Category: Politics

A few years ago, the estate of Dr. Seuss decided to pull six books from publication because the works include illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” This was taken by some on the right as an example of “cancel culture” and it became a battleground in the culture war designed to distract from real problems. There was speculation on the motives of the decision makers. They might have been motivated by sincere moral concerns, they might have been motivated by woke marketing (sales did increase after the announcement), or they might have (as the right suggests) yielded to the threat of “cancel culture.” While questions of motives are interesting, my main concern is with the philosophical matter of re-assessing works of the past in the context of current values.

This is not a new problem in philosophy and David Hume addressed the matter long ago. As Hume sees it, we can and should make allowances for some differences between current and past customs. He says, “The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because of their ruffs and fardingales?” Hume is right to note that elements of past art will be out of tune with our time and that some of these differences should be tolerated as being the natural and blameless result of shifting customs. Such works can and should still be enjoyed.

As an example, movies made and set in the 1960s will feature different styles of clothing, different lingo, different styles of filming, and so on. But it would be unreasonable to look down on or reject a work simply because of these differences. Hume does, however, note that a work can cross over from having blameless differences in customs to being morally problematic:

 

But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blamable.

 

Hume thus provides a rough guide to the moral assessment of past works: when a work’s content violates contemporary ethics, this is a significant flaw in the work. Hume does note that such works can still have artistic merit, and one can understand that the artist was operating within the context of the values of their time but these flaws are blameworthy and diminish our ability to enjoy the work. Put in marketing terms, the work loses its appeal to the audience. Hume’s view can easily be applied to the Dr. Seuss situation.

When Dr. Seuss created these works, the general customs, and ethics of America (and the world) were different. While there were people who held moral views that condemned racist stereotypes in art, there was a general acceptance of such things. In fact, many people would not even recognize them as being racist at the time they were created. Since I hold to an objective view of morality, I think that racist images have always been wrong, but I do recognize the impact of culture on moral assessment. There are, of course, ethical relativists who hold that morality depends on the culture: so, what was right in the earlier culture that accepted racism would be wrong now in a culture that is more critical of racism.

There are also theories that consider the role of cultural context in terms of what can be reasonably expected of people and that shapes how people and works are assessed. That is, that while morality is not relative, it can be harder or easier to be good in different times and places. So, a person trying to be a decent human being in the 1930s faced different challenges than a person trying to be a decent person in 2025. Harms also need to be taken in context: while racist stereotypes in drawings are seen as very harmful today, in the context of the racism of the past, these drawings would pale in comparison to the harms caused by racist violence and laws. This is not to deny the existence of racist violence today; it is just to put matters in context: things are bad, but not as bad as the past (though the future might be worse).

Whether we think that morality has changed or that more people are moral, these racist stereotypes are now broadly rejected by people who are not racists. As such, it made both moral and practical sense for the estate to take these books out of print. From a practical standpoint, racism can taint a business’ reputation and unless one focuses on marketing to racists (which could be a profitable option) purging racist content makes sense. In terms of ethics, racist images are wrong. One could advance a utilitarian argument here about harm, a Kantian argument about treating people as ends and not means, or many other sorts of arguments depending on what ethical theory you favor. As such, removing the products from sale makes sense, especially since they are books for children. We generally accept that children need more protection than adults. While adults can (sometimes) make informed decision about possible harms from content, children generally have not learned how to do this. So just as we would not allow children access to firearms, alcohol, or pornography, it is ethical for a company to decide to protect them from racism.

While it is tempting to see children’s books as just amusements, children can be profoundly shaped by the content of such works. This is, perhaps, why many parents and groups have been instrumental in making Captain Underpants the most banned (cancelled?) book in America. Just as they are shaped by all their experiences. Children will generally pick up on racist stereotypes and can internalize them. Even if they do not become overt racists, these stereotypes will impact how they think and act throughout their life. As Plato argued, “true education is being trained from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things.” Our good dead friend Aristotle developed this notion in his Nicomachean Ethics and he makes an excellent case for how people become habituated. Assuming Aristotle got it right, the estate made the right choice in discontinuing these works.

In closing, it is worth wondering why the right was so concerned about these works. If they were consistent defenders of freedom of expression and freedom of choice, then they could argue that they are merely applying their principles of freedom. However, they are not consistent defenders of these freedoms and one must suspect that they are fighting for racism rather than freedom.

“Bathroom bill” is the popular term for legislative efforts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on gender identity. These bills typically define who can and cannot access these facilities based on how the bill defines sex or Examples include defining sex by assigned sex at birth, sex listed on the person’s birth certificate, or sex based on gender identity. Some states have passed or are considering bathroom bills and this matter is part of the ongoing culture war against transpeople. As Trump himself noted, this front of the culture war is new. As to why it was opened up, the reasonable answer is that the right mostly lost the same-sex marriage culture war, and they needed a new victim to attack for political gain. Transgender people, unfortunately, were the chosen target.

People tend to take a stance on bathroom bills based on how they feel rather than based on a theory of law. This is usually because most people, even politicians, don’t have a theory of law. While my focus in this essay is on bathroom bills, I am using this context to develop my theory of law in more detail. I want to have a principled and consistent method of assessing laws and good faith argumentation involves making this methodology clear.

Good faith also requires me to note that I am operating within a framework of political philosophy based on Mill and Locke. I accept that people have rights, that the purpose of government is the good of the people, and that rights can only be infringed upon based on the principle of harm. I also favor small government: the laws and the state’s use of coercive force should be kept at a minimum. I have other assumptions but laying out my entire political philosophy would require at least one book. Good faith also requires that I make it clear that I generally oppose bathroom bills and my reasons will be advanced in this essay.

My first consideration in assessing a (potential) law is determining whether the subject is fit for law, and this requires determining whether the matter falls under the legitimate use of the power of the state. What counts as legitimate use is a matter of debate and people are rarely consistent beyond thinking that if the state is doing what they want, it is legitimate. Fortunately, the issue of legitimate use can be narrowed down. In the case of the bathroom bill, the issue is whether controlling who can access bathrooms is a legitimate use of the coercive power of the state. In the context of laws that restrict liberty and rights, I generally follow Mill’s approach: liberty can only be justly restricted to prevent harm to another. On this principle, proponents of a bathroom bill would need to identify the harm the bill is intended to prevent: if there is no harm, then there is no justification for restricting liberty. But even if a law is supposed to prevent harm, this does not settle the issue of whether it should be law.

A second consideration is the issue of whether the significance and nature of the alleged harm warrants expending public resources to pass and enforce a law. Harms vary in significance and even significant harm might not be the right sort of harm that justifies the use of the coercive power of the state. Consider, if you will, some harm that can occur in a bathroom.

Like many other men, I feel uncomfortable when other men try to engage me in conversation while I am urinating. I am also a bit offended when people try to make eye contact during these conversations. While I am experiencing some harm (discomfort and feeling offended) these harms are not significant enough to warrant a law against them. They are also not the right sort of harm: the state does not seem obliged to protect us from discomfort or offense. But a person could escalate matters in the bathroom: if the chatty urinator started making threats of violence or tried to touch someone, then the harm becomes both significant enough to and the right sort to warrant state intervention. That is, laws against threatening people and assault fall within the state’s legitimate use of coercive force.

While those advocating bathroom bills might feel uncomfortable around or offended by the people whose bathroom access they wish to control, they generally understand that these reasons do not warrant passing a law. As such, the bills are typically presented as intending to keep women and girls safe in the bathroom. Some proponents of these bills do admit that transgender people are rarely sexual predators. Instead, they express worry that non-transgender sexual predators will exploit laws allowing transgender access to bathrooms to attack women and girls. This does allege harm that would be both significant and the right sort. But is the allegation true? After all, if the harm is make-believe, it cannot justify a law.

Several states and large cities have allowed transgender people to access bathrooms based on their identity for years, thus providing a wealth of empirical data . The evidence is that this access is not exploited by predators. That is, allowing trans people access to bathrooms of their choice does not decrease the safety of women and girls in bathrooms. If it did, there would be evidence. This is not to deny that a sexual predator could dress up as a woman to get into a bathroom, just that it does not seem to be something that occurs with any statistical significance. There is also the obvious fact that  a predator could dress up as a women whether there are bathroom laws in place. A sexual predator could also disguise themselves as a trash can to launch an ambush in a bathroom, but we do not need a law to address this. It is not something that happens enough to warrant creating a law and mandating trash can inspections.

Somewhat ironically, bathroom bills require that transgender men use women’s bathrooms. As such, a sexual predator keen on exploiting the law could simply claim to be a transgender male and freely enter bathrooms. No need to wear a dress or makeup. As such, the fear argument is self-defeating: if a law is needed to keep transgender people out of bathrooms because male sexual predators will put on dresses to pretend to be transwomen, then the law would not work because sexual predators would simply claim to be transmen and have easy access to the bathrooms because the law defines them as women. This could be addressed by employing bathroom police and requiring people to present birth certificates before accessing bathrooms. But this would require a disproportionate expenditure of resources and impose inconveniences not warranted by the alleged harm. In response, one could contend that something must be done to address even the possibility of harm: theoretical transgender predators must be prevented from attacking women and girls in bathrooms no matter how unlikely this is to happen.

My third consideration is the issue of whether the harm is adequately addressed by existing laws or factors other than laws. If the harm is already addressed adequately, there is no need for a new law. Going back to my chatty urinator discussion, we do not need a law banning chatty people from bathrooms because someone might make verbal threats in the bathroom. We also do not need a law banning people who make eye contact in bathrooms because someone might touch someone else in the bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: making threats is illegal and assault is illegal. Likewise, while knowing a trans person is in the bathroom with them might make a person uncomfortable or feel offended, we do not need a law banning trans people because someone might assault or rape someone in a bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: assault and rape are illegal and allowing trans people to use bathrooms as they wish does not change that. As such, there is no need for bathroom bills and on their own grounds of justification they are unjustified.

The United States recently saw another outbreak of the measles with most victims being unvaccinated. Critics of the anti-vaccination movement present incidents like these as proof the movement is not just misinformed but dangerous.  Not surprisingly, anti-vaccination folks are often derided as stupid. After all, the anti-vaccination arguments usually rest on untrue and often debunked claims. For example, the claim that vaccines cause autism is clearly untrue. Vaccination, in general,  has been conclusively shown to safely prevent diseases, although there are some risks.

It is tempting for those who disagree with the anti-vaccination people to dismiss them as to stupid to understand science. This, however, is a mistake.  One reason is purely pragmatic: those who are pro-vaccination want the anti-vaccination people to change their minds and calling them stupid, mocking and insulting them will only cause them to entrench. Another reason is that the anti-vaccination people are not, in general, stupid. There are good grounds for people to be skeptical towards claims about health and science. To show this, I will briefly present some points of concern.

One rational concern is the fact that scientific research has been plagued with a disturbing amount of corruption, fraud and errors. For example, the percentage of scientific articles retracted for fraud is ten times what it was in 1975. Once lauded studies and theories, such as those behind the pushing of antioxidants and omega-3, have proven riddled with inaccuracies. As such, it is not stupid to worry that scientific research might not be accurate. Somewhat ironically, the study that started the belief that vaccines cause autism is a paradigm example of bad science. However, it is not stupid to consider that the studies that show vaccines are safe might have flaws as well.

Another matter of concern is the influence of corporate lobbyists. For example, the dietary guidelines and recommendations set forth by the United States Government should be set based on the best science. However, guidelines are influenced by industry lobbyists, such as the dairy industry. Given the influence of corporate lobbyists, it is not foolish to think the recommendations and guidelines given by the state might not be correct.

A third point of concern is that dietary and health guidelines and recommendations undergo what often seem to be relentless and unwarranted change. For example, the government warned us of the dangers of cholesterol for decades, but this recommendation is being changed. It would, of course, be one thing if the changes were the result of steady improvements in knowledge. However, the recommendations often seem to lack a proper foundation. John P.A. Ioannidis, a professor of medicine and statistics at Stanford, has noted “Almost every single nutrient imaginable has peer reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome. In this literature of epidemic proportions, how many results are correct?” Given such criticism from experts in the field, it hardly seems stupid of people to have doubts and concerns.

There is also the fact that people do suffer adverse drug reactions that can lead to serious medical issues and even death. While the reported numbers vary (one FDA page puts the number of deaths at 100,000 per year) this is a matter of rational concern.  In an interesting coincidence, I was thinking about this essay while watching the Daily Show and one of my “ad experiences” was for Januvia, a diabetes drug. As required by law, the ad mentioned all the side effects of the drug and these include serious things, including death. Given that the FDA has approved drugs with dangerous side effects, it is hardly stupid to be concerned about possible side effects from any medicine or vaccine.

Given the above, it is not stupid to be concerned about vaccines. At this point, the reader might suspect that I am about to defend an anti-vaccine position. I will not. In fact, I am a pro-vaccination person. This might seem surprising given the points I just made. However, I can rationally reconcile these points with my position on vaccines.

The above points do show that there are rational grounds for taking a general critical and skeptical approach to health, medicine and science. However, this general skepticism needs to be rational and consistent. That is, it should not be a rejection of science but rather the adoption of a critical approach in which one considers the best available evidence, assesses experts by the proper standards (those of a good argument from authority), and so on. Also, it is important to note that general skepticism does not automatically justify accepting or rejecting specific claims. For example, the fact that there have been flawed studies does not prove any specific study about a vaccine is flawed. As another example, the fact that lobbyists influence the dietary recommendations does not prove that vaccines are harmful drugs being pushed on Americans by greedy corporations. As a final example, the fact that some medicines have serious and dangerous side effects does not prove that the measles vaccine is dangerous or causes autism. Just as one should be rationally skeptical about pro-vaccination claims one should also be rationally skeptical about ant-vaccination claims.

To use an obvious analogy, it is rational to have a general skepticism about the honesty and goodness of people. After all, people do lie and there are bad people. However, this general skepticism does not automatically prove that a specific person is dishonest or evil. That is a matter that must be addressed on the individual level.

To use another analogy, it is rational to have a general concern about engineering. After all, there have been many engineering disasters. However, this general concern does not warrant believing that a specific engineering project is defective or that engineering itself is defective. The specific project would need to be examined, and engineering is, in general, the most rational approach to building stuff.

So, the people who are anti-vaccine are not, in general, stupid. However, they seem to be making the mistake of not rationally considering specific vaccines and the evidence for their safety and efficacy. It is rational to be concerned about medicine in general, just as it is rational to be concerned about the honesty of people in general. However, just as one should not infer that a friend is a liar because there are people who lie, one should not infer that a vaccine must be bad because there is bad science and bad medicine.

Convincing anti-vaccination people to accept vaccination is challenging. One reason is that the issue has become politicized into a battle of values and identity. This is partially due to the fact that the anti-vaccine people have been mocked and attacked, thus leading them to entrench and double down. Another reason is that, as argued above, they do have well-founded concerns about the trustworthiness of the state, the accuracy of scientific studies, and the goodness of corporations. A third reason is that people tend to give more weight to the negative and tend to weigh potential loss more than potential gain. As such, people would tend to give more weight to negative reasons against vaccines and fear the alleged dangers of vaccines more than they would value their benefits.

Given the importance of vaccinations, it is critical that the anti-vaccination movement be addressed in a way that respects their legitimate worries and concerns. Calling people stupid, mocking them and attacking them are not effective ways of convincing people that vaccines are generally safe and effective. A more rational and hopefully more effective approach is to address their legitimate concerns and consider their fears. After all, the goal should be the health of people and not scoring political points or feeling smug superiority.

Thanks to Jean Garnett’s New York Times article, the concept of heterofatalism has gone viral in some circles. The theoretical foundation for heterofatalism is heteropessimism, a concept developed by Professor Ara Seresin. Heteropessimism describes the disillusionment with heterosexual dating alleged to inflict many women. Heterofatalism transforms pessimism into fatalism about heterosexual relationships. On this view, men are disappointing, relationships are inevitably doomed, but the afflicted women are still attracted to men. Negative views of heterosexual relationships are nothing new, so what is the difference between older criticisms and the new fatalism?

Being an older philosopher, I am most familiar with the “classic” feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships. While there are many historical versions of feminism and it would be a mistake to treat them all the same, the classic criticisms tend to be based on the negative aspects of patriarchy, broadly construed. Most criticisms focus on how men are constructed by society in ways that incline them to be oppressive, exploitive and abusive in heterosexual relationships. This is bad for the men and worse for the women, leading to some feminists to advocate varying degrees of rejecting heterosexual relationships. Other feminists argued for changing gender roles to improve things for everyone.

While there are still classic feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships, the new heterofatalism (which I am sure the cool kids call neo-HF) seems to be exemplified by the anecdotes of Jean Garnett and other women. Their disappointment with men is not based on men being domineering, oppressive, abusive or exploitative. Instead, their tales speak of men who are emotionally avoidant, fearful of commitment, and inconsistent. But haven’t women been saying that about us men since we developed language? The answer is “yes.” So, the big change is that while men are criticized for disappointing, they are not being criticized for manifesting the patriarchy. It could be argued that this is an improvement: while we men still have the old disappointing qualities, at least women like Garnett are not lamenting about being oppressed or exploited by the men they are in a relationship with. At the current rate of “progress” men should be good relationship material in a few centuries. But is there actually a significant problem of the sort described by Garnett?

When it comes to inferences about populations, we philosophers worry about the dangers of hasty generalizations, biased generalization, anecdotal evidence, and the spotlight fallacy. A hasty generalization occurs when an inference is drawn from a sample that is too small to warrant the conclusion. For example, before going to college in Ohio I was biking in my hometown. I was struck by a car from Ohio and inferred that Ohio would be dangerous place based on that sample of one. While I was right about Ohio drivers, my inference was unwarranted at the time. So, there is the question of the sample size used to support the claim that heterofatalism is widespread.

A biased generalization occurs when the sample is not representative. While the sample can also be too small (making it as hasty generalization as well) it can also be large. The problem is that an inference drawn from a biased sample will be unreliable. For example, a survey of 10,000 churchgoers about the existence of God would be a biased sample, since people who go to church would tend to believe in God. So, there is also the question of whether samples used to establish claims about hetereofatalism are biased in some manner.

An appeal to anecdotal evidence is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a very few cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. To be fair and balanced, Garnett does not seem to claim that her article is a rigorous analysis of heterofatalism but people do, as always, seem to be drawing inferences from her anecdotes. While I do not doubt that she and her small circle of friends are suffering dating woes, drawing a conclusion about American women in general from their anecdotes would be fallacious. But, as always, to infer that they must not be representative because they are mere anecdotal would be to commit the fallacy fallacy. This is the fallacy that a fallacy must have a false conclusion because it is a fallacy.

Thanks to Garnett, heterofatalism is enjoying a moment in the media spotlight (complete with backlash from the right). While the anecdotes of heterofatalism are likely to resonate with every woman who has had a bad relationship experience (that is, all women) it is wise to be aware of the spotlight fallacy. This fallacy rests on the availability heuristic cognitive bias. We tend to infer that something is widespread or frequent just because we hear about it often. So, the more something is in the media spotlight, the more inclined we are to think that it happens often or is a widespread occurrence. This can be intentionally used, as politicians often do. For example, an anti-immigrant politician might turn the anecdote of a murderer who is a migrant into a talking point in the right-wing media to create the impression that such murderers are common. When something goes viral, it can have the same effect. So, it is reasonable to wonder whether heterofatalism is widespread or just in the spotlight for now. That said, I think that Garnett is sincere in her article and honestly reports the disappointment of her and her friends.

While feminism is not one of my specialties, I do have moral concerns about relationships and how people are being treated. Like many “classic” feminists, I have argued the obvious: being abusive, oppressive and exploitative in a relationship is bad. But are the men Garnett is complaining about bad people and are they to blame for their alleged failures?

Based on the descriptions offered by Garnett, they are not bad. Just disappointing in that they fail to do what she wants. She does not report any cases of them being abusive or oppressive, or trying to exploit her. Ironically, one of her biggest complaints is that they seem unwilling to leave their house to come have sex with her. Many classic criticisms of men are that “all we care about” is sex. The worst that can be said of these men is that they fail to match her conception of what a man should be, which is (ironically) a criticism feminists have often made of men in terms of their expectation that women should match their expectations (such as being caregivers or having a certain appearance).

My last long-term relationship started in 2016, became a long-distance relationship in 2020 and ended in May, 2024. The ending was amicable, and she broke up with me in person. Like Garnett, I tried dating again and like her I have settled into my own version of heterofatalism. But, obviously, for different reasons.

In my own case, I take the obvious move of applying causal reasoning to assess why my relationships have ended. As a philosopher, I use the obvious approach of Mill’s Method of Agreement. This method requires considering at least two cases in which the effect is present. In this method, these cases are examined to find a common thread. The one indisputable common thread in all my relationships is me; so it makes sense to infer that I am the problem. But to be fair and balanced, I also need to consider common threads in the women I date, and I definitely have a type: ambitious, smart, and professional women whose careers will take them far away. As such, it makes sense why my relationships would end as they do: the woman breaking up with me (amicably) when the challenges of long distance love become too much. I must note that I went into these relationships with my eyes open: the women always made it clear that their career came first and that I would always be, at best, second in importance. Probably third, because dogs.

Garnett reveals much about herself in her article and her qualities and the qualities she seeks in men do provide an explanation for her disappointment. She notes that she recently ended her open marriage because she was in love with a man who later seemed unable to commit. She says she has gone after similar men who also seemed unable to commit. In discussions with her friends, they ripped apart the men they had been dating with obvious contempt for these pathetic creatures who failed them. Using common thread reasoning, one might suspect that while the men include a common thread, the women do as well. While we men are often criticized for being emotionally retarded, we do have feelings, and we can be surprisingly good at noticing how women feel about us (we can also be shockingly or willfully blind). Anecdotally, if I felt that a woman was contemptuous of me and mocking me with her friends, I would certainly not text her back or want to have anything to do with her. Also, if I was looking for a committed and loyal relationship, I would be wary of a woman who had an open marriage yet still divorced her husband because of what she thought she saw in some other man. While I know that this is anecdotal evidence, reading about Garnett and her friend’s contempt for men made me feel even more pessimistic. As such, it is worth considering that part of the problem in any relationship is you. And in my case, me.

While some would be angry if student loans were forgiven and might believe their anger proves this would be unfair, this sort of “reasoning” has it backwards. While people should be angry at unfairness, anger does not prove that something is unfair. People can be angry about things that are fair and even things that are unfair in ways advantageous to them yet not as unfair in their favor as they might wish. As such, as was discussed in the previous essay, it is no surprise that arguments from anger against student loan cancellation are flawed.

People also use the concepts of fair and unfair when engaged in moral masking. This is a rhetorical technique in which a person uses moral language to create the appearance that they are making moral claims or arguments when they are not. In most cases, those using this technique are concealing their own self-interest, desires, or feelings about the matter behind a mask of morality. The rhetorical advantage is that the person seems to have more laudable motivations or reasons than their wants and feelings. To illustrate, saying “I would resent it if other people had their student loans cancelled” is probably less persuasive than saying “student loan cancellation would be unfair.”

Being a professional philosopher, I would be remiss if I did not mention that there are philosophical theories in which moral claims are just expressions of emotions or preferences. While this oversimplifies things, on such views saying, “student loan cancellation is unfair” would be means something like “I don’t like student loan cancellation” or even “student loan cancellation yuck!” Crudely put, on these views there is nothing more to ethics than these feelings or preferences. Fortunately, even if these views of ethics are correct, we could still have a meaningful debate about whether student loan forgiveness is fair in terms of considering the quality of the arguments advanced in favor of the various positions. There are also some sophisticated theories of emotion or preference-based ethics that do allow for meaningful moral debate about which feelings or preferences are more apt. But let us set aside these theoretical meta-ethical concerns and get into the debate over fairness and student loan cancellation.

While people think they know what is fair (and hence unfair), they usually do not have a well-considered concept of fairness. So, a sensible place to begin is with some discussion of the notion of fairness. Perhaps the simplest version of fairness is that everyone gets the same treatment. This view does have considerable appeal and is one I use when teaching. For example, students will sometimes ask for individual extra credit. My response is always that allowing this would be unfair to the other students. While this oversimplifies things, a fair class treats the students the same.

On this view of fairness, student loan cancellation would clearly be unfair. Those who happened to have unpaid student loans right now would receive a benefit that no one else would. Those who paid off their loans, especially those who did so soon before the forgiveness, would be denied this government largesse because they were responsible and probably made sacrifices to repay their loans. Many people who never took out student loans could contend that the debts they have are just as deserving of cancellation as student loans. Since everyone is not getting the same treatment, student loan cancellation is wrong and should not be done. This can be presented as an argument from fairness:

 

Premise 1: Government student loan debt cancellation would not treat people the same.

Premise 2: The government not treating people the same is unfair.

Premise 3: Treating people unfairly is wrong.

Conclusion: Student loan debt cancellation is wrong.

 

While this is certainly a viable moral position, it runs directly into the fact that the government routinely treats people differently. For example, business owners and corporations receive subsidies (agricultural subsidies are a common example) that other people do not receive. As another example, the wealthy and corporations enjoy the advantages of tax laws and policies that allow some of them to pay no taxes despite being greatly benefited by the state.  As such, if someone uses this sort of fairness argument against student loan debt cancellation, then they would be inconsistent if they failed to apply it to other cases in which the government does not treat people the same—which is most cases.

There are two main approaches to having the government treat people the same. One is for the government not to do anything for people. This would treat people the same because the government would not be doing anything for anyone. For example, not providing any form of relief or benefits (such as student loan cancellation or tax cuts) would treat people the same. Taking this to the extreme would result in anarchism (the elimination of the coercive state) or a return to the state of nature (an absence of any government). While there are those who advocate anarchism and even those who favor the state of nature, these would be a long way to go just to avoid cancelling student loan debt.

The other approach is for the government to do things but ensure that each person receives the same services and benefits from the state. For example, if one person received subsidies, then everyone would. If one person got a 10% tax cut, then everyone would. If one person had $50,000 in debt cancelled, then everyone would (perhaps getting a voucher for future debt). Taken to the extreme, this would resemble a common straw-person version of socialism in which everyone is treated identically by the state.  While this might have some initial appeal, reflection shows that it would be absurd. As everyone does not have the same needs and wants, treating everyone exactly the same would not be a very wise approach. Although the rest of us would certainly be better off if we were all treated like the wealthy, the powerful and the corporations by the state.

It would seem that taking fairness as treating people exactly the same in order to argue that cancelling student loan debt is unfair would create some problems: one would seem to be committed to either the state treating everyone the same by doing nothing (no more state) or by having the state treat everyone the same in every way which would seem absurd. As such, we need to consider another conception of fairness.

Trump and his supporters claimed Biden “won” in 2020 because of widespread election fraud. While Sidney Powell wove an international conspiracy too crazy even for Rudy Giuliana, some of Trump supporters embraced it. Another conspiracy theory claimed, falsely, that the US seized election servers in Germany in an armed raid. The pardoned (by Trump) criminal Michael Flynn  called on Trump to suspend the Constitution and impose martial law in order to re-do the election. Officials in Georgia  received death threats for accepting the election results and when a fellow Republican pleaded with Trump to address this, Trump doubled down on his conspiracy theory.

The various conspiracy theories seem to have claimed that all election officials in areas won by Biden were involved in the alleged fraud. It must be noted that these included Republican election officials who supervised elections in which down-ballot Republicans often won. As always, the entire mainstream media (except perhaps Fox News) was said to be in on the conspiracy against Trump. Social media companies, voting machine companies and fellow travelers have been accused of being in on the conspiracy.  Even the Secretary of State and the Governor of Georgia seem were cast into the conspiracy by Trump and his followers thought they betrayed Trump for Biden. Attorney General Bill Barr disputed Trump’s claims of fraud; Lou Dobbs suggested Barr was “compromised.” As other Republicans publicly accepted the results of the election, they were also be seen as “compromised” and in on the alleged conspiracy against Trump. The large number of people alleged to be involved in election fraud to help Biden leads to a conspiracy paradox. But first, a bit more set up.

About 34% of registered voters identify as independents, 33% identify as Democrats and 29% identify as Republicans. Independents tend to lean towards a party and 49% of all registered voters are either Democrats or lean that way. 44% identify as Republicans or lean that way. The party members and leaners do not always vote based on their affiliation or lean; 2016 provides a relevant example here. 5% of the Democrats and Democrat leaners jumped party to vote for Trump while 4% of Republicans and their leaners jumped party to vote for Hillary. Hillary did, after all, get millions more votes than Trump in 2016, she just got them in the wrong places.

In his first term as President, Trump had low approval ratings and his handling of the pandemic was horrible. Polls showed  that 52% of Americans were satisfied (18%) or happy (34%) that Trump lost the 2029 election. Early on Biden had a 55% approval rating. While not conclusive, this information provides evidence in support of the legitimacy of the election. That is, there are good reasons to believe that millions more people voted for Biden than voted for Trump and enough of the votes were in the right place to win the electoral college. But for the sake of the conspiracy theories, let us suppose that this view is mistaken. Given the 2016 results, the best that can be done for Trump’s side is to consider that Biden had millions more popular votes but not enough to beat Trump in the electoral college. As such, the conspiracy theory claim would be that widespread election fraud enabled Biden to win.

As noted above, Trump and his supporters claimed many people were involved in the conspiracy. While they obviously think Democrats are involved, they are added in Republicans. This number kept growing over the year. As noted above, when Barr said that the election was legitimate, he became a suspect in the conspiracy. The same held for other Republicans when they accepted the results. As such, Trump and his supporters need to claim that all these people were involved to maintain the conspiracy theories about widespread voter fraud. After all, if these Republicans are not in on the conspiracy, then that would suggest the election was legitimate. The alleged conspiracy became so large that Biden would have won if the alleged conspirators had simply voted for him in a legitimate election. This, then, is the paradox: Trump and his supporters had to expand the membership in the alleged conspiracies but doing so undermined the theory of fraud. At a certain point, the conspiracy became so large that if everyone in on the alleged conspiracy voted for Biden, then Biden would have easily won legitimately.

Trump is infamous for spewing lies and his supporters are known for believing his claims. As noted in previous essays, one of the many things that is striking about supporters professing belief in Trump’s claims is that they accept claims that are logically inconsistent or even contradictory. Two claims are inconsistent when they both cannot be true but they both could be false. This is different from two claims being contradictory: if one claims contradicts another, one must be true and the other false.

The last pandemic provides a horrific example of the ability of Trump supporters to profess belief in inconsistent claims.  Many Trump supporters claimed to believe that COVID-19 was a hoax, that it was no worse than the flu, that it was a Chinese bioweapon, that Trump did a great job with the pandemic and that Trump should get credit for the vaccine.   When Bob Woodward released tapes proving that Trump acknowledged the danger of the virus in February, many Trump supporters accepted Trump’s claim that he wanted to play down the virus to avoid a panic. His supporters defended him, claiming that great leaders have and should lie to prevent panic in the face of terrible danger. If Trump was right to lie to play down the deadly danger of the virus, then this is inconsistent with the claim that it is like the flu and inconsistent with the claim that it is a hoax. If he was right to lie because of the danger, then it is not like the flu nor is it a hoax. But if it is like the flu or a hoax, then he would not need to lie about the danger. One way to explain Trump supporters professing inconsistent beliefs is that some of them are accomplices. Another is that they are victims. I will begin with the accomplice explanation.

It is possible, even likely, that some of Trump’s supporters are aware when he is lying and perhaps even recognize when they make inconsistent claims. In this case, the inconsistency can easily be explained: they are accomplices to his lies and are repeating them. There is no inconsistency in their beliefs because they do not believe what they are claiming. There are various reasons for people to serve as his accomplices. They might want to express their allegiance to him, they might find his lies advantageous in their own grifts, they might be trolls, or they might gain some other advantage by professing belief in his lies. Not believing inconsistent claims does not make the claims consistent; it is just that the accomplices do not have inconsistent beliefs in this context.

As would be suspected, it can be difficult to prove that a supporter is an accomplice of Trump rather than a victim. While Trump pulls the curtain back and reveals things (like how Republicans want to make it harder to vote), it is unlikely that one of his accomplices would end a social media post professing belief in Trump’s claims by revealing that they do not believe the lies they just professed to believe. Sorting out the accomplices from the victims would require access to such things as private emails and recordings, things that would be difficult and perhaps illegal to acquire. In general, the accomplices are not very interesting from an epistemic standpoint since they are lying. About the only thing interesting is the epistemic problem of discerning the accomplices from the victims. Now, on to the victims.

In this context, the victims of Trump are supporters who believe his lies. These victims can be further divided into those who would change their view of Trump if they realized he was lying and those who would still support him (that is, would become accomplices). Given that Trump lies badly and blatantly even when his lies are easily exposed, my main explanation as to why these victims believe him is that they are often basing their beliefs on an appeal to authoritarian. This fallacious reasoning has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Authoritarian leader L makes claim c.

Conclusion: Claim C is true.

 

The fact that an authoritarian leader makes a claim does not provide evidence or a logical reason that supports the claim. It also does not disprove the claim because accepting or rejecting a claim because it comes from an authoritarian would both be errors. The authoritarian could be right about the claim but, as with any fallacy, the error lies in the reasoning.

A silly math example illustrates why this is bad logic:

 

Premise 1: The dear leader claims that 2+2 =7.

Conclusion: The dear leader is right.

 

Since this is bad logic, it gets its power from psychological rather than logical factors. In this case, these factors are the psychological features of authoritarian personalities. An authoritarian leader is characterized by the belief that they have a special status as a leader. At the extreme, the authoritarian leader believes that they are the voice of their followers and that they alone can lead. Or, as Trump put it, “I alone can fix it.” Underlying this is the (false) belief that they possess exceptional skills, knowledge and ability. This causes them to make false claims and mistakes.

Since the authoritarian leader is reluctant to admit errors and limits, they must be dishonest to the degree they are not delusional and delusional to the degree they are not dishonest. Trump exemplifies this with his constant barrage of untruths and incessant bragging. These claims are embraced as true by his supporters who are victims.

An authoritarian leader like Trump desires followers and fortunately for him, there are those of the authoritarian follower type. While Trump’s accomplices make use of him and assist him, they know he is lying. The authoritarian follower believes that their leader is special, that the leader alone can fix things. Thus, the followers must buy into the leaders’ delusions and lies, convincing themselves despite the evidence to the contrary. Trump’s devoted supporters incorrectly believe him to be honest and competent.

Since Trump has failed often and catastrophically, his victims must accept the deceitful explanations put forth to account for them. This requires rejecting facts and logic.  These victims embrace lies and conspiracy theories—whatever supports the narrative of Trump’s greatness and success Those who do not agree with Trump are not merely wrong but are enemies.  The claims of those who disagree are rejected out of hand, and often with hostility and insults. Thus, the followers tend to isolate themselves epistemically—which is a fancy way of saying that nothing that goes against their view of the leader ever gets in. While this explains, in part, their belief in Trump’s lies it also helps explain how they can believe inconsistent (even contradictory) claims.

Someone who forms beliefs based on the appeal to authoritarian will accept what the authoritarian tells them as true. What justifies these beliefs in the minds of the victims is that the authoritarian made them. As such, they have no reason to consider other evidence and are effectively immune to arguments against these beliefs. After all, if the justification of a belief is a matter of it being a claim made by the authoritarian, then any other evidence or argument against that claim cannot impact its justification. The only things that could undermine the belief would be if the authoritarian told their followers to accept a new belief in place of the old (for example, the authoritarian saying that a once trusted minion is now an enemy) or if the victim stopped accepting the authoritarian for some reason.  So how does this enable inconsistent beliefs?

The answer is that it does so very easily. If the victim believes a claim because the authoritarian makes the claim and other factors are irrelevant, then consistency will not matter to that victim. These beliefs are not accepted because they are backed by evidence, and they are not subject to critical assessment. As such, it would not even occur to the victim to check the claims made by the authoritarian against each other to see if they are consistent or not: these claims are simply believed, and they are believed because the authoritarian makes them. In the case of Trump supporters who are victims, this seems to be what they are doing: they believe what Trump says because Trump says it and that is good enough. It must be; if they engaged in a honest assessment and searched for the truth, they would not believe Trump’s lies. While they might bring up “evidence” and “argue” when responding to critics of Trump, these are not good faith efforts since they do not believe based on evidence (because there is none) and they will refuse all evidence and arguments that go against these beliefs. Trump’s victims believing his lies about the election and insisting there is evidence of widespread fraud is an excellent example of this. The lack of evidence has no impact on their beliefs nor does the inconsistency of some of their beliefs because all that matters is what Trump says. This, of course, is a terrible epistemic system, although it is the foundation of authoritarianism (which is what Trumpism is, at least in part).

An odd thing about the American far right is they often seem to be buffoons doing absurd things. One example is the fascist organization Proud Boys. While this is a domestic terrorist group known for violence, it is also known for its wacky rules and rituals. They have a strict rule about masturbation and a ritual in which they punch a member while shouting out the names of breakfast cereals. They also seem to LARP by dressing up with a Call of Duty look and have an order of “Alt Knights.” As such, they can appear as a bunch of loonies.

As a second example, Trump puts on a masterful show of buffoonery. He maintains an odd orange skin tone which has led to speculation that it is a spray on tan. His COVID press conferences were master performances in absurdity with bizarre claims made in front of the cameras. His bumbling of basic language and expression of ignorance about basic facts relevant to his job are also an impressive performance of buffoonery.

As a third example, Rudy Giuliani rivaled his master in his buffoonery. He crazily advanced unsupported conspiracy theories, filed unfounded lawsuits with typos, held a press conference at a landscaping business, and in a brilliant stroke of foolery held a press conference with what might be mascara (rather than hair dye) running down the sides of his face. Comedians are hard pressed to parody the right. While it is tempting to dismiss this buffoonery as arising from stupidity, it is worth considering it is a strategy. So, what are possible advantages of buffoonery as a political tool?

One advantage is that ridiculous behavior can make someone seem less dangerous or even harmless. Take, for example, the Proud Boys. Their breakfast cereal beating and “no wank” rules make them seem silly. How could such silly people be domestic terrorists? In the case of Rudy and his ilk, their incompetent buffoonery makes them seem silly. How could some crazy guy with mascara running down his face have harmed American democracy? The defense against this is to realize that even buffoons can be dangerous, especially when their buffoonery is directed by non-buffoons and used as a cover.

A second advantage of buffoonery is that it distracts people from serious matters. Trump’s constant buffoonery draws attention away from the harmful and corrupt things going on under his reign. As many have said, Trump sucks up all the oxygen and dominates the news cycle and thus important stories get little or no attention. In the case of the Proud Boys, their buffoonery distracts from their violence. In the case of Rudy and his ilk, their buffoonery distracts from the deeper stories of the undermining of American democracy in favor of authoritarianism.  This tactic is analogous to that used by pickpockets and magicians: they often use an assistant to distract the target so that they can accomplish their goal. The defense is to resist the lure of the buffoonery but this is hard for most of the media as they need to capture an audience.

A third advantage is that buffoonery makes it harder for the opponents of the far right to convince others that these people are a threat. This strategy is presented in the X-Files episode José Chung’s From Outer Space. In this episode, Mulder and Scully run into the Men in Black. Alex Trebek plays one of them but he is supposed to just look like Alek Trebek rather than be Alex Trebek. That is, he is playing someone who is playing him. This is done because the Men in Black are supposed to appear so ridiculous that any story told about them will seem absurd and unbelievable. To use the Proud Boys as an example, if someone tries to explain that this “no wank” group of breakfast cereal shouters is a real threat, they might seem crazy.

Folks on the right also use coded language, dog-whistles, and euphemisms to produce a similar effect. Because of this strategy, trying to explain the right to “normies” can make a person seem crazy. Phrases and terms like “bad hombres”, “law and order”, “inner cities”, “suburban housewives”, “America First”, “international bankers”, and such appear innocent to those ignorant of the code and the context. For example, when Trump talks about “law and order” in the “inner cities” he is usually talking about using the police to oppress black Americans. When a right-wing group talks about “international bankers” and “Soros” they are usually engaging in antisemitism. As I can attest to from my own experience, trying to explain dog whistles and coded language to “normies” results in incredulous stares which is exactly what the right intends. Overcoming this is challenging, especially since the right adapts when their dog whistles and coded language is exposed to the mainstream. But this is something that needs to be done and one hopes that more people become aware of what the right is trying to do and can decode their language even when the right adapts.

QAnon is essentially a conspiracy street sausage: scrap and leftovers of past conspiracies wrapped in the intestines of an apocalyptic cult and served up to people who are not careful about what gets into their minds. But it is also a fascinating bit of story design that mirrors classic techniques used to write horror adventures in role-playing games and tales of terror.

Put a bit simply, QAnon is a conspiracy theory that there is a worldwide cabal of Satan-worshiping (possibly cannibal) pedophiles operating a sex-trafficking ring. Since these are criminal activities universally condemned as morally horrific, the story of QAnon should be in the police procedural genre. If the evidence QAnon claims existed, then there should be worldwide arrests with public support. While there have been arrests and investigations  featuring the likes of Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell, there is no evidence of activity against this alleged cabal. This is not surprising as the authors of the conspiracy seem to be using a classic technique used in horror adventures in games and stories, that of negating the authorities to make room for the heroes.

In horror role-playing games such as Call of Cthulhu, one takes on the role of a hero attempting to thwart or at least delay the machinations of evil. One practical concern is providing a rational explanation as to why the heroes are the ones who must save the day. The heroes are usually just a random collection of people thrown into horror. They are almost never in positions of meaningful power or authority. As such, they are not the ones to take on the job because they have an army or police force to get it done for them. They are the ones to do the job because they are the heroes. There must also be a rational explanation that explains why the authorities are not the ones solving the problem, otherwise there would be no need for the heroes. There are a variety of ways to handle this negation of authority.

One classic is isolation. The heroes are someplace where there are no authorities who can save the day. They might, for example, be in a cabin deep in the Maine woods with no phone service or working transportation. They might, as another example, be on a damaged ship with no power and no working radio. QAnon does not use this approach, since it would not work with their horror story.

A second approach is that the authorities are unwilling or unable to help. They might be too afraid to act, they might be too weak to act, they might not know what is occurring, or the heroes might not have the evidence needed to convince them to act. In some cases, the heroes intentionally avoid involving the authorities when they believe that the authorities simply cannot handle the situation, and they do not want to get people needlessly killed.  In the case of QAnon, they think that some people in power are not part of the cabal but are also not among the heroes supposedly fighting it.

A third classic approach is that the authorities are part of the conspiracy: they are not solving the problem because they are the problem. One practical concern here is that the authorities cannot be too powerful, otherwise the heroes would not stand a chance against them. QAnon does claim that at least some of those in power are part of the conspiracy. They address the power concern by making Donald Trump their main hero: he can fight against the pillars of the community because he is the President and has the military and executive branch at his disposal. This does create another sort of problem: since Trump has such overwhelming force the adventure of QAnon should have ended almost immediately with Trump saving the day immediately. As a game, it would have gone down like this:

 

Keeper: “Okay, you are the President of the United States and have overwhelming evidence of a cabal of pedophile sex-traffickers.”

Player: “I give the FBI director a call and send him all the evidence.”

Keeper: “Great! The cabal members are soon arrested and your approval rating skyrockets!”

Player: “How much XP is that?”

Game Master: “This is Call of Cthulhu; you just get skill improvement rolls.”

 

As such, QAnon must explain why their hero has not used his overwhelming power to solve the problem. This requires another technique, delayed resolution. In a story or horror adventure, an immediate and easy solution is not satisfying and so the resolution must be delayed. To steal from Aristotle, the resolution cannot come too quickly—this makes the story too short, and it will fail to satisfy. It also cannot take too long since dragging the problem out will become tedious and strain plausibility. As such, the ideal is to be neither too short nor too long but to be just right.

QAnon has attempted to delay the resolution by explaining that Trump needed time to plan and organize what they call the “Storm.” On this day Trump will finally spring into action and the cabal members will be arrested. In a horror adventure, the game master delays resolution in various ways, such as having minor villains that must be vanquished, investigations that must be conducted and red herrings that distract the heroes. In the case of QAnon, the delayed resolution seems rather too delayed: Trump is into his second terms and there has not been a drop of rain, let alone a Storm. The Storm is tomorrow and always will be.

QAnon has, of course, a long list of failed predictions and has persisted (as such cults do) through these failures; but the Storm is critical to Trump remaining the hero. A good analogy is to consider what happens to apocalyptic groups when the date of their apocalypse comes and goes without an apocalypse: they tend to collapse. QAnon has, amazingly, been able to persist despite these failed predictions and remains active today. This, I admit, has surprised me. But perhaps playing QAnon is so addictive that they cannot stop.

While it might strike some as odd, I respect Trump supporters who claim Biden won in 2020 through fraud. I am taking them seriously; the same way I would take a claim by a professional colleague seriously in a philosophical dispute. I am also assuming that they are being serious.

This respect manifests in two ways. First, I am assuming they believe in their claims and are not knowingly making false claims for nefarious purposes, such as trying to steal the election.

Because there is currently no evidence for their claims of widespread voter fraud, I believe that Trump’s supporters are in error. But this is different from claiming they are lying. While it might not seem to be an important distinction, the difference between honest error and lying is significant. Honest error occurs when a person believes a claim that is false, but they think it is true, and they have put in the work to check their belief. A person is lying when they knowingly make false claims with an intent to deceive.

If Trump’s supporters believe that widespread voter fraud is real, then they would presumably either have evidence for their belief or they would support efforts to find credible evidence. After all, if they believe they are right, they should be confident of inquiries into their claims: the evidence should be there for all to see.

Trump supporters tend to regard the “mainstream” news and academic institutions as purveyors of fake news and lies. As such, we cannot undertake our search for evidence in such places. Although if these sources did find evidence of fraud by Biden, Trump supporters might find them credible in this one instance.

If the Democrats perpetrated widespread voter or election fraud, then there should be evidence, and this should be turned over to law enforcement. To use an analogy, if it were claimed that a group was involved in a nationwide illegal money laundering scheme, then there should be evidence of this alleged crime, and the police should be informed. If there is credible evidence, law enforcement would find it and there would be documentation in the form of police reports, court transcripts and the like. The same should hold true of the crimes of voter or election fraud.

If Trump supporters do not believe what they are saying, then they would have no evidence to support their lies and would have no interest in looking for evidence that they know does not exist. If they do believe what they are saying, then they should be able to provide evidence and should support the search for objective evidence. This seems like a reasonable test of honesty: the honest believer wants to believe the truth and has no fear of following the evidence to its conclusion. The liar has no evidence and attempts to distract others from the search for truth. To use another analogy, if Ted tells me that his neighbor Sam, whom he dislikes, is kidnaping people, and he is being honest, then I would expect him to provide evidence and take that evidence to the police. If he has no evidence and is unwilling to go to the police, then I would suspect that Ted is lying about Sam. If he was seriously concerned and had actual evidence, he would go to law enforcement. If he was trying to make trouble for Sam, I would expect that he would make unsupported claims but never go to the police as they would expect evidence.

Second, I assume they have a moral motivation. This is the assumption that Trump supporters are sincere when they say they love democracy and are motivated only by a desire to have an honest and fair election. The main alternative is that these claims are lies, and they do not really care how Trump wins.

Given this assumption, Trump supporters would be morally committed to a fair and honest election in which the candidate who receives the majority of legitimate votes wins the state in question. This moral view does, obviously, commit a person to opposing voter and election fraud: this sort of fraud would undermine democracy and make an election illegitimate to the degree that fraud occurred. I agree with the Trump supporters on this point, and I also oppose voter and election fraud: such fraud would be an attack on a foundation of democracy and would be an attempt to rob citizens of their right to choose.

This view also morally commits a person to opposing false claims about voter or election fraud: these false claims can damage the perceived legitimacy of an election. They can also be used, ironically, to commit a form of election fraud in which legitimate votes are rejected due to false claims they are fraudulent. If Trump’s supporters have a sincere moral commitment to democracy and honest elections, they should vehemently oppose false claims of voter or election fraud for these are as dangerous to the democracy and honest elections they purport to love. 

If Trump supporters show little or no concern about ensuring that claims of fraud are accurately assessed, then it would be reasonable to infer that they do not really care about the integrity of elections. Rather, what they care about is winning by any means.

As a closing point, thinking about whether Trump supporters are serious in their claims about fraud took me to pro-wrestling. When I have engaged with Trump supporters seriously on social media over the years, their responses tend to be insults and fallacies, as if we are engaged in some sort of competitive game rather than seriously looking at important claims about fraud. My hypothesis is that they might be engaged in kayfabe: they know they are engaged in performative fiction and accusing Biden of cheating is just part of the theatre. Asking them for evidence of cheating is like asking for evidence that the wrestling heel really does all those terrible things. Asking that question misses the point of the performance. If this is the case, then to Trump supporters I must seem like someone who wanders on stage at a play and thinks the drama is real.  To be honest, I do not know.

In the case of wrestling, taking the make-believe as real has no meaningful consequences. In the case of the election and politics in general, the make-believe (if it is such) does seem to have consequences. Elections are serious matters and if this is all theatre, it is harmful theater. My dilemma is this: if I take Trump supporters seriously, then I expect evidence for their claims. If it is just kayfabe, then it makes sense why no evidence is offered. But this means that their claims can be dismissed for what they are: mere fiction.