The fact that college admission is for sale is an open secret. As with other forms of institutionalized unfairness, there are norms and laws governing the legal and acceptable ways of buying admission. For example, donating large sums of money or funding a building to buy admission are within the norms and laws. But there was admission scandal in which celebrities and other elites broke the rules to get their children into elite colleges. On the face of it, there is no need to argue that what they did was morally wrong. What is more interesting is considering the matter in the context of fairness.

On the surface, the actions of the accused are clearly unfair. While the tactics varied, they included altering admission test results, bribing coaches to accept non-athletes as recruited athletes, and the classic direct bribe. Interestingly, most comments on these misdeeds noted the elites could have used traditional legal and accepted methods of purchasing admission. These methods are unfair because admission was not based on the students’ merits, thus they might have unjustly taken the places of students who merited admission. While the parents did act unfairly, it is worth considering this unfairness within the broader context of our society.

As many others have pointed out over the years, even the normal admission system is unfair. Poor children will almost always attend inferior schools and have far less opportunity to engage in the application enhancing activities available to the well-off. Poor children will also usually not be able to afford tutors, test preparation training, personal statement coaches and so on. They will also usually lack connections that influence admission. In contrast, wealthy children will enjoy a cornucopia of admission advantages. While there were programs and other efforts to provide some microscopic mitigation of disparity, the Trump administration is intent on defunding and dismantling most of these. As such, the disparities in admissions will grow.

It might be countered that some people rose from poverty to attend elite institutions and go on to great success, while some born into wealth have been failures. The obvious reply is that while these stories are interesting, they are just anecdotes and what matters is the general statistics. While some people succeed despite incredible odds, these few examples only show getting out of poverty and into an elite school is extremely unlikely. If people regularly arose from poverty, such success stories would be unremarkable.

In general, college admissions are like a race in which some people must run on foot, some get bikes, some get cars, and some get rocket ships. While one can talk about the merits of people in this race, the competition is fundamentally unfair in intentional ways. I do, obviously, recognize that people vary greatly in abilities. My point is, to stick to the analogy, that even the most talented runner is not going to win against someone who gets to race with a car.

While the elites cheated, they cheated in an already unfair race. To continue the analogy, their children were already driving fast cars in competition with people forced to run. These parents did things analogous to cutting the course and using illegal modifications on their cars. While this certainly matters, it does not matter that much from the perspective of those who were already competing by running. Again, I am not denying that people do vary in ability or that no one ever wins this race on foot or that no one crashes their metaphorical car. My point is that if fairness truly matters, then we should not just be outraged when the elites cheat in an already unfair system, we should be outraged by the unfair system.

In the previous essay I proposed adding inheritance rules to the standard Monopoly game. The aim was to provide a context for discussing the tension between inheritance and fairness by using the classic board game. Out of curiosity, I also posted my proposed rules on Facebook. Not surprisingly, people got the point of the rules and there were criticisms of my analogy. One reasonable criticism was that while Monopoly is a zero-sum game, the economy is not. This does raise the question of the impact of making a non-zero-sum version of monopoly with the inheritance rules in play.

One response to the zero-sum criticism is to note that Monopoly does reflect zero-sum aspects of the real economy. The classic game is about owning properties and major business and these are zero-sum in the actual world. If, for example, I own a vast tract of land, that means less land for other people. While we can make more usable land by draining swamps and building islands, there is a finite amount of land on earth. The same generally holds true of businesses. There is a finite limit to the number of viable businesses and the success of a business in an area limits the success of others. As such, for the zero-sum parts of the economy, Monopoly is not a terrible model.

The easy and obvious counter to this is to argue that there is no zero-sum economy or that there is a significant non-zero-sum part of the economy that negates the unfairness of the inheritance system. My Monopoly analogy, the criticism would go, fails and inheritance is fair. But what if Monopoly could be made into a non-zero-sum game?

In the real economy, the idea is that the sum grows over time. The same can be applied to monopoly. A way to simulate this is to add in the Board Expansion rule variant to the inheritance rules (unlimited money, houses, and hotels can also be added by printing them as needed). To play this variant, you will need several Monopoly sets.

 

Board Expansion Rules for Monopoly Inheritance!

 

Rule 1: Prior to the start of the next game in the series of games, place another Monopoly board with its Go square adjacent to the Just Visiting square of the prior board. Repeat until the players decide to stop playing. Play begins in the Go square on the board from the first game.

 

Rule 2: Once a player’s piece has completed moving completely around a board (from Go back to Go), they must exit the board and move to the next board. A board is exited via the Just Visiting square and entered via the Go square. Once a piece has completely moved around the final board in the set, the piece must be moved back to the prior board and so on until the original board is reached. The process begins anew and continues into the game ends. The board a piece is on is treated as the game board for that piece.

 

Alternative Rule: Instead of being forced to leave a board after moving completely around it (from Go to go), a player can elect to stay on a board if they wish. This rule allows players a chance to escape the original game’s board.

 

This variant allows for a non-zero-sum game, limited only by the number of Monopoly boards on hand. While this allows the players who do not have the luck of inheritance a better chance, the player who gets the inheritance still has a massive advantage. While there will be a new board with property available to all players each game, the player who has inherited from the previous game will be in a much better position than the other players to acquire the new property. The main effect of the expanding game would seem to be that the heir player will have ever more property at the end of each game and thus the next heir will have an even greater advantage over the non-heirs. While the game is not zero-sum, those that lack inheritance will almost certainly still lose.

 

The estate tax in the United States allows a person to gift or donate up to $13.9 million tax free (be sure to check the latest tax law). The catch is, of course, that they must die. The Republicans have long called the estate tax the “death tax” and argue against it. But they also pitch the narrative of a free market, and most Americans praise fair competition and equality of opportunity. So, Americans like inheritance and fair competition. But these are at odds with each other: allowing significant inheritance conflicts with fair competition and equality of opportunity. While it is easy enough to argue for this point, it makes more sense to make people feel the unfairness inherent to inheritance. This can be done by playing my special version of Monopoly.

Almost everyone is familiar with Monopoly. For those who are not, the rules can be found here. The gist of the game is that you win by driving all the other players into bankruptcy. In normal play, the outcome of one game does not affect the next: the game has an equal opportunity start, since everyone begins with the same resources, in the same place and with a chance to win based entirely on ability and luck. My proposed variation adds in inheritance rules to make it more like the real world. This variation requires playing multiple games of Monopoly.

 

Monopoly Inheritance!

 

Rule 1:  The first game in the series is played normally using the standard rules.

 

Rule 2: Upon the conclusion of a game in the series, the winning player records what they possess at the end. This includes money, property, houses, and hotels.

 

Rule Three: At the start of the second and later games in the series, one player is randomly selected to receive the game possessions of the winning player from the previous game. The receiving player is the heir, and the possessions make up their inheritance. The other players start normally. The game is otherwise played using the normal rules, with the exceptions noted in these rules. The series ends when no one wants to play it anymore.

 

Inheritance Variations

Players can experiment with these variations to make the game more “realistic” or “fairer.” The rules need to be set prior to play.

 

Fractional Inheritance: The heir receives a percentage of the possessions of the previous winner (75%, 50% or 25% are suggested). Property is selected by drawing the property cards randomly. Round up fractions up.

 

Multiple Heirs: If there are at least three players, then two players are randomly selected to be heirs, dividing the possessions of the winner between them. This can be a 50-50 split or a 75-25 split at the discretion of all the players.

 

While a player who is not the heir could win the game, the heir has an incredible advantage. Anyone playing by these rules who is not the heir will see how unfair the game is. This should help people feel how inheritance of significant wealth is inconsistent with having a fair and competitive economic system.

From a philosophical standpoint, the first game could be considered a state-of-nature game (of the sort envisioned by Locke) in which everything is initially available to all, and property has yet to be divided up.

The players in the second (and subsequent) game take on the role of the next generation. Since birth is random and inheritance is not merited by effort, the heir is selected at random rather than being the previous winner.

As with any analogy that compares something simple to something vastly more complicated, this analogy will break down quickly. To illustrate, the real-world features multiple heirs, there is no equal start for everyone else, there is not just one game with one winner and so on through all the millions of differences. My point is, of course, not that this game variant is a perfect model of inheritance in the United States. Rather, my goal is to get people who are fine with the inheritance system as it stands to play this variant and see if they still feel that inheritance is a fair addition to the game. And then to think about whether it is fair in the real economy. The question that I want to pose is this: would you play Monopoly by these rules? Why or why not?

As always, I am open to arguments against my view. Perhaps allowing and encouraging massive disparities in inheritance is fair and makes for competitive economic system that improves the general welfare.

Republicans have long raged against what they call the “death tax” and while they have not eliminated the estate tax, they succeeded in changing it. In 2017 the estate tax applied only to individuals with total assets exceeding $5.49 million (double for a married couple). After the Republican tax bill passed, the number was increases to $11.8 million (double for a married couple).  For 2025, it is $13.9 million. Given the exceptional wealth inequality in the United States, the change impacted very few but was advantageous to the wealthy.

Trump justified the change based on his claim that it is unfair that people pay taxes twice: once when they earn the money, once more when their assets are inherited. This ignores the fact that those inheriting the assets did not pay the first taxes on it, so they are not paying the tax twice. But if Trump is right, then sales taxes should also be eliminated. You (probably) pay taxes on your income, then you pay sales tax when you make a taxable purchase with that income. But my focus is not on the fairness of taxes but about inheritance.

While inheritance is seen by some as an ancient tradition and a right, there are rational arguments against allowing it at all. Also, as with any tradition and common practice, it would be a fallacy to infer its traditional nature and common practice justify it. After all, people have been commonly doing bad and stupid things for a long time.

A way to argue against inherited wealth is to contend it has negative consequences that make it immoral. Mary Wollstonecraft argued that hereditary wealth is morally wrong because it produces idleness and impedes people from developing their virtues. While complicated to sort out, this does present an empirical claim: one could do a statistical analysis of the impact of hereditary wealth on idleness and virtue.

Interestingly, while conservatives aggressively oppose estate and inheritance taxes, they also use an argument against welfare that would also apply to eliminating inheritance.

A common argument against welfare echoes Wollstonecraft’s argument against hereditary wealth: it makes people idle and prevents them from developing virtues, therefore it should be restricted (or eliminated). Rod Blum, a Republican representative from Iowa, said “Sometimes we need to force people to go to work. There will be no excuses for anyone who can work to sit at home and not work.” Donald Trump, whose fortune was built on inheritance, has said that “The person who is not working at all and has no intention of working at all is making more money and doing better than the person that’s working his and her ass off.” While this might sound like Trump is describing himself, it seems to be his criticism of welfare.

If this criticism of welfare is correct, then it also applies to inheritance. After all, people do not earn their inheritance. As such, if Republicans are sincere in their arguments against welfare, then they must apply the same reasoning to inheritance and oppose it for the same reasons they oppose welfare. Obviously enough, they do not take this position. They advance one set of arguments against welfare and give another set in favor of protecting inheritance and see to it that the two do not meet.

While it is tempting to dismiss this as just another example of Republican inconsistency and hypocrisy, it could be argued that there are relevant differences between inheritance and welfare that break the analogy.

One argument can be built on the fact that inheritance is passed on voluntarily to the recipient, while welfare involves taking tax money from some people who do not want their money used for welfare . A similar argument can be made by pointing out that inheritance usually goes to relatives while state welfare does not. While these are differences, they would not seem to be relevant to the argument that welfare is bad because it makes people lazy. After all, it is getting money that one has not earned that is the problem, not whether it was giving willingly or who it comes from. Unless one wants to make the implausible claim that money given willingly by relatives is special and will not make people lazy.

Another argument can be made arguing that inherited wealth is earned while welfare is not. While this might appeal to some, even a cursory consideration dismantles this view. First, some do earn their welfare by paying for it when they are working. For example, if Sally works for ten years paying taxes and gets fired when her company moves overseas, then she is getting back money from a system she contributed to. Second, if a person did work for their inheritance, it is not actually an inheritance, but something earned. If, for example, someone worked in the family business for pay, then they have earned their pay. But merely working for a business does not entitle a person to own the business after the death of the current owner. So, this sort of argument fails.

If the Republicans are right that welfare is bad because it makes people idle and impedes their virtue, then the same would apply to inheritance, especially large inheritances. As such, if they are opposed to the harm of welfare and must combat them, then they must also oppose the harm of inheritance with an equal or greater intensity. If they don’t, one might think that they simply dislike poor people and their argument against welfare is made in bad faith.

It might be pointed out that if someone opposes inheritance, then they must oppose welfare. One reply is to accept this. If welfare makes people idle and inflicts moral harm, then it would seem right to oppose it. A second reply is to argue that welfare helps people in need and is analogous to family helping family in times of trouble rather than being analogous to inheritance, in which one simply receives wealth regardless of need or merit.

Lest anyone start mass-producing straw men, my concern here is with large inheritances; I obviously have no objection to the sort of inheritance most of us will receive and I certainly have no issue with, for example, someone inheriting grandad’s Hummel collection or grandma’s collection of assault rifles.

In closing, whenever a politician makes the “lazy” argument against welfare, they should be asked if they apply that argument to inherited wealth.

The intense politicalization of ecological issues makes it difficult to have a rational discussion of environmental regulation. When the left wants regulation, the right can claim they want to destroy jobs because of a deranged preference for tiny fish over humans. When the right opposes regulation, they can be presented as willing to destroy the environment because they value profits over other people and the planet. This conflict leads to the seesaw of regulations as each party takes and loses power. While there is no single solution to this problem, a rational approach would be to try to develop solutions that benefit corporations and the inhabitants of the ecosystem, such as us humans. As an example, I will use the seabirds.

While sea food is delicious and nutritious, modern fishing techniques kill hundreds of thousands of seabirds each year. For example, albatrosses are sometimes killed by longline fishing. As another example, penguins can get caught in gill nets and drown. These dead birds have no value to business and they are an unfortunately bycatch whose carcasses are garbage rather than profitable.

Fortunately for the birds, there are ways to reduce their death toll. For example, long line fishing can be made safer for birds by using streamers to deter them or by weighting the lines so they sink out of reach of diving birds. These methods of protecting birds do cost money and can make things more difficult for the fishing crews. As such, regulations requiring that fishing vessels use these devices and measures impose costs which can impact the pay of the fishing crews and the cost of seafood. Because of this, it would be rational of industry to oppose such regulations to avoid these costs.

While some might be tempted to dismiss this as an obsession with profit, attacking the industry means it will double down on its opposition and lobby against regulations. This will make it even harder for environmentalists to get regulations in place. Aggressive opposition by industry will motivate environmentalists, making it harder for industry to get what they want. In such conflicts, the lobbyists are always victorious.  It would be preferable for everyone (other than the lobbyists) if there was a way to protect birds while also benefiting the fishing industry.

It seems difficult to imagine that protecting birds would benefit the seafood industry in any significant way. After all, they would need to purchase equipment and adopt methods to protect birds. There seems to be no profit in this. But perhaps there is the potential for gain.

Protecting birds could pay off in public relations. A company can advertise it is bird safe and perhaps offset the cost through improved sales and by increasing prices. However, it would be even better if protecting birds was also profitable or at least cost neutral. One example of this is longline fishing.

An estimated 160,000 albatrosses and petrels are killed each year when they get hooked on longlines. While this is obviously bad for the birds, it is also costly to the industry. First, they must waste time removing dead birds from their lines. Second, and more importantly for them, each hooked bird could have been a profitable fish. Keeping birds off their lines means that they can catch more fish. As such, regulations that protect birds can be a win for the birds and the industry.  But this does lead to an obvious objection.

Opponents of environmental regulation can content that if protecting birds is advantageous to the industry, there is no reason to impose regulations. Out of rational self-interest, industry will act without being coerced. So, there is no need to impose regulations.

As I favor minimal state intrusion, I find this appealing: why use the power of the state to compel people to do what they would do without coercion? Especially when an imposition might cause opposition. To use an analogy, think of seat belt laws. Wearing a seat belt is a good idea and people should do so, but some people refuse to wear them because it is required by law. It could be argued that it makes more sense to inform people of the benefits of seat belts and let rational self-interest motivate them.

The obvious counter is that people generally do not operate from rational self-interest. If they did, everyone would be eating the healthiest meals they could get and exercising as often as they could. As such, to follow Aristotle, people must often be compelled to do what is best for them. So, while protecting seabirds would be in the interest of industry, they are unlikely to do so just because it is in their interest. So, regulation is needed to compel them to act in their own interest. To use another analogy, while it is rational for people to learn how to drive properly before taking to the road, the state needs to compel people to do this.

While I favor freedom, freedom can be justly limited on moral grounds when liberty creates significant harm. So, for example, while people should be free to have pets, there should be regulations forbidding people from taking their pet tiger for a walk in the local park. The challenge, as always, is balancing liberty against harm.

By Government of Florida –

DeSantis, the governor of my adopted state of Florida, is plagiarizing Elon Musk’s DOGE. Like Musk, DeSantis claims that his DOGE will eliminate “waste, fraud and abuse.” As with Musk and DOGE, DeSantis already knows what he wants to cut: 70 state boards and commissions and 900 jobs. He also wants to force universities to undergo reviews and audits, and the state will “look into” local government expenditures. As I am not an expert on government finances I will, unlike Musk, leave the merit of any cuts to the experts. Instead, I will discuss the concepts of fraud and waste.

There is an obvious rhetorical advantage to claiming that DOGE is targeting fraud and waste. After all, everyone agrees that fraud and waste are bad. Unless, of course, one is benefiting from either. Fraud, as a concept, is easy to define. It is intentional deception aimed at acquiring an unfair or unlawful gain. While it might seem that fraud would be easy to determine, what counts as fraud will always be a matter of which interpretation of the law is being used. J.D. Vance’s discussion of paroles and Temporary Protected Status provides a good illustration of this. While the Biden administration followed (their interpretation of) the law, J.D. Vance claimed that they had acted illegally, making the migrants in question illegal. The same would also apply to claims about fraud. While, for example, a contract was (interpreted as) legal and not fraudulent when it was made during the Biden administration, under Musk’s interpretation it could now be fraud. While there can be good faith disagreement about the law and fraud, Musk could easily claim that something is fraud simply because he does not like it. Given the lack of oversight of DOGE, fraud could be whatever Musk calls “fraud.” That said, as “fraud” is usually defined in laws, there would be at least some grounds for judging whether something is fraud. The concept of waste is much more problematic.

Wasteful spending is expending resources, especially money, in ways that are either unnecessary or inefficient. While we agree that waste is bad, this is like saying that we also agree that bad is bad. But people obviously disagree about what is wasteful and what is bad. It might seem that inefficiency is an objective matter and in some cases it is. For example, if the government had a contract with one of Musk’s companies that cost taxpayers more than what a competitor would charge for the same product, then that would be inefficient and hence waste. But there can be cases where spending seems inefficient, but it is not. After all efficiency is not just a matter of paying a higher price but involves getting the same or less by paying more. If, for example, Musk’s product was superior to the competition, then the extra cost could be worth it. It is also worth considering the obvious: someone could just lie about efficiency when they want to cut spending. While inefficiency does allow some degree of objectivity, whether spending is unnecessary seems entirely a matter of a person’s values. This applies to everyday spending and government spending.

As an example, consider going out for dinner and buying drinks. Whether that is wasteful depends on your values. While it could be argued that it would be more efficient to cook dinner at home and buy alcohol at the store as the cost would be much lower, some people believe that going out is not a waste of their money. This is because of the return they get from the experience. In terms of who is right, this is a debate of which values are correct and is not something that can be resolved by an Excel spreadsheet. Likewise for government spending.

What is unnecessary is in the eye of the beholder. People who do not like SNAP or Medicaid will see these as unnecessary. People who do not like subsidies for the wealthy will see those as unnecessary. So, when Musk claims to be cutting waste he could be telling the truth: he could be cutting spending that he, as the world’s richest person, thinks is unnecessary. While he sees his lucrative contracts as necessary, he obviously does not need SNAP, Medicaid, or farm subsidies and these no doubt seem unnecessary to him. From a rhetorical standpoint, claiming to be cutting waste sounds much better than cutting programs one does not like, hence that is what Musk says his DOGE is doing.

But has DOGE been a success? Even a cursory review of DOGE’s own “receipts” and claims reveals many untruths and errors. For example, the claims about Social Security fraud and $8 billion in savings in a Department of Homeland Security contract were debunked, with the $8 billion turning out to be $8 million. As of this writing, Musk has made at least 28 false claims, such as the lie about $50 million for condoms in Gaza and the claim that congress gave itself a 40% tax increase. In terms of finding waste, fraud and abuse DOGE has been a failure.

As to why DOGE has done such a poor job, one possible explanation is incompetence: Musk cares about waste and fraud, but he and his DOGE are not very good at their jobs. A second explanation is that Musk does not care about waste and fraud and DOGE has other goals. Going with the reasonable idea that the purpose of a thing is what it does, we should look at what DOGE is doing to see its actual goals. It has succeeded in demoralizing federal employees, it has targeted agencies that protect the American people from fraud and financial exploitation, and it has gone after agencies that regulate and investigate Musk’s businesses. In these areas DOGE has been a success. While DeSantis has yet to announce a billionaire to head up his DOGE, it is reasonable to infer it will serve a similar function in Florida. With the obvious exception of the more Musk focused goals of DOGE. It is reasonable to infer that DOGE is using the rhetorical cover of going after fraud and waste to poorly conceal its real goals. We should expect the same with Florida DOGE.

Imagine I am the CEO of a corporation whose factory farming practices drew the attention of the Humane Society and legislation has now been proposed to reign in my cruel excesses. If I appeared in a video complaining about the Humane Society forcing me to be less cruel and this would have a tiny impact on my vast wealth, few people would be sympathetic. If I was smart and evil, I would use astroturfing instead of honesty. Astroturfing involves concealing those behind a message or organization to make it seem that it arose and is funded by grassroot participants. In this imaginary scenario, I could hire a company to lay down some AstroTurf for me.

 While astroturfing can be a complicated, it usually involves three basic techniques. The first is using positive names for the shell organization(s). For example, my Astroturf organization might be called “Friends of Friendly Farming”, which is much more appealing than “Cow Cruelty Crusaders.”

A second technique is using commercials depicting the “common folk” who just happen to be extremely concerned about the issue. For example, my commercial might feature a mother venting her rage that meat would be unaffordable for her family if the wicked Humane Society had its way.

The third and key part of astroturfing is that those behind it remain anonymous. After all, if people knew that I was behind Friends of Friendly Farming, they would find it less appealing. Since astroturfing is inherently deceitful, it would seem to be immoral. But what, if anything should be done about it?

The use of deceptive names is unethical because of their rhetorical influence over people who might not otherwise support the group if its name matched its purpose. Going back to my example, most would find “Friends of Friendly Farming” appealing. But most would not be won over by “Make Sure Mike Keeps Making Money by Being Mean to Animals.” This technique is like advertising and labelling unhealthy junk food made in China as patriotic, healthy, “Yankee Snacks”. That is, it is deceit. However, just because something is unethical does not entail that it should be illegal.

While the First Amendment does not explicitly protect the right to deceptive speech, laws aimed at requiring honest naming for groups would seem unlikely to withstand scrutiny. There are also practical concerns about enforcement and the potential for abuse of such laws. For example, Republicans would presumably use such laws to insist that all liberal and moderate groups label themselves as “Woke Marxist Transgender Anti-American Vermin.”

 There is also the problem of sorting out whether terms, especially value terms, are being applied correctly. Value terms are especially challenging, given the extent to which even good faith disagreement about them exists. For example, determining whether a group called “Righteous Americans for Righteous Justice” is righteous and for righteous justice would be difficult. As such, while the use of intentionally deceptive names is unethical, it should not be illegal.

The use of dishonest and deceptive commercials is also unethical. They are like listing false ingredients on a food label to get people to buy it. It is also like catfishing. This is when a person pretends, online, to be someone desirable as part of an intentional deception. As with deceptive names, the use of actors portraying “common folk” with strong views on the issue is probably protected by the right to free expression.  There is also the fact that politicians favor allowing considerable leeway in certain deceptive practices, usually determined by which industry is bankrolling their re-election.  

As noted above, the essential quality of astroturfing is that the real parties remain anonymous, hidden behind an appealing shell. In addition to being unethical, this anonymity makes it difficult to assess the case made by those speaking for the anonymous entity. This is because the identity of the source of a claim is necessary to assess the credibility and possible bias of that source. While claims obviously stand or fall on their own, the identity of the source is critical to the practical matter of judging claims.

While there might be a right to deceptive (or persuasive, if one prefers) speech, there is not a right to anonymous speech. Requiring those funding groups and ads to identify themselves does not limit their right of free expression and it serves, as noted above, to protect the right of the listeners to properly assess the claims intended to influence them. Naturally, there are cases in which anonymous speech is morally acceptable—such as in oppressive regimes.

Those who engage in astroturfing might claim they would be harmed if their identities were known. After all, they want to be anonymous because they believe that if people knew their identities, then their efforts at persuasion would be less effective. As such, not being allowed to remain anonymous would harm them.

The easy and obvious response to this is that people do not have a moral right to remain anonymous simply because people would be less likely to be persuaded if they knew their identity. Using an analogy, a company wanting to sell dog meat could not justly claim it would be harmed if it was not allowed to hide the identity of the meat. In such cases, the right to know trumps the right of free expression. As such, it would be reasonable to have laws that forbid such anonymous funding. Naturally, moral exceptions can be made in oppressive countries that engage in unjust persecution.

Despite the American myth, upward mobility is limited and most of us will die in the class we were born into. Part of this myth is the often-true story that college helps people move up the economic ladder. My family fits this narrative. My father’s parents did not finish high school as they had to take jobs in a shoe factory to help support their families. My father finished high school, got a master’s degree, taught high school for years and after his first retirement taught mathematics at the college level. My mother also has an M.A. My sister and I went to college, and I ended up getting my PhD and staying forever as a professor. Because of my family story, I support college education for those who want it.

While college has never been cheap, the increase in the cost of higher education has outpaced inflation. The reasons are clear. First, many states have disinvested from public higher education. Some of this leftover from the last time the financial elites burned down the economy, but most of it is politics. Some of this is ideological: Republicans tend to oppose funding public colleges, preferring to channel money into private profits. There is also the practical reason that weakening public education can push students towards for-profit colleges who have lobbied Republicans and Democrats. With less public support, more of the burden falls on students and their families.

Second, there is massive administrative bloat. Some of this bloat is the number of administrators. For example, while there used to be just deans, there are now assistant deans and associate deans. There are also assistant provosts and associate provosts, and an impressive number of vice presidents at many universities.

 Some of the bloat is due to burdens imposed by the state, such as assessment and various education laws. Some of it is due to the obsession with remaking colleges into businesses. In addition to having well-compensated executives, schools now have marketing departments who talk about “the brand.” There is also the tendency of bureaucrats to expand their bureaucracy. Currently, schools have entire cadres of administrators with no direct connection to education. Despite, or perhaps because of, the increased number of administrators, more administrative tasks are assigned to faculty. This can require hiring more people to teach as their teaching time is devoured by administrative work.

In addition to the ever-increasing number of administrators there has also been a significant increase in their salaries, especially at the higher levels. University presidents can have salaries close to a million dollars and bonuses are common. This is also a result of the business model: high pay “management” ruling over lower pay “workers.” While administrators make the tired old arguments that top money is needed to attract top talent from the private sector (usual business), the same arguments rarely apply to faculty and other employees. Presumably because faculty are not as important to the mission of the university as administrators.

Third, there is the cost of facilities and amenities. Some of this expense is reasonable: smart classrooms are more expensive than the traditional classroom. Other luxury items mainly serve to drive up costs.

Since college provides a way to go up the ladder or at least get a strong grip on a rung, it is important to address the problem of high costs. While one solution has been to make colleges “free”, this runs into the obvious problem that there is no such thing as free college. “Free” college just shifts the cost. This shift can, however, be morally and economically justified—but the discussion needs to be honest about who is paying.

A less drastic solution is for states to return to investing in education. This was once seen as a good idea s as money spent on students was returned many times over as taxes and had many non-economic positive returns on the investment. Valuing helping people upwards does run against current trends, which is to funnel money upwards towards those who already have the most money

It would also help if the state reduced some of the imposed administrative burden on colleges. While this would have a negative impact on those employed in these administrative offices, it would help reduce the cost of education. The challenge is, however, sorting out which administrative burdens to lessen. Reducing administrative positions and salaries would also help.

The number of administrators could be brought back to the older ratios of administrators to everyone else and their salaries could be reduced to more closely match those of faculty. While it could be argued that this would cut down on the top talent, there are some obvious responses. One is that education attracts top talent faculty who are willing to work for relatively low salaries compared to what they could get in the private sector. While detractors of professors often think that people teach or engage in research at colleges because they are unable to get jobs in the private sector, most faculty chose the academic life. This is for a variety of reasons, ranging from the love of teaching to the difference in culture between the academy and the corporation (although this difference is shrinking). So, if the administrator’s argument about having to pay top dollar for top talent were good, then faculty would be terrible. Another is that various scandals and problems have shown what these top dollars sometimes buy.

Finally, schools can also cut their spending on facilities and things that are not relevant to their educational mission. There are, of course, other possibilities but these would be a good start to make college more affordable.

 

Back in 2018, President Trump proposed executing certain types of drug dealers as a solution to the opioid epidemic. As Trump remains Trump, it is likely he will make a similar proposal when he returns to the White House. But this does raise the issue of whether executing drug dealers is a good way to address drug addiction. Put crudely, can the United States kill its way out of this problem.

From a practical standpoint, a key question is whether executing drug dealers would reduce drug addiction in America. It will, of course, be assumed that the CEOs of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing and distributing opioids will not be executed. For those interested in a career in drug dealing, the best option is to get congress to legalize your dealing. The second best is to run your drug dealing as part of the legal business of your large corporation. This way you will probably never do any time no matter how much you do crime. At worst, you’ll be forced to pay a percentage of your profits in a negotiated settlement.

Intuitively, execution could impact addiction. As a great philosopher once said, “if you kill someone for doing something, they won’t do that again.” Killing drug dealers would reduce their numbers and could reduce the extent of drug addiction in America. This would require killing new dealers if they stepped in to replace the dead ones, but this is a practical problem in the logistics of killing.

There is also the deterrence factor. On the face of it, one might believe the threat of execution would deter people from dealing drugs. This assumes drug dealers are suitably rational actors, and their calculation of the risks and benefits will guide them to stop dealing. This would also assume that they have better options available. Alternatively, it could be argued that fear of execution would suffice to deter them. People do fear death and try to avoid it. As such, one could conclude that we could kill our way out of this problem. However, we do not need to rely on speculative arguments about how potential drug dealers might respond to threats of execution. We can look at the data about the effectiveness of the threat execution as a deterrent.

We have extensive data about the death penalty, thanks to America’s enthusiasm for killing people. The evidence is that it is not an effective deterrence, which runs contrary to what intuitions about death and threats of death would suggest. So, it seems unlikely that we can kill our way out of this problem. In addition to the practical issue of whether this approach would work, there is the moral question about its ethics.

On the face of it, the moral issue has been settled by the practical issue: if the death penalty would not deter drug dealers, then the deterrence argument does not morally justify executing them. However, the retribution argument remains: killing drug dealers could be morally justified as retribution for their crimes.

On the one hand, this does have some appeal. Drug use does result in some deaths, and some of the blame for some deaths can be placed drug dealers. If a business knowingly provides a dangerous product to customers, then they are morally accountable for at least some of the harms. This is true in the case of legal products, such as tobacco and prescription opioids, and especially true for products that are illegal because they are harmful, such as illegally trafficked opioids.

While drug dealers do deserve punishment for distributing harmful products (such as tainted drugs), the punishment must fit the principle of proportionality: the punishment must be warranted by the severity of the harm done in the crime.

A drug dealer that intentionally sold contaminated products that killed users would be directly responsible for those deaths. The same would apply to a company that knowingly sold fatally flawed legal products that killed people, such as defective cars. Obviously, the criminal could face legal consequences for their crimes, but from the moral perspective, the legality of the actions is not the primary concern. It would be causing death that matters morally. It would be these case that would most plausibly merit execution, on the principle that the punishment (death) should match the crime (causing death). However, selling someone a fatally defective product is morally distinct from directly killing them, such as by stabbing them to death. As such, executing those who knowingly sell defective products that could cause death would raise moral concerns.

Drug dealers probably do not intentionally sell defective products to kill their customers, if only because they want repeat business. But illegal drugs are often harmful, and this is morally relevant. The harms of illegal drugs can be numerous, ranging from health issues to death by overdose. Many legal products, such as alcohol and tobacco, are also harmful. As such, the question is whether it is morally acceptable to execute someone for providing a harmful product that can potentially kill the user. Once again, the legal issue is distinct from the moral—after all, all any drug could be legalized tomorrow, but this would not change the basic moral concern. The easy and obvious answer is that while knowingly selling harmful products is wrong, this level of wrongness does not merit execution. As such, killing drug dealers for dealing drugs would be no more ethical than killing the owners of Heineken or R.J. Reynolds for distributing legal products that cause significant health issues and contribute to the ruin of many lives.

While analogies, like cars, always break down eventually, they can be useful. While running, I thought about my injury-induced lack of racing trophies and my oxygen deprived brain tied this into the division of goods in capitalism. Hence, this analogy between running races and capitalism.

Both racing and capitalism involve competition, and this results in winners and losers. Winners are supposed to be rewarded while losers are expected to reflect on their defeat and try harder next time. When planning a road race or managing capitalism, those in charge must address the nature and division of the rewards. In the case of a road race, the race director must pick the prizes and decide such matters as whether there will be age group awards and how deep the awards will go. In the case of capitalism, those in charge decide how the rewards will be divided by laws, policies and practices.

While there are many ways to divide rewards, there are two broad approaches. One is a top-heavy reward system that yields the bulk of rewards to a few winners. In the case of a road race, this occurs when all the prizes go to the top three runners or even just the first-place finisher. In the case of capitalism, this will involve most of the rewards going to the very top winners with the few leftovers divided among the many losers.

Another approach is to spread the rewards more broadly among a larger base of winners. For example, many races divide up the groups by age and most races have male and female divisions. In the case of capitalism, such an approach would give less to the top winners and divide more among the other winners relative to approach that only rewards the top winners. For example, under such an approach successful small businesses and successful middle- and lower-class people would get more of the rewards. This would, of course, mean less for those at the top of the pyramid, such as the biggest corporations and billionaires. Success would still be rewarded, but there would be more effort in spreading the rewards across different levels of success (and economic classes).

One argument in favor of the top-heavy systems of capitalism is to contend that a broader division of the rewards would be socialism, and this would destroy competition. But this is not the case. A broader reward system would still be capitalism, it would just have a broader division of the rewards. Returning to the race analogy, a race that has a broader division of prizes is no less a race than one that offers prizes only to the first-place finisher. Competition remains, the difference is that there will be more winners and fewer losers.

It could be argued that having a broader division of rewards would reduce competition and somehow make things worse. In the case of a race, it might be claimed that runners would think “why should I train hard to win the whole race when I can get a prize for being third in my age group?” In the case of capitalism, people would presumably say “why should I work hard to try to be the biggest winner when I can get decent rewards for just being successful?”

While I will not claim that no one thinks that way, most runners still train hard and race hard regardless of what sort of division of prizes the race offers. The same would seem to hold true of capitalism. People would still work hard and compete even when there was no massive prize for a few and little for everyone else. In fact, people who know they have little or no chance at the biggest prize would presumably compete somewhat harder if they knew that they had at least some chance of getting a decent return on their success. Also, in the case of capitalism, people already work hard for small prizes when they know they have no chance of ever getting the biggest prize or even a bigger reward. As such, unless they are delusional or irrational, they are not motivated by having a top-heavy reward system. Survival provides adequate motivation for those of us who are not in the top .1%

At this point, one might bring participation awards, when everyone gets a medal for showing up. The economic analogy would be a form of socialism or communism in which everyone gets the same reward regardless of effort. This, many would argue, would be terrible and unfair.

In the case of races, runners still compete even if everyone gets the same prize (be it the same medal or nothing at all). Many people just love to compete for the sake of competition or race for reasons that have nothing to do with prizes. It would hardly be a stretch to think that this view also extends into the economic realm. There are people, such as open-source developers and community volunteers, who work hard for no financial rewards. But there is certainly a reasonable case that people need to win prizes to be really motivated to do anything.

I must admit that while I will still run hard in a race that has no prizes, I do love competing for them and prefer races that offer competition-based rewards. I am tolerant of participation medals because someone who runs a race has accomplished something meaningful. A race can have both participation medals and prizes for winning. In the case of an economy, this would be a competitive system that offered better rewards to the winners, but also provided those who are actively participating in the economy with at least a minimal reward. One area in which this analogy breaks down is that the economy has people who cannot participate (the very old, the very young, the ill and so on) and it would be a much more serious matter for these people to get nothing than it is for people who do not finish the race to not get their participation medals.