Author: Michael LaBossiere

A few years ago, Gucci created controversy with its black balaclava jumper. The jumper could be pulled up to cover a person’s mouth and featured big red lips that echoed blackface. The designer refuted this, claiming he was inspired by the works of a performance artist Leigh Bowery. Katy Perry, no stranger to accusations of cultural appropriation, was also accused of having blackface shoes in her line of shoes. Her defenders noted that these shoes come in many colors and all have the same face. Unlike cases when a person wears blackface, cases such as the Gucci and Perry incidents admit of ambiguity  and allow room for plausible denial. While the United States had a brief phase in which Black Lives Mattered, the pushback efforts have yielded fruit, and it seems reasonable to re-consider topics such as black face.

One approach to determining whether an object, like a shoe, is a form of black face is to consider the creator’s likely intentions. If a designer did not intend to create a blackface object, then it would seem reasonable to infer that the object is not a work of blackface. This is because being a blackface object is more than how an object looks; it must be created (or used) for that purpose.

In support of this view, it can be argued that since an object of blackface is racist, it requires racist intent to create it. A person who creates an object that looks like a blackface object without racist intent cannot be justly accused of racism. To use an analogy, suppose a designer created something in which some see pornographic images.  If the designer did not intend this, they should not be considered pornographers, and the work should not be considered pornography.

As a practical matter, the challenge is determining intent. While this can be difficult, the sensible approach is to consider the person’s history and their explanation of their inspiration and goals. If they have no history of racism and deny that they intended to create a blackface object, then it would be reasonable to believe them.

It could be objected that the creators cannot plead ignorance. While they might not have intended the works to be blackface objects, they should have realized how they would be seen. After all, anyone familiar with American culture and history should recognize such objects and they should be aware of the consequences of selling them. To use an analogy, a designer who unintentionally creates a work that would obviously be seen as pornographic, should be aware of this. If they put it on sale while denying awareness, then they would be selling pornographic images.

It could be replied that a creator might be unaware of the history of blackface or that they do not see the objects as blackface objects. Using the pornography example, a designer might be unable to see what other people think they see. If a designer has no knowledge of the history of blackface or cannot see that their work would be seen as blackface, then they could be excused. Some might insist that they should be aware of history and that they cannot honestly say that they did not see a problem before it was pointed out by others. But perhaps an object being blackface is not a matter of what is in the mind of the creator, but what is in the eye of the beholder.

Behind the saying “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is the aesthetic theory that beauty is a subjective quality dependent on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver. This saying could be modified for perceptions of racism: “blackface is in the eye of the beholder.” The underlying principle would be that whether an object is blackface depends on the judgment (or feelings) of the perceiver.

If blackface is in the eye of the beholder, then it is up to the beholder to determine whether an object is blackface. This could also apply to racism or sexism in general. This might be a matter of judgment or a matter of feeling, depending on the broader aesthetic theory in play. One possible problem with this principle is that whether an object is blackface would seem to be subjective. As such, those who do not see an object as blackface would be as right (or wrong) as those who see it as blackface. However, there is a way to grant some people a privileged right to judge (or feel).

A way to argue for this is to draw an analogy to insult. Whether something is an insult, it could be argued, depends on the target. If the target does not judge or feel that the alleged insult is an insult, then it is not. If the target judges or feels the alleged insult is an insult, then it is. In the case of objects alleged to be blackface, there is the question of who has a privileged position of judgment.

The easy and obvious answer is that target of any potential blackface object would be black people. As such, whether an object is a blackface object would be decided by the judgment or feeling of black people. While one could get bogged down in the problem of group consensus, there are two approaches here. One is to accept the majority opinion. The other would be to judge at the individual level so an object could be blackface for one person but not another. While messy and inexact, this does seem to reflect the messy and inexact reality of such judgments (or feelings). Thus, an object would be blackface if most black people judged (or felt) that it was. Alternatively, it could be done at an individual level: an object would be blackface for an individual if they judged (or felt) it was blackface.

It could be objected that by this definition, anything could be blackface and anything could be racism. Alternatively, one could argue that if blackface or racism is subjective, then this could be used to avoid accusations of racism. That is, any accusation could be met with “that is just how you feel.”

The solution is a messy one: as with disputes over beauty or insults, there would need to be philosophical arguments and the better arguments should settle things. Even if blackface is in the eye of the beholder, better and worse cases can be made that a judgment is reasonable. That no perfect resolution is possible should be expected.

But some might object that being accused of racism has consequences. A person’s career could be ended and their life ruined and surely this should not be left up to subjective judgments or feelings. Turning back to the analogy of insults, there is the question of whether the person making the alleged insult intended to be insulting or not. This can be investigated by considering their history, character and the context of the situation. Likewise, if a work is judged (or felt) to be a blackface object, there is still the question of the intent of the creator. While one cannot know the true heart and mind of another, the creator’s history and character as well as the context can be assessed to reach a plausible conclusion. As such, a person could create a blackface object without intent and without being a racist, just as a person could insult another without intending it. In such cases, the object should be condemned but the creator should be held innocent. Naturally, if the creator’s history and character and the context provide evidence of racism, then that is another matter.

According to the FDA, it “is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring the safety of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.” Given this mission, the FDA should put the interest of public health ahead of other concerns, such as the profits of a pharmaceutical company. While many at the FDA are dedicated to this mission, federal agencies are routinely captured by industry. So, it is not surprising that the FDA has benefited companies at the expense of public health. Charles Seife wrote an article that appeared in the February 2018 issue of Scientific American. While there are legal issues here, my concern is with ethics

On the face of it, the moral problem is easy to solve. As the FDA is tasked with protecting public health, its moral duty is to do that. Putting public health at risk to benefit a company or individual would be wrong. Part of the problem, as noted by Seife, is that the FDA is secretive, which makes it difficult for the public to know about the FDA and the products it approves. Another part of the problem, also noted by Seife, is that the FDA seems willing to allow research misconduct to remain unreported. Under the current administration, it seems likely that things will only get worse.

While it is tempting to see evidence of misdeed when drugs are recalled or given new warnings, it must be noted that this should be expected even when products are properly evaluated. This is because of how inductive reasoning used in product trials works. While inductive logic is essential, it has a fundamental problem that is called, shockingly enough, the problem of induction. Since an inductive argument’s conclusion always “leaps” beyond its premises, the conclusion of such an argument can always be false, even when all the premises are true. Since the controlled experiments of the trials are inductive, they can be properly conducted  and still yield a false conclusion. These trials are then generalized to the entire population, which is another inductive argument and another chance for things to go wrong.

For example, even a large sample will not contain every genetic or physiological variation relevant to drug interactions. As such, a drug that was safe in the trials might have unexpected results out in the wild. So, one should not rush to judgment if an approved drug needs a warning label revision or has unexpected effects on some people. That said, the concern about how the FDA operates remains, as Seife’s research indicates.  As such, the FDA seems to have acted wrongly by putting corporate interests ahead of public health. It remains to be seen what the future will bring, but even under traditional administrations, the FDA has engaged in bad behavior. If even this modest oversight is stripped away, things will become much worse.

An obvious solution is to make the FDA’s process and data available to the public. Under this solution, the public would have access to everything that occurs within the FDA as well as all the information provided to the FDA by the companies whose products are being evaluated. While this would solve the problems noted above, there are reasonable concerns about such complete transparency.

Allowing full public access to the FDA’s information would also allow the same access to competing pharmaceutical companies (and others with a financial interest in the data). Such transparency would allow access to a company’s trade secrets, commercial and financial information.  This could cause “substantial competitive injury” and would be like playing poker while being forced to let everyone see your cards. Because of the potential harm, such full transparency would seem to be wrong.

It could be countered that all companies would be on equal footing, and no one would have an advantage. Going back to the poker analogy, if everyone must show their cards, no one has an advantage. The obvious problem is that foreign companies that do not undergo FDA approval would have access to the data and this could give them an edge against companies that sought FDA approval.

Another counter is to argue on utilitarian grounds: even if transparency harmed companies, the advantage to public health would outweigh this. But this could be countered by arguing the reverse. As these concerns are reasonable, complete transparency is morally problematic under the current economic system. As such, what would seem to be needed is an approach that protects the public while also protecting the legitimate interests of companies.

As Seife noted in his article, the information the FDA has kept from the public includes data about harmful side-effects and concerns about the efficacy of products. This information has been redacted or withheld based on the harm that would be done to the company if the truth were known. While it is true that releasing such information could harm a company’s profit, this is not a morally acceptable reason. After all, the mission of the FDA is to protect public health; protecting private profit at the expense of public health is a violation of this mission.

While a company or individual does have a right to keep certain information private, this right does not extend to concealing danger to others. To use an analogy, while I do have the right to keep my medical records private, I do not have the right to keep it a secret if I were infected with Ebola. To use another analogy, while a company would have a right to keep its manufacturing process for snacks secret, it has no right to keep secret the fact that the main ingredient is rats. The public does not have a right to know their trade secrets; but they do have a right to know if the snacks contain rats. Likewise, while the public does not have a right to know the legitimate trade secrets of a drug company, they do have the right to know the side-effects and efficacy of the drugs they take. As such, the FDA can fulfil its proper mission of protecting public health while also protecting legitimate trade secrets. Companies that want to profit on concealing data from the public with FDA collusion might be dismayed by this, but they have no moral right to expect this—especially when they can still make massive profits by making safe and efficacious drugs.

Considering the actions of the current administration, it is terrifying to consider how much worse things could become. Information about side-effects and ineffective drugs have been concealed in the past, but Trump and Musk are dedicated to dismantling the federal government, including the FDA. In the best of times, it did not protect us very well and it is reasonable to think it will become much worse. While it is always wise to be cautious about drugs and procedures, it would be prudent to be extremely cautious about forthcoming FDA approvals.

Joyce Short, a victim of deception, has argued that rape by fraud should be a crime. Pragmatically, the legal issues are the most important; but its moral aspects are philosophically important.

To set the context for the discussion and avoid straw person attacks, those arguing that rape by fraud should be a crime are focusing on significant fraud rather than absurd cases. To illustrate, a person who engages in hyperbole about their wealth or engages in bragging about their awesomeness would not be targets of these proposed laws. Rather, the arguments for the proposals are based on cases such as Short’s in which someone engages in significant and sustained deception to gain sexual access. Another example is the case of Abigail Finney. One of her boyfriend’s friends had sex with her by pretending to be him. While the man was chided by the court, he was not convicted of any crime. From a legal standpoint, rape and assault are currently narrowly defined and using fraud, rather than force, is (usually) not a crime. From a moral standpoint, this seems incorrect.

One argument for why the use of fraud to gain assent is wrong is that fraud is wrong. While the goal of the fraud does matter, fraud itself is immoral and using it to trick a person into assenting to sex would thus be immoral.

Another argument for this type of fraud being morally wrong and one that ties into the legal argument, is to draw an analogy between crimes of fraud and using fraud to trick a person into assenting to sex.

While specific laws about fraud vary, the general idea is that the perpetrator intentionally deceives the victim with the intent of persuading the victim to part with property. A key aspect of fraud is that without the deceit, the person would not have parted with their property.  For example, if someone calls a victim and pretends to be an IRS agent to trick them into providing an Apple gift card number, then they are attempting fraud. After all, the person would not give Apple gift card numbers to strangers who call asking for them.

While it might seem odd to see a person’s body as their property, Locke argues for this in his discussion of property rights. He argues that a person’s right to property, such as a house, arises from their ownership of their body.  So, it could be argued a person who uses deceit to acquire sex is morally (and legally) like someone who uses deceit to steal any property. Or, perhaps a better analogy would be stealing access to property, such as using fraud to get a hotel room or a rental car. If it is immoral and illegal to use deceit to steal property or access to it, then the same should apply to using deceit to steal access to a person’s body.

It could also be argued that using deceit to acquire sex is analogous to a theft of services. If someone uses deceit to steal the services of a business, then that would be a crime (and probably wrong). The same should apply to stealing sex by using deceit. One concern is that characterizing sex as a service would seem to imply that people engage in a prostitution when they engage in sex. While this might seem unappealing, it can be argued that consensual sex is an exchange. Naturally, one could note that under capitalism, everything is a good or a service, so seeing acquiring sex by deceit as a theft of service makes sense in our economic system.

While fraud might not seem as bad as the use of force, it is recognized as an immoral and criminal tool and to not apply the same principle to sex would be inconsistent and unprincipled. This would be on par with making violent theft a crime but allowing people to freely engage in theft by deceit.

One counter argument is to contend that a person who assents to sex with a deceiver is still (probably) consenting to have sex with them. To illustrate, imagine a man who creates the false appearance of wealth and success intending to use it to get women to have sex with him. While his targets could say that they would not have had sex with him if they had known he was not rich, it would seem odd to conclude that he should be charged with a crime despite his immoral behavior.

As another example, imagine a woman who uses plastic surgery, makeup and padded clothing to improve her attractiveness. Imagine that a man would not have had sex with her if he knew how she really looked (they have sex in the dark). While she did deceive him and this would be immoral, it would be odd to say that it should be considered a crime.

One final objection is to argue that personal relations should not be regulated by the state. To use an analogy, imagine that Sam pretends to have the same hobbies and interests as Dan so that he can become his friend. Sam does not really care about Dan, but Dan has an awesome boat, a beach house and goes on amazing trips around the world. By pretending to be Dan’s friend, Sam gets to ride in the boat with Sam, stay in the beach house with Sam and go on trips with Sam. Even if Dan forms a one-way emotional bond with Sam and is deeply attached to him, Sam does not seem to be engaged in criminal activity (although he would be a morally awful person) if he simply plays the role of a fake friend. Obviously, if he used deceit to steal the boat, house or money from Dan, that would be different. By analogy, one could argue, using deceit to get assent to sex in similar sorts of circumstances would be immoral but should not be considered a crime.

The easy and obvious counter to such concerns is to note that morality and the law distinguish between degrees of severity regarding immorality and crimes. As such, while these specific examples show immoral behavior in the form of intentional deception, they do not seem to rise to the level of crimes. But there can be cases in which the nature of the fraud should make the act criminal. This shows the legal and moral importance of crafting laws that make such distinctions. While some might object that this would be too hard, the law and ethics already address equally complex matters successfully.

 

For those not familiar with blackface, it originated as makeup for portraying caricatures of black people. In the United States, it is generally considered unambiguously racist. While the use of blackface in the arts has largely ceased (though there is still controversy about white actors taking non-white roles) it has persisted in popular culture. It is most likely to be seen at costume parties, such as on Halloween. As might be suspected, the revelation that a public figure appeared in blackface can be a career ender. A few years ago, Mile Ertel resigned as the Secretary of State of my adopted state of Florida when photos of him in blackface surface.  He dressed up as a black Katrina victim two months after the storm and his defenders argued that this past behavior should not have been held against him.  While Ertel is a Republican, blackface is bipartisan.

The release of a photo from his 1984 medical school yearbook (showing one person in blackface and another in Ku Klux Klan gear) has created a bit of a problem for the former governor of Virgina, the Democrat Ralph Northam. Since the incident occurred in 1984, his defenders argued that he should not suffer the consequences of this past action.

One time-based defense for someone who used blackface is to argue they were not aware of its history and implications and did not have racist intention. People do dress up in non-racist costumes that are odd and problematic that they think are just fine, especially when alcohol is involved.

This defense is not entirely absurd. Everyone has done stupid things from ignorance rather than malice. Also, everyone has done wrong because of lapses in judgment or due influences like alcohol or peer pressure. While it would be a fallacy to argue that something is acceptable because it is commonly done, it is reasonable to argue that judgments of behavior should consider the realities of human behavior: we consistently do dumb things for dumb reasons.

While blackface is racist, if a person used it in sincere ignorance and apologize when informed of the truth, then they should be forgiven. The problem is that the history of blackface is well known in the United States. While a very young child could reasonably claim ignorance, others would be hard-pressed to claim ignorance. They could, however, use the aberration defense: that although they did not act in ignorance, they are not racist.

While it might seem absurd to say that a person could do something racist without being racist, there is an analogy to lying. While a person who lies is a liar when they lie, it would be absurd to label a person who is usually honest a liar because they have lied. Likewise, a person who is generally not racist, but has engaged in some out of character racist behavior, should not be labeled as a racist. Naturally, there would be exceptions. The key question is whether the incident is an aberration or arising from their established character. This is where time becomes a critical factor.

To steal from Aristotle, assessing a person’s actions requires considering whether they are acting from a fixed and permanent disposition. If a person has the vice of racism, they would be consistent in their racism, and it would not be an irregular or aberrant behavior on their part. Someone who is not a racist might have done some racist acts in their past, but if these acts are few and relatively minor, then they should not be considered a racist. To use an analogy, a person who has told a few lies in the past but is generally honest should not be condemned as a liar. The same works for virtues: someone who acted bravely once but is otherwise consistently cowardly would not be a brave person.

As such, while appearing in blackface would be racist, the person should be judged not by a single racist or ignorant action. The person’s reasons for the action must be considered and, importantly, their general character must be assessed. As such, while Ertel and Northam should not have put on blackface, the act itself does not suffice to determine whether they are racists who engaged in habitual racism or non-racists who did something racist. Their complete character and history must be considered.

It could be objected that the principle of judging people based on their character and broad history of behavior rather than on a single incident is unacceptable. In the case of blackface, it could be argued that the offense is so serious that it forever marks a person, rendering them eternally unfit for public office. But the idea of eternal offenses is problematic as it makes redemption impossible.  

While the United States has the best health care money can buy, many Americans cannot afford it. Many Americans are underinsured or not insured and even the insured might face denial of coverage. Americans, as their response to the execution of a health care CEO, are aware of this. Most politicians, with the exception of people like Bernie Sanders, have put their faith in the fact that people forget quickly and have done nothing to address this problem.

A lack of insurance puts the health of the uninsured at risk and health care institutions suffer financially. Medical bankruptcy also occurs at an alarming rate.  Because of these problems, there have been proposals to extend Medicare to all Americans.

On the positive side, this would provide everyone with health insurance. This would benefit those without insurance and would also help the finances of healthcare institutions. As the system already exists, it would mostly be a matter of scale. This would come with serious challenges, but they are obviously not insurmountable. While there are clear advantages to expanding Medicare, a rational assessment requires looking beyond the positive aspects and, as much as possible, without the filters of ideology.

An obvious concern is the cost of such an expansion. Those who already pay for insurance would not suffer any financial impact from the switch, unless the cost of Medicare was significantly higher than what they are paying now.  As the cost could have negative impacts on the economy and individuals, it needs to be assessed rationally.

A second concern is the impact on the health insurance industry. While some might be tempted to think that only the CEOs would suffer, the insurance industry is made up of a range of people who depend on their jobs to survive. Switching to Medicare for all would eliminate the private health insurance industry and put people out of work directly and indirectly. Somewhat ironically, those on the right who oppose Medicare expansion usually see firing workers as a positive thing while those on the left express concern for workers. One possibility is that former insurance workers could be retrained and hired to work for Medicare, assuming that it is not swept away in the current zeal to destroy government agencies and programs that protect and benefit non-billionaires.

 It is also worth considering other economic aspects. While it should not be assumed that this cost will be too high relative to the benefits, this cost needs to be considered. Again, while it is appealing to think that eliminating private insurance would only harm evil CEOs, the effects on others should be considered. But given the tremendous harm Americans suffer from the current system; its replacement would certainly do more good than harm.

A third concern is fraud. While fraud does occur with private health insurance, Medicare is sometimes a cash cow for fraudsters. In 2014 about 10% of Medicare’s total budget was lost to fraud. Expanding Medicare to everyone would turn the cash cow into a cash herd. Fraud could and should be addressed even if Medicare is not expanded, but the cost of fraud must be included in the calculations used to assess the merits of expanding Medicare. While the right advances the narrative that it is poor people who defraud the government, the evidence is that it is the wealthy. This does make intuitive sense: if the poor were as good at committing fraud as the right claims, they would no longer be poor. But even with the inevitable fraud, an expansion of Medicare would be superior to the existing system, which siphons money from Americans into the accounts of CEOs.

A fourth concern is usually advanced by conservatives, namely that the elimination of the for-profit motivation will ruin the quality of health care with socialism. One reply is to note that health care will remain for-profit: Medicare for all does not nationalize health care institutions, just the insurance industry. And the motivation provided by the for-profit approach is to profit more, and that typically involves worse rather than better medical care.

That said, it could be argued that with one entity paying all the bills costs will increase and quality will decrease—but what is needed is evidence for these claims. If they are true, then this would be a problem that could be addressed. The rest of the world

Early immigration laws, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1924, were intended to “to preserve the ideal of U.S. homogeneity.” That is, they were openly racist and aimed at limiting the immigration of non-whites. Immigration was revised in 1952 and then again in 1965. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changed the quota system and removed many of the racial barriers that had marked immigration since the 1920s.

As social norms changed after the 1960s, open racism became largely unacceptable, and most racists switched to coded language and dog whistles. Openly justifying immigration policy based on race became and remains problematic. As such, the narrative changed from preserving the homogeneity of the United States against the threat of non-whites to the narrative of protecting American jobs and protecting Americans from crimes. After 9/11 a new narrative was added, that of protecting Americans from terrorists.

The election and re-election of Donald Trump saw a return of the classic racist narrative. While the mainstream narrative is still focused on crime and economics, white nationalists openly express their fears they will be replaced by non-whites. Sometimes this is dressed up as concerns about culture, but often the white nationalists are honest in their racism. Mainstream politicians, at least for now, still use coded language and dog whistles. Although the code is much more open and the dog whistles much louder. While those ignorant of history might mistake this as something new in American politics, it is a return to its roots. Some would even argue that the core of these polices has always been racist, but the racism has been obscured.

It could be objected that while racism might have been a factor in the past, it does not influence current immigration and border policy. After all, some might contend, those pushing for stronger border control and tighter restrictions on immigration claim their goals are to reduce crime and to protect the American economy. Put simply, the argument is that they are not racists.  They are trying to address crime and the economic threat of migrants. It is just a coincidence that these policies target people who are not white. For this to be true, there would either need to be real problems that would be best addressed by these policies or those supporting the policies would at least need to believe this. As it is difficult to determine what people believe, I will focus on what is real.

While the narrative of the criminal migrant is an American myth, it does not match reality. Migrants are less likely to commit crimes and more likely to be victims of crimes relative to people born in the United States. But migrants do commit some crimes. As such, it can be argued that reducing the number of migrants would reduce the number of crimes and thus these policies are warranted. This would be an odd approach since it would also justify any way of reducing the size of the population based on reducing the number of crimes. Interestingly, this principle would justify public policies supporting birth control and abortion as having fewer people would entail fewer crimes. It could also justify population control in the form of legal restrictions on the number of children: if people have fewer children, then there will be less crime. My point is, obviously, not to argue for population control but to contend that restricting migration to reduce crime makes no more sense than imposing family size limits to reduce crime. While both approaches would reduce crime, they are not an effective or sensible way to address crime. It would be more effective to use social resources to directly address the causes of crimes.

The idea that migrants will steal jobs is a classic myth, but also generally unfounded. Overall, migrants are beneficial to the economy. It is true that migration is not entirely beneficial and there are negative economic consequences. However, the biggest threat American workers face is obviously not being replaced by migrants. It is far more likely that their jobs will be lost to automation, offshoring or changes in the economy. For example, coal workers have suffered not because of migrants taking their jobs, but because natural gas and renewable sources of energy are making coal increasingly obsolete. Ironically, efforts made to help the economy by restricting migration would be more likely to cause economic harm.

Given that the crime and economic arguments used to justify migration and border policy fail, there are few explanations left. One is that those making these arguments believe them, which entails they either have secret information or refusing to accept reality. A second explanation is that these arguments are covers for their real reasons. While speculating about motivations is problematic, the most plausible explanation is that they desire to continue the old racist policies. After all, if they had a good alternative argument backed by facts, then they would simply use that and there would be no need to lie.

While it can be argued that “toxic masculinity” is useful, I still feel a bit uncomfortable about the phrase. While it would be natural to accuse me of fearing an attack on my maleness, my concern is a pragmatic one about the consequences of the term. Which, from a utilitarian standpoint, also makes it a moral one.

As a man, I am familiar with how some other men react to the phrase “toxic masculinity.” The reaction of toxic males is as one would expect, they are outraged that their misdeeds and moral flaws are being challenged. However, non-toxic males can also react negatively to the phrase, typically because they feel it is applied unfairly to all men. While some radicals think all men are evil), this is not how the term is commonly used. After all, if masculinity itself was seen as evil, it would be pointless to talk about toxic masculinity. Doing so would be analogous to speaking of toxic toxins. As such, defenders of the phrase “toxic masculinity” can say it is like saying “contaminated spinach” as this doesn’t claim that all spinach is contaminated. Likewise, saying “toxic masculinity” is not claiming that all masculinity is toxic, just the toxic variety.

This is appealing and when someone uses the phrase in this manner, one can sort out their intent. That said, the use of the phrase can still upset non-toxic men and getting into the nuances of intention often fails to persuade them. After all, when people feel attacked, they rarely pause for a philosophical analysis. As such, using the phrase can have the negative consequence of alienating and upsetting men who do think that men should behave virtuously. It can also cause some men to double down on their toxicity. As such, there is a pragmatic problem with the phrase.

One reply to this would be to argue that only snowflakes and bad men would be angered by it. The snowflakes should “man up” and it is fine that the bad men are angry. They are, after all, criticized for being evil and evil people hate that. While this does have some appeal, it is worth considering how non-toxic (or “curable”) men might feel about the phrase and whether another approach might be better.

Consider, if you will, if the term “toxic” was used to refer to various groups who have members who behave badly and have vices (which would be everybody). To illustrate, consider the phrases “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality”, “toxic transgenderism”, “toxic feminism” and so on. If someone did a YouTube video about “toxic blackness” or “toxic homosexuality” while insisting that they were only concerned about blacks or homosexuals who behaved badly and not in attacking blacks or homosexuals in general, they would be met with skepticism. Even if the person was completely sincere and carefully argued that their concern was with the toxic members of these groups, then they would probably still be doubted.

The obvious reply would be to argue that “toxic blackness”, “toxic homosexuality” and such differ from “toxic masculinity.” While such a case can be made, it does seem reasonable to consider that just as many would find “toxic blackness” and “toxic homosexuality” offensive, many non-toxic men might think “toxic masculinity” is offensive.

From a pragmatic standpoint, the main concern is whether the phrase “toxic masculinity” creates more harm than good in terms of persuading men to behave better.  If it does create more harm, then another approach should be considered in its place.

While toxic masculinity faced some criticism, it seems to have emerged victorious. While the term is not used as often as it was, I am still somewhat uncomfortable with it. This discomfort is not because I am a man. Unlike more fragile “men”, I am not threatened by criticism. I can distinguish between criticisms of bad behavior by men and the rare attacks on men simply for being men. My slight discomfort arises two sources. The first is based in ethics and the second arises from pragmatic considerations. I will look at the first in this essay and the second in the following essay.

While this oversimplifies matters, my ethical view includes an acceptance of universal principles. One implication is that if something is wrong to do, then it is wrong for anyone to do. I am aware of the principle of relevant difference: that a difference in the application of ethics can be justified by a difference that warrants this.

For example, some argue that while it is wrong for members of one ethnicity to “put on the face” of another, there are exceptions. One illustration is that is seen as acceptable for Michael Che to “go undercover” as a white female liberal, but the idea of Colin Jost going undercover as a black girl is seen as utterly unacceptable. The moral justification for this rests on the relevant differences between a black man putting on “white face” and a white man putting on “black face.” These differences are connected to the history of racism and power differences. Naturally, people disagree about whether these differences are relevant. In such cases of relevant differences between ethnicities, it makes sense to reference ethnicity when discussing ethics. The same sort of reasoning applies to sex or gender issues.

For example, some argue that male comedians would be sexist if they used the same type of humor as female comedians who do routines about the failures and defects of men. In such cases, the ethics of a joke would thus depend on the gender or sex of the person telling it and the target of the joke. Using these examples, it would thus make sense to talk about toxic white comedy or toxic male comedy because the whiteness or maleness of the comic would be essential to the wrongness of the comedy. But what about toxic masculinity, considered in terms of moral misdeeds and moral vices?

For toxic masculinity what matters is the ethics of the behavior and its consequences rather than on whether the actions are done by men. To illustrate, the moral concern about sexual harassment is with its wrongness and not the gender or sex of the harasser. After all, while most sexual harassment is done by men, it is not restricted to us and its wrongness does not stem from the gender pf the perpetrator. It is equally wrong for a female to engage in sexual harassment. To focus on toxic masculinity would seem to imply that the vices and moral misdeeds are wrong because they are the misdeeds and vices of males, which would seem to be an error.

One reasonable counter is to argue that while the general misdeeds and vices that make up the evils of toxic masculinity are not limited to males, focusing on males make sense because males are the main offenders. Doing so, one might argue, does not exclude focusing on similar misdeeds by females.  It is just that there are less toxically masculine females to worry about.

Another reasonable counter is that the vices and misdeeds of males that are grouped under the label of “toxic masculinity” are male in character because of the masculinity part. That is, they are vices and misdeeds that arise from a concept of maleness, and it is appropriate to use the term. This has considerable appeal and could counter my initial concern. As such, my next essay will focus on pragmatic concerns.

Mark Zuckerberg’s recent crisis of masculinity reminded me of an earlier round in the endless culture war over gender roles.  In the not-so-distant past, the marketing departments of some major corporations decided that pretending to value positive masculinity would increase profits. Gillette attempted this with the Best Men Can Be themed advertisement. The name was based on Gillette’s classic advertising line, “the best a man can get.” This campaign did ignite a response, but not what the marketing department wanted. To be fair, the marketing department probably thought no decent person could get mad at a mild endorsement of minimal male decency. And they were right.  

As would be expected, people like Piers Morgan and James Wood responded harshly. In the case of Morgan, he accused Gillette of virtue signaling, fueling the “global assault on masculinity” and called for us to “let boys be damn boys” and to “let men be damn men.” Woods claimed Gillette was jumping on the “men are horrible” bandwagon and said he was done with buying Gillette products. Other men were not upset, noting  its message appeared to be “Don’t be a jerk. Don’t raise a jerk. Call out other men being for jerks.” And some pointed out Gillette was just trying to sell more razors. While I will not attempt to see it through the eyes of those who hate it, I will address the philosophical aspects of virtue based advertising.

While some loathed the content of the advertisement, it is advancing a set of values, advocating certain behavior and encouraging men to serve as role-models by acting on those values. It is, of course, doing this to sell razors and shaving cream. From a moral standpoint, this raises two questions. The first is whether the values are morally good. The second is whether motivation is relevant.

Since I generally follow Aristotle’s virtue theory, I think that people should be the best they can be. Intuitively, this is morally commendable. That men should be the best they can be seems to be morally obvious and the burden of proof would rest on those who would deny it. The real dispute is over what it means to be the best.

Each society and subgroup have its own notion of the best man, and the easy approach is to go with what they say. The obvious problem with is approach is that moral relativism collapses into subjectivism, and it then collapses into moral nihilism. So “morally best” would end up referring to nothing. This puts an end to moral discussion, so one must accept moral objectivity for the discussion to progress.

While the response to from Morgan and Woods would suggest the values it advances are wicked, this is not true. The values endorsed seem to be classic virtues, such as respect and courage. For example, one man rushes to stop a group of boys who are attacking another boy, which is a virtuous act. As another example, a man is shown talking another out of harassing a woman, which is also a virtuous act. To treat others with respect and to protect those who need protection certain is what good men should do, hence it is odd to condemn the ad. But perhaps the critics did not take issue with these values, but with another aspect of the ad.

While the ad ends with displays of virtuous behavior, it begins by showing men and boys behaving badly, such as talking over a woman at a business meeting and laughing at sexual harassment in a sitcom. It does make sense that the likes of Morgan and Woods would be angry at this. They see it as an attack on men aimed at showing that all men are terrible. The problem with this interpretation is the ad does not say that all men are horrible. As noted above, the second part of the ad presents men acting ethically. As such, the ad simply says the obvious: some men are awful, some are good. Its message is also quite benign: don’t be awful, be the best you can be. There seems to be nothing here to take issue with, unless one thinks that behavior such as bullying and sexual harassment are morally commendable. In that case, the problem lies with those who think this and not with the ad.

Some might object to being preached at by a company trying to sell goods or services by virtue signaling. This is a reasonable objection, and people are free to not watch the ads or complain about this technique. However, the motivation of the company is irrelevant to the correctness (or incorrectness) of the claims and values in the ad. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to an ad hominem, that the motivation of someone making a claim makes the claim false. Even if Gillette was cynically trying to sell more razors and shaving cream and did not give a damn about men being their best, the claims and values presented in the ad stand or fall on their own. Naturally, it is reasonable to condemn or praise the folks at Gillette based on their motives, but that is another ethical issue distinct from whether some men behave badly and whether being the best men means acting in the ways presented in the ad.  I agree that if Gillette or another corporation is cynically exploiting values it does not endorse, then that is morally dubious behavior—but, once again, this is not relevant to whether the claims and values expressed are right or not.

There have been a series of violent incidents and acts of vandalism aimed at Tesla facilities, dealerships, vehicles and charging stations. The most likely motivation is anger at Elon Musk. Musk has aligned himself with the far-right and his DOGE has proven both unpopular and harmful. For example, DOGE’s attack on USAID will result in illness and death.  This raises the ethical issue of whether this “war” on Musk is morally justified.

 The obvious moral case against these attacks is that while they are aimed at Musk, they will also hurt other people. While people do buy Tesla vehicles because they agree with Musk, there are many Tesla owners who disagree with him. Anecdotally, most of the Tesla owners I know are wealthy liberals who bought them back when Tesla was presenting itself as a green company. And even if a Tesla owner backs Musk, this would not warrant damaging their vehicle to harm Musk, especially since it will hurt the owner rather than Musk. Going after charging stations will also mainly hurt innocent Tesla owners and attacking dealerships and facilities will harm their owners and the people who are employed there. As these attacks will do considerable collateral damage to innocent people, this sort of war on Musk is morally problematic. An obvious reply to this is to run with the analogy to war.

Even a just war will involve collateral damage to innocents and noncombatants and the same arguments used in favor of just war could be applied to this situation. While it is regrettable that innocent people and people other than Musk and his supporters will be harmed, this is the only viable means to impose consequences on Musk for his actions and the harm he and DOGE have been doing to America and the world. Those who believe in the rule of law will make the obvious and sensible reply that the use of extralegal violence is wrong. Instead, they would argue, legal remedies should be sought to preserve the rule of law and minimize violence and harm to property.

While this reply has merit, it suffers from a serious flaw. Trump has given Musk broad powers and Musk has used this to damage and dismantle the agencies and institutions that would keep him and Musk in check. While lawsuits have been brought against Musk, Trump controls the Department of Justice and the Supreme Court. He can also pardon Musk for any federal offenses. Trump also controls congress, albeit by a thin margin. As such, Musk can operate with impunity and is unlikely to face any meaningful consequences for any illegal acts and harm that he does. While Trump controls much of the state, the parts he does not control are being targeted for destruction. Within the parts that Trump controls, the machinery of the state will serve as Musk’s shield and sword: it will protect him and allow him to harm his foes. While lawyers are heroically bringing lawsuits, Musk’s power is effectively unchecked, and he is likely to have nothing to fear from legal means to oppose him.

As the state is dismantled and gutted, Musk will be able to operate in a lawless zone. In Lockean and Hobbesian terms, he is operating in the state of nature: he can do what he wants and the only means to oppose him is the use of force. People already seem to understand this; they know that Musk will be able to keep inflicting terrible damage and the best that can be done within the system is to bring lawsuits and hope that someday there will be a favorable ruling that Musk will be willing to obey.  Ironically, as Musk dismantles the machinery of the state that protects the rest of us from people like him, he also dismantles his protection. When people realize that they have no legal means to address the harm being done by Musk, some people will turn to violence, just as happened with the execution of the health insurance CEO. This is the state of nature situation in which disputes must, as Hobbes said, be settled with the sword.

It is unlikely that anyone will be able to execute Musk, as he has his own private security force. Some of Musk’s private security were deputized by the US Marshall’s Service and this gives him ownership of his own small police force. He will also be protected by the “normal” police.

There is no independent prison system where Musk could be locked up for his alleged crimes or an independent judiciary that could impose fines on him. As such, the only recourse seems to be inflicting financial harm by targeting Musk’s companies. This does provide Musk with a set of hostages since hurting Musk’s companies also hurts the employees, contractors, stockholders and customers. As such, there is the moral question of whether the harm caused to these people to harm Musk would be morally acceptable. As noted above, this can be taken as falling under the ethics of just war and it can be argued that collateral damage to innocents can be justified as part of a moral conflict against an enemy who cannot be held accountable by other means. Naturally, it could be objected that the conflict with Musk is not just or argued that people must stick with legal remedies even as Musk and Trump gut the system that would allow such remedies.