Month: February 2025

 

Shortly after the #metoo movement began gaining nationwide attention, a female student arrived at my office and started to close the door as she introduced herself. While admitting this is embarrassing, I felt a shiver of fear. In an instant, my mind went through a nightmare scenario: what if she is failing and is planning on using the threat of an accusation of sexual harassment to get a passing grade? Quieting this irrational worry, I casually said “Oh, you can leave the door open.” She sat down and we talked about her paper. In a bit of reflection, I realized that this was a reversal: it is usually the woman who feels the shiver of fear when a man is closing the office door.

To head off any criticisms about inconsistency, I’ve always had a literal open-door policy for all students. This originated in my grad school days when a female friend told me that when a male professor closes his office door on her, she feels trapped and vulnerable. As various cases indicate, her fear was not unfounded. Now that I have my own office, I always keep the door open. As such, it was ironic that I would be one scared by the closing of my office door by a woman.

Like everyone else, I have fears. An important question about a fear is whether it is rational. To illustrate, I will use my fear of heights. Part of this fear is rational: I suffered a full quadriceps tear when a ladder went out from under me. So, being wary about ladders, roofs and the edges of tall things like mountains is sensible. However, my fear also extends to flying. This fear, I know, is irrational. While accidents do occur, being inside a commercial airliner is one of the safest places a normal person can be. I have never been in airplane crash or mishap, so there is not even an instigating incident to explain this fear.

While I have been told and have told myself that flying is nothing to fear, this does not work. Statistics and proof do not change how I feel. I deal with it using Aristotle’s method: I make myself face my fear over and over until I can function normally—despite being terrified. Because of my fear of flying, I do not dismiss other peoples’ fears, even when they might seem unfounded or even silly. As such, when men claim to be terrified of false accusations of sexual assault, I do not dismiss this fear. This is, I am obligated to say, a fear I have felt.

As with any fear, an important question is whether the fear of a false accusation is rational. Is it like the sensible fear that leads me to be careful on roofs or is it like the irrational fear of flying that causes me needless discomfort? As with any fear, this cannot be judged by the strength of the feeling—this gives no indication of the likelihood of a bad thing happening. To illustrate, most people are not terrified of the health complications from a poor diet and lack of exercise but are afraid of shark attacks. But poor health habits are much more likely to kill a person than a shark attack. Sorting out the rationality of fear is a matter of statistics, although the specific context does matter. For example, if I jump into shark infested water while covered in blood, my odds of being attacked would be higher than usual. As another example, a person surrounded by women who are scheming, unethical liars would have greater odds of being falsely accused of assault.

While it is challenging to have accurate data about false accusations, the best available data shows that between 2% and 10% of accusations are shown to be false. The FBI claims that 8% of rape accusations are found to be false.  In contrast, unreported cases of assault (which, one must admit, are hard to quantify) are much higher than the number of false accusations. The best evidence suggests that only 35% of sexual assaults are reported. As such, an assault is unlikely to be reported and the odds of a false accusation are extremely low.

But one might insist that false accusations do happen. This is true, but the data shows the typical false allegation is made by a teenage girl trying to get out of trouble. So, the notion that women use false accusations to destroy men is not well supported. This is not to say that this is impossible, just that it is extremely unlikely. Going back to my fear of flying, the fear is not irrational because a crash could never happen. Rather, it is irrational because the fear is disproportional to the likelihood of a crash. So, the terror we men feel about being falsely accused of sexual assault is like my fear of flying: it is not a fear of the impossible, but a fear of the extremely unlikely.

There are, however, people who do have a reasonable fear of being wrongfully accused and convicted. These are black people (and other minorities). Many of those who are vocal about their fear of men being falsely accused of sexual assault have little or no concern about the wrongful accusation and conviction of minorities and express faith in that aspect of the legal system. This is an inconsistent view: if false accusations leading to harm are awful and something to worry about, then the false accusations against minorities should be seen this way. One might suspect that the worry does not stem from a passion for justice, but fear of accountability.

Imagine I am the CEO of a corporation whose factory farming practices drew the attention of the Humane Society and legislation has now been proposed to reign in my cruel excesses. If I appeared in a video complaining about the Humane Society forcing me to be less cruel and this would have a tiny impact on my vast wealth, few people would be sympathetic. If I was smart and evil, I would use astroturfing instead of honesty. Astroturfing involves concealing those behind a message or organization to make it seem that it arose and is funded by grassroot participants. In this imaginary scenario, I could hire a company to lay down some AstroTurf for me.

 While astroturfing can be a complicated, it usually involves three basic techniques. The first is using positive names for the shell organization(s). For example, my Astroturf organization might be called “Friends of Friendly Farming”, which is much more appealing than “Cow Cruelty Crusaders.”

A second technique is using commercials depicting the “common folk” who just happen to be extremely concerned about the issue. For example, my commercial might feature a mother venting her rage that meat would be unaffordable for her family if the wicked Humane Society had its way.

The third and key part of astroturfing is that those behind it remain anonymous. After all, if people knew that I was behind Friends of Friendly Farming, they would find it less appealing. Since astroturfing is inherently deceitful, it would seem to be immoral. But what, if anything should be done about it?

The use of deceptive names is unethical because of their rhetorical influence over people who might not otherwise support the group if its name matched its purpose. Going back to my example, most would find “Friends of Friendly Farming” appealing. But most would not be won over by “Make Sure Mike Keeps Making Money by Being Mean to Animals.” This technique is like advertising and labelling unhealthy junk food made in China as patriotic, healthy, “Yankee Snacks”. That is, it is deceit. However, just because something is unethical does not entail that it should be illegal.

While the First Amendment does not explicitly protect the right to deceptive speech, laws aimed at requiring honest naming for groups would seem unlikely to withstand scrutiny. There are also practical concerns about enforcement and the potential for abuse of such laws. For example, Republicans would presumably use such laws to insist that all liberal and moderate groups label themselves as “Woke Marxist Transgender Anti-American Vermin.”

 There is also the problem of sorting out whether terms, especially value terms, are being applied correctly. Value terms are especially challenging, given the extent to which even good faith disagreement about them exists. For example, determining whether a group called “Righteous Americans for Righteous Justice” is righteous and for righteous justice would be difficult. As such, while the use of intentionally deceptive names is unethical, it should not be illegal.

The use of dishonest and deceptive commercials is also unethical. They are like listing false ingredients on a food label to get people to buy it. It is also like catfishing. This is when a person pretends, online, to be someone desirable as part of an intentional deception. As with deceptive names, the use of actors portraying “common folk” with strong views on the issue is probably protected by the right to free expression.  There is also the fact that politicians favor allowing considerable leeway in certain deceptive practices, usually determined by which industry is bankrolling their re-election.  

As noted above, the essential quality of astroturfing is that the real parties remain anonymous, hidden behind an appealing shell. In addition to being unethical, this anonymity makes it difficult to assess the case made by those speaking for the anonymous entity. This is because the identity of the source of a claim is necessary to assess the credibility and possible bias of that source. While claims obviously stand or fall on their own, the identity of the source is critical to the practical matter of judging claims.

While there might be a right to deceptive (or persuasive, if one prefers) speech, there is not a right to anonymous speech. Requiring those funding groups and ads to identify themselves does not limit their right of free expression and it serves, as noted above, to protect the right of the listeners to properly assess the claims intended to influence them. Naturally, there are cases in which anonymous speech is morally acceptable—such as in oppressive regimes.

Those who engage in astroturfing might claim they would be harmed if their identities were known. After all, they want to be anonymous because they believe that if people knew their identities, then their efforts at persuasion would be less effective. As such, not being allowed to remain anonymous would harm them.

The easy and obvious response to this is that people do not have a moral right to remain anonymous simply because people would be less likely to be persuaded if they knew their identity. Using an analogy, a company wanting to sell dog meat could not justly claim it would be harmed if it was not allowed to hide the identity of the meat. In such cases, the right to know trumps the right of free expression. As such, it would be reasonable to have laws that forbid such anonymous funding. Naturally, moral exceptions can be made in oppressive countries that engage in unjust persecution.

Despite the American myth, upward mobility is limited and most of us will die in the class we were born into. Part of this myth is the often-true story that college helps people move up the economic ladder. My family fits this narrative. My father’s parents did not finish high school as they had to take jobs in a shoe factory to help support their families. My father finished high school, got a master’s degree, taught high school for years and after his first retirement taught mathematics at the college level. My mother also has an M.A. My sister and I went to college, and I ended up getting my PhD and staying forever as a professor. Because of my family story, I support college education for those who want it.

While college has never been cheap, the increase in the cost of higher education has outpaced inflation. The reasons are clear. First, many states have disinvested from public higher education. Some of this leftover from the last time the financial elites burned down the economy, but most of it is politics. Some of this is ideological: Republicans tend to oppose funding public colleges, preferring to channel money into private profits. There is also the practical reason that weakening public education can push students towards for-profit colleges who have lobbied Republicans and Democrats. With less public support, more of the burden falls on students and their families.

Second, there is massive administrative bloat. Some of this bloat is the number of administrators. For example, while there used to be just deans, there are now assistant deans and associate deans. There are also assistant provosts and associate provosts, and an impressive number of vice presidents at many universities.

 Some of the bloat is due to burdens imposed by the state, such as assessment and various education laws. Some of it is due to the obsession with remaking colleges into businesses. In addition to having well-compensated executives, schools now have marketing departments who talk about “the brand.” There is also the tendency of bureaucrats to expand their bureaucracy. Currently, schools have entire cadres of administrators with no direct connection to education. Despite, or perhaps because of, the increased number of administrators, more administrative tasks are assigned to faculty. This can require hiring more people to teach as their teaching time is devoured by administrative work.

In addition to the ever-increasing number of administrators there has also been a significant increase in their salaries, especially at the higher levels. University presidents can have salaries close to a million dollars and bonuses are common. This is also a result of the business model: high pay “management” ruling over lower pay “workers.” While administrators make the tired old arguments that top money is needed to attract top talent from the private sector (usual business), the same arguments rarely apply to faculty and other employees. Presumably because faculty are not as important to the mission of the university as administrators.

Third, there is the cost of facilities and amenities. Some of this expense is reasonable: smart classrooms are more expensive than the traditional classroom. Other luxury items mainly serve to drive up costs.

Since college provides a way to go up the ladder or at least get a strong grip on a rung, it is important to address the problem of high costs. While one solution has been to make colleges “free”, this runs into the obvious problem that there is no such thing as free college. “Free” college just shifts the cost. This shift can, however, be morally and economically justified—but the discussion needs to be honest about who is paying.

A less drastic solution is for states to return to investing in education. This was once seen as a good idea s as money spent on students was returned many times over as taxes and had many non-economic positive returns on the investment. Valuing helping people upwards does run against current trends, which is to funnel money upwards towards those who already have the most money

It would also help if the state reduced some of the imposed administrative burden on colleges. While this would have a negative impact on those employed in these administrative offices, it would help reduce the cost of education. The challenge is, however, sorting out which administrative burdens to lessen. Reducing administrative positions and salaries would also help.

The number of administrators could be brought back to the older ratios of administrators to everyone else and their salaries could be reduced to more closely match those of faculty. While it could be argued that this would cut down on the top talent, there are some obvious responses. One is that education attracts top talent faculty who are willing to work for relatively low salaries compared to what they could get in the private sector. While detractors of professors often think that people teach or engage in research at colleges because they are unable to get jobs in the private sector, most faculty chose the academic life. This is for a variety of reasons, ranging from the love of teaching to the difference in culture between the academy and the corporation (although this difference is shrinking). So, if the administrator’s argument about having to pay top dollar for top talent were good, then faculty would be terrible. Another is that various scandals and problems have shown what these top dollars sometimes buy.

Finally, schools can also cut their spending on facilities and things that are not relevant to their educational mission. There are, of course, other possibilities but these would be a good start to make college more affordable.

While one of many heroes in the Iliad, Odysseus is the main character of the Odyssey. He is characterized as possessing many positive traits, especially intelligence. While President Trump clearly lacks the intellectual keenness and skill at counsel of Odysseus, there are some interesting parallels between the two.

 Odysseus is famously presented as a skilled deceiver and fond of adultery (his own, of course). While his fellow heroes benefit from his cunning, Achilles and others regard him as a liar and condemn him for this. For the heroes of the Republican party, Trump occupies a similar role: they are pleased when he wins and assists them in winning but once found his lies and immoral actions (such as adultery) troubling. Trump, like Odysseus, is a master of deceit and disguise. For example, Trump has presented himself as a populist enemy of the elites while, at the same time, surrounding himself with billionaires.  Like Odysseus, Trump achieves victory through cunning and deceit—and thus deserves all the praise due such success.

While no one likes to lose, both Trump and Odysseus are obsessed with wining. Odysseus makes it clear that he wants to win in everything. One of Trump signature lines was that were he president, we would win so much we would be tired of winning.  Trump did lose his second run for President but won in his third attempt. There is even talk of a third term. While winning is generally seen as good, there is the question of what it means to be a victor.

In the case of Odysseus, being a victor means getting what he desires, despite the contrary wishes of friends or foes. “Odysseus’ outlook threatens to make nonsense of morality in the broadest sense: including those values that provide a guide for conduct in situations affecting the well-being of others, imposing constraints on what one may do in pursuit of personal gain.” Odysseus is thus someone who “disregards moral constraints to do anything at all in pursuit of his or her own goals.” Trump, famously, takes  the same approach: he pursues what he wants and does not let concerns about ethics or the interests of others interfere. While this might seem to make both Odysseus and Trump villains, it must be remembered that Odysseus is the (complicated) hero of the Odyssey. Likewise, Trump is a hero to his followers. This raises the question of how this is possible.

One tempting explanation is that Trump’s followers are somehow still deceived: they do not know what Trump truly is. If they knew, they would abandon him. But this view is, in many cases, implausible. While Trump’s supporters claim he is honest, religious, and acting in their interest their support is (usually) not the result of ignorance. Rather, as others have argued, they see Trump as acting against their enemies and his unethical behavior as justified because it is aimed at these enemies. Trump is, as his followers point out, “winning” and fighting against the “enemies of the people.” In this regard, Trump is much like Odysseus. He exemplifies the pre-Socratic “warrior-king” virtues. This is being strong, doing anything to win, and  providing his friends with a cut of the spoils.

Most importantly, this “warrior-king” promises to harm the perceived enemies of his followers and those they disike. If the “warrior-king” convinces his followers that he is hurting their enemies and protecting their share of the loot, they praise and follow him. If Trump was seen as losing, if he stopped attacking their enemies and could no longer convince his followers that he is protecting their share of the loot, then he would lose support. However, as long as he keeps hurting the right people and is seen as winning, then the loyalty of his base is assured. Ethical violations do not matter, unless they are violations that help the enemies of his followers. As such, his followers do not care about his adultery, they do not care about his lies, and they do not care about any collusion, crimes or other misdeeds. What matters to them is what matters to Trump: believing they are winning, and their enemies are losing.

The concept of tribalism is often used to explain American politics but is also wielded as a weapon. An expert might claim that tribalism is causing unwillingness to compromise, while a partisan might deride the tribalism of the other tribe. While this essay is not intended to explore the complexities of a rigorous definition of the concept, I will endeavor to discuss the matter in a neutral and rational way.

Tribalism is characterized by loyalty to the tribe. This differs from loyalty to principles or values. After all, a person who is loyal to a tribe because it is their tribe will remain loyal even when the values of the tribe change. In contrast, a person dedicated to values that a tribe just also happens to have at a certain time will leave that tribe if these values are abandoned. American tribalism involves value fluidity: as the tribe changes values, tribalists shift their values. For example, Republicans once endorsed free trade and opposed tariffs. They also professed to dislike deficits and spending. Trump, however, shifted these values and now the Republican tribe embraces tariffs, deficits and big government spending. Such is the power of tribalism that it trumps professed values.

It might be contended that tribes need values and principles to define them, hence this claim of fluidity is an exaggeration. However, the ease with which tribes shift values shows that it is real. People even develop myths that the values they profess now have always been the values of their tribe.

Tribalism has its origin in biology as humans are social animals and tribalism is the human equivalent of pack loyalty. Animals generally lack abstract principles or values, and this is one reason why tribalism trumps values—it is grounded in unthinking instinct. Tribalism is also fueled by cognitive biases. The most important is in-group bias, which is the tendency of people to see members of their own group as better than the members of other groups. This bias makes it easy for people to attribute positive qualities to members of their own tribe while easily assigning negative traits to those of other tribes. This probably also helps support value fluidity: whatever changes occur in the values professed by the tribe will still be seen as better than the values of other tribes. As might be expected, fallacious reasoning also plays a role in tribalism.

There is a fallacy, often called the “group think fallacy”, in which it is inferred that a claim is true (or something is good) because members of one’s group believe the claim (or hold to the values). This is obviously fallacious but has considerable psychological appeal. This also helps fuel value fluidity, since beliefs and values are not based on objective assessment, but by reference to the group. As would be expected, tribalism creates numerous problems.

One problem is that tribalism makes the professed values of the tribe meaningless. This is because loyalty is to the tribe rather than to the professed values. This does raise some interesting philosophical questions about the basis of tribal identity. It also creates a ship of Theseus style problem about whether there is a point at which a tribe has changed its professed values so much that it is no longer the same tribe. There are also some other interesting metaphysical problems about identity here as well in terms of what makes a tribe the same tribe across time and value changes.

A second problem is that tribalism encourages irrational behavior. They can often act contrary to what seem to be their own interests and against the general welfare because of the dictates of their tribal leaders. On the positive side, tribal leaders could issue commands that do coincide with the interests of the tribal members and the general welfare. However, this would be a matter of luck.

A third problem is that tribalism makes it easy for authoritarians to gain ready-made followers who happily serve them, no matter how terrible they are. Because of these problems, it would seem best to find ways to counter tribalism.

One obvious solution is improving critical thinking, so that people can recognize the defects behind and of tribalism. However, mere logic is obviously enough—people also need training in goodness and commitment to virtue, as per Aristotle. But tribalism provides its members with a defense against critical thinking and training in the virtues.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Celebrate Discount Chocolate Day: A Sweet Deal for Your Post-Valentine’s Blues

Tallahassee, FL – February 14, 2025 – As the echoes of “I love you” and heart-shaped confetti settle, there’s a new holiday sweeping the nation: Discount Chocolate Day! This delightful holiday takes place the day after Valentine’s Day and is dedicated to selling off all the sad, leftover chocolate. Because nothing says “I survived another Valentine’s Day” like a sweet deal on chocolate that’s been through the emotional wringer.

Whether you spent Valentine’s Day in the loving arms of your significant other or indulging in the fine art of solo Netflix binge-watching, Discount Chocolate Day is here to sweeten the deal. The shelves are stocked with chocolates that might be a little bruised, a bit salty from all the lonely tears, but still deliciously edible!

Highlights of Discount Chocolate Day:

  • Sad Chocolate Sales: Indulge in heart-shaped chocolates that didn’t find a home on Valentine’s Day. They’ve been marked down, and they’re ready to fill your heart (and stomach) with joy.
  • Tear-Infused Treats: Experience a unique taste sensation with chocolates that are just a tad salty—infused with the essence of Valentine’s tears. It’s the perfect blend of sweet and salty, with a hint of “I’m totally fine.”
  • Leftover Love: Pick up those special edition Valentine’s Day treats that didn’t get the memo. They might have been overlooked on the 14th, but on the 15th, they’re the star of the show.
  • Discounted Decadence: Enjoy premium chocolates at a fraction of the price. Because love may be fleeting, but discounted chocolate is forever.

So, join us in celebrating the unsung heroes of Valentine’s Day—those neglected chocolates that still deserve a place in our hearts and pantries. Head to your nearest store and stock up on these sweet deals. After all, nothing cures the post-Valentine’s blues like a mouthful of discounted chocolate!

About Discount Chocolate Day: Discount Chocolate Day is a holiday created to bring humor, joy, and delicious deals to chocolate lovers everywhere. Celebrated on February 15th, it’s a lighthearted reminder that love comes in many forms, including half-price candy.

Contact Information: For more information about Discount Chocolate Day, please contact: Discount Chocolate Day Headquarters Email: info@discountchocolateday.com Phone: (555) 123-4567

END

In 1985 Officer Julius Shulte responded to a missing child report placed by the then girlfriend of Vernon Madison. Madison snuck up on the officer and murdered him by shooting him in the back of the head. Madison was found guilty and sentenced to death.

As the wheels of justice slowly turned, Madison aged and developed dementia. He was scheduled to be executed in January 2018 but the execution was delayed and the Supreme Court heard his case. The defense’s argument was that Madison’s dementia prevents him from remembering the crime and his execution would violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The prosecution seemed to agree that Madison could not recall the crime but argued he should be executed because he can understand that he will be put to death for being convicted of murder. In a 5-3 opinion, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment may permit executing a prisoner even they cannot remember committing their crime, but it may prohibit executing someone suffering from dementia or another disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The Court also held that if a prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for their sentence, the Eighth Amendment forbids their execution. While the legal issue has been settled (for now), there still remains philosophical questions.

While metaphysics might seem far removed from the courts, as John Locke noted, “in this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment…” The reason for this is obvious: it is only just to punish (or reward) the person who committed the misdeed (or laudable deed). Locke is talking about metaphysical personal identity: what it is to be a person and what it is to be the same person across time. As such, he is using the term technically and not in the casual sense in which terms like “person” and “man” or “woman” are used interchangeably.

In the normal pursuit of legal justice, the practical goal is to find the right person and there are no worries about the metaphysics of personal identity. But in unusual circumstances, the question can arise as to whether what seems to be the same person really is the same person. For example, one might wonder whether a person with severe dementia is the same metaphysical person who committed the long ago crime.  Appropriately enough, John Locke addressed this problem in considerable detail.

In discussing personal identity, Locke notes that being the same man (or woman) is not identical with being the same person. For him, being the same man is a matter of biological identity: it is the same life of the body through which flows a river of matter over the years. Being the same person is having the same consciousness. Locke seems to take consciousness to be awareness and memory. In any case, he hinges identity on memory such that if memory is irretrievably lost, then the identity is broken. For example, if I lose the memory of running a 5K back in 1985, then I would not be the same person as the person who ran that 5K. I am certainly a slower person, even if I am the same person. If a loss of memory does entail a loss of personal identity, then perhaps a “memory defense” could be used: a person who cannot remember a crime is not the person who committed the crime.

Locke does consider the use of the memory defense in court and addresses this challenge with practical epistemology. If the court can establish that the same man (biological identity) but the defendant cannot establish that they have permanently lost the memory of the misdeed, then the matter will be “proved against them” and they should be found guilty. Locke does remark that in the afterlife, God will know the fact of the matter and punish (or reward) appropriately. However, if it can be established that the person does not remember what the man (or woman) did, then they would not be the same person as that man (or woman). For Locke punishing a different person for what the same man did would be unjust.

While there is the practical matter of knowing whether a person has forgotten, this seemed to have been established in the Madison case. While people can lie about their memory, dementia seems impossible to fake, as there are objective medical tests for the condition. As such, concerns about deception can be set aside and the question remains as to whether the person who committed the crime is still present to be executed. On Locke’s theory he would not—the memories that would forge the chain of identity have been devoured by the demons of dementia.

There are, of course, many other theories of personal identity to choose from. For example, one could go with the view that the same soul makes the same person. One must simply find a way to identify souls to make this work. There are other options to pull from the long history of philosophy. It is also worth considering various justifications for punishment in this context.

Punishment is typically justified in terms of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. While rehabilitation might be possible in the afterlife, execution cannot rehabilitate a person for the obvious reason that it kills them. While the deterrence value of execution has failed to deter the person to be executed, it could be argued that it will deter others—which is a matter of debate. It could be argued that executing a person with dementia will have deterrent value. In fact, it could be contended that showing that the state is willing to kill even people with dementia would make the state even more terrifying. For the deterrence justification, the metaphysical identity of the person does not seem to matter. What matters is that the punishment would deter others, which is essentially a utilitarian argument.

The retribution justification takes us back to personal identity: retribution is only just if it is retribution against the person who committed the crime. It could be argued that retribution only requires retribution against the same man (or woman) because matters of metaphysics are too fuzzy for such important matters. One could also use the retribution justification by advancing another theory of personal identity. For example, at one point David Hume argues that a person is a bundle of perceptions united by a causal chain (rather like how a nation has its identity). On his view, memory discovers identity but (unlike for Locke) it is not the basis of identity. Hume explicitly makes the point that a person can forget and still be the same person; so, Madison could still be the same person who committed the crime on Hume’s account. However, Hume closes his discussion on personal identity in frustration: he notes that the connections can become so tenuous and frayed that one cannot really say if it is the same person or not. This would seem to apply in cases of dementia and hence Madison might not be the same person, even in Hume’s view.

This view could be countered by arguing that it is the same person regardless of the deterioration of mental states. One approach, as noted above, is to go with the soul as the basis of personal identity or make an intuition argument by asking “who else could it be but him?” One could, of course, also take the pragmatic approach and set aside worries of identity and just embrace what the court decided. Vernon Madison was not executed but died on February 22, 2020.

The Declaration of Independence asserts a variation of Locke’s political philosophy, claiming that all men are created equal and have  the natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Locke said there is a right to property rather than a right to the pursuit of happiness.  As one of my political science professors noted, the founders had most of the property and did not want other people to get ideas.

If this document is taken seriously as a statement of American political philosophy and values, it commits all Americans to the equality of people and to these three basic rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. While the notion of equality and the specifics of these rights are subject to debate and disagreement, their interpretation cannot stray too far, or they become meaningless or absurd. For example, when South Carolina seceded from the Union the authors appealed to the principle of liberty as a justification for maintaining slavery. Asserting that the natural right of liberty justifies rebellion to maintain the violation of the natural right of liberty is clearly an absurd position, but no more absurd than positions taken on rights today.

While slavery is currently illegal (with a few exceptions) there are still violations of the principle of equality and these natural rights. As might be suspected, minorities are often the targets of such violations.  Skeptics often say they see no evidence of systematic violations in their own experiences and then claim is no such thing. If examples are offered, the response is usually that these examples are anecdotal evidence or that the alleged violations are not real violations, but consequences brought about by the individuals in question. That is, that they must have done something wrong that justified what was done to them.

These replies do have some appeal. After all, an appeal to anecdotal evidence to establish a general claim would be a fallacy.  There can also be cases in which apparent violations are instead self-inflicted harm. Responding to the charge of anecdotal evidence requires the presenting of statistical data in support of the claim that such violations exist. Responding to the assertion that the apparent violations are the fault of the alleged victims requires showing that the harms are inflicted rather than self-inflicted.

The statistical evidence for inequality is overwhelming, with blacks and Hispanics in the United States consistently being worse off than white Americans. The disparity begins at birth,  as infant mortality for blacks is more than double that of whites. It ends, one assumes, at death. While the life expectancy of Americans has been declining, black Americans have a lower average life expectancy than white Americans. It should be noted that “deaths of despair” have increased among middle-aged whites as they have been facing conditions routinely endured by blacks and Hispanics (notably a shortage of steady, well-paying jobs). While this might be seen as evidence against the existence of racism (that social ills are increasingly killing whites, too) it serves more to highlight the impact of economic disparity that has always been present. That class disparity is “equalizing” the harms of racism is obviously not a good thing.

Between birth and death, blacks and Hispanics are far more likely to grow up in poverty, less likely to graduate from high school, less likely to be enrolled in college, more likely to earn less money, more likely to lack insurance, and far less likely to own rather than rent. This is not to deny that there are whites who are in dire straits nor is it to ignore anecdotes about the misfortunes of whites. However, this is a matter of statistics and in general blacks and Hispanics are worse-off than whites. While this establishes the statistical evidence, there remains the question of causation.

The racist explanation is that whites are generally superior to blacks and Hispanics and hence do better at life. This view of racial superiority and inferiority is, by definition, racist. However, being morally repugnant does not make something false. Being untrue makes it false.

If there were different races with different abilities, this would show up in genetic testing. However, the scientific evidence is that there is no biological foundation to the categories of race. It could be argued that the differences are undetectable by current science or, perhaps, that they are metaphysical in nature. The obvious problem with such claims is that they are based on a fallacious  appeal to ignorance and the burden of proof rests on those who claim they know there is a difference. As such, the biological superiority argument fails.

Another stock explanation is cultural: white culture is superior to black and Hispanic culture, so whites do better. This avoids the appeal to biological race and instead attributes negative traits (like laziness or criminality) to the cultures. One point of concern with this approach is defining cultures. After all, Americans share a broad culture and those who embrace the allegedly successful culture should tend to succeed at the same rate as whites. After all, anyone can adopt a culture (or appropriate it) and thus succeed. If it were that simple, presumably inequality would have ended long ago. Even if the cultural hypothesis is accepted, there arises the question as to why such cultures exist and have the alleged traits.

Given the historical facts of slavery and racism, the most plausible explanation is that blacks and Hispanics inherit many of the residual the harms of the past centuries while the white population, in general, inherits the benefits. While there are some remarkable rags-to-riches stories,  the United States has low economic mobility and even this has been on the decline. As such, it is no wonder that people whose ancestors were slaves in the United States would still be doing worse than those who owned slaves. After all, wealth provides an enduring advantage, and poverty provides an enduring disadvantage.

Some make the argument that since slavery ended over a century ago, its effects cannot possibly be felt. While this is an absurd claim (think of the old money families who owe their wealth to things that happened long ago), one need not rely on an appeal to the impact of the past. One can simply run through examples of and data about contemporary racism.

Those that disagree with this claim will, of course, endeavor to claim that the examples are isolated incidents and that the statistics are either in error or lies. The challenge is, of course, to respond to the data with opposing data of equal or greater credibility. The other main alternative, as noted above, is to persist in arguing that while the harms are real, they are self-inflicted. While people are sometimes their own worst enemy, the evidence is solid that many of the harms of inequality are inflicted. These, in turn, impact the liberty and life of those affected—which runs against the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. But these sorts of fact-based arguments are generally ineffective as such beliefs are based on values rather than logic. That is, it is not that racists are racists because they have false factual beliefs about statistical data. They are racists because of their values.

It is common practice to sequence infants to test for various conditions. From a moral standpoint, it seems obvious that these tests should be applied and expanded as rapidly as cost and technology permit (if the tests are useful, of course). The main argument is utilitarian: these tests can find dangerous, even lethal conditions that might not be otherwise noticed until it is too late. Even when such conditions cannot be cured, they can often be mitigated. As such, there would seem to be no room for debate on this matter. But, of course, there is.

One concern is the limited availability of medical services. Once an infant is sequenced, parents will need experts to interpret the results. If sequencing is expanded, this will involve dividing limited resources, which will create the usual problems. While the obvious solution is to train more people to interpret results, this faces the usual problems of expanding the number of available medical experts. Another resource problem will arise when problems are found. Parents who have the means will want to address the issues the tests expose, but not everyone has the resources. Also of concern is the fact that conditions that can be found by sequencing can manifest at different times: some will become problems early in life, others manifest later. This raises the problem of distributing access to the limited number of specialists so that infants with immediate needs get priority access.

One obvious reply to the concerns about access is that this is not a special problem for infant sequencing; it runs broadly across health care. And, of course, there is already a “solution”: the rich and connected get priority access to care. The same “solution” will presumably also be applied in the case of sequencing infants.

Another sensible reply to these concerns is that these are not problems with sequencing, but problems with the medical system. That is, shortages of medical experts and difficulty in accessing the system based on need. Sequencing infants will put more burden on the system and this does raise the moral question of whether the burden will be worth the return. On the face of it, of course, improving medical care for infants would seem to be worth it.

A second concern about sequencing is that, like other medical tests, it might end up doing more harm than good. On the face of it, this might seem an absurd thing to claim: how could a medical test do more harm than good? After all, knowing about potential health threats ahead of time is analogous to soldiers knowing of an upcoming ambush, or a community knowing about an incoming storm before it arrives. In all these cases, foreknowledge is good because it allows people to prepare and makes it more likely that they will succeed. As such, sequencing is the right thing to do.

While this view of foreknowledge is plausible, medical tests are not an unmitigated good. After all, medical tests can create anxiety and distress that create more harm than the good they do. There is also an established history of medical tests that are wasteful and, worse, those that end up causing significant medical harm. Because of the potential for such harms, it would be unethical to simply rush to expand sequencing. Instead, the accuracy and usefulness of the tests need to be  determined.

It might be countered, with great emotion, that if even a single child is saved by rapidly expanding sequencing, then it would be worth it. The rational reply is, of course, that it would not be worth it if expanding the sequencing too quickly ended up hurting many children. As such, the right thing to do is to address the possible risks rationally and avoid getting led astray by fear and hope.

 

David Hume is credited with raising what is now known as the problem of induction. As Hume noted, the contrary of any matter of fact is logically possible. To illustrate, it is not a contradiction to claim that although the earth is now rotating around the sun, this will not hold true tomorrow. This is in contrast with what he called the truths of reason, as it is a contradiction to deny them. For example, to deny that a triangle has three sides is to assert that a three-sided figure does not have three sides.

In considering our reasoning about matters of fact, Hume notes that we try to justify our beliefs by appealing to other beliefs about causal laws. That is, people tend to think that there is a causal order set in the laws of nature that ensures a consistent universe. For Hume, an empiricist, this process is based on experience. As he sees it, people observe similarities between events and then form the expectation that the same things will occur in unobserved cases (such as those occurring in the future).  While most of us have faith in causality based on our experience, Hume contends that the reasoning from the observed cases to the unobserved cases is unwarranted. The gist of his argument focuses on the idea that the future will be like the past, which is essential to engaging in inductive reasoning about the future. This sort of reasoning takes the form of inferring that because X happened in situation Y in the past, X will happen in situation Y in the future. For example, people think the earth will still be revolving around the sun tomorrow because it has done so in the past. The challenge is showing that this reasoning is warranted. Hume claims this cannot be done.

As Hume argued, the argument that because X has happened in the past, X will happen in the future is not a sound deductive argument. This is because it could be true that X has happened in the past, while the conclusion could still be false. A sound deductive argument must, of course, be valid (such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true) and have all true premises. This is by definition.

If one attempts to justify inductive logic by using an inductive argument, this will beg the question. To justify induction by induction, inductive logic would already need to be justified. As such, neither a deductive nor inductive argument can justify induction and so we get the problem of induction. In practical terms, the problem is that since an inductive argument always involves a leap from what has been observed to what has not been observed, even if all the premises are true and the reasoning is strong, the conclusion could still be false.

Like many other philosophical problems, the problem of induction initially seems silly and trivial. It seems silly because, as Hume noted, only a fool or a mad person would deny faith in induction. For example, someone who insisted that while fire is hot today it might be cold tomorrow would be regarded as deranged. It seems trivial because, like the problem of the external world, it seems to have no real-world implications. However, it is neither silly nor trivial.

The easy way to argue for this is to point out that the problem of induction has serious practical consequences. Inductive reasoning is used in all aspects of life and the consequences of not keeping this problem in mind range from the embarrassing to the disastrous. For example, most of the inductive generalizations (surveys and polls) predicted that Clinton would win in 2016. While many were shocked when these polls “got it wrong”, this was one more example of the problem of induction: no matter how careful the evidence is gathered and how skillfully the argument is crafted, the conclusion can always be false. As another example, a person might be confident that they will safely arrive at their destination and end up dying in a plane crash. After all, that inference is also inductive. More broadly, the problem infects all inductive reasoning ranging from simple analogies to large scale scientific experiments. As such, it is only fools and lunatics who do not worry about the problem of induction and consider that no matter how careful they are in their reasoning, they could still get things wrong.

At this point, it might be claimed that although this practical aspect of the problem of induction is a meaningful problem, the philosophical variation is still trivial and silly. To be more specific, the notion that our faith in basic aspects of reality is unfounded is a silly idea. For example, to say that while gravity, fire and electromagnetism work in certain ways now, they might not work the same tomorrow would be absurd. Gravity will always work as it does, fire will always burn and so on. Even those who accept inductive arguments can always fail tend to have faith in a consistent and reliable reality.  However, as Hume argued, this faith is unwarranted.

As noted above, the idea that induction can fail in everyday cases is reasonable. For example, it is clearly not absurd to consider that while someone loves you today, they might stop loving you someday. As another example, it is not silly to think that while you have never been allergic to bee stings in the past, you might become allergic to them. In such cases, our faith is not absolute, and we accept the possibility of error. But, in the case of things like fire and gravity, our faith tends to be absolute. A seemingly faithful spouse might betray their partner, but fire will always burn.  But, of course, our faith reflects our feelings and not reality and we simply feel strongly, but we do not know, that fire will always burn and so on for the other matters of our faith in the workings of the world. If we set aside our faith and consider the matter in terms of inductive reasoning, then we would realize that our confidence that the future will be like the past is not well founded. We could be wrong, though we certainly feel otherwise. After all, the same inductive logic that is used for brand buying (“my previous Asics shoes were good, so the next pair I buy will also be good”) is also used for predicting that future fire will be like past fire. The main difference thus cannot be in the logic; it lies in how we feel. Because of this, what is needed is not another logical argument about the problem, but a way to sway intuitions. This is a common approach in the case of big and weird philosophical problems, such as the problem of the external world.

The problem of the external world, which was most famously developed by Descartes in his Meditations, is the problem of proving that the world I think I am experiencing is really real for real. Like most philosophy professors, for years I found it challenging to motivate students to see the problem as a real problem. After all, thinking that the world is not real seems like insanity. Then the Matrix came out and getting people to accept the problem became easy. Fortunately, shows like Black Mirror provide fresher examples. Unfortunately, there has yet to be a big movie or show that includes the problem of induction as a central theme. However, I can use video games to illustrate this problem

Imagine, if you will, that you are a character in a video game like Destiny 2, World of Warcraft or Warframe. From your perspective, the world has rules, and things work in the same way. At least until they do not. After all, a game world is under the control of the programmers, and they can change the reality at will. Think of what the inhabitants of such game worlds would think if they were aware and could remember what had come before. For example, the developers of Destiny 2 accidentally released a bugged weapon, the Prometheus Lens, into the game.  Because of the bug, the weapon could kill a character in player versus player battles almost instantly making it insanely overpowered and broken. Bungie then patched the weapon (“nerfing” it, in gamer slang) so that it would perform properly. From the standpoint of the game world inhabitants, the weapon suddenly and inexplicably went from a fiery engine of instant death to an average gun. Game worlds can also experience far more radical alterations: entire sections of mechanics can change with a patch or update. Players, of course, know that the changes are made in the code by programmers. But, from the perspective of the hypothetical game world inhabitants, reality suddenly changes without any warning or explanation.

Now imagine that we live in a world subject to the alterations of a creator—we could suddenly find that our game has been patched or updated and that there are radical differences between yesterday and today. To say that we have not seen such changes in the past would miss the point—after all, the last patch or update could have been long before our time or perhaps this will be the first update or patch. We have no way of knowing whether this is impossible or not—which is, of course, the problem of induction.