There is a minimum income needed to survive, to pay for necessities such as food, shelter, clothing and health care. To address this need, the United States created a minimum wage. However, this wage has not kept up with the cost of living and many Americans do not earn enough to support themselves. These people are known, appropriately enough, as the working poor. This raises an obvious moral and practical question: who should bear the cost of making up the difference between the minimum wage and a living wage? The two main options seem to either employers can pay employees enough to live on, or taxpayers will need to pick up the tab. Another alternative is to simply not make up for the difference and allow people to try to survive in desperate poverty. In regards to who currently makes up the difference, at least in Oregon, the answer was given in the University of Oregon’s report on “The High Cost of Low Wages in Oregon.”

According to the report, roughly a quarter of the workers in Oregon made no more than $12 per hour. Because of this, many workers qualify for public assistance, such as SNAP (better known as food stamps). Not surprisingly, many low-paid workers are employed by large, highly profitable corporations.

According to Raahi Reddy, a faculty member at the University of Oregon, “Basically state and taxpayers are helping these families subsidize their incomes because they get low wages working for the companies that they do.” As such, the answer is that the taxpayers are making up the difference between wages and living wages. Interestingly, Oregon is a leader in two categories: one is the percentage of workers on public support and the other is having among the lowest corporate tax rates. This suggests that the burden falls heavily on the workers who are not on public support (both in and outside of Oregon).

The authors of the report recommended shifting some burden from the taxpayers to the employers in the form of an increased minimum wage and paid sick leave for workers. Not surprisingly, increasing worker compensation is unpopular with corporations. After all, more for the workers means less for the executives and shareholders.

Assuming that workers should receive enough resources to survive, the moral concern is whether this cost should be shifted from the taxpayers to the employers or remain on the taxpayers.

One argument in favor of leaving the burden on the taxpayers is that it is not the moral responsibility of the corporations to pay a living wage. Their moral obligation is not to the workers but to the shareholders and this obligation is to maximize profits (presumably within the limits of the law).

One response is that businesses are part of civil society and this imposes certain moral obligations on all members of that society. These obligations include providing at least a living wage to full-time employees. It could argued that it is fairer that the employer pay a living wage than to expect the taxpayer to make up the difference. After all, the taxpayers are not profiting from the labor of the workers, so they would be subsidizing the profits of the employers by allowing them to pay workers less. Forcing the taxpayers to make up the difference is unjust and is robbing them to increase corporate profits.

It could be countered that requiring a living wage could destroy a company, thus putting the workers into a worse situation, that of being unemployed rather than underpaid. This is a legitimate concern, at least for businesses that would be unable to survive if they paid a living wage. However, this argument would not work for business, such as Walmart, that have robust profit margins. It might be claimed that there must be one standard for all businesses, be they a tiny bookstore that is barely staying open or a megacorporation that hands out millions in bonuses to top management. The obvious reply is that there are already different standards that apply to different businesses based on the differences between them and some of these are even reasonable and morally acceptable.

Another line of argumentation is to show that there is, in fact, no obligation to ensure citizens have a living income. In this case, employers would would have no obligation. The taxpayers would also not have any obligation, but they could elect lawmakers to pass laws authorizing that tax dollars be spent supporting the poor. That is, the taxpayers could chose to provide charity to the poor. This is not obligatory, but merely a nice thing to do. Some business could, of course, also choose to be nice, they could pay full-time workers at least a living wage. But this should, one might argue, be entirely a matter of choice.

Some folks would, of course, want to take this even further: if assisting other citizens to have a living income is a matter of choice and not an obligation, then tax dollars should not be used to assist those who make less than a living wage. Rather, this should be a matter of voluntary charity, and everyone should be free to decide where their money goes. Naturally, consistency would require that this principle of free choice be extended beyond just assisting the poor.  After all, free choice entails that people should decide as individuals whether to contribute to the salaries of members of the legislatures, to the cost of wars, to subsidies to corporations, to the CIA, to the FBI and so on. This does, obviously enough, have some appeal as the state would operate like a collection of charity recipients, getting whatever money people wished to contribute. The only major downside is that it would probably result in the collapse of civil society.

 

 

While science fiction has intelligent trees and fantasy has its ents and dryads, the idea of trees thinking has often been used to mock philosophers. But scientists now seriously consider the question of whether trees have mental states, such as feelings. This scientific acceptance allows a non-mocking philosophical discussion of the issue.

From a philosophical standpoint, the issue is whether a tree can have a mind. Unfortunately, philosophers do not agree on the nature of the mind. I will consider whether some of the main theories of mind would allow for thinking trees. There are a variety of philosophic theories which attempt to explain the mind. Some of the better-known ones include identity theory, substance dualism, property dualism and functionalism. The implications of each will be considered in turn.

Identity theory is a materialist theory of mind; the view that the mind is composed of matter. Identity theorists assert each mental state is identical to a state of the central nervous system. So, the mind is the central nervous system and its states. Given identity theory, trees cannot think. This is because they lack a central nervous system of the sort humans possess. But this could be criticized as human-centric, and it could be argued that a tree can have mental states that are identical to the relevant physical states of its body.

Substance dualists claim reality contains two fundamental types of substances: material and immaterial. On this view, which was embraced by Descartes, the mind is an immaterial substance which has a causal relation with its body. This mysterious relation enables the mind to control and receive information from the body and allows the body to affect the mind. On this view, a tree could have a mind. A tree having an incorporeal mind connected to its material shell is no more mysterious that a human having an incorporeal mind. It is also no less mysterious. The popular version of substance dualism is that a person is their soul and this soul brings life to the body. A tree having a soul is also no more (or less) mysterious than a human having a soul.

A second type of dualism is property dualism: the mind and body are not distinct substances. Instead, the mind is made up of mental properties that are not identical with physical properties. For example, the property of being the feeling of sadness could not be reduced to a physical property of the brain, such as the firing of certain neurons. So, the mind and body are distinct, but not different substances.

This sort of dualism would allow for trees to think. This is because the theory does not require the physical properties of the body be the same properties that make up the human nervous system. All that would be needed is the right sort of mental and physical properties. Again, that trees could have this metaphysical makeup is no stranger than the belief that humans do.

The last view to be considered is functionalism. There are many varieties of functionalism, but they all have a common foundation: mental states are defined in functional terms. A functional definition of a mental state defines that mental state in terms of its role/function in a mental system of inputs and outputs. To illustrate, a mental state, such as being in pain, is defined in terms of the causal relations it has to external influences on the body, other mental states, and bodily behavior.

Functionalism is usually taken to be a materialist view of the mind because the functional systems are supposed to be physical systems. While identity theory and functionalism are both materialist theories, they differ in a critical way. For identity theorists, each mental state, such as being sad, is identical to a physical state, such as the state of neurons in a specific part of the brain. For two mental states to be the same, the physical states must be identical. So, if mental states are states of neurons in a certain part of the human nervous system, then anything that lacks this sort of biological nervous cannot have a mind.

The functionalist has a different view: a mental state, such as feeling sad, is not defined in terms of a physical state. Instead, while functionalists believe each mental state is some physical state, for two mental states to be the same they need only be functionally identical.  So, if mental states are defined functionally, then anything that can exhibit these functions can have a mind. While trees obviously lack the brain and nervous system of a human, they could have physical systems that function in analogous ways. To use an analogy, different computer hardware can run the same programs. For example, this essay can be read using on a wide variety of hardware platforms including an Android phone, an Xbox One and perhaps even an old Macintosh with a Motorola chip. 

While the issue of whether trees do think or not remains, this essay has addressed the issue of whether they could have minds within the context of modern philosophy of mind. If dualism, property dualism or functionalism is correct, then trees could have minds and think. However, if identity theory is correct, then trees cannot think. Unless, of course, a tree philosopher has an identity theory for trees.