As a political tool, members of congress threaten or engage in a government shutdown. When the government is shut down, federal workers can be furloughed and sent home without pay and forbidden from working. Others, like TSA agents, can be compelled to work without pay. As the government shutdown does not shut down bills and expenses, the unpaid workers will be harmed by their lack of income. While some federal workers are well paid, many live from paycheck to paycheck and have few financial reserves. Because of this, some federal workers have turned to food banks during past shutdowns. In addition to the impact on workers, there are indirect impacts on those providing goods and services. After all, people who are not getting paid will be spending less.

In addition to the financial impacts, there are other harms. One example is the national parks. There is also the harm suffered by those who need the federal services. There are also the long-term harms of the shutdown. While one could write almost endlessly of the harms of a shutdown, it suffices to say they are harmful and something that should be avoided.

Debating about who is to blame for any shutdown is often a fruitless endeavor because of the partisan divide. Minds will generally not be changed by evidence or reasons. That said, a shutdown requires both parties: if one party gives in to the other, then the shutdown will end. From a moral standpoint, both sides bear some blame. However, the blame need not be equal.

After all, refusing to give in to a threat to harm others can be morally acceptable. And it is usually the Republicans who make such threats.  From a utilitarian standpoint, giving in would be wrong if it created more harm than refusing to do so. This utilitarian calculation can consider more than just the immediate factors. For example, it should also include that yielding to such tactics encourages their future use.

The ethics of the shutdown comes down to two moral concerns. The first is whether it is morally acceptable to hurt innocent people to get what you want. The second is whether it is morally acceptable to refuse to give someone what they want when they threaten to harm the innocent.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the matter is settled by weighing the harm against benefit. The benefits can include preventing harm. So, a shutdown would be morally acceptable if doing so prevented greater harm, since shutdowns are always harmful. What must also be considered is whether there is an alternative to the shutdown. To use an analogy, if someone proposed a risky surgery, failing to consider alternatives would be morally irresponsible. In the case of the shutdown, there are alternatives. One is to use a less harmful process of negotiation and for each side to agree they will not use the shutdown as a political tool.

One practical problem is that the shutdown is perceived as a useful, albeit risky, political tool. The side pushing a shutdown will think that it will probably work; the other side thinks they can keep it from working. Both sides think they can score political points. Using a shutdown as a tool requires ignoring or even not caring about the harm being inflicted on the American people. After all, while politicians can lose political points or not get what they want, they are not harmed by their shutdown. This willingness to use people as pawns is morally problematic, assuming you agree with Locke that the purpose of the state is the good of the people.

That said, political, economic and military calculations always involve harming pawns—so the shutdown could be seen as just another move in the political game. This can be countered by arguing that there are better alternatives, and so causing harm is not necessary. As such, the shutdown would seem to be an unethical political tool. Unfortunately, just as it takes two to shut down the government, it also takes two to avoid it: both parties must agree to not shut it down. But as long as it is seen as a viable tool and if politicians are willing to hurt Americans to achieve their political goals, then we must expect future shutdowns.

The denotation of a word is what it literally means. The connotation is the emotional loading of the word, which can be negative or positive; this is how the word makes you feel. To illustrate, “swarm” and “infestation” have strong negative connotations. Whether the connotation is negative or positive depends on various factors, such as how the audience feels about the word. For example, the connotation of “socialism” is negative for most Americans but obviously positive to socialists. Two words can have the same denotation, but very different connotations. For example, the slang “pig” and the word “police” have the same denotation, but different connotations. As would be expected, rhetoric uses the influence of connotation to affect how people feel.

Words that have strong connotations can be powerful rhetorical tools. As with any powerful tool, people will want to use it, even if they must steal it. Hence, connotation theft.  A word can derive its connotation from a variety of factors, such as historical context, and this is how the connotation is earned. If the word is then knowingly used for that connotation in a manner inconsistent with those factors, then the connotation has been stolen. This can also involve intentionally ignoring a word’s denotation to use its connotation.  A person can also unintentionally steal connotation by being unaware that their use is inconsistent with the factors, such as the historical context or denotation, that give the word the connotation in question.

Put into a template, connotation theft looks like this:

 

  1. Word W has connotation C because of P,Q and R.
  2. Word W is used in situation S because it has connotation C.
  3. But S is inconsistent with P, Q, R.

 

A good example is the word “fascism.” The word has a strong negative connotation primarily because of the Nazis and their numerous crimes. To a lesser extent, fascist Italy and Spain also contributed to this negative connotation. Because of the strong negative connotation of “fascism” calling something “fascism” or associating it with fascism can be an effective rhetorical tactic. Doing this can generate negative feelings towards the thing in question and these can influence what people think. Because of this, it is not surprising that the term is often used in American politics. George W. Bush’s administration was called fascist. Bush in turn used the term “Islamofascism” (which is distinct from Islamic fascism) to create negative feelings. Obama was called a fascist and, of course, Trump is being called a fascist now. Interestingly, the left is now being called fascist and some claim that the Nazis were leftists (mainly because of the “socialism” in their name). One might thus agree with a quote attributed to George Orwell, that “[T]he word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable.'” This, it could be argued, arose from connotation theft: using the word for its negative connotation while ignoring its denotation and historical context served to split them apart.

Orwell’s remark shows a problem with connotation theft: it can rob a word of its denotation and historical context, making it just a rhetorical tool. Another problem is that connotation theft is a deceit because the emotional power of the word is exploited by intentionally misapplying it. For example, some on the right assert that the left and the socialists are fascists. Since most people feel fascism is bad, this misuse of the term can make people feel the left is bad. But the claim that fascism is leftist is a lie. First, while the National Socialists used the word “socialist”, they were neither socialists nor leftists. Fascism is a reaction to and an opponent of the left. Second, the negative connotation of “fascism” did not arise from any socialist style programs or policies the Nazis or other fascists might have implemented. It arises from the fascism of the fascists and the Nazi’s multitude of crimes. As such, applying the term “fascist” to the left is an attempt at connotation theft (or, at best an act of ignorance). This is most certainly not to claim that the left is without sin, just that fascism is a sin of the right rather than the left.

The main defense against being deceived by connotation theft is being aware of what gives a term its emotional power, such as its correct denotation and historical context. For example, when someone is accused of being fascist, one should consider if the word applies or, as Orwell said, it is just signifying something the speaker finds undesirable and hopes you will too.

During Trump’s first term the United States assassinated Iran’s Qassem Soleimani which raised moral questions about targeted killings. As it seems likely Trump will order more assassinations, this is a topic worth revisiting.

While the definition of “assassination” can be debated, it is a targeted killing aimed to achieve a political, economic or ideological end. While one could quibble over the fine points of definitions, my concern is with the issue of whether assassination can be morally warranted.

It can be argued that I am misguided to even consider this issue. Some might point out that assassination is killing and killing is wrong, thus there is no need for a distinct discussion about assassination. But I will assume, perhaps incorrectly, that at least some killings are morally acceptable. If I am in error, then the issue would be settled: assassination would be wrong because all killing is wrong,

Others might take the stance that morality is irrelevant and embrace the pragmatic approach that a country should kill when doing so is advantageous. On this view, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. This is a viable approach but entails that if the United States is justified in killing on pragmatic grounds, then everyone else is also justified. The only unjustified killings would be those that were not advantageous, as defined by the killers. This seems problematic.

In discussing this matter “in the wild”, I have found that people can be confused about what counts as ethics. For example, during a Facebook discussion of assassination someone rejected the notion of applying ethics.  They did so for what they claimed were two non-moral reasons. The first was that the United States is justified in assassinating people based on self-defense. The second is that the United States is justified when it kills in retribution.  But self-defense and retribution justifications are moral justifications and are subject to evaluation.

During the discussion, the “anger justification” was also advanced, which is often used to try to justify violence. For example, people will often try to “defend” the death penalty by asking people how they would feel if someone they loved were the victim of a terrible crime. They are supposed to feel angry, and this is supposed to somehow justify the death penalty based on this anger.

 The gist of the argument about assassination was that I would be mad if someone I knew had been killed by a foreigner and I would want to kill them and this entail that killing them would be somehow justified. The gist of the “logic” seems to be

 

Premise 1: If B did X to you, then you would be angry enough to do Y to B.

Conclusion: Doing Y to B is morally justified. 

 

While there might be a macho appeal to this “reasoning”, whether I would be angry enough to kill someone is irrelevant to whether killing them is right. If this was good logic, it would entail that sufficient anger would justify any killing, which is absurd.  For example, it would justify someone killing you if they were enraged because they thought you cut them off in traffic.

This sort of reasoning seems to be fueled by the tendency people have to think that if they are angry, then they are justified in being angry.  But this does not follow; being angry just means you are angry. The anger you feel is irrelevant to truth and justification. Naturally, a person can be both justified and angry, so anger does not invalidate justification.

Getting back to the ethics of assassination, if the principle was adopted that anger justified killing, it would mean that people who killed Americans would also be justified if they were angry and that someone who was angry at you would be justified in killing you. This all seems absurd, so this “principle” is absurd. But perhaps a case can be made for ethical assassination.

A good historical example is Operation Vengeance. In WWII, American P-38 fighters intercepted and killed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. This had a significant impact in terms of morale and the elimination of an important leader.

The moral justification for this is clear: when one is engaged in war, then leaders are legitimate targets. In the broader moral perspective, the overall ethics of a killing would depend on whether the war was just or unjust.  In fact, one could argue that targeting leaders in a just war is morally superior to the killing of soldiers. In general, the soldiers are not involved in the decisions that started the war and would not be fighting without being sent by their leaders. In contrast, the leaders are making the decisions and are morally responsible for the wars they start. As such, if a soldier in a war is a morally legitimate target for violence, then the leaders who sent them to war are also morally legitimate targets. Or even more legitimate, since it is their war.

In the example of Soleimani, the United States and Iran were not at war, hence the ethics of war do not apply. However, one could appeal to the ethics of conflict between nations. In general, killing the citizens of other nations outside of war is wrong. But there can be exceptions if the person did things that morally warranted their death. But accepting this as a justification requires accepting the corresponding moral principle and we would need to accept that Americans could be justly killed by other nations if their evil deeds warranted their deaths. For example, there are those who would argue that the deaths caused by American politicians could warrant their assassination on moral grounds.  There is also the option of just insisting that it is acceptable for the United States to engage in assassination because it is “my country”, but the same sort of argument can be made by citizens of other countries. For example, Iranians can make an equally bad case that it is acceptable for Iran to engage in assassination because it is their country.