Posts

Back in my high school and college track and cross-country days I was accustomed to unflattering comparisons between runners and football players. Runners were mocked as weak and unmanly, while football is a sport for manly men. When Trump’s followers praise his strength, this reminds me of those days and leads me consider the concept of strength.

My conception of strength was influenced by one of my fellow college runners. After he was jokingly mocked by football players, he replied that anyone could hurt somebody else, but it took a real athlete to hurt themselves. To be fair to football players, they do endure being hurt by others and when doing serious training they hurt themselves. But this remark provides a good starting point for a discussion of strength in the context of Trump.

As a runner, I think of strength in terms of the ability to overcome pain, fear and vices to achieve excellence. As an example, getting up at 5:00 am to do a 12-mile training run in the freezing rain is an example of strength. Completing a marathon despite the pain and exhaustion is also an example of strength. While running provides a serious test of strength, there are far greater tests. A good example is the case of someone Trump loathed, Senator John McCain.

While I disagreed with McCain on many political issues, I respect the moral courage and strength he showed during the Viet Nam war. As is well known, McCain was shot down and captured. Severely injured, he endured torture and survived as a prisoner of war. When his captors offered to release him as a sign of preferential treatment, he refused in accord with the military Code of Conduct.  McCain showed incredible strength, endured pain and fear and resisted efforts to corrupt him. One can find other accounts of the strength of American soldiers who endured fear, pain and danger. Strength, obviously, is not limited to the military. The parent who endures the burden of working multiple jobs to provide for their children while also caring for their own parents shows great strength. Those who face adversity, pain and fear with courage show their strength, even if they are broken or killed in their acts of strength. Even the strongest have limits, and there is merit and honor even in defeat.

Trump has a different view of such people. I selected McCain as an example because Trump’s view of McCain is well known. Trump said of John McCain that “He’s not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.” I also used the example of American soldiers because Trump has allegedly called Americans who have died in war “losers” and “suckers.” Trump’s followers see him as strong, but given his utter contempt for McCain and America’s war dead, one must wonder about their conception of strength.

While McCain endured great adversity, Trump has not. He was given millions and has enjoyed a life in which others do his work for him (such as writing “his” book) and clean up his messes. Aside from his repeated bankruptcies and failures, he has been able to escape the consequences of his actions.  But Trump does face some challenges, and these allow us to see his alleged strength.

A good place to look for Trump’s alleged strength is how he handles even mild criticism and challenges presented by people in the media. One can also look at the harsher criticisms advanced by journalists and authors such as Bob Woodward.

Trump’s response is to throw tantrums and lie when faced with even mild criticism. He , accoridng to Tom Nichols, “…is a vain, cowardly, lying, vulgar, jabbering blowhard.” He is also a blamer who refuses to accept responsibility and turns against his people, throwing them under the bus rather than showing strength of characters and accepting responsibility and exhibiting loyalty. He is weakness personified, unable to endure even the mildest criticism without cracking. So where is his strength?

Going back to the remarks by my running friend, Trump’s “strength” seems to lie in his willingness to hurt others; he is “strong” enough to act in ways counter to empathy, compassion and moral decency. This is the sort of strength praised by Himmler in his Posen speeches: “Most of you here know what it means when 100 corpses lie next to each other, when there are 500 or when there are 1,000. To have endured this and at the same time to have remained a decent person — with exceptions due to human weaknesses — has made us tough, and is a glorious chapter that has not and will not be spoken of.” Himmler also expressed his view of strength when he said ,“Thus I have basically given the order to also kill the wives and children of these partisans, and commissars. I would be a weakling and a criminal to our descendants if I allowed the hate-filled sons of the sub-humans we have liquidated in this struggle of humanity against subhumanity to grow up.”

While people often roll their eyes at Nazi comparisons, this view that strength is a matter of overcoming kindness and moral principles in order to do “what must be done” is one explicitly endorsed by modern  thinkers of the right. Ben Shapiro, for example, has come out against empathy. Elon Musk has also come out against empathy, seeing it as a threat to Western civilization. It must be noted that there are critics of empathy who are not on the right; but these criticisms are not that empathy must be overcome by strength so that we might do the “hard things that must be done.” Rather, these tend to be criticisms of tribal empathy, which is only feeling empathy for your side. There have also been criticisms of how empathy can lead to bad policy, not because caring precludes good policy. The concern is that identifying with a very specific person in very specific circumstances can result in badly crafted laws. Those critical of this aspect of empathy do not advocate being uncaring, but advocate compassion over empathy. The right advocates cruelty.

It could be objected that strength is required to overcome empathy, compassion, and moral qualms to do the things that must be done. Going back to my example of McCain and the dead soldiers, they were in combat and usually willing to harm others in battle. Their strength was that they could do the hard things that must be done in war. While this sort of objection does have some appeal, there is an important moral distinction between the strength required to be a combatant and the strength required to be murderous and cruel. Himmler claims that those who engaged in the murders he described retained their decency and were acting from strength; but that is not true. They were engaged in genocide and thus they lost all claim to being decent people.

In the case of Trump, his “strength” is not the sort of strength that enables a person to do something difficult that must be done and can be morally justified, like fighting in a just war. Rather, his cruelty is mistaken for strength. That he readily does cruel and terrible things without any expression of regret, remorse or compassion shows the weakness of his character.  He cannot even be given some credit for contending against those as strong or stronger than him for he is the President and even before then he made a point of going after those with far less power. As such, his followers are making the classic error of confusing cruel emptiness with strength.

Some years ago The Atlantic published a piece claiming that Trump described Americans killed in war as ‘losers’ and ‘suckers.’ Trump has denied these claims and his supporters  rushed to defend him. As would be expected, people tend to believe or reject the claims based on their ideology rather than on considerations of the evidence. I will endeavor to assess the claims philosophically.

In support of the claims is the fact that the Atlantic is a credible source that engages in careful fact checking.  The story has also been corroborated by other news outlets. Trump and his supporters denied the claims. From a critical thinking standpoint, this dispute comes down to an assessment of relative credibility of the Atlantic and Trump. Looked at objectively, Trump lies regularly and the Atlantic carefully fact checks its claims. As such, this is a major plus in favor of the Atlantic. Trump’s supporters assert, without evidence, that the Atlantic is fake news but the burden of proof was  on them to respond to the evidence in favor of the Atlantic’s credibility. If the Atlantic is fake news, they should be able to present evidence establishing this. An obvious problem is that Trump’s supporters tend to reject any claims unfavorable to Trump as false while those who loath Trump tend to accept such claims because of their dislike of Trump. For those between these extremes, the Atlantic would presumably win the credibility battle.

Counting against the Atlantic is the fact that it has a known center-left bias. As such, the Atlantic does have a motivation to be critical of Trump and this lowers its credibility. Trump and his supporters are, obviously, biased in Trump’s favor which lowers their credibility. As such, it comes down to assessing the relative bias and its impact on the credibility of each source. Once again, Trump’s supporters will tend to see the Atlantic as utterly biased against Trump and those who loath Trump will take him as utterly biased. Those in the middle would seem likely to favor the Atlantic here.

Also counting against the Atlantic is the fact that the sources are anonymous. As such, we must rely on a double argument from authority: the claims are supported by the claimed expertise of the author in assessing the anonymous sources and the expertise (broadly speaking) of the anonymous sources. Since we do not know the identity of the sources, we cannot assess their credibility ourselves and must rely on the credibility of the author. While some might be tempted to reject anonymous sources out of hand, this would be an error since anonymous sources have a legitimate role in reporting in cases in which the sources could be harmed if they were identified. Trump would have taken action against anyone who revealed these negative facts. While the use of anonymous sources does not count against the credibility of the claims, their identification and confirmation would greatly increase credibility. And, of course, their identification and disconfirmation would reduce the credibility of the claims. Having a recording of what Trump said would also have a large impact on the credibility of the claims, although one should consider the possibility of technological trickery.

Counting in favor of the claims is Trump’s confirmed negative statements about veterans and, most especially prisoners of war. Trump famously attacked  former POW John McCain, asserting that he likes people that were not captured. Trump also has an established history of disrespecting veterans, soldiers and the military. Trump’s seemingly complete focus on defining all interactions as transactional  is consistent with the claims attributed to him, as is his well known cruelty and lack of empathy. The claims attributed to Trump are completely consistent with Trump’s character and his past claims, which increases the credibility of these claims about him. As such, it is reasonable to believe that the article is accurate.

While Trump and his supporters are very pro-military, Trump has made it clear that he is anti-veteran. The Musk-Trump regime’s cuts have caused significant and ongoing harm to veterans, and Trump expressed no concern for this harm. As such, his current actions lend credence to this past claim.

Back in 2020, Kyle Rittenhouse became famous for shooting three people in Kenosha, Wisconsin. This took place during protests of the killing of Jacob Blake by police. While he was charged, he was found not guilty and even got to meet with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in 2021.

My adopted city of Tallahassee also saw an armed response to protestors. Fortunately, the incident ended quickly without injury or death. The episode seems to have begun with a confrontation between the protestors and the armed person which escalated into shoving. The armed person then drew his weapon to deter the protestors and quickly surrendered to the police.  He was seen as acting in legitimate self-defense: he felt threatened and drew his weapon to deter possible attackers. He might even be credited with showing restraint as Florida has a controversial stand your ground law that might have allowed him to legally shoot the protestors.

These two examples raise the issue of whether it is ethical to go armed to confront protestors. Since my expertise is not law, I will leave it to the lawyers, legislators, and judges to sort out the legal aspects and will focus on the moral issue.

To pre-empt likely straw person attacks, I will begin with the obvious: if protestors unjustly attack someone, they have the right to self-defense. For example, if Sally is standing in front of her store and protestors start throwing bricks at her, she has the right of self-defense. She has done nothing to warrant their attack, and they are acting wrongly to harm her.

As another example, if Bill engages protestors in a debate and the protestors start punching him, then he would have the moral right of self-defense. He has the moral right to be in public spaces and to express his views. As such, he would have done nothing that would warrant the attack and can rightfully defend himself.

At the other extreme there are cases in which it would be absurd to claim the right of self-defense. For example, if a person watches too much Fox News and is terrified of protestors and opens fire on a group of peaceful protestors walking past his property, he cannot claim the moral right of self-defense. Merely being afraid does not suffice to warrant self-defense; there must be a level of threat that a reasonable person would recognize. As another example, if a protestor was spray-painting protest slogans on the wall of a business, this would not morally warrant the owner shooting them as the offense does not merit the punishment of death. As with most moral issues, it is the land between the extremes where the meaningful debate usually takes place.

While many would see the Rittenhouse case as open and shut, it does raise a general point worth considering. Rather than focus on the specific case, this incident raises the moral question of whether a person has the moral right to intentionally travel to a place to defend the property or lives of others knowing that confrontation is likely. This is, of course, a case of an intentional, traveling vigilante. Since I have written vigilantism before, I will take my usual approach of using John Locke’s theory of self-defense.

Locke argues that when we are in the state of civil society, we still retain the right of self-defense and the right to protect others. But it must be “activated” before it can justly be used. What must occur is that a person must be temporarily removed from the state of civil society by an action that wrongly threatens life, liberty, or property. For this to occur, there must be no viable civil authority able or willing to intervene on the person’s behalf. If there is a viable and willing civil authority that can act effectively, the person remains in the state of civil society and does not have the right to use violence. To use an obvious example, if I am in a confrontation and someone punches me and a police officer immediately pins them to the ground, I do not have the right to attack them because the civil authority was present and acted effectively. But if the officer is fifty feet away while the person is trying to hit me, I have the moral right to engage them. But if the officer subdues them, I do not have the right to keep hitting them as civil society has been restored.

On the face of it, a travelling vigilante would be hard-pressed to invoke the right of self-defense: they must travel to a place to intentionally put themselves in danger when they could just stay home and remain safe. This is like running across a room to get in front of a punch aimed at someone else just so one can claim self-defense. That would be absurd. So, a travelling vigilante cannot justly claim self-defense: they could have defended themselves by staying away from the danger. 

But Locke also allows, in the state of nature, people to rightfully defend others. So, if civil society has failed in a location, then people would have a moral right to go to that place to defend lives and property that are being wrongfully threatened. Specific cases would require sorting out whether the alleged threats were real and morally wrong. But if civil society has not failed in that location, then such an action would not be warranted: protecting life, liberty and property is the obligation of the state and vigilantes would not be warranted in using violence. As such, a travelling vigilante could be justified in cases in which civil authority has failed.

The other general sort of case involves a person going to a protest while armed, knowing that their planned actions or presence is likely to provoke a response. There are two main types of situations here. One is that the person is aware that their presence and actions might provoke a response, but they do not intend to instigate violence. If the person has a morally acceptable reason to go, even if it is just to exercise their right to be in a public space, then their going would seem to be acceptable. That said, a person should still consider the consequences of their actions: while they do have the right to be there, if they go knowing they will trigger a conflict, then they bear some responsibility if something happens. After all, they could avoid the conflict by not going. To use an analogy, if Sam’s ex is going to be at a party and Sam knows there will be an incident if he goes, while he still has the right to attend the party, he does have some responsibility for deciding to attend. But, of course, if he does not want an incident and his ex is the instigator, then the ex bears most of the responsibility.

The second is that the person intends to provoke a response so that they can engage in violence while claiming they are acting in self-defense. This is morally complicated. On the one hand, claiming self-defense after intentionally provoking the response would be morally problematic. To use an ex analogy, if Sam knows that his ex will create an incident and ruin the party if he shows up and provokes her and shows up intending to provoke her and ruin the party, then he bears some of the blame.

On the other hand, it can be argued that even if the person intends to provoke an incident, they can still claim self-defense if those provoked act wrongly. Using the ex-example, if Sam knows what his ex will do and goes with the intent of provoking her, if his provocation does not morally justify her response, he can still rightfully claim that she bears most of the responsibility. He can, rightfully, claim that she has no right to respond in that manner even though he knows what will happen when he goes and provokes her. So, if Joe attends a protest of Trump and Musk supporters and shouts “black lives matter” and “go home Elon” intending to provoke a violent response, then he would bear some responsibility if violence ensued. After all, but for his presence and actions, it would not have occurred.  But he can also claim self-defense: the violent response was not warranted by his provocation. This does, of course, raise complicated moral questions about what sort of provocation warrants a violent response.

Since I teach philosophy, I am sometimes asked how to win an argument. Being a philosopher, I disappoint those asking with philosophical discussion rather than providing tips on how to destroy an opponent with “facts” and “logic.”

In philosophy, an argument is a set of claims. There are two types of claims in an argument: one conclusion and one or more premises.  The conclusion is the claim that is supposed to be supported by the premises. A premise is a claim given as evidence or a reason for accepting the conclusion.  As such, making an argument requires making a point (conclusion) and backing it up with evidence or reasons (premises).

When assessing an argument there are two main factors to consider: the quality of the premises and the quality of the reasoning. When assessing the quality of reasoning, the question is: Do the premises logically support the conclusion? If the premises do not logically support the conclusion, then the argument is flawed, and the conclusion should not be accepted based on the premises provided. The conclusion may be true, but a flawed argument gives you no logical reason to believe the conclusion because of that argument. If the premises do logically support the conclusion, then you would have a good reason to accept the conclusion, on the assumption that the premises are true or at least plausible.

When assessing the quality of the premises, the question to ask is: are the premises true (or at least plausible)?  While the testing of premises can be a rather extensive matter, it is reasonable to accept a premise as plausible if it meets three conditions. First, the premise is consistent with your own observations. Second, the premise is consistent with your background beliefs and experience. Third, the premise is consistent with credible sources, such as experts, standard references, and textbooks.

In terms of winning, the constructing of a philosophical argument in isolation is like playing solitaire: winning is not beating someone else. A solitaire win would be constructing a good argument with plausible premises. But this is certainly not the sort of winning that people are interested in. What they want is the victory conditions for an argument against someone else.

In the case of arguing philosophically, the contest would be settled in favor of the best argument(s).  As such, winning is a matter of having better logic and more plausible premises than the opposition. In the ideal, the result would be to find something (likely to be) true. Such contests must also be conducted in good faith and in accord with the philosophical principle of charity. This does not mean that the two sides cannot be engaged in an intense dispute in which claims and logic are called into question. To use an analogy, competing in such an argument is analogous to competing in good faith in an athletic event: one abides by the agreed upon rules and does not cheat. And of course, victory goes to the one who earns it by making the better arguments. Obviously enough, this is not the sort of winning people tend to have in mind when they think of winning an argument.  What people tend to think of is something Ben Shapiro is famous for: his guide to winning arguments against leftists. The underlying view of winning is not unique to Ben Shapiro and one can easily trace this notion back to the Sophists of ancient Greece and no doubt even further into the shadows of time. 

In this context you win if the audience believes you and rejects your opponent, whether what you are claiming is true or whether your logic is good. While philosophical arguments can be used to persuade people, they tend (as Aristotle noted) to be the weakest means of persuasion. As such, if you want to win an argument, then good logic is usually your worst tool. Fallacies (errors in reasoning) are far more effective than good arguments as tools of persuasion. Rhetorical devices, which rely on emotive force, are also effective at persuading people and thus are better weapons than good arguments. While a fallacy can have a true conclusion and rhetoric can be used to dress up the truth, these tools do not reliably lead to the truth. Used well, however, they can reliably persuade.

Philosophers are often critical of this concept of winning in the same way honest athletes are critical of cheating. To use an analogy, consider winning a marathon. One way to win the marathon is to train hard, complete the race fairly, and earn the win. But there are other ways to win the prize. One option is to compete unfairly by using pharmaceuticals or blood doping. One could also cut the course or bribe officials. There are many ways to “win” and get the prize without competing in good faith. Likewise, an argument can be “won” using fallacies, rhetoric and lies. That is, one can be crowned the winner in the same way as the marathon cheat steals their laurels.

It could be countered that in argumentation what really matters is winning. So, if a politician or YouTuber can profit by persuading people to accept their views through fallacies, rhetoric and lies then they have beaten their opponents even (or especially) if their opponents are making true claims. The obvious counter is to draw the analogy to sports: winning matters but winning must be earned through an honest path to victory. Otherwise, one is stealing the laurels. Having the trophy does not make one the best and “winning” does not make one right.

Back during the ideological battle over masks in the last pandemic, I used arguments by analogy to defend governmental mask requirements. My silly comparison was to laws against public nudity. My serious comparisons were to such things as automobile safety laws and regulations for food handling. During discussions, I often encountered the fallacy of perfect analogy, which is the subject of this essay.

Informally speaking, an argument by analogy is an argument in which it is concluded that because two things are alike in certain ways, they are alike in some other way. More formally, the argument looks like this:

 

           Premise 1: X and Y have properties P, Q, R.

           Premise 2: X has property Z.

           Conclusion: Y has property Z.

 

X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as mask ordinances and automobile safety regulations. P, Q, R, and are also variables, but they stand for properties or features that X and Y are known to possess, such as protecting people from danger. Z is also a variable, and it stands for the property or feature that X is known to possess, such as being an acceptable imposition by the government. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of the illustration—the things being compared might have many more properties in common.

An argument by analogy is an inductive argument. This means that it is supposed to be such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is probably true. Like other inductive arguments, the argument by analogy is assessed by applying standards to determine the quality of the logic. Like all arguments, there is also the question of whether the premises are true.

The strength of an analogical argument’s logic depends on three factors. To the degree an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument. To the degree that it fails, it is weak. If the argument is weak enough it can be considered a fallacy (an error in logic). In this case, it would be a false or weak analogy.

The first standard is that the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. This standard is based on the commonsense notion that the more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. It should be noted that even if the two things are very much alike in many respects, there is still the possibility that they are not alike regarding Z. This is one reason why analogical arguments are inductive.

The second is the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present. It should be kept in mind that it is possible for X and Y to share relevant properties while Y does not actually have property Z. Again, this is part of the reason why analogical arguments are inductive.

The third is that it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

These can be simplified to a basic standard: the more like the two things are in relevant ways, the stronger the argument. And the more the two things are different in relevant ways, the weaker the argument. To focus the discussion, I will make use of two analogies to mask regulations. I do not want to get bogged down in the distinctions between ordinances, laws, and such, so I am using the vague term “regulations.” Any substantial battles over the exact terminology can be addressed in the context of law.

When arguing about masks, my concern was with the ethics of such regulations, and I left the legal wrangling to the legal experts. There are two main strategies when using an argument by analogy to argue that something is morally acceptable (or unacceptable). The first is to find something the target audience believes is morally acceptable (or unacceptable) and argue that it is like what you are trying to prove to be morally acceptable (or unacceptable). For example, most people think that laws against public nudity are morally acceptable and hence drawing an analogy between them and mask regulations would be a plausible approach. This differs from an appeal to belief fallacy in that the point is not that something is good (or bad) because people believe it. Rather, it is an appeal to consistency: if a someone accepts public nudity laws as ethical and mask regulations are like these nudity laws, then they should accept the mask regulations are ethical as well.

The second is to find something for which there are already strong arguments for being morally acceptable (or unacceptable) and show how the thing in question is like that thing. This is analogous to how lawyers make use of precedent: if a type of case is already well argued, then a successful analogy to that case allows one to apply the same arguments. As an example, the regulations governing automobile safety (like requiring working brakes) have good arguments supporting them. If it can be shown that mask regulations are like these regulations, then these arguments would also apply to mask regulations, thus providing support for them. While these uses of the argument are reasonable, they can also be reasonably challenged. But the challenges can also be fallacious. It is to the challenges that I now turn.

As noted above, the premises of any argument can be challenged. In the case of an argument by analogy, once counter involves arguing that either (or both) X or Y lack the attributed properties. Another counter is to argue that X lacks Z—this approach can be used against both approaches.

If the argument is a targeted analogy, a person who does not accept that X has Z can reject the analogy. For example, a person who is morally fine with public nudity can reject the analogical argument which assumes laws against public nudity are morally acceptable. If the argument is aimed at making an analogy with something that has established moral arguments, then arguing against these arguments would undercut the analogy. For example, an anarchist could make use of the usual arguments against all the laws of the state to undercut my analogy between masks and automobile safety laws. The arguments that refute the claim that requiring brakes by law is morally acceptable would, by analogy, also refute the claim that mandating mask usage is morally acceptable. This, of course, cannot merely be asserted, it still needs to be argued.

Even if a critic accepts the truth of the premises, they can still reject the argument in a principled manner by arguing that the analogy is weak: that it fails to meet the three standards adequately. If the analogy is bad enough, it could even be the fallacy of false or weak analogy. But the critic must also be on guard against committing fallacies.

One error a critic can make is simply asserting that the three standards are not met and therefore the conclusion of the argument is false. The most common version of this is to assert, without adequate support, that a difference is both relevant and significant enough to refute the analogy.  This can be pushed to the point where it becomes the perfect analogy fallacy. It is often combined with the fallacy fallacy: concluding that an argument must have a false conclusion because the reasoning is (or is alleged to be) fallacious.

The perfect analogy fallacy has this form:

 

Argument 1

Premise 1: An argument by analogy concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: D is a difference between X and Y.

Conclusion: The argument by analogy is a false or weak analogy.

 

One could also combine the perfect analogy fallacy with the fallacy fallacy in an extended argument:

 

Argument 2

Premise 1: An argument by analogy A concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: Argument by analogy A is a false or weak analogy, as per Argument 1.

Conclusion: Y does not have Z.

 

Or just smash them together:

 

Argument 3

Premise 1: An argument by analogy A concludes that Y has Z (because X has Z and X and Y are similar).

Premise 2: D is a difference between X and Y.

Conclusion: Y does not have Z.

 

Argument 2 and 3 would always be fallacies because inferring that the conclusion of a fallacy must be false because it is a fallacy is always a mistake. After all, even an invalid deductive argument can have a true conclusion. For example, consider this invalid argument with all true premises and a true conclusion:

 

Premise 1: If Tallahassee is the capital of Florida, then it is in Florida.

Premise 2: Tallahassee is in Florida.

Conclusion: Tallahassee is the capital of Florida.

 

Argument 1 could, however, be modified to make a good argument. What is wanting is a premise that establishes D as a relevant difference between X and Y that would suffice to show that the argument by analogy is weak. This cannot simply be asserted and it would need to be shown to be plausible using an argument.

The reason I call this fallacy the perfect analogy fallacy is that the use of argument 1 would be part of a strategy to reject an argument by analogy in an unprincipled manner. This would involve either refusing to accept the similarities as adequate or simply asserting that almost any difference is relevant and sufficient to undercut the analogy. That is, the critic is requiring a perfect analogy, which is an impossible standard to meet.

For example, a critic might respond to my nudity law analogy by asserting that the mask covers the mouth while other clothes do not. While this is true, they would need to do more than just point to this difference and they would need to show how this undercuts the analogy. One way to do this is to note that while clothing does not impede breathing, a mask over the mouth can, which could be developed into a relevant difference that undercuts my analogy.

As another example, a critic might respond to my brake analogy by asserting that brakes are not worn but masks are. While this is true, it would need to be shown that this is a relevant and significant difference that breaks the analogy. The main challenge would be showing that while the state can compel people to have safe vehicles, they cannot compel people to wear safety devices, such as seat belts and masks. This could be done but requires more than asserting that people do not wear brakes.

Before accusing a critic of committing this fallacy it is important to determine if this charge has a foundation. After all, good faith criticisms of an argument by analogy involve questioning the similarity between the two things and raising questions about relevant differences. If the critic brings up a difference without support for their claim that it is relevant and significant enough to undercut the analogy, then this would be grounds for suspicion. If they keep repeating the difference without supporting their claim or keep shifting to new, unsupported differences to reject the argument, then it would be reasonable to suspect they are engaged in this fallacy. Their strategy would seem to be to require that X and Y be identical before they accept that X having Z supports Y having Z, which is an impossible standard.

When trying to sort out good faith criticism from bad faith perfect analogy attacks there are two main things to look for. The first is, obviously enough, at least an attempt to argue that the claimed difference is relevant and significant. The second is to look for a willingness on the part of the critic to identify what similarities they would accept as relevant. If they refuse or it plausibly seems that they require an unreasonable (or even impossible) level of similarity, then they are likely to be using the perfect analogy fallacy. It should also be noted that people can fall into this fallacy unwittingly. They are not consciously using a bad faith strategy; they simply believe that asserting a difference exists suffices to undercut the analogy. They would be reasoning in error, but not in bad faith. Such an error can often be corrected, since a person arguing in good faith seeks the truth. I am expecting similar perfect analogy fallacies in the next pandemic, assuming that the government even attempts to take action to protect the people.

https://www.dukeupress.edu/fugitive-modernities

Jessica Krug, a former history professor at George Washington University, admitted to misrepresenting her race and ethnicity. In her confession, she accepted responsibility for her deception while making note of her mental health issues.  This incident was a gift to the right: when it occurred, I learned about it from a Facebook post contending this was proof that there is no such thing as white privilege. While the post asserted this claim without any argument, it did raise an interesting issue.

One could argue that if there is an advantage to a white person masquerading as black, then white privilege must not be real. After all, if a rational person were seeking an advantage by masquerading as another ethnicity, they would take on the most advantageous role. Since the white Krug masqueraded as black and she is clearly intelligent, then it follows that being white is not more advantageous than being black. Therefore, one might conclude that white privilege is not real.

While Krug does refer to mental health issues, she does not claim she took on the black identity because of mental illness. So, it would be a mistake to try to counter the above argument by contending she was crazy and thus gave up her real white privilege. In fact, while her choice was morally wrong, it can be seen as a clever choice in her situation and a case can be made that her masquerade was advantageous while also arguing that this is consistent with white privilege.

The statistical evidence for white privilege is overwhelming. The idea of white privilege is not that white people have it easy or get everything for nothing. In the United States, life for everyone who is not in the upper classes is difficult and often precarious. But being white makes it a bit less bad.  An average white person will enjoy statistically significant advantages over a black person because they are white. Or, rather, other people give white people an advantage in many circumstances. But this does not entail that there are no circumstances in which appearing black can yield an advantage.

As an analogy, matching the current conception of physical beauty yields many advantages and beautiful people are perceived as being better in many non-beauty related ways. But there can be specific and limited circumstances in which not being seen as conventionally beautiful can be advantageous. For example, a company might be looking for models who do not match that conception of beauty for a an ad campaign. As another example, there are some professional contexts in which matching that conception of beauty could be a disadvantage. But these limited cases do not prove that there is no general beauty advantage.

While the academy still favors white people (and more so every day now), there can be specific jobs, awards, fellowships, scholarships, and other opportunities in which being (or appearing) black can be an advantage (or a necessity). For example, when I was at Ohio State a fellow grad student applied for an African-American scholarship. He had dual American and African citizenship and thus seemed to qualify. But he did not because he was a white African-American and not black. There are also certain academic fields where having a specific identity provides more perceived credibility. A humorous example of this is the Black Jeopardy skit on Saturday Night Live featuring Lewis C.K. as a professor of African American Studies at Brigham Young University. It was funny, obviously, because Lewis C.K. is white. In such cases, appearing black can provide a specific advantage that can outweigh the general advantages of being white. While Krug would probably have been successful if she had been honest, this was a very narrow and  unusual case in which appearing black was probably more advantageous. As such, her case does not disprove white privilege; at best it shows that there are very limited and rare circumstances in which appearing black can provide a very specific advantage.

Some on the right might be pleased I have agreed that there can be cases in which a black person can  gain an advantage because they are black. But they should not be that pleased: all I have argued for is that there are very limited cases in which being (or appearing) black can yield a limited and specific contextual advantage. This does not show that whites are at a general disadvantage in the academy. And it certainly does not disprove white privilege. Going back to the beauty analogy, it would be like claiming that one model who succeeded because she was not seen as beautiful proves that there is no advantage to being seen as beautiful.

As noted in the previous essay, the use of false equivalence is a common tactic in politics. This essay will illustrate some of the ways it can be used to influence voters, and I will provide some methods of defense. While this method can be employed across the political spectrum, in the United States it is favored by the right.

One use of the false equivalence is to make voters feel better voting for a politician who has serious flaws. Such voters would not vote for the other politician, but their enthusiasm could be damped by their negative view of their own politician. This might even cause them to skip voting, if obstacles such as bad weather, long lines or a pandemic interfere. The use of a false equivalence can make such voters feel that since the other candidate is just as bad in the specified ways, they should not feel any concern about supporting their politician. While this is inferior to making the voters feel that their politician is great, it can be effective in getting people to vote.

A second use of the false equivalence is to win over voters who are concerned about the serious flaws of a candidate but would vote for them if these worries were assuaged. But the opposing politician is less flawed and might be able to win over these voters. The tactic here is to draw a false equivalence between the two candidates to convince the voters that both candidates are equally bad. This would allow the deceived voters to feel better about voting for the flawed candidate. They can tell themselves that both are equally bad, so they should vote for the one they prefer for some other reasons. This method can be effective and has the advantage of gaining a vote while taking a vote from the opponent.

A third use is against voters who are unlikely to vote for one politician but might vote for another politician if they were to cast a vote. The goal of the false equivalence in such cases is to demotivate the voter by getting them to believe that all politicians are the same, that is, they are all equally bad. The hope is that this will cause the voter to not vote. While this is not as good as winning over a voter, it is likely to cost their opponent a vote and thus increase their chances of not losing. While this is a sensible method for a bad politician who is going up against a better politician, it does run the risk if adopted by an entire party because they might demotivate their own voters. To avoid this, the false equivalence needs to be designed so that it demotivates the target voters while having less or no impact on the other voters.

One way to do this is by focusing on qualities that would demotivate those inclined to vote for the other party while having less negative impact on the voters of one’s party. Fortunately for politicians, there are things that would upset voters for the other party that their own voters are fine with. For example, the Republicans tried to cast Joe Biden as a racist and someone who gropes women. Since Democrats are much more upset about racism and groping, casting Joe Biden in this way can demotivate Democratic voters while not demotivating Republican voters. After all, most Republicans tolerate or approve of Trump’s racism and history of groping.

Crafting a false equivalence often involves making use of other fallacies and rhetorical devices to power the fallacy. One common method is to use down players to make one politician seem less bad and employ hyperbole to make the other worse. People also sometimes lie or use untruths they uncritically accept. These tactics are typically used in two ways. One is to exaggerate or downplay the number of negative factors. The other is to exaggerate or downplay the degree of the negative factors. The defense against all of these is to be critical and seek the truth. Be wary of claims that you really like (which can be negative claims about someone you do not like) and do not simply accept them without adequate evidence from credible sources.

When trying to exaggerate the number of negative factors, a common tactic is repetition: bringing up the same negative factor repeatedly and from different sources. This can make a single or small number seem much larger psychologically. Repetition will feel like there are many negative factors because one hears about them so often. When trying to create the illusion of a large number, a common approach is to use different headlines for stories and social media posts with the same content as people tend not to read the details and will often be deceived.  The main defense here is noting that it is simply the same thing being repeated to create the appearance of a larger number. Also, always consider that claims can be false.

When it comes to intensity, a commonly employed fallacy is the straw man: presenting a distorted or exaggerated version of the truth. In many cases this involves a claim that a person knows an unknown fact about the target. That, for example, although there is no positive evidence that a person said, did or believes something awful, the person making the straw man somehow knows this alleged secret truth.

As with most fallacies, there are two primary defenses against the false equivalence. The first is knowing that the fallacy is a fallacy. The second is being a critical thinker about claims and being careful to believe only in proportion to the evidence.

“All politicians are the same” is an oft repeated phrase that has a certain appeal. It is easy to think all politicians are corrupt, power obsessed liars. But a claim should not be accepted simply because it is tempting, there should be evidence for it. One stock way to “argue” that all politicians are the same is to make use of the false equivalence. While there are many forms of false equivalence, the focus here is on the fallacy of false equivalence.

In this context, the fallacy of false equivalence occurs when it is concluded, without adequate justification, that two things are the same because they have some quality or qualities in common. More formally, the fallacy has the following structure:

 

Premise 1: X and Y are similar in respect to qualities P, Q, R.

Premise 2: X has quality Z (to degree D or quantity Q).

Conclusion:  Y has quality Z (to degree D or quantity Q).

 

Those familiar with the inductive analogical argument will see the similarity between the two arguments. This is because a false equivalence can be taken as a type of fallacious analogical argument: an unjustified inference that because two things are alike in some ways, they must be alike in the specified way.

In the case of the false equivalence, the error is that even if the two things do have qualities in common, there is not adequate evidence for the conclusion of equivalence. There are various reasons the inference can fail, even assuming the premises are true. One is that while the two things do share qualities, these qualities are not relevant to their being equivalent in the specified way. For example, the fact that Hitler and Ronald Reagan were both male, human, and democratically elected does not suffice to show that they were both genocidal fascists.

Another is that while the qualities can be relevant to the claimed equivalence, there can be a difference in the degree in which the properties are possessed. For example, consider two fictional people. Sam, while drunk as a teenager, once kissed another person while in a relationship and sometimes lies about taking the last cookie in the breakroom at work.  Ashley has cheated (sexually) on many partners and routinely lies about stealing money from work. While both have cheated, stolen, and lied, it would be absurd to claim that they are equally bad as their misdeeds are very different in degree.

A third is that while the two things might share qualities, the number of relevant occurrences of those qualities can be significantly different. For example, a person who rarely lies and a person who constantly lies would both be liars, but they would not be equivalent.

The way to avoid falling victim to this fallacy is to question whether the reasons given as to why the two things are equivalent suffice to support this claim. This would involve considering whether the qualities used to argue for the equivalence are possessed to the same degree or number by the two things. While the two things need not be identical, a claim of equivalence does require showing that they are close enough. One should, as always, also determine whether the premises are plausible or not.

It should be noted that while the usual goal of a false equivalence is to “argue” that one thing is as bad as another, they can also be used to “argue” that one thing is as good as another. The basic error is the same, though. For example, one person who has done a few minor good things might try to draw a false equivalency to a person who has done similar, but far more and far better things.

It should also be kept in mind that there can be good arguments for equivalence. A good argument of this sort would have the same structure as a false equivalence; the difference would lie in that the qualities would be shown to be of an adequate relevance, degree, and number to support the conclusion of equivalence.  These would be, in essence, strong analogical arguments.

Generally, false equivalence benefits the worse of the two things being compared and is detrimental to the better thing. This is because the worse thing is presented as being as good as the better thing and the better thing is presented as being as bad as the worse thing. A such, it is hardly surprising that false equivalences are generally used by the worse of the two things or by their defenders or supporters. In my next essay I will look at the false equivalence as a political weapon.

Back when Black Lives Mattered, (HBO) Max briefly pulled ‘Gone with the Wind’ from its video library as an indirect response to protests about racism. The movie was later returned with a disclaimer to provide context. This struck a reasonable balance between the aesthetic importance of the work and the moral importance of presenting slavery honestly. The disclaimer also provided context for the film, such as how racism impacted the black actors. Perhaps because of the success of this approach, Max also added a disclaimer to the classic comedy ‘Blazing Saddles’.

This classic comedy-western engages with racism and prominently features racist characters using racist language. But, as the disclaimer noted, it is anti-racist. The racists are the villains. Racism is savagely mocked. As such, it might be wondered why the film required a disclaimer. This seems like putting a disclaimer before ‘All Quiet on the Western Front’ to make it clear that the famously anti-war film is not pro-war.

One concern about putting a disclaimer on a film like ‘Blazing Saddles’ is it could provide ammunition to those saying the “politically correct cancel culture of the left” is out of control. It could be used as “proof” that “the left” is wrong about criticisms of racism in aesthetic works. In reply, the right can create outrage ex nihilo and thus a disclaimer will have no meaningful impact aside from providing a focus of the outrage. That said, the disclaimer might have some impact on those critical enough to check to see if the target of the outrage exists, yet not critical enough to be thorough critics of the outrage.

This might seem a silly concern, but things like a movie disclaimer can  strike “normies” as ridiculous and this can be exploited as part of the radicalization process. The strategy is that an “absurd” response from “the left” can help build a gradual ramp leading into the pit of, for example, racism.

Another concern is the disclaimer might be seen as insulting. It seems to suggest viewers are too stupid to understand the obvious point of the movie, that racism is bad. As a counter, people do misread comedy. A good example of this is the character of Stephen Colbert once played by Stephen Colbert on the Colbert Report. While Colbert is a liberal who mocks conservatives (and liberals) some conservative viewers believed that he was serious about being a conservative. They understood he was doing comedy (the show was on Comedy Central) but did not get his point. While it is anecdotal evidence, I know conservatives who thought this. Since we all enjoyed the show, I was careful not to spoil their fun with the truth.  As such, it is possible that the movie might be seen by some people as endorsing racism

As another example, the 1975 “Germans” episode of “Fawlty Towers” includes the use of the N-word by the character of the major. In the episode, the major corrects someone for using a racist slur by suggesting they use another racist slur. In 2013 the BBC edited the episode to take out the word, which created a negative reaction in some quarters. A few years ago the BBC pulled the episode from streaming.

John Cleese, who played the main character on the show said that the racism of the major was presented in a negative light and that the point of the line was to criticize (with comedy) rather than commit racism. According to Cleese, “You see, what people don’t understand, there’s two ways of criticizing people. One is a direct criticism. And the other is to present their views as they would present them, but to make sure that everyone realizes that the person presenting those rules is a fool. And literal-minded people, who are the curse of the planet, can’t understand that. They think if you say something, you must mean it literally.” The decision makers seem to have come to agree with Cleese.  The episode was eventually restored, but some streaming services included a disclaimer or warning.

While these are only two examples, they do show how people can be mistaken about the intent of comedy. As the “Fawlty Towers” example shows, people can be confused about the intent of the use of racism in comedy. As such, the use of disclaimers even for comedies critical of racism would seem justified. The explanation provided can help people understand the intention of the work and realize that the racism in the comedy is not intended to be racist but is critical of racism. As such, the use of disclaimers could be a reasonable means of preventing such confusion. This benefit must be balanced against the possible harm, though. It can be argued that a reaction from “the left” about a work they mistake as racist would provide even better fodder for the right-wing outrage engines than the disclaimer. If the argument is a good one, then this would serve to justify the use of disclaimers.

As a final point, it is certainly sensible to inform potential viewers about content that they might find problematic, but it might suffice to add a text warning at the start (“contains comedy critical of racism that references racism”) rather than a disclaimer.

I have two main goals in addressing the question of why the right lies so often. The first is to satisfy my curiosity as a philosopher who teaches ethics, epistemology, and critical thinking. While there is little point in trying to get the liars to stop lying, my second goal is to encourage honest people on the right to look at their claims critically.

What I am asking of the honest folks of the right is to act in accord with Ben Shapiro’s famous saying: “facts don’t care about your feelings.” If you are an honest person on the right and you believe this, then you should engage with the claims made by yourself and your fellows in accord with this professed view: hold your feelings in check and consider what the evidence supports. There is also the popular YouTube pastime of destroying the liberals with facts and logic. Consistency requires that honest folks on the right subject the claims of the conservatives to the same treatment. Or, rather, to the treatment promised in the memes: to check the claims rigorously in accord with the principles of critical thinking and to make use of non-fallacious logic. The truth can withstand scrutiny, and good reasoning can hold up when assessed. As such, if an honest person on the right is sure that a claim made by their fellows is true, then they should not fear subjecting it to rigorous and objective evaluation. Likewise, if an argument made by a fellow conservative is strong (or valid), then you should not hesitate to put it to the test.

Before getting to the substantial content, I need to pre-empt some likely fallacious attacks. One likely attack is to respond by saying “what about the left?” or “What about Stalin? He lied all the time!” This is the rhetorical strategy and fallacy known as “whataboutism.”A second likely response is to say that everyone lies, that the practice is a common one. This is, obviously enough, just the fallacy of common practice. A third likely response is to assert that the left also lies and so they are just as bad as the right. This is a false equivalence. To avoid straw man attacks, I must make it clear that I am not claiming that the American right always lies or that the American left never lies. My claim is that lying is common on the right and my inquiry is into why this is the case. Feel free to destroy the lying left with facts and logic in your own blog or video.

The first step is providing a definition of “lying.” While one could discuss the fine nuances of the concept at length, my discussion only requires an intuitively plausible definition: lying is intentionally asserting that a claim is true when one believes it is false. This is not a perfect definition of the concept, but my discussion does not hinge on any nuanced or fine distinctions. I would, of course, be happy to get into a deep discussion of the complexities of defining the concept at another time.

The second step is providing evidence that the right, under the common usage of the term, lies often. A good place to start is at the top with President Trump. To be fair to the right, a good case can be made that Trump is not committed to conservative ideology, he has shifted his political affiliations often and one can easily imagine a parallel  world in which Trump was elected as Democrat. But Trump has conquered the American right and is their undisputed king. Trump is an epic level liar and his lies are thoroughly documented.

The folks at Fox News lie regularly, as the Daily Show showed back in 2015 with their “50 Fox News lies in 6 seconds.” The dishonesty of Fox News is well documented.  This is important because Fox News is the defining news of the right, although it now has some competition.

Another realm to consider is the brain of the right, the self-proclaimed intellectuals and thinkers of the right. The best known are Ben Shapiro and Jordan Peterson. The YouTube intellectuals of the right are interesting in that they do what politicians and pundits generally do not: they lay out their views at length, they endeavor to argue, and they purport to offer evidence for their claims. While these folks generally do not hold political offices or positions of power, they present and defend the views of the right. As such, they are the ones that can be engaged in some form  intellectual combat.

There is an entire YouTube industry of left-wing tubers who meticulously go through the claims and arguments of the right. The usual approach is the same used by professional scholars: checking the sources and assessing the reasoning. One common occurrence is that the sources used in the right-wing video are often either problematic (biased) or clearly misused (the right-winger is wrong about what the source shows). One example of this is Shaun’s look at Lauren Southern’s claims about the great replacement conspiracy theory. As another example, the sarcastic Some More News goes through Ben Shapiro’s claims about systemic racism and notes the lies. While one might be tempted to use an ad hominem and dismiss the lefty critics on the grounds that they are lefties, the competent critics follow the good practices of citing sources, referencing the original in context, and assessing arguments in accord with the standards of good logic. As such, one can engage these works and check their claims and reasoning. In general, the right-wing thinkers seem to routinely make many false claims. These videos are all available on YouTube and you can go through each one yourself, checking the claims and assessing the logic. Destroying is an option, if you are into that.

The third step is to answer the question of why the right lies so often.  One easy and obvious answer is that it works: conservatives seem to be more susceptible to certain lies than liberals. There are also answers to be found in the realm of psychology as to why, for example, Trump lies. But my concern here is with the rational reasons why the right engages in lying as a strategy.

The first reason is that facts and reality often conflict with interests and ideology of the right. It also conflicts with their claims of success. To be more specific, the claims used to argue for the policies and views of the right are often not true and they know it. The claims used to defend the effectiveness of these policies are also often untrue and they know it. As Stephen Colbert said, reality has a well-known liberal bias.

Two classic examples of this are the right’s notion that tax cuts pay for themselves and climate change denial. We have had decades of empirical testing of the claim that tax cuts pay for themselves: you can examine the results yourself and find out that they do not. The truth of climate change has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. If the right were honest about tax cuts or climate change, they would have a difficult time making their case for their policies or “showing” that their policies are effective. Imagine if Republicans were honest about tax cuts or climate change; they would be unable to make much of a case in favor of their tax cut and climate policies.

As another example, consider the right’s claims about voter fraud. While the right asserts that voter fraud is a problem, the evidence does not support their claim. The means they propose to combat this almost non-existent fraud are instead aimed at voter suppression. If the right were honest about the extent of voter fraud, their argument would be utterly undercut. If voter fraud is almost non-existent, there would be little reason to accept their proposals to address it.

As a final example, consider Trump’s disastrous response to COVID-19. Trump’s main response was to lie. Bizarrely, Trump has made it clear that he would like less testing so that the United States would, falsely, look better. Trump is somewhat unusual in his tendency to sometimes be honest about his dishonesty. The COVID-19 response thus serves as a paradigm example of why the right lies so often: their policies and values often conflict with reality and the only way they can claim success is by lying.

A second reason that many on the right lie is that being honest about their values, beliefs and goals would either not win support or would even repulse most people. To illustrate, being honest about the effectiveness of tax cuts and who they benefit would generally not win much support from citizens. To use a more extreme example, consider the 1981 interview with Lee Atwater in which he lays out the southern strategy. Atwater makes it clear how lying about their racism is a strategy of the right:

 

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

 

Lest you think that this strategy of deceit is a thing of the past, consider Trump’s tweet about the Suburban Lifestyle: “I am happy to inform all of the people living their Suburban Lifestyle Dream that you will no longer be bothered or financially hurt by having low income housing built in your neighborhood……Your housing prices will go up based on the market, and crime will go down. I have rescinded the Obama-Biden AFFH Rule. Enjoy!” Classic Atwater.  As a final example, saying to voters that they want to suppress voters to gain an undemocratic advantage to hold onto power would not win widespread support from the public.

Thus, the right has excellent reasons to lie. The first is that their claims often clash with the facts and if they did not lie, they would have to admit they are wrong. The second is that being honest would often cause them to lose support.

For those who dislike the Democrats, the mainstream of that party generally does not rely on strategic lying. Rather, they make use of strategic silence: they simply say nothing. We can see how well that has been working for them.