Month: October 2025

After each eruption of gun violence, there is also a corresponding eruption in the debates over gun issues. As with all highly charged issues, people are primarily driven by their emotions rather than by reason. Being a philosopher, I like to delude myself with the thought that it is possible to approach an issue rationally. Like many other philosophers, I am irritated when people say things like “I feel that there should be more gun control” or “I feel that gun rights are important. Because of this, when I read student papers I strike through all “inappropriate” uses of “feel” and replace them with “think.” This is, of course, done with a subconscious sense of smug superiority. Or so it was before I started reflecting on emotions in the context of gun issues. In this essay I will endeavor a journey through the treacherous landscape of feeling and thinking in relation to gun issues. I’ll begin with arguments.

As any philosopher can tell you, an argument consists of a claim, the conclusion, that is supposed to be supported by the evidence or reasons, the premises, that are given. In the context of logic, as opposed to that of persuasion, there are two standards for assessing an argument. The first is an assessment of the quality of the logic: determining how well the premises support the conclusion. The second is an assessment of the plausibility of the premises: determining the quality of the evidence.

On the face of it, assessing the quality of the logic should be an objective matter. For deductive arguments (arguments whose premises are supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion), this is the case. Deductive arguments can be checked for validity using such things as Venn diagrams, truth tables and proofs. If a person knows what she is doing, she can confirm beyond all doubt whether a deductive argument is valid or not. A valid argument is an argument such that if its premises were true, then its conclusion must be true. While a person might stubbornly refuse to accept a valid argument as valid, this would be as foolish as stubbornly refusing to accept that 2+2= 4 or that triangles have three sides. As an example, consider the following valid argument:

 

Premise 1: If an assault weapon ban would reduce gun violence, then congress should pass an assault weapon ban.

Premise 2: An assault weapon ban would reduce gun violence.

Conclusion: Congress should pass an assault weapon ban.

 

This argument is valid; in fact, it is an example of the classic deductive argument known as modus ponens or affirming the antecedent. As such, questioning the logic of the argument would just reveal one’s ignorance of logic. Before anyone gets outraged, it is important to note that an argument being valid does not entail that any of its content is true. While this endlessly confuses students, though a valid argument that has all true premises must have a true conclusion, a valid argument need not have true premises or a true conclusion. Because of this, while the validity of the above argument is beyond question, one could take issue with the premises. They could, along with the conclusion, be false although the argument is unquestionably a valid deductive argument. For those who might be interested, an argument that is valid and has all true premises is a sound argument. An argument that does not meet these conditions is unsound.

Unfortunately, there is usually no perfect, objective test for the truth of a premise. In general, premises are assessed in terms of how well they match observations, background information and credible claims from credible sources (which leads to concerns about determining credibility). As should be expected, people tend to prefer premises that match their feelings. This is true for everyone, be that person the head of the NRA or a latte sipping liberal academic who trembles at the thought of even seeing a gun. Because of this, a person who wants to fairly and justly assess the premises of any argument must be willing to understand their own feelings and work out how they influence their judgment. Since people, as John Locke noted in his classic essay on enthusiasm, tend to evaluate claims based on the strength of their feelings, doing this is difficult. People think they are right because they feel strongly about something and are least likely to engage in critical assessment when they feel strongly.

While deductive logic allows for perfectly objective assessment, it is not the logic that is commonly used in debates over political issues or in general. The most used logic is inductive logic.

Inductive arguments are arguments, so an inductive argument will have one or more premises that are supposed to support a conclusion. Unlike deductive arguments, inductive arguments do not offer certainty and instead deal in likelihood. A logically good inductive argument is called a strong argument: one whose premises, if true, would probably make the conclusion true. A bad inductive argument is a weak one. Unlike the case of validity, the strength of an inductive argument is judged by applying the standards specific to that sort of inductive argument to the argument in question. Consider, as an example, the following argument:

 

Premise 1: Tens of thousands of people die each year as a result of automobiles.

Premise 2: Tens of thousands of people die each year as a result of guns.

Premise 3: The tens of thousands of deaths by automobiles are morally acceptable.

Conclusion: The tens of thousands of deaths by gun are also morally acceptable.

 

This is a simple argument by analogy in which it is argued that since cars and guns are alike, if we accept automobile fatalities then we should also accept gun fatalities. Being an inductive argument, there is no perfect, objective test to determine whether the argument is strong or not. Rather, the argument is assessed in terms of how well it meets the standards of an argument by analogy. The gist of these standards is that the more alike the two things (guns and cars) are alike, the stronger the argument. Likewise, the less alike they are, the weaker the argument.

While the standards are reasonably objective, their application admits considerable subjectivity. In the case of guns and cars, people will differ in terms of how they see them in regard to similarities and differences. As would be suspected, the lenses through which people see this matter will be deeply colored by their emotions and psychological backstory. As such, rationally assessing inductive arguments is especially challenging: a person must sort through the influence of emotions and psychology on her evaluation of both the premises and the reasoning. Since arguments about guns are generally inductive, it is no wonder it is a messy, even on the rare occasions when people are sincerely trying to be rational and objective.

The lesson here is that a person needs to think about how she feels before she can think about what she thinks. Since this also applies to me, my next essay will be about exploring my psychological backstory in regard to guns.

 

Each new mass shooting throws gasoline on the political fire of gun control. While people on the left and right both agree that mass shootings should be prevented, they disagree about what steps should be taken to reduce the chances that another one will occur.

As would be expected, people on the left favor efforts focused on guns. While this is normally called “gun control”, this is a phrase that should no longer be used. This is not as a matter of duplicity in order to present proposals under a false guise. Rather, this is because “gun control” is so emotionally charged that the use of the phrase interferes with a rational discussion of proposals. If a proposal is labeled as “gun control”, this will tend to trigger immediate opposition from people who might otherwise support a specific proposal, such as one aimed precisely at preventing criminals and potential terrorists from acquiring guns.

Coming up with a new phrase might be problematic. “Gun safety” is already taken and deals with the safe handling of weapons. “Gun regulation” is a possibility, but “regulation” has become an emotional trigger word as well. The right professes to dislike regulation, except for the regulation that they like. The phrase should certainly not be a euphemism or sugar coated, as we should speak in good faith and leave lying to the liars. Since I do not have a good enough phrase, I will continue to use the loaded “gun control” and hope that the reader is not too influenced by the connotation of the phrase.

Positions on gun control are largely set by emotions rather than logical analysis. In my case, I am emotionally pro-gun. This is because, as a boy in Maine, I grew up with guns. All my gun experiences are positive: hunting with my dad and target shooting with friends. I understand guns are lethal, but I have no more fear of guns than I have of other lethal machines, such as automobiles and table saws. No close friend or relative has been a victim of gun violence. Fortunately, I have enough empathy that I can feel for people who loath guns because of some awful experience in their life. But, as with all complicated problems, one cannot feel a way to a solution. This requires rational thought.

Being a professional philosopher, I have some skill at considering the matter of gun control in rational terms. While there are many possible approaches to gun control, I will discuss two options in this essay.

One idea involves banning people on the infamous no-fly list from purchasing guns. On the face of it, this seems to make sense: people who are evaluated as too much of a threat to fly would seem to also be too much of a threat to buy guns. There are, however, a few problems with this proposal. The first is that the no-fly list has been a mess, with people ending up on the list who should not be there. This can be addressed by improving the quality of list management, though there will always be mistakes. The second problem is a matter of rights. While there is no constitutional right to fly, there is the Second Amendment and banning a person from buying guns because they have been put on such a list is problematic. It could be countered that felons and mentally incompetent people are denied the right to buy guns, so it is no more problematic to ban potential terrorists. The problem is, however, that a person can end up on the no fly list without going through much in the way of due process. That is, a basic constitutional right can be denied far too easily. This can, of course, be addressed by making the process of being on the list more robust or developing an alternative list with stricter requirements and far better management. There would still be the legitimate concern about denying people a right based on suspicion of what they might do rather than as a response to what they have done. There is also the fact that most of the gun violence in the United States is committed by people who are not on that list. So, this proposal would have a rather limited impact.

Another option is to bring back the ban on assault weapons and high-capacity clips (what a friend of mine calls “the ‘scary gun’ ban”). This proposal is based on the belief that if shooters cannot acquire a semiautomatic assault rifle and high-capacity clips, then the casualties of their mass shootings would be reduced.

For those not familiar with weapons, a semiautomatic fires one round with each pull of the trigger and will do so until the magazine is exhausted. Each shot “cocks” the gun again, allowing rapid fire. This is in contrast with, for example, a bolt, pump or lever action weapon. These weapons require the operator to manually move a round from the magazine to the chamber for each shot. These weapons fire slower than semiautomatics, although a skilled user can still fire rapidly. There are also weapons that fire in bursts (firing a certain number of rounds with each trigger pull) and those that are fully automatic (firing for as long as the trigger is held and ammunition remains).

While many people believe otherwise, it is legal to buy certain automatic weapons. A person just has to go through a complicated process including a thorough background check. I know people who own such weapons legally and above board. The strict process of acquisition and high cost of such weapons generally keeps them out of the hands of most people. As such, this could serve as a model for placing stronger limitations on other weapons.

While many people fear what are called “assault rifles” because they look scary to them (merely firing one gave timid journalist Gersh Kuntzman PTSD), the appearance of a gun does not determine its lethality. Many assault rifles fire a 5.56mm round (though some fire the 7.62mm round) and they are less powerful than the typical hunting rifle. This is not surprising: assault rifles were developed to kill medium sized mammals (humans) and many hunting rifles were designed to kill larger mammals (such as moose and bears). But while assault rifles are generally not “high powered”, they do suffice to kill people.

Assault rifles are more of a threat than other rifles for two reasons. The first is that the assault rifle is semi-automatic, which allows a far more rapid rate of fire relative to lever, bolt and pump action weapons. The slower a person fires, the slower they kill, thus allowing a greater chance they can be stopped. However, there are also plenty of semiautomatic non-assault rifles, which leads to the second factor, magazine size. Assault rifles of the sort sold to civilians typically have 20 or 30 round magazines, while typical hunting rifles (non-assault) hold far less. Maine, for example, sets a legal magazine limit of 5 rounds (plus one in the chamber) for hunting rifles. Reloading time on a weapon varies. For example, shotguns and some rifles have tubular magazines built into the weapon and these are slow to reload. Assault rifle magazines almost always have box magazines that can be rapidly swapped.

A ban on semiautomatic rifles sales could have an impact on mass shootings, provided that the shooter had to purchase the rifle after the ban and did not already have access to a semiautomatic weapon. While some hunters do prefer semiautomatic weapons, it is possible to hunt effectively with pump, lever and bolt action weapons. When I went duck hunting, I used a pump shotgun (which I prefer, having seen semiautomatic shotguns jam from time to time) and for deer hunting I used a bolt action rifle.

The main impact of such a ban would be that shooters who must acquire new weapons for their shooting would have weapons with a lower rate of fire. They could still kill many people, but the kill rate would be slower, thus the death toll should be lower in such cases.

A ban on high-capacity clips would also have an impact on the kill rate of shooters who have to buy new clips for their mass shooting. If magazines were limited to 10 rounds, a shooter would need to reload more often, and reloading time would afford a chance to stop the shooter.

Combining the two bans would mean that shooters who had to acquire new weapons for their mass shooting would be limited to lower capacity, slower firing weapons. This could significantly reduce the death toll of future shootings.

As has been noted, these sorts of bans would only affect a shooter who needs to acquire a new weapon or magazines. Shooters who already have their weapons would not be impacted by the ban. As such, what would be needed would be to remove existing semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity clips—something that seems politically impossible in the United States. 

 

 

Modern agriculture deserves praise for the good it does. Food is plentiful, relatively cheap and easy to acquire. Instead of having to struggle with raising crops and livestock or hunting and gathering, many Americans can go to the grocery store and get the food we need to stay alive. However, as with all things, there is a price.

The modern agricultural complex is highly centralized and industrialized, which has advantages and disadvantages. There are also the harms of practices aimed at maximizing profits. While there are many ways to maximize profits, two common ones are to pay the lowest wages possible and to shift costs to others. I will look, briefly, at one area of cost shifting: the widespread use of antibiotics in meat production.

While most think of antibiotics as a means of treating diseases, healthy food animals are routinely given antibiotics. One reason is to prevent infections: factory farming techniques, as might be imagined, vastly increase the chances of a disease spreading. Antibiotics, it is claimed, can help reduce the risk of bacterial infections (antibiotics are useless against viruses). A second reason is that antibiotics increase the growth rate of healthy animals, allowing them to pack on more meat in less time and time is money. These uses allow the industry to continue factory farming and maintain high productivity, which initially seems laudable. The problem is, however, the use of antibiotics comes with a high price that is paid for by everyone else.

Eric Schlosser wrote “A Safer Food Future, Now”, which appeared in the May 2016 issue of Consumer Reports. In this article, he noted that this practice has contributed significantly to the rise of antibiotic resistant bacteria. Each year, about two million Americans are infected with resistant strains and about 20,000 people die. The healthcare cost is about $20 billion. To be fair, the agricultural industry is not the only contributor to this problem: improper use of antibiotics in humans has also added to this problem. That said, the agricultural use of antibiotics accounts for about 75% of all antibiotic usage in the United States, thus converting the factory farms into farms for resistant bacteria.

The harmful consequences of this antibiotic use have been known for years and there have been attempts to address this through legislation. It is no surprise that our elected leaders have failed to act. One likely explanation is the lobbying power of corporations. In the United States, both parties prioritize profits over the people. But it could be contended that lawmakers are ignorant of the harms, doubt there are harms from antibiotics or honestly believe that the harms arising are outweighed by the benefits. That is, the lawmakers have credible reasons other than the money they are paid to do the will of the wealthy. This is a factual matter, but no professional politician who has been swayed by lobbying will attribute her decision to anything other than good intentions.

This matter is one of ethical concern and, like most large-scale ethical matters involving competing interests, is one best approached by utilitarian considerations. On the side of using antibiotics, there is the increased productivity (and profits) of the factory farming system. This allows more and cheaper food to be provided for the population, which can be regarded as pluses. The main reasons to not use the antibiotics, as noted above, are that they contribute to the creation of antibiotic-resistant strains that sicken and kill people. This imposes costs on those who are sickened and killed as well as those who care about them. There are also the monetary costs in the health care system (although the increased revenue can be tagged as a plus for health care providers). In addition to these costs, there are also other social and economic costs, such as lost hours of work. As this indicates, the cost (illness, death, etc.) of the use of the antibiotics is shifted: the industry does not pay these costs, they are paid by everyone else. Including other industries.

Using a utilitarian calculation requires weighing the cost to the general population against the profits of the industry and the claimed benefits to the general population. Put roughly, the moral question is whether the improved profits and greater food production outweigh the illness, deaths and costs suffered by the public. Most politicians seem to believe that the answer is “yes.”

If the United States were in a food crisis in which the absence of the increased productivity afforded by antibiotics would cause more suffering and death than their presence, then their use would be morally acceptable. However, this does not seem to be the case. While banning this sort of antibiotic use would decrease productivity (and impact profits), the harm of doing this would seem to be vastly exceeded by the reduction in illness, deaths and health care costs. However, if an objective assessment of the matter showed that the ban on antibiotics would not create more benefits than harm, then it would be reasonable and morally acceptable to continue to use them. This is partially a matter of value (in terms of how the harms and benefits are weighted) and partially an objective matter (in terms of monetary and health costs). I am inclined to agree that the general harm of using the antibiotics exceeds the general benefits, but I could be convinced otherwise by objective data.

 

In response to a growing general acceptance of LGBT rights, some states have passed laws requiring a person to use the bathroom (and similar facilities) for the sex on their birth certificate.

Being a veteran runner, I am generally fine with people using whatever bathroom they wish to use, if they do not otherwise engage in immoral or criminal activity. Almost anyone who has run a major race probably has a similar view based on pure practicality. Also, like any mature adult, I go to the bathroom to do my business and if everyone else is minding their business, I could care less about who is in the next stall. Or urinal. Obviously, I do hold that assault, rape, harassment, stalking, and so on should not be allowed, but all these misdeeds are already covered by existing law.

Being a philosopher does require that I consider opposing arguments and that they are entitled to whatever merit they earn through the quality of the reasoning and the plausibility of the premises. As such, I will consider a few arguments in favor of bathroom bills.

One of the most compelling arguments is the one from harm. The gist of the argument is that allowing people to use facilities based on their gender identity will allow rapists, molesters, pedophiles and peepers easy access to women and girls, thus putting them in danger. The bathroom bills, it is claimed, will protect women and girls from this danger.

Since I also accept the principle of harm, I accept the basic reasoning conditionally: if the law did protect women and girls from harm (and did not inflict a greater harm), then it would be a sensible law. The main problem with the argument lies in the claim that the bills will protect women and girls from harm. Many states and localities have long prohibited discrimination in public facilities and there has not been an increase in sexual assault or rape. As such, the claim that the bills are needed to protect the public is untrue. The imposition of law should, as a matter of principle, be aimed at addressing significant harm.

This is not to deny that a person might pretend to be transgender to commit nefarious deeds in a bathroom. However, such a determined attacker could just attack elsewhere (it is not as if attacks can only occur in public facilities) or could just disguise himself as a woman (the law does not magically prevent that). There also = seems to be an unwarranted fear that bathrooms are ideal places for attacks, which does not seem true. That said, if it turns out that allowing people to use facilities based on their gender identity did lead to a significant harm, then the bathroom bills would need to be reconsidered.

A second argument that has been advanced is the privacy argument. The gist of it is that allowing people in facilities based on their gender identification would violate the privacy of other people. One common example of this is the concern expressed on the behalf of schoolgirls in locker rooms: the fear that a transgender classmate might be in the locker room with them.

While our culture does endeavor to condition people to be ashamed of their nakedness and to be terrified that someone of the opposite sex might see them naked, the matter of privacy needs to be discussed a bit here.

On the face of it, gender restricted locker rooms are not actually private. While I am not familiar with the locker room for girls and women, the men’s locker room in my high school had a group shower and an open area for lockers. So, every guy in the locker room could see every other guy while they were naked. Some boys found this lack of privacy too much and would put their normal clothes on over their gym clothes without showering. Or they would try to cover up as much as possible. As such, the concern about privacy is not about privacy in the general sense. In space, everyone can hear your scream. In the locker room, everyone can see your junk.

As such, the concern about privacy in locker rooms in regard to the bathroom bills must be about something other than privacy in the usual sense. The most reasonable and obvious interpretation is privacy from members of the opposite sex: that is, girls not being seen by boys and vice versa. This could, I suppose, be called “gender privacy.”

Those favoring transgender rights would point out that allowing people to use facilities based on gender identity would not result in boys seeing girls or vice versa. It would just be the usual girls seeing girls and boys seeing boys. Since the main worry is transgender girls in girls’ locker rooms, I will focus on that. However, the same discussion could be made for transgender boys.

The obvious reply to this would be to assert that gender identification is not a real thing: a person’s gender is set by biological sex. So, a transgender girl would, in fact, be a boy and hence should not be allowed in the girls’ locker room. This is presumably, based on the assumption that a transgender girl is still sexually attracted to girls because they are still a boy. There seem to be three possibilities here.

The first is that transgender girls really are boys and are sexually attracted to girls (that is, they are just faking) and this grounds the claim that a transgender girl would violate the privacy of biological girls. This entails that lesbian girls would also violate the privacy of biological girls and since about 10% of the population is gay, then any locker room with ten or more girls probably has some privacy violation occurring. As such, those concerned with privacy would presumably need to address this as well. The worry that a “hidden homosexual” might be violating privacy could be addressed by having private changing rooms and closed shower stalls. However, this would be costly and most public schools and facilities would not have the budget for this. As such, a more economical solution might be needed: no nakedness in locker rooms at all to ensure that privacy is not being violated. People could wear bathing suits while showering and then wear them under their clothes the rest of the day. Sure, it would be uncomfortable, but that is a small price to pay for privacy.

The second is that transgender girls are not sexually attracted to girls and hence do not violate their privacy: they are just girls like other girls. It could be objected that what matters is biology: a biological boy seeing a biological girl in the locker room violates her privacy. Arguing for this requires showing how biology matters in terms of privacy. That being seen non-sexually by biological girls is no privacy violation but being seen non-sexually by a biological boy who is just going about their business is a privacy violation. That is, if the person looking does not care about what is being seen, then how is it a privacy violation? The answer would need to differentiate based on biology, which could perhaps be done.

The third is that transgender girls are just girls. In which case, there is no privacy violation since it is just girls seeing girls.

While the harm and privacy arguments do have some appeal, they do not seem to stand up well under scrutiny. However, there might be other arguments for the bathroom bills worth considering, although I have yet to see one.

All professions have their problem members, and the field of medicine is no exception. Fortunately, the percentage of bad doctors is low—but this small percentage can do considerable harm. After all, when your professor is incompetent, you might not learn as much as you should. If your doctor is incompetent, they could kill you.

Back in 2016 Consumer Reports published an article by Rachel Rabkin Peachman covering bad doctors and the difficulty patients face in learning whether a physician is a good doctor or a disaster. Unfortunately, not much has changed since then.

There are three main problems. The first is that there are bad doctors. The article presented numerous examples to add color to the dry statistics, and this includes such tales of terror as doctors molesting patients, doctors removing healthy body parts, and patient deaths due to negligence, impairment or incompetence. These are obvious all moral and professional failings on the part of the doctors, and they should clearly not be engaged in such misdeeds. For more recent examples, John Oliver provides disturbing coverage of the dangers presented by med spas.

The second is that, according to Peachman, the disciplinary actions tend to be rather less than ideal. While doctors should enjoy the protection of a due process, the hurdles are, perhaps, too high. There is also the problem that the responses are often very mild. For example, a doctor whose negligence has resulted in the death of patients can be allowed to keep practicing with minor limitations. As another example, a doctor who has been engaged in sexual misconduct might continue practicing after a class on ethics and with the requirement that someone else be present when he is seeing patients. In addition to the practical concerns about this, there is also the moral concern that the disciplinary boards are failing to protect patients.

One possible argument against harsher punishments is that there is always a shortage of doctors and taking a doctor out of practice would have worse consequences than allowing a bad doctor to keep practicing. This would be the basis for a utilitarian argument for continuing mild punishments. Crudely put, it is better to have a doctor who might kill a patient or two than no doctor at all because that would result in many more deaths.

This argument does have some appeal. However, there is the factual question of whether the mild punishments do more good than harm. If they do, then one would need to accept that this approach is morally tolerable. If not, then the argument would fail. There is also the response that consequences are not what matters and people should be reprimanded based on their misdeeds and not based on some calculation of utility. This also has some intuitive appeal.

It could also be argued that it should be left to patients to judge if they want to take the risk. If a doctor is known for sexual misdeeds with female patients but is fine with male patients, then a man who has few or no other options might decide that the doctor is his best choice. This leads to the third problem.

The third problem is that it is very difficult for patients to learn about bad doctors. While there is a National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), it is off limits to patients and is limited to law enforcement, hospital administration, insurance and a few other groups.

The main argument against allowing public access to the NPDB is based on the premise that it contains inaccurate information which could be harmful to innocent doctors. This makes it similar to the credit report data which is notorious for containing harmful inaccuracies that can plague people.

While the possibility of incorrect data is a matter of concern, that premise best supports the conclusion that the NPDB should be reviewed regularly to ensure that the information is accurate. While perfect accuracy is not possible, surely the information can meet a reasonable standard of accuracy. This could be aided by providing robust tools for doctors to inform those running the NPDB of errors and to inform doctors about the content of their files. As such, the error argument is easily defeated.

Patients do have some access to data about doctors, but there are many barriers in place. In some cases, there is a financial cost to access data. In almost all cases, the patient will need to grind through lengthy documents and penetrate the code of legal language. There is also the fact that this data is often incomplete and inaccurate.  While it could be argued that a responsible patient would expend the resources needed to research a doctor, this is an unreasonable request, and a patient should not need to do all this just to know that the doctor is competent. One reason for this is that someone seeking a doctor is likely to be sick or injured and expecting them to add on the burden of a research project is unreasonable. Also, a legitimate role of the state is to protect citizens from harm and having a clear means of identifying bad doctors would seem to fall within this.

Given the above, it seems reasonable to accept that a patient has the right to know about her doctor’s competence and should have an easy means of acquiring accurate information. This enables a patient to make an informed choice about her physician without facing an undue burden. This will also help the profession as good doctors will attract more patients and bad doctors will have a greater incentive to improve their practice.

Isis, my husky, joined the pack in 2004. She was a year old, and her soul was filled with wildness and a love of destruction. I channeled that wildness into running and that (mostly) took care of her love of destruction. We ran together for years, until she could no longer run. Then we walked on our adventures with a stately saunter rather than a mad dash. One day in March, 2016 she collapsed, and I thought that was the end. But steroids granted her a reprieve, and our adventures continued. But time ends all things.

As the months went by, she hit a plateau of recovery and then began her second decline. She could not walk as far; she had to be supported while doing her business and was sometimes confused about where she was. This worsened as November progressed. She required ever more support, walked ever less distance, and had trouble distinguishing between the outside and inside of the house. Since she was my dog and I was her human, I accepted all this. I stocked up on carpet cleaner and ran the steam cleaner regularly. Since she could not handle the smooth floors, I put down yoga mats for her. I had tried carpet runners, but they become urine sponges. Yoga mats can be hosed off, dried and put back in place.

Though she suffered a physical and mental decline, her will remained unimpaired. When she decided that she wanted to walk someplace, she would overcome her weakened legs and force her way through vegetation and up hills. If she could not make it on her own, she would look at me and would not move until I helped her to power up that hill. She had the spirit of a true runner; never giving up in the face of a challenge. But in the face of time will and love are not enough.

She suffered a sudden decline and lost her ability to walk. I would carry her to do her business, but even with my support she had difficulty. On November 22, her suffering peaked and neither of us slept that night. I wanted her to make it through Thanksgiving (she loved turkey), but on the morning of the 23rd I saw the pain in her eyes and knew what had to be done. Courtney, a friend of mine from Maine, had sent us some Christmas dog treats and a dog toy. I unwrapped those and hand fed her, placing the toy between her paws. After we had our early Christmas, I carried her to my truck and drove to Oakwood Animal Hospital. While no one really knows what is in the heart of another, I could tell that she had absolute trust in me as I carried her into the office. She knew that I would, as I have always done, do the right thing for her.

Her regular vet was on duty and, after we talked, Isis was put on an IV. As the vet, vet tech and I comforted her and cried, she passed away gently and peacefully. This was the hardest decision of my life, choosing the death of my friend.

Since I teach ethics, I have thought a great deal about this situation in the abstract. But the theoretical context of the classroom is different from the harsh reality of deciding if your friend should keep living. While some doubt the use of philosophy, thinking about this matter proved  helpful and even comforting.

While people are said to own dogs, I never saw our relationship as matter of owning property. Rather, we had reached a mutual understanding and formed a team. Huskies are supervillains when it comes to escape, so they can (and do) end their relationships with humans when they wish. By accepting her, I took on many moral responsibilities. Some of these were like those to my human friends, others are more like those of a parent to a child. These included the usual obligations of keeping her healthy and safe; but they also included the obligation to ensure her well-being and happiness.

When she collapsed in March, I had to make the decision whether to try treatment or let her go. While she was suffering, the vet said she had a chance to recover. Knowing her stubborn will, I believed she would want to take that chance and power through the pain. I could not be certain; but I went with what I thought she would want. It turned out it was the right call; she recovered and returned to enjoying life.

As I got to know her, I learned that she had a look that meant “I need you to do something for me.” In the past, this usually meant playing with her, getting her a snack or letting her into the backyard to menace the lesser creatures (to a husky, almost all other creatures are lesser).  These things made her happy, and I was pleased to oblige. After all, I had a moral responsibility to her wellbeing because she was my dog and I was her human.

When she had declined to her worst, she stared at me intently with that look. Since she could not talk, she could not say what she wanted. She, I believed, wanted an end to her pain. I might just think that to feel better about my decision and perhaps she was doing nothing of the sort. But I knew that to keep her alive and suffering would not be a choice for her wellbeing or happiness. Medicine is quite good these days; I probably could have kept her going for a few months more with painkillers and other medications. But that would be a dull and drugged life, not a life suitable for a soul so full of wildness and a love of destruction. I wanted her to end her life as my beloved wolf and not dissipate to nothing in a sea of pharmaceuticals. So, I said goodbye to my good girl.

 

James O’Gara, a resident of my adopted state of Florida, sent a postcard to Florida CFO Blaise Ingoglia with the handwritten message “You lack values.” In response, officers from our state’s Department of Financial Services (which is overseen by Ingoglia) were sent to his house to question him. Ingoglia’s communication director Sydner Booker was asked about the incident but declined to explain why the postcard was considered a threat. She also declined to answer questions about how many other people had been investigated and how much it cost to send the agents. Mr. O’Gara and his wife Cathy have been critical of both the Trump and DeSantis administration.

A rational assessment of the postcard and O’Gara’s history (the agents expressed knowledge that he served in the infantry during the Vietnam war) would obviously reveal no threat. And, of course, while “you lack values” might sting a bit, it is clearly no threat. As such, there seems to be no justification for the visit, and the best explanation is that this was an effort at intimidation by the state. The media coverage in Florida is likely to serve an intended purpose of the visit: to spread the word that criticism and opposition to the regimes  of Trump and DeSantis can, and will, result in a visit from agents of the state.

This is consistent with the current ruling ideology of “free speech” in Florida, in which free expression is protected when it is in accord with the values of the right and suppressed when the rulers of the state dislike it or see an opportunity for intimidation. In the past I might have said this was un-American, but now I will simply state that this is immoral. I’ve argued at length in defense of free expression (including for those on the right) and will not repeat my arguments here. In addition to the primary concern about free expression and the coercive power of the state being misused, there are other concerns.

As Republicans pretend to care about state spending and fighting crime, there is a reasonable concern about the cost of sending agents to, it seems, intimidate citizens. These resources would be better spent dealing with actual crimes in Florida. To be fair, while my home state of Maine has America’s lowest crime rate, Florida has a lower crime rate than many other states. But the rate is not low enough that officers have nothing better to do than “talk” to citizens about innocuous postcards.

Another concern is that while the interaction between the agents and O’Gara seemed cordial, there is always the possibility that interactions between police and citizens can go very badly. For example, from 2017 to 2023 at least 800 people were killed in traffic stops. One reason for this is the cultivation of the warrior mentality in police. “Under this warrior worldview, officers are locked in intermittent and unpredictable combat with unknown but highly lethal enemies. As a result, officers learn to be afraid.” Having taught critical thinking for decades, I am aware of the effects of fear on how a person perceives other people and situations. Put simply, while vigilance is wise, fear is unwise. Innocent actions can be seen as potential threats, items such as cell phones or wallets can be perceived as being guns, and any defiance or disrespect can be interpreted as evidence of violent intent. As such, even if an officer has good intentions, unnecessary violence can arise from fear. If, for example, O’Gara had gotten into a heated exchange with the agents then things could have turned out very differently. There is also obvious concern with race in the context of law enforcement.

Someone more cynical than I might claim that certain state officials might be pleased with a violent encounter for two reasons. One might be that the violence could be used as “evidence” that the investigation was justified (much how ICE seems to be trying to provoke violence to justify its violence). Another reason might be that fear of being killed by law enforcement sent to “investigate” threats would deter people from exercising their moral right to criticize the rulers of Florida.

Speaking of free expression, because the rulers of my adopted state of Florida hold it as so precious that they must decide who can exercise it and how one may do so, I must always state that I condemn the use of political violence between Americans

Having a pet imposes morally accountability upon a person, the life of a pet is in one’s hands. When I took my husky Isis to the emergency vet in 2016, she was in such rough shape that I thought I might need to choose to end her suffering that night.

While some dismiss philosophy as valueless in real life, my experience as a philosopher was useful in dealing with the decline of my beloved husky. Having studied and taught ethics, I learned a great deal that helped me frame the choices I had to face

When I brought Isis to the emergency vet, I knew that it would be expensive. When the vet showed me the proposed bill, I was not surprised it was around $600. I am lucky enough to have a decent job and fortunate enough to have made it through the last time the rich wrecked the American economy. While worried about her, I also worried about people who are less well-off yet love their pets as much as I do. They could face a terrible choice between medical care for their pet and having the money for some other essential expenses, such as their own medical care. Or they might not have enough money and hence cannot even make a choice. The Big Beautiful Bill will make this even worse and I am sure that pets will be among the many indirect victims of that act of political cruelty.

Since there are many systems of ethics, there are many ways to approach the moral decision of costly (in money or time) pet care. The most calculating is a utilitarian approach: weighing the costs and benefits to determine what would create the greatest utility. In my case, I could afford such care and the good for my husky vastly outweighed the cost to me. So, the utilitarian calculation was easy for me.

Others are not so lucky, and they will face a difficult choice that requires weighing the well-being of their pet against the cost to them. While it is easy enough to say that a person should always take care of her pet, people have other moral obligations, such as to their children and themselves. In addition to the ethics of making the decision, there is also the moral matter of having a society in which people are forced to make such hard decisions because they have been denied the financial resources to address the challenges they face. While some might say that those who cannot afford pets should not have pets (something also said about children), that is just another evil. While I would not say that people have a right to pets as they have a right to life and liberty, a system that gives rise to such a view is an unjust system. Naturally, some might still insist that pets are a luxury, like adequate education, health care and basic nutrition.

Another approach is to set aside the cold calculations of utility and make the decision based on an ethics of duty and obligation.  Having a pet is analogous to having a child: the choice creates a set of moral duties and obligations. Part of the foundation of these obligations is that the pet cannot make their own decisions and cannot care for themselves. As such, taking an animal as a pet is to accept the role of a decision maker and a caretaker.

An analogy can also be drawn to accepting a contract for a job: the job requires certain things and accepting the job entails accepting those requirements. In the case of a pet, there are many obligations, and the main one is assuming responsibility for their well-being. This is why choosing to have a pet is such a serious decision and should not be entered into lightly.

One reason having a pet should not be taken lightly is that the duty to the pet imposes an obligation to make sacrifices for the well-being of the pet. This can include going without sleep, cleaning up messes and making the hard decision about the end of life. There are, of course, limits to all obligations and working out exactly what one owes a pet is a moral challenge. There are certainly some minimal obligations that a person must accept, or they should not have a pet. These include providing for the basic physical and emotional needs of the pet. The moral discussion becomes more complicated when the obligations impose greater burdens.

When Isis was at her low point, she could barely walk. I had to carry her outside and support her while she struggled to do her business. When I picked her up, I would say “up, up and away!” When carrying her, I would say “wooosh” so she would think she was flying. This made us both feel a little better.

 She could not stand to eat or drink and had little appetite. So, I had to hold her water bowl up for her so she could drink and make special foods to hand feed her.  I found that she would eat chicken and rice processed into a paste—provided I slathered it with peanut butter and let her lick it from my palm. At night, she would cry with pain, and I would be there to comfort her, getting by on a few hours of sleep. Sometimes she would not be able to make it outside, and there would be a mess to clean up.

I did all this for two reasons. The first is, of course, love. The second is duty. My moral obligation to my husky required me to do all this for her because she is my dog. If I did not do all this for her, I would be a worse person and, while I can bear cleaning up diarrhea at 3:23 in the morning, I cannot bear being a worse person.

I am no moral saint and I admit that this was difficult (though it obviously pales in comparison with what other people have faced). It did not reach my limits, though I know I have them. Sorting out the ethics of these limits is a significant moral matter. First, there is the moral question of how far one’s obligations go. That is, determining how far you are morally obligated to go. Second, there is the moral question of how far you can go before your obligations break you. After all, each person also has duties to herself that are as important as obligations to others.

In my case, I accepted that my obligations included all that I mentioned above. While doing all this was exhausting me (I was dumping instant coffee mix into protein shakes to get through teaching my classes), Isis recovered before my obligations broke me. But I had to give serious thought to how long I would be able to sustain this level of care before I could not go on anymore. I am glad I did not have to find out.

Back in 2016 my husky, Isis, and I had slowed down since we teamed up in 2004 because pulling so many years will slow down man and dog. While Isis faced a crisis, most likely due to the wear of time on her spine, the steroids she was prescribed helped address the pain and inflammation and  for a while she was tail up and bright eyed once more.

In my previous essay I looked at using causal reasoning on a small sale by applying the methods of difference and agreement. In this essay I will look at thinking critically about experiments and studies.

The gold standard in science is the controlled cause to effect experiment. The objective of an experiment is to determine the effect of a cause. As such, the question is “I wonder what this does?” While conducting such an experiment can be complicated and difficult, the basic idea is simple.

The first step is to have a question about a causal agent. For example, it might be wondered what effect steroids have on arthritis in elderly dogs. The second step is to determine the target population, which might already be taken care of in the first step, in the example, elderly dogs would be the target population. The third step is to pull a random sample from the target population. This sample needs to be representative, which means it needs to be like the target population. For example, a sample from the population of elderly dogs would ideally include all breeds of dogs, male dogs, female dogs, and so on for all relevant qualities of dogs. If a sample is not properly taken it can be biased. The problem with a biased sample is that the inference will be weak because the sample might not be adequately like the general population. The sample also needs to be large enough. A sample that is too small will also fail to adequately support the inference drawn from the experiment.

The fourth step involves splitting the sample into the control group and the experimental group. These groups need to be as similar as possible (and can be made of the same individuals). The reason they need to be alike is because in the fifth step the experimenters introduce the cause (such as steroids) to the experimental group and the experiment is run to see what difference this makes between the two groups. The final step is getting the results and determining if the difference is statistically significant. This occurs when the difference between the two groups can be confidently attributed to the presence of the cause (as opposed to chance or other factors). While calculating this can be complicated, when assessing an experiment (such as a clinical trial) it is easy enough to compare the number of individuals in the sample to the difference between the experimental and control groups. This handy table from Critical Thinking makes this easy and also shows the importance of having a large enough sample.

 

Number in Experimental Group

 (with similarly sized control group)

Approximate Figure That the difference Must Exceed

To Be Statistically Significant

(in percentage points)
10 40
25 27
50

19
100 13
250 8
500 6
1,000 4
1,500 3

 

Many “clinical trials” mentioned in articles and blog posts have very small samples sizes and this can make their results all but meaningless. This table also shows why anecdotal evidence is fallacious: a sample size of one is useless when it comes to an experiment.

The above table also assumes that the experiment is run correctly: the sample was representative, the control group was adequately matched to the experimental group, the experimenters were not biased, and so on for all the relevant factors. As such, when considering the results of an experiment it is important to consider those factors as well. If, for example, you are reading an article about an herbal supplement for arthritic dogs and it mentions a clinical trial, you would want to check on the sample size, the difference between the two groups and determine whether the experiment was also properly conducted. Without this information, you would need to rely entirely on the credibility of the source. If the source is credible and claims that the experiment was conducted properly, then it would be reasonable to trust the results. If the source’s credibility is in question, then trust should be withheld. Assessing credibility is a matter of determining expertise and the goal is to avoid being a victim of a fallacious appeal to authority. Here is a short checklist for determining whether a person (or source) is an expert or not:

 

  • The person has sufficient expertise in the subject matter in question.
  • The claim being made by the person is within her area(s) of expertise.
  • There is an adequate degree of agreement among the other experts in the subject in question.
  • The person in question is not significantly biased.
  • The area of expertise is a legitimate area or discipline.
  • The authority in question must be identified.

 

While the experiment is the gold standard, there are times when it cannot be used. In some cases, this is a matter of ethics: exposing people or animals to something potentially dangerous might be deemed morally unacceptable. In other cases, it is a matter of practicality or necessity. In such cases, studies are used.

One type of study is the non-experimental cause to effect study. This is identical to the cause to effect experiment with one critical difference: the experimental group is not exposed to the cause by those running the study. For example, a study might be conducted of dogs who recovered from Lyme disease to see what long term effects it has on them. It would be cruel to give dogs Lyme disease to study its effects, although researchers often try to justify such cruelty in the name of progress.

The study, as would be expected, runs in the same basic way as the experiment and if there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups (and it has been adequately conducted) then it is reasonable to make the relevant inference about the effect of the cause in question.

While useful, the study is weaker than the experiment. This is because those conducting the study must take what they get as the experimental group is already exposed to the cause and this can create problems in properly sorting out the effect of the cause in question. As such, while a properly run experiment can still get erroneous results, a properly run study is even more likely to have issues.

A second type of study is the effect to cause study. It differs from the cause to effect experiment and study in that the effect is known but the cause is not. Hence, the goal is to infer an unknown cause from the known effect. It also differs from the experiment in that those conducting the study obviously do not introduce the cause.

This study is conducted by comparing the experimental group and the control group (which are ideally, as similar as possible) to sort out a likely cause by considering the differences between them. As would be expected, this method is less reliable than the others since those doing the study are trying to backtrack from an effect to a cause. If considerable time has passed since the suspected cause, this can make the matter even more difficult to sort out. The conducting the study also must work with the experimental group they happen to get and this can introduce complications into the study, making a strong inference problematic.

An example of this would be a study of elderly dogs who suffer from paw knuckling (the paw flips over so the dog is walking on the top of the paw) to determine the cause of this effect. As one might suspect, finding the cause would be challenging as there would be a multitude of potential causes in the history of the dogs ranging from injury to disease. It is also likely that there are many causes in play here, and this would require sorting out the different causes for this same effect. Because of such factors, the effect to cause study is the weakest of the three and supports the lowest level of confidence in its results even when conducted properly. This explains why it can be so difficult for researchers to determine the causes of many problems that, for example, elderly dogs suffer from.

In the case of Isis, the steroids that she was taking were well-studied, so it was quite reasonable for me to believe that they were a causal factor in her remarkable but all too brief recovery. I do not, however, know for sure what caused her knuckling as there are so many potential causes for that effect. However, the important thing is that she was able to walk normally about 90% of the time and her tail was back in the air, showing that she was a happy husky.

As mentioned in my previous essay, Isis (my Siberian husky) fell victim to the ravages of time. Once a sprinting blur of fur, she was reduced to sauntering. Still, lesser beasts feared her (and to a husky, all creatures are lesser beasts) and the sun was warm in the backyard, so her life was good even at the end.  

Faced with the challenge of keeping her healthy and happy, I relied a great deal on what I learned as a philosopher. As noted in the preceding essay, my philosophical skills kept me from falling victim to the post hoc fallacy and the fallacy of anecdotal evidence. In this essay I will focus on two basic, but extremely useful methods of causal reasoning.

One of the most useful tools for causal reasoning is the method of difference. This method was famously developed by the philosopher John Stuart Mill and has been a staple in critical thinking classes since before my time. The purpose of the method is figuring out the cause of an effect, such as a husky suffering from a knuckling paw (a paw that folds over, so the dog is walking on the top of the foot rather than the bottom). The method can also be used to try to sort out the effect of a suspected cause, such as the efficacy of an herbal supplement in treating canine arthritis.

Fortunately, the method is simple. To use it, you need at least two cases: one in which the effect has occurred and one in which it has not. In terms of working out the cause, more cases are better, although more cases of something bad (like arthritis pain) would be undesirable from other standpoints. The two cases can involve the same individual at different times as it need not be different individuals (though it also works in those cases as well). For example, when sorting out Isis’ knuckling problem the case in which the effect occurred was when Isis was suffering from knuckling and the case in which it did not was when Isis was not suffering from this problem. I also investigated other cases in which dogs suffered from knuckling issues and when they did not.

The cases in which the effect is present and those in which it is absent are then compared to determine the difference between the cases. The goal is to sort out which factor or factors made the difference. When doing this, it is important to keep in mind that it is easy to fall victim to the post hoc fallacy and conclude without adequate evidence that a difference is a cause because the effect occurred after that difference. Avoiding this mistake requires considering that the “connection” between the suspected cause and the effect might be a coincidence. For example, Isis ate some peanut butter the day she started knuckling, but it is unlikely that had any effect, especially since she ate peanut butter since we became a pack. It is also important to consider that an alleged cause might be an effect caused by a factor that is also producing the effect one is concerned about. For example, a person might think that a dog’s limping is causing knuckling, but they might both be effects of a third factor, such as arthritis or nerve damage.

You must also keep in mind the possibility of reversed causation, which is when the alleged cause is the effect. For example, a person might think that limping is causing knuckling, but it might turn out that the knuckling is the cause of the limping.

In some cases, sorting out the cause can be easy. For example, if a dog slips and falls, then has trouble walking, the most likely cause is the fall. But it could still be something else. In other cases, sorting out the cause can be difficult. It might be because there are many possible causal factors. For example, knuckling can be caused by many things (even Lyme disease). It might also be because there are no clear differences (such as when a dog starts limping with no clear preceding event). One useful approach is to do research using reliable sources. Another, which is a good idea with pet problems, is to refer to an expert, such as a vet. Medical tests, for example, are useful for sorting out the differences and finding a likely cause.

The same basic method can also be used in reverse, such as determining the effectiveness of a dietary supplement for treating canine arthritis. For example, when Isis started slowing down and showing signs of soreness, I started giving her senior dog food, glucosamine and extra protein. What followed was an improvement in her mobility and the absence of soreness. While the change might have been a mere coincidence, it is reasonable to consider that one or more of these factors helped her. After all, there is some scientific evidence that diet can have an influence on these things. From a practical standpoint, I decided to keep to this plan since the cost of the extras is low, they have no harmful side effects, and there is some indication that they work. I did consider that I could be wrong. Fortunately, I did have good evidence that the steroids Isis was prescribed worked as she made a remarkable improvement after starting them and there is solid scientific evidence that they are effective at treating pain and inflammation. As such, it is rational to accept that the steroids were the cause of her improvement, though this could also be a coincidence.

The second method is the method of agreement. Like difference, this requires at least two cases. Unlike difference, the effect is present in all cases. In this method, the cases exhibiting the effect (such as knuckling) are considered to find a common thread in all the cases. For example, each incident of knuckling would be examined to determine what they all have in common. The common factor (or factors) that is the most plausible cause of the effect is what should be taken as the likely cause. As with the method of difference, it is important to consider such factors as coincidence to avoid falling into a post hoc fallacy.

The method of agreement is most often used to form a hypothesis about a likely cause. The next step is, if possible, to apply the method of difference by comparing similar cases in which the effect did not occur. Roughly put, the approach would be to ask what all the cases have in common, then determine if that common factor is absent in cases in which the effect is also absent. For example, a person investigating knuckling might begin by considering what all the knuckling cases have in common and then see if that common factor is absent in cases in which knuckling did not occur.

One of the main weaknesses of these methods is that they tend to have very small sample sizes, sometimes just one individual, such as my husky. While these methods are quite useful, they can be supplemented by general causal reasoning in the form of experiments and studies, which is the subject of the next essay in this series.