Author: Michael LaBossiere

In July of 2002 the New England Journal of Medicine published a study on arthroscopic surgery.

The experimental group members underwent surgery while the control group received placebo surgeries.  Somewhat surprisingly, those receiving the placebo reported feeling better and performed better at walking and stair climbing than those in the experimental group. After reading this study, I wrote “Lies…the Best Medicine?” and it appeared in my What Don’t You Know? While working through my massive backlog of magazines, I came across an update on placebo surgeries in Scientific America in which Claudia Wallis argued in favor of fake operations. Reminded of my ancient essay, I am revisiting thoughts on the ethics of placebo surgeries.

As in my old essay, I think that there is a good argument against placebo surgery. Treating a patient with a placebo requires deception. If the effect requires the patient to believe they have received surgery, then the patient must be convinced of an untruth. If the medical personnel are honest and tell the patient the the surgery was fake, then they would, presumably, not benefit from it. If it is wrong to lie, then this deceit would be wrong. What would make it even worse is that medical personnel should be honest with patients.  Thus, even if placebo surgery is effective or even more effective than real surgery, then it should not be used.

One counter to this argument is that even when patients know they are receiving a placebo, it can still be effective. Medical personnel could be honest with patients about a placebo surgery and, perhaps, still maintain the effectiveness of the non-treatment. This would allow the use of placebo surgery while avoiding the moral problem. However, this does not solve the problem for cases in which patients must not know whether they are receiving surgery or the placebo. Placebo surgery is often used to test the effectiveness of surgeries in a rigorous manner. If the surgery is no better (or even worse) than a placebo, then there would be no medical reason to use the surgery over a placebo or no surgery at all.

It can be argued that deception in such situations is acceptable. One approach is to use examples of acceptable, beneficial deception. Obvious examples include the benign deceits about Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny and the Tooth Fairy. As another illustration, there are lies people tell to avoid causing others suffering. If this sort of benign deceit is acceptable, then so is the use of deceit to produce the placebo effect or to conduct a study for the greater good.

A second approach is to focus on the purpose of the medical profession. While philosophers and scientists are supposed to seek the truth, the end of medicine is to relieve pain and prevent or cure illnesses. If deception, in the form of a placebo, can achieve the end of medicine, then it is one more tool, like a scalpel or drug. In fact, it could be argued that effective placebos are even better than drugs or surgery. Surgery always involves some risk, and most drugs have side effects. Placebos would, presumably, involve little or no risk. That said, it is worth considering that there could also be mental side-effects with placebos.

Since placebo treatment is usually not free, it could be objected that it is still wrong: patients are charged, and nothing has been done for them. If medical personnel were using placebos to cover up illnesses and injuries while pocketing profits from fake treatment, then that would be unethical. However, if the treatment is honest and works then it would be as legitimate as any other form of treatment. So, if a patient needs to see a doctor to get the placebo effect working properly and it works as well or better than the “real” treatment, then it is as reasonable to bill for the placebo treatment as it is a real treatment—although the price should be adjusted accordingly. If the placebo effect could be created without involving medical personnel, then charging patients for it would be unethical.

In the case of studies in which the subjects are not paying, then there would be no special moral concern for the use of the placebo. Its use would, in fact, be required for a proper experiment. This does raise the usual moral concerns about conducting experiments, but that is a subject worthy of consideration on its own.

As noted in previous essays, there is a diversity issue in higher education: liberals outnumber conservatives. Given that conservatives have made their view of diversity clear, it is fair to apply their ideology to the issue of the dearth of conservatives in higher education.

When faced a lack of diversity, conservatives usually have two replies. I addressed first in an earlier essay: members of the underrepresented group freely decide to exclude themselves. For example, one might explain the relative low number of women and minorities playing tabletop wargames, such as Warhammer 40k, by claiming that they are generally not interested in the hobby. The second explanation is that the lack of diversity is due to a lack of competence on the part of the allegedly excluded groups. For example, the low number of women in top business, military and academic positions would be explained in terms of women being less capable than men. Some might add that incompetent people are capable in other area where they are more proportionally represented or even dominant. For example, someone might say that while women are inferior to men in science or business, they are capable nurses, speech language pathologists and grade schoolteachers. In some cases, these assertions are undeniably true. For example, men dominate American football because the strongest men are stronger than the strongest women. As another example, women are generally more capable than men for the role of surrogate mother. Since conservatives often find this explanation appealing, it seems fair to consider that a lack of competence is the reason why there are few conservatives in higher education.

Applying this conservative view to conservatives, the explanation for the lack of diversity is that conservatives lack the ability to succeed in higher education. While there are some exceptions, the ideological distribution is fair because of this disparity in ability. This is like the conservative claim that the lack of women in the upper levels of business, academics and the military match the distribution of ability: they claim most women are not as capable as men, hence men rightfully and fairly dominate. By parity of reasoning, most conservatives are not as capable as liberals, hence liberals justly and fairly dominate the academy.

An obvious reply is that ideology is different from sex or ethnicity. Conservatives can be of any sex or ethnicity because ideology is a matter of values. As such, it could be claimed, the idea that conservatives are less capable than liberals make no sense. It would be like saying that deontologists are less capable than utilitarians, that impressionists are less capable than surrealists, or that Yankees fans are less capable than Red Sox fans. This does have some appeal, but we should not abandon the conservative explanation too quickly.

This reply can be countered by arguing that while ideology does not change a person’s capabilities, a person’s capabilities might determine their ideology. That is, people with certain non-ideological qualities would tend to be conservative while people with other qualities would tend to be liberal. While psychology is not an exact science, it does show some interesting claims about the differences between conservatives and liberals. For example, it has been claimed that conservatives tend to be more afraid than liberals and hence have a greater desire for safety and security. Given these differences, it makes sense that conservatives would be less capable than be liberals in areas in which these differences would matter. Higher education, it can be argued, is such an area: the qualities that make a person more likely to succeed as a professor also tend to make them liberal. In contrast, the qualities that make a person more conservative would tend to make it less likely that they would have the ability to become professors.

While some liberals might be tempted to claim that conservatives are stupider than liberals, this need not be the case. After all, becoming a professor is not just a matter of being smart. Most smart people are not professors, and not all professors are smart. Conservatives can be just as intellectually capable as liberals, yet some of the other qualities that make them conservative could impair their ability to become professors (or so one might argue). One factor is that the process of becoming a professor involves having one’s most cherished ideas questioned, challenged and even attacked over the course of years—something liberals might handle better. As charitable conservatives might say that as women and minorities are well-suited for some fields, a charitable liberal might say that conservatives are well-suited for some fields outside the academy.

If it is true that what makes people conservative or liberal is relevant to their ability to become professors, then there are solutions to the problem of diversity. One is to engage in a process of affirmative action and DEI for conservatives: preferential hiring and adjusted standards to address the lack of diversity. Conservatives who oppose affirmative action and DEI would not be able to accept this approach. Unless their view is a matter of self-interest rather than a principle.

A second approach is to see if the academy can be modified to be more inviting to conservatives. For example, it might be that the way grad school classes are taught that deters conservatives. While conservatives are generally not fans of efforts of inclusion, they would presumably welcome such efforts if they were the ones being benefited.

Some readers might think the real reason conservatives are underrepresented in the academy is that liberals are to blame. I will address this in my next essay.

As noted in the previous essay, perhaps conservatives have good reasons to not want to be professors or professors have good reasons not to be conservatives. In this essay, I will offer some possible DEI solutions to the dearth of conservatives in higher education.

If highly educated conservatives find academics unattractive because of the lower salaries, then there are two ways to motivate them into becoming professors. One is to argue that capable conservatives should “take one for the team” and become professors. While this would be a financial loss for conservative professors, their sacrifices would benefit the community of conservatives. The challenge is persuading those who see self-interest as a core value to act in a way seemingly contrary to their self-interest.

Another approach, which would probably be more appealing, is for conservatives to offer financial support and rewards for conservatives who become and remain professors. This is already done in some cases, but expanding the support and rewards would help increase the number of conservative professors. One challenge is to ensure that the support and rewards go to actual conservatives. They would need to police ideological purity to keep out clever liberals (or even secret Marxists) who might exploit these opportunities for their own profit. And we would certainly not want anyone profiting from pretending to believe something.

A possible downside to this approach is that these recruited professors could be accused of bias because they are being paid to be conservative professors. will leave a solution to this problem to any conservatives who might be troubled by it.

A practical worry about supporting conservative students so that they become conservative professors is that their experiences in graduate school and as faculty might turn them away from conservatism. For example, they might start taking rhetorical attacks on experts and science personally as they become experts and scientists. As another example, they might find the hostility of Republicans to higher education a problem as they try to work in a field being attacked so vehemently by their fellows. But what about getting professors to want to be conservative? How could this be done?

One option for conservatives is to change their anti-expert and anti-science rhetoric. Rather than engaging in broad attacks on experts or science, they could confine their attacks to specific targets. Those not being directly attacked might find conservatism more appealing. The Republican party could also change its hostile attitude towards higher education towards a more positive approach. They could, for example, return to providing solid funding for research and education. If professors believed that Republicans would act in their interest and in the interest of their students, they would be more inclined to support them. Conservative faculty would probably also be more likely to stay conservative.

Taking such steps would, however, be a problem for the Republican party. After all, the anti-science stance towards climate change and their broad anti-expert stance have yielded great political success. Changing these views would come at a price. Providing support for public higher education would also put Republicans at odds with their views about what should be cut while giving tax breaks for the rich. It would also go against their strategy of monetizing higher education. As such, Republicans would need to weigh the cost of winning over professors against the advantages they gain by the policies that alienate professors.

Oddly enough, some people claim that it is the Democrats and liberals who are more anti-science and anti-intellectual than the Republicans. If this were true, then the Republicans are doing a terrible job of convincing scientists and intellectuals to support them. If they could convince professors that they are the real supporters of the sciences and the Democrats are the real threat, then they should be able to win converts in the academy. The challenge is, of course, proving this claim and getting professors to accept this proof. But this seems unlikely, given that the claim that Republicans are pro-science is absurd on the face of it.

While the culture warriors claim Marxism dominates higher education, a more realistic concern is that higher education is dominated by liberals (or at least Democrats). Conservatives (or at least Republicans) are an underrepresented minority among faculty. This disparity invites inquiry. One reason to investigate, at least for liberals, would be to check for injustice or oppression causing this disparity. Another motivation is intellectual curiosity.

While sorting out this diversity problem might prove daunting, a foundation of theory and methodology has been laid by those studying the domination of higher education by straight, white males. That is, professors like me. These tools should be useful and ironic for looking into the question of why conservatives are not adequate represented in the academy.  But before delving into theories of oppression and unfair exclusion, I must consider that the shortage of conservatives in the ivory towers is a matter of choice. This consideration mirrors a standard explanation for the apparent exclusion of women and minorities for other areas.

One possible explanation is that conservatives have chosen to not become professors. While not always the case, well-educated conservatives tend to be more interested in higher income careers in the private sector. While the pay for full-time faculty is not bad, the pay for adjuncts is terrible. Professor salaries, with some notable exceptions, tend to be lower than non-academic jobs with comparable educational requirements. So, someone interested in maximizing income would not become a professor. Education and effort would yield far more financial reward elsewhere, such as in the medical or financial fields. As such, conservatives are more likely to become bankers rather than philosophers and accountants rather than anthropologists.

A second possible explanation is that people who tend to become professors do not want to be conservatives (or at least Republicans). That is, the qualities that lead a person into a professorial career would tend to lead them away from conservative ideology. While there have been brilliant conservative intellectuals, the Republican party has consistently adopted a strong anti-expert, anti-intellectual stance. This might be due to an anti-intellectual ideology, or because the facts fail to match Republican ideology—such as with climate change. Republicans have also become more hostile to higher education. In contrast, Democrats tend to support higher education.

As becoming a professor generally requires a terminal degree, a professor will spend at least six years in college and graduate school, probably seeing the hostility of Republicans against education and the limited support offered by Democrats. Rational self-interest alone would tend to push professors towards being Democrats, since the Democrats are more likely to support higher education. Those who want to become professors, almost by definition, tend to be intellectual and want to become experts. So, the conservative attacks on experts and intellectuals will tend to drive them away from the Republican party and conservative ideology. Those pursuing careers in the sciences would presumably also find the anti-science stances of the Republicans and conservative ideology unappealing.

While my own case is just an anecdote, one reasons I vote for Democrats is that Democrats are more likely to do things that are in my interest as a professor and in the interest of my students. In contrast, Republicans tend to make my professional life worse by lowering support for education and engaging in micromanagement and ideological impositions. They also make life more difficult for my students. The anti-intellectualism, rejection of truth, and anti-science stances also make the Republican party unappealing to me. As such, it is not surprising that the academy is dominated by liberals: Republicans would usually not want to be professors, and potential professors would tend to not want to be Republicans.

But perhaps there is a social injustice occurring and the lack of diversity is due to the unjust exclusion of conservatives from the academy. It is to this concern that I will address in a future essay. We might need some diversity, equity and inclusion to get conservatives into the academy.

In the eternal culture war, folks on the right claim that post-modern neo-Marxist college professors are indoctrinating the youth. Some have a more moderate view, seeing professors as merely being excessively liberal and indoctrinating the youth in liberal dogma. While I am confident the academy is not ruled by Marxists, there are still interesting questions about the extent of Marxism on campuses, the degree to which liberals dominate the academy and whether professors indoctrinate their students.

It is true that there are Marxist professors. I have even met some. In some cases, they do seem to understand Marxism and its implications, at least to the degree that anyone understands a philosophical theory. These folks are often political science or philosophy professors. I have also encountered professors who seem to think they are Marxists, but do not seem to understand Marxism. For example, at a conference I met a professor who claimed to be a Marxist, but also accepted free will and metaphysical dualism. Real Marxists are metaphysical materialists and embrace economic determinism. Fortunately, Marxists are rare even in the social sciences and humanities. As such, the idea that the academy is ruled by Marxists is not true. While there is a non-zero number of Marxist professors who preach rather than teach, I do have complete sympathy for students who get caught up in that nightmare.

Professors do tend to be politically liberal and it has been claimed they are becoming more liberal. From my own experiences, I have extensive anecdotal evidence that professors tend to be liberal. As to why they are becoming more liberal, this is often a matter of relativity because the political right in America has moved to the far right. Relative to the Trump administration, Reagan and Bush would be liberals.

That professors tend to be liberal is no more surprising than corporate executives tending to be more conservative. However, there is a reasonable concern that the academy is dominated by the left rather than representing the ideological diversity of the country. Ironically, consistent conservatives would oppose affirmative action or diversity initiatives aimed at recruiting more conservative faculty. However, they could still earn degrees or encourage other conservatives and increase the number of conservatives in academics. It would be a positive thing to have more conservative intellectuals in the academy (and in general). After all, ideology without opposition leads to a multitude of sins, such as intellectual laziness.

While the alleged liberal domination of the academy is a matter for concern, there is also the question of whether students are being indoctrinated in leftist ideology. I am careful to teach without pushing my own ideology. For example, in my ethics class I do not try to convert the students to virtue theory, they get the tools of moral reasoning as well as information about a range of moral theories. But, of course, I am but one professor and my example is mere anecdotal evidence. My not being a leftist indoctrinator no more proves that indoctrination isn’t taking place than a single example of a Marxist professor would prove that Marxism rules the academy.

As would be expected, there are researchers who argue that the academy does not indoctrinate students and that college does not make people more liberal. It could be contended that they are biased because they are liberals. This is a fair point: liberals defending the academy are biased, just as conservatives attacking the academy are biased. This does not entail that the liberals are wrong or that their arguments are flawed—to think otherwise would be to fall victim to an ad hominem: while bias provides grounds for suspicion, it does not disprove a claim. After all, the same sort of bad reasoning could be applied to the conservatives who claim that the academy indoctrinates students to be liberals; as conservatives, they would tend to be biased against liberals.

This question is an empirical one: researchers can comb through a representative sample of syllabi, PowerPoint slides, course notes, and recordings of lectures to find the relevant evidence for or against the claim of indoctrination. This research would need to meet the usual standards of a proper inductive generalization: the sample would need to be large enough and representative enough to provide strong support for the conclusion. Because of this, anecdotal evidence of crazed Marxist professors or professors who teach in a fair and balanced manner do not suffice as adequate evidence. This fallacy involves taking an anecdote as evidence for a general claim. Samples that are too small would result in the fallacy of hasty generalization and biased samples would result in the fallacy of biased generalization.

As would be expected, both conservatives and liberals can be tempted to use anecdotes, excessively small samples and biased samples to “support” their view. I am certainly open to the results of a properly conducted, large scale study of the academy; this is something that could be conducted in good faith by a bipartisan team of researchers. I am sure that there are some professors who try to indoctrinate their students. This would be of concern, but there seems to be no objective evidence that this is a general problem. After all, as folks on the right like to say about the police, we shouldn’t draw an inference from a few “bad apples.”

Even if some professors try to indoctrinate their students, there is also the question of whether they are likely to succeed. Having observed many professors across numerous institutions, such efforts would usually fail. As the joke goes, we have a difficult time getting students to even read the syllabus. Transforming them into deranged Marxists or even getting them to be slightly more liberal is unlikely. This is not to say that professors have no influence nor to deny that there are professors like Jordan Peterson who can sway people. But such charismatic corrupters are obviously quite rare and would be more likely to pursue other, more lucrative careers. Like Jordan Peterson did.

But even if professors fail to indoctrinate their students, it can be argued that they are wasting class time trying to preach rather than teach. This is a fair point. While off-topic discussions can be some of the best learning experiences, a professor spending class time pushing their ideology rather than teaching is a disservice to the students. Of course, professors rambling about fishing stories, D&D, stamp collecting, or their favorite movies also waste students’ time.

That said, it could be argued that professing does have a legitimate role in the classroom—if it has pedagogical value. Even if it does have some value, there is also the worry that by pushing a specific ideology, the professor will mislead the students about the merits or demerits of specific views.  This all ties into the classic problem of the proper role of a professor—although the ideal often advanced today is that of a conveyor of information and skills to prepare the job fillers for their existence as workers.

The intense politicalization of ecological issues makes it difficult to have a rational discussion of environmental regulation. When the left wants regulation, the right can claim they want to destroy jobs because of a deranged preference for tiny fish over humans. When the right opposes regulation, they can be presented as willing to destroy the environment because they value profits over other people and the planet. This conflict leads to the seesaw of regulations as each party takes and loses power. While there is no single solution to this problem, a rational approach would be to try to develop solutions that benefit corporations and the inhabitants of the ecosystem, such as us humans. As an example, I will use the seabirds.

While sea food is delicious and nutritious, modern fishing techniques kill hundreds of thousands of seabirds each year. For example, albatrosses are sometimes killed by longline fishing. As another example, penguins can get caught in gill nets and drown. These dead birds have no value to business and they are an unfortunately bycatch whose carcasses are garbage rather than profitable.

Fortunately for the birds, there are ways to reduce their death toll. For example, long line fishing can be made safer for birds by using streamers to deter them or by weighting the lines so they sink out of reach of diving birds. These methods of protecting birds do cost money and can make things more difficult for the fishing crews. As such, regulations requiring that fishing vessels use these devices and measures impose costs which can impact the pay of the fishing crews and the cost of seafood. Because of this, it would be rational of industry to oppose such regulations to avoid these costs.

While some might be tempted to dismiss this as an obsession with profit, attacking the industry means it will double down on its opposition and lobby against regulations. This will make it even harder for environmentalists to get regulations in place. Aggressive opposition by industry will motivate environmentalists, making it harder for industry to get what they want. In such conflicts, the lobbyists are always victorious.  It would be preferable for everyone (other than the lobbyists) if there was a way to protect birds while also benefiting the fishing industry.

It seems difficult to imagine that protecting birds would benefit the seafood industry in any significant way. After all, they would need to purchase equipment and adopt methods to protect birds. There seems to be no profit in this. But perhaps there is the potential for gain.

Protecting birds could pay off in public relations. A company can advertise it is bird safe and perhaps offset the cost through improved sales and by increasing prices. However, it would be even better if protecting birds was also profitable or at least cost neutral. One example of this is longline fishing.

An estimated 160,000 albatrosses and petrels are killed each year when they get hooked on longlines. While this is obviously bad for the birds, it is also costly to the industry. First, they must waste time removing dead birds from their lines. Second, and more importantly for them, each hooked bird could have been a profitable fish. Keeping birds off their lines means that they can catch more fish. As such, regulations that protect birds can be a win for the birds and the industry.  But this does lead to an obvious objection.

Opponents of environmental regulation can content that if protecting birds is advantageous to the industry, there is no reason to impose regulations. Out of rational self-interest, industry will act without being coerced. So, there is no need to impose regulations.

As I favor minimal state intrusion, I find this appealing: why use the power of the state to compel people to do what they would do without coercion? Especially when an imposition might cause opposition. To use an analogy, think of seat belt laws. Wearing a seat belt is a good idea and people should do so, but some people refuse to wear them because it is required by law. It could be argued that it makes more sense to inform people of the benefits of seat belts and let rational self-interest motivate them.

The obvious counter is that people generally do not operate from rational self-interest. If they did, everyone would be eating the healthiest meals they could get and exercising as often as they could. As such, to follow Aristotle, people must often be compelled to do what is best for them. So, while protecting seabirds would be in the interest of industry, they are unlikely to do so just because it is in their interest. So, regulation is needed to compel them to act in their own interest. To use another analogy, while it is rational for people to learn how to drive properly before taking to the road, the state needs to compel people to do this.

While I favor freedom, freedom can be justly limited on moral grounds when liberty creates significant harm. So, for example, while people should be free to have pets, there should be regulations forbidding people from taking their pet tiger for a walk in the local park. The challenge, as always, is balancing liberty against harm.

By Government of Florida –

DeSantis, the governor of my adopted state of Florida, is plagiarizing Elon Musk’s DOGE. Like Musk, DeSantis claims that his DOGE will eliminate “waste, fraud and abuse.” As with Musk and DOGE, DeSantis already knows what he wants to cut: 70 state boards and commissions and 900 jobs. He also wants to force universities to undergo reviews and audits, and the state will “look into” local government expenditures. As I am not an expert on government finances I will, unlike Musk, leave the merit of any cuts to the experts. Instead, I will discuss the concepts of fraud and waste.

There is an obvious rhetorical advantage to claiming that DOGE is targeting fraud and waste. After all, everyone agrees that fraud and waste are bad. Unless, of course, one is benefiting from either. Fraud, as a concept, is easy to define. It is intentional deception aimed at acquiring an unfair or unlawful gain. While it might seem that fraud would be easy to determine, what counts as fraud will always be a matter of which interpretation of the law is being used. J.D. Vance’s discussion of paroles and Temporary Protected Status provides a good illustration of this. While the Biden administration followed (their interpretation of) the law, J.D. Vance claimed that they had acted illegally, making the migrants in question illegal. The same would also apply to claims about fraud. While, for example, a contract was (interpreted as) legal and not fraudulent when it was made during the Biden administration, under Musk’s interpretation it could now be fraud. While there can be good faith disagreement about the law and fraud, Musk could easily claim that something is fraud simply because he does not like it. Given the lack of oversight of DOGE, fraud could be whatever Musk calls “fraud.” That said, as “fraud” is usually defined in laws, there would be at least some grounds for judging whether something is fraud. The concept of waste is much more problematic.

Wasteful spending is expending resources, especially money, in ways that are either unnecessary or inefficient. While we agree that waste is bad, this is like saying that we also agree that bad is bad. But people obviously disagree about what is wasteful and what is bad. It might seem that inefficiency is an objective matter and in some cases it is. For example, if the government had a contract with one of Musk’s companies that cost taxpayers more than what a competitor would charge for the same product, then that would be inefficient and hence waste. But there can be cases where spending seems inefficient, but it is not. After all efficiency is not just a matter of paying a higher price but involves getting the same or less by paying more. If, for example, Musk’s product was superior to the competition, then the extra cost could be worth it. It is also worth considering the obvious: someone could just lie about efficiency when they want to cut spending. While inefficiency does allow some degree of objectivity, whether spending is unnecessary seems entirely a matter of a person’s values. This applies to everyday spending and government spending.

As an example, consider going out for dinner and buying drinks. Whether that is wasteful depends on your values. While it could be argued that it would be more efficient to cook dinner at home and buy alcohol at the store as the cost would be much lower, some people believe that going out is not a waste of their money. This is because of the return they get from the experience. In terms of who is right, this is a debate of which values are correct and is not something that can be resolved by an Excel spreadsheet. Likewise for government spending.

What is unnecessary is in the eye of the beholder. People who do not like SNAP or Medicaid will see these as unnecessary. People who do not like subsidies for the wealthy will see those as unnecessary. So, when Musk claims to be cutting waste he could be telling the truth: he could be cutting spending that he, as the world’s richest person, thinks is unnecessary. While he sees his lucrative contracts as necessary, he obviously does not need SNAP, Medicaid, or farm subsidies and these no doubt seem unnecessary to him. From a rhetorical standpoint, claiming to be cutting waste sounds much better than cutting programs one does not like, hence that is what Musk says his DOGE is doing.

But has DOGE been a success? Even a cursory review of DOGE’s own “receipts” and claims reveals many untruths and errors. For example, the claims about Social Security fraud and $8 billion in savings in a Department of Homeland Security contract were debunked, with the $8 billion turning out to be $8 million. As of this writing, Musk has made at least 28 false claims, such as the lie about $50 million for condoms in Gaza and the claim that congress gave itself a 40% tax increase. In terms of finding waste, fraud and abuse DOGE has been a failure.

As to why DOGE has done such a poor job, one possible explanation is incompetence: Musk cares about waste and fraud, but he and his DOGE are not very good at their jobs. A second explanation is that Musk does not care about waste and fraud and DOGE has other goals. Going with the reasonable idea that the purpose of a thing is what it does, we should look at what DOGE is doing to see its actual goals. It has succeeded in demoralizing federal employees, it has targeted agencies that protect the American people from fraud and financial exploitation, and it has gone after agencies that regulate and investigate Musk’s businesses. In these areas DOGE has been a success. While DeSantis has yet to announce a billionaire to head up his DOGE, it is reasonable to infer it will serve a similar function in Florida. With the obvious exception of the more Musk focused goals of DOGE. It is reasonable to infer that DOGE is using the rhetorical cover of going after fraud and waste to poorly conceal its real goals. We should expect the same with Florida DOGE.

A few years ago, at my annual checkup, my systolic blood pressure was 145. My doctor was concerned and asked me to monitor my blood pressure. I already owned an automatic blood pressure checker and started taking regular readings, finding that my blood pressure was consistently good (110-130) at home. This inspired an investigation.

I found that one cause was the stress of driving: I’m hyper-vigilant when I drive and my blood pressure spikes. My first reading at the doctor’s office will be high because of this; my second reading is always normal. I also found out that my habit of hydrating also caused the spike. I always visited the water fountain when I arrive, at least until I learned that this also spiked my blood pressure. Thus, I solved my “high” blood pressure problem. But this interest in blood pressure led me to “do my own research” and I recalled that the definition of high blood pressure had changed over the years. The ideal now is 120 systolic (though there was a push for 115). Looking into the change, it turns out that the pharmaceutical companies that sell blood pressure medication were instrumental. This influence extends worldwide, with the WHO panel on this having industry connections. Pharmaceutical companies have engaged in concerted efforts to “educate” and influence doctors. This connection has not gone unnoticed, leading some to question whether the new guidelines are legitimate or a money maker for the pharmaceutical companies. While I will not assume a conspiracy, it is rational to be concerned.

The scientific evidence shows that high blood pressure is unhealthy, but there is still the question of what is too high. There are also practical concerns about properly measuring blood pressure: instruments are often inaccurate; blood pressure varies greatly depending on circumstances and so on. Since I am not a medical expert, I will focus on critical thinking and not directly address the medical issues.

One obvious concern with the seemingly biased research is whether it is accurate. That this is a legitimate worry is illustrated by the infamous case of how the sugar industry paid scientists to blame fat, thus distorting health information. The pharmaceutical companies’ role in the opioid crisis shows these companies have no moral qualms about causing harm to make profits. As such, it is reasonable to be suspicious about the guidelines for blood pressure.

One interesting way to motivate suspicion in this matter across the political spectrum is to make use of climate change. Climate change deniers often assert that there is a conspiracy among climate scientists to deceive the public about climate change. Or, at the very least, the scientists are in error because they are being misled by ideology. Those who believe in climate change claim that the fossil fuel industry has been engaged in a disinformation campaign motivated by a desire for profit.

While the two sides differ about who is engaged in disinformation, they both agree that disinformation is a strategy. As such, it would make sense to them that there could be disinformation about blood pressure. The emotional appeal would be to climate change deniers based on their distrust of science while those who believe in climate change would tend to accept that an industry is engaged in disinformation to the detriment of people.

That said, the fact that research is biased, and disinformation has been spread does not entail that the research must be wrong. The blood pressure guidelines could be medically sound; it might just be coincidence that they were influenced by corporations and that the new guides increase their profits.

The problem is that there is a lack of unbiased research to confirm or discredit the biased research. As such, confidence in the guidelines should be relatively low. That said, the evidence does show that we should strive to keep our blood pressure low. The evidence also shows that the non-drug ways to do this (exercise, rest, good diet, stress management) are good for you even if you don’t have high blood pressure. So, I agree that people should use those methods to be healthy and that high blood pressure is probably bad. However, medication is another matter.

When it comes to medication, the first question (which has been addressed) is whether there is an actual problem. As noted above, high blood pressure does seem to be bad. But it is not entirely clear what is too high. The second question is does the medication work? On the face of it, FDA approved blood pressure medications do seem to work—in that they lower blood pressure. This leads to the third question: if they work, do the benefits outweigh the side effects?

The oldest (and least profitable) blood pressure medication, diuretics,  seem to work with minimal side effects. The new (and more profitable) ones seem to have problematic side effects including increased risk of stroke, increased risk of heart attack, and increased rates of suicide and depression.  As such, the rational approach to these medications (as always) would be to weigh the possible harm against the possible benefits. While there are certainly some objective factors in play here, there are also subjective factors, such as how people feel about risk and side effects. Part of the problem in weighing the harms and benefits takes the discussion back to the question of what constitutes unhealthy high blood pressure. Since the research on this is biased, judging whether the drugs the pharmaceutical companies are selling are worth the side effects (and cost) is problematic. Without trustworthy information on the danger, one cannot make a good judgment about accepting risks to offset that alleged danger.

While my focus is on blood pressure, the same sort of problem arises generally for medicines and surgeries: without independent, trustworthy research we cannot make good health decisions. Unfortunately, there is a problem with independent research. There has been a systematic defunding of public institutions that engage in research, and this creates two major impacts.

The first is that important medical research is often not conducted due to lack of funds. The second is that industry often funds research, which biases it. One plausible, but not perfect, solution is to increase the funding of public institutions so that they can increase independent and objective research into health issues. This, of course, will tend to be opposed by industry and the Trump administration. While this would reduce their research expenses, it would give them far less control over the research, which would be a problem for their profits.

A more radical approach would be to impose additional regulations on the pharmaceutical industry such as requiring establishing the validity of medical claims via independent, publicly funded research before drugs could be marketed. The challenge would be to balance the need for objective, trustworthy research against medical innovation and the legitimate business interests of the for-profit industry.

While some might balk at such regulations and make appeals to the free market, it must be pointed out that the key to the pharmaceutical business is the patent system. This is a form of government regulation that prevents competition that corporations usually like. These patents are backed up by the public institutions of law enforcement and the courts. As such, cries about the free market should not be heeded, unless the regulation is truly unfair and too restrictive. On a personal note, it does worry me that I am unsure whether my blood pressure might be a problem, or whether the pharmaceutical companies are lying so they can extort money through a campaign of deceit. In a civilized nation that cares for its citizens, that should not be a real worry. And yet it is. And it seems likely that matters will only get worse.

 

Now that the ethics of methods and sources have been addressed, I now turn to the content of opposition research. The objective is to provide some general guidance about what sort of content is morally acceptable to research and use against political opponents.

Since the objective of opposition research is to find damaging or discrediting information about the target, the desired content will always be negative (or perceived as negative). While there is the view that if one has nothing nice to say about someone else, then one should say nothing, the negative nature of the content does not automatically make such research unethical. To support this, consider the obvious analogy to reporters: the fact that they are on the lookout for negative information does not make them unethical. Finding negative things and reporting on them are legitimate parts of their jobs. Likewise for opposition researchers. As such, concerns about the ethics of the content must involve considerations other than the negative nature of the desired content.

One obvious requirement for ethical content is that the information must be true. This does raise an obvious epistemic problem: how can the researchers know it is true? Laying aside the epistemic problems of skepticism, this is a practical question about evidence, reasoning and credibility which go beyond the scope of this essay. However, a general ethical guide can be provided. At a minimum, the claim should only be used if it is more likely to be true than false. Both ethics and critical thinking also require that the evidence for a claim be proportional to the strength of the claim. As such, strong claims require strong support. Ethics also requires considering the harm that could be done by using the claim and the greater the harm, the greater the evidence for that claim needs to be. This moral guide is at odds with the goal of the research, since the more damaging the claim, the better it is as a political weapon. But ethics requires balancing the political value of the weaponized information against the harm that could be done to an innocent person. This is not to say that damaging information should not be used, but that due caution is required.

This approach is analogous to guides on using force. Justifying the use of lethal force against a person requires good reasons to believe that person is a threat and that the use of force is justified. To the degree that there are doubts, the justification is reduced. Likewise, damaging information should be used with caution so that an innocent person is not unjustly harmed. For example, if someone is accused of having committed sexual assault, then there would need to be strong evidence supporting such a claim. Although in the current political climate, such an accusation seems more of a plus than a disqualification.

There is debate about when the use of force is justified, and the perception of the person using the force (such as how scared or threatened they claimed to be) is often considered. The same applies to the use of damaging information, so there will be considerable disagreement (probably along ideological lines) about whether using it is justified. And there will be debates about how people see its plausibility. Despite these issues, the general guide remains: the evidence needs to be adequate to justify the belief the claim is true. The use of information that does not meet even the minimal standard (more likely to be true than not) would be unethical. In other cases, there can be good faith debate about whether a claim is adequately supported or not. In addition to the concern about the truth of the information, there is also the concern about the relevance of the information.

The general principle of relevance is obvious: the content must be relevant to the issue. In the abstract, relevance is easy to define: information is relevant if it bears on the person’s suitability for the position.  For example, if the opposition research is against someone running for senate, then the content must be relevant to the person’s ability to do the job of a senator properly and effectively. What should be considered relevant will vary from situation to situation.

One problem is that people have different notions of relevance. For example, some might consider the high school and college behavior of a candidate for the Supreme Court to be relevant information while others disagree. As another example, some might consider a candidate’s sexual activity relevant while others might see consensual sex of any kind between adults as irrelevant. And, as the current political climate shows, being credibly accused of sexual assault or embracing long discredited claims about the cause of autism might be seen as positive rather than disqualifying.

One way to solve this problem is to use this principle: whatever would influence voters (if true) is acceptable to use. While this seems to be entailed by the citizen’s right to know, it provides a very broad principle. In fact, it might be so broad as to be useless as a guide. After all, voters can be influenced by almost any fact about a person even when it would seem to have no relevance to the office/position/etc. in question.

That said, there is also the problem that many offices and positions have little in the way of requirements. For example, the office of President has only the age and nationality requirements. Because of this, using the requirements of the position to set the limits of information would be too narrow. What is needed is a guide that is not too narrow and not too broad.

One option would be to go with the established norms for the position For example, while the requirements to be President are minimal, there (used to be) expectations about what the person should be like to be fit for office, such as basic competence, respect for the rule of law, and not being a convicted felon.

The problem with using the norms is that this seems to embrace relativism and allows for a potentially unchecked race to the bottom as norms are broken and replaced. As such, there should be some restrictions on what is ethical content that goes beyond the norms of the day. Developing a full moral guide goes beyond the scope of this essay, but a general guide can be offered. The guiding principle is that the content should be relevant to the position, while also considering what would reasonably be relevant to the voters. But norms, like laws, only hold when people are willing to follow or enforce them.

When President Trump and Elon Musk do something, the immediate response is usually to ask, “is that legal?” While I am not a lawyer, as a philosopher I say that law is made up and depends entirely on the willingness to comply or enforce.

Law is made up in that people create the laws. But there are those who argue that law is not (entirely) made up but has a real foundation, such as ethics or religion. For example, there are natural law and rights theorists, such as John Locke, who argue for an objective moral foundation for the law. Religious thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, argue that while human laws are made by humans, they derive all their validity from God’s law.

Even if we consider that one of these theories might be correct, there are two basic problems. The first is determining which, if any, theory is correct. From a practical standpoint, people usually believe their interpretation of their morality or religion is correct. But since everyone cannot be right, belief does not settle the matter. The practical problem is that we do not know which, if any, is correct.

The second problem is that even if the correct interpretation of the correct theory is found, there is still the problem of translating that theory into human laws and this means that people will still need to create the laws. Thanks to ambiguity, vagueness and other complexities of language and meaning, each person will have their own interpretation of these laws. As an example, people have very different concepts of what is reasonable.

A person following the law will have their own interpretation, which can be significantly different from that of a person enforcing the law. If conflict arises, this can involve the courts and thus the interpretations of the judges, lawyers and jury members can all become involved. This all assumes that everyone is acting in good faith, but this is often not the case. So, in addition to what people think the law means, there is also what they want the law to mean in a specific situation. Thus, not only is the initial law made up, but each interpretation is also made up. And a person’s interpretation will vary over time and from situation to situation based on both conscious and unconscious factors such as bias, financial interest or even being hungry. Even if an interpretation is made, its efficacy depends entirely on the willingness of people to comply or enforce it. So, asking whether something is legal is asking for an interpretation of the law, which leads to the question of whose interpretation matters.

Unlike what some call the “laws of nature”, such as the law of gravity, people can decide whether to follow an interpretation of human law. An everyday example is the speed limit. Unlike the speed of light, the legal speed limit depends on people willingly not exceeding it. More serious examples include laws about murder, firing federal employees, and obeying the president of the United States. Obviously enough, a person can always refuse to obey and thus the law is nothing without the willingness of people to comply with an interpretation of a law. As such, a simple “no” negates all the power of the law.

As an obvious objection, you are probably thinking about the fact that the police can kill people, that the President can command people to hurt other people, and that judges can make rulings. But this also depends on the willingness of people to obey an interpretation of the law. As an example, an officer can decide not to give you a ticket or not shoot you. If no one listened to the President, he would need to try to, one assumes, get a gun and threaten people like a lone criminal. A judge’s ruling only works if other people are willing to act on that ruling. As such, a simple “no” negates all the power of the law. While an officer, a judge, or all the Presidents men could hurt you, they cannot make you say “yes” unless you are willing to do so. And they will not hurt you unless they are willing to say “yes” to somebody’s interpretation of the law.

Interestingly, when Trump and Musk do “illegal” things, they are relying on the willingness of other people to comply based on “legal” authority. This seems to be a bit of a paradox in that Trump and Musk are relying on their “legal” authority or “right” to do “illegal” things. They do have a great advantage, since the process seems to be that they can do whatever they want and then a judge might be asked to decide if the “illegal” action was illegal. It is somewhat like being able to demand that a bank give you money and they must give it to you, with the only recourse is that they could ask a judge to ask you to give back the money.

Getting back to the question of whether something is legal, the answer is that it depends on the interpretation of the person who other people are willing to obey. From a practical standpoint, the legal system works initially on people agreeing to go along with it and if this fails, it becomes a matter of the willingness of some people to hurt others until they either agree or are killed. So, anything Trump and Musk does is “legal” until they agree to stop or someone stops them.