Author: Michael LaBossiere

 

Before, during and after the 2020 election many Republicans followed Trump’s lead and lied about widespread voter/election fraud. Trump and his allies had their days in court, losing all but one case. Trump’s allies never claimed fraud in court and confined their lies to the public forum. Using their false claims of widespread fraud and pointing to the doubt their lies created, they claimed they needed to take actions aimed at trying to restrict voting.

As election fraud is not widespread, they had no significant problem to address. Instead, the restrictions they imposed, such as those in Georgia, are clearly aimed at suppressing black voters. They are not aimed at voter fraud, as a brief reflection on most restrictions will reveal. As an illustration, one law limits early voting to the hours of 9 to 5 (county registrars can extend this to 7 to 7). How this would reduce fraud is unclear, but it makes it harder for voters with less flexible schedules. As another example, Republicans done things to increase the lines at polling places predominantly used by minorities while making it a misdemeanor to provide voters with water. There is no plausible account of how this would counter fraud.

If the Republican arguments are taken at face value, the following principles would seem to be in operation. The first is that politicians must address the concerns of the public (even when politicians manufacture the concerns). The second is that restriction of fundamental rights is warranted to address even miniscule problems that cause little harm. So, let us apply these principles to gun control. I do not, of course, expect a consistency argument to affect Republicans as they have little respect for truth, ethics or logic.

Most Americans claim that gun violence is a problem and most Americans support gun control. Given the Republican argument about voting laws, it follows that politicians must act to restrict gun rights. After all, if public concerns about (lies about) election fraud warrant restricting voting rights, then public concerns about guns warrants restricting gun rights. But the actions of Republicans show their professed principle is also a lie: they do not apply it consistently and only use it to “justify” actions they want to take for other reasons. Now to the addressing of harms.

While data on gun violence is limited, there were 19,379 deaths caused by gun violence in the United States in 2020. This excludes deaths caused by suicide using a gun; that number was 24.090 in 202o. In contrast, a careful review of claims about voter/election fraud in 2020 revealed that the number of cases is vanishingly small. If the Republican argument warrants restrictions on voting, then it would (by analogical reasoning) provide exceptionally strong support for gun control laws. After all, if voting must be carefully restricted by law to address a vanishingly small number of cases (that were caught and dealt with using current laws) then the much more significant harms arising from gun ownership must be addressed with new laws of equal or greater restrictiveness.

One could counter that passing gun control laws would violate the Second Amendment; but the obvious response is that the right to vote is more fundamental than any constitutional right. After all, the moral legitimacy of the law depends on the consent of the governed and restricting the right to vote reduces the legitimacy of the state in proportion to those restrictions.

One could, of course, embrace the state of nature argument of Thomas Hobbes and contend that the right of self-defense is the most fundamental right. While this has some appeal, this would not show that the restrictions on voting rights are warranted. Reasoning that it is acceptable to restrict one basic right but not another because the other is more basic is poor logic. To illustrate, this would be like arguing that enslaving people or stealing their property is acceptable because the right to life is more basic than these other rights (since liberty and property rights require one to be alive). Once again, Republican action shows that their concern is not with mitigating harms. If they cared about mitigating harm to citizens, they would be applying this principle consistently. As such, their actions reveal their true principles: they want to suppress voting so they can gain and hold onto power illegitimately and they want to serve the interest of the gun lobby over the safety of the American people.

In response to each mass shooting, Democrats usually propose gun control legislation while Republicans offer “thoughts and prayers” while blocking the Democrats as best they can.  Some years ago, Republican Senator John Kennedy said that “We do not need more gun control. We need more idiot control.” He then endeavored to make an argument by analogy to counter arguments for gun control. In this argument, Kennedy asserted that “…And I’m not trying to equate these two, but we have a lot of drunk drivers in America that kill a lot of people. We ought to try to combat that too. But I think what many folks on my side of the aisle are saying is that the answer is not to get rid of all sober drivers.”

Given what he said, he seemed to be comparing mass shooters with drunk drivers. While that seems clear, sorting out the rest of the argument requires a bit more work. Looking at it in the most charitable way, his inference seems to be that because getting rid of sober drivers would not solve the problem of drunk drivers, it follows (by analogy) that getting rid of non-mass shooter gun owners would not solve the problem of mass shootings. On this interpretation, he is right but right in a vacuous way: getting rid of people who do not do something would not solve the problem of people who do that thing.

But since his reply is to proposals for gun regulation, what he seemed to be inferring is that since getting rid of sober drivers would not stop drunk driving, gun control should be rejected. This reasoning requires that  proposed gun control methods be on par with eliminating sober drivers. I think he might have meant taking away everyone’s cars (including those of sober drivers) as a means of addressing drunk driving. As such, the analogy would only hold in the case of proposals to take away all guns. While there have been such proposals, they are generally not made by mainstream Democrats. So, while the analogy does apply to proposals to eliminate all guns, it does not apply to proposals to increase gun control, such as universal background checks or even assault weapon bans. An assault weapon ban would be analogous to addressing drunk driving by getting rid of vehicles favored by drunk drivers and are also unusually good at causing death and injury. As an aside, one problem with how some Republicans debate gun control is that they make straw person arguments: asserting that the plan is to take away all guns. This is a bad faith argument as there are many other approaches to gun control. The usual response to pointing this out is the Slippery Slope fallacy: asserting that even moderate proposals must lead to taking away all guns. This is also a bad faith argument.

As others noted, Kennedy made a strategic error with this analogy. While it was intended to refute gun control proposals, his comparison invited people to compare guns and cars. Just as some people support eliminating all privately owned guns, there those who propose eliminating privately owned cars for similar reasons: private ownership and the operation of dangerous machines results in many preventable deaths. As such, one could accept the analogy and turn it around: we should handle both problems by eliminating private ownership and the operation of deadly machines. But most people do not want to eliminate private ownership of cars or guns. However, Kennedy’s car analogy can still be used in favor of gun control.

As others have noted, cars are strictly regulated. To legally drive, one must be licensed and insured. Cars must be registered with the state and licensed. Their use is also regulated, and safety features are mandatory. When people are incapable of operating a vehicle safely or get convicted of certain crimes (like driving drunk), then they lose the right to drive. This is because cars are dangerous machines and can do a great deal of harm, even by accident.

Going with Kennedy’s automotive analogy, the same should apply to guns. A person should be licensed and insured to own one, their operation should be carefully regulated, and safety features should be mandated by law. When a person cannot possess a firearm safely or they commit certain crimes, they should lose their right to possess a gun.

The obvious reply is that on some interpretations of the Second Amendment, individual gun ownership is a constitutional right and hence such restrictions would be unconstitutional. One obvious counter is that existing restrictions on guns are constitutional (that is, they have not been struck down) and there are well-established precedents for limiting this right. And, of course, all rights are restricted and limited. For example, the First Amendment has many limitations many of which have been imposed by pro-gun Republicans who giveth to the Second with one hand and taketh from the First with the other. Another obvious reply is to point out that the Republicans who oppose gun control are the same ones who pass laws to restrict voting rights. The right to vote is the foundation of democracy and if they are willing to restrict this right on the grounds of their (usually false) claims about the harms of almost non-existent voter fraud, they have no principled way to object to strict gun control laws as the harms of not having adequate gun control are evident. Perhaps a bi—partisan solution is to have people vote by shooting ballots with guns: every citizen of voting ages gets a gun and the right to vote.

In epistemology the problem of the external world is the challenge of proving that I know that entities exist other than me. Even if it is assumed that there is an external world, there remains the problem of other minds: the challenge of proving that I can know that there is at least one other being that has a mind. A common version of this problem tends to assume other beings exist, and the challenge is to prove that I can know that these other beings have (or lack) minds. Our good dead friend Descartes offered the best-known effort to solve the problem of the external world and in trying to solve this problem he also, perhaps unintentionally, attempted to solve the problem of other minds.

In his Meditations Descartes set out to create an infallible foundation of knowledge starting with his method of doubting his beliefs until he found a belief he could not doubt.  As part of this project, he hoped to solve the problem of the external world. After his doubting spree in the first Meditation, he took his belief that he thinks and the belief that he exists to both be certain and indubitable.  In trying to prove that something exists other than him, Descartes attempts to prove that God exists. And so, he attempted to solve the problem of the external world by solving a version of the problem of other minds. Proving that God exists would prove that another mind exists and that something exists other than him, thus solving a limited version of each problem.

While Descartes grinds through a plethora of proofs, his key reasoning for the purposes of this essay is his notion that the cause of a belief must contain as much reality as the belief itself. Roughly put, you can think of this reasoning as analogous to inferring that whatever charged a mobile phone battery must have at least as much power as in in the battery (assuming the battery charged from zero). Descartes based this reasoning on the principle that something cannot arise from nothing.

Roughly put, Descartes claimed that his idea of God is such that he could not be the cause of this idea—it had to be caused by something external to him. For example, Descartes notes that God is perfect and argues that he could not get the idea of a perfect being from his imperfect self. As another example, Descartes claims that God is infinite and that he (Descartes) could not create the idea of infinity from himself. From this he infers that God exists. He then goes on to argue that since God is perfect it follows that God is not a deceiver. Descartes then concludes that since God created us, we can generally trust our senses and thus we can infer that there is an external world. While this does not address the common version of the problem of other minds, it does offer a solution to the narrowest version: it does attempt to show that Descartes is not the only mind. In philosophical terms, success would refute solipsism. That is the philosophical view that I am the only being in existence. Or, alternatively, it could be taken as the view that I am the only mind (thinking being) that exists. While I think that Descartes’ efforts failed, his attempted solution to the problem of other minds provides a model that I will steal. My goal is modest: I am not trying to prove that other people have minds, I am just endeavoring to show that there is at least one other mind. I will do this with an aesthetic argument that was inspired by the combination of watching Wandavision and teaching Epistemology via Zoom during the last pandemic.

While teaching my Epistemology class at squares on Zoom I mentioned Wandavision as an example and had the realization that the quality of the show could be used to argue for the existence of other minds. While Descartes argued that the cause of an idea must equal or exceed the reality of the idea, I will replace this with the principle that the cause of an idea must equal or exceed the quality of the idea in terms of creativity. As such, to show that something exists other than me, I just need to find an idea (or ideas) whose content exceeds my own creativity. That is, I need to find ideas that I could not create. This is extremely easy.

Wandavision, the show that inspired this argument, exceeds my creative abilities as I lack the skill and talent to write such a series. I can obviously say the same about many other movies, books, and stories since they are beyond my skill to create. As a writer, I am aware of the limits of my abilities and can safely draw these conclusions. I can also add other art, such as music and drawing. I know my skills at music (none) and drawing (very limited) and know that I lack the ability to create most works I have heard or seen. Since I could not create such works, there must be at least one other mind that is creating them. There might be only one other mind and it could be electing to create works of varying degrees. Or there might be many other minds creating these works. This does not, of course, show that there is an external world of the sort I think exists. It could be (as Descartes considered) just me and one other being who is causing all these ideas in my mind. While I would condemn the deception, I must thank them for the high-quality work they create for me. As such, I can infer that at least one other mind exists and that I am not alone. But there are, as always, counter arguments.

One obvious counter argument is that I have an unknown talent or skill that allows me to create without being aware I am doing so. That is, I cannot consciously create things of such quality but can somehow do so without being aware I am doing it. One could point to dreams as an obvious example of how this might work: the best explanation for dreams is that their content comes from me although I (usually) lack conscious control. My reply is to point out that my dreams do not match the quality of the works I encounter in the waking world in terms of the stories. Any art I see or music I hear in my dreams are always mere copies from when I am awake (or think I am awake) or of low quality. As such, I would seem to lack such a hidden and unknown faculty of creativity. I do agree it is not a logical impossibility that I have such a faculty, but there is no evidence for its existing beyond explaining my aesthetic experiences without any other mind existing, which would be ad hoc.

A second obvious counter is to allow that something exists other than me, but this is not another mind. That is, the aesthetic experiences are created in a “mechanical” way without the sort of thinking that would be done by a mind. To use an analogy, this would be like having an AI creating content without having a mind. There are two responses to this. The first is that this would still entail that I was not the only being in existence as there would also be this creator entity. The second is that such a high degree of creativity would seem to require a mind. It would pass tests analogous to the Turing test and thus it would be reasonable to infer there is at least one other mind behind these creative works.

In closing, there are two main possibilities. The first is that I alone exist, and I have an unknown faculty of creativity that vastly exceeds my known skills and talents (and I can never consciously use these hidden abilities). The second is that at least one other being exists and is creating these works that are beyond my skill.

Some years ago, the right made Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head battles in their manufactured culture war. When Pepe Le Pew was removed from the Space Jam 2 movie, there were cries that the boundary ignoring skunk had been cancelled. As I have noted in previous essays, these are all just examples of companies changing their products. While some attributed this to companies going woke, the more reasonable explanation is that they thought it would be profitable to make these changes and were trying to be smart capitalists. Sometimes their marketing efforts fail, as happened with Bud Light.

If these companies had been coerced into making such changes, then this could have been morally wrong. If the state had tried to impose these changes, then it would be reasonable to raise the 1st Amendment as the state would be forcing companies to change their products and brands against their will. But if the state was not involved, then this Amendment does not apply as private individuals cannot violate this amendment when acting in their private capacity.

If non-state actors coerced these companies, then this could be immoral since using such power to violate rights is usually wrong. For example, an employer using their coercive advantage over their employees to interfere with their freedom of expression, is usually legal but is morally wrong. However, this does not seem to have been the case; no outsider appears to have forced these changes.

It could be argued that the companies were coerced by popular opinion, that the “woke mob” pressured them into making these changes.  But this does not seem morally problematic since consumers have the right to express their values to companies and companies routinely shift their products and brands to meet consumer demand. If companies making changes based on changing values is coercion, then companies would also be coerced as they responded to tastes and styles changing. But we do not think that the decision to stop making Tab was the result of coercion nor do we think that changes in fashion are the result of coercion: styles and tastes change over time and companies change along with them.

One matter that does not seem to be discussed is the remedy the right would want for the alleged harm of cancellation. That is, what should the state do in response to these changes? If there was adequate evidence of illegal coercion, then the state should step in. But there was no evidence of that, these companies seemed fine with the changes they decided to make. It is the right that was outraged, not Hasbro or the estate of Dr. Seuss. Should folks on the right be able to use the coercive power of the state to force these companies to change things back to how they were? In these cases, should laws have been passed requiring that the books be kept in print, that the “Mr. Potato Head” brand be kept and that Le Pew be returned to the movie, and so on for all that was alleged to be cancelled? This would, ironically, seem to be compelled speech and a violation of the first Amendment. If the folks on the right think the companies should have decided; well, they did. They just did not decide the way some of the right wanted at the time. The behavior of the Trump administration and Republican controlled states has shown how much they care about free expression. Based on their behavior, their concern is with ensuring the content they dislike is cancelled and the content they like is either unrestricted or imposed by the coercive power of the state.

The right-wing news, certain pundits and certain politicians made Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head a battlefield in their manufactured culture war. The core claim was that Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head were cancelled by the left. The narrative expanded to include President Biden, asserting that he was somehow involved in this matter. While Ben Shapiro’s famous catch phrase is “facts don’t care about your feelings”, it seems that some on the right do not care about facts.

The Dr. Seuss matter involves two sets of key facts that seem to have been intentionally misrepresented by some on the right. The first set involves the Read Across America Day context. It is true that Learning for Justice, which is a left-wing group, did call for schools to avoid “connecting Read Across America Day with Dr. Seuss.”  Loudoun County Public Schools did decide to “to not connect Read Across America Day exclusively with Dr. Seuss’ birthday.” In the face of backlash, the district released a statement making it clear that they were not banning Dr. Seuss books. Dr. Seuss was simply not the emphasis of Read Across America day in the district. As such, Learning for Justice did not call for Dr. Seuss to be cancelled nor was Dr. Seuss cancelled by this school district.

The second set of facts involves the decision of Dr. Seuss’ estate to stop publishing six books because they  contain illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” While the illustrations in question have long been criticized, there does not seem to have been any  focused effort to force the estate to  stop publishing these works. On the face of it, this seems to be a business decision made either from a change in values or a recognition that racist content could hurt their reputation and brand (and hence profits). As such, this choice seems to have been an uncoerced business decision of the sort routinely made when assessing product lines. In a sense, this is analogous to the decision to no longer sell Tab: tastes change over time and old products get discontinued. It would, of course, be hilarious if this was a clever business ploy to get the right to buy up the existing supply of these six books (they were not top sellers). As such, the facts that do not care about feelings are that Dr. Seuss is not cancelled: a business simply decided to discontinue six titles that are not top sellers to improve their brand. The Potato Head matter also involves facts that run counter to the cancel narrative.

Hasbro decided to change the Mr. Potato Head brand to Potato Head. Mr. Potato Head and Mrs. Potato Head are still available and sold under those names. The company did make the statement that “Hasbro is making sure all feel welcome in the Potato Head world by officially dropping the Mr. from the Mr. Potato Head brand name and logo to promote gender equality and inclusion.” As of this writing, there is no evidence that Hasbro was subject to coercion or forced to make this decision. Once again, the explanation seems to be that either the decision makers have made a change to reflect changing values, or they engaged in rebranding for their product in a way they thought would prove most profitable.

Changing branding to reflect changing values is how branding works. As an illustration, consider the explicitly racist advertising (and products) of the past. As American norms about explicit racism changed, advertising and branding changed along with them. This need not be for any moral reason. Failure to keep up with norms and values is on par with failing to keep up with trends and tastes: failure to do so means a loss of business. The same is happening today and companies are simply rebranding by shifting with the changing norms of their consumers. It could be claimed that businesses are coerced into this by changing values, but they do have a choice: they could stick with past values and risk losing revenue or keep up with the times. As such, this rebranding is not cancellation, it is just business as usual.

If companies were being coerced by the power of the state to remove products or change their branding, then there could be real concerns about oppression and misuse of power. My adopted state of Florida has been busy banning books from libraries as part of the culture war with the support of the same people who raged against the “cancellation” of Dr. Seuss and Mr. Potato Head. This shows, once again, that they are not driven by a commitment to free expression but by the desire to control expression in accord with their values and agenda.

There can also be moral concerns when private citizens and organizations use their coercive power to wrongly infringe on the freedom of others (such as when employers coerce their employees), but this did not happen in these cases. As such, the efforts on the right to make these matters into proof of cancel culture are at best straw man attacks and could be justly described as a campaign of lies. Those who fall for this deceit can, perhaps, be excused: the claims of the media are reinforced by the claims of the politicians and pundits, and they have been trained to distrust credible sources of information.

As far as why the right lied about all this, the sensible answer is that they do not have any real examples of oppression and injustice to use: they must manufacture examples with hyperbole, by constructing straw persons, and by lying. This is analogous to their claim of widespread voter fraud: while there would be a problem if it were significant, they are at a loss to provide evidence for this and must resort to mere anecdotes, straw persons, hyperbole, and lies. If they had adequate evidence of real harm, they could present it rather than making things up. But it seems to be working for them. As I have discussed in other essays, I am not sure what percentage of their supporters are deceived and what percentage are in on the lies. In practical terms, the distinction often does not matter: the results are the same. But the distinction can matter  for those who are deceived can, in theory, change their views in response to the truth.

The right, one suspects, is angry about changing values and especially upset when business recognizes these changes and respond to them. This is not surprising: to be conservative is, one imagines, to want to conserve what (one thinks) was and to resist changes to this. But this defense is conducted in bad faith: rather than honestly admitting they want to keep the racist images in Dr. Seuss and honestly admitting they are angry that Hasbro has moved away from sexism, they create the fiction of cancel culture. This is a moral mask: they present themselves as defenders of free expression since openly advocating for racism and sexism would be bad for their public brand. That said, there are some on the right who are honest about this: they are openly racist and sexist, which makes them oddly better than those who share their views but lack the courage to do so openly.

A few years ago, the estate of Dr. Seuss decided to pull six books from publication because the works include illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” This was taken by some on the right as an example of “cancel culture” and it became a battleground in the culture war designed to distract from real problems. There was speculation on the motives of the decision makers. They might have been motivated by sincere moral concerns, they might have been motivated by woke marketing (sales did increase after the announcement), or they might have (as the right suggests) yielded to the threat of “cancel culture.” While questions of motives are interesting, my main concern is with the philosophical matter of re-assessing works of the past in the context of current values.

This is not a new problem in philosophy and David Hume addressed the matter long ago. As Hume sees it, we can and should make allowances for some differences between current and past customs. He says, “The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because of their ruffs and fardingales?” Hume is right to note that elements of past art will be out of tune with our time and that some of these differences should be tolerated as being the natural and blameless result of shifting customs. Such works can and should still be enjoyed.

As an example, movies made and set in the 1960s will feature different styles of clothing, different lingo, different styles of filming, and so on. But it would be unreasonable to look down on or reject a work simply because of these differences. Hume does, however, note that a work can cross over from having blameless differences in customs to being morally problematic:

 

But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blamable.

 

Hume thus provides a rough guide to the moral assessment of past works: when a work’s content violates contemporary ethics, this is a significant flaw in the work. Hume does note that such works can still have artistic merit, and one can understand that the artist was operating within the context of the values of their time but these flaws are blameworthy and diminish our ability to enjoy the work. Put in marketing terms, the work loses its appeal to the audience. Hume’s view can easily be applied to the Dr. Seuss situation.

When Dr. Seuss created these works, the general customs, and ethics of America (and the world) were different. While there were people who held moral views that condemned racist stereotypes in art, there was a general acceptance of such things. In fact, many people would not even recognize them as being racist at the time they were created. Since I hold to an objective view of morality, I think that racist images have always been wrong, but I do recognize the impact of culture on moral assessment. There are, of course, ethical relativists who hold that morality depends on the culture: so, what was right in the earlier culture that accepted racism would be wrong now in a culture that is more critical of racism.

There are also theories that consider the role of cultural context in terms of what can be reasonably expected of people and that shapes how people and works are assessed. That is, that while morality is not relative, it can be harder or easier to be good in different times and places. So, a person trying to be a decent human being in the 1930s faced different challenges than a person trying to be a decent person in 2025. Harms also need to be taken in context: while racist stereotypes in drawings are seen as very harmful today, in the context of the racism of the past, these drawings would pale in comparison to the harms caused by racist violence and laws. This is not to deny the existence of racist violence today; it is just to put matters in context: things are bad, but not as bad as the past (though the future might be worse).

Whether we think that morality has changed or that more people are moral, these racist stereotypes are now broadly rejected by people who are not racists. As such, it made both moral and practical sense for the estate to take these books out of print. From a practical standpoint, racism can taint a business’ reputation and unless one focuses on marketing to racists (which could be a profitable option) purging racist content makes sense. In terms of ethics, racist images are wrong. One could advance a utilitarian argument here about harm, a Kantian argument about treating people as ends and not means, or many other sorts of arguments depending on what ethical theory you favor. As such, removing the products from sale makes sense, especially since they are books for children. We generally accept that children need more protection than adults. While adults can (sometimes) make informed decision about possible harms from content, children generally have not learned how to do this. So just as we would not allow children access to firearms, alcohol, or pornography, it is ethical for a company to decide to protect them from racism.

While it is tempting to see children’s books as just amusements, children can be profoundly shaped by the content of such works. This is, perhaps, why many parents and groups have been instrumental in making Captain Underpants the most banned (cancelled?) book in America. Just as they are shaped by all their experiences. Children will generally pick up on racist stereotypes and can internalize them. Even if they do not become overt racists, these stereotypes will impact how they think and act throughout their life. As Plato argued, “true education is being trained from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things.” Our good dead friend Aristotle developed this notion in his Nicomachean Ethics and he makes an excellent case for how people become habituated. Assuming Aristotle got it right, the estate made the right choice in discontinuing these works.

In closing, it is worth wondering why the right was so concerned about these works. If they were consistent defenders of freedom of expression and freedom of choice, then they could argue that they are merely applying their principles of freedom. However, they are not consistent defenders of these freedoms and one must suspect that they are fighting for racism rather than freedom.

“Bathroom bill” is the popular term for legislative efforts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on gender identity. These bills typically define who can and cannot access these facilities based on how the bill defines sex or Examples include defining sex by assigned sex at birth, sex listed on the person’s birth certificate, or sex based on gender identity. Some states have passed or are considering bathroom bills and this matter is part of the ongoing culture war against transpeople. As Trump himself noted, this front of the culture war is new. As to why it was opened up, the reasonable answer is that the right mostly lost the same-sex marriage culture war, and they needed a new victim to attack for political gain. Transgender people, unfortunately, were the chosen target.

People tend to take a stance on bathroom bills based on how they feel rather than based on a theory of law. This is usually because most people, even politicians, don’t have a theory of law. While my focus in this essay is on bathroom bills, I am using this context to develop my theory of law in more detail. I want to have a principled and consistent method of assessing laws and good faith argumentation involves making this methodology clear.

Good faith also requires me to note that I am operating within a framework of political philosophy based on Mill and Locke. I accept that people have rights, that the purpose of government is the good of the people, and that rights can only be infringed upon based on the principle of harm. I also favor small government: the laws and the state’s use of coercive force should be kept at a minimum. I have other assumptions but laying out my entire political philosophy would require at least one book. Good faith also requires that I make it clear that I generally oppose bathroom bills and my reasons will be advanced in this essay.

My first consideration in assessing a (potential) law is determining whether the subject is fit for law, and this requires determining whether the matter falls under the legitimate use of the power of the state. What counts as legitimate use is a matter of debate and people are rarely consistent beyond thinking that if the state is doing what they want, it is legitimate. Fortunately, the issue of legitimate use can be narrowed down. In the case of the bathroom bill, the issue is whether controlling who can access bathrooms is a legitimate use of the coercive power of the state. In the context of laws that restrict liberty and rights, I generally follow Mill’s approach: liberty can only be justly restricted to prevent harm to another. On this principle, proponents of a bathroom bill would need to identify the harm the bill is intended to prevent: if there is no harm, then there is no justification for restricting liberty. But even if a law is supposed to prevent harm, this does not settle the issue of whether it should be law.

A second consideration is the issue of whether the significance and nature of the alleged harm warrants expending public resources to pass and enforce a law. Harms vary in significance and even significant harm might not be the right sort of harm that justifies the use of the coercive power of the state. Consider, if you will, some harm that can occur in a bathroom.

Like many other men, I feel uncomfortable when other men try to engage me in conversation while I am urinating. I am also a bit offended when people try to make eye contact during these conversations. While I am experiencing some harm (discomfort and feeling offended) these harms are not significant enough to warrant a law against them. They are also not the right sort of harm: the state does not seem obliged to protect us from discomfort or offense. But a person could escalate matters in the bathroom: if the chatty urinator started making threats of violence or tried to touch someone, then the harm becomes both significant enough to and the right sort to warrant state intervention. That is, laws against threatening people and assault fall within the state’s legitimate use of coercive force.

While those advocating bathroom bills might feel uncomfortable around or offended by the people whose bathroom access they wish to control, they generally understand that these reasons do not warrant passing a law. As such, the bills are typically presented as intending to keep women and girls safe in the bathroom. Some proponents of these bills do admit that transgender people are rarely sexual predators. Instead, they express worry that non-transgender sexual predators will exploit laws allowing transgender access to bathrooms to attack women and girls. This does allege harm that would be both significant and the right sort. But is the allegation true? After all, if the harm is make-believe, it cannot justify a law.

Several states and large cities have allowed transgender people to access bathrooms based on their identity for years, thus providing a wealth of empirical data . The evidence is that this access is not exploited by predators. That is, allowing trans people access to bathrooms of their choice does not decrease the safety of women and girls in bathrooms. If it did, there would be evidence. This is not to deny that a sexual predator could dress up as a woman to get into a bathroom, just that it does not seem to be something that occurs with any statistical significance. There is also the obvious fact that  a predator could dress up as a women whether there are bathroom laws in place. A sexual predator could also disguise themselves as a trash can to launch an ambush in a bathroom, but we do not need a law to address this. It is not something that happens enough to warrant creating a law and mandating trash can inspections.

Somewhat ironically, bathroom bills require that transgender men use women’s bathrooms. As such, a sexual predator keen on exploiting the law could simply claim to be a transgender male and freely enter bathrooms. No need to wear a dress or makeup. As such, the fear argument is self-defeating: if a law is needed to keep transgender people out of bathrooms because male sexual predators will put on dresses to pretend to be transwomen, then the law would not work because sexual predators would simply claim to be transmen and have easy access to the bathrooms because the law defines them as women. This could be addressed by employing bathroom police and requiring people to present birth certificates before accessing bathrooms. But this would require a disproportionate expenditure of resources and impose inconveniences not warranted by the alleged harm. In response, one could contend that something must be done to address even the possibility of harm: theoretical transgender predators must be prevented from attacking women and girls in bathrooms no matter how unlikely this is to happen.

My third consideration is the issue of whether the harm is adequately addressed by existing laws or factors other than laws. If the harm is already addressed adequately, there is no need for a new law. Going back to my chatty urinator discussion, we do not need a law banning chatty people from bathrooms because someone might make verbal threats in the bathroom. We also do not need a law banning people who make eye contact in bathrooms because someone might touch someone else in the bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: making threats is illegal and assault is illegal. Likewise, while knowing a trans person is in the bathroom with them might make a person uncomfortable or feel offended, we do not need a law banning trans people because someone might assault or rape someone in a bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: assault and rape are illegal and allowing trans people to use bathrooms as they wish does not change that. As such, there is no need for bathroom bills and on their own grounds of justification they are unjustified.

The United States recently saw another outbreak of the measles with most victims being unvaccinated. Critics of the anti-vaccination movement present incidents like these as proof the movement is not just misinformed but dangerous.  Not surprisingly, anti-vaccination folks are often derided as stupid. After all, the anti-vaccination arguments usually rest on untrue and often debunked claims. For example, the claim that vaccines cause autism is clearly untrue. Vaccination, in general,  has been conclusively shown to safely prevent diseases, although there are some risks.

It is tempting for those who disagree with the anti-vaccination people to dismiss them as to stupid to understand science. This, however, is a mistake.  One reason is purely pragmatic: those who are pro-vaccination want the anti-vaccination people to change their minds and calling them stupid, mocking and insulting them will only cause them to entrench. Another reason is that the anti-vaccination people are not, in general, stupid. There are good grounds for people to be skeptical towards claims about health and science. To show this, I will briefly present some points of concern.

One rational concern is the fact that scientific research has been plagued with a disturbing amount of corruption, fraud and errors. For example, the percentage of scientific articles retracted for fraud is ten times what it was in 1975. Once lauded studies and theories, such as those behind the pushing of antioxidants and omega-3, have proven riddled with inaccuracies. As such, it is not stupid to worry that scientific research might not be accurate. Somewhat ironically, the study that started the belief that vaccines cause autism is a paradigm example of bad science. However, it is not stupid to consider that the studies that show vaccines are safe might have flaws as well.

Another matter of concern is the influence of corporate lobbyists. For example, the dietary guidelines and recommendations set forth by the United States Government should be set based on the best science. However, guidelines are influenced by industry lobbyists, such as the dairy industry. Given the influence of corporate lobbyists, it is not foolish to think the recommendations and guidelines given by the state might not be correct.

A third point of concern is that dietary and health guidelines and recommendations undergo what often seem to be relentless and unwarranted change. For example, the government warned us of the dangers of cholesterol for decades, but this recommendation is being changed. It would, of course, be one thing if the changes were the result of steady improvements in knowledge. However, the recommendations often seem to lack a proper foundation. John P.A. Ioannidis, a professor of medicine and statistics at Stanford, has noted “Almost every single nutrient imaginable has peer reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome. In this literature of epidemic proportions, how many results are correct?” Given such criticism from experts in the field, it hardly seems stupid of people to have doubts and concerns.

There is also the fact that people do suffer adverse drug reactions that can lead to serious medical issues and even death. While the reported numbers vary (one FDA page puts the number of deaths at 100,000 per year) this is a matter of rational concern.  In an interesting coincidence, I was thinking about this essay while watching the Daily Show and one of my “ad experiences” was for Januvia, a diabetes drug. As required by law, the ad mentioned all the side effects of the drug and these include serious things, including death. Given that the FDA has approved drugs with dangerous side effects, it is hardly stupid to be concerned about possible side effects from any medicine or vaccine.

Given the above, it is not stupid to be concerned about vaccines. At this point, the reader might suspect that I am about to defend an anti-vaccine position. I will not. In fact, I am a pro-vaccination person. This might seem surprising given the points I just made. However, I can rationally reconcile these points with my position on vaccines.

The above points do show that there are rational grounds for taking a general critical and skeptical approach to health, medicine and science. However, this general skepticism needs to be rational and consistent. That is, it should not be a rejection of science but rather the adoption of a critical approach in which one considers the best available evidence, assesses experts by the proper standards (those of a good argument from authority), and so on. Also, it is important to note that general skepticism does not automatically justify accepting or rejecting specific claims. For example, the fact that there have been flawed studies does not prove any specific study about a vaccine is flawed. As another example, the fact that lobbyists influence the dietary recommendations does not prove that vaccines are harmful drugs being pushed on Americans by greedy corporations. As a final example, the fact that some medicines have serious and dangerous side effects does not prove that the measles vaccine is dangerous or causes autism. Just as one should be rationally skeptical about pro-vaccination claims one should also be rationally skeptical about ant-vaccination claims.

To use an obvious analogy, it is rational to have a general skepticism about the honesty and goodness of people. After all, people do lie and there are bad people. However, this general skepticism does not automatically prove that a specific person is dishonest or evil. That is a matter that must be addressed on the individual level.

To use another analogy, it is rational to have a general concern about engineering. After all, there have been many engineering disasters. However, this general concern does not warrant believing that a specific engineering project is defective or that engineering itself is defective. The specific project would need to be examined, and engineering is, in general, the most rational approach to building stuff.

So, the people who are anti-vaccine are not, in general, stupid. However, they seem to be making the mistake of not rationally considering specific vaccines and the evidence for their safety and efficacy. It is rational to be concerned about medicine in general, just as it is rational to be concerned about the honesty of people in general. However, just as one should not infer that a friend is a liar because there are people who lie, one should not infer that a vaccine must be bad because there is bad science and bad medicine.

Convincing anti-vaccination people to accept vaccination is challenging. One reason is that the issue has become politicized into a battle of values and identity. This is partially due to the fact that the anti-vaccine people have been mocked and attacked, thus leading them to entrench and double down. Another reason is that, as argued above, they do have well-founded concerns about the trustworthiness of the state, the accuracy of scientific studies, and the goodness of corporations. A third reason is that people tend to give more weight to the negative and tend to weigh potential loss more than potential gain. As such, people would tend to give more weight to negative reasons against vaccines and fear the alleged dangers of vaccines more than they would value their benefits.

Given the importance of vaccinations, it is critical that the anti-vaccination movement be addressed in a way that respects their legitimate worries and concerns. Calling people stupid, mocking them and attacking them are not effective ways of convincing people that vaccines are generally safe and effective. A more rational and hopefully more effective approach is to address their legitimate concerns and consider their fears. After all, the goal should be the health of people and not scoring political points or feeling smug superiority.

Thanks to Jean Garnett’s New York Times article, the concept of heterofatalism has gone viral in some circles. The theoretical foundation for heterofatalism is heteropessimism, a concept developed by Professor Ara Seresin. Heteropessimism describes the disillusionment with heterosexual dating alleged to inflict many women. Heterofatalism transforms pessimism into fatalism about heterosexual relationships. On this view, men are disappointing, relationships are inevitably doomed, but the afflicted women are still attracted to men. Negative views of heterosexual relationships are nothing new, so what is the difference between older criticisms and the new fatalism?

Being an older philosopher, I am most familiar with the “classic” feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships. While there are many historical versions of feminism and it would be a mistake to treat them all the same, the classic criticisms tend to be based on the negative aspects of patriarchy, broadly construed. Most criticisms focus on how men are constructed by society in ways that incline them to be oppressive, exploitive and abusive in heterosexual relationships. This is bad for the men and worse for the women, leading to some feminists to advocate varying degrees of rejecting heterosexual relationships. Other feminists argued for changing gender roles to improve things for everyone.

While there are still classic feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships, the new heterofatalism (which I am sure the cool kids call neo-HF) seems to be exemplified by the anecdotes of Jean Garnett and other women. Their disappointment with men is not based on men being domineering, oppressive, abusive or exploitative. Instead, their tales speak of men who are emotionally avoidant, fearful of commitment, and inconsistent. But haven’t women been saying that about us men since we developed language? The answer is “yes.” So, the big change is that while men are criticized for disappointing, they are not being criticized for manifesting the patriarchy. It could be argued that this is an improvement: while we men still have the old disappointing qualities, at least women like Garnett are not lamenting about being oppressed or exploited by the men they are in a relationship with. At the current rate of “progress” men should be good relationship material in a few centuries. But is there actually a significant problem of the sort described by Garnett?

When it comes to inferences about populations, we philosophers worry about the dangers of hasty generalizations, biased generalization, anecdotal evidence, and the spotlight fallacy. A hasty generalization occurs when an inference is drawn from a sample that is too small to warrant the conclusion. For example, before going to college in Ohio I was biking in my hometown. I was struck by a car from Ohio and inferred that Ohio would be dangerous place based on that sample of one. While I was right about Ohio drivers, my inference was unwarranted at the time. So, there is the question of the sample size used to support the claim that heterofatalism is widespread.

A biased generalization occurs when the sample is not representative. While the sample can also be too small (making it as hasty generalization as well) it can also be large. The problem is that an inference drawn from a biased sample will be unreliable. For example, a survey of 10,000 churchgoers about the existence of God would be a biased sample, since people who go to church would tend to believe in God. So, there is also the question of whether samples used to establish claims about hetereofatalism are biased in some manner.

An appeal to anecdotal evidence is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a very few cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. To be fair and balanced, Garnett does not seem to claim that her article is a rigorous analysis of heterofatalism but people do, as always, seem to be drawing inferences from her anecdotes. While I do not doubt that she and her small circle of friends are suffering dating woes, drawing a conclusion about American women in general from their anecdotes would be fallacious. But, as always, to infer that they must not be representative because they are mere anecdotal would be to commit the fallacy fallacy. This is the fallacy that a fallacy must have a false conclusion because it is a fallacy.

Thanks to Garnett, heterofatalism is enjoying a moment in the media spotlight (complete with backlash from the right). While the anecdotes of heterofatalism are likely to resonate with every woman who has had a bad relationship experience (that is, all women) it is wise to be aware of the spotlight fallacy. This fallacy rests on the availability heuristic cognitive bias. We tend to infer that something is widespread or frequent just because we hear about it often. So, the more something is in the media spotlight, the more inclined we are to think that it happens often or is a widespread occurrence. This can be intentionally used, as politicians often do. For example, an anti-immigrant politician might turn the anecdote of a murderer who is a migrant into a talking point in the right-wing media to create the impression that such murderers are common. When something goes viral, it can have the same effect. So, it is reasonable to wonder whether heterofatalism is widespread or just in the spotlight for now. That said, I think that Garnett is sincere in her article and honestly reports the disappointment of her and her friends.

While feminism is not one of my specialties, I do have moral concerns about relationships and how people are being treated. Like many “classic” feminists, I have argued the obvious: being abusive, oppressive and exploitative in a relationship is bad. But are the men Garnett is complaining about bad people and are they to blame for their alleged failures?

Based on the descriptions offered by Garnett, they are not bad. Just disappointing in that they fail to do what she wants. She does not report any cases of them being abusive or oppressive, or trying to exploit her. Ironically, one of her biggest complaints is that they seem unwilling to leave their house to come have sex with her. Many classic criticisms of men are that “all we care about” is sex. The worst that can be said of these men is that they fail to match her conception of what a man should be, which is (ironically) a criticism feminists have often made of men in terms of their expectation that women should match their expectations (such as being caregivers or having a certain appearance).

My last long-term relationship started in 2016, became a long-distance relationship in 2020 and ended in May, 2024. The ending was amicable, and she broke up with me in person. Like Garnett, I tried dating again and like her I have settled into my own version of heterofatalism. But, obviously, for different reasons.

In my own case, I take the obvious move of applying causal reasoning to assess why my relationships have ended. As a philosopher, I use the obvious approach of Mill’s Method of Agreement. This method requires considering at least two cases in which the effect is present. In this method, these cases are examined to find a common thread. The one indisputable common thread in all my relationships is me; so it makes sense to infer that I am the problem. But to be fair and balanced, I also need to consider common threads in the women I date, and I definitely have a type: ambitious, smart, and professional women whose careers will take them far away. As such, it makes sense why my relationships would end as they do: the woman breaking up with me (amicably) when the challenges of long distance love become too much. I must note that I went into these relationships with my eyes open: the women always made it clear that their career came first and that I would always be, at best, second in importance. Probably third, because dogs.

Garnett reveals much about herself in her article and her qualities and the qualities she seeks in men do provide an explanation for her disappointment. She notes that she recently ended her open marriage because she was in love with a man who later seemed unable to commit. She says she has gone after similar men who also seemed unable to commit. In discussions with her friends, they ripped apart the men they had been dating with obvious contempt for these pathetic creatures who failed them. Using common thread reasoning, one might suspect that while the men include a common thread, the women do as well. While we men are often criticized for being emotionally retarded, we do have feelings, and we can be surprisingly good at noticing how women feel about us (we can also be shockingly or willfully blind). Anecdotally, if I felt that a woman was contemptuous of me and mocking me with her friends, I would certainly not text her back or want to have anything to do with her. Also, if I was looking for a committed and loyal relationship, I would be wary of a woman who had an open marriage yet still divorced her husband because of what she thought she saw in some other man. While I know that this is anecdotal evidence, reading about Garnett and her friend’s contempt for men made me feel even more pessimistic. As such, it is worth considering that part of the problem in any relationship is you. And in my case, me.

A fundamental ethical concern in sports is creating fair categories of competition. Age is a non-controversial example of this: elementary school teams do not compete against high school teams. Size is also a relatively non-controversial example in boxing. A heavyweight fighter will generally have a significant advantage over a smaller fighter. But there is a challenge in developing principles of category fairness. After all, there are many factors that can provide one category of athletes an advantage over others that intuitively should not be the basis of categorizing athletes for fair competition.

As an obvious example, some have anatomies and physiologies that give them an advantage. To illustrate, a runner with an ideal body type for running and excellent genetics for speed and endurance will have an advantage over someone with a body that is biomechanically terrible for running and whose genes lack those advantages. One could also consider psychological factors (such as determination) and even economic factors (which can affect diet, coaching, and available training time). While trying to adjust for these factors would make competition fairer, it does lead to a reductio ad absurdum: the ultimate in fairness would be for each person to be in their own category, competing against only themselves. That is, there would be no competition.

The other extreme would be to have no categories: everyone competes with everyone regardless of such factors as age, gender, or weight. This could even be seen as fair: everyone is competing without distinction and the best will win. But this would also be absurd (and dangerous): imagine elementary school students playing tackle football against the Patriots. It can also be argued that this would be unfair: professional football players enjoy far too many advantages over elementary school football players. As Aristotle would say, the right approach lies in a mean between these two extremes: neither too many nor too few categories for fair competition.

One category that seems reasonable in most sports is sex. Males generally enjoy significant physical advantages relative to females and genderless competition would tend to result in males dominating sports. As an example, if the Olympic marathon had no gender categories, all the competing athletes would almost certainly be males. There would, of course, be exceptions at individual competitions as a female runner might beat all the males at a specific marathon. As such, a case can be made that gender categories in sports are fair. While this might seem like a simple matter, it is complicated.

There are world class women athletes, such as Caster Semenya, who have XY chromosomes. While there are many bad faith arguments made about this issue, one can have a good faith debate about the fairness of allowing women with XY chromosomes to compete with XX women since there are some reasons to think XY chromosomes can provide an advantage that XX women lack. It must be noted that the performance of elite XY women athletes does not match that of elite male athletes and XX women athletes can outperform XY women athletes in competition.

The easy and obvious reply to concerns about XY women is to point out that this seems to be almost the only case where people are worried about genetic advantages in sports. Athletes do not get tested to see if they have advantageous genes (or anatomy and physiology) to determine if they can compete. For example, very tall basketball players have an edge over shorter players, and this has a genetic component, but they do not get banned because of that genetic feature. In fact, elite athletes probably enjoy a range of genetic advantages over other athletes, but they do not get banned from the sport even when they greatly exceed even other athletes in their performance.

It can be countered that there are grounds for concern about allowing XY women to compete as women. We have accepted the categories of male and female in sports as a division needed to ensure fair competition. It can be argued that XY women should be excluded from the female category in sports on the grounds that they do not qualify for inclusion. This, one might argue, is based on fairness: XY males are excluded from competing against XX females based on fairness because they do not belong in the female category and would have an unfair advantage. This reasoning can also be backed up by an analogy.

Imagine that Sam has been adopted and is just young enough to be able to play one year of little league baseball before aging out. When he tries out for the little league team, he finds that his somewhat unusual size and strength give him an edge over the other kids and people notice that he seems to be the size of kids a year older. Now imagine that the parents of another child think that something is up, so they hire an investigator to check Sam’s background. The investigator finds out that there seems to have been a mistake in Sam’s records, and he might be a year older than what the official documents say. While Sam and his parents have done nothing wrong intentionally, it would be unfair for Sam to compete against kids a year younger than him. As such, Sam should not be allowed to finish the season because he exceeds the age limit. While this argument does have some appeal, it does raise important concerns.

While I do agree that dividing athletes into the male and female categories can be warranted on the grounds of fairness, to simply assume that XY women are not females would be unwarranted. What is needed is a well-developed and defended set of principles for sorting athletes into these categories. These principles would also need to be consistent and consistently applied.

Going back to the analogy with Sam, he appears to be a large person of his claimed age. But the parents of the other child believe the evidence provided by their investigator and by their standard, Sam is too old to compete in little league and must be excluded on the grounds of fairness. While age is clearly an objective matter, this lack of certainty is intentional to make the analogy fit: while some believe that XY women are not women, this is a matter of what standards one accepts. Just as one would need to argue for which documentation to accept about Sam’s age, one must argue for the standards used to exclude or include people in the male/female categories in sports.

If it is decided that the distinction is based on genetics (which it seems to be) and that XY women must be excluded from the female category because they have an unfair advantage, then consistency would seem to require doing a genetic analysis of all athletes to discern if there are genes that yield similar unfair advantages. If such genes do exist, then allowing people with them to compete with those without would be unfair. If we should exclude XY women based on their alleged advantage, then the same would apply to these other athletes and they would need to be excluded as well. If one says that this should be limited solely to XY and XX, then they would need to provide a principled argument for making this the only genetic distinction that matters. While one could make a practical appeal to the cost of testing; the same would also apply to the XY/XX cases as one must test a person to determine if a woman is XX or XY.  And if there is a need to test for that, then there would seem to be a need to test for other genetic advantages.

One can also argue that the genetic advantages of top athletes are too diverse to identify and categorize and the XX/XY distinction is a simple one that allows the preservation of existing sports competition categories. There would also be degrees of advantage and sorting this all out would be needlessly complicated. But one could reply that we could create broad genetic categories analogous to age groups in sports. This could be countered by arguing that the distinctions and advantages are fuzzy and unclear, so why not let people compete without genetic testing and categorization? This would, of course, seem to also apply to XY women and while they might have some possible advantage over some XX women in sports, this does not seem to warrant creating a special category that excludes them from competing against other women. This does require accepting that the sharp and absolute male/female distinction that some people crave does not exist, that the boundaries are fluid and fuzzy and this reflects reality. While some might want “pure” Platonic concepts of male and female, we do not find them instantiated perfectly in this world. As such, XY women should be permitted to compete as women.