A Philosopher's Blog

Philosophical Essays on Many Subjects

Meat

Metaphysics of Meat II: The Morality of Meat

by Leave a Comment

Put roughly, vegetarians are defined by their refusal to eat meat. Vegans take it further and refuse to eat any animal products. There are, as vegetarians and vegans will tell you, many varieties of each with some involving very subtle nuances about what is and is not acceptable to eat. While this oversimplifies things, people tend to embrace these views for two broad reasons. Moral vegans/vegetarians are motivated by ethical concerns—they believe that it is morally wrong to harm animals. Some take a broader view and include the sum of harms done by consuming animals, such as the environmental damage and wastefulness of animal farming. Health vegans/vegetarians are motivated by concerns about their physical well-being; they regard animal products as being unhealthy. It is obviously possible to have both (and other) motivations, but I will consider ethics in context of defining meat.

From a moral standpoint, the concern about meat (and other products) is the harm done to the animals. For example, the creation of veal and foie gras are both moral nightmares of animal suffering. The production of eggs and milk are also often terrible for the chickens and cows involved. In the case of animals harvested for their meat, even if they are treated well, they are still killed and consumed. Since vegans and vegetarians need to eat to avoid death, they turn to eating plants and plant products.

Embed from Getty Images

The moral justification for eating plants, which are living things, is typically based on the claim that plants do not suffer. They lack, it is argued, the sort of nervous system needed to even feel pain. As such they either lack moral status or have a status that allows them to be consumed. This is despite the fact that plants are obviously alive. Interesting, and to the annoyance of some vegans I know, there has been some scientific research into the idea that plants have some degree of awareness or even intelligence. However, this line of discussion would go beyond the intended focus of this work—which is synthetic meat.

On the face of it, synthetic meat that is gown would seem to be analogous to a plant. While the synthetic meat would be alive, it would not be part of an animal that possessed the capacity to suffer. As such, it would be morally equivalent to a plant (as most people see them)—a source of food that cannot suffer. This would seem to make such meat non-meat, at least from the standpoint of a moral vegan or vegetarian. Then again, a vegan could counter that the cells needed to grow the synthetic meat were original taken from an animal, which would make it unacceptable. An obvious reply is that taking a few cells from an animal would not hurt it. This problem could also be addressed by using source animals that would be well cared for and allowed to die natural deaths. In this case, the moral objection would have to be very abstract—that there is just something wrong with consuming any animal product, regardless of any other factors.

One way to address this concern would be to create completely synthetic meat that has no direct link to an animal. This synthetic product would be identical to meat but would be completely artificial. As such, no animal would be harmed directly or indirectly in the creation of the synthetic meat, thus making it morally not-meat. The odd logic would be that if meat is murder and synthetic meat is not murder, then it is not meat. While this is a bit silly, it does have a certain appeal.

It could be objected that it is not the ethics of the meat that makes meat what it is. To use an analogy, a stolen potato would be morally different from an honestly acquired potato, but both would still be potatoes. As such, it could be argued that even “moral” meat would still be meat, and thus unacceptable to a certain sort of vegan or vegetarian. The challenge would be, of course, to show what it is about such “moral” meat that would still make it immoral. One obvious approach would be the costs of producing it—synthetic meat is and probably will remain inefficient relative to using resources to grow plant-based foods. However, this would apply to anything wasteful of resources and would not be meat specific. It would, for example, apply to the wasteful process of growing almonds in California.

Given the above, synthetic meat would be morally distinct from classic meat. On the one hand, it could be contended that this would make it not-meat. As such, vegans and vegetarians could eat it and still claim to not be eating meat. On the other hand, it could simply be claimed that it would simply be moral meat that moral vegans and vegetarians could eat, thus making them non-vegans and non-vegetarians.

 

My Amazon Author Page

My Paizo Page

My DriveThru RPG Page

My Dungeon Masters Guild Page

Follow Me on Twitter

Metaphysics of Meat I: What is Meat?

by 13 Comments

While synthetic meat (to use the term broadly) has long been a staple chow in science fiction, researchers are working hard to make it a commercially viable product. While there are many controversial aspects to lab grown meat, one matter of dispute is whether it is, in fact, meat.

As would be suspected, a legal battle is already underway over the legal definition of “meat” in the context of commercial food sales. Since this is a legal matter, the definition of “meat” in this context will most likely be settled in favor of whichever side can best lobby the relevant lawmakers.  Interestingly, the legal definitions need have nothing to do with the way chemists or nutritionists would define a food. For example, since high fructose corn syrup has a bad reputation among consumers, the industry tried to get the name changed to “corn sugar.” To the chemist and nutritionist, high fructose corn syrup is a sugar; but the sugar industry rejects this definition—they presumably see a financial advantage in fighting this legal label. While the legal wrangling over how foods should be categorized can be interesting, it does not have much philosophical relevance when it comes to trying to determine what it is to be meat. After all, the legal answer is easy and obvious: it is whatever the law says, and this need have no rational foundation at all. As such, it is wisest to move on from the legal matter.

Embed from Getty Images

While philosophers are often accused of lacking common sense, there are some who think this is where philosophy should begin. That is, when trying to define what something is, a good starting point is where we already are in terms of common sense. J.S. Mill took this approach in his discussion of poetry, electing to start with the generally accepted view of poetry and working from there. This seems to be a sensible approach and will be applied to the matter of meat.

The common-sense definition of “meat” is that it is the edible flesh of an animal, most commonly the muscle tissue. While people do refer to the kernel of a nut as “nut meat”, common sense divides this sort of meat from animal meats. To illustrate, a vegan will not smugly say, “I do not eat coconut because that is meat.” But a vegan would refuse to eat a turkey leg—because that is the meat they do not eat. As such, I will stick with animal-based meats and ignore the other uses of the term “meat.” This does entail that I am rejecting all plant-based meats—they are not real meat.

On the face of it, synthetic meat would not seem to meet the common-sense definition. It is not cut from an animal; it is grown in a vat (or whatever). Thus, it would fail to be meat. On this view, it is the origin of the meat that defines it as meat. At this point, one could raise a weird sci-fi scenario: what if scientists created an animal whose body also included vegetable matter, such as potatoes growing within a cow? The carrots would be part of the animal, but they would not seem to be meat. As such, the composition of the material also matters—to be meat, it must have the right sort of makeup (typically muscle tissue). On this view, composition would be a necessary condition for being meat (so cow-potatoes would not be meat). But composition would not be a sufficient condition. On this view, synthetic meat that was not cut from an animal would not be meat. While this quick and easy solution is appealing, it does not seem to be the final word.

Suppose that a cut of muscles cells is taken from a cow. This would obviously be a steak. No suppose that the cells were cultivated in a lab and grown into a massive slab. These cells originated from the steak and are the same. As such, it would seem to be hard to deny that the slab is not meat. To us an analogy, if someone took a plant cutting and grew a slab of the plant cells in the lab, it would seem undeniable that the slab would be plant matter (unfortunately, “plant” does not work like “meat”, so I can’t say “would be plant”). The same should also apply to meat.

There are two replies to this analogy. One is to argue that plants lack the individuality of animals and hence plant material works differently from meat. If potato was grown as a slab in the lab, it would still be potato. But meat must come from an individual animal or it is not meat. The second reply is that the “plant” slab is not plant (to use “plant” like “meat”) since it is not coming from a plant—a slab grown from potato cells is not a potato plant and hence is not plant.

The counter to these replies is to focus on the question of what the discernible difference would be between the slabs and the plants and animals. Obviously enough, looking at them in the lab would be a dead giveaway, but that would be an unfair comparison. After all, a living cow does not look like a steak. A fair comparison would be to put a steak cut from a cow against a synthetic steak in a series of tests. Some would relate to food—taste testing. Some would be chemical and genetic—to see what the material is. Naturally, the tests would have to avoid being rigged—a test that was aimed only at telling if the meat was grown in an animal would be an example of a rigged test. If the synthetic meat passed these test (it tastes like meat, has the texture of meat, looks like meat, has the amino acids of meat and so on), then it would be hard to deny that it would be meat.

So far, I have only been discussing synthetic meat that can trace its origin back to non-controversial meat. But there is also the problem of completely synthetic meat—meat that is truly synthetic and has no causal chain that links it back to an actual animal. In the ideal, it would be chemically engineered protein that duplicates the qualities of meat. To use an extreme science fiction example, think of the replicator from Star Trek. This fictional machine could create a perfect steak by assembling it from raw materials, no cow involved. Unless someone insists that an animal must die (or at least be cut) for meat to be meat, it would be difficult to argue that replicator meat or properly engineered protein would not be meat. After all, unless one knew that it did not come from an animal, one would think it was meat.

This does point to the obvious counter—someone could draw a line and insist that meat must, by definition, come directly from an animal to be meat. Anything else could be meat-like, but would need to be distinguished from meat. This, of course, nicely mirrors what Locke said in the context of personal identity regarding the use of words, “And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases.” As such, the problem of meat could be solved by having multiple terms for various meat and meat-like things. Or we could follow the lead of Hume and conclude that “…all the nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.” In this case, “meat” is merely a matter of language, which is to say that the problem remains unsolved.

In the next essay I will consider another approach to the metaphysics of meat, namely the morality of meat.

 

My Amazon Author Page

My Paizo Page

My DriveThru RPG Page

My Dungeon Masters Guild Page

Follow Me on Twitter

Meatless Monday, USDA & NCBA

by 33 Comments

Nutrition Assistance for Puerto Rico is a fede...
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Near the end of July, 2012 the newsletter of the  United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) included support for Meatless Monday. This support was based on the well-established health concerns regarding meat consumption, the environmental impact of meat production, and its woeful inefficiency (for example, it takes 7 kilograms of grain to make 1 kilogram of beef).

While this might seem like a laudable (or at least harmless thing) the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) took issue with this recommendation. J.D. Alexander, the president of the NCBA, made the following response:  “This is truly an awakening statement by USDA, which strongly indicates that USDA does not understand the efforts being made in rural America to produce food and fiber for a growing global population in a very sustainable way. USDA was created to provide a platform to promote and sustain rural America in order to feed the world. This move by USDA should be condemned by anyone who believes agriculture is fundamental to sustaining life on this planet.” It was also claimed that the support of Meatless Monday was “a slap in the face of the people who every day are working to make sure we have food on the table to say ‘Don’t eat their product once a week.’ ”

There were also numerous tweets twittered in response to the newsletter. For example, Iowa Representative Steve King responded with “USDA HQ meatless Mondays!! At the Dept. of Agriculture? Heresy! I’m not grazing there. I will have the double rib-eye Mondays instead.”

After these reactions, a USDA spokesperson asserted that the USDA does not support Meatless Monday and that the link to the newsletter had been posted without “proper clearance.”

While this is a fairly minor political dust up, it does raise some interesting concerns. One point of concern is, obviously enough, the factual aspects of the dispute in regards to the claims made in the newsletter and the claims made by the NCBA.

One issue is whether or not meat is a means of producing “food and fiber for a growing global population in a very sustainable way.”

While meat is food and has some fiber, it is clearly not an effective way of providing food and fiber for a growing global population relative to the alternative. After all, it is a matter of fact that meat production is less efficient than growing crops. While the exact ratios vary, producing a kilogram of meat requires far more than one kilogram of feed. As such, a more effective way to feed a growing global population is to grow crops for human consumption rather than feed them to meat animals.

While the meat industry has made efforts to make meat production sustainable, it is clearly not as sustainable as the alternative. After all, meat production is far more resource intensive than growing crops for human consumption and it also does more environmental damage. This is not to say that non-meat agriculture does not have its own problems. However, given that producing a kilogram of meat requires creating multiple kilograms of feed, it is simply a matter of math that meat production is not as sustainable as the alternatives. While it could be sustained, the cost of doing so will be far higher than the alternatives. There is also the obvious concern about the waste products of the animals—waste products that often end up contaminating water and food. While non-meat agriculture does produce contaminates (mainly from pesticides and fertilizers), meat production produces far more because the animals require feed crops that produce contaminants and the animals also produce their own contaminants.

As such, the idea that meat production is a sustainable means for feeding a growing global population seems to be in error.  If the goal is to feed a growing global population in a sustainable manner, then meat production is not a very good means by which to achieve that goal.

Of course, there is also the economic concern. The meat industry employs people and also is a big money maker for the agribusinesses. Obviously enough, advocating that people go meatless on Mondays could result in slightly lower sales of meat, thus costing the meat industry some of its profits. As such, a utilitarian argument could be made against the USDA’s apparent initial support of Meatless Monday in particular and Meatless Monday in general. After all, if people eat less meat, then there will be less income for the meat industry which will in turn harm those who do the actual work. There is also the fact that the USDA has as one of its missions to keep American agriculture in business. As such, supporting Meatless Monday would seem to run afoul of the USDA’s mission and this could be regarded as an immoral action.

There is, of course, an obvious reply to this concern. While advocating Meatless Monday does involve urging people to consume less meat, it is not the same thing as advocating “Mealless Monday” in which people eat nothing. As such, if someone is not eating a steak or pork chop on a given Monday, they will be eating something else, thus supporting some other agricultural industry (perhaps the very same companies that also own the meat industry). As such, supporting Meatless Monday seems consistent with the USDA’s mission. After all, their mission is not limited to supporting only the meat industry, but American agriculture. As such, the NCBA does not have a legitimate basis for their complaint. In fact, Meatless Monday could be seen not as an attack on the meat industry, but as supporting every other agricultural industry—and just for one day. So, perhaps it would be wiser for the meat industry folks to not see Meatless Monday as a day without meat, but rather in context: one meatless day in a week with six days of meat.

Interestingly, to criticize the USDA for the Meatless Monday incident because of its mission to support American agriculture is to ignore the fact that the USDA is not a one mission organization. That is, it does not exist solely to ensure that the meat industry makes money. After all, it is also supposed to “to end hunger and improve health in the United States.” Since the USDA exists for this purpose, the people in the USDA would seem to be remiss in their duties if they failed to act in ways consistent with these ends. There is also the fact that ending hunger and improving health certainly appear to be laudable moral and practical goals, if only on purely utilitarian grounds. That is, there will be greater happiness if hunger is reduced and health is increased.

As far as reducing hunger goes, the fact that meat requires vastly more resources to produce than the alternatives shows that meat is hardly an effective way to reduce hunger. Given the resources available, it is simply not possible to produce enough meat to eliminate hunger. As such, the mission of ending hunger is better served by reducing meat production in favor of producing alternatives that are less resource intense.

While I love meat, I love truth more and hence I have to accept the evidence that meat is not very healthy. While it has long been known that excessive meat consumption is unhealthy, even small amounts of red meat present a health risk.  WebMD, which is hardly a hotbed of liberal veganism, presents a balanced look at the health concerns regarding red meat. While it is noted that red meat is very protein dense, it is also noted that the consumption of red meat is a causal factor in heart disease and studies also link it to other health problems, such as colorectal cancer. Naturally, those in the meat industry dispute these findings. While the fact that the meat industry is clearly biased does not prove that they are in error, this bias does reduce their credibility considerably. In contrast, the scientists conducting the studies do not seem to have a general financial stake in showing that red meat is linked to health problems and this (and the fact that they are scientists) increases their credibility. There is also the fact the majority of the studies do show a link. As Dr. Sinha of the National Cancer Institute correctly says, “If there are 20 studies that say one thing and two studies that say the other thing, you believe the 20 studies.” This is good critical thinking: when it comes to truth, one goes with the weight of the evidence, not with how one feels or how much money is at stake.

Because of my love of meat, I would like these studies to be wrong. I would, of course, prefer to believe that meat is healthy and that I could have meat as often as I like (which would be three times a day, seven days a week). However, what I would like is not the same thing as what is true. In my own case, I had to change my diet because of health concerns. Despite running 50+ miles a week and working out a great deal, my blood pressure and cholesterol became matters of concern some years ago. After changing my diet, my blood pressure dropped and my good cholesterol increased—which is consisting with general findings (after all, my individual story is just an anecdote, albeit a decent example of Mill’s method of difference). As such, advocating Meatless Monday is perfectly in accord with the USDA’s mission of improving health.

To head off the obvious straw man attacks, I am not advocating that people eliminate all meat from their diets (although that would be an excellent idea in terms of health and ethics). Rather, I am saying that I agree with the USDA’s apparent original endorsement of Meatless Monday. Reducing meat consumption would help improve health and would also help the non-meat producing aspects of American agriculture. It would also be better for the environment. It would, of course, not be ideal for folks in the meat industry—but they are not the only people who matter and, as noted above, Meatless Monday is not Meatless Everyday.

My Amazon author page.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Happy Thanksgiving!

by 6 Comments

The First Thanksgiving, painted by Jean Leon G...
Image via Wikipedia

As usual, I’m setting aside politics, philosophy and all that to focus on what really matters: turkey.

I’m attempting to cook the turkey on my own this year. I’ve done it successfully(once) before, so I should be able to pull it off. However, I did buy a smoked turkey and have it as a backup in case there is a repeat of the infamous Imploding Turkey of Infinite Death episode (don’t ask…this is still classified as “Ultimate Turkey Secret”).

In the spirit of the holiday, thanks to all the folks who visit this blog and even more thanks to those who comment. While we don’t always agree, I enjoy the discussion-even when I get called out on my claims.

Happy Thanksgiving!

Enhanced by Zemanta

Debating Meat IV: Kantian Kabobs

by Leave a Comment

{{w|Immanuel Kant}}, Prussian philosopher.
Image via Wikipedia

In part III of debating meat, I examined Descartes’ arguments as to why it is no crime to kill and eat animals. I now turn to a brief examination of Kant’s view of animals.

In his ethical theory Kant makes it quite clear that animals are means rather than ends. Rational beings, in contrast, are ends. For Kant, this distinction rests on the fact that rational beings can (as he sees it) chose to follow the moral law. Animals, lacking reason, cannot do this. Since animals are means and not ends, Kant claims that we have no direct duties to animals. They are classified in with the other “objects of our inclinations” that derive value from the value we give them.

Given this view, it would seem that Kant would not be very concerned with how animals are treated. After all, they would seem to be mere things. Oddly enough, Kant argues that we should treat animals well. However, he does so while also trying to avoid ascribing animals themselves any moral status. Here is how he does it (or tries to do so).

While Kant is not willing to accept that we have any direct duties to animals, he “smuggles” in duties to them indirectly. As he puts it, our duties towards animals are indirect duties towards humans. To make his case for this, he employs an argument from analogy: if a human doing X would obligate us to that human, then an animal doing X would also create an analogous moral obligation. For example, a human who has long and faithfully served another person should not simply be abandoned or put to death when he has grown old. Likewise, a dog who has served faithfully and well should not be cast aside in his old age.

While this would seem to create an obligation to the dog, Kant uses a little philosophical sleight of hand here. The dog cannot judge (that is, the dog is not rational) so, as Kant sees it, the dog cannot  be wronged. So, then, why would it be wrong to shoot the dog?

Kant’s answer seems to be rather consequentialist in character: he argues that if a person acts in inhumane ways towards animals (shooting the dog, for example) then his humanity will likely be damaged. Since, as Kant sees it, humans do have a duty to show humanity to other humans, shooting the dog would be wrong. This would not be because the dog was wronged but because humanity would be wronged by the shooter damaging his humanity through such a cruel act.

Interestingly enough, Kant discusses how people develop cruelty-they often begin with animals and then work up to harming human beings. As I point out to my students, Kant seems to have anticipated the psychological devolution of serial killers.

Kant goes beyond merely enjoining us to not be cruel to animals and encourages us to be kind to them. He even praises Leibniz for being rather gentle with a worm he found. Of course, he encourages this because those who are kind to animals will develop more humane feelings towards humans. So, roughly put, animals are essentially practice for us: how we treat them is training for how we will treat human beings.

While encouraging this good treatment, Kant does allow for some decidedly not-nice behavior. He uses the specific example of vivisectionists (those who studied living animals by dissecting them) and justifies their cruelty because animals are “man’s instruments.” In short, we should not be cruel to animals, unless doing so is to our advantage.

Kant does, however, place some limits on cruelty. While using animals for scientific purpose is justified, Kant claims that being cruel for sport cannot be morally justified. As such, Kant’s view would make certain forms of hunting unacceptable.

In the case of eating  meat, his theory would seem to allow it. After all, if cutting apart living animals for scientific purposes is acceptable, then killing a cow or pig for food would seem to be acceptable as well. However, given his remarks about cruelty for sport, Kant’s theory would probably cast certain ways of raising (and killing) meat animals as being unacceptable. After all, if cruelty for sport is out, presumably cruelty for culinary pleasures would also be out.  For example, veal would probably be out on the grounds that it is needlessly cruel.

Interestingly, Kant’s argument can be pushed to support vegetarianism. After all, if being cruel to animals makes us more likely to be cruel to humans, then treating animals as mere meat would seem to harden our hearts against living things. As such, it would seem that to better develop our human feelings we should forgo meat.

Of course, it can be argued that people can eat animals without suffering such a hardening of the heart (just hardening of the arteries). If so, then Kant’s view would allow the eating of meat.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

Debating Meat III: Cartesian Cutlets

by Leave a Comment

Cover of "Descartes (Collector's Library ...
Cover via Amazon

In my previous post on this subject, I discussed the theology of eating meat. My main focus was on the Christian view of the matter as exemplified by the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine. I now turn to look at the metaphysical view put forth by Rene Descartes and how this relates to the ethics of eating animals.

In his 1648 letter to Henry Moore Descartes addresses the question of whether or not animals have minds. He begins by presenting the main reason that we think that animals think: an argument by analogy. The gist of this argument is that animals resemble us in terms of their behavior and physiology. Hence, we infer that animals also think  because we do so.

Descartes first main argument is based on a common method in philosophy and science, that of Occam’s Razor.  The rough idea is that if something can be explained without assuming the existence of an entity (such as a metaphysical mind), then there is no reason to accept that such a thing exists.

In the case of animals, Descartes argues that all their movements and actions can be explained in purely mechanical terms. Hence, there is no need to accept the existence of animal minds in order to account for their doing what they do. In modern terms, Descartes takes animals to be biological robots-they do what they do on the basis of their mechanical parts rather than on the basis of a metaphysical mind.

While Descartes finds this argument convincing, he thinks that his strongest argument is the language argument. He contends that animals do not use true language (he does concede that they do make sounds that express the states of their bodies, such as pain or hunger) while humans do. He takes this distinction to be the key difference between people (who have minds and bodies) and animals (who are mere bodies).

He concludes his letter, interesting enough, by noting that he is speaking to  “those not committed to the extravagant position of Pythagoras, who held people under suspicion of a crime who ate or killed animals.”

In many ways this argument is similar to those put forth by Augustine and Aquinas. The basic idea is that animals are metaphysically different from us (inferior, of course) and this morally allows us to eat and kill them. While Descartes does not explicitly develop the moral argument, it seems quite reasonable to take this as his view of the matter.

This argument does have  a certain appeal. After all, the moral status of a being does seem to depend on its qualities and the mental qualities (or lack thereof) do seem to be especially relevant. For example, if I get angry and break my laptop, I might be wasting a perfectly good computer but I am committing no wrong against the laptop. After all, a laptop  is simply not the sort of thing that can be wronged. It lacks the qualities that enable it to be a morally relevant agent.

If animals lack minds, then they would be on par with laptops. While they would be complex machines, they would still be mere machines and hence lacking in moral status.

Of course, there are various ways to disagree with Descartes’ argument. One is to argue that animals do, in fact, have minds and that although they are not as complex as the typical human mind, this still entitles them to a moral status. Some folks have even tried to prove that certain animals do use true language. This status might (or might not) be suitable to make the killing or consumption of animals an immoral act.

Another way is to argue that animals have a moral status that does not depend on their having minds. Since Descartes concedes that animals feel pain (but not in the mental sense, since they lack minds) this could be used as a counter against his view (perhaps by making a utilitarian style argument).

One final point I will consider is that some philosophers and scientists (actually many) think that humans lack metaphysical minds. Interestingly enough, one view is that humans are as Descartes saw animals: complex biological automatons (that is, meatbots). So, if Descartes’ argument holds for animals then it would also hold for us as well. Of course, it can also be argued that while humans do not have Cartesian minds, humans do have minds and these minds are superior to animal minds in a way that justifies killing or eating animals.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]
%d bloggers like this: