freedom has been weaponized to be used against homosexuals, transgender people and women. For example, there are those who argue that discrimination against homosexuals and transgender people in housing, employment, and so on is justified by the religious views of those who claim that homosexuality or being transgender is against their religion. In the case of women, there are those who contend that their religious liberty should allow them to refuse to provide contraception or abortion services to women. There are, of course, those who say that they are just defending true religious freedom, it just so happens that it seems to always discriminate against people they do not like.

One interesting point is that if religious freedom allows such discrimination, then it will allow discrimination against anyone if one has the right sort of religion. For example, Christianity would seem to warrant discrimination against liars, adulterers, those who worship graven images, witches, those who misuse the name of God, those who do not respect their mother and father, and so on. Consistency would seem to require that if, for example, homosexuals can be discriminated against because they are seen as violating sincerely held religious beliefs, then the same would apply to all sinners. That is all of us, for we are all guilty of some sin or another. Probably many. Oddly enough, there seems to be little interest in denying goods and services to adulterers and liars (which is fortunate for Trump) even though adultery and lying make it into the Ten Commandments and homosexuality is mentioned but once and apparently as being on par with eating shellfish. One might suspect that proponents of this sort of religious freedom are looking for a way to justify their discrimination rather than with acting consistently in accord with their professed faith. After all, if one should be allowed to discriminate against homosexuals because they are engaged in what one regards as sinful behaviors, then the same should apply to all sins. This, of course, seems absurd since it would warrant discrimination against everyone. So, let he is without sin engage in the first discrimination.

Some years ago, Alabama led the way by passing the most restrictive anti-abortion law of the time, one that forbid abortion even in cases of rape and incest. After Roe v Wade was overthrown, other states rushed to implement anti-abortion laws. Proponents of such laws, such as Alabama governor Kay Ivey, claim that their motivation is to protect life. As the governor said, “to the bill’s many supporters, this legislation stands as a powerful testament to Alabamians’ deeply held belief that every life is precious and that every life is a sacred gift from God.” Some who opposed the bill claimed that it was not about protecting life but about restricting women’s reproductive rights. While we can never know what other people think and feel, it is sensible to look at the evidence when determining likely motivations and intentions. As always, it is rational to judge the function of something by what it does, rather than what people say it is intended to do.

In the case of the abortion law, the claim was that Alabamians believe that every life is a precious and sacred gift from God. This is certainly consistent with wanting to reduce the number of abortions. But do Alabamian politicians and authorities hold to this view? A sensible test is to see if they consistently apply this principle in their legislation and actions throughout the state.

Coincidentally, as the governor of Alabama was signing the law because of her deep belief that life is a precious, sacred gift a story broke that Alabama’s prison conditions are so awful as to be unconstitutional. If Alabamians believe that every life is a precious, sacred gift then they would presumably not permit the sacred lives in their prisons to endure such unconstitutional treatment.

An obvious objection is to argue that while all lives are precious, sacred gifts, some lives are more precious and sacred than others. While fetuses are innocent, prisoners have been found guilty of something and hence deserve to be punished. As such, having horrible prisons is consistent with the view that life is a precious, sacred gift.

This has some appeal. Even if life is precious, morality still permits people to be treated differently based on their actions. As such, one can hold that life is precious, but some life must be locked up. However, there is still a problem. If life is a precious, sacred gift, then even the worst people are still precious, sacred gifts and deserve decent treatment. Moral and legal limits of punishment are, of course, recognized by the constitution and Alabama’s failure to act on this casts doubts on their devotion to the professed principle that each life is a precious, sacred gift.

But one could still argue that criminals earn their abuse by being bad and hence Alabama is acting consistently by having terrible prisons and a strict anti-abortion law at the same time. But if Alabamans have this devotion to life, one expects that it would manifest in excellent maternal and infant health. If your doctor said she saw you as a precious, sacred gift and would do anything to protect life, you would expect her to act on that. You would no doubt be shocked if she proved negligent in her medical responsibilities and you ended up being needlessly ill.

Given the professed view that Alabamans regard life as a precious, sacred gift, one would be shocked to learn that Alabama does poorly when it comes to maternal and infant health. Alabama is tied for 4^th worst in the United States, with 7.4 deaths per 1,000 live births. While it might be argued that this is due to factors beyond their control, there is a consistent correlation between strong anti-abortion laws and poor maternal and infant health. While correlation is not causation, the reason for this correlation is clear: the state governments that enact the strictest anti-abortion laws also show, via public policies, the least concern for maternal and infant health. This is inconsistent with the professed principle that life is a precious, sacred gift. It is also inconsistent with the professed motivation for anti-abortion laws: to protect the life of children. It is, however, consistent with the hypothesis that anti-abortion laws are motivated by misogynistic principles. After all, if legislators pass anti-abortion laws because of hostility towards women’s reproductive freedom and wellbeing, then one would also expect them to also neglect maternal and infant health in their other policies. On the face of it, this is the better explanation. The function of state policy is to ban abortion and increase infant and maternal mortality; it is what it does.

It could be argued that Alabaman leaders do hold to the life is a precious, sacred gift principle, they are just bad at consistently applying it. So, it is applied to abortion but not to maternal and infant health or to prisoners. Failing to apply one’s professed principles consistently is a common human failing and could explain how anti-abortion leaders fail to apply their professed pro-life principles to infant and maternal health care. So, one could argue that the Alabaman legislators have a good principle, but they do not apply it consistently, despite their professed devotion to it and the effort they put in applying it in the case of abortion.

But a better explanation is that the Alabaman legislature and governor do not hold to their professed principle. Their actual principle is one that is hostile to women and perhaps to the less powerful in general. This principle is consistent with the state of Alabama prisons and the state of maternal and infant health care. If they do hold to their professed principle, they are incredibly inconsistent in their application, which is morally problematic as well. But the simplest explanation is that they are lying when they profess to believe that life is a sacred, precious gift.

My Amazon Author Page

While American cities have seen an increase in guns being stolen from unlocked cars, Tennessee has been leading the nation. In 2016 2,203 guns were reported stolen from vehicles. In 2017 4,064 thefts were reported. The causes of the increase are no mystery. One factor is the law. Tennessee passed a law allowing people to keep guns in their vehicles without a permit or any training and this increased the number of people keeping guns in their vehicles. A second factor is fear: people worry about violence and anecdotes about car jackings abound. Hence people are more likely to have a gun in their vehicle. A third factor is that when more people have guns, more people want to have guns because they are worried about the other people who have guns. This motivates both the carrying and theft of guns.

Because some stolen guns have been used in crimes, there have been proposals to make it a crime to fail to secure a gun stored in a vehicle. As would be expected, these proposals meet with strong opposition. One argument against them is based on the claim that they would make criminals out of law-abiding citizens. One obvious reply is that this is true of any new law that makes something a crime. What was legal is now a crime, thus citizens who were law-abiding would become criminals if they did not obey the new law. But, as with any law, there is the question of whether it would be a good law.

It can be argued that the gun owner is the victim when their gun is stolen, and they should not be punished for failing to protect their property from theft. To use an analogy, one should not blame the victim of a sexual assault and to suggest that the victim should have been more cautious would be wrong. The same would apply to people who leave guns unsecured in cars. A such, the law should focus on punishing the thief rather than the victim.

While the analogy is appealing, perhaps there is a better analogy here. In my adopted state of Florida pools must be fenced and have gates that close automatically. This is because pools are a hazard and those responsible for them have an obligation to not endanger the public through  negligence. If a child wanders into my pool and drowns because I did not secure it, that death is partially my responsibility. I am not morally protected by property rights to do as I wish with my property.

The same reasoning could be applied to guns: an unsecured gun presents a potential danger to the public and the owner is obliged to secure it. This obligation does not extend to property in general: if someone steals your iPad from your car, that is your loss and does not put others at risk. If someone steals your .45 from your unlocked car, you do suffer a loss, but the public is now at risk from an armed criminal.

One could raise the obvious counter: securing a pool is to protect children who do not know any better, while securing a car is to keep out people who know exactly what they are doing. So, while securing your vehicle is a good idea, the obligation is not on you to secure it, but on other people not to steal from your vehicle.

On the one hand, in general people are not morally obligated to secure their property and other people should not steal. Roughly put, stealing is wrong; not securing your property is just stupid. As such, the law should aim at punishing theft rather than the failure to secure property.

On the other hand, people are morally responsible for dangerous property and should take reasonable steps to secure it. This is especially important for guns since they can be used to harm others. The concern here is that it is not the thief who is at risk, it is other people who could be harmed by the thief using the stolen weapon, which would not have been easily available if it had been secured. As such, this could be seen as  like the pool analogy: the concern is about  innocent people who might be harmed by the negligence of the owner. As always, the mere fact that something is morally wrong does not automatically entail it should be illegal and the legal question remains.

One stock counter to imposing legal responsibilities on gun owners is an appeal to the Second Amendment. The idea is that such restrictions are unconstitutional since they limit the right to keep and bear arms. One stock reply is to point out all the legal restrictions that have passed muster, although these can be debated. Another option is to point out that there are principled restrictions on other fundamental constitutional rights. To use a popular example, the 1^st amendment does not allow dangerously irresponsible speech, such as falsely saying that you have a bomb while you are on a plane. The same should hold true for the 2^nd. It is not carte blanche for irresponsible behavior and hence it would be acceptable to impose laws requiring responsible behavior as a condition of exercising the right. The question then becomes whether such a law would be unduly burdensome or unreasonable.

On the face of it, requiring people to secure their guns is neither burdensome nor unreasonable. After all, locking the doors is quick and costs nothing. While, as noted above, some have proposed making failure to secure a gun a crime, it seems more reasonable to impose a sensible and effective penalty: the violator would be required to acquire a means of properly securing the gun (such as a gun lock or gun safe). While there might be concerns about cost, these devices are cheaper than the gun they are supposed to secure and hence should be affordable to anyone who can buy a gun. And some guns come with locks when purchased. Pro-gun groups could also use some of their resources to offer discounts to poorer gun owners so they can purchase the means to secure their guns.

Securing one’s gun is a basic responsibility of gun ownership and those who want to exercise this right are obligated to fulfil this responsibility. As such, requiring people to properly secure their guns is reasonable and just, provided that the law does not impose any burdensome requirements or unreasonable punishments.