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During the last pandemic, I contracted COVID and it was the sickest I have been in my life. Not being a member of the ruling class, I had to rely solely on my immune system to get through it. I did not die but have had some lasting effects: persistent fatigue and breathing issues. These make running challenging and I struggle to get in over 40 miles a week, but it is likely that my years of running contributed to my ability to get through COVID.

When the vaccines became available to older Americans, I waited my turn. Florida eventually made them available to educators, but Governor DeSantis pointedly excluded higher education faculty and staff. Like most faculty at public colleges, I was required to return to the classroom. I was not overly concerned; surviving COVID is supposed to grant long-lasting immunity and being fired would be far more dangerous than getting COVID again.

Like everyone else on campus, I had to get bi-weekly COVID tests. Eventually the governor allowed everyone over 50 to get the vaccine, and I was able to get my first shot of Moderna at the community vaccination site on campus. I felt a bit rough after that shot. While waiting for my second shot, the possible issues with the Johnson & Johnson vaccine made the news and there were worries about vaccine availability. Fortunately, I was able to get my second shot.

While I got my vaccinations as soon as I could, some were hesitant. In some cases, this hesitation was rational: the vaccines were rolled out quickly by for-profit corporations and emergency use authorization were issued to allow their deployment. While testing was conducted, the timescale of the tests was limited, and possible long-term side effects were obviously a mystery at that time. Medical experts made educated estimates that the short-term benefits (not dying of COVID) outweigh any likely long-term effects. But these estimates were made based on many unknowns and it was (and is) rational to consider possible long-term consequences. That said, vaccines are well understood, and these vaccines were not crazy radical departures from established science. Given what we knew then, the rational bet favored getting the vaccine. Given what we know now, people should get the vaccine. Unfortunately, the current regime is appallingly anti-health and anti-science.

People also opposed getting vaccinated because of ideological reasons and this has only strengthened. Parents have, perhaps from the very best intentions, have condemned their children to illness and even death from preventable illnesses, like measles.

 Trump and some of his fellow Republicans politicized the pandemic for short term political gain at the expense of the well-being of citizens. While it is certain that some would resist vaccination on ideological grounds no matter what politicians say, Trump and his fellows fed this view and increased the size and intensity of the resistance to vaccination. Vaccination, like mask wearing, also became a macho issue: manly men might think that they do not need to be vaccinated.

At this point, the ideological battle is largely lost, and disease is emerging victorious across the United States. Biden did not try to compel people to get vaccinated, understanding that this would have caused people to double down on their opposition and give credence to the tyranny narrative. Instead, medical experts tried and are still trying to get employers, local doctors, and local leaders to encourage people to get vaccinated. Appeals to the public good have been weakened and the right seems to have completely abandoned this notion in so far as it involves people contributing to the public good. But there are those who will, correctly, point out that vaccination is not without risk.

When I first wrote about vaccination,  about 7 million people were vaccinated with the J&J vaccine. Six women between the ages of 18 and 48 developed cerebral venous sinus thrombosis (CVST) 6-13 days after getting their shot and one woman died. In response, the vaccine was suspended. Addressing this sort of situation is challenging. If you approach it with cold rationality and focus on the statistics, then you seem an uncaring monster, even when your objective is the safety and well-being of people. If you approach it emotionally and focus on the individuals impacted, then you seem caring and concerned. But making broad policy decisions based on such feelings can lead to large scale suffering and death. The solution is to follow our good dead friends Confucius and Aristotle: to hit the mean between the two extremes. If we are too coldly rational, then we will be seen as monsters and our efforts to do good will face opposition. If we are too emotional, then we can make bad decisions that hurt the many from a desire to protect the very few.

In terms of the cold facts, even if we assume that the vaccine caused the clots, then the odds of dying are (based on the available data) were about 1 in 7 million (for women 18-48). The odds of getting CVST are about 1 in 1 million (for women aged 18-48). These are objectively very good odds compared to other things that can kill you. The most sensible comparison is to the risk of death from COVID. While there are many factors that figure into your chances of dying from COVID, a person’s chances of dying from COVID are 36 to 78,571 times greater than dying from CVST from getting the J&J shot. There is also to cold fact that so far only women 18-48 have suffered from clotting, so people in other demographics might have no chance of dying from the vaccine. As such, if the choice is between the J&J vaccine or nothing, then the rational choice would have been the J&J vaccine. Likewise for other vaccinations, if we follow the cold calculations of survival.

As others have done, it is also instructive to re-consider the J&J vaccine in the context of other medications. While the types of clots caused are not identical, the odds of getting a blood clot from oral contraceptives is 3-9 in 10,000. The odds of getting a clot when not on oral contraceptive is 1-5 in 10,000 women and the odds of a women getting one while pregnant is 5-20 in 10,000. Like all analogies, this comparison is imperfect, but it does illustrate that even common medications are not without significant risk. Even the ubiquitous NSAIDs can have very serious side effects including death. While it might be thought that all these risks are the fault of irresponsible and greedy corporations, risks can be due simply to the interaction between chemicals and human bodies. After all, people can die from reactions to naturally occurring foods such as peanuts and shellfish.  Because of the complexity of human biochemistry and the variations between people, there is almost always the risk that a small percentage of the population will have an adverse or even fatal reaction to a pharmaceutical product, even when due care is taken. This is not to say that we should simply tolerate dangerous medicines, just that we need to be aware of what are likely to be unavoidable risks. 

As a final consideration, there are those who still argue that vaccination is a personal choice and they should be free to decide. On the one hand, they are right: a person has a general moral right to refuse medical treatment and vaccination. However, this does not entail that they have a right to freedom from all consequences of making this choice. To use an obvious analogy, a person can refuse to get the vaccinations that are required to travel to certain places, but this comes at the cost of not being able to travel. To use another analogy, a person has the right to own a car without brakes, but they do not have the right to take it out on the road.

On the other hand, the principle of harm would morally warrant requiring people to get vaccinated: the unvaccinated are reservoirs of the disease and “breeding grounds” for disease mutations. They could thus extend future pandemics significantly and thus endanger others and the economy. To the degree that they incubate new strains, they would also make it so that people would need to keep getting vaccinations against these strains. In short, this “freedom” would do considerable damage to society, which is good grounds for limiting a freedom. But as vaccines are part of the culture war, requiring them is becoming increasingly difficult, though doing so is as morally warranted as requiring people to have working brakes before getting on the road.

In closing, while vaccines are not without risk, vaccination is a safe and effective method of reducing the risk of getting sick or dying of a preventable disease. This is not to say that people should accept all vaccines uncritically, that would be a straw man of my position.

In epistemology, the problem of other minds is the challenge of proving that other beings have thoughts and feelings analogous to my own. A practical version of the problem is how to tell when someone is honest: how do I know their words match what they believe? But the version I am concerned with here is the problem of racist minds. That is, how do I know when someone is a racist? Racism, like dishonesty, comes in degrees. Just as everyone is a bit dishonest, everyone is a bit racist. But a person should not be labeled a liar unless they are significantly dishonest. The same applies to being a racist and a person should not be labeled as a racist unless their racism is significant. There is, of course, no exact boundary line defining when a person should be considered a liar or a racist. Fortunately, we can get by with imprecise standards and accept the existence of grey areas. To demand a precise line would, of course, fall for the line drawing fallacy.

It is important to distinguish racists from people who seem racist. One reason is that an accusation of racism can have serious consequences, and such claims should not be made lightly. Another reason is that racists should be exposed for what they are. What is needed are reliable tests for sorting out racists from non-racists.

The need for a test also arises in the classic problem of other minds. Descartes proposed a language-based test to solve the problem in the context of animals. Roughly put, if something uses true language, then it has a mind and thinks. Turing created his own variation on this test, one that is more famous than Descartes’ test. In the case of testing for racism, it is assumed that people have minds and that problem is bypassed (or ignored) for practical reasons.

It might be wondered why tests are needed. After all, many assume the only true racists are the blatant racists: they burn crosses, have Swastika tattoos, and openly use racist language. While these racists are easy to spot, there are more subtle racists who work at avoiding detection. In fact, coded racism has been a strategy in the United States for decades, most famously explained by Lee Atwater:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

This illustrates the challenge of determining whether a person is racist: there are coded words and phrases used by racists that are not openly racist in their normal meaning, and they have many uses. First, they allow a racist plausible deniability: they can claim to be using the word or phrase in a non-racist manner. Second, it allows racists to recruit non-racists. People who are, for example, concerned about welfare fraud can be drawn into racism through that gateway. Third, it allows racists to signal each other while making the “normies” think critics are crazy. As an illustration, when I have tried to explain various code phrases used by racists to “normies” they often think I am either making it up or I accept a wacky woke conspiracy theory. So how does one pierce the veil and solve the problem of racist minds? Here are two useful guides.

As noted above, there code words and phrases used by racists that have non-racist surface meanings. One example is the use of “China virus” by Trump and his fellows during the last pandemic. On the face of it, this seems non-racist: they are referencing where the virus comes from. As I have argued in earlier essays, this use of “China virus” is racist. It makes use of the well-worn racist trope of foreigners bringing disease and Trump’s followers got the message: anti-Asian violence increased dramatically. But one might say, surely there are many people who use such words and phrases without racist intent. That is true and is what gives the racists cover and an opportunity for plausible denial. If only racists used a phrase or word, it would be dead giveaway.

So how does one know when a person is using such words and phrases in a racist manner and when they are not? One easy test is to see how they react to being informed of the racist connotation of the word or phrase. For example, if someone uses “China virus”, then one can inform them it has racist implications and is used by racists. If the person persists in using it despite being aware of its implications, then it is reasonable to conclude they are being racist. It might be objected that a non-racist might want to persist in using the term to “own the libs” or because they refuse to be “politically correct.” While this has some appeal, it can also be a strategy for concealing racism. It is, after all, reasonable to infer that a person who is dedicated to “owning the libs” in this manner is a racist.

To use an analogy, imagine someone who likes setting off fireworks in their backyard. They learn their neighbor has PTSD because they lost an arm, an eye, and friends to IEDs in Iraq and the fireworks really bother her. If they persist in setting of the fireworks despite this knowledge, it would be reasonable to believe they are an ass. After all, a decent person would not do that, even if they believed they had the right to do so. Likewise, a person who persists in using words and phrases that are racist code in contexts where the code is racist would provide evidence they are a racist. Or an ass.

 As the Atwater quote also notes, racism is often coded into policies and their justifications.  Migration provides a good example of this sort of coding. Only the most blatant racists would openly say that they want to keep non-whites out of the United States because of white supremacy. As such, racists have adopted the approach of arguing for restrictions that focus on non-whites using justifications that are not openly racist. The stock reasons given are that migrants are coming here to commit crimes, steal jobs, steal social services and that migrants are bringing diseases.

On the face of it, these are not racist reasons: the arguments for restricting immigration use economic and safety concerns. It just happens that these restrictions target non-white migrants. So how does one distinguish between racists and non-racists who advance such arguments? After all, racists have worked hard to recruit non-racists into using their arguments and they can have considerable appeal. A sensible person would, after all, be concerned if migrants were committing crimes, stealing jobs, and spreading disease.

In most cases where the racists advance coded arguments, they are also making untrue or misleading claims.  This allows for an effective test. Using the migration example, the claims that migrants are stealing jobs, committing crimes and so on are either false or presented in a misleading manner.

If a person is a non-racist and supports, for example, restrictions on migration because they believe these claims, then proving that these claims are false would change their mind. So, if Sally supports restrictions on migration because of her concerns that migrants are doing all those terrible things she is told they do but she learns that these claims are not true or greatly exaggerated, then her position should change. If Sally is a racist, then these are not her real reasons—so she will not change her mind and will persist in lying and exaggerating. As such, a good general test is to find cases where a person claims to believe something that is coded racism and not supported by evidence. If the person is not a racist, they should be amendable to changing their views when the reasons they profess for accepting their views are disproven.

It can be countered that people can become very invested in beliefs and double-down in the face of disproof. Might there not be cases in which a non-racist simply refuses to accept disproof about, for example, claims about migrants? This is certainly possible, but one must wonder why they would be so committed to holding to a disproven view. It makes sense for a racist to do this since their belief is based on racism. But a non-racist would be irrational to do this; although it must be admitted that people are often irrational. As such, the test would not be able to reliably distinguish between racists and people with an irrational commitment to such views.

But, going back to the fireworks analogy, this would seem to be like a person who insists they are not an ass, they just refuse to believe that their neighbor is bothered by the fireworks despite all the overwhelming evidence. This is logically possible, but the better explanation would be that they are, in fact, an ass.

Transgender people, especially transgender athletes are now among the favored targets of the right. Pretending to be concerned about fairness for women, Republican lawmakers have been busy passing laws banning transgender athletes from competition.

On the face of it, these laws seem aimed at saying to the Republican base “we hate and fear transgender people as much as we think you do so keep voting for us.” Obviously, proponents of these laws do not make this claim; they pretend they are very concerned about women and girls being treated fairly.

Republicans profess to be the party of small government, but these laws expand the involvement of the state and as could have agents of the state looking at genitals. This is the same party that raged against mask mandates as too invasive. But, as they have established, the Republican party has no respect for ethics, consistency or logic.

Like Republicans, I profess a belief in minimal government but differ in being consistent.  I have argued in other essays that the state should limit its use of law to cases in which a harm needs to be addressed by law and the good the law outweighs any harms of the law. Those who back the transathlete bans have been hard pressed to find meaningful harms. While inconsistent with their professed love of small government and freedom, these laws are consistent with their approach to voter rights in that they support imposing restrictions where no meaningful harm exists.  But perhaps they are motivated by their professed principle of fairness to women. Let us test this hypothesis.

If the Republicans believe laws should ensure women are treated fairly, then they should pass other laws aimed at addressing serious inequalities between men and women. One example is the persistent pay gap between men and women. In Florida, women make 85 cents for every dollar made by men. This is a harm being done to women and is unfair, yet while the Republican controlled government of Florida was busy with ant-transgender laws, they have been uninterested in this pay gap. One could counter that this is a concern for the private sector, but one can then point to the gender pay gap in Florida government: something the government could and should address. One could also run down a checklist of the areas where women are treated unfairly relative to men and look for evidence that the Republicans have addressed these cases of unfairness. As such, the claim that they are motivated by concerns about fair treatment of women and girls is just another lie. If they were truly motivated by this principle, they would be actively addressing the significant unfairness faced by women and girls and not just focused on ant-transgender laws wearing the mask of fairness.

As a practical response, whenever the Republicans make the fairness argument against transgender athletes, they should be immediately challenged about what else they are going to do to adress fairness. For example, if they are so concerned about fairness, they should ratify the ERA. 

 

Before, during and after the 2020 election many Republicans followed Trump’s lead and lied about widespread voter/election fraud. Trump and his allies had their days in court, losing all but one case. Trump’s allies never claimed fraud in court and confined their lies to the public forum. Using their false claims of widespread fraud and pointing to the doubt their lies created, they claimed they needed to take actions aimed at trying to restrict voting.

As election fraud is not widespread, they had no significant problem to address. Instead, the restrictions they imposed, such as those in Georgia, are clearly aimed at suppressing black voters. They are not aimed at voter fraud, as a brief reflection on most restrictions will reveal. As an illustration, one law limits early voting to the hours of 9 to 5 (county registrars can extend this to 7 to 7). How this would reduce fraud is unclear, but it makes it harder for voters with less flexible schedules. As another example, Republicans done things to increase the lines at polling places predominantly used by minorities while making it a misdemeanor to provide voters with water. There is no plausible account of how this would counter fraud.

If the Republican arguments are taken at face value, the following principles would seem to be in operation. The first is that politicians must address the concerns of the public (even when politicians manufacture the concerns). The second is that restriction of fundamental rights is warranted to address even miniscule problems that cause little harm. So, let us apply these principles to gun control. I do not, of course, expect a consistency argument to affect Republicans as they have little respect for truth, ethics or logic.

Most Americans claim that gun violence is a problem and most Americans support gun control. Given the Republican argument about voting laws, it follows that politicians must act to restrict gun rights. After all, if public concerns about (lies about) election fraud warrant restricting voting rights, then public concerns about guns warrants restricting gun rights. But the actions of Republicans show their professed principle is also a lie: they do not apply it consistently and only use it to “justify” actions they want to take for other reasons. Now to the addressing of harms.

While data on gun violence is limited, there were 19,379 deaths caused by gun violence in the United States in 2020. This excludes deaths caused by suicide using a gun; that number was 24.090 in 202o. In contrast, a careful review of claims about voter/election fraud in 2020 revealed that the number of cases is vanishingly small. If the Republican argument warrants restrictions on voting, then it would (by analogical reasoning) provide exceptionally strong support for gun control laws. After all, if voting must be carefully restricted by law to address a vanishingly small number of cases (that were caught and dealt with using current laws) then the much more significant harms arising from gun ownership must be addressed with new laws of equal or greater restrictiveness.

One could counter that passing gun control laws would violate the Second Amendment; but the obvious response is that the right to vote is more fundamental than any constitutional right. After all, the moral legitimacy of the law depends on the consent of the governed and restricting the right to vote reduces the legitimacy of the state in proportion to those restrictions.

One could, of course, embrace the state of nature argument of Thomas Hobbes and contend that the right of self-defense is the most fundamental right. While this has some appeal, this would not show that the restrictions on voting rights are warranted. Reasoning that it is acceptable to restrict one basic right but not another because the other is more basic is poor logic. To illustrate, this would be like arguing that enslaving people or stealing their property is acceptable because the right to life is more basic than these other rights (since liberty and property rights require one to be alive). Once again, Republican action shows that their concern is not with mitigating harms. If they cared about mitigating harm to citizens, they would be applying this principle consistently. As such, their actions reveal their true principles: they want to suppress voting so they can gain and hold onto power illegitimately and they want to serve the interest of the gun lobby over the safety of the American people.

In response to each mass shooting, Democrats usually propose gun control legislation while Republicans offer “thoughts and prayers” while blocking the Democrats as best they can.  Some years ago, Republican Senator John Kennedy said that “We do not need more gun control. We need more idiot control.” He then endeavored to make an argument by analogy to counter arguments for gun control. In this argument, Kennedy asserted that “…And I’m not trying to equate these two, but we have a lot of drunk drivers in America that kill a lot of people. We ought to try to combat that too. But I think what many folks on my side of the aisle are saying is that the answer is not to get rid of all sober drivers.”

Given what he said, he seemed to be comparing mass shooters with drunk drivers. While that seems clear, sorting out the rest of the argument requires a bit more work. Looking at it in the most charitable way, his inference seems to be that because getting rid of sober drivers would not solve the problem of drunk drivers, it follows (by analogy) that getting rid of non-mass shooter gun owners would not solve the problem of mass shootings. On this interpretation, he is right but right in a vacuous way: getting rid of people who do not do something would not solve the problem of people who do that thing.

But since his reply is to proposals for gun regulation, what he seemed to be inferring is that since getting rid of sober drivers would not stop drunk driving, gun control should be rejected. This reasoning requires that  proposed gun control methods be on par with eliminating sober drivers. I think he might have meant taking away everyone’s cars (including those of sober drivers) as a means of addressing drunk driving. As such, the analogy would only hold in the case of proposals to take away all guns. While there have been such proposals, they are generally not made by mainstream Democrats. So, while the analogy does apply to proposals to eliminate all guns, it does not apply to proposals to increase gun control, such as universal background checks or even assault weapon bans. An assault weapon ban would be analogous to addressing drunk driving by getting rid of vehicles favored by drunk drivers and are also unusually good at causing death and injury. As an aside, one problem with how some Republicans debate gun control is that they make straw person arguments: asserting that the plan is to take away all guns. This is a bad faith argument as there are many other approaches to gun control. The usual response to pointing this out is the Slippery Slope fallacy: asserting that even moderate proposals must lead to taking away all guns. This is also a bad faith argument.

As others noted, Kennedy made a strategic error with this analogy. While it was intended to refute gun control proposals, his comparison invited people to compare guns and cars. Just as some people support eliminating all privately owned guns, there those who propose eliminating privately owned cars for similar reasons: private ownership and the operation of dangerous machines results in many preventable deaths. As such, one could accept the analogy and turn it around: we should handle both problems by eliminating private ownership and the operation of deadly machines. But most people do not want to eliminate private ownership of cars or guns. However, Kennedy’s car analogy can still be used in favor of gun control.

As others have noted, cars are strictly regulated. To legally drive, one must be licensed and insured. Cars must be registered with the state and licensed. Their use is also regulated, and safety features are mandatory. When people are incapable of operating a vehicle safely or get convicted of certain crimes (like driving drunk), then they lose the right to drive. This is because cars are dangerous machines and can do a great deal of harm, even by accident.

Going with Kennedy’s automotive analogy, the same should apply to guns. A person should be licensed and insured to own one, their operation should be carefully regulated, and safety features should be mandated by law. When a person cannot possess a firearm safely or they commit certain crimes, they should lose their right to possess a gun.

The obvious reply is that on some interpretations of the Second Amendment, individual gun ownership is a constitutional right and hence such restrictions would be unconstitutional. One obvious counter is that existing restrictions on guns are constitutional (that is, they have not been struck down) and there are well-established precedents for limiting this right. And, of course, all rights are restricted and limited. For example, the First Amendment has many limitations many of which have been imposed by pro-gun Republicans who giveth to the Second with one hand and taketh from the First with the other. Another obvious reply is to point out that the Republicans who oppose gun control are the same ones who pass laws to restrict voting rights. The right to vote is the foundation of democracy and if they are willing to restrict this right on the grounds of their (usually false) claims about the harms of almost non-existent voter fraud, they have no principled way to object to strict gun control laws as the harms of not having adequate gun control are evident. Perhaps a bi—partisan solution is to have people vote by shooting ballots with guns: every citizen of voting ages gets a gun and the right to vote.

In epistemology the problem of the external world is the challenge of proving that I know that entities exist other than me. Even if it is assumed that there is an external world, there remains the problem of other minds: the challenge of proving that I can know that there is at least one other being that has a mind. A common version of this problem tends to assume other beings exist, and the challenge is to prove that I can know that these other beings have (or lack) minds. Our good dead friend Descartes offered the best-known effort to solve the problem of the external world and in trying to solve this problem he also, perhaps unintentionally, attempted to solve the problem of other minds.

In his Meditations Descartes set out to create an infallible foundation of knowledge starting with his method of doubting his beliefs until he found a belief he could not doubt.  As part of this project, he hoped to solve the problem of the external world. After his doubting spree in the first Meditation, he took his belief that he thinks and the belief that he exists to both be certain and indubitable.  In trying to prove that something exists other than him, Descartes attempts to prove that God exists. And so, he attempted to solve the problem of the external world by solving a version of the problem of other minds. Proving that God exists would prove that another mind exists and that something exists other than him, thus solving a limited version of each problem.

While Descartes grinds through a plethora of proofs, his key reasoning for the purposes of this essay is his notion that the cause of a belief must contain as much reality as the belief itself. Roughly put, you can think of this reasoning as analogous to inferring that whatever charged a mobile phone battery must have at least as much power as in in the battery (assuming the battery charged from zero). Descartes based this reasoning on the principle that something cannot arise from nothing.

Roughly put, Descartes claimed that his idea of God is such that he could not be the cause of this idea—it had to be caused by something external to him. For example, Descartes notes that God is perfect and argues that he could not get the idea of a perfect being from his imperfect self. As another example, Descartes claims that God is infinite and that he (Descartes) could not create the idea of infinity from himself. From this he infers that God exists. He then goes on to argue that since God is perfect it follows that God is not a deceiver. Descartes then concludes that since God created us, we can generally trust our senses and thus we can infer that there is an external world. While this does not address the common version of the problem of other minds, it does offer a solution to the narrowest version: it does attempt to show that Descartes is not the only mind. In philosophical terms, success would refute solipsism. That is the philosophical view that I am the only being in existence. Or, alternatively, it could be taken as the view that I am the only mind (thinking being) that exists. While I think that Descartes’ efforts failed, his attempted solution to the problem of other minds provides a model that I will steal. My goal is modest: I am not trying to prove that other people have minds, I am just endeavoring to show that there is at least one other mind. I will do this with an aesthetic argument that was inspired by the combination of watching Wandavision and teaching Epistemology via Zoom during the last pandemic.

While teaching my Epistemology class at squares on Zoom I mentioned Wandavision as an example and had the realization that the quality of the show could be used to argue for the existence of other minds. While Descartes argued that the cause of an idea must equal or exceed the reality of the idea, I will replace this with the principle that the cause of an idea must equal or exceed the quality of the idea in terms of creativity. As such, to show that something exists other than me, I just need to find an idea (or ideas) whose content exceeds my own creativity. That is, I need to find ideas that I could not create. This is extremely easy.

Wandavision, the show that inspired this argument, exceeds my creative abilities as I lack the skill and talent to write such a series. I can obviously say the same about many other movies, books, and stories since they are beyond my skill to create. As a writer, I am aware of the limits of my abilities and can safely draw these conclusions. I can also add other art, such as music and drawing. I know my skills at music (none) and drawing (very limited) and know that I lack the ability to create most works I have heard or seen. Since I could not create such works, there must be at least one other mind that is creating them. There might be only one other mind and it could be electing to create works of varying degrees. Or there might be many other minds creating these works. This does not, of course, show that there is an external world of the sort I think exists. It could be (as Descartes considered) just me and one other being who is causing all these ideas in my mind. While I would condemn the deception, I must thank them for the high-quality work they create for me. As such, I can infer that at least one other mind exists and that I am not alone. But there are, as always, counter arguments.

One obvious counter argument is that I have an unknown talent or skill that allows me to create without being aware I am doing so. That is, I cannot consciously create things of such quality but can somehow do so without being aware I am doing it. One could point to dreams as an obvious example of how this might work: the best explanation for dreams is that their content comes from me although I (usually) lack conscious control. My reply is to point out that my dreams do not match the quality of the works I encounter in the waking world in terms of the stories. Any art I see or music I hear in my dreams are always mere copies from when I am awake (or think I am awake) or of low quality. As such, I would seem to lack such a hidden and unknown faculty of creativity. I do agree it is not a logical impossibility that I have such a faculty, but there is no evidence for its existing beyond explaining my aesthetic experiences without any other mind existing, which would be ad hoc.

A second obvious counter is to allow that something exists other than me, but this is not another mind. That is, the aesthetic experiences are created in a “mechanical” way without the sort of thinking that would be done by a mind. To use an analogy, this would be like having an AI creating content without having a mind. There are two responses to this. The first is that this would still entail that I was not the only being in existence as there would also be this creator entity. The second is that such a high degree of creativity would seem to require a mind. It would pass tests analogous to the Turing test and thus it would be reasonable to infer there is at least one other mind behind these creative works.

In closing, there are two main possibilities. The first is that I alone exist, and I have an unknown faculty of creativity that vastly exceeds my known skills and talents (and I can never consciously use these hidden abilities). The second is that at least one other being exists and is creating these works that are beyond my skill.

Some years ago, the right made Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head battles in their manufactured culture war. When Pepe Le Pew was removed from the Space Jam 2 movie, there were cries that the boundary ignoring skunk had been cancelled. As I have noted in previous essays, these are all just examples of companies changing their products. While some attributed this to companies going woke, the more reasonable explanation is that they thought it would be profitable to make these changes and were trying to be smart capitalists. Sometimes their marketing efforts fail, as happened with Bud Light.

If these companies had been coerced into making such changes, then this could have been morally wrong. If the state had tried to impose these changes, then it would be reasonable to raise the 1st Amendment as the state would be forcing companies to change their products and brands against their will. But if the state was not involved, then this Amendment does not apply as private individuals cannot violate this amendment when acting in their private capacity.

If non-state actors coerced these companies, then this could be immoral since using such power to violate rights is usually wrong. For example, an employer using their coercive advantage over their employees to interfere with their freedom of expression, is usually legal but is morally wrong. However, this does not seem to have been the case; no outsider appears to have forced these changes.

It could be argued that the companies were coerced by popular opinion, that the “woke mob” pressured them into making these changes.  But this does not seem morally problematic since consumers have the right to express their values to companies and companies routinely shift their products and brands to meet consumer demand. If companies making changes based on changing values is coercion, then companies would also be coerced as they responded to tastes and styles changing. But we do not think that the decision to stop making Tab was the result of coercion nor do we think that changes in fashion are the result of coercion: styles and tastes change over time and companies change along with them.

One matter that does not seem to be discussed is the remedy the right would want for the alleged harm of cancellation. That is, what should the state do in response to these changes? If there was adequate evidence of illegal coercion, then the state should step in. But there was no evidence of that, these companies seemed fine with the changes they decided to make. It is the right that was outraged, not Hasbro or the estate of Dr. Seuss. Should folks on the right be able to use the coercive power of the state to force these companies to change things back to how they were? In these cases, should laws have been passed requiring that the books be kept in print, that the “Mr. Potato Head” brand be kept and that Le Pew be returned to the movie, and so on for all that was alleged to be cancelled? This would, ironically, seem to be compelled speech and a violation of the first Amendment. If the folks on the right think the companies should have decided; well, they did. They just did not decide the way some of the right wanted at the time. The behavior of the Trump administration and Republican controlled states has shown how much they care about free expression. Based on their behavior, their concern is with ensuring the content they dislike is cancelled and the content they like is either unrestricted or imposed by the coercive power of the state.

The right-wing news, certain pundits and certain politicians made Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head a battlefield in their manufactured culture war. The core claim was that Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head were cancelled by the left. The narrative expanded to include President Biden, asserting that he was somehow involved in this matter. While Ben Shapiro’s famous catch phrase is “facts don’t care about your feelings”, it seems that some on the right do not care about facts.

The Dr. Seuss matter involves two sets of key facts that seem to have been intentionally misrepresented by some on the right. The first set involves the Read Across America Day context. It is true that Learning for Justice, which is a left-wing group, did call for schools to avoid “connecting Read Across America Day with Dr. Seuss.”  Loudoun County Public Schools did decide to “to not connect Read Across America Day exclusively with Dr. Seuss’ birthday.” In the face of backlash, the district released a statement making it clear that they were not banning Dr. Seuss books. Dr. Seuss was simply not the emphasis of Read Across America day in the district. As such, Learning for Justice did not call for Dr. Seuss to be cancelled nor was Dr. Seuss cancelled by this school district.

The second set of facts involves the decision of Dr. Seuss’ estate to stop publishing six books because they  contain illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” While the illustrations in question have long been criticized, there does not seem to have been any  focused effort to force the estate to  stop publishing these works. On the face of it, this seems to be a business decision made either from a change in values or a recognition that racist content could hurt their reputation and brand (and hence profits). As such, this choice seems to have been an uncoerced business decision of the sort routinely made when assessing product lines. In a sense, this is analogous to the decision to no longer sell Tab: tastes change over time and old products get discontinued. It would, of course, be hilarious if this was a clever business ploy to get the right to buy up the existing supply of these six books (they were not top sellers). As such, the facts that do not care about feelings are that Dr. Seuss is not cancelled: a business simply decided to discontinue six titles that are not top sellers to improve their brand. The Potato Head matter also involves facts that run counter to the cancel narrative.

Hasbro decided to change the Mr. Potato Head brand to Potato Head. Mr. Potato Head and Mrs. Potato Head are still available and sold under those names. The company did make the statement that “Hasbro is making sure all feel welcome in the Potato Head world by officially dropping the Mr. from the Mr. Potato Head brand name and logo to promote gender equality and inclusion.” As of this writing, there is no evidence that Hasbro was subject to coercion or forced to make this decision. Once again, the explanation seems to be that either the decision makers have made a change to reflect changing values, or they engaged in rebranding for their product in a way they thought would prove most profitable.

Changing branding to reflect changing values is how branding works. As an illustration, consider the explicitly racist advertising (and products) of the past. As American norms about explicit racism changed, advertising and branding changed along with them. This need not be for any moral reason. Failure to keep up with norms and values is on par with failing to keep up with trends and tastes: failure to do so means a loss of business. The same is happening today and companies are simply rebranding by shifting with the changing norms of their consumers. It could be claimed that businesses are coerced into this by changing values, but they do have a choice: they could stick with past values and risk losing revenue or keep up with the times. As such, this rebranding is not cancellation, it is just business as usual.

If companies were being coerced by the power of the state to remove products or change their branding, then there could be real concerns about oppression and misuse of power. My adopted state of Florida has been busy banning books from libraries as part of the culture war with the support of the same people who raged against the “cancellation” of Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head. This shows, once again, that they are not driven by a commitment to free expression but by the desire to control expression in accord with their values and agenda.

There can also be moral concerns when private citizens and organizations use their coercive power to wrongly infringe on the freedom of others (such as when employers coerce their employees), but this did not happen in these cases. As such, the efforts on the right to make these matters into proof of cancel culture are at best straw man attacks and could be justly described as a campaign of lies. Those who fall for this deceit can, perhaps, be excused: the claims of the media are reinforced by the claims of the politicians and pundits, and they have been trained to distrust credible sources of information.

As far as why the right lied about all this, the sensible answer is that they do not have any real examples of oppression and injustice to use: they must manufacture examples with hyperbole, by constructing straw persons, and by lying. This is analogous to their claim of widespread voter fraud: while there would be a problem if it were significant, they are at a loss to provide evidence for this and must resort to mere anecdotes, straw persons, hyperbole, and lies. If they had adequate evidence of real harm, they could present it rather than making things up. But it seems to be working for them. As I have discussed in other essays, I am not sure what percentage of their supporters are deceived and what percentage are in on the lies. In practical terms, the distinction often does not matter: the results are the same. But the distinction can matter  for those who are deceived can, in theory, change their views in response to the truth.

The right, one suspects, is angry about changing values and especially upset when business recognizes these changes and respond to them. This is not surprising: to be conservative is, one imagines, to want to conserve what (one thinks) was and to resist changes to this. But this defense is conducted in bad faith: rather than honestly admitting they want to keep the racist images in Dr. Seuss and honestly admitting they are angry that Hasbro has moved away from sexism, they create the fiction of cancel culture. This is a moral mask: they present themselves as defenders of free expression since openly advocating for racism and sexism would be bad for their public brand. That said, there are some on the right who are honest about this: they are openly racist and sexist, which makes them oddly better than those who share their views but lack the courage to do so openly.

A few years ago, the estate of Dr. Seuss decided to pull six books from publication because the works include illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” This was taken by some on the right as an example of “cancel culture” and it became a battleground in the culture war designed to distract from real problems. There was speculation on the motives of the decision makers. They might have been motivated by sincere moral concerns, they might have been motivated by woke marketing (sales did increase after the announcement), or they might have (as the right suggests) yielded to the threat of “cancel culture.” While questions of motives are interesting, my main concern is with the philosophical matter of re-assessing works of the past in the context of current values.

This is not a new problem in philosophy and David Hume addressed the matter long ago. As Hume sees it, we can and should make allowances for some differences between current and past customs. He says, “The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because of their ruffs and fardingales?” Hume is right to note that elements of past art will be out of tune with our time and that some of these differences should be tolerated as being the natural and blameless result of shifting customs. Such works can and should still be enjoyed.

As an example, movies made and set in the 1960s will feature different styles of clothing, different lingo, different styles of filming, and so on. But it would be unreasonable to look down on or reject a work simply because of these differences. Hume does, however, note that a work can cross over from having blameless differences in customs to being morally problematic:

 

But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blamable.

 

Hume thus provides a rough guide to the moral assessment of past works: when a work’s content violates contemporary ethics, this is a significant flaw in the work. Hume does note that such works can still have artistic merit, and one can understand that the artist was operating within the context of the values of their time but these flaws are blameworthy and diminish our ability to enjoy the work. Put in marketing terms, the work loses its appeal to the audience. Hume’s view can easily be applied to the Dr. Seuss situation.

When Dr. Seuss created these works, the general customs, and ethics of America (and the world) were different. While there were people who held moral views that condemned racist stereotypes in art, there was a general acceptance of such things. In fact, many people would not even recognize them as being racist at the time they were created. Since I hold to an objective view of morality, I think that racist images have always been wrong, but I do recognize the impact of culture on moral assessment. There are, of course, ethical relativists who hold that morality depends on the culture: so, what was right in the earlier culture that accepted racism would be wrong now in a culture that is more critical of racism.

There are also theories that consider the role of cultural context in terms of what can be reasonably expected of people and that shapes how people and works are assessed. That is, that while morality is not relative, it can be harder or easier to be good in different times and places. So, a person trying to be a decent human being in the 1930s faced different challenges than a person trying to be a decent person in 2025. Harms also need to be taken in context: while racist stereotypes in drawings are seen as very harmful today, in the context of the racism of the past, these drawings would pale in comparison to the harms caused by racist violence and laws. This is not to deny the existence of racist violence today; it is just to put matters in context: things are bad, but not as bad as the past (though the future might be worse).

Whether we think that morality has changed or that more people are moral, these racist stereotypes are now broadly rejected by people who are not racists. As such, it made both moral and practical sense for the estate to take these books out of print. From a practical standpoint, racism can taint a business’ reputation and unless one focuses on marketing to racists (which could be a profitable option) purging racist content makes sense. In terms of ethics, racist images are wrong. One could advance a utilitarian argument here about harm, a Kantian argument about treating people as ends and not means, or many other sorts of arguments depending on what ethical theory you favor. As such, removing the products from sale makes sense, especially since they are books for children. We generally accept that children need more protection than adults. While adults can (sometimes) make informed decision about possible harms from content, children generally have not learned how to do this. So just as we would not allow children access to firearms, alcohol, or pornography, it is ethical for a company to decide to protect them from racism.

While it is tempting to see children’s books as just amusements, children can be profoundly shaped by the content of such works. This is, perhaps, why many parents and groups have been instrumental in making Captain Underpants the most banned (cancelled?) book in America. Just as they are shaped by all their experiences. Children will generally pick up on racist stereotypes and can internalize them. Even if they do not become overt racists, these stereotypes will impact how they think and act throughout their life. As Plato argued, “true education is being trained from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things.” Our good dead friend Aristotle developed this notion in his Nicomachean Ethics and he makes an excellent case for how people become habituated. Assuming Aristotle got it right, the estate made the right choice in discontinuing these works.

In closing, it is worth wondering why the right was so concerned about these works. If they were consistent defenders of freedom of expression and freedom of choice, then they could argue that they are merely applying their principles of freedom. However, they are not consistent defenders of these freedoms and one must suspect that they are fighting for racism rather than freedom.

“Bathroom bill” is the popular term for legislative efforts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on gender identity. These bills typically define who can and cannot access these facilities based on how the bill defines sex or Examples include defining sex by assigned sex at birth, sex listed on the person’s birth certificate, or sex based on gender identity. Some states have passed or are considering bathroom bills and this matter is part of the ongoing culture war against transpeople. As Trump himself noted, this front of the culture war is new. As to why it was opened up, the reasonable answer is that the right mostly lost the same-sex marriage culture war, and they needed a new victim to attack for political gain. Transgender people, unfortunately, were the chosen target.

People tend to take a stance on bathroom bills based on how they feel rather than based on a theory of law. This is usually because most people, even politicians, don’t have a theory of law. While my focus in this essay is on bathroom bills, I am using this context to develop my theory of law in more detail. I want to have a principled and consistent method of assessing laws and good faith argumentation involves making this methodology clear.

Good faith also requires me to note that I am operating within a framework of political philosophy based on Mill and Locke. I accept that people have rights, that the purpose of government is the good of the people, and that rights can only be infringed upon based on the principle of harm. I also favor small government: the laws and the state’s use of coercive force should be kept at a minimum. I have other assumptions but laying out my entire political philosophy would require at least one book. Good faith also requires that I make it clear that I generally oppose bathroom bills and my reasons will be advanced in this essay.

My first consideration in assessing a (potential) law is determining whether the subject is fit for law, and this requires determining whether the matter falls under the legitimate use of the power of the state. What counts as legitimate use is a matter of debate and people are rarely consistent beyond thinking that if the state is doing what they want, it is legitimate. Fortunately, the issue of legitimate use can be narrowed down. In the case of the bathroom bill, the issue is whether controlling who can access bathrooms is a legitimate use of the coercive power of the state. In the context of laws that restrict liberty and rights, I generally follow Mill’s approach: liberty can only be justly restricted to prevent harm to another. On this principle, proponents of a bathroom bill would need to identify the harm the bill is intended to prevent: if there is no harm, then there is no justification for restricting liberty. But even if a law is supposed to prevent harm, this does not settle the issue of whether it should be law.

A second consideration is the issue of whether the significance and nature of the alleged harm warrants expending public resources to pass and enforce a law. Harms vary in significance and even significant harm might not be the right sort of harm that justifies the use of the coercive power of the state. Consider, if you will, some harm that can occur in a bathroom.

Like many other men, I feel uncomfortable when other men try to engage me in conversation while I am urinating. I am also a bit offended when people try to make eye contact during these conversations. While I am experiencing some harm (discomfort and feeling offended) these harms are not significant enough to warrant a law against them. They are also not the right sort of harm: the state does not seem obliged to protect us from discomfort or offense. But a person could escalate matters in the bathroom: if the chatty urinator started making threats of violence or tried to touch someone, then the harm becomes both significant enough to and the right sort to warrant state intervention. That is, laws against threatening people and assault fall within the state’s legitimate use of coercive force.

While those advocating bathroom bills might feel uncomfortable around or offended by the people whose bathroom access they wish to control, they generally understand that these reasons do not warrant passing a law. As such, the bills are typically presented as intending to keep women and girls safe in the bathroom. Some proponents of these bills do admit that transgender people are rarely sexual predators. Instead, they express worry that non-transgender sexual predators will exploit laws allowing transgender access to bathrooms to attack women and girls. This does allege harm that would be both significant and the right sort. But is the allegation true? After all, if the harm is make-believe, it cannot justify a law.

Several states and large cities have allowed transgender people to access bathrooms based on their identity for years, thus providing a wealth of empirical data . The evidence is that this access is not exploited by predators. That is, allowing trans people access to bathrooms of their choice does not decrease the safety of women and girls in bathrooms. If it did, there would be evidence. This is not to deny that a sexual predator could dress up as a woman to get into a bathroom, just that it does not seem to be something that occurs with any statistical significance. There is also the obvious fact that  a predator could dress up as a women whether there are bathroom laws in place. A sexual predator could also disguise themselves as a trash can to launch an ambush in a bathroom, but we do not need a law to address this. It is not something that happens enough to warrant creating a law and mandating trash can inspections.

Somewhat ironically, bathroom bills require that transgender men use women’s bathrooms. As such, a sexual predator keen on exploiting the law could simply claim to be a transgender male and freely enter bathrooms. No need to wear a dress or makeup. As such, the fear argument is self-defeating: if a law is needed to keep transgender people out of bathrooms because male sexual predators will put on dresses to pretend to be transwomen, then the law would not work because sexual predators would simply claim to be transmen and have easy access to the bathrooms because the law defines them as women. This could be addressed by employing bathroom police and requiring people to present birth certificates before accessing bathrooms. But this would require a disproportionate expenditure of resources and impose inconveniences not warranted by the alleged harm. In response, one could contend that something must be done to address even the possibility of harm: theoretical transgender predators must be prevented from attacking women and girls in bathrooms no matter how unlikely this is to happen.

My third consideration is the issue of whether the harm is adequately addressed by existing laws or factors other than laws. If the harm is already addressed adequately, there is no need for a new law. Going back to my chatty urinator discussion, we do not need a law banning chatty people from bathrooms because someone might make verbal threats in the bathroom. We also do not need a law banning people who make eye contact in bathrooms because someone might touch someone else in the bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: making threats is illegal and assault is illegal. Likewise, while knowing a trans person is in the bathroom with them might make a person uncomfortable or feel offended, we do not need a law banning trans people because someone might assault or rape someone in a bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: assault and rape are illegal and allowing trans people to use bathrooms as they wish does not change that. As such, there is no need for bathroom bills and on their own grounds of justification they are unjustified.