Category: Ethics

 

While there is debate about the right moral theory to apply to cheating, what makes the behavior cheating is that a person in a committed relationship is engaging in sexual activity with a person outside of that relationship. As such, cheating involves three main factors. The first is that the cheater is in a relationship that is supposed to exclude cheating. The second is that there is sexual activity. The third is that this activity is with a person outside of the relationship.

These factors would, on the face of it, exclude sexting and “cheating” in virtual environments (such as video games) from being real cheating. After all, sexting is the exchange of texts and in current virtual environments, there is no sexual contact. For example, if two players in World of Warcraft decide they are going to have a “virtual affair”, the most they can do is chat, strip down to their virtual underwear and awkwardly bump their characters together. I will address more “robust” virtual interactions in an essay to follow. These virtual and textual realms preclude the possibility of cheating in the traditional sense: at most, one is bumping code rather than bumping body parts. That said, there is intuitive appeal to such virtual cheating being real cheating in a moral sense. The challenge is making the case for this.

Since the physical infidelity aspect of cheating cannot occur in virtual cheating, the obvious focus is on emotional rather than physical fidelity. That is, the commitment is not just to sexual exclusivity but also a certain type of emotional exclusivity. This does require being careful about specifying the boundaries of this exclusivity. To use the obvious analogy, just as sexual exclusivity does not exclude all physical interaction with others, emotional exclusivity does not exclude all emotional interaction with others. Physical cheating, obviously enough, is easier to define and there are reasonably clear boundaries between sexual and non-sexual behavior. While there are some grey areas, the boundaries are adequate for this general discussion, and I will leave the precise boundaries of cheating to the relationship therapists and divorce attorneys.

Emotional cheating is more difficult to define, although the focus is on emotions connected with sex and romance. There is a broad area of concern about emotional fidelity which is the question of what is appropriate to feel about people outside of one’s committed relationship. Fortunately, the discussion is focused not merely on feeling, but the expression of feelings through sexting and virtual behavior. While I am aware of the problem of other minds (one never knows what another is really thinking or feeling or if they are thinking or feeling at all), it is reasonable to take the emotions expressed in sexting and virtual behavior at face value unless there are grounds for doubt.

While it is always reasonable to consider that a person’s feelings and thoughts might not match their behavior, this is more of an epistemic problem than a moral problem in this discussion. So if a person is expressing emotions via sexting and virtual behavior that should be exclusive to their relationship, then they are engaged in virtual cheating. This rests on the reasonable assumption that the expression of romantic and sexual feelings should be confined within the committed, exclusive relationship. The next obvious point of concern is why virtual cheating matters.

Traditional cheating runs the risk of the usual harmful consequences: unplanned pregnancies, STDs, questions of property rights and inheritance, emotional damage, physical damage and so on. While virtual cheating cannot cause STDs or pregnancies, it can cause emotional damage and thus could be morally wrong on utilitarian grounds. If the people in a relationship have agreed to emotional fidelity, such cheating can also be a violation of a person’s rights or moral rules. There is also the practical concern that virtual cheating can lead to physical cheating. To borrow from Plato’s arguments about the corrupting influence of art, even if someone starts out just “joking around” with sexting and virtual behavior outside of their committed relationship, there is a clear psychological path in which that “kidding around” can lead to real infidelity.

In the next essay I’ll look at the ethics of cheating in more “robust” virtual realities.

 

Advances in technology lead to advances in cheating, necessitating advances in moral discussions. Traditional cheating involves people having “face to face” sexual interactions when at least one is in a (supposedly) committed relationship. Virtual cheating is not traditional cheating: the people either do not interact sexually in person or the sexual behavior involves a non-person (such as a sexbot). While most people claim traditional cheating as wrong, it is not clear if the ethics of traditional cheating applies to virtual cheating. Answering this question requires first sorting out what, if anything, makes traditional cheating wrong.

A common approach to arguing that traditional cheating is wrong is to “mix norms” by going from religion to ethics. For example, people will often say that the Ten Commandments forbid adultery and then say this makes cheating wrong. The problem is that religion is not automatically the same as ethics. What is needed is a way to transition from religion to ethics. One easy way to do this is to use divine command theory. This is the moral theory that what God commands is good because He commands it. What He forbids is wrong because He forbids it. Assuming this theory, if God forbids adultery, then it is wrong. Regarding virtual cheating, the question would be whether virtual cheating is adequately like traditional adultery.

Another approach is more norm mixing by inferring that what is illegal is also immoral. While there are excellent reasons not to equate legality and morality, the moral theory of legalism (also known as legal positivism) is that what is legal is moral and what is illegal is immoral. If adultery is a crime, this would make cheating immoral. Legalism provides the easiest way to address the ethics of virtual cheating: just consult the law and the answer is there.

A third approach is the utilitarian option. On this view, the morality of an action is determined by weighing its harmful and beneficial consequences. If more negative value is created by the action, it is morally wrong. If there is more positive value, then it is morally good (or at least acceptable). Moral arguments against traditional cheating focus on the usual negative consequences: emotional damage, physical damage, STDs, unwanted pregnancies, and so on. Moral arguments defendimg cheating focus on the alleged benefits: pleasure, emotional fulfillment, and so on. The utilitarian approach makes it easy to avoid the question of whether virtual cheating is cheating. What matters in the moral assessment is whether the consequences create more negative or positive value.

A fourth option is to embrace a rule-based approach, such as the deontology of Immanuel Kant. On this view, the action itself is wrong or right, and its morality is not a matter of consequences. Religious arguments that do not rely solely on divine command theory are often rule based arguments. The rules would usually be those attributed to God. While deontologists can embrace very different rules about who you should embrace, Kant’s categorical imperative and his view that people are ends rather than means would seem to support the view that cheating is morally wrong. The question about virtual cheating would be whether it is cheating.

A fifth approach is that of virtue theory of the sort of theory endorsed by Aristotle and Confucius. On this view, a person should strive to be virtuous, and the incentive is that virtue will make you happy. Since cheating would seem to violate such virtues as honesty and loyalty, then it would usually be wrong under virtue theory. In the case of virtual cheating, the concern would be with the effect of such behavior on a person’s virtues.

A final approach is a rights-based approach. Ethics that are based on rights purport that people have various rights, and it is wrong to violate them. In the case of cheating, the usual argument is that people engage in a contractual ethics by agreeing to a committed relationship. This gives each party rights and responsibilities. If the explicit or implicit contract is one of exclusive sexual interaction, then traditional cheating would violate this right of exclusivity and is wrong. In the case of virtual cheating, it would also be a question of rights—typically based on an explicit or implicit contract. Naturally, contractual ethics can also be cast in the form of rule based ethics in which the contract forms the rules.

In the next essay I will move on to the matter of virtual cheating, beginning with considerations of sexting and “cheating” in virtual worlds such as video games.

 

Due to the execution of a health insurance CEO, public attention is focused on health care. The United States has expensive health care, and this is working as intended to generate profits. Many Americans are uninsured or underinsured and even those who have insurance can find that their care is not covered. As has been repeatedly pointed out in the wake of the execution, there is a health care crisis in the United States and it is one that has been intentionally created.

Americans are a creative and generous people, which explains why people have turned to GoFundMe to get money for medical expenses. Medical bills can be ruinous and lead to bankruptcy for hundreds of thousands of Americans each year. A GoFundMe campaign can help a person pay their bills, get the care they need and avoid financial ruin. Friends of mine have been forced to undertake such campaigns and I have donated to them, as have many other people. In my own case, I am lucky and have a job that offers insurance coverage at a price I can afford, and my modest salary allows me to meet the medical expenses for a very healthy person with no pre-existing conditions. However, I know that like most of us,  I am one medical disaster away from financial ruin. As such, I have followed the use of GoFundMe for medical expenses with some practical interest. I have also given it some thought from a philosophical perspective.

On the one hand, the success of certain GoFundMe campaigns to cover such expenses suggests that people are morally decent and are willing to expend their own resources to help others. While GoFundMe does profit from these donations, their take is modest. They are not engaged in gouging people in need and exploiting medical necessities for absurdly high profits. That is the job of the health insurance industry.

On the other hand, there is the moral concern that in a wealthy country replete with billionaires and millionaires, many people must beg for money to meet their medical expenses. This spotlights the excessive cost of healthcare, the relatively low earnings of many Americans, and the weakness of the nation’s safety net. While those who donate out of generosity and compassion merit moral praise, the need for such donations merits moral condemnation. People should not need to beg for money to pay for their medical care. 

To anticipate an objection, I am aware that people do use GoFundMe for frivolous things and there are scammers, but my concern is with the fact that some people do need to turn to crowdfunding to pay their bills.

While donating is morally laudable, there are concerns about this method of funding. One practical problem is that it depends on the generosity of others. It is not a systematic and dependable method of funding. As such, it is a gamble to rely on it.

A second problem is that it depends on running an effective social media campaign. Like any other crowdfunding, success depends on getting attention and persuading people to donate. Those who have the time, resources and skills to run effective social media campaigns (or who have help) are more likely to succeed. This is concerning because people facing serious medical expenses are often in no condition to undertake the challenges of running a social media campaign. This is not to criticize or condemn people who can do this or recruit others. My point is that this method is no substitute for a systematic and consistent approach to funding health care.

A third problem is that success depends on the appeal of the medical condition and the person with that condition. While a rational approach to funding would be based on merit and need, there are clearly conditions and people that are more appealing in terms of attracting donors. For example, certain diseases and conditions can be “in” and generate sympathy, while others are not as appealing. In the case of people, we are not all equal in how appealing we are to others. As with the other problems, I do not condemn or criticize people for having conditions that are “in” or being appealing. Rather, my concern is that this method rests so heavily on these factors rather than medical and financial need. Once again, this serves to illustrate how the current system has been willfully broken and does not serve the needs of most Americans. While those who have succeeded in their GoFundMe campaigns should be lauded for their effort and ingenuity, those who run the health care system in which people have to run social media campaigns to afford their health care should be condemned.   

 

Asking “when was the last battle of the Civil War fought?” is a trick question; the last battle has yet to be fought. One example of a minor skirmish is when New Orleans began its removal of Confederate monuments. The removal of the first monument looked like a covert operation. Using equipment with hidden company names, the removal crews wore masks and body armor while operating under the cover of darkness and police sniper protection. These precautions were deemed necessary because of threats. In addition to being controversial, the removal of such monuments is philosophically interesting.

One argument commonly used to defend Confederate monuments is the historical argument: the monuments express and are part of history and their removal is claimed to be like tearing pages from the history books. This argument does have some appeal, at least for objects marking an historical event and presenting facts. However, monuments tend to be erected to bestow honors, and this goes beyond marking an historical event and presenting history.

One example is the Battle of Liberty Place Monument. It was erected in New Orleans in 1891 to honor the 1874 battle between the Crescent City White League and the racially integrated New Orleans Metropolitan police and state militia. The monument was modified by the city in 1932 with a plaque expressing support for white supremacy. The monument was modified again in 1993 when a new plaque was placed over the 1932 plaque, commemorating all those who died in the battle.

From a moral perspective, the problem with this sort of monument is that it is not an objective historical marker, but and endorsement of white supremacy and racism. As such, to keep such a memorial in place would be to say the city at least tolerates white supremacy and racism. If these values are still endorsed by the city, then the monument should remain as a warning label. That way people will know to expect white supremacy and racism.

 However, if the values are no longer endorsed by the city, then such a monument should be removed.  This would express the current views of the people of the city. It could be objected that such removal would be on par with purging historical records. Obviously, the records of the event should not be purged. Historical records should aim at recording the facts without praising (or condemning) what has occurred. In contrast, to erect and preserve an honoring monument is to take a stance on the matter; to praise or condemn it.

It could be argued that the 1993 change to the monument “redeems” it from its white supremacist and racist origins and it and similar monuments should remain in place. This does have some appeal, part of which is that the monument expresses the history of the (allegedly) changed values. To use an analogy, a building that once served an evil purpose can be refurbished and redeemed to serve a good purpose. This, it could be argued, sends a more powerful statement than simply razing the building.

However, the monument was originally created to honor white supremacy, and the recent modification could be justly seen as an effort to conceal this fact. Since the monument does have historical significance, it would be reasonable to preserve it. After all, historical artifacts can be kept without endorsing values associated with the artifact. For example, keeping artifacts that belonged to Stalin as historically significant items is not to endorse Stalinism. Keeping a monument in a place of honor, is an endorsement.

The matter can become more complicated in cases involving statues of individuals such as General Robert E. Lee, Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General P.G.T. Beauregard. These men did shape the history of the United States. It also cannot be denied they possessed some personal virtues. Lee is often presented as a man of considerable virtue. P.G.T. Beauregard went on to advocate for civil rights and voting rights for blacks (though some might say this was due to political expediency).

Given their historical importance and roles, it can be argued that they were worthy of statues and that these statues should remain to honor them. The easy and obvious counter is that they engaged in treason against the United States and backed slavery. Whatever personal virtues they might have possessed, they should not be honored for their role in the Confederacy. Statues that honor people who were Confederates but who did laudable things after the Civil War should, of course, be evaluated based on the merits of those individuals. But to honor the Confederacy and its support of slavery would be a moral error.

It could also be argued that even though the Confederate cause of fighting for the right of some people to own other people is wicked, people like Lee and Beauregard earned their statues and their honor. As such, it would be unjust to remove their statues because of the political sensibilities of today. After all, as it should be pointed out, there are statues that honor the slave owners Washington and Jefferson for their laudable deeds within the context of the dishonor of slavery. If the principle of removing monuments that honored those who supported a rebellion aimed at creating an independent slave-owning nation was strictly followed, then there would need to be a rather extensive purge of American monuments. If honoring supporters of slavery and slave owners is acceptable, then perhaps the removal of the statues of the heroes of the Confederacy could be justified on the grounds of their rebellion against the United States. This would allow for a principled distinction to be made: statues of slavery supporters and slave owners can be acceptable, as long as they were not rebels against the United States. Alternative, the principle could be that statues of victorious rebel slavery supporters are acceptable, but those of losing rebel slavery supporters are not. Winning, it could be said, makes all the difference.

The execution of CEO Brian Thompson has brought the dystopian but highly profitable American health care system into the spotlight. While some are rightfully expressing compassion for Thompson’s family, the overwhelming tide of commentary is about the harms Americans suffer because of the way the health care system is operated. In many ways, this incident exposes many aspects of the American nightmare such as dystopian health care, the rule of oligarchs, the surveillance state, and gun violence.

As this is being written the identity and motives of the shooter are not known. However, the evidence suggests that he had an experience with the company that was bad enough he decided to execute the CEO. The main evidence for this is the words written on his shell casings (deny”, “depose”, and “defend”) that reference the tactics used by health insurance companies to avoid paying for care. Given the behavior of insurance companies in general and United Healthcare in particular, this inference makes sense.

The United States spends $13,000 per year per person on health care, although this is just the number you get when you divide the total spending by the total number of people. Obviously, we don’t each get $13,000 each year. Despite this, we have worse health outcomes than many other countries that spend less than half of what we do, and American life expectancy is dropping. It is estimated that about 85 million people are either without health care insurance or are underinsured.

It is estimated that between 45,000 and 60,000 Americans die each year because they cannot get access to health care on time, with many of these deaths attributed to a lack of health insurance. Even those who can get access to health care face dire consequences in that about 500,000 Americans go bankrupt because of medical debt. In contrast, health insurance companies are doing very well. In 2023, publicly traded health insurance companies experienced a 10.4% increase in total GAAP revenue reaching a total of $1.07 trillion. Thomson himself had an annual compensation package of $10.2 million.

In addition to the cold statistics, almost everyone in America has a bad story about health insurance. One indication that health insurance is a nightmare is the number of GoFundMe fundraisers for medica expenses. The company even has a guide to setting up your own medical fundraiser. Like many people, I have given to such fundraisers such as when a high school friend could not pay for his treatment. He is dead now.

My own story is a minor one, but the fact that a college professor with “good” insurance has a story also illustrates the problem. When I had my quadriceps repair surgery, the doctor told me that my insurance had stopped covering the leg brace because they deemed it medically unnecessary. The doctor said that it was absolutely necessary, and he was right. So, I had to buy a $500 brace that my insurance did not cover. I could afford it, but $500 is a lot of money for most of us.

Like most Americans, I have friends who have truly nightmarish stories of unceasing battles with insurance companies to secure health care for themselves or family. Similar stories flooded social media, filling out the statistics with the suffering of people. While most people did not applaud the execution, it was clear that Americans hate the health insurance industry and do so for good reason. But is the killing of a CEO morally justified?

There is a general moral presumption that killing people is wrong and we rightfully expect a justification if someone claims that a killing was morally acceptable. In addition to the moral issue, there is also the question of the norms of society. Robert Pape, director of the University of Chicago’s project on security and threats, has claimed that Americans are increasingly accepting violence as a means of settling civil disputes and that this one incident shows that “the norms of violence are spreading into the commercial sector.” While Pape does make a reasonable point, violence has long been a part of the commercial sector although this has mostly been the use of violence against workers in general and unions in particular. Gun violence is also “normal” in the United States in that it occurs regularly. As such, the killing does see to be within the norms of America, although the killing of a CEO is unusual.

While it must be emphasized that the motive of the shooter is not known, the speculation is that he was harmed in some manner by the heath insurance company. While we do not yet know his story, we do know that people suffer or die from lack of affordable insurance and when insurance companies deny them coverage for treatment.

Philosophers draw a moral distinction between killing and letting people die and insurance companies can make the philosophical argument that they are not killing people or inflicting direct harm. They are just letting people suffer or die for financial reasons when they can be helped. When it comes to their compensation packages, CEOs and upper management defend their exorbitant compensation by arguing that they are the ones making the big decisions and leading the company. If we take them at their word, then this entails that they also deserve the largest share of moral accountability. That is, if a company’s actions are causing death and suffering, then the CEO and other leadership are the ones who deserve a package of blame to match their compensation package.

It is important to distinguish moral accountability from legal accountability. Corporations exist, in large part, to concentrate wealth at the top while distributing legal accountability. Even when they commit criminal activity, “it’s rare for top executives – especially at larger companies – to face personal punishment.” One reason for this is that the United States is an oligarchy rather than a democracy and the laws are written to benefit the wealthy. This is not to say that corporate leaders are above the law; they are not. They are wrapped in the law, and it generally serves them well as armor against accountability. For the lower classes, the law is more often a sword employed to rob and otherwise harm them. As such, one moral justification for an individual using violence against a CEO or other corporate leader is that might be the only way they will face meaningful consequences for their crimes.

The social contract is supposed to ensure that everyone faces consequences and when this is not the case, then the social contract loses its validity. To borrow from Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, it would be foolish to be restrained by “justice” when others are harming you without such restraint.  But it might be objected, while health insurance companies do face legal scrutiny, denying coverage and making health care unaffordable for many Americans is legal. As such, these are not crimes and CEOs, and corporate leaders should not be harmed for inflicting such harm.

While it is true that corporations can legally get away with letting people die and even causing their deaths, this is where morality enters the picture. While there are philosophical views that morality is determined by the law, these views have many obvious problems, not the least of which is that they are counterintuitive.

If people are morally accountable for the harm they inflict and can be justly punished and the legal system ignores such harm, then it would follow that individuals have the moral right to act. In terms of philosophical justification, John Locke provides an excellent basis. If a corporation can cause unjustified harm to the life and property of people and the state allows this, then the corporations have returned themselves and their victims to the state of nature because, in effect, the state does not exist in this context. In this situation, everyone has the right to defend themselves and others from such unjust incursions and this, as Locke argued, can involve violence and even lethal force.

It might be objected that such vigilante justice would harm society, and that people should rely on the legal system for recourse. But that is exactly the problem: the people running the state have allowed the corporations to mostly do as they wish to their victims with little consequence and have removed the protection of the law. It is they who have created a situation where vigilante justice might be the only meaningful recourse of the citizen. To complain about eroding norms is a mistake, because the norm is for corporations and the elites to get away with moral crimes with little consequence. For people to fight back against this can be seen as desperate attempts at some justice.

As the Trump administration is likely to see a decrease in even the timid and limited efforts to check corporate wrongdoing, it seems likely there will be more incidents of people going after corporate leaders. Much of the discussion among the corporations is about the need to protect corporate leaders and we can expect lawmakers and the police to step up to offer even more protection to the oligarchs from the people they are hurting.

Politicians could take steps to solve the health care crisis that the for-profit focus of health care has caused and some, such have Bernie Sanders, honestly want to do that. In closing, one consequence of the killing is that Anthem decided to rescind their proposed anesthesia policy. Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield plans representing Connecticut, New York and Missouri had said they would no longer pay for anesthesia care if a procedure goes beyond an arbitrary time limit, regardless of how long it takes. This illustrates our dystopia: this would have been allowed by the state that is supposed to protect us, but the execution of a health insurance CEO made the leaders of Anthem rethink their greed. This is not how things should be. In a better world Thompson would be alive, albeit not as rich,  and spending the holidays with his family. And so would the thousands of Americans who died needlessly because of greed and cruelty.

 

While the United States is the richest country on earth, people asking for money is a common occurrence. Last week, when I went to CVS to get my COVID shot, a person laying on the sidewalk asked me for money. I’m often approached while grocery shopping and even while running. Although I have been told I am just helping to buy someone drugs or beer, I routinely give people cash. This is a moral choice, and I would be going against my own professed principles if I did not help people, even when they might be deceiving me about what they will purchase. But some people find panhandling a problem and not in terms of people needing to beg for money.

Local officials sometimes believe panhandlers are detrimental to businesses and tourism and there have been efforts to ban begging. While local governments try to craft laws to pass constitutional muster, their efforts have generally proven futile in the face of the First Amendment. While the legal questions are addressed by courts, there remains the moral question of whether banning panhandling can be morally justified.

One starting point for a moral argument for banning panhandling is a utilitarian approach. Local officials generally want bans because they believe panhandlers are bad for businesses and tourism. For example, if potential customers are accosted by panhandlers on the streets around businesses, then they are less likely to patronize those businesses.

As another example, if a city gets a reputation for being awash in panhandlers who annoy tourists with, then tourism might decline. From the perspective of the business owners and the local officials, these effects would have negative value that outweigh the benefits to the panhandlers of being able to ask for money. There is presumably also utility in encouraging panhandlers to move away to other locations, thus removing the financial and social cost of having panhandlers. If this utilitarian calculation is accurate, then banning panhandling would be morally acceptable. Of course, if the calculation is not correct and such a ban would do more harm than good, then the ban would be morally wrong.

A second utilitarian argument is the safety argument. While panhandlers generally do not engage in violence (they are asking for money and not trying to rob people), some claim they do present a risk. One concern is that by panhandling in or near traffic, they put themselves and others in danger. If this is true, then banning panhandling would be the right thing to do.  If, however, the alleged harm does not justify the ban, then it would be morally unacceptable.

There is also the reply that safety concerns could be addressed by having laws that forbid people from obstructing the flow of traffic and being a danger to themselves and others. Presumably these laws already exist in most places. There is also the concern that the safety argument would need to be applied consistently to all such allegedly risky behavior around traffic, such as people engaging in political campaigns or street side advertising.

One can advance a utilitarian argument in favor of panhandling based on the harm that could be done by restricting the panhandlers’ rights. Following Mill’s classic argument, if panhandlers are not harming people with their panhandling, then it would be wrong to limit their freedom to engage in this behavior. This is on the condition that panhandling is merely annoying and does not involve threatening behavior or harassment. After all, politicians are allowed to annoy us with texts and emails begging for money, so they would be hard pressed to consistently oppose panhandling while asking us for money.

It could be objected that panhandling does cause harm. As noted above, the presence of panhandlers could harm local businesses. People can also regard panhandling as an infringement on their freedom to not be bothered in public. While this does have some appeal, this justification of a panhandling ban would also justify banning any public behavior people found annoying or that had some perceived impact on local businesses. This could include public displays of expression, political campaigning, preaching in public and many other behaviors. In short, the problem is that there is not something distinct about panhandling that would allow it to be banned without also justifying the ban of other activities. To simply ban it because it is panhandling would seem to solve this problem but would not. After all, if an activity can be justly banned because it is that activity, then this would apply to any activity. After all, every activity is the activity it is.

Those who prefer an alternative to utilitarian calculations can easily defend panhandling against proposed bans by appealing to a right of free expression and behavior that is not based on utility. If people do have the moral right to free expression, then reasons would need to be advanced that would be strong enough to warrant violating this right. As noted above, an appeal could be made to the rights of businesses and the rights of other people to avoid being annoyed. However, the right to not be annoyed does not seem to trump the right of expression until the annoyance becomes significant. As such, a panhandler does have the right to annoy others by asking for money, but if it crosses over into actual harassment, then this would be handled by the fact that people do not have a right to harassment.

In the case of businesses, while they do have a right to engage in free commerce, they do not have a right to expect people to behave in ways that are conducive to their business. If, for example, people found it offensive to have runners running downtown and decided to take their business elsewhere, this would not warrant a runner ban. But, if runners were blocking access to the businesses by stretching in the entrances, then the owners’ rights would be violated. Likewise, if panhandlers are disliked by people and they decide to take their business elsewhere, this does not violate the rights of the businesses. But, if panhandlers started harassing people and blocking access to the businesses, then this would violate the rights of the owners.

 

While pharmaceutical companies profited from flooding America with opioids, this inflicted terrible costs on others. Among the costs has been the terrible impact on health. One example of this is endocarditis.

Endocarditis is an abscess on a heart valve. While not limited to drug users, it can be caused by injecting opioids. As opioids were pushed onto the American people, it is no surprise that the number of drug users suffering from endocarditis increased significantly.  The treatment of endocarditis involves a very expensive surgery and many drug users getting this surgery are on Medicaid. To make matters worse, people often return to opioid use after the surgery and this can lead to another expensive surgery, paid for by Medicaid. This raises moral concerns.

There is the moral issue of whether Medicaid should even exist. On the one hand, a compelling moral argument can be made that just as a nation provides military and police protection to citizens who cannot afford their own security forces or bodyguards, a nation should fund medical care for those who cannot afford it on their own. On the other hand, a moral argument can be made that a nation has no obligation to provide such support and that citizens should be left to fend for themselves regarding health care. Naturally enough, if the nation is under no obligation to provide Medicaid in general, then it is under no obligation to cover the cost of the surgery in question. On this view, there is no need to consider the matter further.

 However, if the state should provide Medicaid, then the issue of whether the state should pay for endocarditis surgery for opioid addicts arises. It is to this discussion that I now turn.

While it is harsh to argue against paying for an addict’s heart surgery, a moral case can be made in favor of this position. The most obvious way to do this is on utilitarian grounds. As noted above, surgery for endocarditis is very expensive and uses financial and medical resources that could be used elsewhere. If more good could be done by using these resources elsewhere, the utilitarian conclusion is that this is what should be done. This argument can be strengthened by including the fact that addicts often return to behavior that resulted in endocarditis, thus creating the need for repeating the costly surgery. From a utilitarian perspective, it would be morally better to use those resources to treat patients who are less likely to willfully engage in behavior that will require them to be treated yet again. This is because the resources that would be consumed treating and retreating a person who keeps inflicting harm on themselves could be used to treat many people, thus doing greater good for the greater number. Though harsh and seemingly merciless, this approach seems justifiable on grounds like the moral justification for triage.

Another approach, which is even harsher, is to focus on the fact that the addicts are giving themselves endocarditis and sometimes doing so repeatedly. This provides the basis for two arguments against public funding of their treatment.

One argument can be built around the idea that there is no moral obligation to help people when their harm is self-inflicted. To use an analogy, if a person insists on setting fire to their house and it burns down, no one has a moral responsibility to pay to have their house rebuilt. Since the addict’s woes are self-inflicted, there is no moral obligation on the part of others to pay for their surgery and forcing people to do so (by using public money) would be like forcing others to pay to rebuild the burned house.

One way to counter this is to point out that many health issues are self-inflicted by a lack of positive behavior (such as exercise and a good diet) and an abundance of negative behavior (such as smoking, drinking, or having unprotected sex). If this principle is applied to addicts, it must be applied to all cases of self-inflicted harm. While some might take this as a refutation of this view, others might accept this as reasonable and warranting a state of nature approach to medicine in which everyone is on their own.

Another argument can be built around the idea that while there could be an obligation to help people, this obligation is limited. In this case, if a person is treated and knowingly returns to the same harmful behavior, then there is no obligation to keep treating the person. In the case of the drug addict, it could be accepted that the first surgery should be covered and that they should be educated on what will happen if they persist in their harmful behavior. If they then persist in that behavior and need the surgery again, then public money should not be used. To use an analogy, if a child swings their ice cream cone around and is surprised when the scoops hit the ground, then it would be reasonable for the parents to buy the child another cone. If the child swings the new cone around and the scoops hit the ground, then the child can be justly denied another cone.

An obvious counter is to contend that addicts are addicted and hence cannot be blamed for returning to the behavior that caused the harm. They are not morally responsible because they cannot do otherwise. This does have some appeal but would seem to justify requiring addicts to also undergo treatment for their addiction and to agree to monitoring of their behavior. They should be free to refuse this (which, ironically, assumes they are capable of free choice), but this should result in their being denied a second surgery if their behavior results in the same harm. Holding people accountable does seem to be cruel, but it could be argued that the alternative is unfair to other citizens. It would be like requiring them to keep rebuilding houses for a person who persists in setting fires in their house and refuses to takes steps to stop doing this.

These arguments can be countered by arguing that there is an obligation to provide such care regardless of how many times an addict returns to the behavior that caused the need for the surgery. One approach would be to build an analogy based on how the state repeatedly bails out big businesses every time they burn down the economy. Another approach would be to appeal to the value of human life and contend that it must be preserved regardless of the cost and regardless of the reason why there is a need for medical care. This approach could be noble or, perhaps, foolish.

 

When Middlebury invited Charles Murray to speak, the event was disrupted by student protestors and both Murray and Professor Allison Sanger were assailed on campus. This incident sparked reflection on the campus and beyond. Peter Singer, a philosopher who is no stranger to controversy,  had his talk disrupted by people who disagree with his views. The process of shutting down a speaker by disruption is the heckler’s veto.

Critics have claimed that such disruptions prove the left believes free speech extends only to those they agree with. On the one hand, this does have some merit: some notable disruptions have been aimed at speakers whose views are generally opposed by the left. On the other hand, such disruptions have also been opposed by others on the left. As such, claiming the left opposes free speech they disagree with is no more (or less) accurate than saying the right opposes local control when they disagree with it, such as when local governments want to ban fracking or impose gun control. While speculating about whether “the left” is against free speech is interesting, the focus of this essay in on the ethics of the heckler’s veto.

The extreme version of the heckler’s veto is violence, such as that directed against Murray and Sanger. Richard Spencer, who is regarded by some as a Nazi, was famously punched for his views, igniting a debate about the ethics of punching Nazis. When protests occurred on campuses over Gaza, violence was often used to silence the protestors. This violence included state and university sanctioned police violence. The right, which had been outraged about “the left” silencing speakers was generally on board with this.

The standard version of the heckler’s veto is, as the name indicates, heckling to prevent a speaker from being heard or interfering until they give up. The hallmark of this sort of heckler is that they are not trying to engage and refute the speaker, they are endeavoring to prevent the speaker from being heard.

One approach is to take the standard view that as long as the speaker is not engaged in directly harmful speech (such as slander or calls for violence), they should be free to speak without disruption. A more sophisticated approach is to use a utilitarian method of weighing the harms and benefits of allowing the speaker to exercise the right to free speech. For example, if punching Nazis to silence them sends the message that Nazism will not be tolerated and this reduces the hate crimes committed in the United States, then such punching could be defended as good. For those who see protesting against Israel as bad, they could argued that the good of silencing protestors warrants disrupting protests, perhaps even with violence.

An alternative to the utilitarian approach is to argue that there are some things, such as Nazism and sexism, whose badness entails people should not be permitted to speak in favor of them even if doing so created no meaningful harms. While I do see the appeal in the “there are things we must not allow to be said” approach, there is the challenge of showing that even without any harm being caused, such speech is simply wrong. One obvious approach, which I will not develop here, is that publicly speaking in favor of such things will always cause meaningful harm.

One interesting approach to heckling is to point out that it seems to be a tactic for those who cannot refute the views they oppose; it is the noisy refuge of the logically or rhetorically incompetent. If the views being expressed by the offending speaker are wrong, then they should be refutable by argumentation. If all someone can do is yell and disrupt, they should remain silent in favor of someone who can refute the speaker. For example, those who disagreed with Murray could have made their points by arguing against him.

A practical reply is that the audience might not be given the opportunity to engage in a possibly lengthy refutation of the speaker. As such, they must engage in heckling to prevent the speaker from speaking. A reasonable counter to this is that while a person might not have the chance to engage at the actual event, they have an opportunity at refutation via other venues, such as social media.

Another reply to this is that allowing the speaker to speak on a campus lends legitimacy and normalizes the speaker’s views, even if the views are not explicitly endorsed. As such, if a speaker cannot be prevented from being invited, then they must be silenced by disruption to prevent their views from gaining a platform.

While this does have appeal and schools should consider the educational merit of speakers, having a person speak on campus does not entail that the school endorses the views and does not automatically make them legitimate. To use the obvious analogy, using the Communist Manifesto and Mein Kampf in a political science class does not endorse or legitimize these works. Likewise, inviting someone with right wing views or who is critical of Israel to a debate does not entail that the school endorses these views or make them automatically legitimate. Just as reading books containing ideas one might not agree with (or even hate) is part of education, so too is listening to speakers expressing such ideas. As such, heckling speakers to silence them would be on par with censoring books to keep people from reading them or movies to keep people from seeing them. Critics of the right are, no doubt, thinking that is exactly what the right does, and this exposes the hypocrisy of their claims that they are protecting freedom from the left.

The educational value argument can be countered by making use of  one of Plato’s arguments for censorship in the Republic. Plato argued that exposure to certain types of art would corrupt people and make them worse. For example, someone who was exposed to violent works of art could become corrupted into becoming violent. Plato’s solution was to ban such art.

In the case of speakers, it could be argued that they must be silenced by heckling because their speeches would corrupt members of the audience. For example, one might claim that listening to Murray talk about his work would corrupt audience members with racism and poor methodology. As another example, one might argue that allowing people to protest Israel’s actions would corrupt the audience This argument assumes, as does Plato’s, that most people lack the ability to defend themselves from such corrupting power. Since the hecklers think the speaker is wrong, they presumably think that most people are either incapable of discerning right from wrong or are just awaiting the right trigger to cause them to embrace evil. On this view, the hecklers would be heroes: those strong enough to resist the siren song of evil and loud enough to drown it out. For those who agree with Plato, Aristotle or Stanley Milgram, this argument should be appealing: most people are easily swayed towards misdeeds and few are influenced by either arguments or fine ideals. Those who dislike Trump and attribute his election in part to defects in voters would also find this approach appealing. And, of course, no discussion of this sort would be complete without a mandatory reference to Hitler and his ability to win over the people.

But, of course, no discussion of this sort would be complete without noting how heckling is like any other tool in that it can be used by the good and the evil alike. Naturally, the people using it will usually think they are on the side of good and their foes evil. Their foes are likely to think the opposite. Since sorting out what is good and bad requires consideration and discussion, silencing people would interfere with sorting these things out. As such, I am opposed to heckling, even if I disagree strongly with the target. That said, one might be tempted by Plato’s argument that the ears of the many must be protected from corrupting words and that it is up to the philosophers to decide which words are corrupting and which are wholesome.

 

While the right to free speech is fundamental to classical liberalism, contemporary liberals are often accused of being its enemy. Two examples include incidents at Berkeley and Middlebury. As always, the matter of free speech is philosophically interesting, especially when it involves higher education.

One important distinction in the context of rights is that of the negative versus the positive. A negative right is not an evil right; rather it is a freedom such that the possessor is not entitled to be provided with the means to exercise the right. It is a right to not be interfered with.

A positive right is an entitlement to the means needed to exercise the right. For example, the United States currently grants citizens a right to public K-12 education. In addition to having the liberty to seek this education, it is also provided (by the taxpayers). In contrast, college education is usually a negative right: students have the liberty to attend college but are (generally) not provided with free education.

The right to free speech is a negative right; it is intended as a protection from impediment rather than an entitlement to the means of expression. To use an obvious example, while I have the right to express my views no one is obligated to provide me with free radio or TV time in which to do so.

While university personnel have no right to unjustly interfere with free speech, they are usually under no moral obligation to provide people with speaking opportunities on campus. For example, while I might be invited to speak at Harvard, Harvard has no obligation to provide me with a room just because I might want to talk about philosophy.

Decisions about who to invite and who to allow to speak in official venues are often made on pragmatic grounds, such as which speakers will boost the reputation of the school or who happens to be friends with top administrators. There are also practical concerns about the cost of the speaker, the likelihood of trouble arising, and the extent of the interest in the speaker. While these practical concerns are important, decisions about who to invite (and who to exclude) should also be made on principled grounds.

One reasonable principle is that decisions should be made based on the educational value of the speaker campus, broadly understood. Since universities are supposed to educate students, it makes sense for them to operate on this principle. Speakers who offer little or nothing in the way of educational value could be justly denied invitations. Of course, education is not the only concern of a university in terms of what it offers to the students and the community. Speakers who offer things of artistic value or even mere entertainment value should also be given due consideration.

One concern about decisions based on these factors is that there can be good faith debate about which speakers have the merit to warrant their invitation. For example, the incident at Middlebury arose because some see Charles Murray’s co-authored controversial book The Bell Curve as  based on pseudoscience and bad methodology. While these matters can be clouded with ideology, there are established standards regarding educational merit regarding such things as methodology and legitimacy. The main problem lies in their application, but this is not a problem unique to picking speaker as it extends across the academy. Fortunately, the basic principle of merit is reasonable clear but the real fights take place over the particulars.

Another seemingly sensible principle is a moral one; that those invited should reflect the values of the institution and perhaps the broader society. At the very least, those invited should not be evil and should not be espousing evil.

This principle does have some problems. One is deciding what conflicts with the values of the institution. Another is that it is difficult to speak of the values of the broader society, given the considerable diversity of opinions on moral issues. When people use this approach, they usually refer to their own values and fall prey to the cognitive bias that leads them to assume their values are shared by society. There is the enduring problem in ethics of sorting out good and evil. There is also the concern about whether academic or artistic merit can offset moral concerns. For example, a Catholic university might see a pro-choice philosopher as endorsing a morally wrong position, yet think that having this philosopher engage a pro-life philosopher in a campus debate to have educational merit. As another example, a liberal institution might regard an extreme libertarian as having morally problematic views yet see educational merit in having them present their arguments as part of a series on American political philosophy.  As with the matter of merit, there are rational and principled ways to approach ethical concerns but this is even more fraught with controversy than questions of assessing educational merit.

While I agree that speech can cause harm, I hold to a presumption in favor of free expression. As a principle, this means that if there is reasonable doubt as to whether the merit of a speech outweighs moral concerns about the speaker or content, then the decision should favor free expression. This is based on the view that it is better to run the risk of tolerating possible evil than to risk silencing someone who has something worth saying. As such, I generally favor a liberal (in the classic sense) approach to inviting speakers to universities.

Americans tend to favor free expression for those they agree with and oppose it for those they dislike. When campuses attempted to exclude right wing speakers, the right expressed its devotion to free expression, speaking of the free market of ideas. As was expected, when college students and faculty recently protested the treatment of the Palestinians by Israel, the right supported a crack down on free expression and on some campuses riot police were turned lose on students and faculty. The right has also worked hard to restrict the content of college classes, enacting laws imposing what they call “reforms.” For example, my adopted state of Florida professes to be all about freedom, but this is only for the freedom to express views that accord with the ideology of the right. It could be countered that “the left” takes a similar approach when it is in power, allowing free speech it approves of. While such finger pointing might feel good, it also shows that Americans are not as committed to free speech as we claim.

 

The first time I was summoned for jury duty in my adopted state of Florida, a lawyer in the jury pool told me that they would not pick either of us. He was right: when the lawyer asked me my profession it looked like both lawyers crossed out my name on their sheets and I was not picked. This kept happening until my last summons on November 12, 2024. At last, I was selected for a jury. It did turn out that I was the alternate, which might have some connection with my being a philosophy professor. The outcome of the trial made the local newspaper. I thought I would provide some useful information about jury duty and share some of what I learned.

Since I live in Leon County in Florida, my state summons brings me to the courthouse in Leon County. If you happen to live here, the same would happen to you. While the specific details vary, most courts operate in similar ways. In my case, it began with the distinctive summons via the mail. As there can be a fine and even jail time for not responding, be sure to respond even if you believe it is not your duty to do so.

In Leon County, you can respond online via the e-Response system. If you are familiar with government websites, you know what to expect; it is like a trip back to the late 1990s or early 2000s. But the software is serviceable. I recommend signing up for the text and email alerts, otherwise you will need to call the night before to learn whether you need to report or not. Because most cases do not go to trial, there is a decent chance you will not even need to report. You can also request a delay or even be excused. If you have a reasonable request, they will work with you. For example, a few years ago I had non-refundable plane tickets, and they rescheduled me for another time for service.

If you do have to report, do so. As noted above, there can be consequences for failing to report. Here in Leon County there is a juror parking lot at 123 North Martin Luther King Jr Blvd. and other courts probably have similar arrangements. There is a shuttle that goes from the lot to the courthouse. Be sure to bring your summons with you.

When you arrive, you’ll go through a process like that at the airport: your stuff will be x-rayed and you’ll walk through a metal detector. Obviously, leave any weapons at home. While courts vary, you can usually bring electronics, drinks and food to the jury selection. Once you are in the jury courtroom, you’ll get a short talk or video on jury duty and then a judge will administer an oath. After that, you’ll wait to be taken to another courtroom. My day was a busy day, with juries needed for three trials. My group consisted of 40 people, selected at random. We were then split into two groups, one of 21 people (including me) and another 19 people. The number is likely to vary with the nature of the trial.

The group of 21 was put in the juror box, while the other 19 sat in the spectator seats. Each of the 21 answered a set of questions, such as our age, marital status, profession, and whether we knew anyone involved in the trial. Next, the prosecutor and defense attorney asked us questions.

In my group, only three people were clear they did not want to be there, two said they had medical reasons, and one was a new mother. Those who were taking an unpaid day off from work also did not want to be there, since the state only pays jurors about $15 a day, something that makes jury service a real burden for some people, especially for long trials. The judge was clear that the court did not want to burden people, and he acted upon this, excusing the three people who expressed reasons why serving would be burdensome. These three were replaced from the second group, and the additions were questioned.

After this, I and six other people were selected.  We were told when to report (8:30 am) and where to park (validated parking). While courts vary, we had to provide our own lunch (we could leave for lunch or stay) although snacks and drinks were provided. We could bring electronics, although we had to leave bags and such in the jury room and keep our phones off.

The prosecutor and public defender were both professional, competent and serious. The state presented a carefully considered and well evidenced case, while the defense attorney worked hard to provide the best defense possible for his client. The judge ran the courtroom with skill and compassion. My fellow jurors took their duty seriously, taking detailed notes, paying careful attention and abiding by the rules. Seeing all this helped restore some of my faith in people, despite the obvious fact that I was in a criminal trial. While there are courts that are indeed awful, my experience with Leon County courts (albeit only as a juror) has shown that we are fortunate here.

After both sides rested their cases, court adjourned and then we returned the next day. After the closing arguments, I was revealed as the alternate and had to wait outside the jury room while the bailiff retrieved my stuff. I was then escorted out of the building and returned home.

As an ethicist, I have often been critical of the bad aspects of our legal system, but this trial was conducted in a just and fair manner. This, of course, contrasts with some other aspects of our legal system. In general, it seems that across the United States marginalized people who lack power and resources suffer in the legal system as they are often targeted by the police, exploited for income, and lack the money to hire the best defense. As such, they are often the victims of the legal system. The upper classes tend to get premium justice as they are usually protected by the law and police rather than targeted and can, of course, buy the best lawyers. The folks in the middle seem to get the fairest justice, since they are not targeted and have enough resources to get a decent defense. But they lack the privileges of the upper classes and hence are subject to the law. Which is how it should be for everyone.